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Highlights The direct impact of recently proposed U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum is likely to be small, both for China and the world. In isolation, this development is not very relevant for investment strategy. However, the lessons learned from studying the game of Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that investors should be legitimately concerned about an iterative "tit-for-tat" exchange of retaliation between the U.S. and its major trade partners if the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressively protectionist trade policies. Recent data releases show that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. While the Caixin manufacturing PMI is a bright spot, it is not likely heralding a major turning point for the Chinese economy. Investors should closely watch three bellwethers to judge the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war. Barring a major deterioration on this front, or a sharp further slowdown in Chinese economic growth, investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs global. Feature The looming threat of U.S. protectionism came into full force over the past week, as President Trump stated that sweeping tariffs on all U.S. imports of steel and aluminum would soon be formalized. The tariff situation continues to evolve as we go to press, but the facts as they currently stand are the following: The proposed tariffs would be 25% on steel, and 10% on aluminum imports No exceptions are planned for any country, although statements from U.S. leadership on Monday suggested that Canada and Mexico may be exempt if NAFTA is renegotiated in the U.S.' favor Key European Union leaders threatened to retaliate against the U.S.' proposed tariffs, and the U.S. threatened to counter-retaliate China has taken a more cautious stance on the issue of retaliation, and is strongly seeking to negotiate with the Trump administration Minimal Direct Impact The developments over the past week raise two questions about China's economy that matter for investment strategy: What is the direct impact of the tariffs on China's exports likely to be? What is the implication for global growth? On the first question, the answer is fairly clear that the direct impact is likely to be small. The proposed tariffs do not disproportionately target China, and Chinese exports of steel and aluminum to the U.S. account for less than 0.2% of total exports (Chart 1). Exports of these products to all countries as a share of total exports is still quite small (panel 2). The second question is much more difficult to answer, and it has wide implications for both the Chinese economy and for investment strategy. When approaching the question, it is first important to note that the threat to the global economy from the imposition of the proposed tariffs comes from the potential for a series of retaliations from major trading partners, not the tariffs themselves. U.S. imports of steel and aluminum make up less than 1% of global goods exports, and Chart 2 presents a long-term history of average U.S. tariff rates along with our estimate of the impact of the U.S.' proposal. While the imposition of the announced tariffs would certainly change the trend that has been in place for some time, the rise is not very significant. Critically, even after the tariffs are imposed, U.S. tariffs rates will still be fractional when compared with those that prevailed during the early-1930s, when the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act materially exacerbated the Great Depression. Chart 1Chinese Steel And Aluminum Exports##br## Are Not Significant Chart 2We're A Long, Long Way Away##br## From Smoot-Hawley China's cautious stance towards retaliation is, at first blush, an encouraging development, but it may not be as hopeful of a sign as it seems. First, despite a general feeling among investors that China was the intended target of the U.S.' proposed tariffs, a global tariff on steel and aluminum is likely to disproportionately affect developed countries rather than China. It is therefore not surprising that China has signaled a somewhat conciliatory stance. In our view, the likelihood of Chinese retaliation is considerably higher if further tariffs are announced on goods that make up a larger share of their exports. In addition, as we noted above, the European Union has already highlighted some U.S. goods that may be subject to higher retaliatory tariffs in response to the news (which already elicited a threat of counter-retaliation from the U.S.), and both Canada and Mexico have also threatened retaliation if they are not granted an exemption from the proposed tariffs. In our view, these threats should be treated seriously, especially after revisiting the lessons of one of the most famous experiments in game theory. Bottom Line: The direct impact of proposed U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum is likely to be small, both for China and the world. Retaliation Risk And The Prisoner's Dilemma The dynamics of trade renegotiations can be examined, at least conceptually, through the lens of game theory. It is difficult to model these dynamics precisely because of the complexity of the relationship between trade and potential growth, but it is worth revisiting the lessons learned by the repeated playing of Prisoner's Dilemma, one of the most well-known examples of the application of game theory. To summarize, the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario describes two criminals who have been arrested, and whose statement to the authorities affects the manner in which punishment (if any) is distributed between the two of them. The standard payoff structure of the game is set up such that one prisoner is able to largely avoid punishment if (s)he accuses the other of the crime and the other prisoner remains silent, but that both prisoners receive a punishment if they both accuse each other that is greater than the punishment received if they both remain silent (Table 1). Given that tariffs and other forms of trade protectionism can only durably succeed at improving net domestic economic outcomes if they do not result in retaliation, from the perspective of trade renegotiation, accusing the other player in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma is tantamount to restricting trade, and remaining silent is equivalent to allowing existing trade relationships to persist. Table1In The Prisoner's Dilemma, It's Better To Return Defection With Defection The success of strategies employed in repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma was studied most famously by Robert Axelrod in 1980.1 The winning strategy (in both of Axelrod's tournaments) was "Tit for Tat", which follows two very simple rules: cooperate initially, and thereafter copy the other player's decision in the previous round. This strategy has three attributes that Axelrod showed to be highly successful when playing repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma: niceness (not being the first player to accuse/defect/renege), being provocable (responding to defections with in-kind retaliation), and forgiveness (not allowing one-time defections to impact future choices beyond a one-time retaliation). Chart 3 illustrates the performance of the "Tit for Tat" strategy in the first Axelrod tournament, along with the average scores of several other strategies. The most important lesson from both tournaments is summarized nicely in the chart: the average score of a series of "nice" strategies was considerably higher than those that were not nice. But Chart 4 also highlights that niceness is only a relatively successful strategy because of its ability to produce an optimal outcome with other nice strategies: all strategies, nice or not, tend to generate poor outcomes when played against strategies that are not nice. This is because the payoff structure of Prisoner's Dilemma is such that, compared with defection, co-operation makes a player worse off if their opponent defects. Chart 3In Repeated Games Of Prisoner's Dilemma,##br## "Nice" Strategies Pay Off... Chart 4...But Only Because They Do Well Against ##br##Other "Nice" Strategies In the context of global trade, this can be seen as the likelihood of outsized job losses (or the lack of job gains in a protected industry) from a failure to retaliate. The key point for investors is that the most basic lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that market participants should be legitimately concerned about retaliation from the U.S.' trade partners (and subsequent counter-retaliation) if it continues to pursue a protectionist agenda, because it can be a rational response for an individual country even if it leads to poor outcomes for everyone involved. In addition, three assumptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma game are not valid in the real world (or the current environment), which in two of these cases further increases the risk of an iterative exchange of retaliation: Chart 5The U.S. Has A Trade Deficit ##br##With Many Trading Partners In terms of the payoffs associated with the game, Prisoner's Dilemma assumes an equal starting position (of zero "points") on both sides, which is not the case in the current environment. The U.S. has a sizeable trade deficit with the world (Chart 5), and several important trading partners with the U.S. (especially China) maintain significant non-tariffs barriers to trade. Regardless of whether this inequity has been caused by an unfair trading relationship, in the parlance of Axelrod's tournaments, this implies that the U.S. strategy is likely to be not nice due to the perception on the part of the Trump administration of an unequal starting position. The implication is that the odds of an escalation of the imposition of relatively small tariffs into a full-blown trade war are higher than would normally be the case. Prisoner's Dilemma has clear and symmetric payoffs, which is also not the case in the current environment. The Trump administration apparently feels that the payoff to the U.S. of certain trade restrictions is a net positive even assuming retaliation, which raises the possibility of a negative outcome for the global economy. Worryingly, in our view the chances are high that calculations of the net benefit of any trade restriction are being done on a political basis, rather than an economic one. Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that the participants are unable to communicate, which is a limitation that does not exist in a real-world trade negotiation scenario. This lowers the probability that the U.S. and its major trading partners will engage in a spiraling tit-for-tat trade war relative to what the game of Prisoner's Dilemma would imply, even if the recently announced tariffs on steel and aluminum stand and major partners do retaliate. Bottom Line: The lessons learned from studying the game of Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that investors should be legitimately concerned about an iterative "tit-for-tat" exchange of retaliation between the U.S. and its major trade partners if the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressively protectionist trade policies. No Help From The Domestic Economy A protectionist agenda from the U.S. is also coming at an inconvenient time for Chinese policymakers, even if they were not blindsided by the move. Policymakers already have to contend with managing the impact of renewed reforms on economy's financial and industrial sectors, and the potential addition of the external sector to this list of problems needing attention is unwelcome. While a cooling of the economy was an inevitable result from the government's deleveraging campaign and shadow banking crackdown, Table 2 highlights how broadly leading economic indicators have decelerated. The table presents recent data points for several series that we identified in November Special Report as having leading properties for the Chinese business cycle,2 as well as the most recent month-over-month change, an indication of whether the series is currently above its 12-month moving average, how long this has been the case. Table 2No Convincing Signs Of An Impending Upturn In China's Economy Among the components of the BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator (an index designed to lead turning points in the Li Keqiang index), all six series are in a downtrend and 5 out of these 6 fell in January (the growth in M2 was the exception). A similar story is borne out in the housing price data, with a variety of diffusion indexes having also fallen in January.3 The Caixin Manufacturing PMI remains the one bright spot, having recently risen above its 12-month moving average and having risen in January, in stark contrast to the official PMI (which fell a full point). But as Chart 6 highlights, following the last four episodes when the Caixin PMI exceeded the official PMI by this magnitude, the subsequent trend in the average of the two was down in every case. The implication is that the outlier nature of the current Caixin PMI shown in Table 2 is just that, and not a heralding a major upturn in China's economy. Chart 6The Caixin PMI Is Probably The Noise, Not The Signal Bottom Line: Recent data releases show that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. While the Caixin manufacturing PMI is a bright spot, it is not likely heralding a major turning point for the Chinese economy. Conclusions For Investment Strategy Chart 7 illustrates the decision tree for Chinese stocks that we presented in our first report of the year. While there has been a modest further deterioration in the industrial sector, the pace of the decline is still consistent with the controlled slowdown scenario that we outlined in an October Weekly Report.4 As such, the recent softness in the data is not significant enough to cause us to change our recommended investment strategy. The key change over the past week has been the threat posed by U.S. protectionism to the global economy, which is the very first question to answer in our decision tree. The now high-beta nature of the Chinese stock market underscores that U.S. protectionism can significantly (negatively) impact the relative performance of Chinese equities if it destabilizes the global stock market, even if Chinese exports were to emerge from the exchange relatively unscathed. For now, we judge the likelihood of a full-blown tit-for-tat trade war to be a risk, and thus not a probable event. For now, market participants seem to agree: U.S. and global equities rebounded earlier this week in response to a feeling that the negative repercussions for global growth are likely to be minimal. Nonetheless, this is a risk that needs to be monitored closely, and to facilitate this our Geopolitical Strategy service has highlighted the following three bellwethers that they will be watching in order to judge the likelihood of a major escalation:5 Chart 7The Chinese Equity "Decision Tree" Tariff exceptions for allies: Given the national security basis for the steel and aluminum tariffs, it is likely that exceptions will be made for allies such as Canada and Europe. If yes, then the measure is unlikely to be part of a truly "America First" mercantilist strategy and is instead a veiled swipe at China to satisfy Trump's base ahead of the midterm elections NAFTA: Our geopolitical team has argued that the probability of NAFTA abrogation is around 50%.6 If the administration continues the negotiations in light of tariff announcements, however, it suggests that the revealed preference of the White House is less protectionist than it appears. Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft: The Trump administration is investigating Chinese technology transfer and IP theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. If China is found to have acted unfairly, penalties would likely include a combination of tariffs and restrictions on Chinese investment in the U.S. This might include an indemnity for cumulative losses from past violations, which would be rare, if not unprecedented, and which China would reject outright. This could produce across-the-board tariffs of a sort that the U.S. has not imposed since the Nixon shock. Chart 8China Is Outperforming Global In Ex-Tech Terms In the meantime, Chart 8 highlights that investable Chinese ex-technology stocks (proxied by the MSCI China Index ex-technology) remain in an uptrend versus their global peers, which underscores that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. This underscores that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. While the ongoing slowdown in China's economy is likely to cause earnings growth to decelerate over the coming year, the continued likelihood of decently positive earnings growth coupled with a sizeable valuation discount relative to global signals that Chinese ex-tech stocks are remain attractive on a risk/reward basis. Investors should stay overweight. Bottom Line: Investors should closely watch three bellwethers to judge the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war. Barring a major deterioration on this front, or a sharp further slowdown in Chinese economic growth, investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs global. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" and "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" by Robert Axelrod, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 Nos.1 and 3, March and September 1980. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of The Chinese Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, as discussed in our February 8 Weekly Report, we are keeping an eye on residential floor space sold given its history of leading China's housing market cycles. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War", dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto Populism", dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights We re-examine our Yield and Protector portfolios to find out which assets will hold up best if there is a material correction. Our tactical view on gold is neutral, but the risk in gold prices will remain skewed to the upside this year. Are tariffs on aluminum and steel the start of a trade spat or a trade war? Feature Fears of a trade war and a hawkish tone from Fed Chair Jay Powell at his first Humphrey Hawkins testimony to Congress pushed the U.S. equity market lower last week. The ten-year Treasury yield barely budged however, buffeted by a more hawkish Fed on one side and a trade-induced slowdown in global growth on the other. The dollar was modestly higher last week, but oil and gold prices moved lower. The S&P 500's 4% loss in February was the worst single month since October 2016 and worst February since 2009. Both investment-grade and high-yield credit spreads widened last week, and have yet to return to their late January lows. Moreover, at 22, the VIX remained elevated relative to start of the year, consistent with our view that markets have entered a more volatile, late-cycle phase. With the 2.8% run-up in the S&P 500 since the February 8 low, investors are less concerned that the early February pullback in risk assets was a signal that the equity bull market is over and a recession is right around the corner. Nonetheless, some clients with a more strategic outlook are considering paring back risk now. Others want to know how to protect gains while still participating in the bullish tone for the market BCA expects in the next 12 months. Our Yield and Protector portfolios might provide a way for investors to protect against the downside while still participating in the S&P 500. Preparing For A Pullback BCA recommends investors stay overweight on equities and U.S. spread product, but expects that positions should be moved to neutral later this year and then to underweight sometime in 2019.1 Long-term investors should already consider paring back their exposures to both asset classes given that valuations are stretched. We have periodically recommended that a variety of investments be added as portfolio "insurance" to help guard against a material correction in equities. We recently highlighted two forms of insurance: our Yield and Protector Portfolios. We introduced the Yield Portfolio in October 20142 and first discussed the Protector Portfolio in October 2015.3 This week, we revisit the issue by comparing both portfolios with a more common form of insurance: shifting from cyclical to defensive stocks within an equity allocation. The Yield Portfolio (YP) emphasizes "high quality carry", along with some protection via TIPS (25% of the Portfolio), if inflation begins to surprise on the upside after investors are conditioned to expect only deflation shocks. The YP performs well in an environment of slow nominal growth, no recession and gradual interest-rate hikes. On the other hand, the Protector Portfolio (PP) is designed to provide insulation against both deflationary (gold and trade-weighted dollar) and inflationary (TIPS) tail risks. Therefore, the PP may underperform risk assets for a time if tail risks keep receding. Still, it has done well during the equity rally and conservative investors should consider adopting it. As discussed in the section below, our tactical view on gold is neutral, but the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy notes that the risk in gold prices will remain skewed to the upside this year. Charts 1, 2, and 3 show a breakdown of the relative performance of S&P 500 defensives along with our Yield and Protector Portfolios. Panels 2 and 3 of Charts 1, 2 and 3 present the rolling one-year beta and alpha of each strategy versus the S&P 500. Alpha is presented as the difference between the actual year-over-year excess return of the portfolio (versus short-term Treasury bills) and what would have been expected given the portfolio's beta. This measure is also referred to as "Jensen's alpha." Chart 1S&P 500 Defensives##BR##A Modestly Low Beta Option Chart 2A Lower Beta##BR##Than Defensives Chart 3A Beta Near Zero,##BR##And Positive Alpha Based on the historical beta of the three portfolios versus the S&P 500, defensive stocks are the most correlated with the overall equity market. Our PP had a negative correlation to the broad market until earlier this year, when it turned slightly positive. BCA's YP is somewhere in between, with a positive but relatively low beta. This is consistent with the equity composition of the three portfolios (shown in Table 1). Note that our protector portfolio is composed entirely of non-equity assets. Table 1A Breakdown Of Three##BR##Portfolio Insurance Options After accounting for their lower betas, all three portfolios have outperformed the S&P in risk-adjusted terms since the onset of the global economic recovery. However, the three portfolios have experienced a relative decline versus the S&P 500 since Trump's election. This has occurred due to passive rather than active underperformance. In other words, they have underperformed because they failed to keep up with the S&P 500 rather than because of losses in absolute terms. We draw two important conclusions from Charts 1, 2 and 3 for U.S. multi-asset investors. First, the lower beta of our YP and PP compared with S&P defensives means that the former represent a better insurance against a sell-off in the equity market rather than the latter. Secondly, the persistently positive volatility-adjusted returns for our insurance portfolios highlights an investor preference for these assets in the past few years. However, since late 2017 when investors began to significantly upgrade the prospects for global growth and U.S. corporate profits, all three portfolios struggled to outperform the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis. BCA's forecast implies that these portfolios may continue to struggle in the next year or so. For now, our investment bias towards equities over government bonds makes us less inclined to favor a low beta position within a balanced portfolio. Our analysis suggests that clients who anticipate the need for portfolio insurance in the coming year should back our YP and PP over a defensive-sector allocation. We would likely extend this recommendation to all clients if there is any material progression towards the sell-off triggers identified in the Bank Credit Analyst's February 2018 publication.4 Bottom Line: Investors seeking protection against a potential equity market sell-off should look to our Yield and Protector Portfolios over defensive-sector positioning. We do not currently recommend these portfolios for all clients, but we may do so if our key sell-off triggers are breached. Gold Bugged Our tactical view on gold is neutral, but the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy notes that the risk in gold prices will remain skewed to the upside this year. The yellow metal is supported by increasing inflation and inflation expectations, heightened geopolitical risks and greater volatility in equity markets.5 However, the higher inflation and inflation expectations will be countered by Fed rate hikes, which will boost the U.S. dollar and lift real rates in our base case. Strategically, we expect that gold will provide a good hedge against any downturn in equities when the bull market turns bear in 2H19. Chart 4 shows that the price of gold in real terms is still very expensive. On a nominal basis, gold is at the top end of a trading channel initiated in early 2012 (Chart 5). There has been a significant gap between the model value and the actual price of gold for the past four years. The real price of gold remains elevated, although inflation has been well contained. Chart 4Model Suggests Gold Is Overvalued Chart 5Testing Top End Of A Downward Channel However, the macro environment BCA envisions for 2018 is also supportive for gold (Table 2). Gold tends to perform well when oil prices rise and as the 2/10 Treasury curve steepens. Moreover, gold prices tend to go up when the U.S. economy benefits from fiscal thrust and tax cuts. Furthermore, the soundings on the February ISM manufacturing index support higher gold prices. When the headline index is above 60 as it was in February (60.8), gold climbs by an average of 31%. Even 12 months after ISM is above 60, gold returns are over 20%. The elevated level of ISM new orders (64.2) and price (74.2) indices in February also suggest solid increases for gold. Finally, gold prices climb in the late stages of an economic expansion, such as the current one that began in 2009.6 Even so, our 6 to 12-month view on gold is that it will take its cues from Fed policy and policy expectations. The Fed is not behind the curve on inflation, and inflation expectations and measured inflation remain low. Our CPI and PCE models (Chart 6) show only a modest acceleration in inflation by year-end, which will be sufficient to keep the Fed on track this year as it continues to shrink its balance sheet and boost rates four times. Thus, there is no pressing need to hold gold as a hedge against inflation in the next year. Nonetheless, for those investors too concerned about a pullback that turns into a correction or a bear market, we note that gold has a 33% weight in our Protector Portfolio. Table 2Favorable Macro Backdrop For Gold Chart 6BCA's Inflation Models Show Only##BR##Modest Acceleration Through Year-End Bottom Line: Gold is expensive in real terms relative to a set of fundamentals that have explained its real price since 1970. However, it may have a better value on a strategic basis or as part of a portfolio designed to protect against falling equity prices. Moreover, our macro backdrop forecast for the next 12 months supports higher gold prices. Keep gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Trade Off BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team has long argued that two sources of geopolitical risk this year are China's trade surplus and Trump's position on trade relations with China, Canada and Mexico. Specifically, the view is that weak poll numbers may lead Trump to trigger trade disputes with important trading partners such as China, Mexico and Canada. However, our geopolitical analysts also point out that investors should not confuse a trade spat with a trade war. There are very few legal or constitutional constraints on Trump over trade issues (Table 3). It will be his decision whether to adopt sweeping tariffs (trade war) as opposed to a more targeted approach (trade spat). Clearly, the former is more disruptive and raises more uncertainty, so this is the key distinction to keep in mind. Presidents Nixon, Reagan, Bush (II) and Obama all imposed temporary tariffs on items (including steel and aluminum, and including by citing national security concerns) without triggering a trade war. Late last week, Trump indicated that he would announce tariffs on steel and aluminum this week. He implied that he would go for a broad-based approach of penalizing all steel and aluminum imports, which points toward the more aggressive approach. But the details (whether he exempts U.S. allies and partners or narrows the scope of goods) will not be certain until he issues his official proclamation. Table 3Trump Faces Few Constraints On Trade Steel and aluminum get the headlines, but account for only a small share of U.S. trade and GDP7 (Chart 7). BCA is more concerned about the Administration's stance on more deeper issues, like the WTO, NAFTA, or (in China's case) intellectual property and state-owned enterprises.8 The issues here are harder to quantify, have few precedents, and have more structural and ideological issues which are at stake. The U.S. has a massive trade surplus in services and in intellectual property,9 so a prolonged disruption would pose a serious threat to the U.S. economy, at least in the short term. Trump's decision on intellectual property trade with China is due on August 12, but could occur earlier. BCA's stance on U.S.-China relations is bearish in the long run.10 We place high odds on an eventual trade war, but the timing is a tougher call. Investors should not view China's proportional retaliation on an item-by-item basis as the start of a trade war. BCA's view is that China's leadership will try to offer reforms and investment opportunities to pacify Trump. However, there is a risk either that China offers no reforms (in which case Xi Jinping's rampant Communism exacerbates trade conflicts) or that Trump may introduce broad sweeping measures that give China no choice but to respond in kind, leading to a trade war. Our Geopolitical Strategy service notes that the probability of Trump abrogating NAFTA is as high as 50%. The seventh round of NAFTA talks concludes this week; an eighth round is scheduled for late March. Negotiations could drag on right to the Mexican election on July 1, but if they are not looking more optimistic by this spring then the risk of the U.S. (or Mexico) walking away will rise. The U.S. economy has been largely unaffected by NAFTA and would likely experience no disruption if Trump abrogated the deal and began negotiations on bilateral trade agreements with Canada and Mexico (Chart 8). Chart 7Steel And Aluminum In Perspective Chart 8U.S. Economy: Largely Unaffected By NAFTA Bottom Line: Elevated trade tensions with China,11 Canada and Mexico are near-term risks to global growth. From now through April could be a decisive time for the Trump Administration with China and NAFTA. We are bearish on U.S.-China relations in the long term. If Trump abandons NAFTA, the implications for the U.S. economy would be muted, although U.S. inflation may push higher. Such a decision would also send a clear signal to other key U.S. allies. However, if Trump stands by NAFTA, then it signals that he has sided with the establishment on trade. This would be bullish for risk assets and would lower geopolitical risk premia. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Next Recession: Later But Deeper," published February 23, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Ice Storm", published October 20, 2014. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Tenuous Relief Rally", published on October 12, 2015. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, February 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Gold Still Shines Despite Threat Of Higher Inflation", published February 1, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View", published October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease", published March 1, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "America Is Roaring Back", published January 31, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?", published June 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin", published January 18, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China", published February 28, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights China's new exchange rate regime has significantly weakened the link between the U.S. dollar and the broad RMB trend, at the expense of a stronger (negative) relationship between CNY/USD and the dollar. Our metrics to gauge the impact of broad RMB movements on exports suggest that the recent rise is not yet a threat to China's economy. A further 5% depreciation in the U.S. dollar would cause a meaningful further increase, but not one large enough for our metrics to flash a warning sign. Several factors argue against the probability of an August 2015-style CNY/USD devaluation. Even if the PBOC were to do so, global investors would likely react very differently than they did in 2015, given the underlying strength of the global economy. Stay overweight Chinese investable stocks over the cyclical investment horizon, despite a likely dollar-driven retracement in CNY/USD over the coming months. Feature Chart 1A Sharp Rise In CNY/USD The Chinese Renminbi (RMB) has risen over 4% versus the U.S. dollar since mid-December, and global investors have begun to take notice (Chart 1). The sharp acceleration in the RMB has raised several questions in the minds of market participants: What is the likely economic impact of the rise, and how does this fit into the view that China's ongoing growth slowdown is likely to be benign and controlled? How will policymakers respond to the strength in the exchange rate? Is there a risk of a 2015-style depreciation that would roil global financial markets? In this week's report we offer our perspective on these issues, and provide investors with forecasts for the RMB assuming a 5% appreciation or depreciation of the U.S. dollar versus major currencies over the coming 6-12 months. While it is true that the broad RMB trend has risen non-trivially over the past year, we conclude that is too early to view this rise as a threat to the export sector. This supports our view of a benign, controlled economic slowdown in China, as well as a cyclical overweight stance towards Chinese equities. Putting Recent Exchange Rate Movements In Context In order to answer the questions noted above, it is important to examine recent exchange rate movements in the context of China's ongoing efforts to internationalize the RMB, as they have had a substantial impact on the relationship between the RMB and the U.S. dollar over the past few years. Beijing has been taking steps for years to promote the global use of the RMB, but these efforts came into sharp focus on August 11-12, 2015, when the PBOC devalued the currency versus the U.S. dollar (Chart 2). In addition to the devaluation, the PBOC changed the way that the daily fixing rate would be set, in a fashion that increased the sensitivity of the rate to market forces. The PBOC made these changes at the time that they did for two specific reasons: The IMF was in the process of deciding whether to include the RMB in the SDR basket, after having stated that a more market-based RMB rate was a precondition for inclusion. The policy to link the RMB to the U.S. dollar was causing significant appreciation of the former during a period of enormous dollar strength. Given the decision to alter the fixing rate mechanism, the PBOC decided to devalue the exchange rate by a modest amount in one, bundled policy change. The important point for investors is that the market turmoil that followed the August 2015 changes to the exchange rate overshadowed a much more consequential announcement on December 11, 2015 that precipitated a shift in the link between the RMB and the US dollar (USD) towards multiple currencies.1 At first blush, the "decision" made by the PBOC in December was trivial: they announced that the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) would publish an index for the RMB measured against a basket of foreign currencies. But the implication of the announcement was that the PBOC was shifting its focus from managing CNY/USD to managing the value of the RMB versus the currencies of many trading partners. Essentially, December 2015 marked the beginning of a new exchange rate policy in China. The effect of this new policy change can clearly be seen in the relationship between CNY/USD and the trade-weighted RMB versus the U.S. dollar (Chart 3). The chart highlights that the beta of J.P. Morgan's nominal trade-weighted RMB versus the Bloomberg U.S. Dollar Spot Index was strongly positive prior to 2016, whereas the beta of CNY/USD to the Dollar Index was weak. Following the PBOC's policy shift, these relationships traded places: the beta between CNY/USD and the dollar became much more negative, whereas the strength of the U.S. dollar / trade-weighted RMB link weakened considerably. Chart 2The August 2015 Deval Significantly##br## Impacted Global Markets Chart 3A New Exchange Rate Regime Began##br## In December 2015 Bottom Line: China's new exchange rate regime has significantly weakened the link between the U.S. dollar and the broad RMB trend, at the expense of a stronger (negative) relationship between CNY/USD and the broad dollar trend. The Economic Implications Of China's New Exchange Rate Policy Chart 4The Recent Rise In CNY/USD ##br##Has Been Dollar-Driven Given our discussion above, the recent strength of the CNY/USD exchange rate should not be surprising: Chart 4 highlights that its sharp rise is largely the mirror image of recent U.S. dollar weakness. Panel 2 illustrates another way of observing this effect; EUR/USD typically trades inversely to the broad dollar trend, and CNY/EUR has been little changed over the past six months. The key questions for investors are 1) how to assess what impact the broad RMB appreciation over the past year will have on Chinese export growth, and 2) what future dollar movements might imply for the broad RMB trend. We use two metrics to gauge the likely impact of broad exchange rate movements on export growth: a fair value assessment (Chart 5), and the rise of an export-weighted RMB index relative to its high and low points over the past few years, when the exchange rate was clearly negatively and positively contributing to monetary conditions (Chart 6). The charts highlight that the real effective RMB is currently cheap, and that a nominal export-weighted index is only marginally above the median value since 2015. Neither of these measures implies that the rise in the RMB has reached levels that would be restrictive for exports. Chart 7 shows that the annual growth rate of our export-weighted RMB index has been predicted quite well by that of the dollar index and the CNY/USD exchange rate over the past two years. Based on this regression, Chart 8 presents what is likely to occur to our export-weighted RMB index in a 5% appreciation & depreciation scenario. The chart shows that the impact of a 5% appreciation (which we expect) will be muted, whereas a 5% depreciation in the dollar would cause a meaningful further rise in the export-weighted RMB. Still, it would not be enough to push the index to a new high, nor would it cause the real effective RMB shown in Chart 5 to rise into expensive territory. Bottom Line: Our metrics to gauge the impact of broad RMB movements on exports suggest that the recent rise is not yet a threat to the export sector. A further 5% depreciation in the U.S. dollar would cause a meaningful further increase, but not one large enough for our metrics to flash a warning sign. Chart 5The RMB Is Cheap In REER Terms Chart 6Rising, But Not Yet Near Previous Highs Chart 7The Dollar and CNY/USD Explain ##br##The Broad RMB Trend Chart 8Further Dollar Depreciation Would Bite, ##br##But Not Disastrously So August 2015, Redux? Given that the PBOC's devaluation of the RMB in August 2015 roiled global financial markets, it seems natural to ask whether the Chinese central bank could cause another shock by again depreciating the CNY/USD exchange rate. In our view, the answer is no. First, there are several reasons why the PBOC is unlikely to intervene to limit a rise in CNY/USD barring material further strength: Trade frictions with the U.S. remain, and a stronger CNY/USD could reduce the likelihood that the Trump administration will levy across-the-board tariffs on Chinese imports The PBOC recently reduced the influence of the "counter-cyclical factor" that was included in the CNY/USD midpoint formula. Since the factor was introduced to lessen the impact of market forces on the yuan's reference rate, the PBOC would likely have refrained from making any changes to it if they were unduly worried about the upward impact of recent dollar declines on CNY/USD If the PBOC becomes uncomfortable with the extent of the RMB rise in trade or export-weighted terms, it could aim to lower the yuan versus other key trading partners, including the euro area. As noted above, CNY/EUR has recently remained flat during the euro's sharp recent upleg versus the dollar. We noted that the RMB is now cheap in real effective terms (Chart 5), unlike in August 2015 when the deviation from fair value was the highest that it had been since mid-2000. Chart 92015 Vs Today: A Completely Different ##br##Global Economic Backdrop Second, even if the PBOC were to depreciate the CNY/USD exchange rate over the coming months, we doubt that investors would react in the same way as they did to the initial devaluation. As we reviewed in a Weekly Report last October,2 the global economy was suffering from a synchronized slowdown, and the surprise decision caused global investors to speculate heavily that additional devaluations were likely. The current condition of the global economy is clearly quite different than that which prevailed in the summer of 2015. Global PMIs are the most synchronized that they have been since the earliest phase of the economic cycle (Chart 9), which suggests that a significant slowdown is not imminent. Even if the pace of growth becomes narrower or slows modestly, it is difficult to envision the same kind of panicked response absent a separate and highly impactful accompanying shock. Bottom Line: Several factors argue against the probability of an August 2015-style CNY/USD devaluation. Even if the PBOC were to do so, global investors would likely react very differently than they did in 2015, given the underlying strength of the global economy. Investment Strategy Implications Chart 10Export Impact Of The RMB Appreciation##br## Is Non-Trivial, But Manageable Over a 6-12 month time horizon, there are two investment strategy implications of our above discussion. First, our analysis suggests that investors should focus on the broad RMB trend rather than the CNY/USD exchange rate when determining the likely impact of currency fluctuations on China's growth picture. It is true that an export-weighted RMB index has risen by a greater amount over the past year than a typical trade-weighted RMB (or the CFETS RMB index) would suggest (Chart 10), but for now it is too early to conclude that this represents a threat to the export sector. This conclusion is consistent with our view that China's ongoing economic slowdown will be benign, and controlled in nature. Second, given the tight (negative) link between CNY/USD and the U.S. dollar, and our view that USD is more likely to appreciate than depreciate over the coming months, it is true that the US$ relative performance of Chinese equities may be somewhat negatively impacted by a retracement in CNY/USD. But as we noted when presenting our "decision tree" for Chinese stocks at the beginning of the year,3 the cyclical condition of China's business cycle is the dominant factor that investors should consider when judging the appropriate allocation to Chinese equities. As such, our focus on China's exchange rate remains on how it impacts the growth outlook, and our judgement on this question continues to support a favorable stance towards the equity market. Bottom Line: Stay overweight Chinese investable stocks over the cyclical investment horizon, despite a likely dollar-driven retracement in CNY/USD over the coming months. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2988680/index.html 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Decision Tree For Chinese Stocks", dated January 4, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights The U.S.'s twin deficits do not explain the drop in the USD; Global growth is the biggest factor for the USD, and growth depends on China's economic reforms; The U.S. is turning more hawkish on China trade despite Beijing's reform-induced vulnerability; U.S. and Chinese political dynamics suggest upside risks in the former and downside in the latter; Go long DXY. Feature American policymakers scrambled to walk back Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin's "weak dollar" comments last week. Investors were left to wonder why Mnuchin broke with the long-held official position of favoring a strong dollar. Was it a "shot across the bow" of China, warning Beijing that the U.S. would engage in currency manipulation if it was not given concessions on trade? Or was it an admission that the U.S. would run large "twin deficits" - a budget deficit and a current account deficit - going forward? We don't have a good explanation for what Mnuchin said in Davos.1 But we can say with some conviction that the "twin deficit" explanation, which has been brought up in almost every client conversation so far this year, is wrong. Chart 1Twin Deficits: Why The Panic? Chart 2Because The Narrative Is Scary First, who says that the U.S. is about to widen its twin deficit (Chart 1)? The concern arises periodically in the marketplace but is often grossly off the mark in predicting the path of deficits or the dollar (Chart 2). We expect the budget deficit to hold steady in 2018, if not contract. Why? Because the fiscal deficit almost always contracts in the eight quarters before a recession, barring, in some cases, one or two quarters just before the recession hits (Chart 3). Unless investors have a high-conviction view that a recession is afoot in the next two quarters, they should ignore the dire predictions about the U.S. budget deficit. Chart 3The Deficit Is Not A Problem... Yet Chart 4Bond Market Not Sniffing Out Any Twin Deficit Crisis If the risk to the U.S. economy is to the upside, as we believe due to the tax cuts and unleashing of animal spirits, then deficits will come down regardless of additional tax or spending policy.2 In the long term, yes, the budget deficit will almost certainly expand due to entitlement spending, the impact of automatic stabilizers during a recession, and the loss of revenue from tax cuts. But long-term deficit concerns are the purview of the bond market, not currency traders. So what is the bond market telling us? Chart 4 shows that the yield curve tends to steepen as the twin deficit widens; both tend to occur during and after recessions. Today, however, the curve continues to flatten. Another fixed-income market indicator that tends to track budget deficits is the 30-year swap spread, which falls during recessions as budget deficits expand. But today the swap spread is not falling, it is increasing and doing so at the fastest pace since the 2008 recession (Chart 5). This may be a sign of resurgent animal spirits as banks throw caution - and concerns over Obama-era overregulation - to the wind. Credit demand is rising in the economy, which should increase both the velocity of money and growth. Concerns over the widening fiscal deficit are not being reflected in this indicator. Finally, our currency strategist, Mathieu Savary, has pointed out that a widening twin deficit only impacts developed economies' currencies about 50% of the time over 12 month periods. In other words, expansion of the twin deficit predicts currency moves about as well as flipping a coin. What really matters is how central banks respond to the causes and economic effects of the twin deficits. Protectionism, on the other hand, ought to be bullish for the dollar.3 As such, a potential trade war between China and the U.S. should not be the reason for the dollar's deepening doldrums. And while we are generally open to alarmism on trade protectionism - due to the fact that President Trump has few constitutional or political constraints holding him back on this issue - there is still not enough evidence to say whether the Trump administration will impose across-the-board tariffs on China. (See next section.) Could dollar weakness, conversely, be the result of a Plaza Accord 2.0 orchestrated between Chinese and American policymakers to depreciate the greenback in order to avert the need for protectionist policies? We doubt it. First, the U.S. and China economic dialogue has faltered. Second, the dollar would not have declined following the Plaza Accord had the Fed not aggressively cut rates from 1984 to 1985 by 423 basis points (Chart 6). And the Fed is obviously not cutting rates today, it is hiking them. Chart 5No Sign Of Deficit Here Chart 6The Fed Is More Important Than Politics... So, what matters for the U.S. dollar? Higher domestic inflation would matter as it would incentivize the Fed to tighten more than the market expects. Even here, however, recent history warrants caution on this view. Between 2004 and 2006, the Fed tightened 440 basis points and yet the dollar declined 11% from the start of the tightening cycle to its end (Chart 7). This is because the rest of the world's growth outpaced U.S. growth, particularly that of emerging markets, which grew at an annual 19%. We therefore come full circle to the single biggest issue on our forecasting horizon: Chinese policy. China is the most important variable for the U.S. dollar at the moment as it can single-handedly tip the global growth balance back towards the U.S., given its expected contribution to global growth (Chart 8). Chart 7...But Not More Important Than Global Growth Chart 8China Really Matters For Global Growth Our view is that Chinese policymakers are acting as an accelerant to BCA's House View that the Chinese economy will experience a benign slowdown. Risks are skewed towards the downside. We recently dedicated our monthly Crow's Nest Webcast solely to this issue and we highly encourage our clients to listen to it on replay.4 In today's weekly, we briefly assess where our Chinese view stands and then turn to U.S. politics. News Flash: Chimerica Has Been Dead Since 2012 Two critical aspects of our China view are coming together. The first is U.S. policy, which is becoming more aggressive after a year in which Trump showed restraint for the sake of North Korean negotiations.5 The second is China's renewed focus on domestic economic reforms.6 The "symbiotic" relationship between the U.S. and China is in decay, as we have argued since 2012.7 As China's economy grows, so grows its capacity for challenging the United States in the strategic sphere (Chart 9). Meanwhile the two economies have diverged markedly since U.S. households began to deleverage in 2008 (Chart 10). Chart 9China's Capabilities Are Growing Chart 10China No Longer Addicted To U.S. Demand The mainstream media is about to become more attuned to this reality now that the Trump administration has published a series of high-level reports declaring that U.S. strategy toward China is changing. Here are a few choice quotations: "China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea." (Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018) "Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department." (Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018) "[High-level bilateral dialogues] largely have been unsuccessful - not because of failures by U.S. policymakers, but because Chinese policymakers were not interested in moving toward a true market economy." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "The United States also will take all other steps necessary to rein in harmful state-led, mercantilist policies and practices pursued by China, even when they do not fall squarely within WTO disciplines." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "The United States ... is seeking fundamental changes to China's trade regime, including the overarching industrial policies that have continued to dominate China's state-led economy." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor." (President Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017) We expect to find echoes of this tough rhetoric in Trump's State of the Union Address on January 30, which will air as we go to press. Already commentators have declared that the U.S. is entering a "post-engagement" phase in the U.S.-China relationship.8 The U.S. and China will continue to engage. What is important is the Trump administration's shift toward more aggressive economic statecraft. Trump's view, made amply clear on the campaign trail, and now officially U.S. policy, holds that China is a mercantilist as well as a revisionist power and that it has initiated a trade war against the U.S. Thus the real policy change lies not in naming China a "strategic competitor" antithetical to U.S. values, but in declaring that normal "WTO consistent" remedies are no longer sufficient and the U.S. will have to resort to "all other steps necessary." The question is whether the U.S., in adopting unilateral measures, will pursue trade remedies on an item-by-item basis, as it has done so far, or break out of the mold and levy broader tariffs to try to achieve "fundamental changes" as quoted above. Trump's recent tariffs on solar panels and washing machines adhered closely to U.S. institutional procedures and penalized U.S. ally South Korea as well as China: if this is the trajectory that the U.S. intends to take, then markets can breathe a sigh of relief.9 The basic trade data show that the U.S. has continued to expand imports from China despite past incidents of presidents slapping on tariffs (Chart 11). Chart 11China And U.S.: Ships Passing In The Night However, the U.S. is likely to draw a harder line than that. The same data also show that the U.S. is not gaining much access to the Chinese market over time, while China has greatly diminished its exposure both to exports and to U.S. trade as a whole. Furthermore, the Trump administration is accusing China of trying to gain superior technology from the U.S. in a way that jeopardizes its security and sovereignty in the pursuit of a better strategic position. This is said to include coercion and corruption of U.S. firms in China, favoring the manufacturing sector by squeezing out competition, preferring domestic-sourced goods over foreign goods, and jeopardizing U.S. companies' intellectual property and network security. The key grievances are forced technology transfer, the "Made in China 2025" industrial strategy, "indigenous innovation" rules, and the new Cyber-Security Law.10 A test case for the U.S.'s harder line will be the ongoing investigation into China's intellectual property theft, which is due by August but is expected to elicit action by Trump sooner. Trump has a range of actions he can take either within or without the WTO. Going outside the WTO would give him greater flexibility, for instance, to impose a "fine," as he called it, for the cumulative "big damages" of China's intellectual property theft - but it would also enable China to claim that the U.S. itself is violating WTO trade rules.11 How will China respond to this turn in U.S. policy? It will continue to focus on rebooting its economic reforms. Reform is both necessary for its own interests, as we have outlined in the past, and expedient in that it enables China to try to deflect and delay U.S. pressure.12 This is not to say that China will not retaliate to particular U.S. moves, but simply that it will prefer to minimize conflict unless and until the Trump administration demonstrates via broad and sweeping trade measures that Beijing has no choice but to engage in open trade war. China's recent declarations that it will accelerate economic reforms aimed at trade and investment openness - particularly in financial services but also more generally - are geared toward allaying Washington. Xi Jinping's right-hand economist, Liu He, who is a key figure, made this clear at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he said that China's reform and opening up this year would "exceed international expectations." Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang made a similar point late last year, saying that the "Made in China 2025" program would not discriminate against foreign or private firms.13 Simultaneously, leading technocrats are calling attention to China's vulnerability as it attempts delicate financial reforms. Guo Shuqing of the China Banking Regulatory Commission has warned of "black swan" or "gray rhino" events as he continues with his financial regulatory crackdown, and he has been echoed by the vice-secretary general of the National Development and Reform Commission.14 These statements are prudent - as it is always risky for highly leveraged countries to tinker with financial tightening - and useful because Beijing wants to warn the U.S. against pushing too hard since it is both "making progress" and vulnerable to instability. We certainly expect the reforms to have a significant, adverse impact on China's economic growth this year. In the latest developments, the policy crackdown is spreading to local governments, where fiscal tightening could ensue (Chart 12). Local governments lack stable sources of revenue, have large hidden debts, face an intensifying debt repayment schedule over the next three years, and have recently begun to cancel infrastructure projects under central government scrutiny (in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and other provinces, and reportedly even in Xi's favored province of Zhejiang). Furthermore, the reforms have involved a crackdown on shadow lending that has sent non-bank credit into a steep decline (Chart 13). While some market estimates suggest that bank loans could grow by 13%-15% in 2018, such estimates cut against the policy grain. Assuming that non-bank credit does not grow any faster in 2018 than it did in 2017 (9.7%), China can afford to let new bank loans grow at 9.7% and still keep its total social financing (TSF) at its five-year annual average growth rate of 14.5%. Policymakers will not be able to soften their line easily, as several key players are newly appointed and must establish their credibility from the outset. Chart 12Local Government Finances Under Scrutiny Chart 13Shadow Bank Crackdown To Weigh On Credit Growth Our view is that Trump will harden the line despite China's promises both of deeper internal reforms and greater opening up. But the timing is impossible to predict. The real fireworks may be reserved until closer to the U.S. midterm election, as campaigning heats up in the fall. That would be the time for Trump to try to rally his voters by means of a clash of economic nationalisms with China. Beyond the top U.S. grievances cited above, we would highlight the U.S. approach toward China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Preferential policies for SOEs are a structural issue that the U.S. is now criticizing. At the party congress in October, President Xi Jinping pledged not only to reform the SOEs but also to make them bigger and stronger. Hence there is a potential collision course. The precise implementation of China's reforms could determine whether the U.S. pursues the issue further. China's State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission has so far reaffirmed Xi's comments at the party congress but, in keeping with the subtlety of Xi's policies, has also suggested there may be room to intensify reforms. The combination of Trump's economic policies, and China's intensifying reforms, will result in the U.S. economy outperforming expectations relative to China while U.S. corporations will outperform their Chinese counterparts (Chart 14). China will experience higher volatility, both in general and in relation to the U.S., and Chinese companies that suffer from reforms will underperform U.S. companies that benefit most from tax cuts (Chart 15). This is ironic given the popular narrative that the U.S. is suffering from chaotic democratic politics while China's centralized authoritarian model reigns triumphant. Of course, we do think Xi has key capabilities to drive reforms further in his second term than in his first, so these U.S.-China divergences will continue for the next 6-to-12 months at least. China's slowdown and increase in equity volatility should create a policy response: more fiscal spending and credit expansion. The comparison of relative U.S. and Chinese credit impulses suggests that China extends more credit as relative volatility rises (Chart 16). Our view, however, is that China's credit impulse will continue disappointing this year as Beijing prioritizes reform over growth. The credit numbers in January are the next data set to watch, in addition to the aforementioned local government spending. Investors should brace for more uncertainty as the Lunar New Year approaches (Feb. 16). Chart 14U.S. Earnings Surprise Relative To China Chart 15Xi Adds Volatility Relative To Trump Bump Chart 16China's Credit Impulse Disappoints Bottom Line: The Trump administration has issued an ultimatum of sorts on trade. Yet China claims to be redoubling its efforts at reforming and opening up its economy - party to deflect the pressure. We are almost certain that Trump will take further punitive actions, but it is too soon to say when or if he will engage in sweeping measures that threaten to destabilize China and thus initiate a trade war. The political context heading into the U.S. midterm vote will be crucial. Is America Having A Macron Moment? It is unfortunate when one's forecast is challenged only weeks after it is conceived. But that appears to be happening to our view, articulated in late December, that investors should expect no significant legislation to come out of Congress following the passage of the tax cuts.15 Bad news for our forecast is perhaps good news for U.S. policy initiatives and the overall quality of U.S. governance. President Trump has softened his stance on immigration, stating that he would be willing to grant citizenship to roughly 1.8 million "Dreamers" - young adults who came to the U.S. as illegal immigrants.16 Clearing the immigration hurdle would mean that Congress can focus on passing a budget for FY2018 that would see both defense and discretionary spending levels significantly raised. It would also relegate the never-ending saga of the debt ceiling to the dustbin, at least for the duration of this political cycle. Trump also followed up his immigration proposal by sketching a $1.7 trillion infrastructure investment plan (albeit a vague one). Chart 17Bipartisanship = Steeper Bull Market? Could we be approaching a "Macron moment" in U.S. politics? A moment when the "silent majority" rises up and sends a message to politicians that it has had enough of polarizing extremes? Previous such moments have included President Reagan's collaboration with congressional Democrats and President Clinton's with Republicans, which underpinned that glorious stock market run between August 12, 1982 and March 24, 2000 (Chart 17). Both presidents passed significant economic and social reforms during that time. Chart 18Peak Partisanship? Chart 19Independents On The Rise Yes, polarization remains at extreme levels (Chart 18), but that could also mean that it is reaching its natural limits. Rather than dwell on the high levels of polarization, which are baked into the "expectations cake," we would point out that the percentage of Americans who identify as independents is now fast approaching the combined total who identify as either Republican or Democrat (Chart 19). Ominously for Republicans - who hold both the House and the Senate - midterm electoral sweeps have almost always occurred along with the share of independents crossing the 40% mark (Table 1). Table 1Sweep Elections Coincide With High Independent Affiliation Meanwhile, President Trump's conciliatory tone on immigration was met with howls of protest from conservative activists. This is despite the fact that his proposal essentially exchanges leniency for Dreamers for considerably tougher immigration laws in general, which would align the U.S. with its developed market peers.17 Conservative activists are, however, massively out of step with the rest of America. Polls show that immigration is not high on the list of priorities for most Americans, and that most Americans continue to believe both that immigration is a positive and that immigration intake should remain at current levels (Chart 20). Chart 20Americans Are Neither Anti-Immigrant Nor All That Concerned About Immigration Our gut call that President Trump was itching to move to the political middle appears to be correct.18 Whether this becomes investment relevant will ultimately depend on whether the Democrats reciprocate. If Democrats go by data, they will. The government shutdown imbroglio has cost them a double-digit lead in the generic congressional ballot (Chart 21). As a political strategy, the shutdown was a miserable failure. Furthermore, the 2016 election stands as clear evidence that "outrage" does not work. Clinton picked up almost a million more voters in California than President Obama yet failed to beat his performance where it mattered: the Midwest. If Democrats continue to run on a "resistance" platform in order to satisfy their activist base, they will fail to win the House. Chart 21Government Shutdown An 'Own Goal' For Dems Ironically, the best strategy for Democrats ahead of the midterm election is to cooperate with Trump. The swelling ranks of independent voters will reward them if they do so. That same strategy, however, will paradoxically boost Trump's chances in 2020. Bottom Line: The market is, of course, ideologically nihilist. But a move to the middle - which benefits everyone involved except House Republicans - would be positive for stocks and the economy. Key bellwethers going forward are how Democrats react to Trump's immigration proposal and whether Trump moves to the middle on trade deals, starting with NAFTA, whose sixth round of negotiations just ended inconclusively (although not negatively) in Montreal. Investment Implications From the perspective of global asset allocation, the most important issue today is Chinese economic and regulatory policy. Yes, U.S. inflation is important, but whether it moves the dollar - and therefore commodities and EM assets - will depend on the pace of the current Chinese slowdown. China is therefore the most "diagnostic variable" in 2018. If our House View that inflation is coming back in the U.S. is right and our Geopolitical Strategy view that risks to growth in China are to the downside is also right, then investors should go long the U.S. dollar and underweight EM and EM-leveraged assets. If, on the other hand, we are wrong, then investors should load up with EM risk assets to the hilt right now. It is that simple. For what it is worth, we are putting our moderate-conviction view to the test and opening a long DXY trade. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 But on a completely unrelated note we would like to remind our clients that, over the past 24 months, Mr. Mnuchin was the executive producer of How to Be Single, Midnight Special, Batman v. Superman: Dawn of Justice, Keanu, The Conjuring 2, Central Intelligence, The Legend of Tarzan, Lights Out, Suicide Squad, Sully, Storks, The Accountant, Rules Don't Apply, The Lego Batman Movie, Fist Fight, CHiPs, Going in Style, Unforgettable, King Arthur: Legend of the Sword, Wonder Woman, The House, Annabelle: Creation, The Lego Ninjago Movie, and The Disaster Artist. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, and Weekly Reports, "Trump and Trade," December 9, 2016, and "The Elusive Gains From Globalization," dated November 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Webcasts, Geopolitical Strategy Crow's Nest, "China: How Is Our View Working Out?" dated January 25, 2018. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2017 Report Card," dated December 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, and "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Daniel H. Rosen, "A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship," Rhodium Group, January 19, 2018, available at rhg.com. 9 In fact, in the case of washing machines, the U.S.-based GE Appliances stands to gain from the tariff and has been owned by China's Haier Electronics Group since 2016. 10 Several clients have asked us about China's Cyber-Security Law, which has been in the process of implementation since July 2017 and will go fully into effect by the end of 2018. The law is meant to give the Chinese government the option of exercising control over all networks in the country. State security agencies are deeply involved in its enforcement and oversight. Foreign business interests fear that the law's new obligations will be onerous and potentially damaging - including potential violations of corporate security over intellectual property, source code, supply chain details, and data storage and transmission. 11 Please see Stephen E. Becker, Nancy Fischer, and Sahar Hafeez, "Update on US Investigation of China's IP Practices," Lexology, January 8, 2018, available at www.lexology.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," dated October 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Wang has served as the top interlocutor with the U.S. in the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue. 14 Please see "China eyes black swans, gray rhinos as 2018 growth seen slowing to 6.5-6.8 percent: media," Reuters, January 28, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. "Gray rhinos," coined by author Michele Wucker, refer to high-probability, high-impact risks, whereas the proverbial "black swan" is a low-probability, high-impact risk. These terms have both been making the rounds more frequently in Chinese policymaking circles since last year. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 What is fascinating about Trump's statement is that he cited the 1.8 million figure. There are actually only about 800,000 people who officially participated in President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. But estimates suggest that another 1,000,000 young adults are in the U.S. illegally, yet did not register. Trump has come under criticism from conservative, anti-immigration groups for essentially moving the goalposts beyond what even the Democrats had wanted. 17 Canada, for example, has a purely merit-based immigration system that is considerably tough on family reunification. (Reunification has even been suspended because of a large backlog.) In Europe, family reunification laws are extremely strict. Even spouses are not automatically allowed residency status in several major European countries unless they fulfill various conditions. 18 Please see footnote 2 above.
Highlights A potential rise in U.S. inflation and China's growth slowdown represent formidable headwinds to EM risk assets. A manifestation of these tectonic macro shifts will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices. These two will dent the EM risk asset rally. Strong DM growth will not offset the impact of a slower Chinese economy on EMs and commodities. A new fixed-income trade: bet on a steeper swap curve in Mexico relative to Canada. Feature The global macro landscape in 2018 will be shaped by the two tectonic shifts: U.S. fiscal stimulus amid vigorous growth, and policy tightening in China amid lingering credit and money excesses. The former will grease the wheels of the already robust U.S. economy, generating a whiff of inflation and fueling a further selloff in the U.S. bond market. China's tightening will in turn weigh on commodities prices and curtail the emerging market (EM) economic recovery. A manifestation of these tectonic macro shifts will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices producing formidable headwinds to EM risk assets. As such, we are reiterating our recommendation to underweight EM risk assets versus their DM peers. As to the absolute performance, we believe EM risk assets are close to a major market top. A Whiff Of U.S. Inflation Strong U.S. growth could in fact be damaging to EM financial markets, as it will likely augment U.S. consumer price inflation. Investors are currently extremely sanguine on U.S. inflationary pressures. An upside surprise to inflation will lift U.S. interest rate expectations further, supporting the greenback and hurting EM carry trades. There is some evidence that U.S. inflation is about to pick up: The New York Federal Reserve underlying inflation gauge is rising, signaling higher inflation ahead (Chart I-1). The nascent revival in the MZM (money of zero maturity) impulse presages a trough in inflation (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Fed Price Pressure Gauge Signifies Higher Inflation Chart I-2U.S. Money Growth And CPI The weak U.S. dollar will also help augment inflation in America. U.S. import prices from emerging Asia and Mexico have been rising - even before the latest carnage in the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). This will filter through into higher domestic price pressures. Chart I-3U.S. Import Prices Are Rising In brief, fiscal stimulus amid buoyant growth as well as overwhelming optimism among consumers and businesses is creating fertile ground for companies to raise prices. This will amplify corporate profit growth but will also lead to higher inflation. We are not making a case that U.S. inflation is about to surge. Our thesis is that market participants are very complacent on inflation. The money market is pricing in only 96 basis points in rate hikes in 2018-'19. In the meantime, the term premium in the U.S. yield curve is extremely depressed. Therefore, even modest inflation surprises will likely produce an additional meaningful selloff in U.S./DM bond markets. Will global share prices rise in response to strong corporate profit growth, or sell off in the face of higher U.S. inflation? Our hunch is that share prices will suffer as rising bond yields cause multiples to shrink. Rising bond yields will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices. The basis is that multiples are disproportionately and inversely linked to percentage change interest rates but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 At still-low yields, a 50-basis-point rise in bond yields constitutes a sizable percentage change in the bond yield, likely leading to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Current sky-high bullish sentiment towards equities combined with elevated valuations and overbought conditions will mean that even a modest rise in inflation readings will likely trigger equity market jitters. EMs will underperform DMs amid such a selloff, as the former has benefited much more than the latter from low interest rates. Bottom Line: U.S. fiscal stimulus is arriving at a time when final demand is robust, the labor market is tight and business and consumer confidence is buoyant. This will encourage companies to raise prices, resulting in a whiff of U.S. inflation. The latter will rattle markets in the months ahead. China: Tightening Amid Credit/Money Excesses Inflation in China has already been steadily rising (Chart I-4). Interest rates adjusted for inflation remain low. Rising inflation along with still-lingering credit and money excesses necessitates policy tightening. We have written extensively about China's ongoing tightening trifecta - liquidity tightening, increased regulatory oversight and clampdown as well as an anti-corruption crackdown in the financial industry.2 Regulatory tightening in particular could inflict a particular bite as it outright constrains banks' ability to originate credit. This tightening has already led to record low broad money growth, and credit growth is downshifting too (Chart I-5). The cumulative impact of this tightening will play out in the months ahead, weighing further on money and credit growth and ultimately on final demand. Chart I-4China: Inflation Is In Steady Uptrend Chart I-5China: Broad Money And Credit Growth On the fiscal front, local government spending has languished in recent months (Chart I-6, top panel) and general (central plus local) government spending growth has been lackluster (Chart I-6, bottom panel). In 2017, local government annual spending amounted to RMB 19 trillion, or 22% of nominal GDP. Central government expenditures are about 6-fold smaller. Local governments rely on land sales to replenish their coffers, but timid money growth points to weaker land sales ahead (Chart I-7). In the meantime, their annual borrowing is restricted by the central government. Overall, this will constrain local government expenditures in 2018. Chart I-6China: Government Expenditures Chart I-7China: Land Sales To Slump The combined credit and fiscal spending impulse heralds a relapse in mainland imports of goods and commodities (Chart I-8). This constitutes a major threat to commodities prices, and consequently to EM. A pertinent question is whether financial markets will react to rising U.S. inflation or a slowdown in Chinese growth. Clearly, one could argue that strong U.S. growth would offset a mainland growth slump, resulting in a stable global macro environment. However, financial markets are an emotional discounting mechanism, and they do not always follow rational thinking. For example, in the first half of 2008 - just a few months ahead of the Global Financial Crisis - global financial markets were preoccupied with mounting global inflation due to strong growth in EM/China. At the time, oil and many other commodities prices were literally surging, and U.S. bond yields were climbing (Chart I-9). Global financial markets were not concerned with the ongoing U.S. recession, shrinking bank loans and deflating house prices. Chart I-8China's Impact On Rest Of The World Chart I-92008: An Inflation Scare Just ##br##Before Deflationary Bust In retrospect, financial markets traded on the theme of rising global inflation in the first half of 2008 even though the U.S. was already in a recession, and was heading into the most severe deflationary bust of the past 80 years. Similarly, the financial markets today could trade on the U.S. inflation theme for a couple months, even though China will be slowing. Bottom Line: China's policy tightening is particularly dangerous because it is occurring amid substantial and still-lingering credit, money and property market excesses. Won't Strong DM Growth Support China And Other EMs? Our investment stance on EM has been and remains negative, despite our positive view on U.S. and European growth. The key rationale for this stance is that EMs are much more leveraged to China than to the U.S. and Europe. Hence, our view assumes de-synchronization of growth between EM and DM. In our opinion, an EM slowdown will be largely due to China's deceleration and the latter's impact on commodities prices and non-commodity economies in Asia via trade. South America, Russia, South Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia are commodities producers, and as such are sensitive to fluctuations in commodities prices. The rest of Asia - Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines - are still exposed to the mainland economy as the latter is their largest export destination. Thus out of the EM sphere, China's dynamics will have a limited impact on only Mexico, India, and Turkey. However, Mexico is at risk of a NAFTA abrogation, while Turkey is at risk of runaway inflation and monetary profligacy. India on the other hand has its own problems and its bourse is unlikely to do well, given it is overbought and expensive. Furthermore, while we are bullish on the growth outlook in central European economies, they are too small to matter from an EM benchmark perspective. It might be useful to contemplate the late 1990s macro dynamics when major decoupling occurred between DM and EM. The booming economies of the U.S. and Europe did not prevent recurring crises in EM in the second half of the 1990s. Chart I-10 illustrates that U.S. and European imports growth was surging at that time, but EM stocks and currencies collapsed. What's more, despite the economic boom in DM during that period - U.S. and euro area real GDP growth rates averaged 4.2% and 2.6%, respectively, between 1996 and 1998 - commodities prices were in a bear market (Chart I-11). Chart I-10EM Crises In 1997-98: U.S. And ##br##Europe's Imports Were Booming Chart I-11Booming DM GDP And ##br##Falling Commodities Prices One might suspect that EM crises in the second half of the 1990s occurred because booming DM growth led to rising U.S. bond yields. However, Chart I-12 portrays that U.S. bond yields actually fell in 1997 and 1998 due to the deflationary shock stemming from the EM turmoil. Chart I-12EM Crises Occurred Amid ##br##Falling U.S. Bond Yields By and large, the 1997-98 EM crises occurred despite buoyant DM growth and falling DM bond yields. Nowadays, advanced economies carry much smaller weight in global trade and GDP than they did 20 years ago. Furthermore, EMs are much less dependent on exporting to DMs than they were two decades ago. In addition, China was not an economic powerhouse 20 years ago like it is today, and it did not buy as much from the rest of EMs as it does today. Presently, China holds the key to the EM outlook, and the link is through Chinese imports of goods and commodities. As China's credit and fiscal spending impulse suggests, mainland imports are likely to slow, weighing on commodities prices (refer to Chart I-8 on page 6). To be sure, we are not suggesting that EMs are facing crises similar to what transpired in 1997-98. The point of this comparison is to highlight that robust DM growth in of itself is not sufficient to head off an EM downturn if the latter faces a negative shock from China. With respect to DM growth benefiting China itself, it is critical to realize that China's exports to the U.S. and EU together account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP (Chart I-13). By far, the largest component of the mainland economy is capital spending, constituting 42% of GDP. Construction and infrastructure are an integral part of capital expenditures, and they are very sensitive to money/credit cycles. Finally, from a global trade perspective, China and the rest of EM account for 46% of global imports, while the U.S. and EU account for 20% and 15%, respectively (Chart I-14). Hence, the total import bill of EM including China is larger than that of the U.S.'s and EU's imports combined. This entails that the pace of global trade growth is set to moderate if EM/China domestic demand decelerates. Chart I-13What Drives Chinese Economy: ##br##Capex Not Exports To DM Chart I-14Important Of EM/China In Global Trade Bottom Line: Strong DM growth will not offset the impact of a slower Chinese economy on EMs and commodities. Investment Conclusions A manifestation of the above-discussed tectonic macro shifts - a rise in U.S. inflation and China's slowdown - will be a U.S. dollar rally and weakening commodities prices. These two macro shifts will produce a perfect storm for EM risk assets. As a harbinger of a forthcoming selloff in EM exchange rates and DM commodities currencies (AUD, NZD and CAD), their implied volatility measures are already picking up (Chart I-15). As to a China/Asia slowdown, Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean manufacturing output volume growth rates have already relapsed (Chart I-16). Their exports and corporate profits still appear robust because of rising prices. This certifies that there are inflationary pressures, even in Asia. Chart I-15Currency VOLs Are Rising Chart I-16Asian Manufacturing Output Volume All in all, we maintain a negative stance on EM risk assets in absolute terms and recommend underweighting them versus their DM peers. Within the EM universe, our equity market overweights are Taiwan, India, Korean technology, Thailand, Russia, central Europe and Chile. Our underweights are South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Among currencies, our favorite shorts are the TRY, the ZAR, the MYR and the BRL. For investors who prefers relative EM currency trades, we recommend the following longs for crosses: RUB, TWD, THB, CNY and INR. For fixed-income trades, please refer to our open position table on page 18. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Bet On A Steeper Swap Curve Relative To Canada For Mexican financial markets, the key uncertainty at the moment is the outcome of the ongoing NAFTA negotiations. Mexico's macro backdrop argues for considerable central bank easing, as inflation is about to roll over and domestic demand is extremely weak. However, if the U.S. pulls out of NAFTA - the odds of which are considerable, as our Geopolitical Strategy team has argued3 - the peso will sell off and interest rates are likely to rise. How should investors position themselves in Mexican fixed-income markets given this binominal outcome from the NAFTA negotiations and uncertainty over its timing? One way is to position for a swap curve steepening in Mexico, and hedge it by betting on a swap curve flattening in Canada by entering the following pair trades (Chart II-1): Chart II-1Mexico, Canada And Their ##br##Relative Swap Curve Receive 6-month and pay 10-year swap rates in Mexico Pay 6-month and receive 10-year swap rates in Canada In A Scenario Where The U.S. Withdraws From NAFTA: The Mexican swap curve would invert due to short-term rates going up more than long-term rates. In Canada, potential risks from NAFTA abrogation and tightening monetary policy amid frothy property markets and high household debt will cap upside in its long-term interest rates. With its long-term bond swap rates at par with those in the U.S., it seems as though the Canadian fixed income market is underpricing the risk of potential growth disappointments beyond the near run. In essence, should the U.S. withdraw from NAFTA, the loss realized on the Mexican steepener leg would partially be offset by the potential gain on the Canadian flattener leg. In A Scenario Where The U.S. Does Not Withdraw From NAFTA: The Mexican swap curve would start steepening. The rationale is that domestic dynamics suggest inflation has peaked and Banxico should begin its easing cycle soon. Monetary and fiscal policies have been extremely restrictive in Mexico, and considerable monetary easing is justified going forward: A significant part of the rise in inflation in 2017 was caused by peso depreciation in 2016. Last year's peso rally suggests that inflation should start to roll over soon (Chart II-2). Besides, one-off effects on inflation - such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of 2016 - will subside as the base effect it has caused fades. In brief, the consumer inflation rate will rapidly decline, justifying substantial monetary easing. Banxico's 425 basis points in rate hikes since the end of 2015 are still filtering through the economy. The persistent slowdown in money and credit growth will continue to weigh on domestic demand for the time being. Notably, retail sales volume and gross fixed capital formation are both contracting while domestic vehicles sales are shrinking sharply (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Mexico: Inflation Is Set To Drop Chart II-3Mexico: Consumer And Business ##br##Spending Are Extremely Weak Due to currently high inflation, real wage growth remains weak. This will continue to weigh on consumer spending (Chart II-4). Fiscal policy has been tightening. Fiscal expenditures, excluding interest payments, are contracting in nominal terms (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Mexico: Real Wage Growth Is Very Timid Chart II-5Mexico: Fiscal Policy Is Super Tight Canada is currently on the opposite side of the business cycle spectrum relative to Mexico. The Canadian economy is very strong, being led by domestic demand. Real consumer spending is growing at its fastest pace in nearly 10 years, while the unemployment rate is at 40-year lows. Moreover, a record proportion of Canadian firms are having difficulty meeting demand because of capacity constraints and a tight labor market (Chart II-6, top and middle panel). Chart II-6Canadian Economy Is ##br##Above Full-Employment As such, the output gap is positive and growing, which has historically led to rising inflation (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Robust growth and rising inflation will force the Bank of Canada to hike rates further. In the meantime, real estate and consumer credit in Canada are overextended, leaving the Canadian consumer at risk from much higher interest rates. The threat that monetary tightening will hurt domestic demand in the future will cap the swap curve in Canada relative to Mexico. On the whole, in the scenario where the U.S. remains in NAFTA, the potential for swap curve steepening in Canada is less than in Mexico. Investment Recommendations We have been recommending that investors maintain a neutral stance across all asset classes in Mexico and wait for clarity on NAFTA negotiations before going overweight the country's currency, fixed-income markets and possibly equities relative to their EM peers. In the face of lingering NAFTA uncertainty, fixed-income investors should contemplate the following relative trade: Receive 6-month and pay 10-year swap rates in Mexico / pay 6-month and receive 10-year swap rates in Canada. Overall, this trade is exposed to minimal losses in the scenario where the U.S. withdraws from NAFTA but is exposed to considerable gains where the U.S. remains in NAFTA, making the overall risk/reward attractive. Provided the NAFTA negotiations could drag till year-end, this trade offers a reasonable risk-reward for traders. It offers a profitable opportunity to profit from Mexico's swap curve steepening, while limiting downside in case NAFTA is terminated before year-end. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 This is due to the fact that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model while EPS/dividends are in the numerator. 2 Please refer to Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Questions For Emerging Markets," dated November 29, 2017, the link is available on page 19. 3 Please refer to the Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, titled "Nafta - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, the link is available at gps.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The U.S. government shutdown showed that the path of least resistance is for more fiscal spending; President Trump is turning to trade and foreign policy amid a lack of popularity at home; North Korean diplomacy is on track, but U.S.-China relations and Taiwan are potential black swans; Iran and the U.S. are playing a risky double game that will add geopolitical risk premium to oil; NAFTA will be a bellwether for Trump's future actions on issues that carry greater constraints, like Iran and China; Book profits on French vs German industrials and China volatility; close U.S. curve steepener and long PHP/TWD. Feature This weekend, investors woke up to the nineteenth government shutdown since 1976, a product of "grand standing" on both sides of the aisle. Our low-conviction view, which we elucidated last week, is that President Donald Trump will be forced to migrate to the middle on policy as the midterm election approaches.1 Chart 1Trump Hitting (And Building!) A Wall Despite a roaring stock market, strong economic fundamentals, and decade-low unemployment, President Trump's popularity continues to flounder. There is now even a perceptible decline in his support among GOP voters. Key problems for Trump have been the failure to repeal the Affordable Care Act and the intensification of the Mueller investigation (Chart 1). We suspect that he will try to preempt an electoral disaster in November by means of bipartisan deal-making and more orthodox policies. The government shutdown, although not entirely unexpected, undermined the view that President Trump is thinking about moderating his stance. That said, the Democrats are as much, if not more, to blame. With the Republicans in charge of Congress and the White House, it is clear that the Democrats thought that voters would ultimately see the shutdown as the GOP's fault. This was a dangerous assumption given that current polling suggests the Democrats have more to lose. One positive about the short-lived imbroglio is that it was the first government shutdown in twenty years that had little to do with government spending, whether the appropriations bill explicitly or entitlements. While immigration is an intractable issue, the disagreement between Republicans and Democrats is not about dollars. This is good news for the markets as it means that more spending will likely be necessary to grease the wheels of compromise. Our mantra continues to be that the political path of least resistance will lead towards profligacy. While the media's focus is on domestic politics, the real risks remain in the international arena. The two are connected. As political science theory teaches us, policymakers often play "two-level games," with the domestic arena influencing what is possible in the international one. As Donald Trump loses political capital on the domestic front, his options for affecting policy will become constrained. However, the U.S. constitution places almost no constraints on the president when it comes to foreign policy. To this arena we turn, starting with China-U.S. relations and the other potential risks in Asia (the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan). We also briefly turn to Iran and NAFTA. What binds all these risks is that it is essentially up to President Trump whether they become market-relevant or not. Korean Diplomacy Is On Track In mid-September North Korean tensions peaked (Chart 2).2 Leader Kim Jong Un chose to demonstrate known missile capabilities rather than escalate the crisis. Chart 2Markets Have Called Kim's Bluff Chart 3North Korea Is Running Out Of Cash We expected this choice given Pyongyang's considerable military constraints. Kim is a rational actor following his father Kim Jong Il's nuclear negotiations playbook.3 Just as brinkmanship reached new highs, Kim Jong Un declared victory and offered to play nice. Specifically, he launched his most advanced missile yet on November 28 (the Hwasong-15) and immediately thereafter North Korean state media declared that North Korea has "finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force," complete with a fireworks celebration in Pyongyang.4 Kim confirmed this message personally on January 1 while offering an olive branch to South Korea for the New Year. Apparently, then, Kim is responsive to the United States' threats of devastating military retaliation against any attack. Kim is also responsive to the fact that China's President Xi Jinping has joined the U.S. coalition imposing sanctions on the North (Chart 3), squeezing North Korea's economy. The deep drop in exports to China suggests that the North will run into foreign-exchange problems if it does not adjust its posture - not to mention shortages of goods like fuel that China is gradually cutting off (Chart 4). In short, the U.S. established a credible military threat in 2017, just as it did with Iran in 2012 (Chart 5). China responded to the U.S. and established a credible economic threat of its own. Kim has de-escalated. Kim said in his New Year declaration that he would only use his nuclear deterrent if the U.S. committed an act of aggression. Rhetoric about destroying American cities is gone. Meanwhile Kim has engaged South Korea in direct negotiations, with military-to-military talks possibly to follow, and both sides will make a display of friendship at the Olympic Games in South Korea in February. Chart 4China Is Enforcing Sanctions Chart 5Credible Threat Cycle: North Korea Mirrors Iran While our view that diplomacy will reduce tensions is on track, we caution that the underlying disagreement is driven by North Korea's weapon capabilities and remains unresolved. The North Korean issue is not a red herring and the diplomatic route may continue to be bumpy from time to time.5 Markets could still be rattled by surprise North Korean provocations. Nevertheless, we do not expect a replay of the 2017 level of "fire and fury" that caused the U.S. 10-year treasury yield to drop from 2.31% to 2.05% between June and September 2017. If the North should jerk back toward a belligerent posture and decisively throw away this opportunity for diplomacy, then we will watch closely to determine whether its provocations truly alter the status quo and whether the U.S. shows any sign of greater willingness to respond with force. Otherwise we will simply monitor the diplomatic talks and watch for any signs of internal stress in North Korea as global sanctions tighten.6 Bottom Line: Korean risks remain market-relevant as the crisis is not resolved and talks are just beginning. Nevertheless, diplomacy is taking shape. We remain long the Korean two-year government bond versus the ten-year on the back of global trends and continued de-escalation. China-U.S. Relations May Sour Anyway Over the past year we have warned clients that U.S.-China tensions are the fundamental source of geopolitical risk globally and in Asia Pacific; that North Korea is a derivative of this fact; and that China's cooperation in policing North Korea would only temporarily dissuade the Trump administration from imposing punitive measures on China over trade. Despite China's assistance with North Korea, Trump will be driven by domestic American politics to slap tariffs on China in addition to those levied on January 22.7 First, Trump is committed to an "America First" trade policy and to economic nationalist voters. Thus he may need to show more muscle against China ahead of the midterm elections. This is particularly true for the key rust-belt states that handed him the election in 2016, where four Democratic senators' seats are in competition in November (not to mention nine other senate seats that could be swayed for similar reasons) (Chart 6). It is politically embarrassing to Trump that China racked up its largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in his first year in office and is on track to continue racking up surpluses (Chart 7). While Beijing has vowed to open up market access and import more goods and services, these promises have yet to impress (Chart 8). Chart 6Trump's Base Expects Protectionism Chart 7China's Exports To U.S. Are Growing... Administrative rulings on several trade disputes early this year will give Trump ample opportunity to take additional trade action against China. The critical question, however, is whether Trump will continue to focus on item-by-item trade remedies (perhaps at an accelerated pace), or whether he goes beyond previous administrations and demands that China make progress on structural and systemic issues. The latter is more politically difficult and would have greater macro consequences. The U.S. has recently suggested that it made a mistake by bringing China into the WTO. This comes after the December WTO meeting in which the administration was able to secure a joint statement with Japan and Europe that increased the pressure on China.8 At the same time, Trump is weighing a significant decision (due by August, but possible any day now) on China's alleged systemic intellectual property theft, which Trump says is likely to require a "fine" (penalty). And comments by White House officials suggest that the administration may be going after China's promotion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as forced technology transfers (Chart 9).9 These are structural demands on China that will create much bigger frictions than tariffs on a few sub-sectors. Chart 8...While Imports Remain Tepid Chart 9Foreign Firms Forced To Transfer Tech Second, assuming that the U.S. and international community reach some kind of deal to reduce Korean tensions over the next six-to-eighteen months - for instance, a missile-test moratorium and corresponding easing of sanctions. It is likely still to be a complicated and ugly deal, as Pyongyang has no intention of giving up its nuclear and missile capabilities. The U.S. will have to make unpopular compromises with a rogue regime, comparable to the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015. The deal will leave a bitter taste in Trump's mouth and the administration will likely blame China for failing to prevent the North from achieving its nuclear status. It will rotate to address other long-standing disagreements with China, and may well look for compensation for Korea by taking a harder line on trade. Bottom Line: Korean diplomacy may delay or soften Trump's trade policies but cannot change his domestic political calculus. The Trump administration is more, not less, likely to impose further punitive trade measures on China as the midterm election draws near. We expect Chinese equity volatility to remain high. We are closing our recommendation to go long the CBOE China ETF Volatility Index, which has appreciated by 26.5%. This is not an investable index but an indicator of volatility in ETFs. A Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis? The rumor is going around that China and Taiwan are on the verge of a "Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis." Clients all over the world - from Hong Kong to San Francisco to Toronto - are asking us about cross-strait tensions and the risk of war. As we go to press, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has just publicly acknowledged that war is possible. Taiwan could indeed be a geopolitical "black swan." It was one of our top five black swans for 2016,10 and several extraordinary events that year suggested that our concerns are warranted: China cut off all communication with the island; the Taiwanese navy accidentally fired a missile towards the mainland on the Communist Party's birthday; and a U.S. president-elect spoke directly with a Taiwanese president for the first time since 1979, creating an uproar in Beijing.11 Today, in the wake of Xi Jinping's concentration of power at the nineteenth National Party Congress,12 and Beijing's heavy-handed crackdown on Hong Kong throughout 2017,13 there is renewed concern that China is about to stage a major intervention to rein in Taiwan. There is even talk that China could be preparing to mount a surprise attack.14 The rumors are arising from a confluence of events. On the mainland side, Xi is personally powerful and has made it a priority to lead China into a "New Era" of greater Chinese influence globally. This means that a decision to take bolder action on Taiwan could come from individual whim rather than a collective decision within the party (which would tend to maintain the status quo). Xi has also taken personal control of the military through promotions, and reasserted that the "party controls the gun," making it less likely that he would meet institutional resistance in any major foreign policy initiative. Finally, Xi has hardened Communist Party policies toward Taiwan, reflected in increased military drills, controversial new air traffic routes, and tougher language in the five-year policy blueprint that he presented to the party congress. On the Taiwanese side, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is the party that leans toward independence from the mainland, dominates the country's politics. The DPP not only won the presidency but also won legislative control for the first time in the January 2016 election.15 The DPP is also the leading party on lower levels of government. And young Taiwanese people increasingly identify as exclusively Taiwanese.16 While President Tsai has been relatively pragmatic so far, her party has fewer domestic political constraints than in the past - leaving room for the party's more radical side to have more influence or for Tsai to overreach. Internationally, Tsai has allies in Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan - both nationalists who favor Taiwan and harbor deep suspicions about the reviving communism emanating from Beijing. Hence we still see Taiwan as a potential black swan event in the coming years. However, we would put a near 0% subjective probability on the likelihood that China will spring a massive surprise attack in the near future. Why? Xi is not yet breaking the status quo: Xi has not yet shown himself to be a reckless revisionist. China's foreign policy assertiveness is a gradual process that began in the mid-2000s - it traces the country's growing economic importance and need for supply-line security (Chart 10). Xi has trod carefully in both the East and South China Seas, and both of these strategic thrusts are connected with China's security vis-à -vis Taiwan, as well as vis-à -vis the U.S. and Japan. There is no reason to think that China is ready to launch a multi-front attack against the combined forces of the U.S., Taiwan, Japan, and the rest of the American alliance system. North Korea's new missile capabilities do not tip the scales in China's favor either. Incidentally, even Xi's tougher rhetoric at the party congress echoed the 2005 "Anti-Secession" law, so that more evidence would be needed to conclude that a drastic policy shift is under way.17 China may even want to avoid antagonizing the Taiwanese ahead of local elections later this year. Trump is not yet breaking the status quo: Trump's Asia policy has been consistent with that of previous administrations.18 And Trump's moves to assure Taiwan of U.S. commitment to its defense are status quo. After all, the Democratic Party is historically more enthusiastic about supplying Taiwan with arms (Chart 11). Trump has assured Xi Jinping he will adhere to the "One China" policy; and it is rarely observed that Trump's controversial phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai followed the first-ever tête-à -tête between a Chinese president and his Taiwanese counterpart.19 As long as Trump upholds the norm, the U.S. remains committed to Taiwan's defense yet will refuse to let Taiwan lock it into excessive tensions with China. This policy actually reduces the probability of a miscalculation by Beijing or Taipei. By contrast, the probability would rise if China and Taiwan perceived that the U.S. was withdrawing from its commitments, as Taiwan might want to suck the U.S. back in, or China might see Taiwan as vulnerable. Incidentally, if the Trump administration is not rushing into conflict over Taiwan, then Japan's Abe administration certainly is not. Tsai is not yet breaking the status quo: President Tsai has so far played a pragmatic role. While she is dissatisfied with the "1992 Consensus," which holds that there is only "One China" but two different interpretations of it, she has not rejected the status quo, and she has not implied that Taiwan should be its own state (either of which would cause a huge reaction from the mainland). And there is no serious prospect of a popular independence referendum ("Twexit"?) on the horizon, which would assuredly prompt Beijing to aggressive measures. Chart 10China's Assertiveness Grows With Trade Chart 11Trump Has Not Changed Status Quo In order for us to increase the probability of a Taiwanese war, we would have to see one of these three players start behaving in a way that truly violates the status quo that has prevailed since the U.S. and China normalized relations in 1979. The real risk for Taiwan comes if the U.S. and China fail to arrest the secular decline in relations that began in the mid-2000s. A serious misunderstanding between these two would have a range of global repercussions, and could lead to miscalculation over Taiwan. Unfortunately, a miscalculation is conceivable within Trump's and Tsai's terms, which last until 2020. Consider the following scenario as an example. The U.S. is currently demanding that China assist with the North Korean problem, and may believe that it can compensate China by delaying any punitive trade measures. However, China may be expecting something else - it may be expecting the U.S. to downgrade relations with Taiwan. (In other words, China says, we diminish the North Korean threat to the U.S. mainland, you diminish the Taiwanese threat to the Chinese mainland.) Instead of giving China what it wants, the U.S. may provide Taiwan with new weapon capabilities in response to China's militarization of the South China Sea. In this way, U.S.-China competition could shift to the Taiwan Strait in the aftermath of any Korean settlement. In the meantime, we see Taiwan as vulnerable to China's discrete economic sanctions, which China has not hesitated to use in this or other diplomatic spats (Chart 12).20 Chart 12Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Bottom Line: What is clear to us is that U.S.-China tensions continue to grow and Taiwan could become more frightened, or more emboldened, in the "security dilemma" between them. But until we see signs that any of the relevant powers are actively attempting to break the status quo, we see war as a distant prospect. More likely, today's robust trade between China and Taiwan could suffer a hit due to politics, and tit-for-tat cross-strait sanctions could be imposed. We are closing our tactical trade of long Philippine peso / short Taiwanese dollar for a loss of 5%. This was a speculative play on the divergence in diplomatic relations with China. Taiwan has allowed its currency to rise to avoid antagonizing President Trump, while China and Taiwan have so far avoided the diplomatic crisis that we expect eventually to occur, as outlined above. Iran: Could America Pivot Back To The Middle East? BCA's Geopolitical Strategy correctly forecast the U.S.-Iran détente two years before the nuclear deal was agreed in the summer of 2015.21 At the heart of this call was our read of global forces, namely the paradigm shift in the global distribution of power away from American hegemony towards multipolarity (Chart 13). As the U.S. pivoted its geopolitical focus towards China, Iran became a thorn in its side, forcing it to maintain considerable presence in the Middle East. Without a formal détente with Iran - of which the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the fulcrum - such a pivot to Asia would be extremely difficult. On January 12, President Trump imperiled our forecast by threatening not to waive sanctions against Iran the next time they come due (May 12).22 To avoid that fate, President Trump wants to see three major changes to the JCPOA: An indefinite extension of limits on Iran's uranium enrichment; Immediate access for inspectors to all nuclear sites; Adding new provisions to limit development of ballistic missiles. These additions are likely to kill the deal, although Trump appears to have directed his comments to the European signatories only. This could potentially create a loophole in the crisis, by allowing Europe to agree to new thresholds for re-imposing sanctions outside of the deal's framework. Pressure from the U.S. president comes at a delicate time for Iran. Domestic unrest has been ongoing since December 28. Although protests have largely fizzled out, they have reopened the rift between the clerical regime, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and moderate President Hassan Rouhani. In a surprising statement, President Rouhani said, "it would be a misrepresentation and also an insult to Iranian people to say they only had economic demands ... people had economic, political, and social demands." He went on to say that "We cannot pick a lifestyle and tell two generations after us to live like that ... The views of the young generation about life and the world is different than ours." We agree with President Rouhani. First, 49% of Iran's population is under the age of 30 (Chart 14). Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader and the twelve members of the "Guardian Council" - which has the power to veto parliamentary legislation and to vet presidential candidates - have an average age of 73.23 As with the 2009 Green Revolution, which was brutally repressed, Iran's demographics provide the kindling for a potential regime change. Chart 13American Hegemony Ended,##br## Global Multipolarity Ascending Chart 14Iran's Youth:##br## A National Security Risk Second, Iran's economy is clearly not the main reason for the angst. While unemployment is elevated at 12%, it is only slightly above its two-decade average. Meanwhile, inflation is well below its average, with real GDP growth at 5.8% by the end of 2016 (Chart 15). Considering that inflation peaked at 44%, and real GDP growth bottomed at -16% during the most severe sanctions, the current situation is not dire. What has irked the population is that while the private sector suffered throughout the sanctions ordeal, government spending remained elevated (Chart 16). This is not merely because of automatic stabilizers amidst a deep recession. Instead, Iran has elevated its military spending as new geopolitical opportunities presented themselves in the region (Chart 17). It currently spends more on its military as a percent of GDP than any peer in the region (save for Saudi Arabia, its chief rival). It is openly engaged in military conflict in both Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, while it continues to support allies militarily, economically, and diplomatically across the region, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon. Chart 15Economic Situation Poor But Not Dire Chart 16Government Felt No Pain During Sanctions Chart 17Iran Overspends On Military Third, Chart 18 shows that Iran is becoming "dangerously wealthy." Both the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 2009 Green Revolution occurred at, or near, the peak of Iran's wealth. The 25 years preceding each event saw the country's GDP per capita triple and double, respectively. Chart 18Wealth Is Also A National Security Risk Political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have empirically shown that wealth changes people's basic values and beliefs, from political and economic beliefs to religion and sexual mores.24 This is the process of modernization. Economic development gives rise to cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and even democracy likely. Iran has essentially come full circle since 1979. We suspect that the conservative hardliners in the regime understand the revolutionary context well. After all, they were themselves in their 30s when they rebelled against the old corrupt regime. As such, they will welcome President Trump's pressure as it gives them a raison d'être and an opportunity to undermine the moderate President Rouhani who staked his presidency on the success of the nuclear deal. The risk in this scenario is that the domestic arena of the ongoing "two-level game" will prevent both the U.S. and Iran from backing away from a confrontation. Iranian hardliners, who control part of the armed forces, could lash out in the Persian Gulf, either by rhetorically threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz - as they did repeatedly in 2011 - or by boarding foreign vessels in international waters.25 Geopolitical tensions would therefore serve to undermine President Rouhani's embrace of diplomacy and to de-legitimize any further protests, which would be deemed treasonous. For Trump, a belligerent Iranian response to his pressure would in turn legitimize his suspicion of the nuclear deal. What about the global constraints of multipolarity that compelled the U.S. to seek a détente with Iran in order to pivot to Asia? They remain in place. As such, President Trump's simultaneous pressure on Iran and China runs counter to U.S. strategy, given its limited material resources and diplomatic bandwidth. It is therefore unsustainable. What we cannot forecast, however, is whether the White House will realize this before or after it commits the U.S. to a serious confrontation. Bottom Line: Domestic political calculus in both Iran and the U.S. make further Tehran-Washington tensions likely. The two countries are playing a dangerous two-level game that could spiral out of control in the Middle East. For the time being, however, we expect merely a minor geopolitical risk premium to seep into the energy markets, supporting our bullish BCA House View on oil prices. NAFTA: Of Global Relevance On a recent client trip through Toronto and Ottawa we were unsurprisingly asked a lot of questions regarding the fate of NAFTA. The deal is not just of importance to Canada but to the world. It is a bellwether for our low-conviction view that President Trump is going to moderate to the middle on policy issues ahead of the midterm elections. We encourage clients to read our November Special Report titled "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism."26 In it, we cautioned clients that the probability of NAFTA being abrogated by Trump is around 50%. Why so high? Because there are few constraints: Economic: The U.S. economy has been largely unaffected by NAFTA (Chart 19) and would likely experience no disruption if Trump abrogated the deal and began negotiations on bilateral trade agreements with Canada and Mexico. Political: Investors and the media are overstating the importance of the Midwest automotive and agricultural sectors to Trump's base. Trump's Midwest voters knew well his view on NAFTA when they voted for him. In fact, they voted for him because of his NAFTA view. Investors have to realize that Americans do not support unbridled free trade (Chart 20). Constitutional/Legal: There is an argument that Congress could stop President Trump from withdrawing from NAFTA, but the only way to do so would be to nullify his executive orders or legislate a law that prevents the president from withdrawing. However, given the point from above, Congress is afraid to go against the median voter. The immediate implications for investors are that both the CAD and MXN could face downside pressure following the Montreal round of negotiations ending January 29. Both fell by 1.2% and 1.9% respectively in the week of trading following the third round of negotiations in September (Chart 21). Chart 19U.S. Economy:##br## Largely Unaffected By NAFTA Chart 20America Belongs To##br## The Anti-Globalization Bloc Chart 21NAFTA Negotiations##br## Are FX-Relevant More broadly, NAFTA is an important bellwether for the direction of Trump's policy. He has practically no constraints to abrogating the deal. If his intention is to renegotiate two separate deals - or simply reactivate the 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement - then it makes sense for him to end NAFTA and score political points at home. As such, if he does not, it will indicate that the White House is not truly populist but has been captured by the Republican establishment. Bottom Line: If President Trump does not abrogate NAFTA, which comes with few constraints, then he has clearly decided to throw his lot in with the U.S. establishment, which has consistently been more pro-trade than the American voter. This would be highly bullish for investors as it would suggest that the (geo)political risk premium would dissipate going forward. In fact, the decision on NAFTA could be a broad indicator for future decisions on trade relations with China, Iranian sanctions, and policy writ large. For if Trump sides with the establishment on an issue with minimal constraints, then he is more likely to do so on issues with greater constraints. This month, we are closing our 2/30 curve steepener recommendation, which is down 90bps since inception. The two alternative ways we have played rising U.S. growth and inflation prospects - shorting the 10-year Treasury vs. the Bunds and shorting the Fed Funds December 2018 futures - are in the money, 27bps and 46bs respectively. We are keeping both open for now. In addition, we are closing our long French industrial equities relative to German industrials for a gain of 10.26%. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 The playbook is really Nikita Khruschev's. 4 Please see "NK celebrates completion of nuke arsenal with fireworks," The Korea Herald, December 2, 2017, available at www.koreaherald.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Trump decided to impose tariffs on solar panels and washing machine, mostly affecting China and South Korea, on January 22. On steel and aluminum, Trump has until late April to decide, i.e. 90 days after reports from the Commerce Department due Jan. 15 and Jan. 22. Please see Andrew Restuccia and Doug Palmer, "White House preparing for trade crackdown," Politico, dated January 7, 2018, available at www.politico.com. 8 The U.S. Trade Representative's latest edition of an annual report to Congress over China's compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments declares that the U.S. "erred in supporting China's entry into the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China's embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime." Please see "Joint Statement by the United States, European Union and Japan at MC11," December 2017, and "USTR Releases Annual Reports on China's and Russia's WTO Compliance," dated January 2018, available at ustr.gov. 9 Please see Lesley Wroughton, "Trump administration says U.S. mistakenly backed China WTO accession in 2001," Reuters, January 19, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see "China cuts communication with Taiwan," Al Jazeera, June 25, 2016, available at www.aljazeera.com; "Taiwan mistakenly fires supersonic missile killing one," BBC, July 1, 2016, available at www.bbc.com; Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, "Trump Speaks With Taiwan's Leader, An Affront To China," New York Times, December 2, 2016, available at www.nytimes.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "U.S.-China: From Rivalry To Proxy Wars" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Xi Jinping is rumored to have told Communist Party leaders in 2012 that the country would invade Taiwan by 2020. Please see Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Project 2049 Institute, 2017). 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 National Chengchi University's long-running data series on Taiwanese identity shows that 58% of Taiwanese people identify as Taiwanese, and 70% under the age of 40. However, 77.5% of twenty-year olds also support the political status quo, i.e. do not seek political independence. Please see Marie-Alice McLean-Dreyfus, "Taiwan: Is there a political generation gap?" dated June 9, 2017, available at lowyinstitute.org. 17 Please see Richard C. Bush, "What Xi Jinping Said About Taiwan At The 19th Party Congress," Brookings Institution, October 19, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 18 Even the North Korea threat portfolio was bequeathed to him from former President Barack Obama, and it is being managed largely by the Pentagon and navy. 19 In other words, the incoming Trump administration implied that if China's leader Xi Jinping can speak directly to Taiwan's leader Ma Ying-jeou, then U.S. President Donald Trump can speak to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. This is a sign that alliances are alive and well, and that there are tensions, but it is not a harbinger of war. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Does It Pay To Pivot To China?" dated July 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Out Of The Vault: Explaining The U.S.-Iran Détente," dated July 15, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 The JCPOA did not actually legislate the removal of sanctions against Iran as the Obama administration was unable to get the Republican-controlled Senate to agree. Instead, the president has to use his executive authority to continue waiving sanctions against Iran. 23 That is only two years away from the average life expectancy in Iran. 24 Please see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 25 Iranian military personnel - almost always the Navy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards - seized British Royal Navy personnel in 2007 and U.S. Navy personnel in 2016. 26 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
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