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Macro and geopolitical risks may spoil the narrow window for a stock market rally before recessionary trends rise to the fore.

No, the secular rise in geopolitical risk has not peaked. EU-China trade ties underscore the multipolar context, but this multipolarity is unbalanced, as the US has not reached a new equilibrium with its rivals. While the second quarter is murky, investors should stay defensive this year on the whole.

Stay defensive in the second quarter. We can see a narrow window for risky assets to outperform but we recommend investors stay wary amid high rates, supply risks, extreme uncertainty, peak polarization, and structurally rising geopolitical risk.

Remain cautious and defensive overall. Stay long DM Europe over EM Europe. Look for EM opportunities in Southeast Asia and Latin America over Greater China.

Prefer government bonds over stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Favor North America over other markets. Favor emerging markets like Southeast Asia and Latin America over Greater China, Turkey, and emerging Europe. Stick with aerospace/defense stocks.

特別レポート

Prefer government bonds over stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Favor North America over other markets. Favor emerging markets like Southeast Asia and Latin America over Greater China, Turkey, and emerging Europe. Stick with aerospace/defense stocks.

The Chinese government will repress social unrest, then relax Covid-19 social restrictions to try to stabilize the economy. Russia will be aggressive in the short term but will pursue a ceasefire before March 2024. European and Italian risk will stay high on energy constraints.

Stay short Greater China assets. Stay long Japanese yen. Hold back on Brazil for now but look forward to opportunities in future.

Executive Summary Our negative view on the summer rally is coming to fruition, with equities falling back on the negative geopolitical, macro, and monetary environment. China is easing policy ahead of its full return to autocratic government this fall. Yet the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis has only just begun. Tensions can still deal nasty surprises to global investors. It is essential to verify that relations will thaw after the US midterm and Chinese party congress is critical. Russia continues to tighten energy supply as predicted. Ukraine’s counter-offensive is pushing back the time frame of a ceasefire deeper into next year. Putin may declare victory and quit while he is ahead – but Russia will not be forced to halt its invasion until commodity prices fall significantly. Sweden’s election will not interfere with its NATO bid; Australia’s new government will not re-engage with China; Malaysia’s election will be a positive catalyst; South Africa’s political risks are reawakening; Brazil’s risks are peaking; Turkey remains a leading candidate for a negative “black swan” event. China’s Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Political Risk Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 17.4% Bottom Line: Investors should stay defensive in the short run until recession risks and geopolitical tensions abate. Feature Last week we visited clients across South Africa and discussed a broad range of global macro and geopolitical issues. In this month’s GeoRisk Update we relate some of the key points in the context of our market-based quantitative risk indicators. While we were traveling, US-Iran negotiations reached a critical phase. A deal is said to be “closer” but we remain pessimistic (we still give 40/60 odds of a deal). The important point for investors is that the supply side of global oil markets will remain tight even if a deal is somehow agreed, whereas it will get much tighter if a deal is not agreed. China’s rollout of 1 trillion yuan ($146 billion) in new fiscal stimulus and rate cuts (5 bps cut to 1-year Loan Prime Rate and 15 bps cut to 5-year LPR) is positive on the demand side and supports our key view in our 2022 annual outlook that China would ease policy ahead of the twentieth national party congress. However, it is still the case that China is not providing enough stimulus to generate a new cyclical rally. Second quarter US GDP growth was revised slightly upwards but was still negative. Russia tightened control of European energy, as expected, increasing the odds of a European recession. Europeans are getting squeezed by rising energy prices, rising interest rates, and weak external demand. China Eases Policy Ahead Of Return To Autocracy China is facing acute political risk in the short term but it is also delivering more stimulus to try to stabilize the economy ahead of the twentieth national party congress this fall (Chart 1). The People’s Bank of China cut the benchmark lending rate by (1-year LPR) by 5 basis points, while authorities unveiled fiscal spending worth 1 trillion renminbi. Chart 1China's Confluence Of Domestic And Foreign Political Risk After the party congress, the regime is likely to “let 100 flowers bloom,” i.e. continue with a broad-based policy easing to secure the recovery from the Covid-19 shock. This will include loosening social restrictions and aggressive regulations against industrial sectors like the tech sector. It should also include some diplomatic improvements, especially with Europe. But it is only a short term (12-month) trend, not a long-term theme. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter China’s return to autocratic government under General Secretary Xi Jinping is a new, negative, structural factor and is nearly complete. Xi is highly likely to secure another decade in power and promote his faction of Communist Party stalwarts and national security hawks. The period around the party congress will be uncertain and dangerous. The exact makeup of the next Politburo could bring some surprises but there is very little chance that Xi and his faction will fail to consolidate power. The nomination of an heir-apparent is possible but of limited significance since Xi will not step down anytime soon or in a regular, predictable manner. Larger stimulus combined with power consolidation could spur greater risk appetite around the world, as it would portend a stabilization of growth and policy continuity. However, China’s underlying problems are structural. The manufacturing and property bust can be delayed but not reversed. China’s foreign policy will continue to get more aggressive due to domestic vulnerability, prompting foreign protectionism, export controls, sanctions, saber-rattling, and the potential for military conflict. Bottom Line: Investors should use any rally in Chinese assets over the coming 12 months as an opportunity to sell and reduce exposure to China’s historic confluence of political and geopolitical risk. Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Only Beginning The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis has only just begun. The previous three crises ranged from four to nine months in duration. The current crisis cannot possibly abate until November at earliest. Taiwan’s political risk will stay high and we would not buy any relief rally until there is a firm basis for believing tensions have fallen (Chart 2). Chart 2Taiwan: The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis If this year’s crisis were driven by US and Chinese domestic politics – the US midterm election and China’s party congress – then both Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping would already have achieved what they want and could proceed to de-escalate tensions by the end of the year – i.e. before somebody really gets hurt. The two leaders could hold a bilateral summit in Asia in November and agree to uphold the one China policy and status quo in the Taiwan Strait. We have given a 40% chance to this scenario, though we would still remain pessimistic about the long-term outlook for Taiwan. But if this year’s crisis is driven by a change in US and Chinese strategic thinking as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s rising domestic instability, then there will not be a quick resolution on Taiwan. The crisis would grow next year, increasing the risk of aggression or miscalculation. We have given a 60% probability to this scenario, of which full-scale war comprises 20 percentage points. Bottom Line: Our geopolitical risk indicator for Taiwan spiked and Taiwanese equities rolled over relative to global equities as we expected. However, our oldest trade to capture the high long-term risk of a war in the strait – long Korea / short Taiwan – has performed badly despite the crisis. South Korea: China Stimulus A Boon But Not Geopolitics US-China rivalry – and the thawing of Asia’s once-frozen conflicts – is also manifest on the Korean peninsula, where the limited détente between the US and North Korea negotiated by President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un has fallen apart. South Korea’s situation is not as risky as Taiwan’s but it is nevertheless less stable than it appears (Chart 3). Chart 3South Korea: Lower Geopolitical Risk Than Taiwan South Korea resumed its full-scale joint military exercise with the US, the Ulchi Freedom Shield, from August 22 to September 1. The drills involve amphibious operations and a carrier strike group. Full-scale drills were scaled down or cancelled under the Trump and Moon Jae-In administrations with the hopes of facilitating diplomacy and reducing tensions on the peninsula. North Korea was to discontinue ballistic missile tests and threats to the United States. But after the 2020 election neither Washington nor Pyongyang considered itself bound by this agreement. This year the US went forward with Ulchi Freedom even though regional tensions were sky-high because of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the De-Militarized Zone in Korea. The US is flagging its regional interests and power bases. North Korea is increasing the frequency of missile tests this year and is likely to conduct an eighth nuclear test. On August 17, it fired two cruise missiles towards the Yellow Sea. Pyongyang does not want to be ignored amid so many other geopolitical crises. It is emboldened by the fact that Russia and China will not be voting with the US for another round of sanctions at the United Nations Security Council due to the war in Ukraine and tensions over Taiwan. On August 11, South Korea responded to China’s insistence that the new government should abide by the “Three No’s,” i.e. three negatives that the Moon administration allegedly promised China: no additional deployments of the US’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, no Korean integration into US-led missile defense, and no trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan. Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin told reporters upon his return from China that the three no’s were “neither an agreement nor a promise.” South Korea’s new and conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol is unpopular and gridlocked at home but he is using the opportunity to reassert Korean national interests, including the US military alliance. Tension with the North and cold relations with China are coming at a time when the economy is slowing down. Korean GDP grew by 0.7% in Q2 2022 on a quarter-on-quarter basis, supported by household and government spending, while exports and investments shrank. Roughly a quarter of Korean exports go to China, its biggest trading partner. Korean exports to China have suffered due to China’s economic woes but cold relations could bring new economic sanctions, as China has hit South Korea before over THAAD. With the Yoon administration planning to bring the fiscal deficit back to below 3% of GDP next year, and a broader backdrop of weak Chinese and global demand, it is hard to find bright corners in the Korean economy in the near term. With Yoon’s basement level approval rating, he will resort to foreign policy to try to revive his political capital. Saber rattling and tough talk with North Korea and China will increase tensions in an already hot region – geopolitical risk is bound to stay high on the back of the Taiwan crisis. Bottom Line: On a relative basis, due to the ironclad US security guarantee, South Korea is safer than Taiwan. Investors wanting exposure to Chinese economic stimulus, electric vehicles, and semiconductors should go long South Korea. But some volatility is likely because the North’s eighth nuclear test will occur in the context of high and rising regional tensions. Australia: Stimulus Is Positive But No “Thaw” With China Australia is blessed with strong geopolitical fundamentals but it is seeing a drop in national security and economic security due to the deterioration of China relations. Domestic political turmoil is one of the consequences (Chart 4). Most recently Australia has been roiled by the revelation that former Prime Minister Scott Morrison secretly ran five ministries during the pandemic: the ministries of Home, Treasury, Finance, Resources, and Health. Chart 4Australian Geopolitical Risk Limited After an investigation and review by the Solicitor General Stephen Donaghue, Morrison’s action was determined to be legal, although highly inappropriate and inconsistent with the principles of responsible governance. Morrison’s appointments to these ministries were approved by the Governor General but the announcement or publication of appointments has always been the prerogative of the government of the day. One might think that this investigation is merely politically motivated but the Solicitor General is an apolitical position unlike the Attorney General, and Donaghue had been serving with Morrison, guiding him about the constitutionality of a vaccine mandate during the pandemic. The new Labor Party government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has vowed to be more transparent and will seek to enshrine a transparency measure into the law. Its political capital will improve, which is helpful for its ability to achieve its chief election promises. With the change of the government, it was hoped that there would be a thaw in the Australia-China relationship. China is Australia’s largest export destination and it erected boycotts against certain Australian exports in 2020 in response to Prime Minister Morrison’s inquiry into the origin of Covid-19. Hence Australia’s new defense minister, Richard Marles, met with his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Fenghe, on the sideline of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, which rekindled the hope that a thaw might happen. Yet a thaw is unlikely for strategic reasons, as highlighted by the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Biden administration’s retention of former President Trump’s tariffs, and Australia’s fears of China’s rising influence in the Pacific Islands. The US and Australia are preparing for a long-term policy of containing China’s ambitions. A few days after his election, Prime Minister Albanese flew to Tokyo to attend a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), sending a signal that there will be policy continuity with respect to Australian foreign policy. On May 26, Chinese fighter jets flew closely to an Australian surveillance plane on its routine operation and released aluminum chaffs that were ingested by the P8’s engines. An Australian warship, the HMAS Parramatta, was tracked by a People’s Liberation Army nuclear power submarine and multiple aircrafts on its way back from Vietnam, Korea, and Japan as part of its regional presence deployment in June. Currently Australia is hosting the Pitch-Black military exercise, with 17 countries participating. This exercise will last for three weeks – focusing on air defense and aerial refueling. It will also see the German air force with 13 military aircrafts deployed to the Indo-Pacific region for the very first time. They will be stopping in Japan after the exercise. As Australia’s policy towards China is unlikely to change, geopolitical risk will remain elevated. On the economic front, Australia’s misery index is at the highest point since 2000, with an unemployment rate at 3% and inflation at 6%. GDP growth in the first quarter was 0.8% compared to 3.6% in Q4 2021, propped up by government and household consumption while investment and exports contracted. The good news for the government is that it is inheriting this negative backdrop and can benefit from cyclical improvements in the next few years. Since the Labor government lacks a single-party majority in the Senate (where it must rely on the Greens and independents), it will be difficult for the government to raise new taxes. So far, Albanese has indicated that the budget to be tabled in October will focus on pre-election promises, which includes childcare, healthcare, and energy reforms. At worst, Australian government spending will stay flat, but it is unlikely to shrink considering Labor’s narrow control of the House of Representatives. Australian equities have not outperformed those of developed market peers despite high industrial metal prices. The stock market’s weak performance is attributable to the stumbling Chinese economy (Chart 5). Australian exports to China in June are still down 14% from June of last year. Chinese economic woes will be a headwind to Aussie growth and equity markets until next year, when Chinese stimulus efforts reach their full effect. Chart 5Australian Equities Have Yet to Benefit from Industrial Metal Prices On the other hand, the value of Australian natural gas and oil exports in June grew by 118% and 211% respectively (Chart 6), compared to June of last year. Chart 6Geopolitics: A Boon and Bane to Aussie Growth​​​​​ Bottom Line: As China will continue stimulating the economy and global energy markets will remain tight, investors should look for opportunities in Aussie energy and materials stocks. Malaysia Closes A Chapter … And Opens A Better One? Rarely do we get to revisit our positive outlook on Malaysia – a Southeast Asian state with an ability to capitalize on the US break-up with China. On August 23, the embattled ex-prime minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, lost his final appeal at the Federal Court in Putrajaya after being found guilty in 2020 for abuse of power, criminal breach of trust, and money laundering tied to Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund, 1MDB. The high court instructed that he serves his 12-years prison sentence immediately, becoming the first prime minister to be imprisoned in the country’s 60-years plus of history. Political risk has weighed on the Malaysian economy for almost a decade starting with the contentious 2013 general election, which saw the collapse of non-Malay voter support for the ruling party. Then came the 2015 Wall Street Journal bombshell about 1MDB, and then the 2018 general election that resulted in Malaysia’s first change of government since independence. The pandemic also led to political crisis in 2020. Each crisis resulted in a successive weakening of animal spirits and ever lower investments, resulting in Malaysia’s loss of competitiveness (Chart 7). Malaysia’s cheap currency was unable to increase its competitiveness, due to the low investments in the economy, and reflected higher political risks in the country (Chart 8). Chart 7Political Risk Undermines Competitiveness​​​​​​ Chart 8Cheap Currency Reflects Political Risk​​​​​​ Nonetheless this entire saga has proved that Malaysia’s legal system is independent and that its political system is capable of holding policymakers accountable. The next general election will come in a matter of months and recent state elections bodes well for the institutional ruling party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), and its coalition, Barisan Nasional. The coalition is managing to claw back support from the Malay and non-Malay voters. The opposition had the bad luck of ruling during the pandemic and its rocky aftermath, which has helped to rehabilitate the traditional ruling party. We have long seen Malaysia as a potential opportunity. But we would advise investors to wait until the new election is held and a new government takes power before buying Malaysian equities. With the conclusion of its decade-long 1MDB saga, we would turn more bullish if the next election produces a sizeable and enduring majority, if the use of racial and sectarian rhetoric tones down, and if the governing coalition pursues pro-competitiveness policies. Bottom Line: Structurally, Malaysia is one of the largest exporters of semiconductors and will benefit from the US’s shift away from China and attempt to reconstruct supply chains so they run through the economies of allies and partners. Russia: Escalating To De-Escalate? Russia increased the number of active military personnel in a move that points to an escalation of the conflict with Ukraine and the West, even as Ukraine wages a counter-offensive against Russia in Crimea and elsewhere. The time frame for a ceasefire has been pushed further into next year. As long as the war escalates, European energy relief will be elusive. Our risk indicators will rise again (Chart 9). Chart 9Russia: Geopolitical Risk To Rise Again, Ceasefire Pushed Back Into Next Year Ukraine will not be able to drive Russians out of territory in which they are entrenched. It would need a coalition of western powers willing to go on the offense, which will not happen. Russia is also threatening to cut off the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, ostensibly removing one-fifth of Ukraine’s electricity. Once the Ukrainian counter-offensive grinds to a halt, a stalemate will ensue, incentivizing ceasefire talks – but not until then. The Europeans will have to support Ukraine now but will become less and less inclined to extend the war as they get hit with recession. Russia says it is prepared for a long war but that kind of rhetoric is necessary for propaganda purposes. The truth is that Russia does not have great success with offensive wars. Russia usually suffers social instability in the aftermath. The best indicator for the duration of the war is probably the global oil price: If it collapses for any reason then Russia’s war machine will fall short of funds and the Kremlin will probably have to accept a ceasefire. This what happened in 2014-15 with the Minsk Protocols. Putin will presumably try to quit while he is ahead, i.e. complete the conquest and shift to ceasefire talks, while commodity prices are still supportive and Europe is economically weak. If commodity prices fall, Russia’s treasury dries up while Europe regains strength. So while military setbacks can delay a ceasefire, Russia should be seen as starting to move in that direction. The deal negotiated with Turkey and the United Nations to ship some grain from Odessa is not reliable in the short run but does show the potential for future negotiations. However, a high conviction on the timing is not warranted. Also, the US and Russia could enter a standoff over the US role in the war, or NATO enlargement, at any moment, especially ahead of the US midterm election. Bottom Line: Ukraine’s counteroffensive and Russia’s tightening of natural gas exports increases the risk to global stability and economic growth in the short run, even if it is a case of “escalating tensions in order to de-escalate” later when ceasefire talks begin. Italy: Election Means Pragmatism Toward Russia Italy’s election is the first large crack in the European wall as a result of Russia’s cutoff of energy. The party best positioned for the election – the right-wing, anti-establishment party called the Brothers of Italy – will have to focus on rebooting Italy’s economy once in power. This will require pragmatism toward Russian and its natural gas. Regardless of whether a right-wing coalition obtains a majority or the parliament is hung, Italian political risk will stay high in the short run (Chart 10). Chart 10Italy: Election Brings Uncertainty, Then Economic Stimulus Although the center-left Democratic Party (PD) is narrowing the gap with the Brothers of Italy in voting intentions, it is struggling to put together an effective front against the right-wing bloc. After its alliance with the centrist Azione party and +Europa party broke down, PD’s chance of winning has become even slimmer. Even if the alliance revives, the center-left bloc still falls short of the conservative parties. Together, the right-wing parties account for just 33% of voting intentions (Democrats at 23%, Greens and Left Alliance at 3%, Azione and +Europa at 7%). By contrast, the right-wing bloc has a significant lead, with 46% of the votes (Brothers of Italy at 24%, Lega at 14%, Forza Italia at 8%). They also have the advantage of anti-incumbency sentiment amid a negative economic backdrop. Unless some sudden surprises occur, a right-wing victory is expected, with Giorgia Meloni becoming the first female prime minister in Italy’s history. This has been our base case scenario for the past several months. But what does a right-wing government mean for the financial markets? In an early election manifesto published in recent weeks, the conservative alliance pledged full adhesion to EU solidarity and dropped their previous euroskepticism. This helps them get elected and is positive for investors. However, there are also clouds on the horizon: In the same manifesto, the right-wing parties pledged to lower taxes for families and firms, increase welfare, and crack down on immigration. These programs will add to Italy’s huge debt pile and eventually lead to conflicts with the ECB and other EU institutions. In the manifesto, they stated that if elected, they would seek to amend conditions of Italy’s entitlement to the EU Recovery Fund, as the Russia-Ukraine war has changed the context and priorities significantly. This could potentially put the EU’s grants and cheap loans at risk. Under the Draghi government, Italy has secured about 67 billion euros of EU funds. According to the schedule, Italy will receive a further 19 billion Euros recovery funds in the second half of 2022, if it meets previously agreed upon targets. The new government will try to accept the funds and then make any controversial policy changes. On Russia, the conservative parties claimed that Italy would not be the weak link within EU. They pledged respect for NATO commitments, including increasing defense spending. Both Meloni and her Brothers of Italy have endorsed sending weapons to support Ukraine. Still, we think that due to Italy’s historical link with Russia and the need to secure energy supplies, the new government would be more pragmatic toward Russia. On China, Meloni has stressed that Italy will look to limit China’s economic expansion if the right-wing alliance wins. She stated that “Russia is louder at present and China is quieter, but [China’s] penetration is reaching everywhere.” China will want to use diplomacy to curb this kind of thinking in Europe. Meloni also stated that she would not seek to pursue the Belt and Road Initiative pact that Italy signed with China in 2019. In short, we stand firm on our recommendation of underweighting Italian assets at least until a new government is formed. Europe Gets Its Arm Twisted Further The United Kingdom is going through a severe energy, water, and inflation crisis – on top of the long backlog at the National Health Service – as it stumbles through the aftermath of Covid-19 and Brexit. The Conservative Party’s leadership contest is a distraction – political risk will not subside after it is resolved. The new Tory leader will lack a direct popular mandate but the party will want to avoid an early election in the current economic context, creating instability. The looming attempt at a second Scottish independence referendum will also keep risks high, as the outcome this time may be too close to call (Chart 11). Chart 11UK: Tory Leaders A Sideshow, Risks Will Stay High Germany saw Russia halt natural gas flows through Nord Stream 1 as the great energy cutoff continues. As we have argued since April, Russia’s purpose is to pressure the European economies so that they are more conducive to a ceasefire in Ukraine. Germany will evolve quickly and will improve its energy security faster than many skeptics expect but it cannot do it in a single year. The ruling coalition is also fragile, even though elections are not due anytime soon (Chart 12). Chart 12Germany: Geopolitical Risk Still Rising France’s political risk will also remain high (Chart 13), as domestic politics will be reckless while President Emmanuel Macron and his allies only control 43% of the National Assembly in the aftermath of this year’s election (Chart 14). Chart 13France: Lower Geopolitical Risk Than Germany Chart 14Macron Will Focus On Foreign Policy Spain is likely to see its coalition destabilized and early elections, much like Italy this year (Chart 15). Chart 15Spain: Early Elections Likely Sweden, along with Finland, will be joining NATO, which became clear back in April. In this sense it is at the center of Russia’s conflict with the West over NATO enlargement, so we should take a quick look at the Swedish general election on September 11. Currently the left-wing and right-wing blocs are neck and neck in the polls. While the current Social Democrat-led government may well fall from power, Sweden’s new pursuit of NATO membership is unlikely to change. The right-wing parties in Sweden are in favor of joining NATO. The two parties that oppose NATO membership are the left-wing Green and Left Party. The Social Democrats were pro-neutrality until the invasion of Ukraine and since May have spearheaded Swedish accession to NATO. The pro-neutrality bloc currently holds 43 seats in the 349-seats Riksdag. It has a supply-and-confidence arrangement with the current government and is currently polling at 13%. If it was willing and able to derail Sweden’s NATO bid, it would already have happened. So the general election in Sweden is unlikely to stop Sweden from joining. However, Russia does not want Sweden to join and the entire pre- and post-election period is ripe for “black swan” risks and negative surprises. One thing that could change with the election is Sweden’s immigration policy. The Social Democrats are pro-immigration (albeit pro-integration), while the right-wing bloc is less so. Sweden has received a great many asylum seekers since the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 and will be receiving more from Ukraine and Russia (Chart 16). Chart 16Asylum Seekers to Surpass 2015 Refugee Crisis Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor points out that the increase in asylum seekers could augment Swedish labor force and increase its potential growth in the long run, while in the short run it could increase demand in the domestic economy. But an increase in demand could also exacerbate inflation in Sweden, especially considering how much the Riksbank is behind the curve vis-à-vis the ECB. Our European Investment Strategy recommends shorting EUR/SEK as Sweden is less vulnerable to Russian energy sanctions. Sweden produces most of its energy from renewable sources. Relative to Europe, Canada faces a much more benign political and geopolitical environment (Chart 17). However, within its own context, it will continue to see more contentious domestic politics as interest rates rise on a society with high household debt and property prices. The post-Covid-19 period will undermine the Justin Trudeau government over time, though it is not facing an election anytime soon. Canada continues to benefit from North America’s geopolitical advantage, though quarrels with China will continue, including over Taiwan, and should be taken seriously. Aside from any China shocks we expect Canadian equities to continue to outperform most global bourses. Chart 17Canada: Low Geopolitical Risk But Not Happy South Africa: The Calm Before The Storm South Africa’s economy remains in a low growth trap, which is contributing to rising political risk (Chart 18). Electricity shortages continue to dampen economic activity. Other structural issues like 33.9% unemployment, worsening social imbalances, and a split in the ruling party threaten to cause negative policy surprises. Chart 18South Africa: Institutional Ruling Party At Risk The South African economy has failed to translate growth outcomes into meaningful economic development, leaving low-income households (the median voter) increasingly disenfranchised, burdened, and constrained. Last year’s civil unrest was fueled by economic hardships that persist today. Without a significant and consistent bump to growth, social and political risks will continue to rise. Low-income households remain largely state dependent. Fiscal austerity has already begun to unwind, well before the 2024 election, in a bid to shore up support and quell rising social pressures (Chart 19). Chart 19South Africa: Fiscal Easing Ahead Of 2024 Vote The fact that the social scene is relatively quiet for now should not be seen as a sign of underlying stability. For example, two of the largest trade unions led a nationwide labor strike last week – while we visited clients in the country! – but failed to “shut down” the country as advertised. Labor union constituents noted the ANC’s economic failures, demanded immediate economic reform, and advocated for a universal basic income grant. This action blew over but the election cycle is only just beginning. Looking forward to the election, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s ANC is still viewed more favorably than the faction led by ex-President Jacob Zuma, but Ramaphosa has suffered from corruption allegations recently that have detracted attention from his anti-corruption and reform agenda and highlighted the party’s shortcomings once again. The ANC’s true political rival, the far-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), have so far failed to capitalize on the weak economic backdrop. The EFF is struggling with leadership battles, thus failing to attract as many soured ANC voters as otherwise possible. If the Economic Freedom Fighters refocus and install new leadership, namely a leader that better reflects the tribal composition of the country, the party will become a greater threat to the ANC. But the overall macro backdrop is a powerful headwind for the ANC’s ability to retain a parliamentary majority. Global macro tailwinds that supported local assets in the first half of the year are experiencing volatility due to China’s sluggish growth and now stimulus efforts. Cooling metals prices and slowing global growth have weighed on the rand and local equity returns. But now China is enacting more stimulus. China is South Africa’s largest trading partner, so the decision to ease policy is positive for next year, even though China’s underlying structural impediments will return in subsequent years. This makes it hard to predict whether South Africa’s economic context will be stable in the lead-up to the 2024 election. As long as China can at least stabilize in the post-pandemic environment in 2023, the ANC will not face as negative of a macro environment in 2024 as would otherwise be the case. Investors will need to watch the risk of political influence on the central bank. Recently the ANC resolved to nationalize the central bank. Nationalization is mostly about official ownership but a change in the bank’s mandate was also discussed. However, to change the bank’s mandate from an inflation target to an unemployment target, the ANC would need to change the constitution. Constitutional change requires a two-thirds vote in parliament, a margin the ANC does not hold. Constitutional change will become increasingly difficult if the ANC sheds more support in the 2024 general election, as expected. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on South Africa until global and Chinese growth stabilize. Political risk is rising ahead of the 2024 election but it is not necessarily at a tipping point. Brazil And Turkey: Election Uncertainty Prevails We conclude with two brief points on Brazil and Turkey, which both face important elections – Brazil immediately and Turkey by June 2023. Both countries have experienced different forms of instability as emerging middle classes face economic disappointment, which has led to political challenges to liberal democracy. Brazil – President Jair Bolsonaro’s popular support is rallying into the election, as expected, but it would require a large unexpected shift to knock former President Lula da Silva off course for re-election this October (Chart 20). Brazil’s first round vote will be held on October 2. If Lula falls short of the 50% majority threshold, then a second round will be held on October 30. Bolsonaro faces an uphill battle because his general popularity is weak – his support among prospective voters stands at 35% compared to Lula at 44% today and Lula at 47% when he left office in 2010. Meanwhile the macroeconomic backdrop has worsened over the course of his four-year term. Bolsonaro will contest the election if it is close so Brazil could face significant upheaval in the short run. Chart 20Brazil: Risk Will Peak Around The Election Turkey – President Recep Erdogan’s approval rating has fallen to 41%, while his disapproval has risen to 54%. It is a wonder his ratings did not collapse sooner given that the misery index is reaching 88%, with headline inflation at 78%. Having altered the constitution to take on greater presidential powers, Erdogan will do whatever it takes to stay in power, but the tide of public opinion is shifting and his Justice and Development Party is suffering from 21 years in power. Erdogan could interfere with NATO enlargement, the EU, Syria and refugees, Greece and Cyprus, North Africa and Libya, or Israel in a way that causes negative surprises for Turkish or even global investors. Turkey will be a source of “black swan” risks at least until after the general election slated for June 2023 (Chart 21). Chart 21Turkey: A Source Of 'Black Swans' We will revisit each these markets in greater detail soon. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Senior Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com ​​​​​​​Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix Geopolitical Calendar
特別レポート エグゼクティブ・サマリー 第4次台湾海峡危機が現実化していることを受けて、世界の大国間での大規模な戦争の確率は上昇しました。 当社のディシジョンツリーは確率を約20%と示唆しており、これはロシアのウクライナ戦争だけを起点に想定した水準の2倍に相当します。世界は五発リボルバーで「ロシアンルーレット」をしている状態です。 今後の基本見解としては、米中の国内政治イベントが今秋に一段落した後、台湾緊張は横ばい(悪化はしないが改善もしない)になると見ています。 しかし、もし中国が第20回党大会後に緊張をエスカレートさせれば、侵攻の確率は大幅に上昇します。 台湾で紛争が発生した場合、ロシアが欧州でさらに攻勢的になる確率が高まります。 イランは核兵器の追求を強く進める可能性が高いです。   2022年下半期にポジティブな触媒は多くない 五連発拳銃によるルーレット 五連発拳銃によるルーレット タクティカル推奨開始日リターン 米国10年国債ロング2022-04-141.3% グローバルのディフェンシブ/サイクリック株式ロング2022-01-2013.8% 結論:投資家は少なくとも中国の党大会と米国の中間選挙が今秋に終わるまでは防御的なポジションを維持すべきです。来年の地政学的リスクは中国の台湾海峡での行動次第です。 特集   チャート 1 第三次世界大戦をめぐる臆測が高まる 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 世界の出来事に注意を払う悲観論者たちは、近年第三次世界大戦が勃発するリスクを懸念するようになりました。用語の検索は2019年以降増えていますが、懸念の理由は特定の危機事象というよりもむしろグローバルな多極化という基調にあります(チャート 1)。1 米中、あるいは米露間での大規模な戦争の確率はどのくらいでしょうか。どのように算出できるでしょうか。本レポートでは一連の「ディシジョンツリー」を提示し、各シナリオと確率を形式化して示します。 もしWWIIIを米国がロシアあるいは中国、または両方と直接交戦する戦争と定義するなら、今後数年以内にWWIIIが勃発する確率は20%に達すると計算されます! これは非常に高い確率ですが、歴史はこうした確率が非現実的でないことを示しており、投資家は油断してはなりません。政治学者グレアム・アリソンは長期的に見た米中戦争の確率は約75%であると歴史的類推に基づいて示しています。 要点は、各国がこのWWIIIリスクを直視し、拒否しない限り世界の政治環境は改善しないということです。最もあり得るのは、WWIIIおよびそれがもたらす核戦争のリスクが最終的な制約となり、各国がそれを認識して行動を改めるケースですが、現在の大国の振る舞いはまだ制約を認識しておらず、短期的には瀬戸際政策を続ける意向が窺えます。 中国による台湾侵攻の確率 まず問いは、中国が台湾に侵攻するかどうかです。2021年4月に当社は第4次台湾海峡危機が12~24か月以内に発生すると予測しましたが、全面戦争には発展しないと見ていました。この見方が今試されています。 図表 1では、中国の台湾に対する政策選択肢をマッピングし、それぞれに確率を割り当てるディシジョンツリーを示します。 図表 1 第4次台湾海峡危機に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五連発の拳銃によるルーレット 五連発の拳銃によるルーレット   中国は台湾を侵攻する能力を獲得しましたが、特に核三本柱(トライアド)のさらなる進展がない限り、失敗の確率は依然として高いです。したがって、即時に侵攻のために動員をかける確率は20%と見積もります。 明らかに、中国が侵攻を計画しているという具体的な兆候があれば真剣に受け止めるべきです。 2021年にウクライナ周辺でのロシアの軍事増強を投資家やメディアが軽視したことは損失を招きました。 同時に、米中は台湾海峡の現状を試しているだけであり、現状は今回のエピソード後に強化される可能性が高いという見方もあります。結局のところ、今回の危機は第4次台湾海峡危機であり、過去の危機はいずれも戦争には至りませんでした。 バイデン大統領と習近平が、今秋に予定される重要な国内政治イベントを前にそれぞれの力を誇示しているだけなら、両者は既に目的を達成しています。少なくとも今後数年間にわたっては、これ以上の軍事的見せつけは不要です。 我々は、過去一週間の緊張が残るが現状が強化されるシナリオに40%の確率を割り当てます。 その場合、台湾海峡の構造的問題は2024年の米国と台湾の大統領選挙の後、つまりこの図表の時間枠の外で再燃するでしょう。 残念ながら我々は長期的には悲観的であり、台湾での戦争の確率は高いと考えています。 そのため、我々は今後2年間で状況が悪化するシナリオにも同じく40%の確率を割り当てます。 もし中国が党大会後に演習や制裁を拡大するなら、習指導部が単なる国内向けパフォーマンスではないことが明らかになります。 同様に、もしバイデン政権が中間選挙後も対中ハイテク輸出管理の強化を推し進め、同盟国やパートナーにも同様の対応を求め続けるなら、米国は中国が何らかの攻勢作戦を準備していると暗に判断していることになります。その場合、侵攻の危険性は20%から40%に上昇します。 それでも、米中の危機外交が2023-24年に全面戦争を防ぐという見方は依然として妥当ですが、誤算のリスクは非常に高まります。 このディシジョンツリーの最後の要素は、中国が第二次世界大戦で見られたような従来型の上陸侵攻ではなく、「グレーゾーン戦術」やハイブリッド戦を好むという前提です。理由は複数あります。 第一に、上陸侵攻は最も困難な軍事作戦です。第二に、中国軍は未熟である一方、米国と同盟国は守備を固めています。第三に、ハイブリッド戦は米国の同盟国間に対応の分裂を生みます。第四に、ここ14年でロシアはハイブリッド戦が機能することを何度も示してきました。それは戦略的便益を最大化し、コストを最小化する手段です。 西側が小規模な侵攻にどう反応するかは世界が知っている:経済制裁だ。しかし大規模な侵攻にどう反応するかはまだ分かりません。したがって中国は小さく噛み切るインセンティブを持ちます。 とはいえ台湾の場合、こうした戦術が持続可能でない可能性もあります。当社の台湾に関するディシジョンツリーは、ハイブリッド戦や「代理戦争」が大規模戦争に進展する可能性を完全には織り込んでいません。しかしその可能性は実際には高いのです。したがって我々は米中の大規模戦争のリスクを過小評価しているわけではありません。 結論: 今後2年間で、台湾を巡る米中の代理戦争の主観的確率は約32%、直接的な米中戦争の確率は約4%です。 真の試練は習近平が今秋の党大会で権力を固めた後に訪れます。 我々は習氏が経済の再起動に注力すると予想します したがって我々は中国と台湾を除く新興アジアの市場を引き続き推奨します。 ロシアとNATOの戦争の確率 第二の問いは、ウクライナの戦争が西側とのより広範な戦争に変貌するかどうかです。ウクライナでは既に戦争が継続しているため、ロシアと西側の大規模戦争の確率は中国の場合よりも高くなります。一方、台湾海峡の緊張は現時点ではまだ虚勢の段階にすぎません。 投資家のベースケースとしては、ウクライナ戦争はウクライナ内に限定されると考えるべきです。欧州諸国はドンバスのためだけにロシアと壊滅的な戦いを望んでいません。しかし戦時には物事がしばしば誤ることがあります。 重要な問いは、ロシアがNATO加盟国を攻撃するかどうかです。そうなれば同盟条約の第5条が発動され、「欧州または北米における一つ以上の(同盟)加盟国に対する武力攻撃は、すべての加盟国に対する攻撃と見なされる」ことになり、必要に応じて安全回復のために武力行使が正当化されます。 ロシアのウクライナ侵攻以降、バイデン大統領は繰り返し米国は「NATO領土の一インチたりとも防衛する」と述べており、これは政策の変更ではなく米国のレッドラインであり極めて高い可能性で防衛されるでしょう。したがってこれはロシアにとって重大な制約です。 図表 2ではロシアの選択肢をマッピングし、確率を割り当てます。 図表 2 ロシア・ウクライナ戦争に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット   我々はロシアがドンバス地域とクリミアへの陸路を確保し、勝利を宣言する確率を55%と見ています。ロシアは征服地を何らかの外交合意、つまり停戦という形で正当化しようと動き始めるでしょう。これが我々の2023年のベースケースです。 ロシアが既に外交に向けた動きを始めている証拠があります。2 理由はロシア経済が打撃を受け、世界のコモディティ価格が下落し、人的・物的資源が消耗しているからです。プーチン大統領はドニエプル川河口など、侵攻した地域を支配している限り、ウクライナを弱体化させるという目的は大部分達成したと見なすでしょう。 プーチンは征服地を固め、経済と社会を立て直す必要があります。早ければ早いほどロシアにとって有利であり、欧州がコンセンサスを形成して将来的に天然ガスの全面禁輸を実施するのを防げます。 しかしプーチンの野心が彼を破滅に導くリスクもあります。 我々は侵攻が南西ウクライナ(戦略的港湾都市オデッサを含む)やモルドバ東部に拡大する確率を35%と見積もります。モルドバでは親ロシア派が分離統治するトランスニストリア地域にロシア軍が駐留しています。 この新たなキャンペーンはウクライナを完全に内陸化し、モルドバを無力化し、ロシアにより大きな海上アクセスを与えるでしょう。しかしそれはEUを結束させ、天然ガス禁輸を誘発し、ロシアを弱体化させて絶望的な状況に追い込む可能性もあります。報復に出れば、広範な戦争につながることも考えられます。 フィンランドやスウェーデンがNATO加盟を試みたことでプーチンが攻撃する確率は7%にすぎないと見ます。スターリンはフィンランドに失敗し、プーチンの軍はキエフすら征服できませんでした。英国はこれらの国の支援を約束しており、攻撃はNATOとの戦争を引き起こす公算が大きいでしょう。フィンランド攻撃の決断はロシアがNATOがそこに基地を置く計画を立てていると本当に信じた場合にのみ生じるでしょう。つまりそれがロシアの宣言したレッドラインです。 バルト三国に対するロシアの攻撃は、それらが既にNATOに加盟しているため可能性は低いです。ただしプーチンが絶望的になれば起こり得るというリスクはあります。 我々はバルト侵攻のリスクを3%と見積もります。 要するに、ロシアが欧州に対するエネルギーの締め付けを停戦交渉で有利な合意を引き出すためではなく侵攻の拡大に使うなら、より広範な戦争の確率は上昇します。 結論: 結果として、今後24か月での鎮静化の確率は55%、小規模なエスカレーション(例:オデッサ、モルドバ)は35%、NATO加盟国を巻き込みNATOとロシアの戦争に発展する大規模なエスカレーションは10%です。 戦術的には、もし世界経済が回復しロシアが軍事作戦を中止して停戦交渉に舵を切る明確な転換を示すなら、先進国の欧州通貨および資産を買うべきです。景気循環的には、欧州資産で持続的な強気市場が実現するには米露間のより深い理解が必要です。 米国・イスラエルによるイラン攻撃の確率 今年起きている第三の地政学的危機は、バイデン大統領とアリー・ハメネイ師が2015年の米国・イラン核合意に再加盟することで当面先送りになる可能性があります。しかし我々は懐疑的です。 バイデン政権は2015年の核合意に再加盟して、イランの原油を日量約100万バレル市場に戻し、中間選挙前にガソリン価格を下げたいと考えています。米国のグランドストラテジーはまたイランと関与して中東を安定化させ、米国がアジアへ軸足を移せるようにしたいと考えています。 EUはイラン資源への需要がより大きく、イランの核獶取得を防ぎたいので合意を提案しています。ロシアと中国も対米制裁解除とイランとの貿易を望むため支持的ですし、必ずしもイランに核が持たれることを望んでいるわけではありません。 ただし一つ問題があります:イランは体制の長期的生存を確保するために核兵器を必要としている。 問題はハメネイが再び米国との合意を承認するかどうかです。最初の合意は彼の体制に大きな代償をもたらして裏切られました。近い将来ハメネイに代わって権力を握ることを望むエブラヒム・ライシ大統領は、自らのキャリアと個人の安全を2024年の大統領選の共和党勝利に賭けることには強く反対するでしょう。 イランは既に核ブレイクアウト能力を達成しています—核装置を構築できるだけの60%濃縮ウランを保有している—そして最終的に核抑止力を獲得しようとしない理由が不明です。特に将来的に米国やその同盟国からの軍事攻撃から体制を守る必要が生じる可能性があるためです。 ただし当社の確信度は中程度です。バイデン大統領は制裁解除を望んでおり一方的にそれを行うことができるからです。バイデン政権はいまだ合意を成立させるための予備的措置を講じていませんが、それは変わる可能性があります。3 短期的なつなぎ合意には好循環的な理屈があります。 BCAのコモディティ&エネルギー・ストラテジスト、ボブ・ライアンによれば、サウジアラビアとUAEの間の予備生産余力は合わせて約150万バレルに過ぎません。EUの石油禁輸と西側諸国の対ロシア制裁は約200万バレル/日を市場から押し出すため、OPECの余力の大部分を吸収します。したがってバイデン政権はイランが市場にもたらし得る100万バレルを必要としています。 我々はイランが制裁解除を認める合意に署名し、バイデンに制裁解除を可能にする可能性を否定できません。それは彼らの経済に利益をもたらします。彼らは核査察を許容しつつ、密かに弾頭や弾道ミサイル開発に注力を移すかもしれません。イランは不可逆的に核計画を放棄するわけではなく、時間稼ぎに長けています。 それでもイランの国内政治は合意を支持しておらず、米国が提供できる信頼できる安全保障の保証がなければ、イランのグランドストラテジーは合意を支持しません。米国はその外交政策の一貫性の欠如からそのような保証を提供できないのです。米国のグランドストラテジーは合意が検証可能であれば支持しますが、イランが合意を口実に爆弾を追求するようなケースは容認しません。 イランは3年間の最大制裁、パンデミック、世界的混乱を経ても屈服していません。そしてロシアと中国が西側に攻勢をかけるようになったことで、戦略的利益を引き出す見通しがより大きくなったとイランは見ています。 モスクワと北京は対ワシントンの共通の不満のため戦略的パートナーになり得ます。一方で米国はルーハニ政権を裏切ったのと同じようにライシ政権を裏切ることも容易であり、その結果として経済は再び翻弄され、最高指導者と政治体制は国民から二重に愚か者と見なされるでしょう。 図表 3はイランの選択肢を整理しています。 図表 3 イラン核危機に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五連発拳銃でのルーレット 五連発拳銃でのルーレット   交渉が決裂した場合(50%)、イランは米国とイスラエルが攻撃する前に核兵器確保へ向けて突進するでしょう。 米国とイランが合意に達した場合(40%)、イランは2024年の米国選挙まで合意の条件に従う可能性があり、当面は投資家の懸念材料が除かれます。しかし長期的に核抑止力を得ようとする利害は変わらず、2024年以降に紛争が再燃するでしょう。 協議が決着せず継続する場合(10%)、イランは合意の制約なしに核計画を漸進的に進めるでしょう(ただし突発的な突進を必ずしも必要としないかもしれません)。 要するに、ロシアと中国はイランが核計画を凍結してもイランを必要としますが、米国とイスラエルはイランを抑止するために勢力均衡のアブラハム同盟を形成するでしょう—たとえイランが核計画を凍結してもです。 結論: 投資家は短期的なつなぎの米国・イラン核合意に40%の確率を割り当てるべきです。原油価格の下落は一時的なものにとどまるでしょう。長期的な供給拡大は、米国がイランに不可逆的に核計画を停止させるのに十分な安全保障保証を提供できないため期待できません。 第三次世界大戦の確率 ここからが難しい部分で、これら3つの地政学的危機を合わせて考えます。以下では単純化しすぎていますが、異なるプレーヤーとその選択肢について我々の考えを形式化するのが目的です。 図表 4は中国/台湾紛争に関する結論から出発し、その結果としてロシアのより広範な戦争の確率を調整し、イランが核兵器追求に極めて積極的であるという見方を加えたものです。時間枠は再び2年です。 図表 4 第三次世界大戦に関するディシジョンツリー(次の24か月) 五発の銃を使ったルーレット 五発の銃を使ったルーレット   WWIIIとは異なる紛争シナリオとしては「限定戦争」があり—これは米国が関与しない、あるいは間接的にしか関与しないハイブリッド戦や代理戦争を指す危険な概念です。あるいはロシアと中国を巻き込まないイランとの紛争である可能性もあります。 我々は中国から議論を始めます。なぜなら中国は現代で最も有能で野心的なグローバルパワーだからです。中国の戦略的台頭は世界秩序を揺るがし米国に挑戦しています。また今年のいくつかの証拠から、ロシアは戦争をウクライナ外に拡大する意図を持っていない可能性が示唆されていることも理由です。 中国が台湾に対してさらなる攻撃的行動を取れば、ロシアがより大きなリスクを取るユニークな機会が生まれます。そうでない場合、WWIIIの確率は2年間で急落します。これが我々のベースケースです。 しかし中国が台湾を攻撃し米国が台湾を防衛する場合、我々はロシアがバルト三国に侵攻する確率が高まると見ています。もし中国がハイブリッド攻撃を行い米国が台湾を間接的にしか支援しないなら、ロシアの攻勢の確率はわずかにしか上がりません。 結果として、WWIII(米国がロシアまたは中国、あるいは両者と直接戦う戦争)の確率は20%になります。こうした戦争が限定的に留まるかどうかは議論の余地があります。1945年以降の戦争ゲームは、主要核保有国間の戦争はエスカレートしやすいことを示しています。しかし核兵器は相互確証破壊という究極の制約をもたらします。核エスカレーションのリスクがあるため、我々はディシジョンツリーにおけるWWIIIの確率を下方に丸めています。 より確からしい59%の「限定戦争」シナリオは一見ポジティブな結果のように見えるかもしれませんが、そこには今日の水準からの地政学的緊張の大幅な上昇、例えば中国の台湾に対するハイブリッド戦などが含まれます。 結論: この試算ではWWIIIの確率は最大20%に達し得ます。これは我々のロシアに関するディシジョンツリーの水準の倍であり、当社の台湾危機の予測が現実化したことを考慮すると妥当です。 重要な要因は、今秋の党大会後に北京が台湾への圧力をさらにエスカレートさせるかどうかです。それが危険な連鎖反応を引き起こす可能性があります。 世界経済と金融市場は地政学的リスクからの下振れリスクを依然として抱えていますが、ロシアが停戦に向かい、中国が台湾への行動を遅らせて経済再起動に集中する場合、2023年には改善が見られる可能性があります。 投資の示唆 今年初めにロシアがウクライナに侵攻した際、当社の同僚であるチーフ・グローバル・ストラテジストのピーター・ベレジンは核による破滅の確率を10%と主張しました。 少なくともこれはロシアとNATOが衝突する確率として合理的な数値です。 今や予想された台湾危機が現実になりました。我々は主要な戦争の確率が20%へと倍増したと推定します。 逆に言えばより良い結果が起こる確率は80%です。分析的には、我々は依然としてロシアが限定的な目的—ウクライナを繁栄や軍事的に強大にさせないよう弱体化する—を追求していると見ており、中国も限定的な目的—台湾を国家たる存在としてではなく従属へと向かわせることで威嚇する—を追求していると見ています。 これらの目的が変わらない限り、我々はまだ第三次世界大戦からは遠いと考えます。 世界は不活化されたウクライナと従属した台湾と共存できます。 しかし否定できないのは、2008年のグローバル金融危機以降の世界情勢の軌跡が第二次世界大戦前の道筋と不快なほど似ているということです:金融危機、経済後退、デフレ、国内不安、通貨切り下げ、貿易保護主義、債務の貨幣化、軍備増強、インフレ、そして侵略戦争。ルーレットがゲームなら、世界戦争の確率は6分の1、すなわち17%であり、我々のディシジョンツリーの20%という結果に近い数値です。 我々が仮に大げさであるとしても、WWIIIの確率が20%に達すると論理的に主張できること自体が、投資家が現在のウクライナと台湾をめぐる緊張が低下するまで大きなリスクを取るのを待つべきであることを示唆しています。 簡単なチェックリストを見ると、グローバルマクロと地政学の文脈は陰鬱です(表 1)。チェックリストの改善が見られるまでより楽観的になるのは控えるべきです。 表 1 2022年下半期にポジティブな触媒は多くない 五発の拳銃を使ったルーレット 五発の拳銃を使ったルーレット     チャート 2 2022年下半期は防御的ポジションを維持 2022年下半期は防御的なポジションを維持する 2022年下半期は防御的なポジションを維持する 具体的には、投資家はロシアがNATOに拡大しないこと、そして中国が当面台湾を侵攻しないことに合理的な安心感を持つ必要があります。 これはワシントンとモスクワ、ワシントンと北京の間で紛争を回避する新たな外交的理解を要求します。 そのような理解は危機の中でしか築かれません。関連する危機は進行中ですがまだ完了していません。 通常の解決策である外交を通じて戦争リスクが払拭されるまで、グローバル株式にはさらに下振れリスクがある可能性が高いです。 世界システムの具体的かつ信頼できる改善が見られるまで、リスク資産に対して一般的なオーバーウェイト姿勢を取るのは控えましょう。株より政府債券を重視し、グローバル株より米国株、景気敏感セクターよりディフェンシブ・セクターを好み、中国・台湾の通貨と資産は評価を下げることを推奨します(チャート 2)。     マット・ガートケン チーフ・ジオポリティカル・ストラテジストmattg@bcaresearch.com  脚注 1      記:Graham Allison、Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?(New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017)。 2     例えば、オデッサからの穀物輸送に関するトルコ仲介の合意、2015年イラン核合意への再加盟を支持する外交的動き、ヘルソンのような征服地での住民投票、軍縮交渉での影響力強化の試みなどです。欧州のエネルギーを断つことは最終的に欧州を停戦に有利な条件で妥協させるための圧力手段です。 3     イランは依然として余計な要求を出しています—最近ではIAEAがイランの未公表の核施設で発見された特定の人工ウラン粒子の出所を調査している件を取り下げるよう要求しました。IAEAはこの調査を取り下げておらず、取り下げればIAEAの信頼性が損なわれます。一方でバイデンは制裁を強化しており、制裁解除はイランの主要な要求です。バイデンはイラン革命防衛隊やイQods部隊をテロ指定から外していません。これらのハードルは決定的ではありませんが、我々の見方を変える前に何らかの進展を見るべきだと考えます。 戦略テーマ オープン・タクティカル・ポジション(0~6か月) オープン・サイクリック推奨(6~18か月) 地域別地政学リスクマトリックス 「打率」:地政学ストラテジーの成果()