新興市場

Highlights It is too early to conclude that the PBoC’s surprise rate cut last Friday to its reserve requirement ratio (RRR) marks the beginning of another policy easing cycle.  Historically it took more than a single RRR reduction to lower interest rates and to boost credit growth. Overall economic conditions do not yet suggest that Chinese policymakers will initiate a broad-based policy easing to spur demand. The end-of-July Politburo meeting will shed more light on whether there is a decisive turn in China’s overall policy stance. In previous cycles, consecutive RRR cuts led to bond market rallies, but were not good leading indicators for equities, which have been more closely correlated with cyclical swings in credit and business cycle. We recommend patience. Chinese onshore stocks are richly valued and their prices can still correct in Q3 when corporate profits and economic growth slow further. Feature The speed and magnitude of the PBoC’s 50-basis point trim in its RRR rate last week exceeded market expectations. The RRR rate drop, combined with June’s better-than-expected credit data, sparked speculation that China’s macroeconomic policy had shifted to an easier mode. A single RRR cut does not indicate that another policy easing cycle is underway. Rather, the PBoC’s intention is to prevent rising demand for liquidity in 2H21 from significantly pushing up interest rates. In addition, we do not expect that the credit impulse will decisively turn around until later this year. We will remain alert to any signs of additional policy easing, particularly because policymakers will face more pressure to maintain trend growth next year. The July Politburo meeting may provide more information on the direction of Chinese macro policy going forward. Meanwhile, investors should stay the course. In previous cycles there were long lags between the first RRR cut and sustained rallies in China’s onshore stock markets. We will continue to maintain an underweight stance towards Chinese stocks through the next three months, given that economic data and corporate profits will likely weaken further in Q3. Surprise, Surprise! The PBoC lowered the RRR rate only two days after the State Council mentioned the possibility, which exceeded the consensus. Historically, the PBoC has always made more than one RRR reduction during easing cycles, separated by about three months. Are more RRR cuts pending and does the initial decrease mark the beginning of another policy easing cycle? It is too early to conclude that a broad-based easing cycle has started, for the following reasons: First, economic fundamentals do not suggest an urgent need for policy easing. The economy is softening, but it is softening from a very elevated level (Chart 1). Importantly, production is weakening at a faster pace than demand and partially due to COVID-related idiosyncrasies. This supply-side issue cannot be solved by monetary easing.  For example, the production subcomponent of the manufacturing PMI fell in June while new orders increased (Chart 2). Since its trough in April last year, the gap between new orders and production has consistently narrowed for 11 of the past 15 months, highlighting that the demand-side recovery has been outpacing the supply-side. The recent resurgence in COVID-19 cases and local lockdowns in Guangdong province, which is China’s manufacturing and export powerhouse, may have curbed June’s manufacturing production and new export orders. Global supply shortages in raw materials and chips also add to the sluggishness in manufacturing production. Chart 1Chinese Economy Is Slowing, But Not Too Slow Chart 2Demand Not As Soft Compared With Production Similarly, China’s service PMI slipped notably in June and has closely tracked the country’s domestic COVID-19 situation. The decline is an issue that policy easing and boosting demand will not solve (Chart 3). Secondly, global supply chains are still impaired and commodity prices remain elevated. Even though China’s PPI on a year-over-year basis rolled over in June, it is at its highest level since 2008 (Chart 4). As such, spurring demand through monetary easing would only exacerbate inflationary pressures among producers. Chart 3Slow Recovery In Services Largely Due To Lingering COVID Effects Chart 4Producer Prices Remain Elevated Apart from COVID-related disruptions, the weakness in China’s economy this year has been driven by slower growth in infrastructure and real estate investment due to tightened regulatory oversights that were put in place late last year (Chart 5). Construction PMI declined sharply from its peak in March and both excavator sales and loader sales have plummeted since Q1 this year (Chart 5, bottom panel). However, regulatory tightening towards the housing market and infrastructure projects remain firmly in place, suggesting that policymakers are not looking to stimulate the old economy sectors to support growth. Lastly, despite weaker home sales, housing prices in tier-one cities continue to escalate (Chart 6). The rising prices will keep authorities vigilant about excessive liquidity in the market.    Chart 5It Has Been Chinese Policymakers' Intention To Slow The 'Old Economy' Sectors Chart 6Housing Market Mania Remains Authorities' Pressure Point Bottom Line: Supply-demand dynamics in the global economy and China’s domestic inflationary pressures suggest that it is premature to assume that the RRR cut marks the beginning of another policy easing cycle.  Why Now? Chart 7More 'Pain' Needed For Broad Easing The drop in the RRR highlights the PBoC’s determination to maintain a low interest-rate environment without any further easing, and does not indicate that the central bank has shifted its current policy setting framework. The PBoC has been reactive rather than proactive in the past as it typically waits for severe signs of economic weakness before broadly relaxing its policy (Chart 7). The PBoC cited two main reasons for the RRR cut. One is to ease liquidity pressures of small to medium enterprises (SMEs), which have been struggling with rising input prices and subdued output prices (Chart 8). This motive is consistent with the PBoC’s monetary position so far this year –the central bank has kept rates at historical low levels while scaling back credit creation (Chart 9).   Chart 8SMEs Under Elevated Pricing Stress Chart 9The PBoC Has Kept Rates At Historic Low Levels Demand for liquidity will rise meaningfully in the second half of the year due to an acceleration in local government bond issuance and the large number of expiring medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans and bonds. The liquidity gap could significantly push up interbank and market-based interest rates without the central bank’s intervention. The amount of maturing MLF and government bonds could be more than RMB1 trillion in July. Thus, the 50bp RRR cut, which the PBoC indicates will free up about RMB1 trillion of liquidity to the banking system, will ensure that interest rates remain stable. Chart 10Bank Lending Rates Have Not Declined With Policy Rates The PBoC also stated that it intends to keep down financing costs for both banks and SMEs. The statement is vague, but the PBoC may mean it plans to guide bank lending rates lower for SMEs and, at the same time, provide banks (particularly smaller banks) with enough liquidity to encourage lending to those enterprises. To achieve this goal, a broad-based RRR cut would be more effective than other monetary policy tools, such as open-market operations or MLF injections, which normally benefit large commercial banks more than their smaller counterparts. While interbank rates have been sliding since Q4 last year, the weighted average lending rates moved sideways and even ticked up slightly this year (Chart 10). As of Q1 2021, more than half of bank loans charged higher interest rates than the loan prime rate (LPR), highlighting a distribution matrix unfavorable to SMEs (Chart 11). Loan demand from SMEs, as shown in the PBoC survey, peaked much earlier and tumbled more rapidly than their large peers (Chart 12). Chart 11SMEs Face Rising Input And Funding Costs Chart 12Waning SMEs' Demand For Bank Credit Lowering lending rates for SMEs is usually at the cost of the banks by bearing higher default risks and lower profits. A RRR reduction, coupled with recent changes in banks’ deposit rate pricing mechanisms,1 are measures that can potentially reduce the banks’ liability costs. Bottom Line: The PBoC is using a RRR cut to avoid a sudden jump in interest rates from their low levels in 1H21, and to reduce funding costs for the SMEs and banks. What About Credit Growth? Chart 13Credit Numbers In June Beat Market Expectations Credit numbers beat the market’s expectations in June. Both credit growth and impulse rose slightly after a fast deceleration in much of 1H21 (Chart 13). We continue to expect the credit impulse to hover at a low level throughout Q3. Local government bond issuance will pick up in 2H21, but the acceleration will not necessarily lead to a reversal in credit growth (Chart 14). On a year-over-year basis, high base during Q3 last year will depress credit growth and impulse in the next three months. Moreover, in the past couple years, on average local government bonds account for only about 18% of annual total social financing. As such, the pace of bank loan expansion would need to substantially accelerate to reverse the slowdown in credit growth in the next three months. In previous cycles, on average it took more than one RRR cut and about two quarters for credit growth to turn around (Chart 15). Therefore, even if monetary policy is on an easing path, we expect credit growth to pick up in Q4 at the earliest. Chart 14LG Bonds Only A Small Part Of Total Credit Creation Chart 15Credit Growth Lags RRR Cuts By About Two Quarters Furthermore, policymakers are unlikely to deviate from targeting credit growth in line with nominal GDP this year. Based on our estimate, the target suggests that the overall credit impulse relative to 2020 will be negative this year (Chart 16). Chart 16Negative Credit Impulse In 2021 Relative To 2020 Chart 17The Credit Structure, Rather Than Volume, Will Improve In 2H21   Meanwhile, we think that the PBoC will focus on improving the structure of credit creation by continuing to encourage medium- to long-term lending, while scaling back shadow banking and short-term loans (Chart 17). Corporate bond financing improved slightly in June. However, room for further improvement in corporate bond issuance is small this year, given tightened financing reglations on local government financing vehicles. Downside potential for corporate bond yields is also limited in 2H21, when the economy slows and corporate bond default risks are rising (Chart 18).  Given elevated housing prices and tightened regulations to contain the property sector’s leverage, bank lending to real estate developers and mortgages will continue to trend down in the foreseeable future, regardless the direction of interest rates (Chart 19). Chart 18Limited Upsides For Corporate Bond Issuance In 2H21 Chart 19Bank Loans To Property Market Unlikely To Pick Up In 2H21 Bottom Line: Regardless changes in monetary policy, credit growth will not decisively bottom until later this year. Investment Implications Chart 20Chinese Stock Prices Failed To Break Out Chinese stocks in both onshore and offshore equity markets failed to reverse their trend of underperformance relative to global stocks (Chart 20). Investors should be patient in upgrading their allocation to Chinese stocks from underweight to overweight, in both absolute terms and within a global equity portfolio.  Historically, there has been a long lag between an initial RRR trim and a trough in Chinese onshore stock prices (Chart 21). Although prices moved up along with RRR cut announcements in the past, the price upticks were short lived. Stock prices in previous cycles troughed when the credit impulse and/or the economy bottomed. Given our view that a single RRR decrease does not indicate a broad-based policy easing and the credit impulse is unlikely to pick up until later this year, investors should wait for more price setbacks in Q3 before favoring Chinese stocks again.  Chart 21Long Lags Between First RRR Cut And Stock Market Troughs We are slightly more optimistic than last month about Chinese bonds because the RRR cut has reduced the possibility for any substantial rise in interest rates in 2H21. However, we maintain a cautious view on Chinese government and corporate bonds in Q3. In previous cycles, onshore bond yields often fluctuated sideways or even climbed a bit following the first RRR reduction. It often took several RRR drops, more policy easing signals and sure signs of economic weakening for the bond market to enter a tradable bull run (Chart 22). Therefore, we recommend investors stay on the sidelines for a better entry price point. Chart 22It Takes More Than One RRR Cut To Start A Bond Market Bull Run It is also unrealistic to expect the RRR cut will lead to significant and sustained devaluation in the RMB relative to the US dollar. We expect the dollar index to rebound somewhat in Q3 on the back of positive US employment data surprises which will push US bond yields higher. However, following previous RRR cuts, the RMB had sizeable depreciations only when geopolitical events (the US-China trade war in 2018/19) or drastic central bank intervention (the August 2015 de-pegging from the USD) coincided with the RRR cuts. These scenarios are not likely to play out in the next six months (Chart 23). As such, we maintain our view that the CNY will slightly weaken against the USD in Q3 but will end the year at around 6.4. Chart 23Expect Muted And Short-Lived Movements In The USDCNY From A Single RRR Cut   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1The reform changes the way banks calculate and offer deposit rates. The upper limit is set on their deposit interest rates by adding basis points to the central bank’s benchmark deposit rates, rather than multiplying the benchmark rates by a specific number. Exclusive: Banks Prepare to Lower Deposit Rates as Rate Cap Reform Takes Effect (caixinglobal.com) Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature Since the end of the first quarter, the decline in Treasury yields has been the most important trend in global financial markets. It has contributed to the return of the outperformance of growth stocks relative to value stocks, the underperformance of Eurozone equities relative to the S&P 500, and the tepid results of cyclicals relative to defensive equities. This decline in yields is a temporary phenomenon, because the global economy continues to re-open and inventory levels remain so low that further restocking is in the cards. The cyclical picture is not without blemish; COVID-19 variants remain a concern. However, if these risks were to materialize into another delayed re-opening, then further reflationary efforts by both monetary and fiscal authorities would buoy financial markets. The greatest near-term worry for the global economy and markets comes from China. The Chinese credit impulse is slowing markedly and fiscal support has yet to come to the rescue. This phenomenon is the main reason why this publication maintains a cautious tactical stance on Eurozone cyclical stocks, even if we believe these sectors have ample scope to outperform over the remainder of the business cycle. As a corollary, we believe that yields will likely remain within range this summer and Eurozone benchmarks will lag behind the US. This week, we review key charts, organized by theme, highlighting some of these key concepts. As an aside, none covers inflation. Even if the balance of evidence suggests that any sharp increase in Eurozone inflation will be temporary, the proof will only become more visible by early 2022. The Opening Is On Track… The pace of vaccination across the major Eurozone economies has picked up meaningfully since the spring. Consequently, the number of doses distributed per capita is rapidly approaching that of the US, even as it still lags behind that of the UK (Chart 1). As a result of this improvement, the stringency of lockdown measures is declining, which is allowing European mobility to recover (Chart 2). While this phenomenon is evident around the world, EM still lag in terms of vaccination rates. However, the Global Health Innovation Center at Duke University expects 10 billion vaccine doses to be produced by the year’s end, which will be enough to inoculate most (if not all) the vulnerable people in the world by early 2022. Consequently, the re-opening of the economy will remain a potent tailwind behind global growth for three or four more quarters. Chart 1Vaccination Progress... Chart 2...Leads To Greater Activity   … But Near-Term Headwinds Remain The re-opening of the global economy will allow growth to stay well above trend for the upcoming 12 months, at least. Global industrial activity could nonetheless decelerate this summer. Input costs have risen. The two most important ones, oil and interest rates, are already consistent with a peak in the US ISM manufacturing and the global PMI (Chart 3). In this context, the decelerating Chinese credit impulse is concerning (Chart 4) because it portends a hit to global trade and industrial activity. The effect of this slowdown should be most evident in the third and fourth quarters of 2021. However, it will be temporary because Beijing only wants credit to grow in line with GDP, rather than an outright deleveraging. Thus, the credit impulse will stabilize before the year’s end, which will allow the positive effect of the global re-opening to be fully experienced once again. Chart 3Rising Input Costs... Chart 4...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter   Domestic Tailwind In Europe Despite the extreme sensitivity of the European economy to the global business cycle, Europe should continue to produce positive surprises. The supports to the domestic economy are strong. The NGEU funds means that Europe will suffer one of the smallest fiscal drag among G-10 nations next year. Moreover, the re-opening will support household income and allow the positive effect of the increase in the money supply to buoy consumption (Chart 5). Finally, rising consumer confidence, and the ebbing propensity to save will reinforce the tailwinds behind consumption (Chart 6). Chart 5Europe's Domestic Activity Chart 6...Will Improve Further   Higher Bond Yields Are Coming… The environment continues to support higher yields. Our BCA Pipeline Inflation Indicator is surging, which historically translates into higher global borrowing costs (Chart 7). Most importantly, our Nominal Cyclical Spending Proxy remains very robust, which normally leads to rising yields (Chart 8). While US inflation expectations at the short end of the curve already fully reflect current inflationary pressures, the 5-year/5-year forward inflation breakeven rates will have additional upside. Moreover, the term premium and real rates remain depressed, and policy normalization will cause these variables to climb higher over time. Chart 7Higher Yields Will Come... Chart 8...Later This Year   … But Not This Summer It could take some time before the bearish backdrop for bonds results in higher bond yields. First, bonds have yet to purge fully their oversold status created by the 125 basis-point surge that took place between August 2020 and March 2021 (Chart 9). This vulnerability is even more salient in an environment in which the Chinese credit impulse is decelerating. As Chart 10 illustrates, a slowing total social financing number reliably leads to bond rallies. While the chart looks dire for bond bears, it must be placed in context, in which global fiscal policy remains accommodative considering the decline in the private sector savings rate and in which Advanced Economies’ capex will stay strong. Thus, instead of betting on a large swoon in yields in the coming quarters, we expect US yields to remain stuck between 1.20% and 1.70% for a few more months before they resume their upward path once the Chinese economy stabilizes. Chart 9But Bonds Are Still Oversold... Chart 10...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now   A Positive Cyclical Backdrop For The Euro The near-term forces suggest that the euro will remain range bound over the summer, between 1.16 and 1.23. EUR/USD is a pro-cyclical pair, and so the near-term lack of upside to global growth will act as a temporary ceiling on this currency. Nonetheless, the 18-month outlook continues to favor the common currency. Investors have shed Eurozone exposure for more than 10 years and are structurally underweight this region (Chart 11). Hence, EUR/USD should benefit from any positive reassessment of the growth path in the Euro Area compared to that of the US. Additionally, the euro benefits from a structural current account surplus compared to the USD, which translates into a positive basic balance of payments (Chart 12). In an environment in which US real interest rates are low in relation to foreign ones and in which the Fed wants to maintain accommodative monetary conditions to achieve maximum employment, the capital account balance is unlikely to come to the rescue of the dollar. In this context, EUR/USD still possesses significant cyclical upside and is likely to move back above 1.30 by the year’s end of 2022. Chart 11Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets... Chart 12...And The BoP Favors The Euro   The Bull Market In Global Stocks Is Not Over The cyclical outlook for equities remains supportive. To begin with, in most years, equities eke out positive returns, as long as a recession is not around the corner; we do not expect a recession anytime soon. Moreover, while the balance of valuation risk and monetary accommodation is not as supportive of stocks as it was last year, it is not pointing to an imminent deep pullback either (Chart 13). The equity risk premium echoes this message. Our ERP measure adjusts for the expected growth rate of earnings as well as the lack of stationarity of the ERP. According to this indicator, equities are not an urgent buy, but they are not at risk of a bear market either (Chart 14). This combination does not prevent corrections, but it suggests that pullbacks of 10% are to be bought. Chart 13Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy... Chart 14...Nor A Screaming Sell   Europe’s Structural Underperformance Is Intact… Eurozone stocks have been underperforming their US counterparts since the GFC. As Chart 15 highlights, this subpar performance reflects the decline in European EPS relative to US ones. There is very little case to be made for this underperformance to end on a structural basis. Europe remains saddled with an excessive capital stock and ageing assets. This combination is weighing on European profit margins and RoE (Chart 16). To put an end to this structural underperformance, either European firms will have to consolidate within each industry (allowing cuts to the excess capital stock, to increase concentration, and to boost profit margins) or the regulatory burden must rise in the US to curtail rates of returns in relation to European levels. Chart 15Europe's Underperformance... Chart 16...Reflects Profitability Problems   …But The Window For A Cyclical Outperformance Remains Open Despite a challenging structural backdrop, European equities have a window to outperform US stocks, similar to the outperformance of Japan from 1999 to 2006, which only marked a pause within a prolonged relative bear market. European stocks beat their US counterparts when global yields rise (Chart 17). This is because European benchmarks underweight growth stocks relative to US markets. The effect of higher yields on the relative performance of the Euro Area is not limited to the impact of higher discount rates. Yields rise when global economic activity is above trend. As Chart 18 highlights, robust readings of our Global Growth Indicator correlate with an outperformance of the EPS of value stocks compared to growth equities. Thus, when rates rise, Europe should enjoy both a period of re-rating relative to the US and stronger profits. Chart 17Yields Drive European Stocks... Chart 18...And So Does Global Growth   Positives For Euro Area Financials Like the broad European market, the financials’ fluctuations are linked to interest rates. Moreover, Euro Area banks also move in line with EUR/USD (Chart 19). As a result, our positive view on both yields and the euro for the next 18 months or so should translate into an outperformance of financials in Europe. Additionally, European banks are inexpensive, embedding not just depressed long-term growth expectations, but also a wide risk premium. Europe’s structural problems mean that investors are correct to expect poor earnings growth from the region’s banks. However, the risk premium is overdone. Eurozone banks are much safer than they were 10 years ago. Banks now sport significantly higher Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios and NPLs have shrunk considerably (Chart 20). Moreover, governmental supports and credit guarantees implemented during the pandemic should limit the upside to NPL in the coming quarters. Finally, the so-called doom-loop that used to bind government and bank solvency together is not as problematic as it once was, because the ECB is a willing buyer of government paper and the NGEU programs create the embryo of fiscal risk sharing that limit these dynamics. As a result, investors should overweight this sector for the next 18 months. Chart 19Financials Have A Window To Shine... Chart 20...And Are Less Risky   A Tactical Hedge Our worries about the impact on the global economy of the Chinese credit slowdown are likely to prompt some downside in European cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. Moreover, cyclicals are still significantly overbought relative to defensives, while our relative Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator confirms the near-term threat (Chart 21). A high-octane vehicle to play this tactical underperformance of cyclicals relative to defensives is to buy Euro Area telecom stocks relative to consumer discretionary equities. Not only are the discretionary stocks massively overbought and expensive relative to telecoms (Chart 22), they also offer a lower RoE. This backdrop makes the short discretionary / long telecoms bet a great hedge for portfolios with a pro-cyclical bias over one- to two-year horizons.  Chart 21Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable... Chart 22...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away   Currency Performance Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Corporate Bonds Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Geographic Performance Sector Performance  

Highlights Over the short term – 1-2 years – the pick-up in re-infection rates in Asia and LatAm states with large-scale deployments of Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery (Chart of the Week). The UAE-Saudi impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of OPEC 2.0 spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived.  The UAE's official baseline production will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly.  Over the medium term – 3-5 years out – the risk to the expansion of metal supplies needed for renewables and electric vehicles (EVs) will rise, as left-of-center governments increase taxes and royalties, and carbon prices move higher. Rising metals costs will redound to the benefit of oil and gas producers, and accelerate R+D in carbon- and GHG-reduction technologies. Longer-term – 5-10 years out – the active discouragement of investment in hydrocarbons will contribute to energy shortages. In anticipation of continued upside volatility in commodity prices and share values of oil, gas and metals producers, we remain long the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF, and long equities of producers and traders via the PICK ETF. Feature Our conversations with clients almost invariably leads us to considering the risks to our long-standing bullish views for energy and metals. This week, we reprise some of the highlights of these conversations. In the short term, our bullish call on oil is underpinned by the assumption of continued expansion in vaccinations, which we believe will lead to global economic re-opening and increased mobility, as the world emerges from the devastation of COVID-19. This expectation is once again under scrutiny. On the supply side, the very public negotiations undertaken by the UAE and the leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – over re-basing the UAE's production reminds investors there is substantial spare capacity from the coalition available for the market over the short term. The slow news cycle going into the US Independence Day holiday certainly was a fortuitous time to make such a point. Chart of the WeekWorrisome Uptick Of COVID-19 Cases KSA-UAE Supply-Side Worries The abrupt end to this week's OPEC 2.0 meeting was unsettling to markets. Shortly after the meeting ended – without being concluded – officials from the Biden administration in the US spoke with officials from KSA and the UAE, presumably to encourage resolution of outstanding issues and to get more oil into the market to keep crude oil prices below $80/bbl (Chart 2). We're confident the KSA-UAE impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived. The UAE's official baseline production number (i.e., its October 2018 output level) will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly. Coupled with a likely return of Iranian export volumes in 4Q21, this will bring prices down into the mid- to high-$60/bbl range we are forecasting. Chart 2US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat Longer term, markets are worried this incident is a harbinger of a breakdown in OPEC 2.0's so-far-successful production-management strategy, which has lifted oil prices 200% since their March 2020 nadir. At present, the producer coalition has ~ 6-7mm b/d of spare capacity, which resulted from its strategy to keep the level of supply below demand. A breakdown in this discipline – in extremis, another price war of the sort seen in March 2020 or from 2014-2016 – could plunge oil markets into a price collapse that re-visits sub-$40/bbl levels. In our view, economics – specifically the cold economic reality of the price elasticity of supply – continues to work for the OPEC 2.0 coalition: Higher revenues are realized by members of the group as long as relatively small production cuts produce larger revenue gains – e.g., a 5% (or less) cut in production that produces a 20% (or more) increase in price trumps a 20% increase in production that reduces prices by 50%. Besides, none of the members of the coalition possess the wherewithal to endure another shock-and-awe display from KSA similar to the one following the breakdown of the March 2020 OPEC 2.0 meeting. We also continue to expect US shale-oil producers to be disciplined by capital markets, and to retain a focus on providing competitive returns to their shareholders, which will limit supply growth to that which maintains profitability. Until we see actual evidence of a breakdown in the coalition's willingness to maintain its production-management strategy, we will continue to assume it remains operative. Worrisome COVID-19 Re-Infection Trends Reports of increased re-infection rates in Latin American and Asia-Pacific states providing Chinese Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery. Conclusive data on the efficacy of these vaccines is not available at present, based on reporting from Health Policy Watch (HPW).1 The vast majority of these vaccines were purchased in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, where ~ 80% of the 759mm doses of the two Chinese vaccines were sold, according to HPW's reporting. This will draw the attention of markets to this risk (Chart 3). Of particular concern are the increases in re-infection rates in the Seychelles and Chile, where the majority of populations in both countries were inoculated with one of the Chinese vaccines. Re-infections in Indonesia also are drawing attention, where more than 350 healthcare workers were re-infected after receiving the Sinovac vaccination.2 The risk of renewed global lockdowns remains small, but if these experiences are repeated globally with adverse health consequences, this assessment could be challenged. Chart 3COVID-19 Returning In High-Vaccination States Transition Risks To A Low-Carbon Economy Over the medium- to long-terms, our metals views are premised on the expectation the build-out of the global EV fleet and renewable electricity generation – including its supporting grids – will require massive increases in the supply of copper, aluminum, nickel, and tin, not to mention iron ore and steel. This surge in demand will be occurring as governments rush headlong into unplanned and unsynchronized wind-downs of investment in the hydrocarbon fuels that power modern economies.3 The big risk here is new metal supplies will not be delivered fast enough to build all of the renewable generation, EVs and their supporting grids and infrastructures to cover the loss of hydrocarbons phased out by policy, legal and boardroom challenges. Such a turn of events would re-invigorate oil and gas production. Renewable energy and electric vehicles are the sine qua non of the drive to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. However, the rising price of base metals will add to already high costs of rebuilding power grids to make them suitable for green energy. Given miners’ reluctance to invest in new mines, we do not expect metals prices to drop anytime soon. According to Wood Mackenzie, in 2019 the cost of shifting just the US power grid to renewable energy over the next 10 years will amount to $4.5 trillion.4 Given these cost and supply barriers, fossil fuels will need to be used for longer than the IEA outlined in its recent and controversial report on transitioning to a net-zero economy.5 To ensure that fossil fuels can be used while countries work to achieve their net zero goals, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) technology will need to be developed and made cheaper. The main barrier to entry for CCUS technology is its high cost (Chart 4). However, like renewable energy, the more it is deployed and invested in, the cheaper it will become, following the trend seen in the development of renewable energy and EVs, which were aided by large-scale subsidies from governments to encourage the development of the technology. These cost reductions are already visible: In its 2019 report, the Global CCS Institute noted the cost of implementing CCS technology initially used in 2014 had fallen by 35% three years later. Chart 4CCUS Can Be Expensive Metals Mines' Long Lead Times In 2020 the total amount of discovered copper reserves in the world stood at ~ 870mm MT (Chart 5), according to the US Geological Service (USGS). As of 2017, the total identified and undiscovered amount of reserves was ~ 5.6 billion MT.6 The World Bank recently estimated additional demand for copper would amount to ~ 20mm MT p.a. by 2050 (Chart 6).7 Glencore’s recently retired CEO Ivan Glasenberg last month said that by 2050, miners will need to produce around 60mm MT p.a. of copper to keep up with demand for countries’ net zero initiatives.8 Even with this higher estimate, if miners focus on exploration and can tap into undiscovered reserves, supply will cover demand for the renewable energy buildout. Chart 5Copper Reserves Are Abundant Chart 6Call On Base Metals Supply Will Be Massive Out To 2050 While recent legislative developments in Chile and Peru, which together constitute ~ 34% of total discovered copper reserves, could lead to significantly higher costs as left-of-center governments re-write these states' constitutions, geological factors would not be the main constraint to copper supply for the renewables energy buildout: Even if copper mining companies were to move out of these two countries, there still is about 570 million MT in discovered copper reserves, and nearly ten times that amount in undiscovered reserves. As we have written in the past, capital expenditure restraint is the principal reason the supply side of copper markets – and base metals generally – is challenged (Chart 7). Unlike in the previous commodity boom, this time mining companies are focusing on providing returns to shareholders, instead of funding the development of new mines (Chart 8). Chart 7Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Chart 8Shareholder Interests Predominate Metals Agendas Of course, it is likely metals miners, like oil producers, are waiting to see actual demand for copper and other base metals pick up before ramping capex. Sharp increases in forecasted demand is not compelling for miners, at this point. This means metals prices could stay elevated for an extended period, given the 10-15-year lead times for copper mines (Chart 9). For example, the Kamoa-Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) now being brought on line took roughly 24 years of exploration and development work, before it started producing copper. Technological breakthroughs that increase brownfield projects’ productivity, or significant increases in the amount of recycled copper as a percent of total copper supply would address some of the price pressures arising from the long lead times associated with the development of new copper supply. Another scenario with a non-trivial probability that threatens the viability of metals investing is a breakthrough – or breakthroughs – in CCUS technology, which allows oil and gas producers to remove enough carbon from their fuels to allow firms using these fuels to achieve their net-zero carbon goals. Chart 9Long Lead Times For Mine Development Investment Implications Short-term supply-demand issues affecting the oil market at present are transitory, and do not signal a shift in the fundamentals supporting our bullish call on oil. Our thesis based on continued production discipline remains intact. That said, we will continue to subject it to rigorous scrutiny on a continual basis. Our average Brent forecast for 2021 remains $66.50/bbl, with 2H21 prices averaging $70/bbl. For 2022 and 2023 we continue to expect prices to average $74 and $81/bbl, respectively (Chart 10). WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. Our metals view has become slightly more nuanced, thanks to our client conversations. One of the unintended consequences of the unplanned and uncoordinated rush to a net-zero carbon future will be an improvement in the competitive position of oil and gas as transportation fuels and electric-generation fuels going forward. This will be driven by rising costs of developing and delivering the metals supplies needed to effect the net-zero transition. We expect markets will provide incentives to CCUS technologies and efforts to decarbonize oil and gas fuels, which will contribute to the global effort to arrest rising temperatures. This suggests the rush to sell these assets – which is underway at present – could be premature.9 In the extreme, this could be a true counterbalance to the metals story, if it plays out. Chart 10Our Oil Price View Remains Intact     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The monthly OPEC 2.0 meeting ended without any action to increase monthly supplies, following the UAE's bid to increase its baseline reference production – determined based on October 2018 production levels – to 3.8mm b/d, up from 3.2mm b/d. S&P Global Platts reported the UAE's Energy Minister, Suhail al-Mazrouei, advanced a proposal to raise its monthly production level under the coalition's overall output deal, while KSA's energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, insisted the UAE follow OPEC 2.0 procedures in seeking an output increase. We do not expect this issue to become a protracted standoff between these states. The disagreement between the ministers is procedural to substantive. Remarks by bin Salman last month – to wit, KSA has a role in containing inflation globally – and his earlier assertions that production policy of OPEC 2.0 would be driven by actual oil demand, as opposed to forecasted oil demand, suggest the Kingdom is not aiming for higher oil prices per se. Base Metals: Bullish Spot benchmark iron ore (62 Fe) prices traded above $222/MT this week in China on the back of stronger steel demand, according to mining.com (Chart 11). Market participants are anticipating further steel-production restrictions and appear to be trying to get out in front of them. Precious Metals: Bullish The USD rally eased this week, allowing gold prices to stabilize following the June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. In the two weeks since the FOMC, our gold composite indicator shows that gold started entering oversold territory (Chart 12). We believe gold prices will start correcting upwards, expecting investor bargain-hunting to pick up after the price drop. The mixed US jobs report, which showed the unemployment rate ticked up more than expected, implies that interest rates are not going to be raised soon. Our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy (USBS) expect rates to increase only by end-2022.10 This, along with slightly higher odds of a potential COVID-19 resurgence, will support gold prices in the near-term. Ags/Softs: Neutral The USDA's Crop Progress report for the week ended 4 July 2021 showed 64% of the US corn crop was in good to excellent condition, down from the 71% reported for the comparable 2020 date. The Department reported 59% of the bean crop was in good to excellent shape vs 71% the year earlier. Chart 11 Chart 12     Footnotes 1     Please see Are Chinese COVID Vaccines Underperforming? A Dearth of Real-Life Studies Leaves Unanswered Questions, published by Health Policy Watch, June 18, 2021. 2     According to HPW, the World Health Organization's Emergency Use Listing for these two vaccines "were unique in that unlike the Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Jonhson & Johonson vaccines that it had also approved, neither had undergone review and approval by a strict national or regional regulatory authority such as the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency. Nor have Phase 3 results of the Sinopharm and Sinovac trials been published in a peer-reviewed medical journal.  More to the point, post-approval, any large-scale tracking of the efficacy of the Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccine rollouts by WHO or national authorities seems to be missing." 3    Please see A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, which we published on June 3, 2021 for additional discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please refer to The Price of a Fully Renewable US Grid: $4.5 Trillion, published by greentechmedia 28 June 2019. 5    Please refer to the IEA's Net Zero By 2050, published in May 2021. 6    Please refer to USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2021. 7     Please refer to Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition, published by the World Bank. 8    Please refer to Copper supply needs to double by 2050, Glencore CEO says, published by reuters.com on June 22, 2021. 9    Please see the FT's excellent coverage of this trend in A $140bn asset sale: the investors cashing in on Big Oil’s push to net zero published on July 6, 2021. 10   Please refer to Watch Employment, Not Inflation, published by the USBS on June 15, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Please note: There will be no Strategy Report next week, July 15. Our next publication will be a Thematic: Charts That Matter, on July 22. Highlights For any country with local currency public debt, the ultimate constraints to lower debt burden and service debt are the magnitude of inflation overshoot and/or currency depreciation that authorities are willing to tolerate. What makes Brazil’s public debt untenable is not the level of debt but the very high domestic interest rates. Growing odds of Lula’s victory in the next presidential election in October 2022 entail an eventual shift to more pro-growth fiscal and monetary policies in Brazil. The upshot of these policies will be higher inflation and chronic currency depreciation. Brazilian share prices will likely rally on the back of high nominal growth over the coming years. Yet, currency depreciation will dampen equity returns for international investors. Absolute-return investors with a medium- and long-term horizon should consider going long stocks and shorting the BRL. Feature One of the structural challenges Brazil faces is the public debt overhang. Fiscal and monetary authorities have responded by periodically embarking on fiscal and monetary austerity. Yet, such austerity depresses nominal growth and has in fact worsened public debt dynamics. Can Brazil break out of the vicious circle that has held the economy in check for the past several years? We suspect that authorities will ultimately move away from fiscal and monetary tightening despite the large public debt overhang. Abandoning fiscal and monetary austerity will boost growth. However, these policies will entail higher inflation and currency depreciation. Such a macro shift warrants the following long-term investment strategy in Brazil: going long stocks and shorting the real. Policymakers’ Ultimate Constraint For any country with local currency public debt, the ultimate constraints to lower debt burden and service debt are the magnitude of inflation overshoot and/or currency depreciation that authorities are willing to tolerate. In Brazil, such a policy trade-off is pertinent because productivity-boosting structural reforms – that could lift its potential GDP growth rate – are not realistic in the foreseeable future. We discuss the political landscape and economic policies in detail below. Chart 1Sufficient Fiscal Tightening To Stabilize Public Debt Is Not Politically Feasible As we have written previously, any country with predominantly local currency public debt can stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio by either (1) running continuous sizable primary surpluses or (2) having nominal GDP growth consistently above the interest rate on government debt. The former is politically unfeasible in Brazil because it requires such substantial fiscal tightening that no government can deliver (Chart 1). The second criteria of having nominal GDP to grow meaningfully above government borrowing costs cannot be achieved in Brazil without major government stimulus to boost nominal GDP while also capping local bond yields. Although the nation’s nominal GDP growth has recently improved at about 6.5-7%, its underlying trend is still below government borrowing costs in local currency at 8% (Chart 2). Chart 2Brazil Needs Higher Nominal GDP Growth And Lower Domestic Bond Yields If and as the central bank (BCB) continues to hike policy rate, government effective borrowing costs will rise. The basis is that in recent years, the government has drastically increased the share of short-term local currency debt. Consequently, as the BCB raises the SELIC rate and as the government has to roll over maturing short-term bonds, its borrowing costs will rise. Chart 3Various Measures Of Public Debt On the whole, we consider that in the medium and long run, Brazil’s nominal GDP growth will need to hover at higher levels (say, 9-10%) for it to meaningfully exceed government borrowing costs of 8%. This is the only politically feasible option to achieve public debt sustainability in Brazil. Yet, this entails persistent inflation of 7-8%. Provided that Brazil’s labor force growth will be 0.5% in the coming years, and if we assume underlying productivity growth of 1.5%, the potential (real) GDP growth is probably around 2%. Hence, to achieve nominal GDP growth of 9-10%, inflation should average 7-8%. This is only possible if fiscal and monetary policies become very stimulative. Why does Brazil need to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio? The reason is that the latter is at levels where debt servicing consumes 4% of GDP or 26% of federal government spending. A higher debt-to-GDP ratio will devour more resources. With fiscal spending straightjacketed by the Fiscal Responsibility Law, rising debt servicing will curb non-interest government spending and, thus, economic growth. There are different measures of the nation’s public debt. The Brazilian central bank’s measure stands at 87% of GDP while the IMF’s measure stands at 97% of GDP. The difference is that the IMF includes all government securities held by the central bank while the BCB excludes non-repo government securities held by the BCB from its public debt calculation (please see Chart 3 and Box 1 for more information and analysis). BOX 1 What Is The Correct Measure Of Brazil’s Public Debt? The key difference between the IMF and BCB calculations of Brazil’s public debt is the way these account for government securities held by the central bank. The BCB’s measure of public debt includes its holdings of government securities used in repo operations – they amount to 15% of GDP – but excludes the ones for non-repo operations – equivalent to 10% of GDP. The IMF measure includes all government securities held by the central bank (Chart 3). Each of these two measures has its pros and cons. We will not get into technical details as to which one is superior because from a big picture perspective the precise level of public debt and how to measure it are not significant. We have three considerations concerning this point: The reason why Brazil needs to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio is that interest payments on public debt consume 4% of GDP or 26% of federal government spending. This is hurting Brazil’s development. The government needs to divert spending to other programs to lift the nation’s growth trajectory. “High public debt” is a relative concept and this metric should be compared with the identical measures of other countries. Given the Brazilian central bank’s large holdings of government bonds, it makes sense to compare Brazil with the US and Japan where their respective central banks also own large shares of government bonds and notes. As Chart 3 reveals, if one were to exclude the central bank’s holdings of government securities from public debt, the public debt-to-GDP ratio would be 70% in Brazil, 105% in the US and 125% in Japan. Finally, if investor concern is public debt monetization by the central bank and commercial banks, the focal point of analysis should be the level of and trend in broad money supply not the level of public debt. Chart 4 suggests that broad money supply as a share of GDP in Brazil is somewhat elevated but not very high compared with other nations. Bottom Line: What makes Brazil’s public debt untenable is not the level of debt but the very high domestic interest rates. Brazil needs much lower interest rates – potentially via financial repression – to ensure public debt sustainability. In turn, financial repression/suppression of interest rates will cause considerable currency deprecation. Chart 4Broad Money Supply-to-GDP Ratios: A Cross Country Perspective Yet, whether the level of public debt is 87% of GDP or 97% does not really matter. If neither of the above two criteria of public debt sustainability is satisfied, the government debt-to-GDP ratio will continue rising with negative ramifications for growth in Brazil. Chart 5Brazil: Broad Money (M4) Growth And Impulse While Brazil needs higher nominal growth, local bond yields must also be capped well below nominal GDP growth. If local and foreign creditors are reluctant to finance the government at yields lower than nominal GDP growth, the central bank and/or commercial banks could fill in the gap and purchase domestic bonds. In doing so, the central bank and commercial banks would create more deposits/money supply and, thereby, ceteris paribus exert downward pressure on the exchange rate. As we have argued in previous reports, in any country, when the central bank and commercial banks purchase securities from non-banks, they create money/deposits “out of thin air.” Hence, national savings are not a constraint for the central bank and for commercial banks to finance the government and bring down government bond yields. The primary indicator to monitor whether Brazil is beginning to run more stimulative policies is the M4, the broadest measure of money supply in Brazil. It reflects the monetary and fiscal policy stance as well as captures debt monetization. Chart 5 illustrates Brazil’s M4 annual growth rate (the top panel) and its impulse – calculated as the second derivative (the bottom panel). The M4 impulse reflects how stimulative both monetary and fiscal policies are at any point in time. The spike in the M4 impulse last year reflected large fiscal stimulus and aggressive monetary easing by the central bank. Chart 6Brazil Is Going Through Large Fiscal Tightening For now, the M4 impulse will continue falling because monetary policy is tightening and the fiscal thrust is estimated by the IMF to be -5% of GDP this year and -1% in 2022 (Chart 6). Bottom Line: The only chance for Brazil to stabilize public debt dynamics is to run loose monetary and fiscal policies. In short, Brazil needs to inflate its way out of public debt. The outcome will be currency depreciation yet strong nominal growth that will produce higher share prices in local currency terms. Former president Lula’s PT (Workers’ Party) and its economic policies put Brazil’s government finances on an unsustainable trajectory ten years ago. Ironically, it could be Lula’s comeback as president that could address the issue of public debt and stabilize public finances. Lula’s Comeback Chart 7Lula Is Massively Beating Bolsonaro In Polls Odds of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva running and winning the presidential elections next year have greatly increased in recent months. His presidency will have considerable ramifications for macro-economic policies, the economy and financial markets in the medium-to-long term. The rulings of the Supreme Federal Court have legally paved the way for Lula to participate in the 2022 October presidential elections. While there are still charges pending against Lula, the odds of a full trial and conviction against the ex-president within the next 15 months are negligible. According to the latest June polls from local company IPEC, voting intentions for the first round of elections show Lula mustering over twice as many votes as Bolsonaro, and miles away from the crowded centrist camp (Chart 7). President Bolsonaro’s disapproval rating has reached an all-time high since the beginning of his term. The government’s failure to handle the COVID-19 pandemic effectively has been put in the spotlight due to an ongoing inquiry by Congress, which is being broadcast daily on public television. Further, last week the Supreme Court authorized a criminal investigation into the government for allegations of corruption and irregularities in the procurement of vaccines from India’s Covaxin. It is uncertain as to whether these trials will lead to impeachment procedures given House leader Arthur Lira’s support for Bolsonaro. Nevertheless, odds are that the investigation will cement popular opinion against the current president. There is growing evidence that Lula is positioning himself as a mainstream moderate candidate. This will give him an advantage against Bolsonaro as centrist voters will likely abandon Bolsonaro and support Lula in the upcoming presidential elections. Lula has been meeting with political leaders from the center left and center right, trying to garner support from various corners of the political spectrum that have become disillusioned with Bolsonaro. It seems Lula is attempting to position next year’s presidential elections as a matter of Bolsonaro versus the rest of the country. Most notably, Lula has secured the support of longtime rival, ex-President Fernando Cardoso. This is particularly noteworthy for two reasons: First, Cardoso represents the ultimate economic orthodoxy and pragmatism in Brazil. Second, Cardoso expressed his support for his former political arch-rival Lula in the nation’s most important economic newspaper, Valor Economico. Another important source of support for Lula will likely be the business community. The corporate establishment dropped their backing of Bolsonaro over his mishandling of the pandemic. Further, his failure to combat corruption and his inflammatory rhetoric against democratic institutions have disturbed businesspeople and investors. Anecdotal evidence shows that behind closed doors the business elite is discussing supporting Lula for several reasons. First, banks and large conglomerates had positive relations with the ex-President during the 2000s. Second, even though Lula will not pass structural economic reforms or support privatization, his behavior is at least predictable. Chart 8Brazil: Real Income Per Capita Has Plunged Although Lula is the most prominent member of the Workers’ Party (PT), not all voters necessarily associate him with the corruption that prevailed during the PT’s rule. Not only low-income but also middle-income households associate Lula’s presidency with rising per capita income. Neither Michel Temer’s centrist government nor Jair Bolsonaro’s right and conservative government were able to deliver rising income per capita (Chart 8). In short, centrist voters might favor Lula over Bolsonaro’s disarray. Economic Policy During Lula’s Potential Presidency Lula will not likely run on a purely socialist platform. By vying to gather support from centrist political parties and centrist voters, it is very likely that Lula’s election platform and third term will be marked by pragmatism rather than ideology. We believe fiscal policy during Lula’s presidency will be expansionary. Known as a ferocious political dealmaker, Lula will probably succeed in persuading Congress to dismantle the fiscal spending cap that limits government expenditure growth to last year’s consumer price inflation. This will allow the government to stimulate the economy via fiscal policy. Chart 9Brazil: The Economy Is Recovering But Not Surging Regarding monetary policy, Lula will likely build a consensus across the political spectrum for an accommodative monetary policy. The latter is required to both boost growth and to cap government borrowing costs. A shrewd political operator, Lula will likely convince Congress to change the central bank’s singular mandate of targeting inflation to include targeting economic growth and employment. The US Federal Reserve’s dual mandate might be used as a justification for the change. Bottom Line: The Brazilian population is shattered by extremely poor economic conditions and will favor the presidential candidate who promises more stimulative macro policies. Lula will appeal to such popular sentiment. Following an election win, he will work with various political parties to promote legislation enabling easier fiscal and monetary policies. In short, Lula’s policies will boost nominal GDP growth while capping government borrowing costs. This is needed to stabilize the nation’s public debt-to-GDP ratio. However, the collateral damage of these policies will be the exchange rate: the currency will depreciate meaningfully in such a scenario. A Word About Business Cycle Incoming economic data suggest the economy is recovering. However, year-on-year growth rates appear very strong partially due to a low base effect from the lockdowns a year ago. In Chart 9, we show two-year growth rates, that are annualized, for key business cycle variables. The message is that the recovery is progressing but muted. Further, the BCB has justified its rate hikes by fast rising core and headline inflation. Nevertheless, high inflation readings are also partially the result of very low prints last year from the economic lockdowns. Chart 10 removes the base effect showing a 24-month rate of change and it reveals that core measures of inflation actually remain tame. In addition, lending rates in real terms remain high. This entails that the monetary authorities are risking over-tightening and impeding the recovery. Interestingly, our marginal propensity to spend proxy is forecasting a relapse in economic growth (Chart 11). Chart 10Brazil: Core Inflation Is At The Low End Of BCB's Target Chart 11Is Brazil's Business Cycle About To Peak? Chart 12Households' Debt Servicing And Importance Of Fiscal Spending Importantly, the household debt-service ratio is very high, which means successive rate hikes could dampen consumption (Chart 12, top panel). In fact, there has been little improvement in the unemployment rate and household nominal disposable income and wages. Finally, the fiscal thrust is estimated by the IMF to be -5% of GDP this year and -1% in 2022 (please refer to Chart 6 above). Given government spending (excluding interest payments) accounts for 24% of GDP (Chart 12, bottom panel), fiscal tightening is a major risk to the economy over the next 18 months. Bottom Line: A combination of tightening fiscal and monetary policies will cap the economic recovery. By failing to deliver strong growth this year and next year, the government risks handing the election to ex-President Lula da Silva. While Bolsonaro will likely push to relax fiscal policy leading up to the election, our hunch is that it will be too little too late to help facilitate his reelection. Investment Conclusions Growing odds of Lula’s victory in the next presidential election in October 2022 entail a shift to more pro-growth fiscal and monetary policies in Brazil. The upshot of these policies will be higher inflation (say, core CPI above 6%) and chronic currency depreciation. Chart 13Brazilian Stock Prices, Valuations And EPS Brazilian share prices will likely rally on the back of high nominal growth over the coming years. Yet, currency depreciation will dampen equity returns for international investors. Absolute-return investors with a medium- and long-term horizon should consider going long stocks and shorting the BRL. Our favored segment of the equity market is Brazilian small cap stocks and exporters. The former will benefit from high nominal growth while the latter from a cheapened exchange rate. For EM portfolio managers, our recommended strategy is as follows: While still underweighting Brazil within an EM equity portfolio, we are putting this bourse on an upgrade watch list. We intend to use the potential underperformance by Brazilian stocks in the coming months to upgrade this stock market. This equity market’s valuation is close to its fair value according to our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 13). Relative to the EM equity benchmark, Brazilian share prices might be forming a bottom (Chart 14). We are upgrading Brazilian sovereign credit to overweight relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Brazil’s foreign currency debt stands at only 11% of GDP and the government does not have a problem servicing its foreign currency debt even if the currency depreciates. For local currency bonds, we recommend patience before upgrading. As financial markets start pricing in the fact of Lula’s presidency, the real will likely drop and domestic bond yields might rise. Finally, we continue shorting BRL as a part of our EM currency basket versus the US dollar. The real will likely have a setback in the coming months due to the US dollar’s rebound, a selloff in commodities prices driven by China’s slowdown and disappointing political news flow in Brazil. Concerning currency valuation, Chart 15 shows the real’s real effective exchange rate. The upshot is that it is not cheap. Chart 14Brazil Versus EM: Relative Share Prices Chart 15The Brazilian Real Is Not Cheap   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña Research Analyst juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes