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Highlights EM QE programs will ensure that EM local currency bond yields will drop further. However, the impact of these EM QE programs on EM currencies is ambiguous. Continue receiving long-term swap rates in a number of EM economies. QE programs globally constitute public debt monetization. A stronger money supply does not in itself constitute a sufficient reason to expect a rise in inflation rates. However, DM and EM QE programs could fuel financial market manias. Feature Chart I-1Broad Money Is Booming In DM And Accelerating In EM In this report we discuss the various quantitative easing programs (QEs) that have begun to surface in emerging economies. This is a new phenomenon that will likely mark a major precedent for EM central banks. Over time, these programs will likely become more prominent tools in EM. Understanding these unorthodox monetary policy easing measures in EM and DM is of paramount importance to investors. We use a Q&A format to discuss and elaborate on this topic. Question: What has forced the authorities to launch QE programs in EM and what forms have they taken? Answer: QE programs in developing countries are in their infancy. Several governments launched them in haste in the month of March in response to the recession and panic selloff that was occurring across global financial markets. These programs will be shaped by different forces and take different forms over time. Generally, QE programs are implemented in order to: (1) halt the abrupt deleveraging among local commercial banks amid the COVID-19 crisis (2) ensure credit continues to flow to the real economy (companies and households) (3) bring down long-term interest rates and prevent large government borrowings from crowding out the private sector. In addition to slashing policy rates, many EM central banks (CBs) are implementing one or more of the following initiatives to achieve these objectives: I.  Providing unlimited liquidity to commercial banks through various facilities II.  Buying government bonds III. Conducting direct purchases of local currency corporate bonds and, in some cases, mortgage-backed securities IV. Direct lending to non-banks such as mutual funds and enterprises V. Expanding the range of public and private sector securities that can be used as collateral when lending to banks The second, third and fourth types of operations can be considered forms of QE to the extent that they fall beyond the scope of customary CB operations. The latest QEs qualify as public debt monetization. This is also true for the QEs in advanced economies. Table I-1 provides information about various central bank policies across mainstream EM countries. Details are still limited regarding the technicalities, quantity and timelines of some of these measures. Table I-1Quantitative Easing Policies Annouced By Emerging Economies Question: Do these QEs represent a public debt and fiscal deficit monetization? Answer: Yes, monetary and fiscal policies are being coordinated and these QEs qualify as public debt monetization. This is also true for the QEs in advanced economies. These QE policies have been designed to ensure that the cost of government borrowing does not rise amid the surge in public sector borrowing requirements. Especially at a time when foreign investors were abandoning EM financial markets. Governments have deployed large fiscal stimulus packages to offset the devastating economic impact of COVID-19 induced shutdowns. Coupled with a collapse in fiscal revenues, this has resulted in a widening of fiscal deficits and large borrowing requirements. Chart I-2EM QEs Are Intended To Drive Down Local Bond Yields EM local currency government bond yields spiked in March (Chart I-2). This prompted CBs in many EMs to announce government bond purchasing programs in order to bring down government bond yields. Government bond yields influence other interest rates such as those for consumer and business loans. Higher borrowing costs amid a deep recession would have been lethal for corporate and household debtors. Additionally, it would have materially damaged public debt dynamics. To bring down government bond yields and ensure that policy rate cuts translate into lower borrowing costs across the entire yield curve, CBs have begun purchasing government bonds in the following developing countries: Brazil, South Africa, Poland, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. Government bond yields in many EMs have declined since mid-March (Chart I-2). That could be at least partially attributed to EM CBs’ QE programs. CB purchases of government bonds in either primary or secondary markets, qualify as public debt monetization. Question: How are QEs different from conventional CB operations and what makes them so unique as to warrant investor attention? Answer: There are three things that distinguish these QE initiatives from traditional CB operations: First, CBs do not typically lend to non-banks. They do not lend to or purchase credit instruments issued by non-banks. Hence, by purchasing corporate bonds and issuing loans to non-banks, CBs have entered into unchartered territory. This is also true for the Federal Reserve and CBs in other advanced economies. Second, by buying government bonds CBs are conducting an outright monetization of public debts and fiscal deficits. This is true for central banks in both EM and DM. Outside QEs, monetary authorities typically set the short-term interest rate and provide enough liquidity to the banking system to keep short-term interbank rates on par with policy rates. Chart I-3Fed’s Ownership Of Treasurys Prior to the launch of QE programs, CB operations with long-term government bonds were limited in scope and often technical in nature. For example, the Fed’s ownership of US Treasury securities rose by only 40% from $550 billion in 2002 to $775 billion in 2006. By comparison, it has doubled from $2 trillion to $4 trillion since September 2019 (Chart I-3). When CBs buy government bonds en masse, as they are currently doing in many countries, we are no longer talking about open market operations, but rather the monetization of public debt. Third, by launching QEs, CBs affect long-term interest rates. When financial markets are malfunctioning, which results in unjustifiably elevated long-term interest rates and cost of capital, QEs become essential to ensure the monetary policy transmission channel is operating effectively.  Nevertheless, as we have seen in the cases of the ECB and Bank of Japan, the use of QEs can become addictive. Once CBs have deployed QEs, they have a hard time abandoning them. When the financial systems and markets get accustomed to zero or negative nominal interest rates and to a constant overflow of CB liquidity, the termination of QEs will be disruptive and painful. Consequently, there is a risk that both DM and EM CBs will end up overdoing it with QEs - suppress long-term interest rates too much, for too long and for no justifiable reason. This will in turn lead to misallocations of capital, asset bubbles and other distortions in financial markets and real economies. If the velocity of money recovers to its pre-pandemic levels amid the massive expansion of money supply, inflation will rise even if real output returns to its potential pace. Question: Is it fair to say that QEs lead only to an increase in commercial banks’ excess reserves at the CB, and that they have no real impact on the money supply? In other words, if commercial banks do not lend, is it true that the money supply will not expand and, thereby, QEs will never lead to higher rates of inflation?  Answer: Not really. QEs have a much more nuanced impact on the money supply. Moreover, the relationship between the money supply and the inflation rate is not straightforward. We will consider several examples, dissecting the impact of QEs on both excess reserves (ER) and the money supply. But first, let us recall that the broad money supply is the sum of both the cash in circulation and all types of deposits in commercial banks, including demand, time and savings deposits. Commercial banks’ ER at CBs are not included in either the narrow or broad definitions of money supply. Case 1: When a central bank purchases securities from or lends to a bank, ER rise although no deposit is created, so the money supply does not change.  Case 2: When a central bank purchases securities from or lends money to non-banks, this transaction creates both an ER and a new deposit in commercial banks, meaning that the money supply does increase. Case 3: When a commercial bank buys securities from or lends to non-banks, ER do not change while a new deposit is created “out of thin air”, so that the money supply rises. Conversely, when a bank sells a security to a non-bank, or a non-bank repays a loan, the money supply (i.e. the amount of deposits in the banking system) shrinks. To sum up, QEs lead to a larger money supply when CBs purchase assets from or lend to non-banks. When CBs purchase assets from banks, no new money (deposits) are created. Importantly, the money supply also expands when commercial banks buy securities from or lend to non-banks. Chart I-4A and I-4B reveal that QEs in the US, the UK, Japan and the euro area, over the past 10 or so, years have created a lot of ER but little money supply. Chart I-4AExcess Reserves Have Expanded More Than Broad Money In US, Japan… Chart I-4B… Euro Area And UK   In China, the broad money supply has been exploding since 2009. The commercial banks have, on their own, generated an enormous increase in the money supply “out of thin air”, by making loans to and buying securities from non-banks, even though there has been much less ER creation from the PBoC (Chart I-5). The top panel of Chart I-6 illustrates the remarkable evolution of broad money supply in China versus the US, the euro area and Japan. In the chart, broad money supply in these four economies is plotted along the same scale, since January 2009, when QEs began in DM and the credit boom commenced in China. Even though ERs have expanded much more in the US, the euro area and Japan (Chart I-6, bottom panel), broad money growth in China outstripped all other economies by a large margin (Chart I-6, top panel). Chart I-5Excess Reserves Have Expanded Less Than Broad Money In China Chart I-6Broad Money And Excess Reserves: China Versus DM     As we discussed in our previous reports on money, credit and savings, money supply growth is not at all contingent on savings in an economy. Rather, outside of QEs money in all countries is primarily created by the commercial banks when they lend to or purchase assets from non-banks. Still, the nature of QE is now changing in the US. Chart I-7 reveals that the broad money supply is booming faster than it ever has, since World War II. As the Fed lends directly to businesses and purchases corporate bonds that are largely held by non-banks, the money supply will explode in the US, alongside a surge in ER. Chart I-7US Money Growth: The Sky Is The Limit Chart I-8April Datapoints Suggest Notable EM Money Growth Acceleration Similar trends will occur in EM and other DM (Chart I-8): as their CBs buy securities from non-banks, they will simultaneously create both ER and new deposits at commercial banks (money supply). Question: Does this potential explosion in money supply globally – and in the US in particular – imply that there is an imminent risk of an inflation outbreak in the real economy? Answer: A stronger money supply does not in itself constitute a sufficient reason to expect a rise in inflation rates. Inflation (rising prices of goods and services) also depends on the velocity of money and the productive capacity of an economy. Nominal GDP = Velocity of Money x Money Supply In turn, Nominal GDP = Output Volume x Prices Hence, Output Volume x Prices = Velocity of Money x Money Supply Finally, Prices = (Velocity of Money x Money Supply) / Output Volume. Therefore, inflation is contingent not only on the money supply but also on the velocity of money and the output volume. The money supply will continue surging in the US and will boom in the rest of the world as other CBs also deploy QEs (Chart I-7 and I-8). However, the surge in money supply has so far been offset by a lower velocity of money (Chart I-9Aand I-9B). The velocity of money reflects the willingness of consumers and businesses to spend their money. Chart I-9AVelocity Of Money Dropped In March Chart I-9BVelocity Of Money Dropped In March If the velocity of money recovers to its pre-pandemic levels amid the massive expansion of money supply, inflation will rise. In a nutshell, money growth will be booming worldwide due to QEs but the velocity of money, or the willingness to spend, will be the critical factor in determining inflation dynamics in the months and years to come. Question: Will the current excessive creation of money leak into asset prices and produce asset bubbles? Answer: It could. As we discussed in our January report titled, A Primer On Liquidity, an abundant money supply is conducive to higher asset prices and bubbles, but it is not a sufficient condition. Investors should be willing to allocate money to financial assets in order for the latter to appreciate. For example, since the beginning of this year, global risk assets have gone through an enormous roller-coaster ride. Through mid-February, risk assets were buoyant and the oft-cited rationale for the rally was plentiful liquidity. Then, from mid-February on through late March, we witnessed historic liquidity crunches across all financial markets, including US Treasurys. It is crucial to note that neither ER in the global banking system, nor global narrow and broad money slowed down during that period (Chart I-1 on page 1 and Charts I-4A and I-4B on page 6). Investors were simply liquidating financial assets and raising their cash level. Since late March, risk assets have been rallying as investors have felt more comfortable taking on more risk. Overall, whether ballooning money supply flows into financial assets or not is contingent on the willingness of all types of investors to deploy their deposits into financial markets. Just as price inflation in the real economy is dependent on the willingness of consumers and businesses to spend their money on goods and services, financial asset price appreciation is contingent on the animal spirit of all investors and their inclination to take on more risk. Whether ballooning money supply flows into financial assets or not is contingent on the willingness of all types of investors to deploy their deposits into financial markets. Question: How does the stock of US dollars (the broad money supply) compare with the value of US-denominated securities available to investors? Has the Fed’s purchases of securities not shrunk the amount of publicly-traded securities available to investors? Answer: Yes, indeed, they have. One of the distortions that the Fed’s and other CBs' QEs created has been the shrinkage of publicly-traded bonds and stocks. This has certainly lifted asset prices to levels they would have otherwise not reached. Chart I-10 plots the ratio of the US broad money supply-to-the market value of all US dollar-denominated securities. The US broad money supply represents all US dollars in the world – in cash and in electronic bank deposits. The denominator is the market capitalization of US denominated stocks and all types of bonds held by non-bank investors. It is calculated as the sum of the following: US equity market capitalization (the Wilshire 5000); the market cap values of all US-dollar bonds, including government, corporate, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities and commercial mortgage backed securities (the Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Index); and the market cap value of US dollar-denominated bonds issued by EM governments and corporations; minus the Fed’s and US commercial banks’ holdings of all types of securities. Chart I-10The US: Broad Money Supply Relative To Equity And Bond Market Capitalization The higher this ratio, the more US dollar deposits, or liquidity, is available per one dollar of market value of outstanding securities – excluding those held by the Fed and US commercial banks. Based on the past 25 years, this ratio is somewhat elevated meaning that liquidity is relatively abundant. However, as argued above, animal spirits among investors are as important in driving financial asset prices as the amount of money supply. Question: What will happen to exchange rates in general, and to EM currencies in particular, given that almost every country in the world is expanding its money supply, simultaneously? Answer: There is no stable correlation between the relative money supply of two individual economies and their bi-lateral exchange rate. In addition, this is the first time that QEs are being deployed in both DM and EM countries at the same time. Therefore, there is no easy and straightforward answer to this question. Chart I-11EM Currencies: A Bounce Or Beginning Of A Cyclical Rally? We recommend using the following framework to think about EM exchange rates versus the US dollar, at the moment: 1. EM currencies in aggregate will continue to be driven by global growth, as they have been historically. Chart I-11 illustrates that the EM ex-China currency index correlates with industrial commodity prices. The basis for this correlation is that they are both driven by the global business cycle. So far, the advance in both EM exchange rates and industrial commodities has been tame. It is still not clear if this is merely a rebound from very oversold levels or rather the beginning of a cyclical rally. 2. The rampant expansion of US money supply will eventually lead to the greenback’s depreciation. However, for the US dollar to depreciate against EM currencies, the following two conditions should be satisfied: US imports should expand, meaning that the US should send dollars to the rest of the world by buying goods and services. This has not yet happened though, as domestic demand in America has plunged and any demand recovery in the next three to six months will be tame and muted. US investors should channel US dollars to EM to purchase EM financial assets. 3. From an individual EM perspective, there are several scenarios to consider: If a country’s QE: materially boosts its real growth, its currency will rally in spite of ongoing domestic QE; fails to meaningfully boost growth, its exchange rate will weaken; produces a rapid rise in inflation, its currency will depreciate; is used to finance unsustainable public debt dynamics, its currency will depreciate. As we have written in the recent reports, this could very well be the case in Brazil and South Africa. Investment Conclusions We expect EM local yields to fall further. For absolute-return investors we continue to recommend receiving swap rates in Korea, China, India, Malaysia, Russia, Colombia and Mexico. Our country allocation for EM local currency bond portfolios is always presented at the end of our reports on page 15. We continue shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, ZAR, PHP, IDR and KRW. However, if the strength in EM currencies persists in the near term, we will close our short positions. Continue underweighting EM equities and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. Within the EM credit space, favor sovereign to corporate credit. On that issue, please refer to our April 22, Special Report on EM foreign currency debt. For dedicated EM equity managers, we recommend overweighting Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Russia, central Europe, Mexico and Peru. Our underweights are Indonesia, India, the Philippines, the UAE, South Africa and Brazil. Please refer to our Open Position Table on page 14. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

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What Can 1918/1919 Teach Us About COVID-19?    “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” George Santayana – 1905   Chart 1Coronavirus: As Contagious But Not As Deadly As Spanish Flu Today’s economy is very different to that of 100 years ago. Many countries then were in the middle of World War I (which ended in November 1918). The characteristics of the Spanish Flu which struck the world in 1918 and 1919 were also different to this year’s pandemic. COVID-19 is almost as contagious as the Spanish Flu, but it is much less deadly (Chart 1). Healthcare systems and treatments today are far more advanced than those of a century ago: many people who caught Spanish flu died of complications caused by bacterial pneumonia, given the absence of antibiotics. Influenza viruses tend to mutate rapidly: the influenza virus in 1918 first mutated to become far more virulent in its second wave, and then to become much milder. Coronaviruses have a “proofreading” capacity and mutate less easily.1  Nevertheless, an analysis of the pandemic of 100 years ago provides a number of insights into the current crisis, particularly now that policymakers are easing social-distancing rules to help the economy, even at the risk of more cases and deaths. Among the lessons of 1918-1919: Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) do lower mortality rates. The speed at which NPIs are implemented and the period of implementation are as important as the number of measures taken. Removing or relaxing measures too early can lead to a renewed rise in mortality rates. It is hard to compare current fiscal and monetary policies to those taken during the 1918 pandemic, since policy in both areas was already easy before the pandemic as a result of the world war. However, a severe pandemic would certainly call for a wartime-like fiscal and monetary response. The economy was negatively impacted by the pandemic in 1918-19 but, despite the shock to industrial activity and employment, the economy subsequently rebounded quickly, in a V-shaped recovery. Introduction Predicting how the economy will react to the COVID-19 pandemic is hard. Governments and policymakers face multiple uncertainties: How effective are different containment measures? Will cases and deaths rebound quickly if lockdown measures are eased? When will the coronavirus disappear? When will a vaccine be ready? With an event unprecedented in the experience of anyone alive today, perhaps there are some lessons to be learned from history. For this Special Report, we attempt to draw some parallels between the current situation and the 1918-19 Spanish flu. We focus on the different containment efforts implemented, the role that fiscal and monetary policies played, the impact on markets and the economy, and whether history can throw any light on how the COVID-19 crisis might pan out. The 1918 Spanish Flu Chart 2The Spanish Flu Hit The World In Three Waves The 1918 influenza pandemic was the most lethal in modern history. Soldiers returning from World War I helped spread the pandemic across the globe. The first recorded case is believed to have been in an army camp in Kansas. While there is no official count, researchers estimate that about 500 million people contracted the virus globally, with a mortality rate of between 5% and 10%. The pandemic occurred over three waves in 1918 and 1919 – the first in the spring of 1918, the second (and most deadly) in the fall of 1918, and the third in spring 1919 (Chart 2). In the US alone, official data estimate that around 500,000 deaths (or over 25% of all deaths) in 1918 and 1919 were caused by pneumonia and influenza.2 The pandemic moved swiftly to Europe and reached Asia by mid-1918, but became more lethal only towards the end of the year (Map 1).3 Map 1The Spread Of Influenza Through Europe Initially, scientists were puzzled by the origin of the influenza and its biology. It was not until a decade later, in the early 1930s, that Richard Shope isolated the particular influenza virus from infected pigs, confirming that a virus caused the Spanish Flu, not a bacterium as most had thought. Many of those who caught this strain of influenza died as a result of their lungs filling with fluid in a severe form of pneumonia. In reporting death rates, then, it is considered best practice to include deaths from both influenza and pneumonia. The first wave had almost all the hallmarks of a seasonal flu, albeit of a highly contagious strain. Symptoms were similar and mortality rates were only slightly higher than a normal influenza. The first wave went largely unnoticed given that deaths from pneumonia were common then. US public health reports show that the disease received little attention until it reappeared in a more severe form in Boston in September 1918.4  Most countries did not begin investigating and reporting cases until the second wave was underway (Chart 3). Chart 3Most Countries Began Reporting Only When The Second Wave Hit This second wave – which was more lethal because the virus had mutated – had a unique characteristic. Unlike the typical influenza mortality curve – which is usually “U” shaped, affecting mainly the very young and elderly – the 1918 influenza strain had a “W”-shaped mortality curve – impacting young adults as well as old people (Chart 4). This pattern was evident in all three waves, but most pronounced during the second wave. The reason for this was that the infection caused by the influenza became hyperactive, producing a “cytokine storm” – when mediators secreted from the immune system result in severe inflammation.5 Simply put, as the virus became virulent, the body’s immune system overworked to fight it. Younger people, with strong immune systems, suffered most from this phenomenon. Chart 4A Unique Characteristic: Impacting Younger Adults By the summer of 1919, the pandemic was over, since those who had been infected had either died or recovered, therefore developing immunity. The lack of records makes it difficult to assess if “herd immunity” was achieved. However, some historical accounts and research – particularly for army groups in the US and the UK – suggest that those exposed to the disease in the first mild wave were not affected during the second more severe wave.6 The failure to define the causative pathogen at the time made development of a vaccine impossible. Nevertheless, some treatments and remedies showed modest success. These varied from using a serum – obtained from people who had recovered, who therefore had antibodies against the disease – to simple symptomatic drugs and various oils and herbs. The Effectiveness Of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) What we today call “social distancing” showed positive effects during the 1918-19 pandemic. These included measures very similar to those applied today: school closures, isolation and quarantines, bans on some sorts of public gatherings, and more. However, there were few travel bans.  The number of passengers carried during the months of the pandemic did noticeably decline though (Chart 5). Chart 5Travel Slowed...Just Not Enough Table 1, based on research by Hatchett, Mecher and Lipsitch, breaks down NPIs by type for 17 major US cities. Most cities implemented a wide range of interventions. But it was not only the type of NPIs implemented that made a difference, but also the speed and length of implementation. Table 1Measures Applied Then Are Very Similar To Those Applied Today Further research by Markel, Lipman and Navarro based on 43 US cities shows that the median number of days between the first reported influenza case and the first NPI implementation was over two weeks. The median period during which various NPIs were implemented was about six weeks (Table 2). Table 2NPIs Were Implemented Only For Short Periods Markel, Lipman and Navarro's findings show that a rapid public-health response was an important factor in reducing the mortality rate by slowing the rate of infection, what we now refer to as “flattening the curve.” There were major differences in cities’ policies: both the speed at which they implement NPIs, and the length of the implementation period. Chart 6 shows that: Cities that acted quickly to implement NPIs slowed the rate of infections and deaths (Chart 6, panel 1) Cities that acted quickly had lower mortality rates from influenza and pneumonia (Chart 6, panel 2) Cities that implemented NPIs for longer periods had fewer deaths (Chart 6, panel 3) Chart 7 quantifies the number of NPIs taken, the time it took to implement the measures, and the length of NPIs to gauge policy strictness. Cities with stricter enforcement had lower death rates than those with laxer measures. Chart 6Fast Response And Longer Implementation Led To Fewer Deaths... Chart 7...So Did Policy Strictness For example, Kansas City, less than a week after its first reported case, had implemented quarantine and isolation measures. By the second week, schools, churches, and other entertainment facilities closed. Schools reopened a month later (in early November) but quickly shut again until early January 1919.  While we do not have definitive dates on when each NPI was lifted, some sort of protective measures in Kansas City were in place for almost 170 days. By contrast, Philadelphia, one of the cities hardest hit by Spanish Flu, took more than a month to implement any measures. Its tardiness meant that it reached a peak mortality rate much more quickly: in 13 days compared to 31 days for Kansas City. Even after the first reported case, the Liberty Loans Parade was still held on September 28, 1918 – with the knowledge that hundreds of thousands of spectators might be vulnerable to infection.7,8 It was not until a few days later that institutions were closed and a ban on public gatherings was imposed. Many other cities also held a Liberty Loans Parade, including Pittsburgh and Washington DC, but Philadelphia’s was the deadliest. Studies also show that relaxing interventions too early could be as damaging as implementing them too late. St. Louis, for example, was quick to lift restrictions and suffered particularly badly in the second wave as a result. It later reinstated NPIs up until end of February 1919. Other cities that eased restrictions too early (San Francisco and Minneapolis, for example) also suffered from a second swift, albeit milder, increase in weekly excess death rates from pneumonia and influenza (Chart 8). Chart 8Relaxing Lockdown Measures Too Early Can Lead To A Second Rise In Deaths... Chart 9...And So Can Highly Effective Measures Of course, NPIs cannot be implemented indefinitely. A recent research paper by Bootsma and Ferguson raises the point that suppressing a pandemic may not be the best strategy because it just leaves some people susceptible to infection later. They argue that highly effective social distancing measures, which allow a susceptible pool of people to reintegrate into society when the measures are lifted, are likely to lead to a resurgence in infections and fatalities in a second peak (Chart 9).9 They suggest an optimal level of control measures to reduce R (the infection rate) to a value that makes a significant portion of the population immune once measures are lifted.   The Impact Of The Spanish Flu On The Economy And Markets How did the Spanish Flu pandemic affect the economy? Many pandemic researchers ignore the official recession identified by the NBER during the months of the pandemic (between August 1918 and March 1919).10 The reason is that most of the evidence indicates that the economic effects of the 1918-19 pandemic were short-term and relatively mild.11 Disentangling drivers of the economy is, indeed, tricky given that WW1 ended in November 1918. However, it is easy to underestimate the negative impact of the pandemic since the war had such a big impact on the economy, as well as investor and public sentiment. Various research papers support the fact that, while the pandemic did indeed have an adverse effect on the economy, NPIs did not just depress mortality rates, but also sped the post-pandemic economic recovery.12 Research by Correia, Sergio, and Luck showed that the areas most severely affected by the pandemic saw a sharp and persistent decline in real economic activity, whereas cities that intervened earlier and more aggressively, experienced a relative increase in economic activity post the pandemic.13 Their findings are based on the increase in manufacturing employment after the pandemic compared to before it (1919 versus 1914). However, note that the rise of manufacturing payrolls in 1919 was high everywhere given the return of soldiers post-WWI. The researchers also note that those cities hardest hit by the pandemic also saw a negative impact on manufacturing activity, the stock of durable goods, and bank assets. Because Spanish flu disproportionately killed younger adults, many families lost their breadwinner. In economic terms, this implies both a negative supply shock and negative demand shock. If fewer employees are available to produce a certain good, supply will fall. The same reduction in employment also implies reduced income and therefore lower purchasing power. Both cases will result in a decrease in output. However, the change in prices depends on the decline of supply relative to demand. In 1918-19, the impact was disinflationary: demand declined by more than supply, and both spending and consumer prices fell during the pandemic (Chart 10). Chart 10Short-Term Price Impact Was Disinflationary US factory employment fell by over 8% between March 1918 and March 1919 – the period from the beginning of the first wave until the end of the second wave. It is important to note, however, that few businesses went bankrupt during the pandemic years (Chart 11). Additionally, the November 1918 Federal Reserve Bulletin highlighted that many cities, including New York, Kansas City, and Richmond, experienced a shortage of labor due to the influenza.14  Factory employment in New York fell by over 10% during this period.  Chart 11Loss Of Middle-Aged Adults = Loss Of Breadwinners The link between the labor shortages and the decline in industrial production is unclear. Industrial activity in the US peaked just before the second wave, contracting by over 20% during the second wave (Chart 12). Various industries reported disruptions: automobile production fell by 67%, anthracite coal production and shipments fell by around 45%, and railroad freight revenues declined by over seven billion ton-miles (Chart 12, panels 2, 3 & 4). However, some of this decline is attributed to falling defense production after the war. Chart 12Activity Slowed, But Rebounded Quickly Chart 13The War Had A Bigger Impact On The Stock Market Than The Pandemic The equity market moved in a broad range in 1915-1919 and fell sharply only ahead of the 1920 recession (Chart 13). Seemingly, stock market participants were more focused on the war than the pandemic. The lack of reporting of the pandemic could have contributed to this: newspapers were encouraged to avoid carrying bad news for reasons of patriotism and did not widely cover the pandemic until late 1918.15   Chart 14Monetary Policy Was Easy...Even Before The Pandemic Started The Federal Reserve played an active role in funding the government’s spending on the war, and so monetary policy was very easy during the pandemic – but for other reasons. The Fed used its position as a lender to the banking system to facilitate war bond sales.16 Interest rates were cut in 1914 and 1915 even before the US entered the war. The US economy had been in recession between January 1913 and December 1914. Policy rates remained low throughout 1916 and 1917 and slightly rose in 1918 and 1919. It was not until 1920 that Federal Reserve Bank System tightened policy rapidly to choke off inflation, which accelerated to over 20% in mid-1920 – rising inflation being a common post-war phenomenon (Chart 14). The Lessons Of 1918-19 For The Coronavirus Pandemic Non-pharmaceutical interventions should continue to be implemented until a vaccine, effective therapeutic drugs, or mass testing is available. Relaxing measures prematurely is as damaging as a tardy reaction to the pandemic. Reacting quickly and imposing multiple measures for longer periods not only reduces mortality rates, but also improves economic outcomes post-crisis. The economy suffers in the short-term: supply and demand shocks lead to lower output. The demand shock however is larger leading to lower prices and disinflationary pressures, at least during and immediately after the pandemic.   Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see the Q&A with immunologist and Nobel laureate Professor Peter Doherty, published by BCA Research April 1st 2020: BCA Research Special Report, “Questions On The Coronavirus: An Expert Answers,” available at bcaresearch.com 2 Please see “Leading Cause of Death, 1990-1998,” CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 3 Please see Ansart S, Pelat C, Boelle PY, Carrat F, Flahault A, Valleron AJ, “Mortality burden of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic in Europe,” NCBI. 4 Please see Public Health Report, vol. 34, No. 38, Sept. 19, 1919. 5 Please see Qiang Liu, Yuan-hong Zhou, Zhan-qiu Yang Cell Mol Immunol. 2016 Jan; 13(1): 3–10. 6 Please see Shope, R. (1958) Public Health Rep. 73, 165–178. 7 The Liberty Loans Parade was intended to promote the sale of government bonds to pay for World War One. 8 Please see Hatchett RJ, Mecher CE, Lipsitch M (2007) "Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic,"PNAS 104: 7582–7587. 9 Please see Bootsma M, Ferguson N, “The Effect Of Public Health Measures On The 1918 Influenza Pandemic In U.S. Cities,” PNAS (2007). 10Please see https://www.nber.org/cycles.html 11Please see https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/community-development/research-reports/pandemic_flu_report.pdf 12Please see https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/03/fight-the-pandemic-save-the-economy-lessons-from-the-1918-flu.html. 13Please see Correia, Sergio and Luck, Stephan and Verner, Emil, Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu (March 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561560. 14Please see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), 1935- and Federal Reserve Board, 1914-1935. "November 1918," Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1918). 15Please see https://newrepublic.com/article/157094/americas-newspapers-covered-pandemic. 16Please see https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/feds_role_during_wwi.

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Highlights Fed/BoE NIRP: It is too soon for either the Fed or Bank of England to consider a move to a negative interest rate policy (NIRP), even with US and UK money markets flirting with pricing in that outcome. Lessons from “NIRP 1.0”: In the countries that did go to negative rates in 2014-16 (Japan, Switzerland, the euro area, Sweden and Denmark), there existed some combination of weak economies, near-0% inflation, anemic credit growth or unwanted currency appreciation. Negative rates were needed to help fight those trends by driving down longer-term bond yields. NIRP 2.0?: Among the major countries without negative rate policies in effect (the US, UK, Canada and Australia), there is no evidence that longer-term borrowing rates need to fall further to boost credit growth, even in the midst of deep recessions. However, additional strength of the stubbornly resilient US dollar could be the deflationary shock that eventually forces the Fed into NIRP. Feature Chart 1NIRP 2.0 Would Trigger A Surge Of Negative Yielding Bonds Within a 20-month window in 2014-16, the central banks of Japan, Sweden, the euro area, Switzerland and Denmark all cut policy interest rates to below 0% - where they remain to this day. Fast forward to 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic and deep worldwide recession that has already forced major developed market central banks to cut rates close to 0%, there is now increased speculation that the negative interest rate policy (NIRP) club might soon get a few new members. The Federal Reserve has been front and center in that group. Fed funds futures contracts had recently priced in slightly negative rates in 2021, despite Fed Chair Jerome Powell repeatedly saying that a sub-0% funds rate was not in the Fed’s plans. The Bank of England (BoE) has also seen markets inch toward pricing in negative rates, although BoE officials have been more open to the idea of negative rates as a viable policy choice. Even the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has suggested that negative rates may be needed there soon. An expansion of the list of countries that have moved to negative rates, beyond the “NIRP 1.0” group of 2014-16, has the potential to drive down global bond yields even further. Already, there is $11 trillion of negative yielding debt within the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate index, representing 20% of the total (Chart 1) If there is a shift to negative rates in the potential “NIRP 2.0” group of major developed economies with policy rates now near 0% – a list that includes the US, the UK, Canada and Australia – then the amount of negative yielding debt worldwide will soar to new highs. An expansion of the list of countries that have moved to negative rates, beyond the “NIRP 1.0” group of 2014-16, has the potential to drive down global bond yields even further. In this report, we take a look at the conditions that led the NIRP 1.0 countries to shift to negative rates in the middle of the last decade, to see if any similarities exist in non-NIRP countries today. We conclude that the conditions are not yet in place for a shift to sub-0% policy rates in the US, the UK, Canada or Australia – all countries where central banks still have other policy tools available to provide stimulus before resorting to negative rates. How Negative Interest Rates Can “Work” To Revive Growth Broadly speaking, central banks around the world have had difficulty meeting their inflation targets since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The main reason for this has been sub-par economic growth, much of which is structural due to aging demographics and weak productivity. Since central bankers must stick to their legislated inflation targeting mandates, they are forced to cut rates when economic growth and inflation are too low. If real economic growth remains weak for structural reasons, then central banks can enter into a cycle of continually cutting rates all the way to zero, or even below zero, in order to try and prevent low inflation from becoming entrenched into longer-term inflation expectations. If growth and inflation continue to languish even after policy rates have reached 0%, then other tools must be used to ease monetary conditions to try and stimulate economies. These typically involve driving down longer-term borrowing rates (bond yields) through dovish forward guidance on future monetary policy, bond purchases through quantitative easing (QE) and, if those don’t work, moving to negative policy interest rates. A nice summary indicator to identify this intertwined dynamic of real economic growth and inflation is to look at the trend growth rate of nominal GDP. Chart 2 shows the policy interest rates three-year annualized trend of nominal GDP growth for the NIRP 1.0 countries, dating back to before the 2008 crisis. Japan stands out as the weakest of the group, with trend nominal growth contracting during and after the 2009 recession, while struggling to reach even +2% since then. The euro area, Sweden and Switzerland all enjoyed +5% nominal growth prior to 2008, before a plunge to the 1-2% range during and after the recession. After that, the three countries had varying degrees of economic success. Between 2016 and 2019, Sweden saw trend nominal growth between 4-5%, while the euro area struggled to achieve even +3% nominal growth and Switzerland maintained a Japan-like pace. Chart 2Fewer Tools Left For NIRP 1.0 Countries To Boost Growth Chart 3NIRP 2.0 Candidates Can Still Expand QE First The European Central Bank (ECB), Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and Sweden’s Riksbank all cut policy rates aggressively in 2008/09, helping spur a recovery in nominal growth. The central banks had to keep rates lower for longer because of structurally weak growth, leaving far less capacity to ease aggressively in response to the growth downturn a few years later. Eventually, the ECB, SNB, BoJ and Riksbank all went to negative rates between June 2014 and February 2016. The BoJ and SNB, facing persistent headwinds from strengthening currencies, also resorted to aggressive balance sheet expansion to provide additional monetary stimulus – trends that have continued to this day, with both central banks having balance sheets equal to around 120% of GDP. The experience of these four NIRP 1.0 countries showed that the move to negative rates was a process that began in the 2008 financial crisis. Central banks there were unable to raise rates much, if at all, after the recession, leaving little ammunition to fight the varying growth slowdowns suffered between 2012 and 2016. Eventually, rates had to be cut below 0% which, combined with QE, helped generate lower bond yields, weaker currencies and, eventually, a pickup in growth and inflation. Looking at the NIRP 2.0 candidate countries, nominal GDP growth has also struggled since the financial crisis, unable to stay much above 3-4% in the US, Canada and the UK. Only Australia has seen trend growth reach peaks closer to 5-6% (Chart 3). The Fed, BoE, Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and Bank of Canada (BoC) all also cut rates aggressively in 2008/09, with the Fed and BoE doing QE buying of domestic bonds. Rates were left at low levels after the crisis in the US and UK, with only the RBA and, to a lesser extent, the BoC hiking rates after the recession ended. When growth slowed again in these countries during the 2014-16 period, the RBA and BoC did lower policy rates, but negative rates were avoided by all four central banks. Today, nominal growth rates have collapsed because of the COVID-19 lockdowns that have shuttered much of the world economy. Central banks that have had any remaining capacity to cut policy rates back to 0% have done so, yet this recession has already become so deep that additional declines in rates may be necessary to stabilize unemployment and inflation. The experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries shows that negative rates can also be effective in boosting growth – especially in countries suffering unwanted currency strength. One way to see the problem that monetary policymakers are now facing is by looking at Taylor Rule estimates of appropriate interest rate levels (Charts 4 and 5). Given the rapid surge in global unemployment rates to levels that, in some cases, have not been seen since the Great Depression (Chart 6), alongside decelerating inflation, Taylor Rule implied policy rates are now deeply negative in the US (-5.6%), Canada (-2.9%) and euro area (-1.7%).1 Taylor Rules show that moderately negative rates are also needed in Sweden (-0.5%), Switzerland (-0.2%) and Japan (-0.2%). Only in Australia (+1.3%) and the UK (+0.3%) is the Taylor Rule indicating that negative rates are not currently required. Chart 4Taylor Rule Says More Rate Cuts Needed Here … Chart 5… But Rates Are Appropriate Here Chart 6The Main Reason Why Taylor Rule Implied Policy Rates Have Plunged Among the potential NIRP 2.0 candidates, the negative rate option has been avoided and aggressive QE balance sheet expansion has been pursued by all of them – including the BoC and RBA who avoided asset purchase programs in 2008/09. Balance sheet expansion can be an adequate substitute for policy interest rate cuts by helping drive down longer-term bond yields and borrowing rates, which helps spur credit demand and, eventually, economic growth. Yet the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries shows that negative rates can also be effective in boosting growth – especially in countries suffering unwanted currency strength. How negative rates worked for the NIRP 1.0 countries For the ECB (Chart 7), BoJ (Chart 8), Riksbank (Chart 9) and SNB, the path from negative policy rates in 2014-16 to, eventually, faster economic growth and inflation followed a similar process: Chart 7The Euro Area's Negative Rates Experience Chart 8Japan's Negative Rates Experience Chart 9Sweden's Negative Rates Experience Moving to negative policy rates resulted in a sharp decline in nominal government bond yields The fall in yields helped trigger currency depreciation Nominal yields fell faster than inflation expectations, allowing real bond yields to turn negative Credit growth eventually began to pick up in response to the decline in real borrowing costs Inflation bottomed out and started to move higher. In Japan, the euro area and Sweden, this process played out fairly rapidly with credit growth and inflation bottoming within 6-12 months of the move to negative rates. Only in Switzerland (Chart 10), where the SNB gave up on currency intervention in January 2015, was the process delayed, as the surge in the currency triggered a move into deeper deflation and higher real bond yields. It took a little more than a year for the deflationary impact of the franc’s surge to fade, allowing real bond yields to decline and credit growth and inflation to bottom out and recover. The implication is clear – negative rates are good for real assets, but troublesome for banks.  Of course, we are talking about the pure economic effect of negative rates as a monetary policy tool. There are side effects of having negative nominal interest rates and deeply negative real bond yields, like surging asset values (especially for real assets like housing). Bank profitability is also negatively impacted by the sharp fall in longer-term bond yields that hurts net interest margins, even with higher lending volumes and reduced non-performing loans. Chart 10Switzerland's Negative Rates Experience Chart 11Negative Rates Are Good For Real Assets This can be seen in Charts 11 & 12, which compare the performance of real house prices and bank equities (relative to the domestic equity market) in the years leading up to, and following, the move to negative rates in 2014-16 for the NIRP 1.0 countries. The implication is clear – negative rates are good for real assets, but troublesome for banks. Chart 12Negative Rates Are Bad For Bank Stocks Nonetheless, the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries suggests that the potential NIRP 2.0 countries could see similar benefits on growth and inflation – but not before other policy options are exhausted first. Bottom Line: In the countries that did go to negative rates in 2014-16 (Japan, Switzerland, the euro area, Sweden and Denmark), there existed some combination of weak economies, near-0% inflation, anemic credit growth or unwanted currency appreciation. Negative rates were needed to help fight those trends by driving down longer-term bond yields and helping spur credit growth and, eventually, some inflation. Depreciating currencies had a big role to play in generating those outcomes. Negative Rates Are Not Necessary (Yet) In The NIRP 2.0 Countries As discussed earlier, the sharp surge in unemployment because of the COVID-19 global recession means that negative interest rates may now be “appropriate” in the US and Canada, based on Taylor Rules. Negative rates are not needed in the UK and Australia, however, although policy rates need to stay very low in both countries. A similar divergence can be seen in inflation. Headline CPI inflation rates were already under severe downward pressure from the recent collapse in oil prices. The surge in spare economic capacity opened up by the current recession can only exacerbate the disinflation trend. However, the drop in inflation has been more acute in the US and Canada relative to the UK and Australia, suggesting a greater need for the Fed and BoC to be even more stimulative than the BoE or RBA (Chart 13). A renewed breakout of the currency to new cyclical highs could be the deflationary signal that triggers the Fed into an even more aggressive policy response. There is one area where the Fed stands alone in this group. The relentless strength of the US dollar, even as the Fed’s rate cuts have taken much of the attractive carry out of the greenback, hurts US export competitiveness in a demand-deficient recessionary global economy. The strong dollar also acts as a dampening influence on US inflation. A renewed breakout of the currency to new cyclical highs could be the deflationary signal that triggers the Fed into an even more aggressive policy response (Chart 14). This would mirror the experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries prior to the move to negative rates, where unwanted currency strength crippled both economic growth and inflation. Chart 13The Threat Of Deflation Could Trigger NIRP Chart 14Could More USD Strength Drag The Fed Into NIRP? For now, the Fed has many other policy options open before negative rates would be seriously considered. The reach of its QE programs could be expanded even further, even including equity purchases. The existing bond QE could be combined with a specific yield target (i.e. yield curve control) for shorter-maturity US Treasuries, helping anchor US yields at low levels for longer. Summing it all up, we do not see the need for any of the NIRP 2.0 candidates to move to negative rates anytime soon. The need for such extreme policies is not yet necessary, though, both in the US and the other NIRP 2.0 candidate countries. Bank lending is expanding at a double-digit pace in the US, and still at a decent 5-7% pace in the UK, Canada and Australia, even in the midst of a sharp recession (Chart 15). This may only be due to the numerous loan guarantees provided by governments as part of fiscal stimulus responses, or it may be related to companies running down credit lines to maintain liquidity. The experience of the NIRP 1.0 countries, though, suggests that credit growth must be far weaker than this to require negative policy rates to push down longer-term borrowing costs. Chart 15These Already Look Very "NIRP-ish" Chart 16Too Soon For Global NIRP, Maintain Neutral Global Duration Exposure Summing it all up, we do not see the need for any of the NIRP 2.0 candidates to move to negative rates anytime soon. In terms of investment implications, we continue to recommend an overall neutral stance on global duration exposure, as we see little immediate impetus for yields to move lower because of reduced expectations of future interest rates or inflation (Chart 16). We will continue to watch currency levels and credit growth as a sign that policymakers may need to shift their tone in the coming months. Bottom Line: Among the major countries without negative rate policies in effect (the US, UK, Canada and Australia), there is no evidence that longer-term borrowing rates need to fall further to boost credit growth, even in the midst of deep recessions. However, additional strength of the stubbornly resilient US dollar could be the deflationary shock that eventually forces the Fed into NIRP.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Footnotes 1 Our specification of the Taylor Rule uses unemployment rates relative to full employment (NAIRU) levels as the measure of spare capacity in the economies. For the neutral real interest rate, we use the New York Fed’s estimate of r-star for the US, Canada, the euro area and the UK; while using the OECD’s estimate of potential GDP growth as the neutral real rate measure for countries where we have no r-star estimate (Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia).

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Dear Client, With this weekly update on the Chinese economy, we are sending you a Special Report published by BCA Geopolitical Strategy team and authored by my colleague Matt Gertken. Lately we have been getting numerous questions from our clients, on the risk of a significant re-escalation in the US-China conflict. Matt’s report provides timely insights on the topic, and we trust you will find the report very helpful. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Feature An Update On The Chinese Economy Since mid-April, the speed of resumption in China’s domestic business activity has accelerated. Industrial enterprises appear to be operating at 87% of normal activity levels as of May 11, up from 81.8% one month ago. Small to medium-sized enterprise (SMEs) are estimated to now operate at 87.3% of their normal activity, a vast improvement from 82.3% just two weeks ago. Chart 1Pickup In M1 Still Modest The material easing in monetary conditions and strong flows of local government special-purpose bond issuance in the past two months helped jump start a recovery in the construction sector. But at this early stage of a domestic economic rebound and in the middle of a deep global economy recession, China’s corporate marginal propensity to invest remains muted (Chart 1). Household consumption showed some resilience during last week’s “Golden Week” holiday. The strength in big-ticket item purchases, however, was highly concentrated among consumers in China’s wealthiest urban areas (Chart 2). The COVID-19 pandemic has created a situation resembling a combination of SARS and the global financial crisis. Now the physical constraints on consumption have largely been lifted, consumers’ willingness to spend, after a brief period of compensatory spending, will be suppressed if their expectations of the medium-term job and income security remain pessimistic (Chart 3). Chart 2A Compensatory Rebound In Big-Ticket Item Sales Chart 3The Average Chinese Consumer Remains Cautious Next week we will publish a report, focusing on China’s consumption in a post-pandemic environment. Looking forward, we maintain the view that China’s business activity will pick up momentum in H2, when the massive monetary and fiscal stimuli continue working its way into the economy.  Downside risks to employment and income loom large, which makes it highly unlikely that the authorities will tighten their policy stance any time soon. As such, while we maintain our defensive tactical positioning due to near-term economic and geopolitical uncertainties, our view remains constructive on both the economy and Chinese financial asset prices in the next 6 to 12 months.  (Chart 4). Chart 4Recovery To Gain Traction In H2   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     #WWIII The phrase “World War III” or #WWIII went viral earlier this year in response to a skirmish between the US and Iran (Chart 1). Only four months later, the US and China are escalating a strategic rivalry that makes the Iran conflict look paltry by comparison (Chart 2). Chart 1US-Iran Tensions Were Just A Warm-Up Chart 2The Thucydides Trap Fortunately, the two great powers are constrained by the same mutually assured destruction that constrained the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They are also constrained by the desire to prevent their economies from collapsing further. Unfortunately, the intensity of their rivalry can escalate dramatically before reaching anything truly analogous to the Berlin Airlift or Cuban Missile Crisis – and these kinds of scenarios are not out of the question. Safe haven assets will catch a bid and the recovery in US and global risk assets since the COVID selloff will be halted. We maintain our defensive tactical positioning and will close two strategic trades to book profits and manage risk. In the wake of the pandemic and recession, geopolitics is the next shoe to drop. The War President Over the past 24 hours the White House has taken several steps indicating that President Trump is adopting the “war president” posture in the run-up to the US election: Export controls: Trump has gone forward with new export controls on “dual-purpose” technologies – those that have military as well as civilian applications, in a delayed reaction to China’s policy of civil-military technological fusion. The Commerce Department has wide leeway in whether to grant export licenses under the rule – but it is a consequential rule and would be disruptive if enforced strictly. Supply chain de-risking: Trump is also going forward with new restrictions on the import of foreign parts for US power plants and electricity grid. The purpose is to remove risks from critical US infrastructure. COVID investigation: Trump has hinted that the novel coronavirus that causes the COVID-19 disease may have originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The Director of National Intelligence issued a statement indicating that the Intelligence Community does not view the virus as man-made (not a bio-weapon), but is investigating the potential that the virus transferred to humans at the institute. The State Department had flagged the institute for risky practices long before COVID. Trump avoided the bio-weapon conspiracy theory and is focused on the hypothesis that the laboratory’s investigations into rare coronaviruses led to the outbreak. New tariffs instead of reparations: Director of the National Economic Council Larry Kudlow denied that the US would stop making interest and principal payments on some Chinese holdings of US treasuries. He said that the “full faith and credit of the United States’ debt obligation is sacrosanct. Absolutely sacrosanct.” Trump denied that this form of reparations, first floated by Republican Senator Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, was under consideration. Instead he suggested that new tariffs would be much more effective, raising the threat for the first time since the Phase One trade deal was agreed in principle in December. Strategic disputes: Tensions have flared up in specific, concrete ways across the range of US-Chinese relations – in the cyber-realm, psychological warfare, Korean peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. These could lead to sanctions. The war president posture is one in which President Trump recognizes that reelection is extremely unlikely in an environment of worse than -4.8% economic growth and likely 16% unemployment. Therefore he shifts the basis of his reelection to an ongoing crisis and appeals to Americans’ patriotism and desire for continuity amid crisis. Bottom Line: Protectionism is not guaranteed to work, and therefore it was not ultimately the path Trump took last year when he still believed a short-term trade deal could boost the economy. Now the bar to protectionism has been lowered. The Decline Of US-China Relations President Trump may still be bluffing, China may take a conciliatory posture, and a massive cold war-style escalation may be avoided. However, it is imprudent to buy risk assets on these reasons today, when the S&P 500’s forward price-to-earnings ratio stands at 20.15. It is more prudent to prepare for a historic escalation of tensions first, buy insurance, then reassess. Why? Because the trajectory of US-China relations is empirically worsening over time. US household deleveraging and the Chinese shift away from export-manufacturing (Chart 3) broke the basis of strong relations during the US’s distractions in Iraq and Afghanistan and China’s “peaceful rise” in the early 2000s. US consumers grew thriftier while Chinese wages rose. Not only has China sought economic self-sufficiency as a strategic objective since General Secretary Xi Jinping took power in 2012, but the Great Recession, Trump trade war, and global pandemic have accelerated the process of decoupling between the two economies. Decoupling is an empirical phenomenon, and it has momentum, however debatable its ultimate destination (Chart 4). Obviously policy at the moment is accelerating decoupling. Chart 3The Great Economic Divorce Chart 4Decoupling Is Empirical The US threat to cease payments on some of China’s Treasury holdings is an inversion of the fear that prevailed in the wake of 2008, that China would sell its treasuries to diversify away from dependence on the US and the greenback. China did end up selling its treasuries, but the US was not punished with higher interest rates because other buyers appeared. The US remains the world’s preponderant power and ultimate safe haven (Chart 5). By the same token, Trump and Kudlow naturally poured water on the threat of arbitrarily stopping payments because that would jeopardize America’s position. Instead Trump is threatening a new round of trade tariffs. Since the US runs a large trade deficit with China, and China is more exposed to trade generally, the US has the upper hand on this front. But it is important to notice that US tariff collections as a share of imports bottomed under President Obama (Chart 6). Chart 5Treasuries Can't Be Weaponized By Either Side... Chart 6... But Tariffs Can And Will Be   The US shift away from free trade toward protectionism occurred in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. President Trump then popularized and accelerated this policy option in an aggressive and unorthodox way. Trade tariffs are a tool of American statecraft, not the whim of a single person, who may exit the White House in January 2021 anyway. The retreat from globalization is not a passing fancy. Today’s recession also marks the official conclusion of China’s historic 44 year economic boom – and hence a concrete blow to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party (Chart 7). The more insular, autarkic shift in the Communist Party’s thinking is not irreversible, but there are no clear signs that Xi Jinping is pivoting toward liberalism after eight years in power. Chart 7Recession Destabilizes The 'G2' Powers China’s unemployment rate has been estimated as high as 20.5% by Zhongtai Securities, which then retracted the estimate (!). It is at least at 10%. Moreover 51 million migrant workers vanished from the job rolls in the first quarter of the year. Maximum employment is the imperative of East Asian governments, especially the Communist Party, which has not dealt with joblessness since the late 1990s. The threat to social and political stability is obvious. The party will take extraordinary measures to maintain stability – not only massive stimulus but also social repression and foreign policy distraction to ensure that people rally around the flag. Xi Jinping has tried to shift the legitimacy of the party from economic growth to nationalism and consumerism, the “China Dream.” But the transition to consumer growth was supposed to be smooth. Financial turmoil, the trade war, and now pandemic and recession have forced the Communist Party off the training wheels well before it intended. Xi’s communist ideology, economic mercantilism, and assertive foreign policy have created an international backlash. The US is obviously indulging in nationalism as well. A stark increase in inequality and political polarization exploded in President Trump’s surprise election on a nationalist and protectionist platform in 2016 (Chart 8). All candidates bashed China on the campaign trail, but Trump was an anti-establishment leader who disrupted corporate interests and followed through with his tariff threats. The result is that the share of Americans who see China’s power and influence as a “major threat” to the United States has grown from around 50% during the halcyon days of cooperation to over 60% today. Those who see it as a minor threat have shrunk to about a quarter of the population (Chart 9). Chart 8A Measure Of Inequality In The US Chart 9US Nationalism On The Rise Chart 10Broad-Based Anti-China Sentiment In US As with US tariff policy, the bipartisan nature of US anger toward China is significant. More than 60% of Democrats and more than 50% of young people have an unfavorable view of China. College graduates have a more negative opinion than the much-discussed non-college-educated populace (Chart 10). Already it is clear, in Joe Biden’s attack ads against Trump, that this election is about who can sound tougher on China. The debate is over who has the better policy to put “America first,” not whether to put America first. Biden will try to steal back the protectionist thunder that enabled Trump to break the blue wall in the electorally pivotal Rust Belt in 2016 (Map 1). Biden will have to win over these voters by convincing them that he understands and empathizes with their Trumpian outlook on jobs, outsourcing, and China’s threats to national security. He will emphasize other crimes – carbon emissions, cyber attacks, human rights violations – but they will still be China’s crimes. He will return to the “Pivot to Asia” foreign policy of his most popular supporter, former President Barack Obama. Map 1US Election: Civil War Lite Bottom Line: Economic slowdown and autocracy in China, unprecedented since the Cultural Revolution, is clashing with the United States. Broad social restlessness in the US that is resolving into bipartisan nationalism against a peer competitor, unprecedented since the struggle with the Soviets in the 1960s, is clashing with China. Now is not the time to assume global stability. Constraints Still Operate, But Buy Insurance The story outlined above is by this time pretty well known. But the “Phase One” trade deal allowed global investors to set aside this secular story at the beginning of the year. Now, as Trump threatens tariffs again, the question is whether he will resort to sweeping, concrete, punitive measures against China that will take on global significance – i.e. that will drive the financial markets this year. Trump is still attempting to restore his bull market and magnificent economy. As long as this is the case, a constraint on conflict operates this year. It is just not as firm or predictable. Therefore we are looking for three things. First, will President Trump’s approval rating benefit so much from his pressure tactics on China that he finds himself driven into greater pressure tactics? This raises the risk of policy mistakes. Second, will Trump’s approval rating fall into the doldrums, stuck beneath 43%, as the toll of the recession wears on him and popular support during the health crisis fades? “Lame duck” status would essentially condemn him to electoral loss and incentivize him to turn the tables by escalating the conflict with China. Chart 11Trump May Seek A Crisis ‘Bounce’ To Popularity Presidents are not very popular these days, but a comparison with Trump’s two predecessors shows that while he can hardly obtain the popularity boost that Obama received just before the 2012 election, he could hope for something at least comparable to what George W. Bush received amid the invasion of Iraq (Chart 11). (Trump has generally been capped at 46% approval, the same as his share of the popular vote in 2016.) The reason this is a real risk, not a Shakespearean play, is outlined above: however cynical Trump’s political calculus, he would be reasserting US grand strategy in the face of a great power that is attempting to set up a regional empire from which, eventually, to mount a global challenge. Thus if he is convinced he cannot win the election anyway, this risk becomes material. Investors should take seriously any credible reports suggesting that Trump is growing increasingly frustrated with his trailing Biden in head-to-head polls in the swing states. Third, will China, under historic internal stress, react in a hostile way that drives Trump down the path of confrontation? China has so far resorted to propaganda, aircraft carrier drills around the island of Taiwan, and maritime encroachments in the South China Sea – none of which is intolerably provocative to Trump. A depreciation of the renminbi, a substantial change to the status quo in the East or South China Seas, or an attempt to vitiate US security guarantees regarding US allies in the region, could trigger a major geopolitical incident. A fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is fully within the realm of possibility, especially given that Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” is fundamentally at stake. While we dismissed rumors of Kim Jong Un’s death in North Korea, any power vacuum or struggle for influence there is of great consequence in today’s geopolitical context. Aggressive use of tariffs always threatened to disrupt global trade and financial markets, but tariffs function differently in the context of a global economic expansion and bull market, as in 2018-19, than they do in the context of a deep and possibly protracted recession. Trump has a clear political incentive to be tough on China, but an equally clear financial and economic incentive to limit sweeping punitive measures and avoid devastating the stock market and economy. If events lower the economic hurdle, then the political incentive will prevail and financial markets will sell. Bottom Line: However small the risk of Trump enacting sweeping tariffs, the downside is larger than in the 2018-19 period. The stock market might fall by 40%-50% rather than 20% in an all-out trade war this year. Investment Takeaways Go tactically long US 10-year treasuries. Book a 9.7% profit on our long 30-year US TIPS trade. Close long global equities (relative to US) for a loss of 3.8%.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

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Highlights COVID-19 & The Economy: Australia is now in its first recession in 30 years, thanks to lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Yet the nation’s rates of infection and death from the virus are relatively low, which should allow for a faster reopening of the domestic economy. Policy Responses: The RBA has taken extraordinary measures to cushion the blow from the lockdowns, like cutting policy rates to near-0% and capping shorter maturity bond yields through quantitative easing. The Australian government has also been aggressive in providing fiscal stimulus. These measures give the economy a better chance of seeing a “v”-shaped recovery as the lockdown restrictions are eased. Fixed Income Strategy: Downgrade Australian government bonds to neutral within global fixed income portfolios: the RBA has little room to cut rates, inflation expectations are too low and the structural convergence to global yields is largely complete. Favor inflation-linked bonds and investment grade corporate debt over government debt, as both now offer better value. Feature Chart 1The Australian Bond Yield Convergence Story Is Over Australia has a well-deserved reputation as a wonderful place to live, regularly sitting near the top of annual “world’s most livable countries” lists. A big reason for that is the stability of the economy, which has famously not suffered a recession since 1991. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed that happy economic story, with Australia now in the midst of a deep recession. Yet even during this uncertain time, Australia is living up to its reputation as a livable country, with one of the lowest rates of COVID-19 infection among the major economies. This potentially sets up Australia as an economy that can recover from the pandemic – and the growth-crushing measures used to contain its spread - more quickly than harder-hit countries like the US and Italy. For global fixed income investors, Australia has also been a very pleasant place to spend some time. The local bond market has enjoyed a stellar bull run since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with policy rates and yields converging to much lower global levels (Chart 1). We have steadfastly maintained a structural overweight recommendation on Australian government bonds since December 2017. Over that time, the benchmark yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Australia government bond index declined -168bps, delivering a total return of +17.6% (in local currency terms). That soundly outperformed the global government benchmark index by 5.7 percentage points (in USD-hedged terms). However, just like the nation’s recession-free streak, Australia’s status as a secular bond outperformer is coming to an end. Just like the nation’s recession-free streak, Australia’s status as a secular bond outperformer is coming to an end. In this Special Report, we take a closer look at the Australian economy and fixed income landscape after the shock of the global pandemic. Our main conclusion is that most of the juice has been squeezed out of the Australian government bond yield global convergence trade. There are, however, some interesting opportunities still available in other parts of the Australian fixed income universe, like corporates and inflation-linked bonds. Yes, Recessions Can Actually Happen In Australia Chart 2A V-Shaped Recovery Is Widely Expected During the record streak of recession-free growth in Australia, the annual growth of real GDP has never dipped below 1.1%. The fact that a recession was avoided in 2009, given the degree of the shock from the Global Financial Crisis, is a testament to the balance within the Australian economy; consumer spending is 55% of GDP, business investment is 12%, government spending is 24% and exports are 25%. This stands out in contrast to more imbalanced economies like the US (where consumer spending is 70% of GDP) and Germany (where exports are 47% of GDP). Yet the unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has forced shutdowns across the entire economy, has nullified that advantage for Australia. There is no part of the economy that can avoid a major slowdown to help prevent a full-blown recession in 2020. Yet while expectations have adjusted to this new short-term reality, there appears to be a broad consensus that this Australian recession will be a short-lived “V” rather than an extended “U”. That can be seen in the forecasts of the Bloomberg Consensus survey and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), both of which are calling for a year-over-year decline in real GDP growth of at least -7% in Q2/2020. That will represent the low point of the recession, with growth expected to steadily recover over the subsequent year, with annual real GDP growth reaching +7% by the second quarter of 2021 (Chart 2). The Westpac-Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index suffered the single greatest monthly decline in the 47-year history of the series in April. Yet there was only a modest decline in the longer-run expectations component of that survey, which remains above recent cyclical lows (bottom panel) This is a message consistent with the RBA and Bloomberg consensus forecasts, where economic resiliency is expected. One reason for that relative optimism among Australian consumers is that COVID-19 has not hit the country as hard as other nations. A recent survey of Australian consumers conducted by McKinsey in April showed that 65% of respondents named “the Australian economy” as their biggest COVID-19 related concern. At the same time, only 33% of those surveyed cited “not being able to make ends meet” as their main worry related to the virus (Chart 3). Other responses to the survey showed a similar divide, with greater concern shown for the state of the overall Australian nation compared to worries about one’s own economic or health outlook. Chart 3Australians Worrying More About The Nation Than Their Own Situation For an economy that has not seen a recession in over a generation, a relative lack of concern over one’s own financial health – even in a global pandemic that has paralyzed the world economy – may not be that surprising. Another reason for that relative optimism is that Australia has, so far, escaped relatively unscathed from the spread of COVID-19 compared to other nations. Australia has, so far, escaped relatively unscathed from the spread of COVID-19 compared to other nations. The number of new daily COVID-19 cases is now only 1 per million people, according to the Johns Hopkins University data on the virus. This is down from the peak of 20 per million people reached on March 28, and substantially below the numbers seen in countries more severely struck by the virus like the US and Italy (Chart 4). Australia has also seen a relatively low fatality rate from the virus, with only 1.4% of confirmed cases resulting in deaths (Chart 5). Chart 4The COVID-19 Wave Has Crested Down Under Chart 5Australia Has Weathered The Pandemic Much Better Than Others Given these low rates of infection and death, it is likely that Australia will be able to reopen its economy faster than other nations. The Australian government has already announced an easing of the COVID-19 lockdown measures, which will include the opening of restaurants (with limited seating) and schools (on a staggered schedule). There is even talk of creating a “trans-Tasman travel bubble” with neighboring New Zealand, which has similarly low rates of COVID-19 infection. Yet even when Australians can begin resuming a more “normal” life, the backdrop for consumer spending will be constrained by relatively low income growth and high consumer debt levels (Chart 6). Real consumer spending has struggled to grow faster than 2-3% over the past decade and, with household debt now up to a staggering 190% of disposable income, a faster pace of spending is unlikely even as the economy reopens. Chart 6Weak Consumer Fundamentals Chart 7Australian Businesses Are Retrenching Among the other parts of the Australian economy, the near-term outlook is gloomy, but there are potential areas where the damage to growth could be more limited. Capital Spending Business fixed investment has been flat in real terms over the past year. With corporate profit growth already slowing rapidly and likely to contract because of the recession, firms will look to cut back on capital spending to preserve cash, leading to a bigger drag on overall growth from investment (Chart 7). According to the latest National Australia Bank business survey conducted in March, confidence has collapsed to lower levels than seen during the Global Financial Crisis, while capital spending and employment expectations have also declined sharply – trends that had already started before the COVID-19 breakout. Chart 8No Rebound In Housing Housing The housing market has long been a source of both strength and vulnerability for the Australian economy. While the days of double-digit growth in house prices are in the past, thanks to greater restrictions on banks for mortgage lending and worsening affordability, Australian housing was showing signs of life before the COVID-19 outbreak. National house prices were up +2.8% on a year-over-year basis in Q4/2019, while building approvals were stabilizing (Chart 8). That nascent housing rebound was choked off by the virus, with the Westpac-Melbourne Institute “good time to buy a home” survey plunging 30 points in April to the lowest level since February 2008. While the RBA’s interest rate cuts over the past decade have helped lower borrowing costs in Australia, the gap between the RBA cash rate and variable mortgage rates has been steadily widening (bottom panel). This suggests a worsening transmission from monetary policy into the most interest-sensitive parts of the economy like housing. Australian banks have been more stringent on mortgage lending standards over the past couple of years, which likely explains some of the widening gap between the RBA cash rate and mortgage rates. However, Australian banks have also seen an increase in their funding costs over that same period, both for onshore measures like the Bank Bill Swap Rate and offshore indicators like cross-currency basis swaps (Chart 9). Those funding costs have plunged in recent weeks, in response to the RBA’s aggressive monetary policy easing measures to help mitigate the hit to growth from COVID-19. The US Federal Reserve’s decision to activate a $60 billion currency swap line with the RBA back in March also helped reduce offshore funding costs for Australian banks. It is possible that the easing of funding costs could make banks more willing to make consumer and mortgage loans in the coming months, at lower interest rates, as the lockdown restrictions ease. This could help improve the transmission from easy RBA monetary policy to economic activity. Exports Demand for Australian exports was already starting to soften in the first few months of 2020. The year-over-year growth in total exports fell to 9.7% in March from a peak of 18.7% in July 2019. Exports to China, Australia’s largest trade partner, have held up better than non-Chinese exports (Chart 10). This was largely due to increased Chinese demand for Australian iron ore earlier in the year. Chart 9Bank Funding Pressures Have Diminished Iron ore prices have been declining more recently, but remain surprisingly elevated given the sharp contraction in global economic activity since March. This may be a sign that China’s reawakening from its own COVID-19 lockdowns, combined with more monetary and fiscal stimulus measures from Chinese policymakers, is putting a floor under the demand for Australian exports to China. Chart 10Australian Exports Will Not Rebound Anytime Soon Summing it all up, a major near-term economic contraction in Australia is unavoidable, but a relatively quick rebound could happen as domestic quarantine measures are lifted – especially given the significant amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus put in place by the RBA and the Australian government. Bottom Line: Australia is now in its first recession in 30 years, thanks to lockdown measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Yet the nation’s rates of infection and death from the virus are relatively low, which should allow for a faster reopening of the domestic economy. A Powerful Policy Response To The Recession Almost every government and central bank in the world has introduced fiscal stimulus or monetary easing measures in response to the COVID-19 economic downturn. Australia’s policymakers have been particularly aggressive, both on the monetary and (especially) fiscal side. Monetary Policy The RBA has announced a variety of measures since late March to ease financial conditions and provide more liquidity to the economy, including: cutting the cash rate by 50bps to 0.25% the introduction of quantitative easing for the first time, buying government bonds in enough quantity in secondary markets to keep the yield on 3-year Australian government debt around 0.25% introducing a Term Funding Facility for the banking system under which authorized deposit-taking institutions can get funding from the RBA for three years at a rate of 0.25%, with additional funding available to increase lending to small and medium-sized businesses an increase in the amount and maturity of daily reverse repurchase (repo) operations, to support liquidity in the financial system setting up the currency swap line with the US Fed, providing US dollar liquidity to market participants in Australia. The RBA’s decisions on cutting the cash rate the 0.25%, and capping 3-year bond yields at the same level, sent a strong message to the markets that monetary policy must be highly accommodative until the threat of COVID-19 has passed. Fixed income markets have taken notice, with the yield on the benchmark 10-year Australian government bond falling from 1.30% just before the RBA announced the easing measures on March 19th to a low of 0.68% on April 1st. The yield has since rebounded to 0.95%, but this remains well below the level prevailing before the RBA eased. Those low interest rates have also helped to keep monetary conditions easy by dampening the attractiveness, and value, of the Australian dollar. The currency has historically been driven by three factors – interest rate differentials, commodity prices and global investor risk-aversion. With the RBA’s relentless rate cuts over the past decade, capped off by the measures introduced two months ago, the dominant factor on the currency has become interest rate differentials between Australia and other countries (Chart 11). The Aussie dollar has enjoyed a bounce as global equity markets have rebounded since the collapse in March, but remains well below levels implied by the RBA Commodity Price Index. The implication is that the upside in the currency will be capped by the RBA’s interest rate stance, which has taken all the formerly attractive carry out of the Aussie dollar. The RBA will need to maintain an accommodative stance for some time, as inflation – and inflation expectations – are likely to remain well below the central bank’s 2-3% target range. The RBA will need to maintain an accommodative stance for some time, as inflation – and inflation expectations – are likely to remain well below the central bank’s 2-3% target range. The new baseline forecast by the RBA calls for the Australian unemployment rate to double from 5.2% in Q1/2020 to 10% in Q2/2020, before drifting back down to 8.5% by Q2/2021 (Chart 12). The central bank sees the jobless rate returning to 6.5% in Q2/2022, but that will still not be enough to push headline or core CPI inflation back above 2% (middle panel). Chart 11Interest Rates Are The Main Driver Of The AUD Now Chart 12Inflation Is Dormant Down Under Inflation expectations have discounted a similar outcome. The Union Officials’ and Market Economists’ surveys of 2-year-ahead inflation expectations are both now under 2%. Market-based measures like the 2-year CPI swap rate are even more pessimistic, priced at a mere 0.12%! The recent plunge in oil prices is clearly playing a role in that extreme CPI swap pricing, but until there is some recover in market-based inflation expectations, the RBA will be unable to move away from its current emergency policy easing measures. Fiscal Policy The Australian government has been very aggressive in its economic support measures, including1: a so-called “JobKeeper Payment” to allow businesses to cover employee wages direct income support payments to individuals and households allowing temporary withdrawals from superannuation (retirement savings) plans direct financial support to businesses to “boost cash flow” temporary changes to bankruptcy laws to make it more difficult for creditors to demand payment increased financial incentives for new investment providing loan guarantees to small and medium-sized businesses temporarily easily regulatory standards (like capital ratios) for Australian banks, to free up more funds for lending The size of these combined measures is estimated to be 12.5% of GDP, according to calculations from the IMF (Chart 13). This puts Australia in the upper tier of G20 countries in terms of the size of the total government support measures, according to an analysis of fiscal policy responses to COVID-19 from our colleagues at BCA Research Global Investment Strategy.2 When looking at purely the fiscal policy response through tax changes and direct spending, and removing liquidity support and loan guarantees that may not be fully utilized, the Australian government’s stimulus response is 10.6% of GDP - the largest in the G20 (Chart 14). Chart 13Australian Policymakers Have Responded Aggressively To COVID-19 Chart 14Australia’s Planned Deficit Increase Is The Largest In The G20 Chart 15Australia Has The Fiscal Space To Be Aggressive The Australian government can deliver such a large response because it has the fiscal space to do it, with a debt/GDP ratio that was only 41.9% prior to the COVID-19 outbreak (Chart 15). This compares favorably to other countries that have delivered major stimulus packages but from a starting point of much higher levels of government debt. The Australian government can deliver such a large response because it has the fiscal space to do it. We do not see any downgrade risk for Australia’s sovereign AAA credit rating from the fiscal stimulus measures, despite the recent decision by S&P to put the nation on negative outlook. Australia will still have one of the lowest government debt/GDP ratios among the G20, even after adding in the expected increases in deficits for all the countries in 2020 (Chart 16). Chart 16Australia’s AAA Credit Rating Is Safe Net-net, the monetary and fiscal stimulus measures undertaken by Australian policymakers appear large enough to offset the immediate hit to the economy from the COVID-19 recession. This has important investment implications for Australian bond markets. The monetary and fiscal stimulus measures undertaken by Australian policymakers appear large enough to offset the immediate hit to the economy from the COVID-19 recession. Bottom Line: The RBA has taken extraordinary measures to cushion the blow from the lockdowns, like cutting policy rates to near-0% and capping shorter maturity bond yields through quantitative easing. The Australian government has also been aggressive in providing fiscal stimulus. These measures give the economy a better chance of seeing a “v”-shaped recovery as the lockdown restrictions are eased. Investment Conclusions We started this report by discussing the consistent outperformance of Australian government bonds versus other developed market debt over the past decade. After going through a careful analysis of the economy, inflation, monetary policy and fiscal policy, we now view the period of Australian bond outperformance as essentially complete. This leads us to make the following investment conclusions on a strategic (6-12 months) investment horizon. Duration: We recommend only a neutral duration stance for dedicated Australian fixed income portfolios; the RBA has little room to cut policy rates further; inflation expectations are too low; the nation is poised to rapidly emerge from COVID-19 lockdowns; and fiscal stimulus will be more than enough to offset the hit to domestic incomes from the recession. Country Allocation: Within global bond portfolios, we recommend downgrading Australia to neutral from overweight. The multi-year interest rate convergence story is largely complete, both in terms of central bank policy rates and longer-term bond yields. Our most reliable indicator for the future relative performance of Australian government bonds versus the global benchmark – the ratio of the OECD’s leading economic indicator for Australia to the overall OECD leading indicator – is increasing because of a greater decline in the non-Australian measure (Chart 17, second panel). This fits with the idea of the relative economic growth story turning into a headwind for Australian bonds after being a tailwind for the past few years. Within global bond portfolios, we recommend downgrading Australia to neutral from overweight.  Yield Curve: We recommend positioning for a steeper Australian government bond yield curve. The RBA is anchoring the short-end of the curve as part of its quantitative easing program, leaving the slope of the curve to be driven more by longer-term inflation expectations that are too depressed (third panel). Inflation-linked Bonds: We recommend overweighting Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt. As we discussed in a recent report, breakevens on Australian inflation-linked bonds are far too low on our fair value models, which include the sharp decline in global oil prices (fourth panel).3 Chart 17Move To Neutral Duration Exposure In Australia, While Favoring Inflation-Linked Bonds Chart 18Australian Corporate Bonds Look More Attractive Now   Corporate Credit: We recommend going overweight Australian investment grade corporate debt versus government bonds. The recent spread widening has restored some value - especially when compared to the more modest increase seen in credit default spreads - while Australian equity market volatility, which correlates with spreads, has peaked (Chart 18). Also, the RBA has just announced that they will now accept investment grade corporates as collateral for its domestic repo market operations, which should increase the demand for corporates on the margin.4   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The full details of the Australian government economic response to COVID-19 can be found here: https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/Overview-Economic_Response_to_the_Coronavirus_2.pdf 2 Please see BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Global COVID-19 Fiscal Response: Is It Enough?”, dated April 30, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4https://www.rba.gov.au/mkt-operations/announcements/broadening-eligibility-of-corporate-debt-securities.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

The Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy will likely continue to underpin equity prices in the coming 9-12 months. Specifically, according to Leo Krippner’s shadow short rates (SSR) estimate, the shadow fed funds rate is now negative, which is tailwind for the SPX (SSR shown inverted, top panel). Falling interest rates are a boon to equities via a rising price-to-earnings multiple (SSR shown inverted, bottom panel). Also, while the Fed would never admit to it, it is trying to devalue the US dollar and reflate the global economy, which will indirectly boost S&P 500 revenues. As a reminder, 40% of SPX sales are internationally sourced and thus a falling greenback is a welcoming sign for S&P 500 turnover (middle panel). Bottom Line: We remain constructive on the prospects of the broad equity market on a cyclical time horizon. Please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report for more details.