新興市場

Highlights We expect both the Australian dollar and Chinese RMB to move higher in the coming months. A key catalyst is broad-based weakness in the US dollar. The composition of goods benefiting from the US-China Phase I deal are a small portion of Australia’s export basket, limiting substitution. Remain long AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD. Place a limit buy on AUD/USD at 0.68. Feature The three key obstacles that have been hijacking currency markets are finally being addressed. First, the lack of dollar liquidity that was creating a funding crisis in repo markets has been curtailed via significant expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. The Libor-OIS spread - a measure of banking stress - is rapidly narrowing (Chart I-1). Second, the US-China trade deal has cemented a cap on economic policy uncertainty for now. At minimum, this should allow for an increase in cross-border flows, which tends to be positive for growth. As a counter-cyclical currency, the US dollar will continue to depreciate as global growth improves. The third obstacle giving way is political risk. The biggest uncertainty for the dollar was the surge in far-left populist candidates, especially Elizabeth Warren. The result would be a highly polarized election campaign, heightening uncertainty. The near-term reaction would be a surge in safe-haven demand, even though far-left policies could significantly knock down expected returns on US assets, which would be negative for the dollar. Chart I-1An Improvement In Dollar Liquidity Chart I-2The Dollar And Election Outcomes Chart I-2 shows that the ebb and flow in the dollar in recent months has eerily matched the probability of a Donald Trump–Elizabeth Warren contest. With a centrist like former Vice President Joe Biden now likely the next democratic nominee, the likelihood of a knee-jerk rally in the dollar has subsided. Unless these risks flare up again, this suggests that for the next few months, US dollar long positions face asymmetric downside risk. This creates a growing number of trading opportunities on the short side. Australian Growth And The Fires One of the FX market’s current favorite short positions is the Australian dollar (Chart I-3). Granted, most incoming data over the past year have been negative for the Aussie dollar, and typical global reflation indicators are just beginning to show tentative signs of a bottom. Among our favorite indicators on whether or not easing liquidity conditions are fuelling higher global growth are the copper-to-gold and oil-to-gold ratios. The signal is usually strongest when they are moving in tandem with US bond yields, another global growth barometer. The message so far has been one of stabilization rather than a renewed reflation cycle (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Lots Of AUD Shorts Chart I-4Reflation Barometers The devastating fires that are sweeping through Australia are the worst in decades. As we go to press, the death toll has risen to at least 25, and the cumulative damage is expected to exceed A$4.4 billion.1 Given that we are still in the middle of the summer months, both are likely to keep ramping up. Tourist arrivals are already down significantly, and both business and consumer confidence are approaching fresh lows. This augurs a swift and powerful policy response. Tourist arrivals are already down significantly, and both business and consumer confidence are approaching fresh lows. This augurs a swift and powerful policy response. So far, at A$2 billion, the fiscal pledge will do little to alter Australia’s economic fortunes (Chart I-5). But given the scale of this season’s fires, the effects are rapidly spilling over into urban populated areas and tourist hot spots compared to the past. This suggests more fiscal stimulus will be forthcoming.  Chart I-5The Fiscal Impulse Is Minuscule Naturally, the odds of the Reserve Bank of Australia cutting rates at its next policy meeting are rapidly rising. The RBA views the risks from climate change through the lens of financial stability.2 With insurance companies slated to rack up significant losses, along with the immediate impact of slower economic growth, lower rates will likely be the policy of choice. The probability of a rate cut next month is currently being priced at 55%. That said, we would still be buyers of the AUD today despite an impending rate cut. Bottom Line: The latest fires have hit the Australian economy at a time when growth is weak. We expect the RBA to cut rates. How To Trade The Aussie For most small, open economies, external conditions tend to be more important for asset prices than what is happening domestically. In the case of the Australian dollar, the commodity cycle has been the most important driver (Chart I-6). Similarly, the most important catalyst for multiple expansion in Australian equities is Chinese credit demand. This makes sense, since over 35% of Australian exports go to China (Chart I-7), generating tremendous income for domestically-listed concerns. Chart I-6AUD Tracks Commodities Chart I-7Australian Equities And Chinese Credit Australian exports have remained resilient in recent weeks, and are unlikely to be affected much by the Phase I trade deal. This is because the composition of goods that have been spared additional tariffs or seen much-reduced export duties are mostly consumer goods that make up a small portion of Australia’s export basket. This means that the path of least resistance for Aussie assets will continue to be dictated by Chinese reflationary efforts. On that front, we have seen a number of green shoots, notably the rise in the manufacturing PMI, retail sales, imports and exports. Last night’s credit numbers were also robust. Meanwhile, interest rates in China continue to be lowered. For most small, open economies, external conditions tend to be more important for asset prices.In the case of the Australian dollar, the commodity cycle has been the most important driver. Our favorite indicator for Chinese domestic demand is the lag between the drop in bond yields (more and more credit is being intermediated through the bond market) and the pick-up in import demand. This suggests a very healthy recovery in Chinese consumption (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Chinese Imports And Bond Yields How to trade the Aussie will depend on time horizons. In the near-term, improving global growth will likely be accompanied by a weakening dollar. This means the most potent trade in the short term will be long AUD/USD. Given our bias that we will get a dovish surprise from the RBA next month, we are instituting a limit-buy on AUD/USD at 68 cents today. Over the longer term, we believe the Australian dollar will outperform its commodity-currency counterparts. In our portfolio, we are already both long AUD/CAD and AUD/NZD. This bullish view is predicated on three key developments: Commodity Prices: One bright spot for the Aussie dollar has been rising terms of trade. However, the media often focuses on rising steel and iron ore prices as a catalyst for rising terms of trade in Australia. While true, often overlooked is the rising share of liquefied natural gas in the export mix (Chart I-9). Beijing has a clear environmental push to shift its economy away from coal electricity generation and towards natural gas. Given that reducing if not outright eliminating pollution is a long-term strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind. As the market becomes more liberalized and long-term contracts are revised to reflect higher spot prices, the Aussie dollar will get a boost (Chart I-10). In a nutshell, this is a bet that terms of trade in Australia will continue to outpace those in Canada and New Zealand over the medium-term. Chart I-9LNG Will Be A Game-Changer For Australia Chart I-10A Terms-Of-Trade Tailwind Construction Activity: All things equal, natural disasters tend to be ultimately positive for GDP, since the destruction in the capital stock does not go into the GDP equation, but reconstruction efforts do. This is especially the case when the economy is running well below capacity. The downturn in Australian housing on the back of macro-prudential measures has been negative for consumption via the wealth effect and the outlook for residential construction activity. At a minimum, this downturn should stabilize as reconstruction efforts pick up (Chart I-11). Meanwhile, policy has become supportive for Aussie homebuyers at the margin. The government now guarantees first-time homebuyers in Australia below a certain income threshold access to the housing market, with just a 5% down payment instead of the standard 20%. Should labor market conditions improve, it will also help household income levels. Already, the Liberal-National coalition has left in place “negative gearing”3 and kept the capital gains tax exemption from selling properties at 50% (the pledge from the center-left Labour party was to reduce it to 25%). Aussie home prices are further along their downward adjustment path than, say, Canada or New Zealand.  Most importantly, Aussie home prices are further along their downward adjustment path than, say, Canada or New Zealand. The mirror image has been that Aussie banks have massively underperformed those in Canada (Chart I-12). Over the medium term, we could see a reversal of these fortunes. Chart I-11Capex Should Rise In Australia Chart I-12Aussie Banks Versus Canadian Banks Valuation And Sentiment: We will show in an upcoming report that while currency valuation is a poor timing tool, it is excellent for calibrating longer-term returns. One of our favorite metrics for gauging the Australian dollar’s fair value is its real effective exchange rate relative to its terms of trade. On this basis, the Aussie dollar is cheap by about 18% (Chart I-13). In terms of currency performance, a lot of the bad news already appears priced in the Australian dollar, which is down 15% from its 2018 peak, and 37% from its 2011 peak. Meanwhile, Australian dollar short positions appeared to have already hit a nadir. This suggests outright short AUD bets are at risk from either upside surprises in global growth or simply the forces of mean reversion (Chart I-14). Chart I-13AUD Is Cheap Chart I-14Still Lots Of AUD Shorts Bottom Line: Place a limit buy on AUD/USD at 0.68. Remain long AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD. Notes On The RMB The currency details from the Phase I trade deal were vague, suggesting monitoring export balances and FX reserves, data that is already available publicly. Our guess is that there was some kind of handshake accord agreed upon to ensure that the RMB does not depreciate significantly in the coming months. More importantly, the RMB will also be a beneficiary from increased cross-border trade, given that it has been trading like a pro-cyclical currency. The USD/CNY has been moving tick-for-tick with emerging market equities, Asian currencies, and even some commodity prices (Chart I-15). It has also closely mirrored the broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-16).  Chart I-15CNY And EM Assets Chart I-16CNY And The Dollar This has implications for developed market currencies, since the RMB is often a signaling mechanism on the efficacy of China’s reflationary efforts. Fundamentally, the RMB has more upside. In a world of rapidly falling yields, Chinese rates remain attractive. Historically, the USD/CNY has moved in line with interest rate differentials between the US and China. The current divergence pins the USD/CNY near 6.7 (Chart I-17). Chart I-17USD/CNY Could Touch 6.7 Bottom Line: Remain positive on the RMB.  Housekeeping The Canadian dollar is one of the strongest currencies this year. The most recent catalyst was good news from the Bank of Canada’s business outlook survey, a key input into policy decisions. Canadian firms are now expecting an acceleration in both domestic and international sales throughout 2020, particularly outside the energy sector (Chart I-18, top panel). Chart I-18BoC Business Outlook Survey Hiring intentions among surveyed firms edged up in Q4. Meanwhile, many firms reported facing capacity pressures, particularly related to a shortage of labor (Chart I-18, middle panel). This will allow the BoC to overlook weak labor market data in October and November. That said, it is not all clear blue skies for the CAD. The balance of opinion for capex intentions among surveyed Canadian firms plunged in Q4 (Chart I-18, bottom panel). We will be monitoring these developments but remain short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD for the time being.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Keith Bradsher and Isabella Kwai, “Australia’s Fires Test Its Winning Growth Formula,” The New York Times, January 13, 2020. 2 Please see “Financial Stability Risks From Climate Change,” Financial Stability Review, Reserve Bank Of Australia, October 2019. 3 The practice of using investment properties that are generating losses to offset one’s income tax bill. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: On the labor market front, nonfarm payrolls increased by 145K in December, the smallest increase since May. Average hourly earnings growth slowed to 2.9%, while the unemployment rate was unchanged at 3.5%. Lastly, initial jobless claims fell to 204K for the week ended January 10th. The NFIB business optimism index declined to 102.7 from 104.7 in December. Headline inflation increased to 2.3% year-on-year in December, while core inflation was unchanged at 2.3%. Both the NY Empire State and Philly Fed manufacturing indices rose to 4.8 and 17, respectively in January. The DXY index fell by 0.3% this week. While both headline and core inflation remain close to target, the bearish job report last Friday is likely to reduce the scope for the Fed to raise rates in the near term. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mixed: The seasonally-adjusted trade balance fell by €4.8 billion to €19.2 billion in November. Industrial production fell by 1.5% year-on-year in November. German GDP grew by 0.6% year-on-year in 2019, down from 1.5% the previous year. Car registrations rose by a remarkable 21.7% in December. The euro rose by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. "Incoming data since the last monetary policy meeting pointed to continued weak but stabilizing euro area growth dynamics," according to the ECB Meeting Accounts this Thursday. Moreover, both private and government consumption accelerated in 2019, while capex and exports slowed down. A pickup in global growth will be bullish the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Both the coincident and leading indices fell to 95.1 and 90.9, respectively in November. That said, they were above expectations. The current account balance fell to ¥1,437 billion from ¥1,817 billion in November. The trade balance shifted from a surplus of ¥254 billion to a small deficit of ¥2.5 billion. The Eco Watchers' Survey recorded an improvement of current conditions to 39.8 in December, while the outlook index marginally dropped to 45.7. Preliminary machine tool orders continued to plunge by 33.6% year-on-year in December. However, machinery orders increased by 5.3% year-on-year in November. The Japanese yen depreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. The recent Eco Watchers' Survey was cautiously positive on the Japanese outlook. We continue to recommend the Japanese yen as a safe-haven hedge. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been weak: Core CPI fell to 1.4% while core PPI declined to 0.9%. The total trade balance (including EU) rose from a deficit of £1.3 billion to a surplus of £4 billion in November. Industrial production fell by 1.6% year-on-year in November; manufacturing production also fell by 2% year-on-year in November. The notable improvement was in car registrations that rose 3.4% year-on-year in December. The British pound fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The recent drop in inflation has undoubtedly put more pressure on the BoE to reduce rates in the coming policy meeting late January. The market is now pricing in a 66% probability for a rate cut, up from 40% a week ago, while a 25 bps cut is fully priced in by May.  Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly negative: The AiG services PMI fell to 48.7 from 53.7 in December. Retail sales increased by 0.9% month-on-month in November. Melbourne Institute headline inflation fell to 1.4% from 1.5% year-on-year in December. Home loans increased by 1.8% month-on-month in November, higher than expectations of a 1.4% increase. The Australian dollar is flat this week. The ongoing wildfires continue to impact the Australian economy, particularly the tourism industry. Please refer to our front section for a more in-depth analysis on Australia. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been soft: Building permits fell by 8.5% month-on-month in November. REINZ house prices grew by 1.2% month-on-month in December. The New Zealand dollar has been flat versus the US dollar this week. The recent quarterly survey from the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) showed that a net 21% of firms surveyed expected business conditions to deteriorate, an improvement from 40% in the previous survey. Improving data has led speculators to close NZD shorts. Stay long AUD/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been positive: The unemployment rate fell further to 5.6% from 5.9% in December. Average hourly wage growth slowed to 3.8% from 4.4% year-on-year in December. 35.2K new jobs were created compared to a loss of 71.2K jobs the previous month. The Canadian dollar increased by 0.1% against the US dollar this week. The recent BoC Business Outlook Survey indicator edged up in Q4, lowering the probability that the BoC will cut interest rates next week. That said, the forecast for weak investment spending is worrisome. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: The unemployment rate was unchanged at 2.3% in December. The Swiss franc has appreciated by 1% against the US dollar, making it the best performing G10 currency this week. It is an open question whether the US Treasury’s move to put the Swiss franc on the currency manipulation watch list was a catalyst.  What is clear is that interventions in recent weeks have been weak. Meanwhile, the last inflation reading from Switzerland was positive, reducing the urge for the SNB to intervene. EUR/CHF is approaching our limit buy position at 1.06. Stay tuned. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: The producer price index fell by 2.2% year-on-year in November. Both headline and core inflation fell to 1.4% and 1.8% year-on-year, respectively in December. The trade surplus increased to NOK 25.6 billion from NOK 18.8 billion in December. The Norwegian krone has been flat against the US dollar this week. Both inventory reports from API and EIA have been bearish on oil prices, which put a cap on petrocurrencies this week. However, going forward, we continue to believe that the combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy will support commodity demand growth in 2020, which is bullish for the Norwegian krone. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: Industrial production increased by 0.4% year-on-year in November. Manufacturing new orders fell by 1.2% year-on-year in November. Headline inflation was unchanged at 1.8% year-on-year in December. The Swedish krona rose by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The Swedish government cut the forecast of GDP growth to 1.1% this year, down from the previous figure of 1.4% in September. Moreover, it forecasted negative rates going forward. That said, valuations and improving global growth will remain strong catalysts for long SEK positions. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Our top five geopolitical “Black Swans” are risks that the market is seriously underpricing. With the “phase one” trade deal signed, Chinese policy could become less accommodative, resulting in a negative economic surprise. The trade deal may fall victim to domestic politics, raising the risk of a US-China military skirmish. A Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention or a Democratic takeover of the White House could trigger social unrest and violence in the US. A pickup in the flow of migrants to Europe would fundamentally undermine political stability there. Russia’s weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest, risking an escalation beyond the point of containment. Feature Over the past four years, we have started off the year with our top five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s perennial list of market surprises, we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.” We offer risks that the market is seriously underpricing by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when we think the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Some of our risks below are so obscure that it is not clear how exactly to price them. We exclude issues that are fairly probable, such as flare-ups in Indo-Pakistani conflict. The two major risks of the year – discussed in our annual outlook – are that either US President Donald Trump or Chinese President Xi Jinping overreaches in a major way. But what would truly surprise the market would be a policy-induced relapse in Chinese growth or a direct military clash between the two great powers. That is how we begin. Other risks stem from domestic affairs in the US, Europe, and Russia. Black Swan 1: China’s Financial Crisis Begins The risk of Xi Jinping’s concentration of power in his own person is that individuals can easily make mistakes, especially if unchecked by advisors or institutions. Lower officials will fear correcting or admonishing an all-powerful leader. Inconvenient information may not be relayed up the hierarchy. Such behavior was rampant in Chairman Mao Zedong’s time, leading to famine among other ills. Insofar as President Xi’s cult of personality successfully imitates Mao’s, it will be subject to similar errors. If President Xi overreaches and makes a policy mistake this year, it could occur in economic policy or other policies. We begin with economic policy, as we have charted the risks of Xi’s crackdown on the financial system since early 2017 (Chart 1). Chart 1A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail Chart 2Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy This year is supposed to be the third and final year of Xi Jinping’s “three battles” against systemic risk, pollution, and poverty. The first battle actually focuses on financial risk, i.e. China’s money and credit bubble. The regime has compromised on this goal since mid-2018, allowing monetary easing to stabilize the economy amid the trade war. But with a “phase one” trade deal having been signed, there is an underrated risk that economic policy will return to its prior setting, i.e. become less accommodative (Chart 2). When Xi launched the “deleveraging campaign” in 2017, we posited that the authorities would be willing to tolerate an annual GDP growth rate below 6%. This would not only cull excesses in the economy but also demonstrate that the administration means business when it says that China must prioritize quality rather than quantity of growth. While Chinese authorities are most likely targeting “around 6%” in 2020, it is entirely possible that the authorities will allow an undershoot in the 5.5%-5.9% range. They will argue that the GDP target for 2020 has already been met on a compound growth rate basis (Chart 3), as astute clients have pointed out. They may see less need for stimulus than the market expects. Chart 3Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Similarly, while urban disposable income is ostensibly lagging its target of doubling 2010 levels by 2020, China’s 13th Five Year Plan, which concludes in 2020, conspicuously avoided treating urban and rural income targets separately. Chart 4Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Chart 5Has China's Stimulus Peaked? If the authorities focus only on general disposable income, then they are on track to meet their target (Chart 4). This would reduce the impetus for greater economic support. There are already tentative signs that Chinese authorities are “satisfied” with the amount of stimulus they have injected: some indicators of money and credit have already peaked (Chart 5). The crackdown on shadow banking has eased, but informal lending is still contracting. The regime is still pushing reforms that shake up state-owned enterprises. The Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. An added headwind for the Chinese economy stems from the currency. The currency should track interest rate differentials. Beijing’s incremental monetary stimulus, in the form of cuts to bank reserve requirement ratios (RRRs), should also push the renminbi down over time (Chart 6). However, an essential aspect of any trade deal with the Trump administration is the need to demonstrate that China is not competitively devaluing. Hence the CNY-USD could overshoot in the first half of the year. This is positive for global exports to China, but it tightens Chinese financial conditions at home. A stronger than otherwise justified renminbi would add to any negative economic surprises from less accommodative monetary and fiscal policy. Conventional wisdom says China will stimulate the economy ahead of two major political events: the centenary of the Communist Party in 2021 and the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. The former is a highly symbolic anniversary, as Xi has reasserted the supremacy of the party in all things, while the latter is more significant for policy, as it is a leadership reshuffle that will usher in the sixth generation of China’s political elite. But conventional wisdom may be wrong – the Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. It would make sense to save dry powder for the next US or global recession. The obvious implication is that China’s economic rebound may lose steam as early as H2 – but the black swan risk is that negative surprises could cause a vicious spiral inside of China. This is a country with massive financial and economic imbalances, a declining potential growth profile, and persistent political obstacles to growth both at home and abroad. Corporate defaults have spiked sharply. While the default rate is lower than elsewhere, the market may be sniffing out a bigger problem as it charges a much higher premium for onshore Chinese bonds (Chart 7). Chart 6CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions Chart 7Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Bottom Line: Our view is that China’s authorities will remain accommodative in 2020 in order to ensure that growth bottoms and the labor market continues to improve. But Beijing has compromised its domestic economic discipline since 2018 in order to fight trade war. The risk now, with a “phase one” deal in hand, is that Xi Jinping returns to his three-year battle plan and underestimates the downward pressures on the economy. The result would be a huge negative surprise for the Chinese and global economy in 2020. Black Swan 2: The US And China Go To War In 2013, we predicted that US-China conflict was “more likely than you think.” This was not just an argument for trade conflict or general enmity that raises the temperature in the Asia-Pacific region – we included military conflict. Chart 8Americans' Attitudes Toward China Plunged … At the time, the notion that a Sino-American armed conflict was the world’s greatest geopolitical threat seemed ludicrous to many of our clients. We published this analysis in October of that year, months after the Islamic State “Soldier’s Harvest” offensive into Iraq. Trying to direct investors to the budding rivalry between American and Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea amidst the Islamic State hysteria was challenging, to say the least. The suggestion that an accidental skirmish between the US and China could descend into a full-blown conflict involved a stretch of the imagination because China was not yet perceived by the American public as a major threat. In 2014, only 19%of the US public saw China as the “greatest threat to the US in the future.” This came between Russia, at 23%, and Iran, at 16%. Today, China and Russia share the top spot with 24%. Furthermore, the share of Americans with an unfavorable view of China has increased from 52% to 60% in the six intervening years (Chart 8). The level of enmity expressed by the US public toward China is still lower than that toward the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s (Chart 9). However, the trajectory of distrust is clearly mounting. We expect this trend to continue: anti-China sentiment is one of the few sources of bipartisan agreement remaining in Washington, DC (Chart 10). Chinese sentiment toward the United States has also darkened dramatically. The geopolitical rivalry is deepening for structural reasons: as China advances in size and sophistication, it seeks to alter the regional status quo in its favor, while the US grows fearful and seeks to contain China. Chart 9… But Not Yet To War-Inducing Levels Chart 10Distrust Of China Is Bipartisan Chart 11Newfound American Concern For China’s Repression One example of rising enmity is the US public’s newfound concern for China’s domestic policies and human rights, specifically Beijing’s treatment of its Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. A Google Trends analysis of the term “Uyghur” or “Uyghur camps” shows a dramatic rise in mentions since Q2 of 2018, around the same time the trade war ramped up in a major way (Chart 11). While startling revelations of re-education camps in Xinjiang emerged in recent years, the reality is that Beijing has used heavy-handed tactics against both militant groups and the wider Uyghur minority since at least 2008 – and much earlier than that. As such, the surge of interest by the general American public and legislators – culminating in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019 – is a product of the renewed strategic tension between the two countries. The “phase one” trade deal risks falling victim to domestic politics due to greater public engagement in foreign policy. The same can be said for Hong Kong: the US did not pass a Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2014, during the first round of mass protests, which prompted Beijing to take heavy-handed legal, legislative, and censorship actions. It passed the bill in 2019, after the climate in Washington had changed. Why does this matter for investors? There are two general risks that come with a greater public engagement in foreign policy. First, the “phase one” trade deal between China and the US could fall victim to domestic politics. This deal envisions a large step up in Sino-American economic cooperation. But if China is to import around $200 billion of additional US goods and services over the next two years – an almost inconceivable figure – the US and China will have to tamp down on public vitriol. This is notably the case if the Democratic Party takes over the White House, given its likely greater focus on liberal concerns such as human rights. And yet the latest bills became law under President Trump and a Republican Senate, and we fully expect a second Trump term to involve a re-escalation of trade tensions to ensure compliance with phase one and to try to gain greater structural concessions in phase two. Second, mounting nationalist sentiment will make it more difficult for US and Chinese policymakers to reduce tensions following a potential future military skirmish, accidental or otherwise. While our scenario of a military conflict in 2013 was cogent, the public backlash in the United States was probably manageable.1 Today we can no longer guarantee that this is the case. China has greater control over the domestic narrative and public discourse, but the rise of the middle class and the government’s efforts to rebuild support for the single-party regime have combined to create an increase in nationalism. Thus it is also more difficult for Chinese policymakers to contain the popular backlash if conflict erupts. In short, the probability of a quick tamping down of public enmity is actively being reduced as American public vilification of China is closing the gap with China’s burgeoning nationalism at an alarming pace. Chart 12Tsai Ing-Wen Enjoys A Greater Mandate On Higher Turnout … Another of our black swan risks – Taiwan island – is inextricably bound up in this dangerous US-China dynamic. To be clear, Washington will tread carefully, as a conflict over Taiwan could become a major war. Nevertheless Taiwan’s election, as we expected, has injected new vitality into this already underrated geopolitical risk. It is not only that a high-turnout election (Chart 12) gave President Tsai Ing-wen a greater mandate (Chart 13), or that her Democratic Progressive Party retained its legislative majority (Chart 14). It is not only that the trigger for this resounding victory was the revolt in Hong Kong and the Taiwanese people’s rejection of the “one country, two systems” formula for Taiwan. It is also that Tsai followed up with a repudiation of the mainland by declaring, “We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.” Chart 13… Popular Support … Chart 14… And A Legislative Majority This statement is not a minor rhetorical flourish but will be received as a major provocation in Beijing: the crystallization of a long-brewing clash between Beijing and Taipei. Additional punitive economic measures against Taiwan are now guaranteed. Saber-rattling could easily ignite in the coming year and beyond. Taiwan is the epicenter of the US-China strategic conflict. First, Beijing cannot compromise on its security or its political legitimacy and considers the “one China principle” to be inviolable. Second, the US maintains defense relations with Taiwan (and is in the process of delivering on a relatively large new package of arms). Third, the US’s true willingness to fight a war on Taiwan’s behalf is in doubt, which means that deterrence has eroded and there is greater room for miscalculation. Bottom Line: A US-China military skirmish has been our biggest black swan risk since we began writing the BCA Geopolitical Strategy. The difference between then and now, however, is that the American public is actually paying attention. Political ideology – the question of democracy and human rights – is clearly merging with trade, security, and other differences to provoke Americans of all stripes. This makes any skirmish more than just a temporary risk-off event, as it could lead to a string of incidents or even protracted military conflict. Black Swan 3: Social Unrest Erupts In America There are numerous lessons that one can learn from the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, but perhaps the most cogent one is that Millennials and Generation Z are not as docile and feckless as their elders think. Images of university students and even teenagers throwing flying kicks and Molotov cocktails while clad in black body armor have shocked the world. Perhaps all those violent video games did have a lasting impact on the youth! What is surprising is that so few commentators have made the cognitive leap from the ultra-first world streets of Hong Kong to other developed economies. Perhaps what is clouding analysts’ minds is the idiosyncratic nature of the dispute in Hong Kong, the “one China” angle. However, Hong Kong youth are confronted with similar socio-economic challenges that their peers in other advanced economies face: overpriced real estate and a bifurcated service-sector labor market with few mid-tier jobs that pay a decent wage. In the US, Millennials and Gen Z are also facing challenges unique to the US. First, their debt burden is much more toxic than that of the older cohorts, given that it is made up of student loans and credit card debt (Chart 15). Second, they find themselves at odds – demographically and ideologically – with the older cohorts (Chart 16). Chart 15Younger American Cohorts Plagued By Toxic Debt Chart 16Younger And Older Cohorts At Odds Demographically The adage that the youth are apolitical and do not turn out to vote may have ended thanks to President Trump. The 2018 midterm election, which the Democratic Party successfully turned into a referendum on the president, saw the youth (18-29) turnout nearly double from 20% to 36% (the 30-44 year-old cohort also saw a jump in turnout from 35.6% to 48.8%). The election saw one of the highest turnouts in recent memory, with a 53.4% figure, just two points off the 2016 general election figure (Chart 17). Chart 17Massive Turnout To The 2016 Referendum On Trump Despite the high turnout in 2018, the-most-definitely-not-Millennial Vice President Joe Biden continues to lead the Democratic Party in the polls. Chart 18Biden Unpopular Among Young American Voters Chart 19Bookies Pulled Down "Uncle Joe's" Odds, Capturing Democratic Party Zeitgeist His probability of winning the nomination is not overwhelming, but it is the highest of any contender. In recent polls, Biden comes third place in Millennial/Gen-Z vote preferences (Chart 18). Yet he is hardly out of contention, especially for the 30-44 year-old cohort. The view that “Uncle Joe” does not fit the Democratic Party zeitgeist has become so entrenched in the Democratic Party narrative that it became conventional wisdom last year, pulling oddsmakers and betting markets away from the clear frontrunner (Chart 19). As such, a Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16 may come as an affront to the left-wing activists who will surely descend on the convention. This will particularly be the case if Biden wins despite the progressive candidates amassing a majority of overall delegates, which is possible judging by the combined progressive vote share in current polling (Chart 20). He would arrive in Milwaukee without clearing the 1990 delegate count required to win on the first ballot. On the second ballot, his presidency would then receive a boost from “superdelegates” and those progressives who are unwilling to “rock the boat,” i.e. unify against an establishment candidate with the largest share of votes. This is also how Mayor Michael Bloomberg could pull off a surprise win. Chart 20Progressives Come Closest To Victory Such a “brokered” – or contested – convention has not occurred since 1952. However, several Democratic Party conventions came close, including 1968, 1972, and 1984. The 1968 one in Chicago was notable for considerable violence and unrest. Even if the Milwaukee Democratic Party convention does not produce unrest, it could sow the seeds for unrest later in the year. First, a breakout Biden performance in the primaries is unlikely. As such, he will likely need to pledge a shift to the left at the convention, including by accepting a progressive vice-presidential candidate. Second, an actual progressive may win the primary. Chart 21Zealots In Both Parties Perceive Each Other As A National Threat It is likely that either of the two options would be seen as an existential threat to many of Trump’s loyal supporters across the United States. President Trump’s rhetoric often paints the scenario of a Democratic takeover of the White House in apocalyptic terms. And data suggests that the zealots in both parties perceive each other as a “threat to the nation’s wellbeing” (Chart 21). The American Civil War in the nineteenth century began with the election of a president. This is not just because Abraham Lincoln was a particularly reviled figure in the South, but because the states that ultimately formed the Confederacy saw in his election the demographic writing-on-the-wall. The election was an expression of a general will that, from that point onwards, was irreversible. Given demographic trends in the US today, it is possible that many would see in Trump’s loss a similar fait accompli. If one perceives progressive Democrats as an existential threat to the US constitution, rebellion is the obvious and rational response. There is a risk of rebellion from Trump’s most ardent supporters if he loses the White House. Bottom Line: Year 2020 may be a particularly violent one for the US. First, left wing activists may be shocked and angered to learn that Joe Biden (or Bloomberg) is the nominee of the Democratic Party come July. With so much hype behind the progressive candidates throughout the campaign, Biden’s nomination could be seen as an affront to what was supposed to be “the big year” for left-wing candidates. Second, investors have to start thinking about what happens if Biden – or a progressive candidate – goes on to defeat President Trump in the general election. While liberal America took Trump’s election badly, it has demographics – and thus time – on its side. Trump’s most ardent supporters may conclude that his defeat means the end of America as they know it. Black Swan 4: Europe’s Migration Crisis Restarts Chart 22Decline In Illegal Immigration Dampened European Populism It is a testament to Europe’s resilience that we do not have a Black Swan scenario based on an election or a political crisis set on the continent in 2020. Support for the common currency and the EU as a whole has rebounded to its highest since 2013. Even early elections in Germany and Italy are unlikely to produce geopolitical risk. The populists in the former are in no danger of outperforming whereas the populists in the latter barely deserve the designation. But what if one of the reasons for the surge in populism – unchecked illegal immigration – were to return in 2020? The data suggests that the risk of migrant flows has massively subsided. From its peak of over a million arrivals in 2015, the data shows that only 125,472 migrants crossed into Europe via land and sea routes in the Mediterranean last year (Chart 22). Why? There are five reasons that we believe have checked the flow of migrants: Supply: The civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have largely subsided. Heterogenous regions, cities, and neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed and internal boundaries have largely ossified. It is unlikely that any future conflict will produce massive outflows of refugees as the displacement has already taken place. These countries are now largely divided into armed, ethnically homogenous, camps. Enforcement: The EU has stepped up border enforcement since 2015, pouring resources into the land border with Turkey and naval patrols across the Mediterranean. Individual member states – particularly Italy and Hungary – have also stepped up border enforcement policy. While most EU member states have publicly chided both for “draconian” policies, there is no impetus to force Rome and Budapest to change policy. Libyan Imbroglio: Conflict in Libya has flared up in 2019 with military warlord Khalifa Haftar looking to wrest control from the UN-backed Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Serraj. The Islamic State has regrouped in the country as well. Ironically, the conflict is helping stem the flow of migrants as African migrants from sub-Saharan countries dare not cross into Libya as they did in 2015 when there was a brief lull in fighting. Turkish benevolence: Ankara is quick to point out that it is the only thing standing between Europe and a massive deluge of migrants. Turkey is said to host somewhere between two and four million refugees from various conflicts in the Middle East. Fear of the crossing: If crossing the Mediterranean was easy, Europe would have experienced a massive influx of migrants throughout the twentieth century. Not only is it not easy, it is costly and quite deadly, with thousands lost each year. Furthermore, most migrants are not welcomed when they arrive to Europe, many are held in terrible conditions in holding camps in Italy and Greece. Over time, migrants who made it into Europe have reported these dangers and conditions, reducing the overall demand for illegal migration. We do not foresee these five factors changing, at least not all at once. However, there are several reasons to worry about the flow of migrants in 2020. US-Iran tensions have sparked outright military action, while unrest is flaring up across Iran’s sphere of influence. Going forward, Iran could destabilize Iraq or fuel Shia unrest against US-backed regimes. Second, Afghanistan has been the source of most migrants to Europe via sea and land Mediterranean routes – 19.2%. The conflict in the country continues and may flare up with President Trump’s decision to formally withdraw most US troops from the country in 2020. Third, a break in fighting in Libya may encourage sub-Saharan migrants to revisit routes to Europe. Migrants from Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo make up over 10% of migrants to Europe. Finally, Turkish relationship with the West could break up further in 2020, causing Ankara to ship migrants northward. We highly doubt that President Erdogan will risk such a break, given that 50% of Turkish exports go to Europe. A European embargo on Turkish exports – which would be a highly likely response to such an act – would crush the already decimated Turkish economy. Bottom Line: While we do not see a return to the 2015 level of migration in 2020, we flag this risk because it would fundamentally undermine political stability in Europe. Black Swan 5: Russia Faces A “Peasant Revolt” Our fifth and final black swan risk for the year stems from Russia. This risk may seem obvious, since the US election creates a dynamic that revives the inherent conflict in US-Russian relations. Russia could seek to accomplish foreign policy objectives – interfering in US elections, punishing regional adversaries. The Trump administration may be friendly toward Russia but Trump is unlikely to veto any sanctions passed by the House and Senate in an election year, should an occasion for new sanctions arise. Conversely Russia could anticipate greater US pressure if the Democrats win in November. Yet it is Russia’s domestic affairs that represent the real underrated risk. Putin’s fourth term as president has been characterized by increased focus on domestic political control and stability as opposed to foreign adventurism. The creation of a special National Guard in 2016, reporting directly to Putin and responsible for quelling domestic unrest, symbolizes the shift in focus. So too does Russia’s adherence to the OPEC 2.0 regime of production control to keep oil prices above their budget breakeven level. Meanwhile Putin’s courting of Europe for the Nordstream II pipeline, and his slight peacemaking efforts with Ukraine, has suggested a slightly more restrained international posture. Chart 23Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Strategically it makes little sense for Russia to court negative attention at a time when the US and Europe are at odds over trade and the Middle East, the US is preoccupied with China and Iran, and Russia itself faces mounting domestic problems. The domestic problems are long in coming. The central bank has maintained a stringent monetary policy for the better part of the decade. Despite cutting interest rates recently, monetary and credit conditions are still tight, hurting domestic demand. Moscow has also imposed fiscal austerity, namely by cutting back on state pensions and hiking the value added tax. Real wage growth is weak (Chart 23), retail sales are falling, and domestic demand looks to weaken further, as Andrija Vesic of BCA Emerging Markets Strategy observes in a recent Special Report. The effect of Russia’s policy austerity has been a drop in public approval of the administration (Chart 24). Protests erupted in 2019 but were largely drowned out by the larger and more globally significant protests in Hong Kong. These were met by police suppression that has not removed their underlying cause. Putin’s first major decision of the new year was to reshuffle the government, entailing Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s transfer to a new post and the appointment of a new cabinet. This move reveals the need to show some accountability to reduce popular pressure. While Moscow now has room to cut interest rates and ease fiscal policy, it is behind the curve and the weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest. Meanwhile Putin’s efforts to alter the Russian constitution so he can stay in power beyond current term limits, effectively becoming emperor for life, like Xi Jinping, should not be dismissed merely because they are expected. They reflect a need to take advantage of Putin’s popular standing to consolidate domestic political power at a time when the ruling United Russia party and the federal government face discontent. They also ensure that strategic conflict with the United States will take on an ideological dimension. Chart 24Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Chart 25Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russia's recent cabinet shakeup is positive from the point of view of economic reform. And the country's monetary and fiscal room provide a basis for remaining overweight equities within EM, as our Emerging Markets Strategy recommends. However, Russian equities have rallied hard and the political risk is understated. Bottom Line: It is never easy predicting Putin’s next international move. Our market-based indicators of Russian political risk have hit multi-year lows, but both the domestic and international context suggest that these lows will not be sustained (Chart 25). A new bout of risk can emanate from Putin, or from changes in Washington, or from the Russian people themselves. What would take the world by surprise would be domestic unrest on a larger scale than Russia can easily suppress through the police force. Housekeeping We are closing our long European Union / short Chinese equities strategic trade with a 1.61% loss since inception on May 10, 2019. Dhaval Joshi of BCA’s European Investment Strategy downgraded the Eurostoxx 50 to underweight versus the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225 this week. He makes the point that the Euro Area bond yield 6-month impulse hit 100 bps – a critical technical level – and will be a strong headwind to growth. We will look to reopen this trade at a later date when the euphoria over the “phase one” trade deal subsides, as we still favor European equities and DM bourses over EM. We will reinstitute our long Brent crude H2 2020 versus H2 2021 tactical position, which was stopped out on January 9, 2020. We remain bullish on oil fundamentals and expect Middle East instability to add a political risk premium. China's stimulus and the oil view also give reason for us to reinitiate our long Malaysian equities relative to EM as a tactical position. The Malaysian ringgit will benefit as oil prices move higher, helping Malaysian companies make payments on their large pile of dollar-denominated debt and improving household purchasing power. Higher oil prices also correlate with higher equity prices, while China's stimulus and the US trade ceasefire will push the US dollar lower and help trade revive in the region. Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Observe how little attention the public paid to US-China saber-rattling around China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that year.

Highlights The World Bank lowered its growth forecast for EM economies – the growth engine for commodity demand – to 4.1% from 4.6% for 2020, which still will outpace last year’s rate of 3.5%. Our high-conviction call remains intact: The combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy will support commodity demand growth this year in excess of last year’s paltry rate. The Bank highlights policy uncertainty as a key risk, cautioning renewed trade tensions could derail the already-fragile global economy. The other side of this coin is: Lower policy uncertainty – particularly in the US – would provide a significant boost to global growth. This is in line with our long-standing assessment of the global economy. We continue to expect a revival in industrial commodity demand, particularly for oil and base metals, where we remain long. We see risk to the upside, if demand expands sooner or stronger than what the Bank – and the market – are pricing in. Feature We see upside risks arising from demand recovering sooner and stronger than markets are currently pricing. The title of the World Bank’s January 2020 Global Economic Prospects – Slow Growth, Policy Challenges – summarizes our maintained view for commodity markets this year. However, the Bank stresses downside risks to markets arising from policy uncertainty, whereas we see upside risks arising from demand recovering sooner and stronger than markets are currently pricing. In its current report, the Bank revised its 2020 real GDP growth estimates for EM economies to 4.1% p.a. from 4.6% p.a. previously. This still represents a rebound in growth vs. last year’s paltry 3.5% p.a. growth estimate. Still, growth will not approach the 6.2% rate seen in the 2005 – 2009 period, or the 5.7% rate seen in 2010 – 2014. The Bank’s forecast is a key input to our global commodity demand assessment, particularly for EM economies. The Bank’s view in its current report is consistent with our view that economic growth globally will accelerate modestly this year, fueled by accommodative monetary policies globally for the better part of last year (Chart of the Week). We continue to expect a modest increase in fiscal stimulus in major economies this year, particularly in the US, China and Germany. Chart of the WeekGlobal Monetary Accommodation Will Lift Manufacturing Our proprietary indicators – Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index, Global Commodity Factor (GCF), and EM Import Volume Model (EMIV) – continue to signal industrial growth will be lifting as global policy stimulus kicks in (Chart 2).1 Chart 2BCA Research Prop Indicators Continue To Signal Higher Growth This pick-up will become apparent in manufacturing and EM trade data over the course of 1H20. This pick-up will become apparent in manufacturing and EM trade data over the course of 1H20 – most global trade is in manufactured goods, which is important for EM economies (Chart 3). This will translate to higher demand for industrial commodities – mainly base metals and oil (Chart 4). Industrial-commodity demand also will get a boost at the margin from the phase-one trade deal signed in Washington, DC, this week, which reduced tariffs the US and China imposed on each others’ imports. Chart 3Global PMIs Will Recover In 2020 Chart 4Stronger Manufacturing Lifts Demand For Industrial Commodities It is important to note that supply is tightening for these industrial commodities. OPEC 2.0’s production discipline, coupled with reduced growth in US shale-oil output due to capital constraints, and tighter copper and aluminum supplies – will continue to leave these markets open to short-term price spikes should demand recover sooner and stronger than expected.2 Policy Uncertainty Continues To Hinder Growth The World Bank’s growth estimate for EM economies remains low vs. its historical average. The World Bank’s growth estimate for EM economies remains low vs. its historical average (Chart 5, top panel). The effect of elevated Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) continues to plague EM economies. It has extracted a heavy toll on EM commodity exporters via a strong USD (Chart 5, top panel). This weaker GDP growth for EM generally over the 2015 – 2019 period reflects the market-share war launched by OPEC in late 2014, which saw global benchmark oil prices fall from more than $110/bbl in 1H14 to close to $25/bbl by January 2016, and the deleterious effects caused by safe-haven demand for the USD, which is partly driven by global policy uncertainty.3 Reduced policy uncertainty – particularly in the US – would go a long way to restoring EM economic growth, as the bottom panel of Chart 5 demonstrates: According to the World Bank’s calculations, a 10% reduction in US policy uncertainty would add 0.6% to EM investment growth. This would lift growth closer to its long-term average rate of 5.4% for 2000 – 2019 from the Bank’s currently projected rate of 4.3% for 2020 – 2022. Chart 5Lower Uncertainty Would Boost Growth Bottom Line: The World Bank’s and our forecasts both point to a modest pick-up in EM growth this year, which will lift industrial-commodity demand. While the Bank continues to flag risks to this recovery arising from renewed policy uncertainty – e.g., the resumption of the Sino-US tariff increases – we continue to see risks to the upside in our short term outlook, particularly if demand revives sooner and stronger than markets currently are pricing in.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com       Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight.  OPEC crude production is estimated at 29.55mm b/d in December 2019, down 100k b/d from November levels, according to Platts. Iraq appears to be converging to quota and is expected to fully comply this month, according to Saudi Arabia officials.4 This implies a 180k b/d reduction in supply vs. November, assisting Saudi Arabia in its long attempt at balancing the oil market. Downside risks to Iraqi supply are mounting as continued internal discontent and ongoing tensions with the US – the Iraqi Parliament demand the US withdraw its troops from Iran – draws attention to the vulnerability of the country’s oil output. Base Metals: Neutral LME copper inventories stand at 130k MT, the lowest level since March 2018. (Chart 6). Tuesday, China reported a 9% month-to-month increase in copper imports. The most active copper future on the LMEX was up 1.5% at market close. Chinese iron-ore imports rose 11.8% to 101.3mm MT in December, the highest level in more than two years. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices remain above $1,550/oz, reflecting residual geopolitical tensions in the wake of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of Iran’s elite Quds force. Our gold models suggest prices are ~ $120/oz above a model based on US real rates and the broad trade-weighted dollar. This highlights gold’s ability to hedge against geopolitical tensions (Chart 7). We are moving our stop to $1,500/oz from $1,450/oz at tonight’s close. Chart 6LME Copper Stocks Resume Drawing Chart 7Gold Proves Its Worth As A Portfolio Hedge Ags/Softs:  Underweight Expectations of a US-China trade deal are boosting demand for soybeans. China’s soybean imports jumped to a 19-month high of 9.54mm tons in December, a 67% year-on-year increase, as trade tensions recede. The USDA’s WASDE report on Friday showed yield increases more than offset a decline in area harvested for both corn and soybeans. For corn, the increase in production was not enough to keep up with the rise in use, mainly driven by higher feed, yet the average price for the 2019/20 season was unchanged at $9.00/bu. Higher feed usage levels drove U.S. wheat ending stocks below expectations. CBOT March Wheat futures were up 6.25 cents/bu on Tuesday.   Footnotes 1     Our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index uses trade data, FX rates, manufacturing data, and Chinese industrial activity statistics to gauge current global industrial activity. These statistics are highly correlated with trade-related activity, which, since most of this involve trade in manufactured goods, is important to global industrial activity. The Global Commodity Factor (GCF) uses principal component analysis to distill the primary driver of 28 different real commodity prices. The EM Import Volume Model (EMIV) model tracks EM import volumes which are reported with a two-month lag by the CPB in the Netherlands, which we update to current time using FX rates for trade-sensitive currencies, commodity prices and interest rates variables. We are also following shipping indexes, which are highly correlated with global trade volumes. 2     Please see On OPEC 2.0’s Agenda In Vienna: More Production Cuts, Longer Deal, published December 5, and Godot … Trade Deal … Wait For It … Base Metals Are Primed For A Rally, published November 28, 2019 for additional discussion. NB: We will be updating our global oil supply-demand balances and price forecasts next week. 3     This remains a major theme in our analysis, and one of the key risks we highlighted going into 2020. This policy uncertainty is transmitted to commodity markets globally via FX markets – as policy uncertainty rises, the broad trade-weighted USD for goods (TWIBG), our preferred benchmark, rises, as can be seen in the middle panel of Chart 5. We have shown that safe-haven demand strengthens the TWIBG index maintained by the Fed, which elevates the local-currency cost of commodities – most of which price and are invoiced in USD – which reduces demand at the margin; it also lowers the local-currency cost of production for commodities ex-US, which, at the margin, incentivizes supply. Please see 2020 Key Views: Policy Uncertainty Continues To Drive Commodity Markets, which we published December 19, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4     Please see Saudi energy minister: We want sustainable oil prices published January 13, 2020 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

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Highlights Money supply, not central banks’ assets, is the ultimate liquidity available to economic agents to purchase goods and services as well as invest in both real and financial assets. Changes in the velocity of money are as important as those in money supply. Yet, forecasting changes in the velocity of money is a near impossible task as it entails foreseeing the behavior of economic agents. A large and expanding stock of money in and of itself does not guarantee greater liquidity for asset markets. Gauging liquidity flows to asset markets boils down to predicting investors’ behavior. Liquidity flows into financial assets when “animal spirits” among investors improve, and vice versa. Feature Investors and market commentators often refer to “liquidity” as a driving force for financial markets. Yet definitions and calculations of liquidity vary tremendously. This report aims to define and differentiate among various categories of liquidity and assess their relevance for asset markets. What investors refer to as “liquidity” can by and large be classified into three groupings: (1) banking system liquidity; (2) broad money supply (all deposits and cash in circulation) available to purchase goods, services and assets, including securities; and (3) liquidity in asset markets - the portion of broad money supply that is channeled to purchase financial assets. Diagram I-1 on page 2 provides visual representation of money and liquidity groupings. All other measures of “liquidity” generally fall into one of these three groupings. Diagram I-1Liquidity Groupings And Linkages Banking System Liquidity At the core of any monetary system is the monetary base, which is also referred to as high-powered money. This consists of commercial banks’ reserves at the central bank, and cash in circulation. Provided the quantity of cash in circulation is determined by the economy’s demand for cash, it is beyond the control of central banks and commercial banks.1 Besides, cash in circulation is a part of broad money supply, while bank reserves at the central bank are not. Broad money is the focal point of the next section. In this section, we deliberate on the genuine liquidity within the banking system, which is banks’ excess reserves at the central bank. Banks require excess reserves to settle payments with other banks arising both from their own and their clients’ transactions. Only the central bank can create bank reserves, and does so “out of thin air” when it purchases assets or lends. The central bank creates reserves electronically simply by crediting commercial banks’ reserve accounts held at the central bank. Chart I-1Excess Reserves And Share Prices: No Strong Correlation The amount of excess reserves each individual bank holds as well as the cost of borrowing these reserves influence commercial banks’ willingness to expand their balance sheets – i.e., originate loans and purchase assets. Yet excess reserves do not flow into the economy and financial markets. Banks do not lend out excess reserves to borrowers. Banks require excess reserves to settle payments with other banks arising both from their own and their clients’ transactions.   Furthermore, banks do not use deposits – which are liabilities owed by banks – to settle payments with other banks or the central bank. Rather, they draw down their excess reserves to conduct settlements. When banks are short on excess reserves, they borrow them from the central bank or other banks. In short, all types of deposits at banks – those of households, companies, organizations and governments – do not constitute liquidity for banks. The incentive for banks to attract deposits from their peers is not the deposits themselves but rather the handover of excess reserves that occurs when a deposit is transferred from one bank to another. In a nutshell, banks compete with one another not for deposits, per se, but for excess reserves. How well do excess reserves correlate with share prices? Chart I-1 reveals that there has been no stable correlation between excess reserves and share prices in the US, the Euro Area, Japan and China. Bottom Line: Excess reserves do not constitute broad purchasing power for goods and services as well as real and financial assets. Excess reserves can be thought of as “core” liquidity that has a bearing on banks’ willingness to create money “out of thin air.” Money Supply Broad money supply is the sum of all types of deposits and cash in circulation. Narrow money (M1) supply is comprised of demand deposits and cash in circulation. Thereby, broad money supply determines potential purchasing power for goods, services and all types of assets. Outside of quantitative easing (QE), central banks do not typically create deposits/broad money; they typically create reserves only. When a central bank lends to or purchases an asset from a bank, it creates reserves, but not deposits. When a central bank purchases an asset from a non-bank, it creates both deposits (money) and reserves. Critically, as highlighted previously, reserves are not a part of narrow or broad money supply. Chart I-2Money Multiplier = Broad Money / Excess Reserves This is why fears that QE will immediately lead to high inflation are false. QE in advanced economies have generated a lot of reserves but little in the way of new money supply. Ultimately, it is deposits/money – not reserves – that determine purchasing power. Outside of QE, money is created by banks, not central banks. Both a loan origination to and a purchase of a security from a non-bank by a bank leads to new deposit/money creation “out of thin air.” Also, savings versus spending decisions by economic agents (non-banks) do not change the amount of money supply. We have deliberated on these topics at length in past reports. In turn, the willingness of banks to expand their assets for a given level of excess reserves and interest rates is measured by the money multiplier. The latter is computed as a ratio of broad money to excess reserves. Chart I-2 illustrates money multipliers in the US and China. The US money multiplier has been rising since late 2014. America’s broad money supply (M2) has been expanding in recent years, even though the Federal Reserve – until this past September – had been draining banking system excess reserves. In China, by contrast, the money multiplier has been declining since late 2017.  Remarkably, the level of the money multiplier is considerably higher in China (62) than in the US (11). In other words, for each unit of excess reserves, there are 62 outstanding units of broad money in China, and only 11 units in the US. China’s higher money multiplier signifies the following: (1) Its banks are more overextended in terms of liquidity – i.e., they are more likely to experience liquidity shortages than their US peers; and (2) mainland banks have been acquiring more assets and originating more loans per unit of excess reserves. The willingness of banks to expand their assets (captured by the money multiplier) is often more important for money creation than excess reserves provisions by central banks. For example, since January 2009 - the onset of the credit boom in China - the country’s excess reserves have almost doubled. Yet broad money has expanded more than 4-fold (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This compares with an 85% rise in US broad money and 40% in the euro area's since January 2009 (Chart I-3, top panel).   Chart I-3“Helicopter” Money In China Chinese commercial banks have literally been dropping “helicopter” money from the time when the country embarked on a massive credit binge in early 2009. Since that time, Chinese banks have created 178 trillion yuan ($25 trillion) of new broad money, based on our measure of broad (M3) money supply. This is almost triple the $8.4 trillion broad money supply created in the US and euro area combined over the same period. China’s broad (M3) money supply2 now stands at 232 trillion yuan, equivalent to US$33 trillion (Chart I-3, bottom panel). What is astonishing is that Chinese broad money is larger than the sum of broad money in both the US and euro area, which is roughly equivalent to $30 trillion (i.e., the sum of all outstanding US dollars and euros in the world). Yet China’s nominal GDP is equivalent to only 40% of US and euro area GDP combined. In China, broad money supply has been a good leading indicator for its business cycle (Chart I-4, top panel). In the US and Europe, however, broad money has been much less successful in predicting the direction of the business cycle (Chart I-4, middle and bottom panels). Money supply is liquidity available to economic agents to purchase goods and services as well as invest in both real and financial assets. Why does money supply correlate better with business cycles in some economies than others? The answer is the velocity of money. Even when two economies experience similar rates of money growth, the pace of their economic growth will differ due to differences in their velocity of money. Specifically: Nominal GDP Income = Money Supply x Velocity Of Money Hence, a change in nominal GDP growth is driven by both changes in the money supply and the velocity of money. Therefore, it is a mistake to think that new money creation is the only source of new demand and growth. When the existing money supply turns faster – i.e. the velocity of money rises – nominal GDP will expand without new money being created. The velocity of money reflects households’ and companies’ willingness to spend versus save. For the same amount of outstanding money supply, households and businesses can spend more (turn over money faster) or less (turn over money more slowly). It is much harder to gauge changes in the velocity of money than in money supply. Changes in the velocity of money reflect variations in the willingness to spend, save and invest among households, companies and institutions. Chart I-5 illustrates the velocity of money in China, the US, the euro area and Japan have not been constant. Chart I-4Money And The Business Cycle Chart I-5Velocity Of Money Changes Over Time   Therefore, forecasting money growth is in and of itself insufficient to predict the business cycle. One also needs to consider changes in the velocity of money – i.e. the spending versus saving preferences of economic agents. How do interest rates impact money supply and the velocity of money? Low and falling interest rates boost demand for credit and lead to more loan origination, resulting in greater money supply. In addition, low interest rates encourage more spending versus savings. As a result, the velocity of money rises. Faster money growth accompanied by an acceleration in the velocity of money ensures more rapid nominal GDP growth.  Bottom Line: Money supply is liquidity available to economic agents to purchase goods and services as well as invest in both real and financial assets. However, knowing money supply’s future trajectory is insufficient to gauge the prospects for economic growth or direction of financial markets. Changes in the velocity of money are as important as those in money supply. Yet, forecasting changes in the velocity of money literally amounts to predicting the behavior of economic agents. Liquidity In Asset Markets Deposits/money supply can be used to acquire both financial and real assets as well as purchase goods and services. They could also be kept idle. In a given period of time, it is impossible to envisage what portion of deposits in the banking system will be allocated to securities investments. Ultimately, this decision rests with each individual and institution. There is no way to foresee both the amount of deposits that will be channeled to purchase financial assets as well as the velocity of these funds. Therefore, it is impossible to forecast the true size of liquidity overflow into and out of asset markets. Overall, gauging liquidity flows to asset markets boils down to predicting investors’ behavior. Liquidity flows into financial assets when “animal spirits” among investors improve, and vice versa. Please refer to Diagram I-1 on page 2 for a visual illustration. Many market participants monitor fund flows to gauge liquidity tides into and out of various asset classes. Nevertheless, there are some common problems with these fund-flow datasets. First, reported data on fund flows into an asset class or a region are often old news. The basis is that capital has already been allocated – i.e., transactions have already taken place, and asset prices already reflect these flows. In fact, fluctuations in asset prices are the best timely reflection of fund flows into a particular asset class. Second, to our knowledge, there is no comprehensive fund flows dataset that encompasses fund flows across all types of investors globally – including but not limited to all pension and sovereign funds, institutional money managers, wealth managers and family offices as well as hedge funds. Hence, existing fund flows datasets are incomplete.  Chinese broad money is larger than the sum of broad money in both the US and euro area. How do we deal with the lack of comprehensive fund flow data? Our framework is as follows: We assume that liquidity (money) will flow into/out of countries offering a superior/poor risk-reward profile, respectively. Our analysis of each asset class/country takes into consideration both the ability of this particular asset class/country to generate sustainable cash flows as well as valuations. Our underlying conjecture is that capital will ultimately flow into the areas that generate high or improving return on capital, and will flow out of segments that experience low or falling return on capital. Thereby, we try to predict whether capital will flow in or flow out based on these fundamentals, and position a portfolio accordingly. This approach assumes that global capital allocation in the medium to long term is efficient and rational – i.e., financial markets will reward good companies/countries and penalizes bad ones. Finally, we constantly monitor various liquidity proxies to make sense of marginal shifts in money supply as well as investors’ risk tolerance – the latter being a proxy for the velocity of money in the investment industry. Both are critical to gauging liquidity circulation in financial markets. Bottom Line: A large and expanding stock of money in and of itself does not guarantee plentiful liquidity for asset markets. Investors’ willingness to invest is required for money (liquidity) to flow into financial assets. In turn, deteriorating investor confidence can lead to a dearth of liquidity in asset markets, despite abundant broad money supply.  Key Questions And Summary What is the connection between interest rates and liquidity? Why do many investors use interest rates and liquidity inter-changeably? Low and/or declining interest rates entail rising odds that substantial liquidity will flow into various risk assets, and vice versa. This is why many commentators use interest rates as a proxy for liquidity for financial assets. Is there too much liquidity in the world? Apart from China, broad money supply has not expanded tremendously since 2009 (please refer to Chart I-3 on page 6). The QE efforts by central banks in advanced economies have significantly boosted bank reserves, but broad money supply has expanded relatively modestly.   In China, however, broad money supply in RMB has more than quadrupled to $33 trillion. In brief, China has a money bubble. Is there a shortage of financial assets relative to available liquidity? Yes. QE programs in advanced economies have removed high-quality financial assets – valued at about $9 trillion – from global markets (Chart I-6). Yet money supply has expanded. This has left money chasing few assets. Also, low policy rates reduce the opportunity cost of owning financial securities. These two phenomena have led investors to bid up prices of available financial assets. Consequently, high-quality financial assets have become expensive, and those that appear attractive are likely “cheap for a reason.” Does the Fed’s balance sheet expansion since September amount to additional QE and more liquidity provision for financial markets? There is a difference between a central bank’s balance sheet/assets and banks’ excess reserves. They are not always the same. For example, since September, the Fed has expanded its assets by about $400 billion but US banks’ excess reserves have risen by only $190 billion (Chart I-7, top panel). Chart I-6QE Removed $9 Trillion Worth Of Financial Assets From Global Markets Chart I-7Beware Of Difference Between Fed’s Assets And Excess Reserves   This discrepancy is largely due to the rise in the Treasury’s General Account (TGA) at the Fed. Since September, the US Treasury has shifted $200 billion of deposits from banks to its TGA at the Fed (Chart I-7, middle panel). By doing so, the Treasury has destroyed a similar amount of banks’ excess reserves. Overall, the net excess reserves injection by the Fed has been shallower than is generally perceived by looking at its balance sheet. A large and expanding stock of money in and of itself does not guarantee plentiful liquidity for asset markets. Is the Fed’s balance sheet expansion a reason behind strong US money growth since September? Not really. Most of the US money supply (deposits) is created by US banks – not the Fed. When banks originate a loan or purchase a security from a non-bank, they create a new deposit/money “out of thin air.” Not only has US banks’ loan origination growth been brisk, but they also have purchased a substantial amount of US Treasurys since late 2018 to meet Basel III liquidity requirements. These operations have created new money supply, as evidenced in Chart I-8.  Chart I-8US Commercial Bank Assets And Components In short, US money supply growth has been robust due to strong loan demand and the willingness of banks to lend as well as to their purchases of high-quality securities for regulatory reasons. The latter has depressed US government bond yields facilitating the rally in risk assets. Are fluctuations in global narrow and broad money reliable indicators for global share prices? Chart I-9 illustrates that both the global narrow and broad money impulses – their second derivatives – have some correlation with global share prices, but not a strong one. Chart I-9Global Money Impulse And Global Share Prices On the whole, banking system reserves, money supply and interest rates are important drivers of liquidity allocated to financial assets. Nevertheless, the amount of liquidity flowing into and out of financial assets is ultimately contingent on investor behavior. When investors are willing to invest, liquidity flows into asset markets. On the contrary, when investors turn cautious, they withhold liquidity and asset prices drop.    Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Commercial banks in this report are referred to as banks. 2     China’s broad money (M3) is calculated by BCA as the sum of deposits of non-financial institutions, households and other financial corporations at commercial banks; the calculation also includes commercial banks’ other liabilities as well as nonfinancial institutions’ deposits at PBoC but excludes commercial banks’ borrowing from the PBoC, interbank borrowing, foreign liabilities and bonds issued. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

特別レポート

Dear Clients, Please note that this week we are re-publishing a Special Report written by our Emerging Market Strategy team and published on January 7, 2020. The report, authored by Ellen JingYuan He, is an extension of the Special Report published in September 2017 and examines the progress made in China’s “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” since its implementation in 2013.  This Special Report concludes that going forward, the Chinese government will likely shift to a stricter regulatory stance in BRI project financing. The shift will lead to a modest pullback in realized BRI investment in 2020. However, given the small size of BRI investments relative to China’s total capital spending, the recovery in Chinese capital goods imports still hinges on the domestic property and infrastructure spending cycle.  I trust you will find this report insightful. In addition, we are closing our long USD/CNH trade, initiated in May 2019 as a currency hedge for our cyclical overweight in Chinese stocks and corporate bonds (denominated in USD terms). As we mentioned in last week’s China Macro and Market Review, upon the signing of the Phase One trade deal on January 15, we expect further modest strengthening in the Chinese currency as China’s economy continues to improve. Therefore, the currency hedge is no longer needed and we recommend that investors favor Chinese stocks and bonds versus the global benchmark in unhedged terms.  Best regards, Jing Sima, China Investment Strategist   Highlights The Chinese government will be applying more scrutiny and tighter oversight over lending for ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI) projects going forward. As a result, total BRI investment with Chinese financing will fall moderately – by 5% to US$135 billion in 2020 from US$142 billion in 2019. BRI investment is too small relative to mainland capital spending. Hence, the global outlook for capital goods and industrial commodities will be driven by Chinese capex, not BRI. BRI Overview Chart I-1Chinese BRI Investment: Likely To Decline In 2020 China has been promoting and implementing its strategic ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative (BRI) since late 2013. The country has so far signed about 200 BRI cooperation documents with 137 countries and 30 international organizations. The government’s strong push has resulted in a surge in Chinese BRI investment, albeit with a major downturn in 2018 (Chart I-1). BRI projects center on infrastructure development such as transportation (railways, highways, subways and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunications infrastructure in recipient countries covered by the BRI program. Chart I-2 demonstrates the geographical reach of the BRI as well as transportation linkages/routes being built and funded by it. We discussed the BRI in great detail in a special report published in September 2017. Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program The cumulative size of the signed contracts with BRI-recipient countries over the past six years is about US$700 billion, of which US$460 billion has already been completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment that occurred in that year, as these contracts generally take several years to be implemented and completed. In this report, “BRI investment” encompasses realized investments for BRI projects, which we derive from the official data of “BRI newly signed contracts.” Based on our calculations, Chinese BRI investment reached about US$142 billion in 2019, equaling about 2% of nominal gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China. The latter in 2019 was about US$6 trillion. Yet, BRI is much larger than multilateral funding for the developing world. For example, current annual financing disbursements from the World Bank are only about US$50 billion. Looking into 2020, due to a number of considerations, the Chinese government’s attitude towards BRI project financing will continue to shift from aggressive to a stricter and more-cautious stance. Looking into 2020, due to a number of considerations, the Chinese government’s attitude towards BRI project financing will continue to shift from aggressive to a stricter and more-cautious stance. Consequently, we expect a 10% decline in the total value of annual newly signed contracts in 2020, slightly less than the 13% decline in 2018. In addition, we also expect the average implementation period for BRI projects to be slightly longer this year than last year. Based on these expectations, our projection is that realized Chinese BRI investment in 2020 will likely fall moderately – by 5% to US$135 billion this year from US$142 billion in 2019 (Chart I-1 and Table I-1). Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment In 2020 BRI Investments: More Scrutiny Ahead The Chinese authorities are constantly recalibrating their BRI implementation strategy. The lessons learned over the past six years as well as shifting domestic macro and global geopolitical landscapes all suggest even more scrutiny ahead. First, the Chinese government has learned hard lessons that easy large lending/financing can result in unanticipated negative consequences. In the past six years, the Chinese government has actively promoted the BRI by providing considerable amounts of financing to BRI projects. The main objectives of the BRI have been: (1) to export China’s excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries; and (2) to build transportation and communication networks to facilitate trade between China and other regions. Although the projects have indeed improved infrastructure and connectivity and boosted both current and potential growth rates in the recipient countries, there have been numerous cases of debt restructuring demand by borrowers as well as growing criticism on China’s BRI as “debt trap diplomacy.” The argument is that China makes loans and uses the debt as leverage to secure land or strategic infrastructure in the recipient countries – in addition to the Middle Kingdom promoting its own geopolitical interests. History will eventually reveal whether BRI constituted “debt trap diplomacy.” As of now, China has either renegotiated or written off debt for some debt-strapped BRI- recipient countries rather than seize their assets. Among all BRI projects spreading over 60 countries in the past six years, there has been only one asset seizure case in Sri Lanka. Crucially, increasingly more BRI-recipient countries are now demanding to renegotiate the terms of their loans and financing, asking China for more favorable concessions, debt forgiveness and write-offs. The reasons run the gamut: from BRI projects not generating enough cash flow to service debt to simple requests among recipient countries for better financing terms. These demands are reducing the value of China’s claims on both BRI projects and recipient countries, and curtailing its willingness to finance more BRI projects. In general, China has learned again that substantially augmenting investments in a single stroke – whether on the mainland or in other countries – produces capital misallocation. The latter results in unviable debtors and bad assets on balance sheets of financiers. Second, many BRI investment projects have suffered delays or cancellations due to changes in the recipient countries’ governments. Reducing both unanticipated negative consequences and unexpected delays/ cancellations requires more scrutiny and tighter oversight on BRI projects by the Chinese government, which is on the way. In April 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for high-quality, sustainability and transparency in implementing BRI projects, as well as a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption. He also stressed that China would only support open cooperation and clean governance when pursuing BRI projects. China’s Ministry of Finance last year released a new document titled, The Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative, in order to identify debt stress among recipient countries and prevent defaults. China, in April, rejected the Kenyan government’s request of US$3.7 billion in new loans for the third phase of its standard gauge railway (SGR) line amid concerns about the country’s finances. In Zimbabwe, the Export-Import Bank of China backed out of providing financing for a giant solar project due to the government’s legacy debts. To be sure, like any lender, the risks and costs fall to Chinese banks and financing providers in the event of a default. Therefore, increasing scrutiny of such projects is in the best interests of China as a whole. That said, the BRI is a signature initiative of President Xi and still has many positives for China. Specifically, it helps the country export its excess capacity, increase its trade with the rest of the world and expand the country’s geopolitical influence. Therefore, any slowdown in the BRI will be marginal. China will tweak and may reduce the pace of BRI investment moderately, but it will not halt it outright. Like any lender, the risks and costs fall to Chinese banks and financing providers in the event of a default. Therefore, increasing scrutiny of such projects is in the best interests of China as a whole. Bottom Line: There will be increasing scrutiny of BRI projects by the Chinese government. Consequently, it will become incrementally more difficult for BRI countries to obtain financing from China in 2020. Nevertheless, the pace of BRI will slow somewhat but not plunge, given the program’s strategic benefits for China. BRI Financing: Switching From Dollar- To Yuan-Denominated Chinese banks have been the major BRI funding providers. Table I-2 shows Chinese policy banks and large state-owned commercial banks accounted for about 51% and 41% of BRI funding in the past five years, respectively. Table I-2China's BRI Funding Sources During 2014-2018 Debt and equity financing are the two major types of BRI funding, with the former playing the dominant role in the form of bank loans and BRI-specialized bond issuance. While the majority of BRI financing to date – about 83% of the total, according to our estimates – has been denominated in foreign currency (mainly in US dollars), there has been a noticeable rise in loans and bond issuance denominated in yuan. In May 2017, President Xi encouraged domestic financial institutions to promote overseas RMB-denominated financing for BRI projects. In the past two and a half years, about 17% of BRI financing has been in yuan. Before May 2017, such yuan-denominated loans for BRI projects were insignificant. Yuan-denominated BRI loans: The two Chinese policy banks have provided more than RMB 380 billion (equivalent to US$55 billion) in BRI-specialized loans in RMB terms over the past two and half years. Offshore yuan-denominated BRI-related bond issuance by Chinese banks and companies: There has been an increasing amount of BRI-specialized bond issuance in RMB terms offshore over the past several years as well. Onshore yuan-denominated BRI-related bond issuance by governments and organizations/companies of recipient countries: Since 2018, foreign private companies and government agencies have been allowed to issue RMB-denominated BRI bonds onshore in China. There are three reasons why the Chinese authorities will continue to encourage more yuan-denominated financing for BRI projects. Chart I-3China: Few FX Reserves Compared With RMB Money Supply First, balance-of-payment constraints make RMB funding for BRI more desirable. US dollar financing for BRI initiatives inevitably creates demand for the People’s Bank of China’s increasingly precious foreign-exchange resources. The main risk to China’s balance of payments is the 177 trillion of local currency deposits of households and enterprises. The PBoC’s US$3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves accounts for only 12% of Chinese total deposits (Chart I-3). Chinese households and private enterprises prefer to hold a higher proportion of their assets in foreign currencies than they do now. This will continue to generate capital outflows, and risks depleting the nation’s foreign currency reserves. Given potential capital outflows from the domestic private sector, China will be careful in expanding state-sponsored capital outflows, including US dollar-denominated BRI financing. Therefore, increasing RMB-denominated funding will reduce US dollar outflows and diminish pressure on China’s foreign exchange reserves. Second, providing BRI financing in yuan promotes RMB internationalization, which is a major long-term objective of China. When a borrower (whether Chinese or foreign entity) with a BRI project obtains yuan-denominated financing, it is encouraged to also pay its suppliers in yuan. As a result, more global trade is settled in renminbi, promoting its internationalization. This is especially convenient when the borrower buys goods and services from China, as they can easily pay in yuan. In cases where a borrower has to buy services and equipment from other countries and is required to pay in US dollars, the renminbis will go into foreign exchange markets. On margin, this will drive the yuan’s value versus the US dollar lower. Provided China has excess capacity in many raw materials and industrial goods, there is a lot of scope to expand RMB financing for BRI projects, with limited downward pressure on the yuan’s exchange rate. In short, RMB-denominated funding will be used to buy Chinese goods. Chart I-4Low Odds Of Acceleration In Bank Financing In 2020 Finally, in any country, banks originate local-currency denominated loans “out of thin air,” – i.e., bank balance sheet expansion is not constrained by national savings. We have written about this extensively in numerous past reports. Theoretically, there is no hard limit on much in yuan-denominated loans Chinese commercial banks can originate, nor how many yuan-denominated bonds they can buy. What constrains commercial banks from expanding their assets infinitely is banking regulation, liquidity constraints (their excess reserves at the central bank rather than deposits), worries about asset impairment and a lack of loan demand among borrowers. Among these, the most pertinent that could cap the amount of BRI financing originated by Chinese banks is macro-prudential bank regulation that is being implemented by regulators in a piecemeal way to cap leverage among enterprises, households, local governments and banks themselves. Chart I-4 illustrates that banks’ asset growth is on par with nominal GDP, and has recently rolled over. The Chinese authorities target bank assets, bank broad credit and broad money growth at the level of potential nominal GDP growth. This entails low odds of acceleration in bank financing in general and BRI projects in particular. Meanwhile, the need for BRI debt restructuring and provisioning will also lead mainland commercial banks to become slightly more cautious in BRI financing. Bottom Line: Both RMB- and US dollar- denominated financing for BRI projects will marginally diminish in 2020. Macro Implications Chart I-5Deep Contraction In Chinese Property Construction... Implications For Commodities And Capital Goods The size of BRI investments in 2019 – US$142 billion – accounts for only about 2% of China’s nominal GFCF. Hence, BRI investment is too small relative to mainland capital spending. This is why we often do not incorporate BRI when analyzing China’s capital spending cycle. In 2020, we are still negative on China’s property construction activity due to weak real estate demand and increasing difficulty for indebted property developers to secure financing (Chart I-5). There will likely be a moderate growth rebound in Chinese infrastructure investment. However, it will not be able to offset the negative impact on commodities and capital goods from weaker BRI investment and mainland contracting property construction. All in all, the recovery in Chinese capital goods imports will be moderate (Chart I-6). Notably, prices of steel, industrial metals and other raw materials do not signal widespread and robust recovery as of now (Chart I-7). Chart I-6...And In Chinese Capital Goods Imports Chart I-7Commodity Prices Do Not Signal Widespread And Robust Recovery     Impact On Chinese Exports Chinese exports to BRI countries have done much better than its shipments elsewhere (Chart I-8). For example, Chinese exports to ASEAN countries showed a strong 10.4% year-on-year growth in 2019, versus a 1% contraction in overall exports. The ASEAN countries that received significant amounts of BRI investments posted double-digit growth in imports from China. There are two primary reasons behind the stronger growth in Chinese exports to BRI-recipient countries. 1. As most of China’s BRI investment has focused on infrastructure projects, it has significantly increased recipient countries’ imports of capital goods and raw materials. Chart I-9 shows that Chinese exports of digging and excavating machines have gone vertical. Chart I-8Strong Growth In Chinese Exports To BRI Countries Chart I-9Surging Chinese Exports Of Digging And Excavating Machines   2. Considerable BRI investment has propelled recipient countries’ income growth. Chart I-10 reveals a positive correlation between capital spending as a share of GDP and real GDP growth across 33 BRI-receiving developing economies during the BRI implementation period of 2014-2018. Hence, BRI investments have considerable impact on both potential and current growth of recipient countries. Chart I-10Strong Capital Spending Tend To Facilitate Real Economic Growth Chart I-11BRI Helped Boost Chinese Consumer Goods Exports Robust income growth has boosted demand for household goods (Chart I-11). China has a very strong competitive advantage in consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Despite a slight drop in overall BRI investment, we still expect solid growth (albeit less than in 2019) in Chinese exports to BRI countries in 2020. Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations