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特別レポート

Stocks will only get temporary relief from gridlock. Inflation will abate but then remain sticky. US and global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain historically high.

Expect the Middle East to create new and unexpected energy supply disruptions on top of the Russian energy shock.

Stay short Greater China assets. Stay long Japanese yen. Hold back on Brazil for now but look forward to opportunities in future.

特別レポート

Favor US and Southeast Asian stocks over global stocks. Stay underweight China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

Russia’s conflict with the West will escalate and trigger more bad news for risky assets this fall. Beyond that, stalemate looms. Latin American equities present a potential opportunity once the macro and geopolitical backdrop improve.

Investors should go long US treasuries and stay overweight defensive versus cyclical sectors, large caps versus small caps, and aerospace/defense stocks. Regionally we favor the US, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, while disfavoring China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

特別レポート

Executive Summary Turkey is staring into an abyss: economic crisis that will morph into political crisis in the June 2023 election cycle. President Erdoğan will pursue populist economic policies and foreign policy adventurism to try to stay in power, leading to negative surprises and “black swan” risks over the coming 9-12 months. While Erdoğan and the ruling party are likely to be defeated in elections, which is good news, investors should not try to front-run the election given high uncertainty. Neither Turkey’s economy and domestic politics nor the global economy and geopolitics warrant a bullish view on Turkish assets. GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY  Recommendation (TACTICAL) Initiation Date Return LONG JPY/TRY 2022-09-23     Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Bottom Line: The Lira will depreciate further versus the dollar. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Feature Turkey – now technically Türkiye – is teetering on the verge of a national meltdown. The inflation rate is the fastest in G20 countries, both because of a domestic wage-price spiral and soaring global food and fuel prices. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in power since 2002, making them highly vulnerable to demands for change in the general election slated for June 18, 2023. Yet Erdoğan is a strongman who won a popular vote to revise the constitution in 2017 and increase his personal power over institutions. His populist Islamist movement is starkly at odds with the country’s traditional elite, including the secular military establishment. Given the poor state of the economy, Erdoğan will likely lose the 2023 election but he could refuse to leave office … or he could win the election and be ousted in a coup d'état, as happened in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980.1 Meanwhile Turkey is beset by foreign dangers – including war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East. Erdoğan will try to use foreign policy to bolster his popular standing. Turkey has inserted itself in various regional conflicts and could instigate conflicts of its own. While global investors are eager to buy steeply discounted Turkish financial assets ahead of what could be a monumental change in national policy in 2023, the country is extremely unstable. It is a source of “black swan” risks. The best bet is to remain underweight Turkish assets unless and until a pro-market election outcome shakes off the two-decade trend toward economic ruin. Turkish Grand Strategy Turkey is permanently at a crossroads. The land-bridge between Europe and Asia, it is secular and cosmopolitan but also Islamist and traditional. Its past consists of the greatness of empires – Byzantine, Ottoman – while its present consists of a frustrating search for new opportunities in a chaotic regional context. The core of the country consists of the disjointed coastal plains around the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and the Sea of Marmara, where Istanbul is located. The Byzantine and Ottoman empires were seated on this strategic location at the juncture of the world’s east-west trade. To secure this area, the Turks needed to control the larger Anatolian peninsula – Asia Minor – to prevent roving Eurasian powers from invading, just as they themselves had originally invaded from Central Asia. During times of greatness the Turks could also expand their empire to control the Balkan peninsula and Danube river valley up to Vienna, Crimea and the Black Sea coasts, and the eastern Mediterranean island approaches. During the Ottoman empire’s golden days Turkish power extended all the way into North Africa, Mesopotamia, the Nile river valley, and Mecca and Medina. The empire – and the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate – collapsed in 1924 after centuries of erosion and the catastrophes of World War I. Subsequently Turkey emerged as a secular republic. It adapted to the post-WWII world order by allying with the United States and NATO, in conflict with the Soviet Union which encircled the Turks on all sides. The Russians are longstanding rivals of Turkey, notably in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Stalin wanted to get his hands on the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits. Hence alliance with the US and NATO fulfilled one of the primary demands of Turkish grand strategy: a navy that could defend the straits and Turkish interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to usher in an era of opportunity for Turkey. Turkey benefited from democratization, globalization, and foreign capital inflows. But then America’s wars and crises, Russia’s resurgence, and Middle Eastern instability created a shatter-belt surrounding Turkey, impinging on its national security. In this context of limited foreign policy options, Turkey’s domestic politics coalesced around Erdoğan, the AKP, political Islam, and investment-driven economic growth. Erdoğan and the AKP represent the Anatolian, religious, and Middle Eastern interests in Turkey, as opposed to the maritime, secular, and Euro-centric interests rooted in Istanbul. This point can be illustrated by observing that the poorer interior regions have grown faster than the national average over the period of AKP rule, whereas the more developed coastal regions have tended to lag (Map 1). Voting patterns from the 2018 general election overlap with these economic outcomes. The AKP has steered investment capital into the interior to fund infrastructure and property construction while currency depreciation, rather than productivity enhancement, has merely maintained the status quo with the manufacturing export sector in the coastal regions (Chart 1). Map 1Turkey’s Anatolian Model And The Struggle With The Coasts Chart 1Turkey's Export Competitiveness Today Turkey faces three distinct obstacles to its geopolitical expansion: Russian aggression: Russia’s resurgence, especially with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and broader invasion of Ukraine in 2022, threatens Turkey’s interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Turkey must always deal with Russia carefully but over the past 14 years Russia has become belligerent, forcing Turkey to come to terms with Putin while maintaining the NATO alliance. Today Erdoğan tries to mediate the conflict as it does not want to encourage Russian aggression but also does not want NATO to provoke Russia. For instance, Turkey is willing to condone Finland and Sweden joining NATO but only if the West grants substantial benefits to Turkey itself. Ultimately Turkish ties with Russia are overrated. For both economic reasons and grand strategic reasons outlined above, Turkey will cleave to the West (Chart 2). Chart 2Turkey Still Linked To The West​​​​​ Chart 3Turkish Energy Ties With Russia Western liberal hegemony: The EU and NATO foreclosed any Turkish ambitions in Europe. The EU has consolidated with each new crisis while rejecting Turkish membership. This puts limits on Turkish access to European markets and influence in the Balkans. Turkey has guarded its independence jealously against the West. After the Cold War the US expected Turkey to serve American interests in the Middle East and Eurasia. The EU expected it to serve European interests as an energy transit state and a blockade against Middle Eastern refugees. But Turkish interests were often sidelined while its domestic politics did not allow blind loyalty to the West. This led Turkey to push back against the West and cultivate other options, such as deeper economic ties with Russia and China. Turkish dependency on Russian energy is substantial and Turkey has tried to play a mediating role in Russia’s conflict with NATO (Chart 3). Recently Turkey offered to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a military alliance of Asian powers. However, as with trade, Turkish defense and security ties with the Russo-Chinese bloc are ultimately overrated (Chart 4).  There is room for some cooperation but Turkey is not eager to abandon American military backing in a period in which Russia is threatening to control the Black Sea rim, cut off grain exports arbitrarily, and use tactical nuclear weapons. Chart 4Turkey’s Defense Alliance With The West Middle Eastern instability: The Middle East is a potential area for Turkey to increase influence, especially given the AKP’s embrace of political Islam. Turkey benefits from regional economic development and maintains relations with all players. But the region’s development is halting and Turkey is blocked by competitors. The US toppled Iraq in 2003, which strengthened Iran’s regional clout over the subsequent decades. But Iran is not stable and the US has not prevented Iran from achieving nuclear breakout capacity. Turkey cannot abide a nuclear-armed Iran. At the same time, the US continues to support Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies, which oppose Turkey’s combination of Islam and democratic populism. Russia propped up Syria’s regime in league with Iran, which threatens Turkey’s border integrity. Developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran have all complicated Turkey’s management of Kurdish militancy and separatism. Kurds make up nearly 20% of Turkey’s population and play a central role in the country’s political divisions. Erdoğan’s Anatolian power base is antagonistic toward the Kurds and regional Kurdish aspirations. China’s strategic rise brings both risks and rewards for Turkey but China is too distant to become the focus of Turkish strategy: China’s dream of reviving the Silk Road across Eurasia harkens back to the glory days of Ottoman power. The Belt and Road Initiative and other investments help to develop Central Asia and the Middle East, enabling Turkey to benefit once again as the middleman in east-west trade (Chart 5). Chart 5Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade But insofar as China’s Eurasian strategy is successful, it could someday impinge on Turkish ambitions, particularly by buttressing Russian and Iranian power. In recent years Erdoğan has experimented with projecting Turkish power in the Middle East (Syria), North Africa (Libya), the Caucasus (Armenia), and the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus). He cannot project power effectively because of the obstacles outlined above. But he can manipulate domestic and foreign security issues to try to prolong his hold on power. Bottom Line: Boxed in by Russian aggression, western liberal hegemony, and Middle Eastern instability, Turkey cannot achieve its geopolitical ambitions and has concentrated on internal development over the past two decades. However, the country retains some imperial ambitions and these periodically flare up in unpredictable ways as the modern Turkish state attempts to fend off the chaotic forces that loom in the Black Sea, Middle East, North Africa, and Caucasus. The Erdoğan regime is focused on consolidating Anatolian control of Turkey and projecting military power abroad so that the military does not become a political problem for his faction at home. Erdoğan’s Domestic Predicament President Erdoğan has stayed in power for 20 years under the conditions outlined above but he faces a critical election by June 18, 2023 that could see him thrown from power. The result will be extreme political turbulence over the coming nine months until the leadership of the country is settled by hook or by crook. Erdoğan has pursued a strongman or authoritarian leadership style, especially since domestic opposition emerged in the wake of the Great Recession. By firing three central bankers, he has pressured the central bank into running an ultra-dovish monetary policy, producing a 12% inflation rate prior to the Covid-19 pandemic and an 80% inflation rate today. He has also embraced populist fiscal handouts and foreign policy adventurism. Taken together his policies have eroded the country’s political as well as economic stability. From the last general election in 2018 to the latest data in 2022: Real household disposable income  growth has fallen from -7.4% to -18.7% (Chart 6). Chart 6Real Incomes Falling​​​​​​ Chart 7Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election​​​​​ The manufacturing PMI has fallen from 49.0 to 47.4 (Chart 7). Consumer confidence has fallen from 92.1 to 72.2 (Chart 8). Chart 8Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election​​​​​​ Chart 9Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval​​​​​​ Bad economic news is finally altering public opinion, with polls now shifting against the president and incumbent party: Since the pandemic erupted, Erdoğan’s approval rating has fallen from a peak of 57% to 40% today. Disapproval has Erdoğan’s risen to 54%, leaving him a net negative job approval (Chart 9). Bear in mind that Erdoğan won the election with 52.6% of the vote in 2018, only slightly better than the 51.8% he received in 2014 and well below the 80% that his AKP predecessor received in 2007. Meanwhile the AKP, which never performs as well as Erdoğan himself, has fallen from a 45% support rate to 30% today in parliamentary polls, dead even with the main opposition Republican People’s Party (Chart 10). The AKP won 42.6% of the vote in 2018, down from 49.5% in the second election of 2015, 49.8% in 2011, and 46.6% in 2007. Chart 10Justice And Development Party Neck And Neck With Republican Opposition The gap between Erdoğan and his Republican rivals has narrowed sharply since the global food and fuel price spike began to bite in late 2021 (Chart 11). Chart 11Erdoğan Faces Tough Re-Election Race However, the 2023 election is not straightforward. There are several caveats to the clear anti-incumbent tendency of economic and political data: Soft Economic Landing? The election takes place in nine months, enough time for surprises to salvage Erdoğan’s presidential campaign, given his and his party’s heavily entrenched rule. For example, it is possible – not probable – that Russia will resume energy exports, enabling Europe to recover, and that central banks will achieve a “soft landing” for the global economy. Turkey’s economy would bounce just in time to help the incumbent party. This is not what we expect (see below) but it could happen. Foreign Policy Victories? Erdoğan could achieve some foreign policy victories. He has negotiated a tenuous deal with Russia and Ukraine, along with the UN, to enable grain exports out of Odessa. He could build on this process to negotiate a broader ceasefire in Ukraine. He could also win major concessions from the US and NATO to secure Finnish and Swedish membership in that bloc. If he did he would come off looking like a grand statesman and might just buy another term in office. Unfortunately what is more likely is that Erdoğan will pursue an aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to distract voters from their bread-and-butter woes, only to destabilize Turkey and the region further. Stolen Election? Erdoğan revised the constitution in 2017 – winning 51.4% of the votes in a popular referendum – to give the presidency substantial new powers across the political system. Using these powers he could manipulate the election to produce a favorable outcome or even cling to power despite unfavorable election results. He does not face nearly as powerful and motivated of a liberal establishment as President Trump faced in 2020 or as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces in 2022. As noted Erdoğan has a contentious relationship with the Turkish military, so while investors cannot rule out a stolen election, they also cannot rule out a military coup in reaction to an attempted stolen election. Thus the election could produce roughly four outcomes, which we rank below from best to worst in terms of their favorability for global investors: 1.  Best Case: Decisive Opposition Victory – 25% Odds – A resounding electoral defeat for the AKP would reverse its unorthodox economic policies in the short term and serve as a lasting warning to future politicians that populism and economic mismanagement lead to political ruin. This outcome would also provide the political capital and parliamentary strength necessary to impose tough reforms and restore a semblance of macroeconomic stability. 2.  Good Case: Narrow AKP Defeat – 50% Odds – A narrow or contested election would produce a weak new government that would at least put a stop to the most inflationary AKP policies. It would improve global investor sentiment around Turkey’s eventual ability to stabilize its economy. The new government would lack the ability to push through structural reforms but it could at least straighten out the affairs of the central bank so as to ensure a cycle of monetary policy tightening, which would stabilize the currency. 3.  Bad Case: Narrow AKP Victory – 15% Odds – A narrow victory would force the AKP to compromise with opposition parties in parliament and pacify social unrest. Foreign adventurism would continue but harmful domestic policies would face obstructionism. 4.  Worst Case: Decisive AKP Victory – 10% Odds – A resounding victory for the ruling party would vindicate Erdoğan and his policies despite their negative economic results, driving Turkey further down the path of authoritarianism, populism, money printing, currency depreciation, and hyper-inflation. He could also be emboldened in his foreign adventurism. Bottom Line: We expect Erdoğan and the AKP to be defeated and replaced. However, Turkey is in the midst of an economic and political crisis and the next 12 months will bring extreme uncertainty. The election could be indecisive, contested, stolen, or overthrown. The aftermath could be chaotic as well as the lead-up. If the AKP stays in power then investors will abandon Turkey and its economy will suffer a historic shock. Therefore investors should underweight Turkey – at least until the next phase in the economic downturn confirms our forecast that the AKP will fall from power. Macro Outlook: Fade The Equity Rally Chart 12Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM The Turkish economy is beset by hyper-inflation. Headline consumer prices are rising at upwards of 80% and core inflation is 65%. Yet Turkish government 10-year bond yields are low and falling: they are down to 11% currently, from a high of 24% at the beginning of the year. Turkish stocks have also outperformed their Emerging Markets counterparts this year in common currency terms even though the lira has been the worst performing EM currency (Chart 12). So, what’s going on in this market? The answer is hidden in the slew of unorthodox policies adopted by the authorities. These measures caused massive distortions in both the economy and the markets. Specifically, late last year, despite very high inflation, the central bank began to cut policy rates encouraging massive loan expansion. As a result, both local currency loans and money supply surged. Which, in turn, completely unhinged inflation (Chart 13). As inflation rose, so did government bond yields. In a bid to keep government borrowing costs low, policymakers changed several bank regulations to force commercial banks to buy government bonds.2  The upshot was that the bond yields stopped tracking inflation and instead began to fall even as inflation skyrocketed. The rampant inflation meant Turkish non-financial firms’ nominal sales skyrocketed. Indeed, sales of all MSCI Turkey non-financials companies have risen by 40% in US dollar terms and 200% in local currency (Chart 14). Chart 13Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation This was at a time when policy rates were being cut. The policy rate has fallen to 12% today from 19% a year earlier. Firms’ local currency real borrowing costs have fallen deeply into negative territory (Chart 15). It helped reduce firms’ costs significantly. Chart 14Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits​​​​​ Chart 15Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc​​​​​ Chart 16Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation​​​​​ Meanwhile, even though wage growth accelerated, it still fell short of inflation, and therefore of nominal sales of the firms (Chart 16). Firms’ wage costs did not rise as much as their prices. All this boosted non-financial firms’ margins. Total profits have risen by 35% in US dollar terms from a year earlier (200% in lira terms). ​​​​​​​ Chart 17The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket ​​​​​​​ On their part, listed financials’ profits have surged by 50% in USD terms and 220% in local currency terms. They benefited both from surging interest income due to rapid loan growth and from massive capital gains on their holding of government securities (see Chart 14 above). All this is reflected in Turkish companies’ earnings per share as well. The spike in EPS has propped up Turkish stocks for past few months. Over the past year, not only have corporate profits and share prices surged, but also house prices have skyrocketed by 170% in local currency terms and 30% in USD terms (Chart 17). In sum, the abnormally low nominal and deeply negative real borrowing costs have produced a money/credit deluge, which has generated a massive inflationary outbreak and has inflated revenues/profits as well as various asset prices. The Lira To Depreciate Further This macro setting is a recipe for a major currency sell-off.  First, Europe – the destination of 90% of Turkish exports – will likely slide into recession over the coming year (Chart 18).  Chart 18A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A fall in exports will widen Turkey’s current account deficit. Notably, imports will not fall much since the authorities are pursuing easy money policy. Second, the lack of credible macro policies as well as political crisis will assure that foreign capital escapes Turkey. Turkey will find the current account deficit nearly impossible to finance. Third, the country’s net foreign reserves, after adjusting for the central bank’s foreign currency borrowings and commercial banks’ deposits with the central bank, stand at minus 30 billion dollars. In other words, the central bank now has large net US dollar liabilities. As such, it has little wherewithal to defend the currency. There are very high odds that the lira depreciation will accelerate in the months ahead. Fourth, the slew of unorthodox measures taken by the Turkish authorities will encourage banks to buy more government local currency bonds to suppress the government’s borrowing costs. When commercial banks buy government securities from non-banks, they create money “out of thin air.” Hence, the ongoing money supply deluge will continue. This is bearish for the currency. Notably, the economy will likely enter into recession next year – and yet core inflation will stay very high (30% and above). Recent unorthodox bank regulations are meant to encourage a certain kind of lending – loans to farmers, exporters, and small and medium-sized businesses – while discouraging other kinds. Consequently, the overall loan growth will likely slow in nominal terms. There are already signs that credit is decelerating on the margin (Chart 19). Given the very high inflation, slower credit growth will likely lead to a liquidity crunch for many businesses – forcing them to curtail their activity.  Chart 19Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations​​​​​​ Chart 20Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP​​​​​​ Indeed, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), local currency loan growth has already slipped into negative territory. This is a bad omen for the overall economy: contracting real loan growth is a harbinger of recession (Chart 20). In short, Turkey is looking into an abyss: a recession amid high inflation (i.e., stagflation) as well as a brewing political crisis (with Erdoğan likely doubling down on unorthodox and populist policies). All this point to another period of a large currency depreciation. While the country will likely change direction to avoid the abyss, investors should wait to allocate capital until after the change in direction is confirmed.    Investment Takeaways The Turkish lira will fall much more vis-à-vis the US dollar in the year ahead. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Turkey is involved in an economic crisis that will devolve into a political crisis over the election cycle. While Erdoğan and the AKP are likely to fall from power as things stand today, they are heavily entrenched and will be difficult to remove, creating large risks of an indecisive or contested election in 2023 that will increase rather than decrease policy uncertainty and the political risk premium in Turkish assets. As a strongman leader Erdoğan has consolidated political power in his own hands, so there is no one to take the blame for the country’s economic mismanagement – other than foreigners. Hence there is a distinct risk that his foreign policy adventurism will escalate between now and next year, resulting in significant military conflicts or saber-rattling. These will shake out western investors who try to speculate on the likelihood that the election or the military will oust Erdoğan and produce sounder national and economic policies. That outcome is indeed likely but Erdoğan is not going without a fight. Our Geopolitical Strategy also recommends tactically shorting the lira versus the Japanese yen in light of global slowdown, extreme geopolitical risk, and the Bank of Japan’s desire to prevent the yen from falling too far.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Consulting Editor Footnotes 1      Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci, “The Turkish constitutional referendum, explained,” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2017, brookings.edu. 2     The central bank replaced an existing 20% reserve requirement ratios for credits with a higher 30% treasury bond collateral requirement. Lenders will have to cut interest rates on commercial loans (except for loans to farmers, exporters, and SMEs). Otherwise, banks will have to maintain additional securities. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary The US inflation surprise increases the odds of both congressional gridlock and recession, which increases uncertainty over US leadership past 2024 and reduces the US’s ability to lower tensions with China and Iran.   Despite the mainstream media narrative, the Xi-Putin summit reinforces our view that China cannot reject Russia’s strategic partnership. The potential for conflict in Taiwan forces China to accept Russia’s overture. For the same reason the US and China cannot re-engage their economies sustainably, even if Biden and Xi somehow manage to reduce tensions after the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. Russia could reduce oil exports as well as natural gas, intensifying the global energy shock. Ukraine’s counter-offensive and Europe’s energy diversification increase the risk of Russian military and economic failure. The Middle East will destabilize anew and create a new source of global energy supply disruptions. US-Iran talks are faltering as expected. Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 19.1% Bottom Line: Stay long US stocks, defensive sectors, and large caps. Avoid China, Taiwan, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Feature Several notable geopolitical developments occurred over the past week while we met with clients at the annual BCA Research Investment Conference in New York. In this report we analyze these developments using our geopolitical method, which emphasizes constraints over preferences, capabilities over intentions, reality over narrative. We also draw freely from the many valuable insights gleaned from our guest speakers at the conference.  China Cannot Reject Russia: The Xi-Putin Summit In Uzbekistan Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Uzbekistan as we go to press and Putin has acknowledged China’s “questions and concern” about the war in Ukraine.1 They last met on February 4 when Xi gave Putin his blessing for the Ukraine invasion, promising to buy more Russian natural gas and to pursue a “no limits” strategic partnership (meaning one that includes extensive military cooperation). The meeting’s importance is clear from both leaders’ efforts to make it happen. Putin is leaving Russia despite rising domestic criticism over his handling of the Ukraine war and European energy war. Ukraine is making surprising gains in the battlefield, particularly around Kharkiv, threatening Russia’s ability to complete the conquest of Donetsk and the Donbas region. Meanwhile Xi is leaving China for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak, despite the fact that he is only one month away from the most important political event of his life: the October 16 twentieth national party congress, where he hopes to clinch another five, ten, or fifteen years in power, expand his faction’s grip over the political system, and take over Mao Zedong’s unique title as chairman of the Communist Party. We do not yet know the full outcome of the Uzbek summit but we do not see it as a turning point in which China turns on Russia. Instead the summit reinforces our key point to investors all year: China cannot reject Russia. Russia broke energy ties with Europe and is fighting a proxy war with NATO. The Putin regime has lashed Russia to China’s side for the foreseeable future. China may not have wanted to move so quickly toward an exclusive relationship but it is not in a position to reject Russia’s diplomatic overture and leave Putin out to dry. The reason is that China is constrained by the US-led world order and like Russia is attempting to change that order and carve a sphere of influence to improve its national security. Beijing’s immediate goal is to consolidate power across the critical buffer territories susceptible to foreign interests. It has already consolidated Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and to some extent the South China Sea, the critical approach to Taiwan. Taiwan is the outstanding buffer space that needs to be subjugated. Xi Jinping has taken it upon himself to unify China and Taiwan within his extended rule. But Taiwanese public opinion has decisively shifted in favor of either an indefinite status quo or independence. Hence China and Taiwan are on a collision course. Regardless of one’s view on the likelihood of war, it is a high enough chance that China, Taiwan, the US, and others will be preparing for it in the coming years. Chart 1US Arms Sales To Taiwan The US is attempting to increase its ability to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It believes it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine – and Taiwan is far more important to US economy and security than Ukraine. The US is already entering discussions with Taiwan and other allies about a package of severe economic sanctions in the event that China attacks – sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. The US Congress is also moving forward with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which will solidify US support for the island as well as increase arms sales (Chart 1).2  Aside from China's military preparation – which needs to be carefully reviewed in light of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine and the much greater difficulty of invading Taiwan – China must prepare to deal with the following three factors in the event of war: 1. Energy: China is overly exposed to sea lines of communication that can be disrupted by the United States Navy. Beijing will have to partner with Russia to import Russian and Central Asian resources and attempt to forge an overland path to the Middle East (Chart 2). Unlike Russia, China cannot supply its own energy during a war and its warfighting capacity will suffer if shortages occur or prices spike. 2. Computer Chips: China has committed at least $200 billion on a crash course to build its own semiconductors since 2013 due to the need to modernize its military and economy and compete with the US on the global stage. But China is still dependent on imports, especially for the most advanced chips, and its dependency is rising not falling despite domestic investments (Chart 3). The US is imposing export controls on advanced microchips and starting to enforce these controls on third parties. The US and its allies have cut off Russia’s access to computer chips, leading to Russian shortages that are impeding their war effort.  Chart 2China’s Commodity Import Vulnerability Chart 3China's Imports Of Semiconductors     3. US Dollar Reserves: China is still heavily exposed to US dollar assets but its access will be cut off in the event of war, just as the US has frozen Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan, and Cuban assets over the years. China is already diversifying away from the dollar but will have to move more quickly given that Russia had dramatically reduced its exposure and still suffered severely when its access to dollar reserves was frozen this year (Chart 4). Where will China reallocate its reserves? To developing and importing natural resources from Russia, Central Asia, and other overland routes. Chart 4China's US Dollar Exposure Russia may be the junior partner in a new Russo-Chinese alliance but it will not be a vassal. Russia has resources, military power, and regional control in Central Asia that China needs. Of course, China will maintain a certain diplomatic distance from Russia because it needs to maintain economic relations with Europe and other democracies as it breaks up with the United States. Europe is far more important to Chinese exports than Russia. China will play both sides and its companies will develop parallel supply chains. China will also make gestures to countries that feel threatened by Russia, including the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the crucial point is that China cannot reject Russia. If the Putin regime fails, China will be diplomatically isolated, it will lose an ally in any Taiwan war, and the US will have a much greater advantage in attempting to contain China in the coming years and decades. Russo-Chinese Alliance And The US Dollar Many investors speculate that China’s diversification away from the US dollar will mark a severe downturn for the currency. This is of course possible, given that Russia and China will form a substantial anti-dollar bloc. Certainly there can be a cyclical downturn in the greenback, especially after the looming recession troughs. But it is harder to see a structural collapse of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency. The past 14 years have shown how global investors react to US dysfunction, Russian aggression, and Chinese slowdown: they buy the dollar! The implication is that a US wage-price spiral, a Russian détente with Europe, and a Chinese economic recovery would be negative for the dollar – but those stars have not yet aligned. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThe Geopolitical Consequences Of The Ukraine War The reason China needs to diversify is because it fears US sanctions when it invades Taiwan. Hence reducing its holdings of US treasuries and the dollar signals that it expects war in future. But will other countries rush into the yuan and yuan-denominated bonds if Xi is following in Putin’s footsteps and launching a war of choice, with damaging consequences for the economy? A war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe and would send other countries plunging into the safe-haven assets, including US assets.   Nevertheless China will diversify and other countries will probably increase their yuan trade over time, just as Russia has done. This will be a cyclical headwind for the dollar at some point. But it will not knock the US off the premier position. That would require a historic downgrade in the US’s economic and strategic capability, as was the case with the United Kingdom after the world wars. China will continue to stimulate the economy after the party congress. A successful Chinese and global economic rebound next year – and a decision to pursue “jaw jaw” with the US and Taiwan rather than “war war” – would be negative for the dollar. Hence we may downgrade our bullish dollar view to neutral on a cyclical basis before long … but not yet and not on a structural basis.  Bottom Line: Favor the US dollar and the euro over the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Underweight Chinese and Taiwanese assets on a structural basis. Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive And A Russian Oil Embargo Ukraine launched a counter-offensive against Russia in September and achieved significant early victories. Russians fell back away from Kharkiv, putting Izyum in Ukrainian hands and jeopardizing Russia’s ability to achieve its war aim of conquering the remaining half of Donetsk province and thus controlling the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Russian positions also crumbled west of the Dnieper river, which was always an important limit on Russian capabilities (Map 1). Map 1Status Of Russia-Ukraine War: The Ukrainian Counter-Offensive (September 15, 2022) Some commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama in the Washington Post, have taken the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a sign that the Ukrainians will reconquer lost territory and Russia will suffer an outright defeat in this war.3 If Russia cannot conquer the Donbas, its control of the “land bridge” to Crimea will be unsustainable, and it may have to admit defeat. But we are very skeptical. It will be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to drive the Russians out of all of their entrenched positions. US military officials applauded Ukraine’s counter-offensive but sounded a cautious note. The chief problem is that neither President Putin nor the Russian military can afford such a defeat. They will have to double down on the Donbas and land bridge. The war will be prolonged. Ultimately we expect stalemate, which will be a prelude to ceasefire negotiations. But first the fighting will intensify and the repercussions for global economy and markets will get worse. Russia’s war effort is also flagging because Europe is making headway in finding alternatives for Russian natural gas. Russia has cut off flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany, the Yamal pipeline to Poland, and partially to the Ukraine pipeline system, leaving only Turkstream operating normally. Yet EU gas storage is in the middle of its normal range and trending higher (Chart 5).   Chart 5Europe Handling Natural Gas Crisis Well … So Far Of course, Europe’s energy supply is still not secure. Cold weather could require more heating than expected. Russia has an incentive to tighten the gas flow further. Flows from Algeria or Azerbaijan could be sabotaged or disrupted (Chart 6). Chart 6Europe’s NatGas Supply Still Not Secure Chart 7Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Russia’s intention is to inflict a recession on Europe so that it begins to rethink its willingness to maintain a long-term proxy war. Recession will force European households to pay the full cost of the energy breakup with Russia all at once. Popular support for war will moderate and politicians will adopt more pragmatic diplomacy. After all they do not have an interest in prolonging the war to the point that it spirals out of control. Clearly the economic pain is being felt, as manufacturing expectations and consumer confidence weaken (Chart 7). Europe’s resolve will not collapse overnight. But the energy crisis can get worse from here. The deeper the recession, the more likely European capitals will try to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire.   However, given Ukraine’s successes in the field and Europe’s successes in diversification, it is entirely possible that Russia faces further humiliating setbacks. While this outcome may be good for liberal democracies, it is not good for global financial markets, at least not in the short run. If Russia is backed into a corner on both the military and economic fronts, then Putin’s personal security and regime security will be threatened. Russia could attempt to turn the tables or lash out even more aggressively. Already Moscow has declared a new “red line” if the US provides longer-range missiles to Ukraine. A US-Russia showdown, complete with nuclear threats, is not out of the realm of possibility. Russia could also start halting oil exports, as it has threatened to do, to inflict a major oil shock on the European economy. Investors will need to be prepared for that outcome.  Bottom Line: Petro-states have geopolitical leverage as long as global commodity supplies remain tight. Investors should be prepared for the European embargo of Russian oil to provoke a Russian reaction. A larger than expected oil shock is possible given the risk of defeat that Russia faces (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock US-Iran Talks Falter Again This trend of petro-state geopolitical leverage was one of our three key views for 2022 and it also extends to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which are faltering as expected. Tit-for-tat military action between Iran and its enemies in the Persian Gulf will pick up immediately – i.e. a new source of oil disruption will emerge. If global demand is collapsing then this trend may only create additional volatility for oil markets at first, but it further constrains the supply side for the foreseeable future. It is not yet certain that the talks are dead but a deal before the US midterm looks unlikely. Biden could continue working on a deal in 2023-24. The Democratic Party is likely to lose at least the House of Representatives, leaving him unable to pass legislation and more likely to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Biden administration wants the Iran deal to tamp down inflation and avoid a third foreign policy crisis at a time when it is already juggling Russia and China. The overriding constraints in this situation are that Iran needs a nuclear weapon for regime survival, while Israel will attack Iran as a last resort before it obtains a nuclear weapon. Yes, the US is reluctant to initiate another war in the Middle East. But public war-weariness is probably overrated today (unlike in 2008 or even 2016) and the US has drawn a hard red line against nuclear weaponization. Iran will retaliate to any US-Israeli aggression ferociously. But conflict and oil disruptions will emerge even before the US or Israel decide to launch air strikes, as Iran will face sabotage and cyber-attacks and will need to deter the US and Israel by signaling that it can trigger a region-wide war. Chart 9If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further Recent social unrest in Iraq, where the nationalist coalition of Muqtada al-Sadr is pushing back against Iranian influence, is only an inkling of what can occur if the US-Iran talks are truly dead, Iran pushes forward with its nuclear program, and Israel and the US begin openly entertaining military options. The potential oil disruption from Iraq presents a much larger supply constraint than the failure to remove sanctions on Iran (Chart 9). A new wave of Middle Eastern instability would push up oil prices and strengthen Russia’s hand, distracting the US and imposing further pain on Europe. It would not strengthen China’s hand, but the risk itself would reinforce China’s Eurasian strategy, as Beijing would need to prepare for oil cutoffs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s attempts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be seen in this context. Ultimately the only factor that could still possibly convince Iran not to make a dash for the bomb – the military might of the US and its allies – is the same factor that forces China and Russia to strengthen their strategic bond. The emerging Russo-Chinese behemoth, in turn, acts as a hard constraint on any substantial reengagement of the US and Chinese economies. The US cannot afford to feed another decade of Chinese economic growth and modernization if China is allied with Russia and Central Asia. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi and Biden administrations will try to prevent a total collapse of US-China relations in 2023. If China is not yet ready to invade Taiwan then there is a brief space for diplomacy to try to work. But there is no room for long-lasting reengagement – because the US cannot simply cede Taiwan to China, and hence China cannot reject Russia, and Russia no longer has any options. Bottom Line: Expect further oil volatility and price shocks. Sell Middle Eastern equities. Favor North American, Latin American, and Australian energy producers. Investment Takeaways Recession Risks Rising: The inflation surprise in the US in August necessitates more aggressive Fed rate hikes in the near term, which increases the odds of rising unemployment and recession. US Policy Uncertainty Rising: A recession will greatly increase the odds of US political instability over the 2022-24 cycle and reduce the incentive for foreign powers like Iran or China to make concessions or agreements with the US. European Policy Uncertainty Rising: We already expected a European recession. Russia’s setbacks make it more likely that it will adopt more aggressive military tactics and economic warfare. Chinese Policy Uncertainty Rising: China will continue stimulating next year but its economy will suffer from energy shocks and its stimulus is less effective than in the past. It will likely increase economic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the US will increase punitive measures against China. It is not clear that it will launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan – that is not our base case – but it is possible so investors need to be prepared. Long US and Defensives: Stay long US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Buy safe-havens like the oversold Japanese yen. Long Arms Manufacturers: Buy defense stocks and cyber-security firms. Short China and Taiwan: Favor the USD and EUR over the CNY. Favor US semiconductor stocks over Taiwanese equities. Favor Korean over Taiwanese equities. Favor Indian tech over Chinese tech. Favor Singaporean over Hong Kong stocks. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Tessa Wong and Simon Fraser, “Putin-Xi talks: Russian leader reveals China's 'concern' over Ukraine,” BBC, September 15, 2022, bbc.com. 2     US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” foreign.senate.gov. 3    Greg Sargent, “Is Putin facing defeat? The ‘End of History’ author remains confident,” Washington Post, September 12, 2022, washingtonpost.com.                                                                                         Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz A US-Iran deal would make for a notable improvement in the geopolitical backdrop during an otherwise gloomy year. It would remove the risk of a major new oil shock. We maintain our 40% subjective odds of a deal, which is well below consensus. The risk of failure is underrated. Our conviction level is only moderate because President Biden can make concessions to clinch a deal – and Supreme Leader Khamenei may want to earn some money and time. Yet we have high conviction in our view that the US will ultimately fail to provide Iran with sufficient security guarantees while Iran will pursue a nuclear deterrent. Hence the Middle East will present a long-term energy supply constraint. In the short term, global growth and recession risk will drive oil prices, not any Iran deal. Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / BROAD MARKET EQUITIES 2020-11-27 9.3% Bottom Line: Any US-Iran deal will be marginally positive for risky assets. However, the failure of a deal would sharply increase the odds of oil supply disruptions in the short run. Feature Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remain in a critical phase. Rumors suggest Iran has agreed to rejoin the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) with the United States. But these rumors are unconfirmed, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) just announced that Iran has started operating more advanced centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear site.1 In this report we provide a tactical update on the topic. A US-Iran nuclear deal is one item on our checklist for global macro and geopolitical stability (Table 1). We are pessimistic about a deal but it would be a positive outcome for markets. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 A decision could come at any moment so investors should bear in mind our key conclusions about a deal: Chart 1Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga 1.  Any deal will be a short-term, stop-gap measure to delay a crisis until 2024 or beyond. This is not a small point because a crisis could lead to a large military conflict. 2.  The short-run implication of any deal is oil volatility, not a drop in oil prices (Chart 1). Global demand is wobbly and OPEC could cut oil production in reaction to a deal. 3.  Over the long run, global supply and demand balances will remain tight even if a deal is agreed. 4.  If there is no deal, then a major new source of global supply constraint will emerge immediately due to a new spiral of conflict in the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program will continue which will prompt threats from Israel and the Gulf Arab states and Iranian counter-threats. We are sticking with our subjective 40/60 odds that a deal will occur – i.e. our conviction level is medium, not high. The Biden administration wants a deal and has the executive authority to conclude a deal. Iran wants sanctions lifted and can buy time with a short-term deal. Our pessimism stems from the fact that neither side can trust the other, the US can no longer give credible security guarantees, and Iran has a strategic interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. A deal can happen but its durability depends on the 2024 US election. Status Of Negotiations Table 2Iran’s Three Demands Of US For Rejoining 2015 Nuclear Deal Ostensibly there were three outstanding Iranian demands over the month of August that needed to be met to secure a deal (Table 2). Iran reportedly dropped the first demand: that the US remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the US State Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This concession prompted the news media to become more optimistic about a deal. This leaves two outstanding demands. Iran wants the IAEA conclude a “safeguards” investigation into unexplained uranium traces found at unauthorized sites in Iran, indicating nuclear activity that has not been accounted for. The IAEA will be very reluctant to halt such a probe on a political, not technical, basis. But it could happen under US pressure. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter Iran also wants the US to provide a “guarantee” that future presidents will not renege on the nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions like President Trump did in 2019. President Biden cannot give any credible guarantee because the JCPA is an executive action, not a formal treaty, so a different president could reverse it. (The deal always lacked sufficient support in the Senate, even from top Democrats.) Iran is demanding certain diplomatic concessions and/or an economic indemnity in the event of another American reversal. Aside from attempting to incarcerate former President Trump, Biden can only offer empty promises on this front. In what follows we review the critical constraints facing the US and Iran. The US’s Constraints The first constraint on the US is the stagflationary economy. High inflation and oil prices pose a threat to President Biden and the Democrats not only in this year’s midterm elections but also in the 2024 presidential election. A recession is not at all unlikely by that time, given the inverted yield curve (Chart 2). If the US can help maintain stability in the Middle East, then the odds of another major oil supply shock (on top of Russia) will be reduced. Lifting sanctions on Iran will free up around 1 million barrels of oil to feed global demand. With Europe and the US imposing an oil and oil shipping embargo on Russia, the world is likely to lose around two million barrels of crude per day that the Gulf Arab states can only partially make up for, according to our Chief Commodity Strategist Bob Ryan (Table 3). This is a notable material constraint – and the main reason that Bob is more optimistic about an Iran deal than we are. Chart 2US Economic Constraint: Stagflation​​​​​ Table 3The Oil Math Behind Any Iran Deal However, Saudi Arabia would be alienated by a US-Iran détente. The American view is that Iranian production would threaten Saudi market share and force the Saudis to produce more. But the Saudis are seeing weakening global demand and have signaled that they will cut production. There is still an economic basis for an Iran deal but it is not clear that it will lower prices, especially in the short run. Over the long run the Saudis are a more reliable oil producer than Iran for both economic and geopolitical reasons. The second constraint is political. The US public is primarily concerned about the economy. Stagflation or recession could ultimately bring down the Biden administration. However, in the short run, American voters are much more concerned about domestic social issues (such as abortion access) than they are about foreign policy. In the long run, American voters are likely to maintain their long-held negative view of Iran (Chart 3). So the Biden administration has an incentive to prevent geopolitical events from hurting the economy but not to join arms with Iran in a major diplomatic agreement. The third constraint is military. Americans are not as war-weary today as they were in 2008 or 2016 but they are still averse to any new military conflicts in the Middle East. An Iranian nuclear bomb could change that view – but until a bomb is tested it will persist. Chart 3US Political Constraint: Americans Ignore Foreign Policy, Dislike Iran​​​​​​ Chart 4US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz If Iran freezes its nuclear program then it will reduce the odds of a Middle Eastern war and large-scale oil supply disruptions. If Iran does not freeze its nuclear program, then Israel will have to demonstrate a credible military threat against nuclear weaponization, and then Iran will have to demonstrate its region-wide militant capabilities, including the ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz (Chart 4). The Biden administration wants to delay this downward spiral or avoid it altogether. Chart 5US Strategic Constraint: Avoid Mideast Quagmires The fourth constraint is strategic. The Biden administration wants to avoid conflict if possible because it is attempting to reduce America’s burden in the Middle East so that it can focus on emerging great power competition in Eastern Europe and East Asia. The original motivation for the Iran deal was to enable the US to “pivot to Asia” and counter China. Iranian hegemony in the Middle East is less of a threat than Chinese hegemony in East Asia (Chart 5). This logic is sound if Iran can really be brought to halt its nuclear program. The Europeans need to stabilize and open up the Middle East to create an alternative energy supply to Russia. The Americans need to avoid a nuclear arms race and war in the Middle East that distracts them from China. However, if Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapon, then the US suffers strategically for doing a short-term deal that provides Iran with time and access to funds. Ultimately the only thing that can dissuade Iran from going nuclear is American power projection in the Middle East – and this capability is also one of the US’s greatest advantages over China. Bottom Line: The US has a strategic, military, and economic interest in concluding a deal that freezes Iran’s nuclear program. It arguably has an interest in a deal even if Iran violates the deal and pursues nuclear weaponization, since that will provide a legitimate basis for what would then become a necessary military intervention. The Biden administration faces some political blowback for a deal but will suffer more if failure to get a deal leads to a Middle Eastern oil shock. For all these reasons Biden administration is attempting to clinch a deal. But Iran is the sticking point. Iran’s Constraints Our reasons for pessimism regarding the nuclear talks hinge on Iran, not the United States. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s goal is to secure the regime and arrange for a stable succession in the coming years. A deal with the Americans made sense in that context. But going forward, if dealing with the Americans does not bring credible security guarantees and yet makes the economy vulnerable again to a future snapback of sanctions, then the justification for the deal falls apart. We cannot read Khamenei’s mind any more than we can read Biden’s mind, so we will look at the material limitations. Chart 6Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation First, the economic constraint: The Iranian economy suffered a huge negative shock from the reimposition of sanctions in 2019 (Chart 6). However, the economy has sputtered through this shock and the Covid-19 shock without collapsing. Social unrest is an ever-present risk but it has not spiraled out of control. There has not been an attempted democratic revolution like in 2009. The upswing in the global commodity cycle has reinforced the regime. Sanctions do not prevent exports entirely. There is still a huge monetary incentive to let the Biden administration lift sanctions if it wants to do so: a deal is estimated to free up $100 billion dollars per year in revenue for the regime for ten years.2 Realistically this should be understood as more than $275 billion for two years since the longevity of the deal is in question. The problem is that Iran’s economy would be fully exposed to sanctions again if the US changed its mind. The bottom line is that the economic constraint does not force Iran to accept a deal but it is enticing. Second comes the political constraint. President Ebrahim Raisi hopes to become supreme leader someday and is loath to put his name on a deal with weak foundations. He originally opposed the deal, was vindicated, and does not now want to jeopardize his political future by making the same mistake as his hapless predecessor, Hassan Rouhani. Opinion polls may not be reliable in putting Raisi as the most popular politician in Iran but they probably are reliable in showing Rouhani at the bottom of the heap (Chart 7). There is a significant political constraint against rejoining the deal. Chart 7Iran’s Political Constraint: Risk Of American Betrayal Chart 8Iran’s Military Constraint: Outgunned, Unsure Of Allies Third comes the military constraint. While Iran is extremely vulnerable to Israeli and American military attack, it is also a fortress of a country, nestled in mountains, and airstrikes may not succeed in destroying the entire nuclear program or bringing down the regime. An attack by Israel could convert an entirely new generation to the Islamic revolution. And Iran may believe that the US lacks the popular support for military action in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran may also believe that China and Russia will provide military and economic support (Chart 8). Ultimately, America has demonstrated a willingness to attack rogue states and Iran will try to avoid that outcome, since it could succeed in toppling the regime. But if Iran believes it can acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon in a few short years, then it may make a dash for it, since this solution would be a permanent solution: a nuclear deterrent against western attack, as opposed to temporary diplomatic promises. We often compare Iran’s strategic predicament to that of Ukraine, Libya, and North Korea. Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear weapons after the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which promised that Russia, the US, the UK, France, and China would guarantee its security. Yet Russia ended up invading 20 years later – and none of the others prevented it or sent troops to halt the Russian advance. Separately Libya gave up its nuclear program in 2003 but NATO attacked and toppled the regime in 2011 anyway. Meanwhile North Korea played the diplomatic game with the US, ever inching along on the path toward nuclear weapons, and today has achieved nuclear-armed status and greater regime security. The outflow of refugees from the various regimes shows why Iran will emulate North Korea (Chart 9). Chart 9Iran’s Strategic Constraint: The Need For A Nuclear Deterrent Bottom Line: Iran has a short-term economic incentive to agree to a deal and a long-term military incentive. But ultimately the US cannot provide ironclad security guarantees that would justify halting the quest for a nuclear deterrent. A nuclear deterrent would overcome the military constraint. Therefore Iran will continue on that path. Any deal will be a ruse to buy time. Final Assessment The 2015 deal occurred in a context of Iranian strategic isolation, when American implementation was credible, oil prices were weak, and Iran had not achieved nuclear breakout capacity. Today Iran is not isolated (thanks to US quarrels with Russia and China), American guarantees are not credible (thanks to the polarization of foreign policy), oil prices are not weak (thanks to Russia), and Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout (Table 4). Table 4Iran’s Nuclear Program Status Check, Aug. 31, 2022 The US’s strategic aim is to create a balance of power in the region but Iran’s strategic aim is to ensure regime survival. The US’s emerging balancing coalition (Israel and the Gulf Arab states) increases the strategic threat to Iran and hence its need for a nuclear deterrent. While Russia and China formally support the 2015 deal, they each see Iran as a valuable asset in a great power struggle with the United States. Iran sees them the same way. Russia needs Iran as a partner to bypass western sanctions. Regardless, it benefits from Middle Eastern instability, which could entangle the United States. China must develop a deep long-term partnership with Iran for its own strategic reasons and does not look forward to a time when the US divests from that region to impose tougher strategic containment on China. China can survive a US conflict with Iran – and such a conflict could reduce the US ability to defend Taiwan. While neither Russia nor China positively desire Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, neither power stopped North Korea from obtaining the bomb – far from it. Russia assumes that Israel and the US will take military action to prevent weaponization, which would be catastrophic for the region but positive for Russia. China also assumes Israel and the US will act, which reinforces its need to diversify energy options so that it can access Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern oil via pipeline. Investment Takeaways Our negative view on the global economy and geopolitical backdrop is once again being priced into global financial markets as equities fall anew. An Iran deal would delay a notable geopolitical risk for roughly the next 24 months and hence remove a major upside risk for oil prices. This would be marginally positive for global equities, although it will not be the driver. Europe’s and China’s economic woes are the drivers. The failure of a deal would bring major upside risks for oil into the near term and as such would be negative for equities – and could even become the global driver, as Middle Eastern oil disruptions will follow promptly from any failure of the deal. We continue to recommend that investors overweight US equities relative to global, defensive sectors relative to cyclicals, and large caps relative to small caps. We are overweight aerospace and defense stocks, India and Southeast Asia within emerging markets, and underweight China and Taiwan.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Iran International, “Exclusive: Ex-IAEA Official Says US And Iran To Sign Deal Soon,” August 30, 2022, iranintl.com. See also Francois Murphy, “Iran enriching uranium with more IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz -IAEA,” Reuters, August 31, 2022, reuters.com. 2     See Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Tehran’s $1 Trillion Deal: An Updated Forecast of Iran’s Financial Windfall From a New Nuclear Agreement,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 19, 2022, fdd.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

特別レポート

エグゼクティブ・サマリー 第4次台湾海峡危機が現実化していることを受けて、世界の大国間での大規模な戦争の確率は上昇しました。 当社のディシジョンツリーは確率を約20%と示唆しており、これはロシアのウクライナ戦争だけを起点に想定した水準の2倍に相当します。世界は五発リボルバーで「ロシアンルーレット」をしている状態です。 今後の基本見解としては、米中の国内政治イベントが今秋に一段落した後、台湾緊張は横ばい（悪化はしないが改善もしない）になると見ています。 しかし、もし中国が第20回党大会後に緊張をエスカレートさせれば、侵攻の確率は大幅に上昇します。 台湾で紛争が発生した場合、ロシアが欧州でさらに攻勢的になる確率が高まります。 イランは核兵器の追求を強く進める可能性が高いです。   2022年下半期にポジティブな触媒は多くない 五連発拳銃によるルーレット 五連発拳銃によるルーレット タクティカル推奨開始日リターン 米国10年国債ロング2022-04-141.3% グローバルのディフェンシブ／サイクリック株式ロング2022-01-2013.8% 結論：投資家は少なくとも中国の党大会と米国の中間選挙が今秋に終わるまでは防御的なポジションを維持すべきです。来年の地政学的リスクは中国の台湾海峡での行動次第です。 特集   チャート 1 第三次世界大戦をめぐる臆測が高まる 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 世界の出来事に注意を払う悲観論者たちは、近年第三次世界大戦が勃発するリスクを懸念するようになりました。用語の検索は2019年以降増えていますが、懸念の理由は特定の危機事象というよりもむしろグローバルな多極化という基調にあります（チャート 1）。1 米中、あるいは米露間での大規模な戦争の確率はどのくらいでしょうか。どのように算出できるでしょうか。本レポートでは一連の「ディシジョンツリー」を提示し、各シナリオと確率を形式化して示します。 もしWWIIIを米国がロシアあるいは中国、または両方と直接交戦する戦争と定義するなら、今後数年以内にWWIIIが勃発する確率は20%に達すると計算されます！ これは非常に高い確率ですが、歴史はこうした確率が非現実的でないことを示しており、投資家は油断してはなりません。政治学者グレアム・アリソンは長期的に見た米中戦争の確率は約75%であると歴史的類推に基づいて示しています。 要点は、各国がこのWWIIIリスクを直視し、拒否しない限り世界の政治環境は改善しないということです。最もあり得るのは、WWIIIおよびそれがもたらす核戦争のリスクが最終的な制約となり、各国がそれを認識して行動を改めるケースですが、現在の大国の振る舞いはまだ制約を認識しておらず、短期的には瀬戸際政策を続ける意向が窺えます。 中国による台湾侵攻の確率 まず問いは、中国が台湾に侵攻するかどうかです。2021年4月に当社は第4次台湾海峡危機が12～24か月以内に発生すると予測しましたが、全面戦争には発展しないと見ていました。この見方が今試されています。 図表 1では、中国の台湾に対する政策選択肢をマッピングし、それぞれに確率を割り当てるディシジョンツリーを示します。 図表 1 第4次台湾海峡危機に関するディシジョンツリー（次の24か月） 五連発の拳銃によるルーレット 五連発の拳銃によるルーレット   中国は台湾を侵攻する能力を獲得しましたが、特に核三本柱（トライアド）のさらなる進展がない限り、失敗の確率は依然として高いです。したがって、即時に侵攻のために動員をかける確率は20%と見積もります。 明らかに、中国が侵攻を計画しているという具体的な兆候があれば真剣に受け止めるべきです。 2021年にウクライナ周辺でのロシアの軍事増強を投資家やメディアが軽視したことは損失を招きました。 同時に、米中は台湾海峡の現状を試しているだけであり、現状は今回のエピソード後に強化される可能性が高いという見方もあります。結局のところ、今回の危機は第4次台湾海峡危機であり、過去の危機はいずれも戦争には至りませんでした。 バイデン大統領と習近平が、今秋に予定される重要な国内政治イベントを前にそれぞれの力を誇示しているだけなら、両者は既に目的を達成しています。少なくとも今後数年間にわたっては、これ以上の軍事的見せつけは不要です。 我々は、過去一週間の緊張が残るが現状が強化されるシナリオに40%の確率を割り当てます。 その場合、台湾海峡の構造的問題は2024年の米国と台湾の大統領選挙の後、つまりこの図表の時間枠の外で再燃するでしょう。 残念ながら我々は長期的には悲観的であり、台湾での戦争の確率は高いと考えています。 そのため、我々は今後2年間で状況が悪化するシナリオにも同じく40%の確率を割り当てます。 もし中国が党大会後に演習や制裁を拡大するなら、習指導部が単なる国内向けパフォーマンスではないことが明らかになります。 同様に、もしバイデン政権が中間選挙後も対中ハイテク輸出管理の強化を推し進め、同盟国やパートナーにも同様の対応を求め続けるなら、米国は中国が何らかの攻勢作戦を準備していると暗に判断していることになります。その場合、侵攻の危険性は20%から40%に上昇します。 それでも、米中の危機外交が2023-24年に全面戦争を防ぐという見方は依然として妥当ですが、誤算のリスクは非常に高まります。 このディシジョンツリーの最後の要素は、中国が第二次世界大戦で見られたような従来型の上陸侵攻ではなく、「グレーゾーン戦術」やハイブリッド戦を好むという前提です。理由は複数あります。 第一に、上陸侵攻は最も困難な軍事作戦です。第二に、中国軍は未熟である一方、米国と同盟国は守備を固めています。第三に、ハイブリッド戦は米国の同盟国間に対応の分裂を生みます。第四に、ここ14年でロシアはハイブリッド戦が機能することを何度も示してきました。それは戦略的便益を最大化し、コストを最小化する手段です。 西側が小規模な侵攻にどう反応するかは世界が知っている：経済制裁だ。しかし大規模な侵攻にどう反応するかはまだ分かりません。したがって中国は小さく噛み切るインセンティブを持ちます。 とはいえ台湾の場合、こうした戦術が持続可能でない可能性もあります。当社の台湾に関するディシジョンツリーは、ハイブリッド戦や「代理戦争」が大規模戦争に進展する可能性を完全には織り込んでいません。しかしその可能性は実際には高いのです。したがって我々は米中の大規模戦争のリスクを過小評価しているわけではありません。 結論： 今後2年間で、台湾を巡る米中の代理戦争の主観的確率は約32%、直接的な米中戦争の確率は約4%です。 真の試練は習近平が今秋の党大会で権力を固めた後に訪れます。 我々は習氏が経済の再起動に注力すると予想します したがって我々は中国と台湾を除く新興アジアの市場を引き続き推奨します。 ロシアとNATOの戦争の確率 第二の問いは、ウクライナの戦争が西側とのより広範な戦争に変貌するかどうかです。ウクライナでは既に戦争が継続しているため、ロシアと西側の大規模戦争の確率は中国の場合よりも高くなります。一方、台湾海峡の緊張は現時点ではまだ虚勢の段階にすぎません。 投資家のベースケースとしては、ウクライナ戦争はウクライナ内に限定されると考えるべきです。欧州諸国はドンバスのためだけにロシアと壊滅的な戦いを望んでいません。しかし戦時には物事がしばしば誤ることがあります。 重要な問いは、ロシアがNATO加盟国を攻撃するかどうかです。そうなれば同盟条約の第5条が発動され、「欧州または北米における一つ以上の（同盟）加盟国に対する武力攻撃は、すべての加盟国に対する攻撃と見なされる」ことになり、必要に応じて安全回復のために武力行使が正当化されます。 ロシアのウクライナ侵攻以降、バイデン大統領は繰り返し米国は「NATO領土の一インチたりとも防衛する」と述べており、これは政策の変更ではなく米国のレッドラインであり極めて高い可能性で防衛されるでしょう。したがってこれはロシアにとって重大な制約です。 図表 2ではロシアの選択肢をマッピングし、確率を割り当てます。 図表 2 ロシア・ウクライナ戦争に関するディシジョンツリー（次の24か月） 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット 五発のリボルバーを使ったルーレット   我々はロシアがドンバス地域とクリミアへの陸路を確保し、勝利を宣言する確率を55%と見ています。ロシアは征服地を何らかの外交合意、つまり停戦という形で正当化しようと動き始めるでしょう。これが我々の2023年のベースケースです。 ロシアが既に外交に向けた動きを始めている証拠があります。2 理由はロシア経済が打撃を受け、世界のコモディティ価格が下落し、人的・物的資源が消耗しているからです。プーチン大統領はドニエプル川河口など、侵攻した地域を支配している限り、ウクライナを弱体化させるという目的は大部分達成したと見なすでしょう。 プーチンは征服地を固め、経済と社会を立て直す必要があります。早ければ早いほどロシアにとって有利であり、欧州がコンセンサスを形成して将来的に天然ガスの全面禁輸を実施するのを防げます。 しかしプーチンの野心が彼を破滅に導くリスクもあります。 我々は侵攻が南西ウクライナ（戦略的港湾都市オデッサを含む）やモルドバ東部に拡大する確率を35%と見積もります。モルドバでは親ロシア派が分離統治するトランスニストリア地域にロシア軍が駐留しています。 この新たなキャンペーンはウクライナを完全に内陸化し、モルドバを無力化し、ロシアにより大きな海上アクセスを与えるでしょう。しかしそれはEUを結束させ、天然ガス禁輸を誘発し、ロシアを弱体化させて絶望的な状況に追い込む可能性もあります。報復に出れば、広範な戦争につながることも考えられます。 フィンランドやスウェーデンがNATO加盟を試みたことでプーチンが攻撃する確率は7%にすぎないと見ます。スターリンはフィンランドに失敗し、プーチンの軍はキエフすら征服できませんでした。英国はこれらの国の支援を約束しており、攻撃はNATOとの戦争を引き起こす公算が大きいでしょう。フィンランド攻撃の決断はロシアがNATOがそこに基地を置く計画を立てていると本当に信じた場合にのみ生じるでしょう。つまりそれがロシアの宣言したレッドラインです。 バルト三国に対するロシアの攻撃は、それらが既にNATOに加盟しているため可能性は低いです。ただしプーチンが絶望的になれば起こり得るというリスクはあります。 我々はバルト侵攻のリスクを3%と見積もります。 要するに、ロシアが欧州に対するエネルギーの締め付けを停戦交渉で有利な合意を引き出すためではなく侵攻の拡大に使うなら、より広範な戦争の確率は上昇します。 結論： 結果として、今後24か月での鎮静化の確率は55%、小規模なエスカレーション（例：オデッサ、モルドバ）は35%、NATO加盟国を巻き込みNATOとロシアの戦争に発展する大規模なエスカレーションは10%です。 戦術的には、もし世界経済が回復しロシアが軍事作戦を中止して停戦交渉に舵を切る明確な転換を示すなら、先進国の欧州通貨および資産を買うべきです。景気循環的には、欧州資産で持続的な強気市場が実現するには米露間のより深い理解が必要です。 米国・イスラエルによるイラン攻撃の確率 今年起きている第三の地政学的危機は、バイデン大統領とアリー・ハメネイ師が2015年の米国・イラン核合意に再加盟することで当面先送りになる可能性があります。しかし我々は懐疑的です。 バイデン政権は2015年の核合意に再加盟して、イランの原油を日量約100万バレル市場に戻し、中間選挙前にガソリン価格を下げたいと考えています。米国のグランドストラテジーはまたイランと関与して中東を安定化させ、米国がアジアへ軸足を移せるようにしたいと考えています。 EUはイラン資源への需要がより大きく、イランの核獶取得を防ぎたいので合意を提案しています。ロシアと中国も対米制裁解除とイランとの貿易を望むため支持的ですし、必ずしもイランに核が持たれることを望んでいるわけではありません。 ただし一つ問題があります：イランは体制の長期的生存を確保するために核兵器を必要としている。 問題はハメネイが再び米国との合意を承認するかどうかです。最初の合意は彼の体制に大きな代償をもたらして裏切られました。近い将来ハメネイに代わって権力を握ることを望むエブラヒム・ライシ大統領は、自らのキャリアと個人の安全を2024年の大統領選の共和党勝利に賭けることには強く反対するでしょう。 イランは既に核ブレイクアウト能力を達成しています—核装置を構築できるだけの60%濃縮ウランを保有している—そして最終的に核抑止力を獲得しようとしない理由が不明です。特に将来的に米国やその同盟国からの軍事攻撃から体制を守る必要が生じる可能性があるためです。 ただし当社の確信度は中程度です。バイデン大統領は制裁解除を望んでおり一方的にそれを行うことができるからです。バイデン政権はいまだ合意を成立させるための予備的措置を講じていませんが、それは変わる可能性があります。3 短期的なつなぎ合意には好循環的な理屈があります。 BCAのコモディティ＆エネルギー・ストラテジスト、ボブ・ライアンによれば、サウジアラビアとUAEの間の予備生産余力は合わせて約150万バレルに過ぎません。EUの石油禁輸と西側諸国の対ロシア制裁は約200万バレル／日を市場から押し出すため、OPECの余力の大部分を吸収します。したがってバイデン政権はイランが市場にもたらし得る100万バレルを必要としています。 我々はイランが制裁解除を認める合意に署名し、バイデンに制裁解除を可能にする可能性を否定できません。それは彼らの経済に利益をもたらします。彼らは核査察を許容しつつ、密かに弾頭や弾道ミサイル開発に注力を移すかもしれません。イランは不可逆的に核計画を放棄するわけではなく、時間稼ぎに長けています。 それでもイランの国内政治は合意を支持しておらず、米国が提供できる信頼できる安全保障の保証がなければ、イランのグランドストラテジーは合意を支持しません。米国はその外交政策の一貫性の欠如からそのような保証を提供できないのです。米国のグランドストラテジーは合意が検証可能であれば支持しますが、イランが合意を口実に爆弾を追求するようなケースは容認しません。 イランは3年間の最大制裁、パンデミック、世界的混乱を経ても屈服していません。そしてロシアと中国が西側に攻勢をかけるようになったことで、戦略的利益を引き出す見通しがより大きくなったとイランは見ています。 モスクワと北京は対ワシントンの共通の不満のため戦略的パートナーになり得ます。一方で米国はルーハニ政権を裏切ったのと同じようにライシ政権を裏切ることも容易であり、その結果として経済は再び翻弄され、最高指導者と政治体制は国民から二重に愚か者と見なされるでしょう。 図表 3はイランの選択肢を整理しています。 図表 3 イラン核危機に関するディシジョンツリー（次の24か月） 五連発拳銃でのルーレット 五連発拳銃でのルーレット   交渉が決裂した場合（50%）、イランは米国とイスラエルが攻撃する前に核兵器確保へ向けて突進するでしょう。 米国とイランが合意に達した場合（40%）、イランは2024年の米国選挙まで合意の条件に従う可能性があり、当面は投資家の懸念材料が除かれます。しかし長期的に核抑止力を得ようとする利害は変わらず、2024年以降に紛争が再燃するでしょう。 協議が決着せず継続する場合（10%）、イランは合意の制約なしに核計画を漸進的に進めるでしょう（ただし突発的な突進を必ずしも必要としないかもしれません）。 要するに、ロシアと中国はイランが核計画を凍結してもイランを必要としますが、米国とイスラエルはイランを抑止するために勢力均衡のアブラハム同盟を形成するでしょう—たとえイランが核計画を凍結してもです。 結論： 投資家は短期的なつなぎの米国・イラン核合意に40%の確率を割り当てるべきです。原油価格の下落は一時的なものにとどまるでしょう。長期的な供給拡大は、米国がイランに不可逆的に核計画を停止させるのに十分な安全保障保証を提供できないため期待できません。 第三次世界大戦の確率 ここからが難しい部分で、これら3つの地政学的危機を合わせて考えます。以下では単純化しすぎていますが、異なるプレーヤーとその選択肢について我々の考えを形式化するのが目的です。 図表 4は中国／台湾紛争に関する結論から出発し、その結果としてロシアのより広範な戦争の確率を調整し、イランが核兵器追求に極めて積極的であるという見方を加えたものです。時間枠は再び2年です。 図表 4 第三次世界大戦に関するディシジョンツリー（次の24か月） 五発の銃を使ったルーレット 五発の銃を使ったルーレット   WWIIIとは異なる紛争シナリオとしては「限定戦争」があり—これは米国が関与しない、あるいは間接的にしか関与しないハイブリッド戦や代理戦争を指す危険な概念です。あるいはロシアと中国を巻き込まないイランとの紛争である可能性もあります。 我々は中国から議論を始めます。なぜなら中国は現代で最も有能で野心的なグローバルパワーだからです。中国の戦略的台頭は世界秩序を揺るがし米国に挑戦しています。また今年のいくつかの証拠から、ロシアは戦争をウクライナ外に拡大する意図を持っていない可能性が示唆されていることも理由です。 中国が台湾に対してさらなる攻撃的行動を取れば、ロシアがより大きなリスクを取るユニークな機会が生まれます。そうでない場合、WWIIIの確率は2年間で急落します。これが我々のベースケースです。 しかし中国が台湾を攻撃し米国が台湾を防衛する場合、我々はロシアがバルト三国に侵攻する確率が高まると見ています。もし中国がハイブリッド攻撃を行い米国が台湾を間接的にしか支援しないなら、ロシアの攻勢の確率はわずかにしか上がりません。 結果として、WWIII（米国がロシアまたは中国、あるいは両者と直接戦う戦争）の確率は20%になります。こうした戦争が限定的に留まるかどうかは議論の余地があります。1945年以降の戦争ゲームは、主要核保有国間の戦争はエスカレートしやすいことを示しています。しかし核兵器は相互確証破壊という究極の制約をもたらします。核エスカレーションのリスクがあるため、我々はディシジョンツリーにおけるWWIIIの確率を下方に丸めています。 より確からしい59%の「限定戦争」シナリオは一見ポジティブな結果のように見えるかもしれませんが、そこには今日の水準からの地政学的緊張の大幅な上昇、例えば中国の台湾に対するハイブリッド戦などが含まれます。 結論： この試算ではWWIIIの確率は最大20%に達し得ます。これは我々のロシアに関するディシジョンツリーの水準の倍であり、当社の台湾危機の予測が現実化したことを考慮すると妥当です。 重要な要因は、今秋の党大会後に北京が台湾への圧力をさらにエスカレートさせるかどうかです。それが危険な連鎖反応を引き起こす可能性があります。 世界経済と金融市場は地政学的リスクからの下振れリスクを依然として抱えていますが、ロシアが停戦に向かい、中国が台湾への行動を遅らせて経済再起動に集中する場合、2023年には改善が見られる可能性があります。 投資の示唆 今年初めにロシアがウクライナに侵攻した際、当社の同僚であるチーフ・グローバル・ストラテジストのピーター・ベレジンは核による破滅の確率を10%と主張しました。 少なくともこれはロシアとNATOが衝突する確率として合理的な数値です。 今や予想された台湾危機が現実になりました。我々は主要な戦争の確率が20%へと倍増したと推定します。 逆に言えばより良い結果が起こる確率は80%です。分析的には、我々は依然としてロシアが限定的な目的—ウクライナを繁栄や軍事的に強大にさせないよう弱体化する—を追求していると見ており、中国も限定的な目的—台湾を国家たる存在としてではなく従属へと向かわせることで威嚇する—を追求していると見ています。 これらの目的が変わらない限り、我々はまだ第三次世界大戦からは遠いと考えます。 世界は不活化されたウクライナと従属した台湾と共存できます。 しかし否定できないのは、2008年のグローバル金融危機以降の世界情勢の軌跡が第二次世界大戦前の道筋と不快なほど似ているということです：金融危機、経済後退、デフレ、国内不安、通貨切り下げ、貿易保護主義、債務の貨幣化、軍備増強、インフレ、そして侵略戦争。ルーレットがゲームなら、世界戦争の確率は6分の1、すなわち17%であり、我々のディシジョンツリーの20%という結果に近い数値です。 我々が仮に大げさであるとしても、WWIIIの確率が20%に達すると論理的に主張できること自体が、投資家が現在のウクライナと台湾をめぐる緊張が低下するまで大きなリスクを取るのを待つべきであることを示唆しています。 簡単なチェックリストを見ると、グローバルマクロと地政学の文脈は陰鬱です（表 1）。チェックリストの改善が見られるまでより楽観的になるのは控えるべきです。 表 1 2022年下半期にポジティブな触媒は多くない 五発の拳銃を使ったルーレット 五発の拳銃を使ったルーレット     チャート 2 2022年下半期は防御的ポジションを維持 2022年下半期は防御的なポジションを維持する 2022年下半期は防御的なポジションを維持する 具体的には、投資家はロシアがNATOに拡大しないこと、そして中国が当面台湾を侵攻しないことに合理的な安心感を持つ必要があります。 これはワシントンとモスクワ、ワシントンと北京の間で紛争を回避する新たな外交的理解を要求します。 そのような理解は危機の中でしか築かれません。関連する危機は進行中ですがまだ完了していません。 通常の解決策である外交を通じて戦争リスクが払拭されるまで、グローバル株式にはさらに下振れリスクがある可能性が高いです。 世界システムの具体的かつ信頼できる改善が見られるまで、リスク資産に対して一般的なオーバーウェイト姿勢を取るのは控えましょう。株より政府債券を重視し、グローバル株より米国株、景気敏感セクターよりディフェンシブ・セクターを好み、中国・台湾の通貨と資産は評価を下げることを推奨します（チャート 2）。     マット・ガートケン チーフ・ジオポリティカル・ストラテジストmattg@bcaresearch.com  脚注 1      記：Graham Allison、Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?（New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017）。 2     例えば、オデッサからの穀物輸送に関するトルコ仲介の合意、2015年イラン核合意への再加盟を支持する外交的動き、ヘルソンのような征服地での住民投票、軍縮交渉での影響力強化の試みなどです。欧州のエネルギーを断つことは最終的に欧州を停戦に有利な条件で妥協させるための圧力手段です。 3     イランは依然として余計な要求を出しています—最近ではIAEAがイランの未公表の核施設で発見された特定の人工ウラン粒子の出所を調査している件を取り下げるよう要求しました。IAEAはこの調査を取り下げておらず、取り下げればIAEAの信頼性が損なわれます。一方でバイデンは制裁を強化しており、制裁解除はイランの主要な要求です。バイデンはイラン革命防衛隊やイQods部隊をテロ指定から外していません。これらのハードルは決定的ではありませんが、我々の見方を変える前に何らかの進展を見るべきだと考えます。 戦略テーマ オープン・タクティカル・ポジション（0～6か月） オープン・サイクリック推奨（6～18か月） 地域別地政学リスクマトリックス 「打率」：地政学ストラテジーの成果（）