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Highlights The US-China trade talks will continue despite Hong Kong. The UK election will not reintroduce no-deal Brexit risk â either in the short run or the long run. European political risk is set to rise from low levels, but Euro Area break-up risk will not. There is no single thread uniting emerging market social unrest. We remain constructive on Brazil. Feature Chart 1Taiwan Indicator To Rise Despite Ceasefire President Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act into law on November 27. The signing was by now expected â Trump was not going to veto the bill and invite the Senate to override him with a 67-vote at a time when he is being impeached. He does not want to familiarize the Senate with voting against him in supermajorities. The Hong Kong bill will not wreck the US-China trade talks, but it is a clear example of our argument that strategic tensions will persist and cast doubt on the durability of the âphase one trade dealâ being negotiated. It is better to think of it as a ceasefire, as Trumpâs electoral constraint is the clear motivation. Trump is embattled at home and will contend an election in 11 months. He will not impose the tariff rate hike scheduled for December 15. A relapse into trade war would kill the green shoots in US and global growth, which partly stem from the perception of easing trade risk. Only if Trumpâs approval rating collapses, or China stops cooperating, will he become insensitive to his electoral constraint. Will China abandon the talks and leave Trump in the lurch? This is not our base case but it is a major global risk. So far China is reciprocating. Xi Jinpingâs political and financial crackdown at home, combined with the trade war abroad, has led to an economic slowdown and an explosion in Chinaâs policy uncertainty relative to Americaâs. A trade ceasefire â on top of fiscal easing â is a way to improve the economy without engaging in another credit splurge. The US and China will continue moving toward a trade ceasefire, despite the Hong Kong bill. The move toward a trade ceasefire will probably keep our China GeoRisk Indicator from rising sharply over the next few months. However, our Taiwan indicator, which we have used as a trade war proxy at times, may diverge as it starts pricing in the heightened political risk surrounding Taiwanâs presidential election on January 11, 2020 (Chart 1). Sanctions, tech controls, Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, Iran, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang are all strategic tensions that can flare up. Yes, uncertainty will fall and sentiment will improve on a ceasefire, but only up to a point. Chinaâs domestic policy decisions are ultimately more important than its handling of the trade war. At the upcoming Central Economic Work Conference authorities are expected to stay focused on âdeepening supply-side structural reformâ and avoiding the use of âirrigation-styleâ stimulus (blowout credit growth). But this does not mean they will not add more stimulus. Since the third quarter, a more broad-based easing of financial controls and industry regulations is apparent, leading our China Investment Strategy to expect a turning point in the Chinese economy in early 2020. This âChina viewâ â on stimulus and trade â is critical to the outlook for the two regions on which we focus for the rest of this report: Europe and emerging markets. Assuming that China stabilizes, these are the regions where risk assets stand to benefit the most. Europe is a political opportunity; the picture in emerging markets is, as always, mixed. United Kingdom: Will Santa Bring A Lump Of Coal? The Brits will hold their first winter election since 1974 on December 12. Prime Minister Boris Johnsonâs Conservative Party has seen a tremendous rally in opinion polls, although it has stalled at a level comparable to its peak ahead of the last election in June 2017 (Chart 2). Another hung parliament or weak Tory coalition is possible. Yet the Tories are better positioned this time given that the opposition Labour Party is less popular than two years ago, while the Liberal Democrats are more capable of stealing Labour votes. The Tories stand to lose in Scotland, but the Brexit Party of Nigel Farage is not contesting seats with them and is thus undercutting Labour in certain Brexit-leaning constituencies. Markets would enjoy a brief relief rally on a single-party Tory majority. This would enable Johnson to get his withdrawal deal over the line and take the UK out of the EU in an orderly manner by January 31. The question would then shift to whether Johnson feels overconfident in negotiating the post-Brexit trade agreement with the EU, which is supposed to be done by December 31, 2020. This date will become the new deadline for tariff increases, but it can be extended. Johnson is as unlikely to fly off the cliff edge next year as he was this year, and this year he demurred. Negotiating a trade agreement is easier when the two economies are already integrated, have a clear (yet flexible) deadline, and face exogenous economic risks. Our political risk indicator will rise but it will not revisit the highs of 2018-19 (Chart 3). The poundâs floor is higher than it was prior to September 2019. Chart 2Tories Look To Be Better Positioned For A Single Party Majority Chart 3UK Risk Will Rise, But Not To Previous Highs Bottom Line: A hung parliament is the only situation where a no-deal Brexit risk reemerges in advance of the new Brexit day of January 31. The market is underestimating this outcome based on our risk indicator. But Johnson himself prefers the deal he negotiated and wishes to avoid the recession that would likely ensue from crashing out of the EU. And a headless parliament can prevent Johnson from forcing a no-deal exit, as investors witnessed this fall. We remain long GBP-JPY. Germany: The Risk Of An Early Election Germany is wading deeper into a period of political risk surrounding Chancellor Angela Merkelâs âlame duckâ phase, doubts over her chosen successor, and uncertainty about Germanyâs future in the world. The federal election of 2021 already looms large. Our indicator is only beginning to price this trend which can last for the next two years (Chart 4). On October 27 Germanyâs main centrist parties suffered a crushing defeat in the state election of Thuringia. For the first time, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) not only lost its leadership position, but also secured less vote share than both the Left Party and the right-wing Alternative fÃŒr Deutschland (AfD) (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 4Germany Is Heading Toward A Period Of Greater Political Risk The AfD successfully positioned itself with the right wing of the electorate and managed to capture more undecided voters than any other party (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5The Right-Wing AfD Outperformed In Thuringia ⊠While the rise of the AfD (and its outperformance over its national polling) may seem alarming, Germany is not being taken over by Euroskeptics. Both support for the euro and German feeling of being âEuropeanâ is near all-time highs (Chart 6). The question is how the centrist parties respond. Merkelâs approval rating is at its lower range. Support for Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), Merkelâs chosen successor, is plummeting (Chart 7). Since AKK was confirmed as party chief, the CDU suffered big losses in the European Parliament election and in state elections. Several of her foreign policy initiatives were not well received in the party.1 In October 2019, the CDU youth wing openly rejected her nomination as Merkelâs successor. At the annual CDU party conference on November 22-23, she only narrowly managed to avoid rebellion. She is walking on thin ice and will need to recover her approval ratings if she wants to secure the chancellorship. Meanwhile the CDU will lose its united front, increasing Germanyâs policy uncertainty. Chart 6... But Euroskeptics Will Not Take Over Germany Germanyâs other major party â the Social Democratic Party (SPD) â is also going through a leadership struggle. Chart 7The CDU Party Leader Is Walking On Thin Ice Chart 8A Return To The Polls Would Result In A CDU-Green Coalition In the first round of the leadership vote, Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and Klara Geywitz (member of the Brandenburg Landtag) secured a small plurality of votes with 22.7%, just 1.6% more than Bundestag member Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans (finance minister of North Rhine-Westphalia from 2010-17). The latest polling, and Scholzâs backing by the establishment, implies that he will win but this is uncertain. The results of the second round will be published on November 30, after we go to press. What does the SPDâs leadership contest mean for the CDU-SPD coalition? More likely than not, the status quo will continue. Scholz is an establishment candidate and supports remaining in the ruling coalition until 2021. Esken is calling for the SPD to leave the coalition, but Walter-Borjans has not explicitly supported this. An SPD exit from the Grand Coalition would likely lead to a snap election, not a favorable outcome for stability-loving Germans. A return to the polls would benefit the Greens and AfD at the expense of the mainstream parties, and would likely see a CDU-Green coalition emerge (Chart 8). Given that a majority of voters want the SPD to remain in government (Chart 9), and that new elections would damage the SPDâs prospects, we believe that the SPD is likely to stay in government until 2021, even if the less established Esken and Walter-Borjans win. The risk is the uncertainty around Merkelâs exit. October 2021 is a long time for Merkel to drag the coalition along, so the odds of an early election are probably higher than expected. Chart 9Germans Prefer The SPD Remains In Government Chart 10Climate Spending Closest Germany Gets To Fiscal Stimulus (For Now) Chart 11There Is Room For More Fiscal Stimulus In Germany, If Needed What would a Scholz win mean for the great debate over whether Germany will step up its fiscal policy? If the establishment duo wins the SPD leadership, the Grand Coalition remains in place, and the economy does not relapse, we are unlikely to see additional fiscal stimulus in the near future. Scholz argues that additional stimulus would not be productive, as the slowdown is due to external factors (i.e. trade war).2 The recently released Climate Action Program 2030 is the closest to fiscal stimulus that we will see. This package will deliver additional spending worth 9bn euro in 2020 and 54bn euro until 2023 (Chart 10). We are unlikely to see additional fiscal stimulus from Germany in the near future. Bottom Line: Germany is wading into a period of rising political uncertainty. In the event of a downward surprise in growth, there is room to add more fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). But there is no change in fiscal policy in the meantime, e.g. no positive surprise. France: Macron Takes Center Stage While Merkel exits, President Emmanuel Macron continues to position himself as Europeâs leader â with a vision for European integration, reform, and political centrism. But in the near term he will remain tied down with his ambitious domestic agenda. France is trudging down the path of fiscal consolidation. After exiting the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2018, and decreasing real government expenditures by 0.3% of GDP, Franceâs budget deficit is forecasted to decline further (Chart 12). Macronâs government is moving towards balancing its budget primarily by reducing government expenditures to finance tax cuts and decrease the deficit. Macronâs reform efforts following the Great National Debate â tax cuts for the middle class, bonus exemptions from income tax and social security contributions, and adjustment of pensions for inflation â have paid off.3 His approval rating is beginning to recover from the lows hit during the Yellow Vest protests (Chart 13). These reforms will be financed by lower government expenditures and reduced debt burden as a result of accommodative monetary policy. Chart 12Fiscal Consolidation In France Chart 13Macron's Reform Efforts Have Paid Off Overall, France has proven to a very resilient country in light of a general economic slowdown (Chart 14, top panel). Business investment and foreign direct investment, propped up by gradual cuts in the corporate income tax rate, have remained steady, and confidence remains strong (Chart 14, bottom panels). France is consumer driven and hence somewhat protected from storms in global trade. Chart 14French Economy Resilient Despite Global Slowdown Chart 15Ongoing Strikes Will Register In French Risk Indicator Bottom Line: France stands out for remaining generally stable despite pursuing structural reforms. Strikes and opposition to reforms will continue, and will register in our risk indicator (Chart 15), but it is Germany where global trends threaten the growth model and political trends threaten greater uncertainty. On the fiscal front France is consolidating rather than stimulating. Italy: Muddling Through This fallâs budget talks caused very little political trouble, as expected. The new Finance Minister Roberto Gualtieri is an establishment Democratic Party figure and will not seek excessive conflict with Brussels over fiscal policy. Italyâs budget deficit is projected to stay flat over 2019 and 2020. The key development since the mid-year budget revision was the repeal of the Value Added Tax hike scheduled for 2020, a repeal financed primarily by lower interest spending.4 Equity markets have celebrated Italyâs avoidance of political crisis this year with a 5.6% increase. Our own measure of geopolitical risk has dropped off sharply (Chart 16). But of course we expect it to rise next year given that Italy remains the weakest link in the Euro Area over the long run. The left-leaning alliance between the established Democratic Party and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement hurt both partiesâ approval ratings. In fact, the only parties that have seen an increase in approval in the last month are the League, the far-right Brothers of Italy, and the new centrist party of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Italia Viva (Chart 17). We expect to see cracks form next year, particularly over immigration, but mutual fear of a new election can motivate cooperation for a time. Chart 16Decline In Italian Risk Will Be Short Lived Chart 17The M5S-PD Alliance Damaged Their Approval Bottom Line: Italyâs new government is running orthodox fiscal policy, which means no boost to growth, but no clashing with Brussels either. Spain: Election Post Mortem Chart 18A Gridlocked Parliament In Spain The Spanish election produced another gridlocked parliament, as expected, with no party gaining a majority and no clear coalition options. The Spanish Socialist Workersâ Party (PSOE) emerged as the clear leader but still lost three seats. The Peopleâs Party recovered somewhat from its April 2019 defeat, gaining 23 seats. The biggest loser of the election was Ciudadanos, which lost 47 seats after its highly criticized shift to the right, forcing its leader Alberto Rivera to resign. The partyâs seats were largely captured by the far-right Vox party, which won 15.1% of the popular vote and more than doubled its seats (Chart 18). Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez has arranged a preliminary governing agreement with Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, but it is unstable. Even with Podemos, Sanchez falls far short of the 176 seats he needs to govern. In fact, there are only three possible scenarios in which the Socialists can reach the required 176 seats and none of these scenarios are easy to negotiate (Chart 19). The first â a coalition with the Peopleâs Party â can already be ruled out. The other two require the support of the smaller pro-independence party, which will be difficult for Sanchez to secure, given that he hardened his stance on Catalonia in the days leading up to the election. Chart 19No Simple Way To A Majority Government The next step for Sanchez is to be confirmed as prime minister in an âinvestitureâ vote, likely on December 16.5 He would need 176 votes in the first round (or a simple majority in the second round) to gain the confidence of Congress. He looks to fall short (Chart 20).6 If he fails to be confirmed, Sanchez will have another two months to form a government or face the possibility of yet another election. Chart 20Sanchez Set To Fall Short In Investiture Vote Spainâs indecision is leading to small conflicts with Brussels. Last week, the European Commission placed Spain under the preventative arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, stating that the country had not done enough to reach its medium-term budget objective.7 The European Commissionâs outlook on Spain is slightly more pessimistic than that of the Spanish government (Chart 21). Deficit projections could worsen if a left-wing government takes power that includes the anti-austerity Podemos â which means that Spain is the only candidate for a substantial fiscal policy surprise. Chart 21A Fiscal Policy Surprise In Spain? Chart 22Spanish Risk Will Keep Rising We expect our Spanish risk indicator to keep rising (Chart 22). The silver lining is that Spainâs turmoil â like Germanyâs â poses no systemic risk to the Euro Area. Spain could also see an increase in fiscal thrust. Stay long Italian government bonds and short Spanish bonos. Bottom Line: We remain tactically long Italian government bonds and short Spanish bonos. Italian bonds will sell off less in a risk-on phase and rally more in a risk-off phase, and relative political trends reinforce this trade. Emerging Markets: Global Unrest Civil unrest is unfolding across the world, grabbing the attention of the global news media (Chart 23). The proximate causes vary â ranging from corruption, inequality, governance, and austerity â but the fear of contagion is gaining ground. Chart 23Pickup In Civil Unrest Raising Fear Of Contagion A countryâs vulnerability to unrest can be gauged by two main factors: political voice and underlying economic conditions. ⢠Political Voice: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, specifically voice and accountability, corruption, and rule of law, provide proxies for political participation (Chart 24). The aim is to assess whether there is a legitimate channel for discontent to lead to change. Countries with low rankings are especially at risk of experiencing unrest when the economy is unable to deliver. Chart 24Greater Risk Of Unrest Where Political Voice Is Absent ⢠Economic Conditions: Last yearâs tightening monetary conditions, the manufacturing and trade slowdown, the US-China trade war, and a strong US dollar have weighed on global growth this year. This is challenging, especially for economies struggling to pick up the pace of growth (Chart 25). It translates to increased job insecurity, in some cases where insecurity is already rife (Chart 26). The likelihood that economic deterioration spurs widespread unrest depends on both the level and change in these variables. The former political factor is a structural condition that becomes more relevant when economic conditions deteriorate. Chart 25The Global Slowdown Weighed On Growth In Regions Already Struggling ⊠Chart 26⊠And Raise Job Insecurity Chart 27Brazilian Risk Unlikely To Reach Previous Highs BCA Research is optimistic on global growth as we enter the end game of this business cycle. Nevertheless risks to this view are elevated and emerging market economies are still reeling from the past yearâs slowdown. This makes them especially sensitive to failures on the part of policymakers. As a result, policymakers will be more inclined to ease monetary and fiscal policy and less inclined to execute structural reforms. Brazil is a case in point. Our indicator is flagging a sharp rise in political risk (Chart 27). This reflects the recent breakdown in the real â which can go further as the finance ministry has signaled it is willing to depreciate to revive growth. Meanwhile the administration has postponed its proposals to overhaul the countryâs public sector, including measures to freeze wages and reduce public sectors jobs. On the political front, President Jair Bolsonaroâs recent break from the Social Liberal Party and launch of a new party, the Alliance for Brazil, threatens to reduce his ability to get things done. This move comes at a time when Brazilâs political landscape is being shaken up by former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silvaâs release from jail, pending an appeal against his corruption conviction. The former leader of the Workerâs Party lost no time in vowing to revive Brazilâs left. Our risk indicator might overshoot due to currency policy, but we doubt that underlying domestic political instability will reach late-2015 and mid-2018 levels. Brazil has emerged from a deep recession, an epic corruption scandal, and an impeachment that led to the removal of former president Dilma Rousseff. It is not likely to see a crisis of similar stature so soon. Bolsonaroâs approval rating is the lowest of Brazilâs recent leaders, save Michel Temer, but it has not yet collapsed (Chart 28). An opinion poll held in October â prior to Lulaâs release â indicates that Bolsonaro is favored to win in a scenario in which he goes head to head against Lula (Chart 29). Justice Minister Sergio Moro, who oversaw the corruption investigation, is the only candidate that would gain more votes when pitted against Bolsonaro. He is working with Bolsonaro at present and is an important pillar of the administration. So it is premature to pronounce Bolsonaroâs presidency finished. Chart 28Bolsonaroâs Approval, While Relatively Low, Has Not Collapsed Chart 29Bolsonaro Not Yet Finished The problem, as illustrated in Charts 25 and 26, is that Brazil still suffers from slow growth and an uninspiring job market â longstanding economic grievances. This will induce the administration to take a precautionary stance and slow the reform process. The result should be reflationary in the short run but negative for Brazilâs sustainability over the long run. There is still a positive path forward. Unlike the recently passed pension cuts and the public sector cuts that were just postponed â both of which zap entitlements from Brazilians â the other items on the reform agenda are less controversial. Privatization and tax reform are less politically onerous and will keep the government and economy on a positive trajectory. Meanwhile the pension cuts are unlikely to be a source of discontent as they will be phased in over 12-14 years. Thus, while the recent political events justify a higher level of risk, speculation regarding the likelihood of mass unrest in Brazil â apart from the mobilization of Workerâs Party supporters ahead of the municipal elections next fall â is overdone. Bottom Line: The growth environment in emerging markets is set to improve in 2020. US-China trade risk is falling and China will do at least enough stimulus to be stable. Moreover emerging markets will use monetary and fiscal tools to mitigate social unrest. This will not prevent unrest from continuing to flare. But not every country that has unrest is globally significant. Brazil is a major market that has recently emerged from extreme political turmoil, so a relapse is not our base case. Otherwise one should monitor Hong Kongâs impact on the trade deal, Russiaâs internal stability, and the danger that Iranian and Iraqi unrest could cause oil supply disruptions. In the event that the global growth rebound does not materialize we expect Mexico and Thailand â which have better fundamentals â to outperform. Our long Thai equity relative trade is a strategic defensive trade. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see âMerkelâs Successor Splits German Coalition With Rogue Syria Plan,â dated October 22, 2019 and âMerkel's Own Party Wants Outright Huawei Ban From 5G Networks,â dated November 15, 2019, available at bloomberg.com. 2 Please see âScholz Says No Need for German Stimulus After Dodging Recession,â dated November 14, 2019, available at bloomberg.com. 3 Please see âFrance: Draft Budgetary Plan For 2020,â dated October 15, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. 4 Please see âAnalysis of the Draft Budgetary Plan of Italy,â dated November 20, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. 5 Please see âInvestiture calendar | Can a government be formed before Christmas?â dated November 14, 2019, available at elpais.com. 6 If Sanchez convinces PNV, BNG, and Teruel Exists to vote in his favor for both rounds of the vote, he would need ERC and Eh Bildu to abstain in order to win. However, given that the PSOE has stated that it will not even negotiate with Eh Bildu, it is likely that this party will vote against Sanchez, giving the opposition 168 votes. In this case, Sanchez would not only need PNV, BNG, and Teruel in his favor, but also the support of either CC or ERC, both unlikely scenarios. 7 Please see âCommission Opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Spain,â dated November 20, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. Appendix Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights Equities & Bonds: The accelerating upward momentum of global equities â the ultimate âleading economic indicatorâ â suggests that the current rise in global bond yields can continue. Maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure, while staying overweight global corporate credit versus government bonds. U.S. Agency MBS: U.S. agency MBS spreads are now attractive relative to high-quality U.S. corporate bonds, both in absolute terms and on a risk-adjusted basis. Increase allocations to agency MBS, while reducing exposure to Aaa-, Aa- and A-rated U.S. corporates. Feature The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB) are both set to ease monetary policy this week. The Fed is almost certain to deliver a third consecutive 25bp rate cut at tomorrowâs FOMC meeting, while the ECB will restart its bond buying program on Friday. Yet government bond yields around the world continue to drift higher, as markets reduce expectations of incremental rate cuts moving forward. Equity prices are an excellent leading indicator of global growth, while bond yields typically reflect current economic conditions. Thus, equity prices should be considered a leading indicator of bond yields. Chart of the WeekMore Upside For Global Bond Yields Yields are finally responding to the evidence that global growth is troughing - a dynamic that we have been telegraphing in recent weeks. Global equity markets are rallying, with the U.S. S&P 500 hitting a new all-time high yesterday. The year-over-year increase in global equities, using the MSCI World Index, is now at +10%, the fastest pace of upward acceleration seen since January 2017. Some of that rally in U.S. stock markets can be chalked up to 3rd quarter earnings beating depressed expectations. Yet there is also a forward-looking component of the rally that bond markets are starting to notice. Equity prices are an excellent leading indicator of global growth, while bond yields typically reflect current economic conditions. Thus, equity prices should be considered a leading indicator of bond yields. We see no reason to discount the positive message on growth from rallying equity markets, especially when confirmed by an improvement in our global leading economic indicator (LEI), led by the more cyclical emerging market (EM) countries (Chart of the Week). Falling stock prices in 2018 accurately heralded the global growth slowdown of 2019 which triggered the huge decline in bond yields. Why should rising stock prices not be interpreted in the same light, predicting better global growth â and higher bond yields â over the next 6-12 months? Multiple Signals Point To Higher Bond Yields The more optimistic message on growth is not only confined to developed market (DM) stock prices. EM equities and currencies have begun to perk up, with EM corporate credit spreads remaining stable, as well, mimicking the moves seen in U.S. credit markets. Bond volatility measures like the U.S. MOVE index of Treasury options are retreating to the lower levels implied by equity volatility indices like the U.S. VIX index, which is now just above the 2019 low (Chart 2). Markets are clearly pricing out some of the more negative tail-risk outcomes that prevailed through much of 2019. Some of that reduction in volatility can be attributed to the recent de-escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions and U.K. Brexit risks, both important developments that can help lift depressed global business confidence. A reduction in trade/political uncertainty should help fortify the transmission mechanism between easing global financial conditions and economic activity â an outcome that could extend the rise in yields given stretched bond-bullish duration positioning (Chart 3). Chart 2A More Pro-Risk Global Market Backdrop Chart 3Less Uncertainty = Higher Yields The improving global growth story remains the bigger factor pushing bond yields higher, though. While the manufacturing PMI data within the DM world remain weak, the downward momentum is starting to bottom out on a rate-of-change basis (Chart 4). The EM aggregate PMI index is showing even more improvement, sitting at 51 and above the year-ago level, helping confirm the pickup in EM equity market momentum (bottom panel). Importantly, if this is indeed the trough in the EM PMI, the index would have bottomed above the 2015 trough of 48.5. Given the improvement seen in âBig Moâ for global equities and global LEIs and PMIs, we remain comfortable with our current below-benchmark stance on global interest rate duration exposure. Given the improvement seen in âBig Moâ for global equities and global LEIs and PMIs, we remain comfortable with our current below-benchmark stance on global interest rate duration exposure. How high could yields rise in the near term? Looking at yields on a country-by-country level, a reasonable initial target for yields would be a return to the medium-term trend as defined by the 200-day moving average (MA). For benchmark 10-year DM government yields, those targets are: U.S. Treasuries: the 200-day MA is 2.18%, +23bps above the current level German Bunds: the 200-day MA is -0.22%, +11bps above the current level U.K. Gilts: the 200-day MA is 0.89%, +17bps above the current level Japanese government bonds (JGBs): the 200-day MA is -0.10%, +2bps above the current level Canadian government bonds: the 200-day MA is 1.59%, -2bps below the current level Australian government bonds: the 200-day MA is 1.53%, +43bps above the current level Among those markets, the U.S. is likely to reach the level implied by the 200-day MA, led by the market pricing out the -53bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months discounted in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap curve (Chart 5) â a number that includes the likely -25bp cut tomorrow. A move beyond that 200-day MA may take longer to develop, as it would require markets to begin pricing in some reversal of the Fedâs âmid-cycle cutsâ of 2019. That outcome would first require a pickup in TIPS breakevens. The Fed would not feel justified in risking a tightening of financial conditions by signaling rate hikes without the catalyst of higher inflation expectations. Chart 4EM Growth Leading The Way? Chart 5UST Yields Have More Upside German Bund yields are even closer to that 200-day MA than Treasuries but, as in the U.S., a sustained move beyond that level would require an increase in bombed-out inflation expectations, with the 10-year EUR CPI swap rate now sitting at only 1.05% (Chart 6). As for other markets, the likelihood of reaching, or breaching, the 200-day MA is more varied (Chart 7). Chart 6Bund Yield Upside Limited By Inflation The move in the Canadian 10-year yield to just above its 200-day MA fits with Canadaâs status as a âhigh-betaâ bond market, as we discussed in last weekâs report.1 Chart 7Which Yields Will Test The 200-day MA? The Bank of Canada also meets this week and, while no change in policy is expected, the central bank will be publishing a new Monetary Policy Report that will update their current line of thinking about the Canadian economy and inflation. U.K. Gilts should easily blow through the 200-day MA if and when a final Brexit deal is signed, as the Bank of England remains highly reluctant to consider any policy easing even as political uncertainty weighs on economic growth. With the European Union now agreeing to an extension of the Brexit deadline to January 31, and with U.K. prime minister Boris Johnson now pursuing an early election in December, the political risk premium in Gilts will persist. Thus, Gilt yields will likely lag the move higher seen in higher-beta markets like the U.S. and Canada. JGBs remain the ultimate low-beta bond market with the Bank of Japan continuing to anchor the 10-yield around 0%, making Japan a good overweight candidate in an environment of rising global bond yields. Australian bond yields have the largest distance to the 200-day MA, but the Reserve Bank of Australia is giving little indication that it is ready to shift away from its dovish bias anytime soon, while inflation remains subdued. We do not expect a rapid jump in yields back towards the medium-term trend in the near term, and Australian yields will continue to lag the pace of the uptrend in the higher-beta global bond markets. Net-net, a climb in yields over the next 3-6 months to (or beyond) the 200-day MA is most likely in the U.S. and Canada, and least likely in Japan, Germany and Australia (and the U.K. until the Brexit uncertainty is finally sorted out). Bottom Line: The accelerating momentum of global equities â the ultimate âleading economic indicatorâ â is suggesting that the current rise in global bond yields can continue. Maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure, while staying overweight global corporate credit versus government bonds. Raise Allocations To U.S. Agency MBS Out Of Higher Quality Corporate Credit Chart 8U.S. MBS More Attractive Than High-Rated U.S. Corporates Our colleagues at our sister service, BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy, recently initiated a recommendation to favor U.S. agency MBS versus high-rated (Aaa, Aa, A) U.S. corporate bonds.2 This week, we are adding this position to the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy recommended model bond portfolio. There are three factors supporting this recommendation: 1) The absolute level of MBS spreads is competitive The average option-adjusted spread (OAS) for conventional 30-year U.S. agency MBS â rated Aaa and with the backing of U.S. government housing agencies - is currently 57bps. That is only 3bps below the spread on Aa-rated corporates and 26bps below that of A-rated credit. (Chart 8). 2) Risk-adjusted MBS spreads look very attractive Agency MBS exhibit negative convexity, with an interest rate duration that declines when yields fall. The opposite is true for positively convex investment grade corporate bonds, where the duration rises as yields decrease. This makes agency MBS look attractive on a risk-adjusted basis after the kind of big decline in bond yields seen in 2019. The average duration of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. agency MBS index is now only 3.4 compared to 7.9 for an A-rated corporate bond. Both of those durations were around similar levels at the 2018 peak in U.S. bond yields, but now the gap between them is large. With those new durations, it would take a 17bp widening of the agency MBS spread for an investor to see losses versus duration-matched U.S. Treasuries, compared to only an 11bp widening of the A-rated corporate spread (bottom panel). This is a big change in the relative risk profile of agency MBS versus high-rated U.S. corporates compared to a year ago, making the former look relatively more attractive. That was not the case the last time agency MBS duration fell so sharply in 2015/16, since corporate bond spreads were widening (getting cheaper) at that time. Today, corporate bond spreads have been stable as corporate duration has increased and agency MBS duration has plunged, making risk-adjusted MBS spreads more attractive. Given our view that U.S. Treasury yields will continue to grind higher, favoring lower duration assets like agency MBS over higher duration investment grade corporates makes sense. Given our view that U.S. Treasury yields will continue to grind higher, favoring lower duration assets like agency MBS over higher duration investment grade corporates makes sense. 3) Macro risks are reduced Mortgage refinancing activity remains the biggest macro driver of MBS spreads, particularly in an environment when mortgage rates are falling and prepayments are accelerating. There was a pickup in refinancing activity over the past year as mortgage rates fell, but the increase has been small relative to similar-sized rate declines in the past (Chart 9). We interpret this as an indication that, after the sustained period of low mortgage rates seen in the decade since the Great Financial Crisis, most homeowners have already had an opportunity to refinance. In other words, the so-called ârefi burnoutâ is now quite high. Chart 9Muted Refi Activity Keeping Nominal U.S. MBS Spreads Low Beyond refinancing, the other macro risks for agency MBS are subdued. The credit quality of outstanding U.S. mortgages remains solid. The median credit (FICO) score for newly-issued mortgages remains high and stable near the post-2008 crisis highs, while mortgage lending standards have mostly been easing over that same period according to the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officers Survey. In addition, U.S. housing activity remains solid, with the most reliable indicators like single-family new home sales and the National Association of Home Builders activity surveys all up solidly following this yearâs sharp drop in mortgage rates (Chart 10). This makes MBS less risky for two reasons: a) stronger housing activity typically leads to higher mortgage rates, which limits future refi activity; and b) more robust housing demand will boost home prices, the value of the underlying collateral for MBS securities. Chart 10U.S. Housing Activity Hooking Up Chart 11Relative Value Favoring U.S. MBS Over U.S. Corporates Given the improved risk-reward balance of agency MBS versus higher-quality U.S. corporates, we recommend that dedicated fixed income investors make this shift within bond portfolios, reducing allocations to Aaa-rated, Aa-rated and A-rated corporates while increasing exposure to agency MBS. Agency MBS is part of the investment universe of our model bond portfolio. Thus, we are increasing the recommended weighting of agency MBS while reducing the exposure to U.S. investment grade corporates in the portfolio. The changes can be seen in the table on Page 11. We do not split out the investment grade exposure by credit tier in the portfolio, as we prefer to allocate by broad sector groupings (Financials, Industrials, Utilities). So we cannot implement the precise âMBS for high-rated corporatesâ switch in the model portfolio. There is still a case for reducing overall investment grade exposure and adding to MBS weightings, however. The relative option-adjusted spread of agency MBS and investment grade corporates typically leads the relative excess returns (over duration-matched U.S. Treasuries) between the two by around one year (Chart 11). Thus, the compression of the spread differential between MBS and corporates over the past year is signaling that agency MBS should be expected to outperform the broad U.S. investment grade universe over the next twelve months. Bottom Line: U.S. agency MBS spreads are now attractive relative to high-quality U.S. corporate bonds, both in absolute terms and on a risk-adjusted basis. Increase allocations to agency MBS, while reducing exposure to Aaa-, Aa- and A-rated U.S. corporates. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, âCracks Are Forming In The Bond-Bullish Narrativeâ, dated October 23, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âTwo Themes And Two Tradesâ, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresarch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
On the heels of yesterdayâs disappointing German PMIs, the October Belgian Business Confidence and German IFO surveys will help alleviate fears towards the European economy. While the current assessment component of the IFO softened from 98.5 to 97.8, theâŠ
Highlights On a tactical horizon, underweight bonds versus cash, especially those bonds with deeply negative yields⊠âŠand underweight bonds versus equities. On a strategic horizon, remain overweight a 50:50 combination of U.S. T-bonds and Italian BTPs versus a 50:50 combination of German Bunds and Spanish Bonos, at either 10-year or 30-year bond maturities. Investors could also play the component pairs: overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds; and overweight Italian BTPs versus Spanish Bonos. New recommendation: switch Japanese yen long exposure into Swedish krona long exposure. Fractal trade: long SEK/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekSwiss Bond Yields Have Found It Difficult To Go Down, But Easy To Go Up! Anybody who has dared to bet that JGB yields would rise has ended up being carried out of their job, feet first. Shorting Japanese government bonds (JGBs) is known as the widow maker trade. Over the past 20 years, any investment manager who has dared to bet that JGB yields would rise â whether starting from 2 percent, 1 percent, or even 0.5 percent â has ended up being carried out of their job in a box, feet first. Today, the Bank of Japanâs policy of âyield curve controlâ means that JGB yields are constrained within a tight range around zero, limiting their immediate scope to break higher. The European equivalent of the widow maker trade has been to short Swiss government bonds. Just as with JGBâs during the past two decades, anybody who has dared to bet that Swiss government bond yields would rise â whether starting from 2 percent, 1 percent, or 0.5 percent â has been proved fatally wrong (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Widow Makers: Shorting Japanese And Swiss Bonds That is, until this year, when Swiss government bond yields reached -1 percent. The Lower Bound To Bond Yields Is Around -1 Percent According to several senior central bankers who have spoken to us, the practical lower bound to the policy interest rate is -1 percent, because â-1 percent counterbalances the storage cost of holding physical cash and/or other stores of valueâ. They argue that if bank deposit rates were to fall much below -1 percent, it would be logical for bank depositors to flee wholesale into physical cash, and such a deposit flight would destroy the banking system.1 Still, couldnât central banks just abolish physical cash, forcing us all into âdigital cashâ with unlimited negative interest rates? No, because that would just push us into other stores of value: for example, gold, or the rapidly growing âdecentralisedâ cryptocurrency asset-class. The common counterargument is that cryptocurrenciesâ volatility makes them a poor store of value. But that is also true for gold: during a few months in 2013, gold lost one third of its value (Chart I-3). Yet who has ever argued that gold cannot be a store of value just because its price is volatile! Chart I-3Gold Is A Store Of Value ##br## Despite Its Volatility The practical lower bound to the policy interest rate is around -1 percent because the central bank policy rate establishes the banking systemâs funding rate â for example, the Eonia rate in the euro area (Chart I-4). If the funding rate fell well below the rate that the banks were paying on deposits, the banking system would come under severe strain and ultimately go bust. The lower bound of the policy rate also sets the lower bound of the bond yield, because a bond yield is just the expected average policy rate over the bondâs lifetime. Chart I-4The Policy Interest Rate Establishes The Banking System's Funding Rate There is one important exception. If bond investors price in the possibility of being repaid in a different and more valuable currency, the bond yield will carry a further redenomination discount as an offset for the potential currency gain. This is relevant to euro area bonds because there remains the remote possibility of euro disintegration. Bonds which would expect to see a currency redenomination gain â notably, German bunds â therefore carry an additional discount on their yields. But for bonds where no currency redenomination is possible, the practical lower bound to bond yields is around -1 percent. Overweight High Yielding Bonds Versus Low Yielding Bonds To state the obvious, the closer that a bond yield gets to the -1 percent lower bound, the more limited becomes the possibility for a further yield decline (capital gain), while the possibility for a yield increase (capital loss) stays unlimited. This unattractive lack of upside combined with plenty of potential downside is called negative skew or negative asymmetry. It follows that, close to the lower bound of yields, the cyclicality or âbetaâ of bond prices also becomes asymmetric. In risk-off phases, the bond prices cannot rally; while in risk-on phases, bond prices can plummet. Making such bonds a âlose-loseâ proposition. Case in point: Swiss bond yields have found it difficult to go down this year, but very easy to go up (Chart of the Week). Because their yields were already so close to -1 percent, Swiss bond yields could not decline much during the bond marketâs recent strong rally â meaning, Swiss bond prices were very low beta on the way up. But in the recent reversal, Swiss bond yields have risen much more than others â meaning, Swiss bond prices are high beta on the way down (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Swiss Bond Prices Are Low Beta Going Up, But High Beta Going Down Does this mean the widow maker trade can finally work? Yes, but only on a tactical horizon. For the full rationale, which we will not repeat here, please see Growth To Rebound In The Fourth Quarter, But Fade In 2020. However in summary, expect bond yields to edge modestly higher, and especially those yields that are deeply in negative territory. Also on a tactical horizon, prefer equities over bonds. On a longer term horizon, a much safer way to play the asymmetric beta is to short low yielding bonds in relative terms. In other words, overweight high yielding bonds versus low yielding bonds.2 Close to the lower bound of yields, the cyclicality or âbetaâ of bond prices becomes asymmetric. Our strategic recommendation is to overweight a 50:50 combination of U.S. T-bonds and Italian BTPs versus a 50:50 combination of German Bunds and Spanish Bonos, at either 10-year or 30-year bond maturities. Since initiation five months ago, the recommendation at the 30-year maturity is already up by almost 7 percent. Nevertheless, it has a lot further to go (Chart I-6). Investors could also play the component pairs: overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds; and overweight Italian BTPs versus Spanish Bonos (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8), but the combined two bonds versus two bonds recommendation has better return to risk characteristics. Chart I-6Expect High Yielding Bonds To Outperform Low Yielding Bonds Chart I-7Expect Yield Spread Convergence At 10-Year Maturities... Chart I-8...And At 30-Year ##br##Maturities Switch Into The Swedish Krona Bond yield spreads are also an important driver of currency moves. The currency corollary of overweighting high yielding versus low yielding bonds is to tilt towards low yielding currencies, because these are the currencies that have the most scope for substantial upside. Our favourite low yielding currency has been the Japanese yen, and this has worked very well. Since early 2018, the yen has been the strongest major currency, and is up 16 percent versus the euro. But our favourite currency is now changing to the Swedish krona, for three reasons: The SEK is depressed from a valuation perspective. For example, it is the only major currencies that is weaker than the GBP compared to before the Brexit vote in 2016 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Swedish Krona Has Underperformed The Pound Despite Brexit Unlike other major central banks, the Riksbank is seeking to normalise the policy rate upwards. The SEK is technically oversold on its 130-day fractal dimension, signalling over-pessimism in the price (Chart I-10), while the JPY is showing the opposite tendency. Chart I-10The Swedish Krona Is Due A Countertrend Move Bottom Line: switch Japanese yen long exposure into Swedish krona long exposure. Fractal Trading System* (Chart 1-11) As just discussed, this week's recommended trade is long SEK/JPY. Set the profit target at 1.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long NZD/JPY has started off very well and long Spain versus Belgium achieved its 3.5 percent profit target, at which it was closed, leaving five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investmentâs fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report âFractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,â dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The cost of holding physical cash is the cost of its safe storage. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report âGrowth To Rebound In The Fourth Quarter, But Fade In 2020â, October 3, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
The oil price impulse has a major bearing on Germanyâs short term growth accelerations and decelerations. The six months ending in June 2019 constituted a severe headwind impulse. A 30% increase in oil prices in that period followed a 40% decline in theâŠ
If the German economy contracts in the third quarter and thereby enters a technical recession, the knee-jerk response will be to blame the troubles in the auto industry. But the evidence does not support this story. German new car production rebounded in theâŠ
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Germanyâs most important energy source is still oil which accounts for over a third of its primary energy use. Moreover, 98 percent of Germanyâs consumption of oil depends on imports. Most of Germanyâs oil consumption is for transport. In the short term, oilâŠ
Dear Client, BCAâs New York conference takes place next week on September 26-27, and I look forward to meeting some of you there. Because of the conference, our next report will come out on October 3. Dhaval Joshi Highlights If the WTI crude oil price breached $70, Germanyâs net export growth would suffer a short-term relapse. If the WTI crude oil price breached $90, Germanyâs economic growth would suffer a much longer setback. The WTI crude oil price is now trading at $59, well below even the first pain threshold. Hence, at the moment, the oil price âspikeâ is a minor irritant rather than a major risk to a German (and European) economic rebound in the fourth quarter. Stay overweight the Eurostoxx50 versus the Shanghai Composite and Nikkei225. If the WTI price stabilises well below $70, we intend to initiate an overweight to the DAX versus global equities. German bunds are a structural short relative to U.S. T-bonds. Feature Chart of the WeekOil Price Oscillations Have Explained German Growth Oscillations With A Spooky Precision It is touch and go whether Germany suffered a technical recession through the second and third quarters.1 We will know in about six weeksâ time, once the statisticians have finished crunching the numbers. But for the financial markets, this is old news. A technical recession in Germany during the second and third quarters is already baked in the market cake. The economy and financial markets are entwined in a perpetual dance. In a dance, sometimes one person decides the steps and sometimes the other person does, but the couple always moves together. And so it is with the economy and markets. The ZEW indicator of (German) economic sentiment recently hit its lowest level since 2011, and the performance of the DAX versus global equities has moved in near perfect lockstep (Chart I-2). Chart I-2A German Recession Is Already Baked In The Market Cake Some people try to predict the movement of markets based on the releases of backward-looking economic data or even supposedly real-time economic data, such as sentiment surveys. Good luck with that. The markets instantaneously discount those releases. To predict the markets, the key question is: what will the future releases look like? If the German economy rebounds in the fourth quarter, then the stark underperformance of the DAX constitutes a compelling buying opportunity versus other equity markets. That said, a new potential risk has emerged: the spike in the crude oil price. Germany Is Highly Sensitive To The Oil Price Europeans are large importers of energy, with 55 percent of all energy needs met by net imports. Moreover, the volume of energy they import tends to be price inelastic. Hence, when energy prices plunge, it boosts net exports and thereby it boosts growth. Conversely, when energy prices soar â as they have recently â it depresses net exports and thereby it depresses growth.2 98 percent of Germanyâs consumption of oil depends on imports. This is especially true for Germany whose energy import dependency, at 65 percent, is well above the European average. The most important energy source is still oil which accounts for over a third of Germanyâs primary energy use (Chart I-3). Moreover, 98 percent of Germanyâs consumption of oil depends on imports.3 Chart I-3Germany Is Highly Sensitive To The Oil Price Most of Germanyâs oil consumption is for transport. On a timeframe of decades, the planned decarbonisation of all sectors by 2050 should all but eliminate fossil oil from German energy consumption. However, on a timeframe of quarters, oil consumption for transport is highly inelastic and non-substitutable. Hence, in recent years, swings in the oil price have always caused swings in Germanyâs net exports (Chart I-4). Based on this excellent relationship, a likely rebound in German net exports in the fourth quarter would be threatened if the WTI crude price reached and stayed in the mid $70s. Chart I-4Swings In The Oil Price Cause Swings In Germany's Net Exports For Economic Growth, The Oil Price Impulse Is What Matters Empirically, we have found that the German economy is much more sensitive to the oil price than other European economies (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). This could be because other drivers of the economy such as credit developments are less significant in Germany. Chart I-5Germany Is More Sensitive To The Oil Price... Chart I-6...Than Other European ##br##Economies Most analysts argue that it is the change in the oil price that is relevant for the economy. This is obviously correct for the impact on inflation, which is, by definition, the change in a price. However, it is incorrect to argue that the change in the oil price drives economic growth. Instead, it is the impulse of the oil price â the change in its change â that drives economic growth. To understand why, consider a simplified example. Letâs say a 20 percent drop in the oil price added to Germanyâs net exports, causing the economy to grow 1 percent. In the following period, another 20 percent drop in the oil would cause the economy to grow again by 1 percent, so growth would stay unchanged. On the other hand, if the oil price dropped by 10 percent, the economy would still grow, but now at a reduced rate of 0.5 percent. Therefore somewhat paradoxically, though the oil price has declined by 10 percent, growth has slowed. This is because the second drop in the price (10 percent) is less than the first (20 percent) â which means the tailwind impulse has faded. Now letâs put in the actual numbers for the oil priceâs 6-month impulse. The period ending around June 2019 constituted a severe headwind impulse. This is because a 30 percent increase in the oil price followed a 40 percent decline in the previous period, equating to a headwind impulse of 70 percent.4 Allowing for typical lags of a few months, this severe headwind impulse is a likely culprit, or at least a contributing culprit, for Germanyâs slowdown during the second and third quarters. As the Chart of the Week compellingly illustrates, oscillations in the oil priceâs 6-month impulse have explained the oscillations in Germanyâs 6-month economic growth with a spooky precision. Empirically, other explanatory factors are not needed. The period ending June 2019 constituted a severe headwind impulse from the oil price. Now the good news. Until the last few days, the oil priceâs severe headwind impulse had eased â and this fading of the headwind strongly suggested a rebound in German economic growth during the fourth quarter and beyond. This raises a crucial question: to what level would the crude oil price have to spike for the maximum headwind impulse to return, and thereby extinguish the chance of such a rebound? By reverse engineering the price from the maximum headwind impulse, the answer is the WTI crude price at $90. Pulling all of this together, the first pain threshold is WTI breaching $70, at which Germanyâs net export growth could suffer a short-term relapse. The second and greater pain threshold is WTI breaching $90, at which Germanyâs economic growth could be stifled for much longer. Having said all that, WTI is now trading at $59, well below even the first pain threshold. Hence, at the moment, this is a minor irritant rather than a major risk to a German (and European) economic rebound. Stay overweight the Eurostoxx50 versus the Shanghai Composite and Nikkei225. And in the coming week or so, if the WTI price stabilises well below $70, we intend to initiate an overweight to the DAX versus global equities. The ECB Fired A Dud So much for the ECBâs promise to âshock and aweâ the markets. The bazooka ended up firing a dud! Unlimited QE is not really unlimited when the ECBâs asset purchase program is running close to its individual issuer limit, and its country composition cannot deviate too far from the ECBâs capital key. QE is nothing more than a signal of intent to keep policy interest rates ultra-low for a protracted period. In any case, QE is nothing more than a signal of intent to keep policy interest rates ultra-low for a protracted period. But once the markets have fully discounted this intent â as they have in the euro area and Japan â the monetary policy armoury is effectively out of ammunition (Chart I-7-Chart I-10). So it is not surprising that the ECB fired a dud. Chart I-7Monetary Policy Is Exhausted In The Euro Area... Chart I-8...But The U.S. Still Has ##br##Ammunition Chart I-9Monetary Policy Is Exhausted In Japan... Chart I-10...But China Still Has Ammunition Some people counter that there are even more exotic monetary policy options in the pipeline, such as âhelicopter moneyâ. However, as Mario Draghi correctly pointed out, âgiving money to people in whatever form is not a monetary policy task, itâs a fiscal policy task.â Helicopter money might be a step too far, but its notion encapsulates the shape of things to come in Europe. With euro area monetary policy exhausted, the baton is passing to fiscal policy. The upshot is that in a bond portfolio, German bunds are a structural short relative to U.S. T-bonds. Fractal Trading System* Although we are structurally overweight Italian long-dated BTPs, the 130-day fractal dimension is signalling that the pace of the rally is now technically extended and therefore vulnerable to a countertrend correction. This weekâs trade recommendation is to express this via a short position in the Italian 10-year BTP, setting a profit target of 3 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short the U.S. 10-year T-bond quickly achieved its profit target, while short financial services versus market reached the end of its holding period in slight loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investmentâs fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report âFractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,â dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We define a technical recession as two consecutive quarters of contraction in real GDP. 2 Energy dependence = (imports â exports) / gross available energy. 3 According to the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources. 4 The 6-month steps in the WTI crude oil price were $74.15, $45.21, and $58.24. The first change equated to a 40 percent decrease and the second change equated to a 30 percent increase. So the 6-month impulse was 70 percent. 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