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I am on the road this week, so instead of our regular weekly report, we are sending you an update of our long-term fair value models. I hope to report any insights I have gained next week. Regards, Chester Ntonifor  Highlights Our long-term FX models are not sending any strong signals right now, with the U.S. dollar at fair value.  The cheapest currencies are the yen, the Norwegian krone and Swedish krona. The priciest currencies are the South African rand and the Saudi riyal. Feature This week we are updating our long-term FX models, part of a set of technical tools we use to help us navigate FX markets. Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion. These models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G-10 and emerging market FX markets. The models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their main purpose is to provide information on the longevity of a currency cycle, depending on where we are in the economic cycle. For all countries, the variables are highly statistically significant, and of the expected signs. Together with other currency models we maintain in-house, these help us guide currency strategy, while providing a crosscheck when we might be offside. U.S. Dollar Chart 1The U.S. Dollar Is Close To Fair Value The uptrend in the dollar that has been in place since 2011 has lifted it only as far as the neutral zone. This is the biggest risk to our cyclical bearish dollar view. The big driver behind the uptrend has been interest rate differentials. If U.S. interest rates continue to roll over relative to their G-10 counterparts, this will lower the greenback’s fair value (Chart 1). The Euro Chart 2The Euro Is Trading At A Discount The euro is cheap by one standard deviation below its fair value. Historically, when the euro has hit its fair value bands, it has tended to mean-revert. The big driver lifting the euro’s fair value is the cumulative current account. Our bias is that the R-star for the euro area could start to head higher in the coming quarters, which will further lift its fair value (Chart 2). The Yen Chart 3The Yen Is Still Undervalued The yen is cheap by most relative price measures. The latest uptick in the yen’s fair value is driven by an appreciation in the gold-to-oil ratio, a measure of risk aversion (Chart 3). We believe the yen sits in a beautiful spot at the current economic juncture. Further deterioration in economic data will lead to higher risk aversion and a higher fair value. Meanwhile, a pickup in economic activity will still keep the fair value rising from a current account perspective.  The British Pound Chart 4GBP Grinding Higher Towards Its Fair Value The pound is cheap by most model measures, including our fundamental models. Downside in the pound has tended to capitulate around 1.5 standard deviations below fair value, even during the ERM crisis. Of course, the latest down leg has been politically driven, since the economic fair value of the pound has not really shifted by much (Chart 4). The Canadian Dollar Chart 5The Canadian Dollar Is Slightly Overvalued The fair value for the Canadian dollar has been falling since the 2011 peak in the commodity cycle. This still leaves the CAD slightly above fair value today (Chart 5). Meanwhile, the current account deficit has narrowed but remains quite wide by historical standards, which does not bode well for the CAD’s long-term fair value. The Australian Dollar Chart 6Aussie At Fair Value The recent drop in the Australian dollar has nudged it slightly below its fair value. However, like the Canadian dollar, the fair value of the Aussie has been dropping in recent years on the back of depressed commodity prices. Given the growing importance of liquified natural gas in Australia’s export mix, we believe terms of trade will remain a tailwind for the Australian currency over the longer term (Chart 6). The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7The Kiwi Has Been Fluctuating Around Its Fair Value The New Zealand dollar is currently at fair value, similar to its antipodean neighbor. Like other commodity currencies, its fair value has fallen in recent years. The catalyst has been the drop in commodity prices, along with the fall in relative real rates (Chart 7). The Swiss Franc Chart 8The Swiss Franc Is Not Expensive The Swiss franc is not as cheap as the yen, but our fundamental models show it as undervalued. The biggest driver in the rise of the franc’s fair value has been the structural trade surplus. The rise in the gold-to-oil ratio has further helped boost the fair value of the exchange rate (Chart 8). The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Krona Is Cheap The Swedish krona is one of the cheapest currencies in our universe, together with the Norwegian krone. The key model inputs for the Swedish krona are interest rate differentials and relative productivity trends. So, while the fair value of the krona has been falling for several years, the currency is still massively undershooting this fair value (Chart 9). The Norwegian Krone Chart 10The Krone Is Cheap Too The Norwegian krone is the cheapest it has been in the history of our model. More interestingly, the fair value has actually risen in recent years as the exchange rate has nosedived (Chart 10). The big driver in lifting the fair value has been the rise in crude oil prices. Within the commodity complex, the Norwegian krone is the most attractive. The Chinese Yuan Chart 11The Yuan Is Not Expensive The Chinese yuan is currently at one standard deviation below fair value. The yuan’s fair value has been mostly rising during the entire history of our model. This is driven predominately by higher relative productivity (Chart 11). We lie in the camp that there will be no significant devaluation in the RMB, in part because the exchange rate is already cheap. The Brazilian Real Chart 12The Brazilian Real Is Slightly Overvalued The Brazilian real is slightly above fair value, according to our fundamental models. Meanwhile, the fair value has been falling since 2011, in line with other commodity currencies (Chart 12). The current account component of the model should start to rise if reforms in Brazil lead to better productivity and improved competitiveness. The Mexican Peso Chart 13The Mexican Peso Is Now Above Fair Value The Mexican peso is trading a nudge above fair value. Over the last few years, opposing forces in the model have kept the fair value roughly flat. On one hand, the rising gold-to-oil ratio has been negative, as the peso is a cyclical currency. On the other hand, the cumulative current account has started to improve and bond yield differentials remain positive (Chart 13). The Chilean Peso Chart 14The Chilean Peso Is At Fair Value The fair value of the Chilean peso has been roughly flat for many years. This has also been the case for the real effective exchange rate, with fluctuations between half a percent of one standard deviation around fair value (Chart 14). This suggests the peso is mainly a trading currency, especially versus other emerging markets. The Colombian Peso Chart 15The Colombian Peso Is Depressed The Colombian peso is cheap, and is also one of our favorite petrocurrencies. The reason is that it has one of the strongest correlations to oil prices among commodity currencies, even though that correlation has been weakening (Chart 15). The South African Rand Chart 16The South African Rand Is Above Its Fair Value The South African rand is now trading slightly above its fair value (Chart 16). The correlation between precious metals prices and the South African rand has gradually weakened, largely due to domestic supply constraints and shrinking mining production. Meanwhile, the current account deficit continues to widen. This has gradually eroded the rand’s fair value. The Russian Ruble Chart 17The Russian Ruble Is Not Cheap The Russian ruble is now sitting around 0.5 standard deviations above its fair value (Chart 17). We are positive on oil, which will boost the fair value of petrocurrencies, including the Russian ruble. Meanwhile, real interest rates are at relatively high levels in Russia, even though the model’s results do not provide significant explanatory power. We are currently long RUB/EUR in our petrocurrency basket, with the Russian ruble being the best-performing petrocurrency. The Korean Won Chart 18The Korean Won Has Cheapened Further The Korean won has underperformed this year, and is now trading at a non-negligible discount to its fair value (Chart 18). Meanwhile, the fair value of the Korean won has been rising over the years. This has been partly driven by an increasing current account surplus – at least up until the trade war began. The fair value also tends to benefit from risk flare-ups. The Philippine Peso Chart 19The Philippine Peso Has Appreciated The Philippine peso has increased by 5% against the U.S. dollar year-to-date. However, despite its recent appreciation, the peso is still trading at a 6% discount to its long-term fair value (Chart 19). The Philippine peso is one of the few currencies whose REER tends to have well-defined and long cycles that last five-to-eight years. It will be important to watch if the recent appreciation is the start of a new trend. The Singapore Dollar Chart 20The Singapore Dollar Is Still Overvalued The Singapore dollar is another currency whose REER tends to have long cycles, probably a feature of the managed float (Chart 20). The Singapore dollar is a defensive currency, and so the decline in other emerging market currencies has made it slightly expensive. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 21The Hong Kong Dollar Is Overvalued The HKD’s REER has been rising in recent years, meaning inflation in Hong Kong has been outpacing that of other regions (Chart 21). This has made the HKD expensive, according to our models. However, the fair value has been on an uptrend in recent years, in part driven by rising relative productivity. The Saudi Riyal Chart 22The Saudi Riyal Is Expensive The fair value of the Saudi riyal has been falling for quite a while on declining relative productivity (Chart 22). This has made the riyal incrementally expensive. However, it may take much more stretched valuations before greater tensions arise in the peg. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD was indefinitely suspended beginning in 4Q18 by the pervasive economic uncertainty we identified last week as the culprit holding back global oil demand growth via a super-charged dollar.1 This uncertainty is most pronounced in the U.S. and Europe vis-à-vis gold, and partly explains the performance of safe havens, particularly the USD, which has soared to new heights on a trade-weighted goods basis, and gold (Chart of the Week). So far, gold has held its ground after breaking above $1,500/oz from the low $1,200s in mid-2018, indicating investors are much more concerned about economic risks arising from economic policy uncertainty than inflation and other diversifiable risks gold typically hedges (Charts 2A, 2B). Cyclically we remain positive on gold prices on the back of a lower dollar and rising inflation pressure in the U.S. Chart of the WeekDemand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Economic policy uncertainty in Europe and the U.S. supports gold prices. Even so, we are putting a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long gold portfolio hedge to cover tactical risks showing up in our technical indicators. In addition, as is the case with oil demand, if the ceasefire we are expecting in the Sino-U.S. trade war materializes in 1H20 and limited trade – mostly in ags and energy – is forthcoming, demand for safe-haven assets could weaken gold prices at the margin. Fiscal and monetary stimulus globally also could revive economic growth and commodity demand, pushing global yields higher, which would put negative pressure on gold at the margin, as well, given the high correlation between real rates and gold prices. Chart 2AU.S., Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Chart 2BU.S., Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Highlights · Energy: Overweight. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are on the verge of signing an historic pact to restart production from the Neutral Zone. Kuwait expects to sign the pact within 30 to 45 days. Potential production from the jointly operated fields – Khafji and Wafra – is estimated at ~ 500k b/d. Ramping up production at the Wafra field could take up to 6 months. Importantly, both countries are expected to respect their production quota mandated under the OPEC 2.0 agreement expiring in 1Q20.2 Separately, Chevron’s waiver to operate in Venezuela was extended for three months from the Trump administration this week. · Base Metals: Neutral. Chile copper production was up 1% and 11% y/y in July and August, according to the World Bureau of Metal Statistics. Earlier this week, the Union of workers at Chile’s Escondida copper mine – the world’s largest – held a strike in support of broader protests sparked by the increase of metro fare last Friday. Chile’s President suspended the fare hike on Saturday, but the protests are still ongoing and have now caused 15 deaths.3 · Precious Metals: Neutral. The gold/silver ratio fell 9% since July 2019. Our tactical long spot silver recommendation is up 3% since inception in August 2019, and our strategic long gold position is up 21%. Cyclically, we remain positive on both silver and gold prices, more on this below. A tactical pullback is possible; money managers have started liquidating some of their long gold positions, dropping by 67k contracts from September levels, according to CFTC data. · Ags/Softs: Underweight. According to USDA data, corn and soybean harvest are 30% and 46% complete, lagging behind their respective 47% and 64% five-year average pace. For corn, the USDA rates 54% of the U.S. crop good or excellent, vs. 66% a year earlier. For beans, 56% of the crop is rated good or excellent, vs. 68% last year. Separately, China announced waivers allowing up to 10mm MT of U.S. soybeans to be imported by domestic and international crushing concerns. The waivers are in place until March 2020. Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term tactical horizon – 3 to 6 months – as economic policy uncertainty continues to stoke global demand for safe havens.4 The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term. This can be seen in the elevated correlations between the USD’s broad trade-weighted goods index with the Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes for the U.S. and Europe (Chart 3).5 Rising economic uncertainty – particularly since 4Q18 – has created a rare environment in which both the USD and gold trended up simultaneously and continue to move in the same direction. The implication of this is that gold’s correlation with both the USD and EPU is weaker than before because economic policy uncertainty now is positively correlated with the dollar. Chart 3Strong USD, EPU Correlation Chart 4Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher There is a possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the U.S. and China can agree on a trade ceasefire... The typically negative correlation between daily returns of gold and the USD also is weakening, moving toward positive territory (Chart 4), as both the USD and gold trend higher simultaneously (Chart 5).   Chart 5Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher ...If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. Our short-term technical indicator is signaling an overbought gold market (Chart 6), and our fair-value model indicates gold should be trading ~ $1,450/oz (Chart 7). The latter signal off our fair-value model is less concerning, given the demand for safe-haven assets like the USD and gold now dominates gold’s typical drivers. Chart 6Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Chart 7High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model However, to be on the safe side, we are placing a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long-term gold position, which as of Tuesday’s close was up 21% since inception on May 14, 2017. This is a precautionary measure, which recognizes the possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the U.S. and China can agree on a trade ceasefire, and global fiscal and monetary policy are successful in reviving EM income growth, which would revive commodity demand generally, pushing up global bond yields. If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. During that period, the monetary and fiscal aggregates we track as explanatory variables for gold prices will reassert themselves as the dominant drivers of gold prices (see below). This could produce tension between a falling USD and rising real rates as growth picks up, which would send us to a risk-neutral setting re gold, given the current high correlation between gold and real rates, which should remain strong until the Fed starts hiking rates again, most likely in 2020 (Chart 8). This is part of the reason we are including the stop-loss at $1,450/oz for our existing gold position: During this risky period going into 1H20 economic uncertainty could dissipate, and real rates could rise. Although the USD depreciation would mute these effects, rising real rates would be a risk to gold prices Chart 8Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Economic Uncertainty Dominates Gold’s Fundamentals At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. In Table 1, we collect the variables we consider when assessing gold’s fair value. At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. This variable broadly falls in the geopolitical risk we regularly account for in our analysis of gold markets. Table 1Fundamental And Technical Gold-Price Drivers If the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Checking off each of these groups, we see: · Demand for inflation hedges remaining muted over the short-term, as inflationary pressures remain weak. In line with our House view, however, we do expect inflation could move higher toward the end of next year and overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for the U.S. This would support gold prices. · Monetary and financial aggregates are working less well as explanatory variables for gold prices in a market dominated by economic policy uncertainty. The USD-gold correlation continues to be disrupted by strong demand for safe-haven assets. As inflation picks up next year, we expect nominal bond yields to rise. Real rates, however, could remain subdued, as long as the Fed is not aggressively raising rates to get out ahead of a possible revival of inflation (Chart 9). Later in 2020, the correlation between rates and gold should be supportive for gold prices – the correlation fades when the Fed tightens, which creates a demand for safe-haven assets like gold. All the same, an increase in real rates would be a risk to gold prices in 1H20. · At present, demand for portfolio-diversification assets via safe-haven assets is a powerful force in gold’s price evolution. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that if global economic uncertainty is resolved and global growth does rebound, recession fears will diminish, thus reducing the marginal impact of geopolitical shocks. On the other hand, if the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Should that happen, short-term volatility in gold will rise (Chart 10). Chart 9Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Chart 10Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investment Implications As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries. Over a tactical horizon – i.e., 3 to 6 months – we expect global economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated. Going into 2020 – and particularly in 2H20 – we expect the USD to weaken on the back of global monetary accommodation policies and increased fiscal stimulus. We also are expecting a ceasefire in the Sino-U.S. trade war, which will revive trade somewhat and support EM income growth and commodity demand. These assumptions, which we’ve laid out in previous research, will be bullish cyclical factors supporting commodities generally. Bottom Line: A ceasefire in the Sino-U.S. trade war, coupled with global fiscal and monetary stimulus, will reduce some of the economic uncertainty dogging aggregate demand. This should be apparent in the data in 1H20. As a result, we continue to expect rising EM income growth to be cyclically bullish for commodities generally. This will allow inflation to revive – again, assuming the Fed does not become aggressive in raising rates. Chart 11EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold Net, this will be bullish for gold: As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries (Chart 11).   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1               Please see our report entitled “Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth,” published October 17, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2              Please see “Kuwait Sees Neutral Zone Oil Pact With Saudis Within 45 Days,” published by Bloomberg.com on October 19, 2019. 3              Please see “Chile lawmakers call for social reforms as protests mount,”  published by reuters.com on October 22, 2019. 4              We expect a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war to be announced in 1H20, which will defuse – but not eliminate – an important risk for global growth in our analytical framework.  We expect this will allow the relationship between the USD and gold to move back to its previous equilibrium in 1Q20 or 2Q20. 5              For more info on the Baker-Bloom-Davis index, please see policyuncertainty.com   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2016

Highlights Shifting Trends: The factors that have driven bond yields lower throughout 2019 – slowing growth, rising uncertainty, demand for safe assets and dovish monetary policy expectations – have all started to turn in a more bond-bearish direction. Duration & Country Allocation Strategy: Maintain a moderate below-benchmark stance on aggregate bond portfolio duration. Favor lower-beta countries with central banks that are more likely to stay relatively dovish as global yields drift higher, like core Europe, Australia and Japan. Credit Allocation Strategy: Stay overweight corporate bonds versus government debt in the U.S. and Europe, both for investment grade and high-yield. Maintain just a neutral stance on EM USD-denominated spread product, but look to upgrade if global growth improves further and the USD begins to weaken. Feature Chart of the WeekBond Yields Sniffing A Turn In Global Growth? It has been fifty days (and counting) since the 2019 low for the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yield was reached on September 3. The year-to-date low for the benchmark 10-year German bund yield was seen six days before that on August 28. Yields have risen by a healthy amount since those dates, up +34bps and +37bps for the 10yr Treasury and Bund, respectively. This has occurred despite the significant degree of bond-bullish pessimism on global growth and inflation that can be found in financial media reporting and investor surveys. The fact that yields are now steadily moving away from the lows suggests that the 2019 narrative for financial markets – slowing global growth, triggered by political uncertainty and the lagged impact of previous Fed monetary tightening and China credit tightening, forcing central banks to turn increasingly more dovish – is no longer correct. If that is true, yields have more near-term upside as overbought government bond markets begin to “sniff out” a bottoming out of global growth momentum (Chart of the Week). In this Weekly Report, we take a look at the changing state of the factors that fueled the sharp decline in bond yields in 2019. We follow that up with a review of all our current recommended investment positions on duration, country allocation and spread product allocations in light of recent developments. We conclude that maintaining a below-benchmark duration exposure, while favoring lower-beta countries in sovereign debt and overweighting corporate debt in the U.S. and Europe, is the most appropriate fixed income strategy for the next 6-12 months. The timing of the bottoming of yields in the major developed markets (DM) should not be surprising, given the more bond-bearish turn of reliable leading directional yield indicators. Yields Are Rising At The Right Time, For The Right Reasons Chart 2Bond-Bullish Growth & Inflation Factors Are Turning The timing of the bottoming of yields in the major developed markets (DM) should not be surprising, given the more bond-bearish turn of reliable leading directional yield indicators. The diffusion index of our global leading economic indicator (LEI), which leads the real (ex-inflation expectations) component of DM bond yields by twelve months, is at an elevated level (Chart 2). At the same time, the slowing of the annual rate of growth in the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, which leads 10-year DM CPI swap rates by around six months, is signaling that bond yields have room to increase from the inflation expectations side. Finally, the rising trend of positive data surprises for the major DM countries is also pointing to higher yields. Breaking it down at the country level, the pickup in DM 10-year bond yields since the 2019 lows has been widespread (Charts 3 & 4). The range of yield increases is as low as +16bps in Japan, where the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is pursuing a yield target, to +46bps in Canada where the economy and inflation are both accelerating. Chart 3Pricing Out Some Expected Rate Cuts … Chart 4… Across All Developed Markets The increase in yields has also occurred alongside reduced expectations for easier monetary policy. Our 12-month discounters, which measure the expected change in short-term interest rates priced into Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves, show that markets have partially priced out some (but not all) expected rate cuts in all major DM countries. The Three Things That Have Changed For Global Bond Markets So what has changed to trigger a reduction in rate cut expectations and an increase in global yields? The bond-bullish narrative that we refer to in the title of this report can be broken down into the following three elements, which have all turned recently: Slowing global growth (now potentially bottoming) Chart 5Global Growth Bottoming Out Current global growth is still trending lower, when looking at measures like manufacturing PMIs or sentiment surveys like the global ZEW index. Forward-looking measures like our global LEI, however, have been moving higher in recent months, suggesting that a bottom in the PMIs may soon unfold (Chart 5). We investigated that improvement in our global LEI in a recent report and concluded that the move higher was focused almost exclusively within the emerging market (EM) sub-components that are most sensitive to improving global growth.1 This fits with the improvement shown in the OECD LEI for China, a bottoming of the annual growth rate of world exports, and the general acceleration of global equity markets – the classic leading economic indicator. Rising political uncertainty (now potentially fading) The U.S.-China trade war (including the implications for the upcoming 2020 U.S. presidential election) and the U.K. Brexit saga have been the main sources of bond-bullish political uncertainty over the past several months. Yet recent developments have helped reduce the odds of the most negative tail risk outcomes, providing a bit of a boost to global bond yields. The U.S. and China have agreed (in principle) to a “phase one” trade deal that, at a minimum, lowers the chances of a further escalation of the trade dispute through higher tariffs. Meanwhile, the momentum has shifted towards a potential final Brexit agreement between the U.K. and European Union that can avoid an ugly no-deal outcome. Our colleagues at BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy believe that developments are likely to continue moving away from the worst-case scenarios, given the constraints faced by policymakers.2 U.S. President Donald Trump is now in full campaign mode for the 2020 elections and needs a deal (of any kind) to deflect criticism that his trade battle with China is dragging the U.S. economy into recession. Already, there has been a sharp decline in income growth for workers in swing states that could vote for either party’s candidate in next year’s election (Chart 6). Trump cannot afford to lose voters in those states, many of which are in the U.S. industrial heartland (i.e. Ohio, Michigan) that helped put him in the White House. In other words, he is highly incentivized to turn down the heat on the trade war or else face a potential loss next November. While these political uncertainties have not been fully resolved by these latest developments, the shift in momentum away from worst-case scenarios has likely been enough to reduce the safe-haven bid for DM government bonds, helping push yields higher. Meanwhile, China is facing a slowing economy and rising unemployment, but with reduced means to fight the downtrend given high private sector debt that has impaired the typical response between easier monetary conditions and economic activity (Chart 7). While the Chinese government does not want to be seen as caving in to U.S. pressure on trade policy, its desire to maintain social stability by preventing a further rise in unemployment from the trade war provides a powerful incentive to try and ratchet down tensions with the U.S. Chart 6Political Reasons For Trump To Retreat On Trade In the U.K., a no-deal Brexit is an economically painful and politically unpopular outcome that would severely damage the re-election chances of Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservative party. Thus, even a hard-line Brexiteer like Johnson must respond to the political constraints forcing him to try and get a Brexit deal done (Chart 8). Chart 7Economic Reasons For China To Retreat On Trade Chart 8Political Reasons To Retreat On A No-Deal Brexit While these political uncertainties have not been fully resolved by these latest developments, the shift in momentum away from worst-case scenarios has likely been enough to reduce the safe-haven bid for DM government bonds, helping push yields higher. Bull-flattening pressure on yield curves (now turning into moderate bear-steepening) The final leg down in bond yields in August had a technical aspect to it, fueled by the demand for duration and convexity from asset-liability managers like European pension funds and insurance companies. Falling yields act to raise the value of liabilities for that group of investors, forcing them to rapidly increase the duration of their assets to match the duration of their liabilities (the technique used to limit the gap between the value of assets and liabilities). That duration increase is carried out by buying government bonds with longer maturities (and higher convexity), but also through the use of interest rate derivatives like long maturity swaps and swaptions. The end result is a bull flattening of yield curves (both for government bonds and swaps) and a rise in swaption volatility (i.e. the price of swaptions). Those dynamics were clearly in play in August after the shocking imposition of fresh U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports early in the month. Bond and swaption volatilities spiked, and bond/swap yield curves bull-flattened, in both Europe and the U.S. (Chart 9). That effect only lasted a few weeks, however, and volatilities have since declined and curves have steepened. This suggests that the “convexity-buying” effect has run its course and is now starting to work in the opposite direction, with asset-liability managers looking to reduce the duration of their assets as higher yields lower the value of their liabilities. This is putting some upward pressure on longer-maturity global bond yields. Chart 9Signs Of Reduced Convexity-Related Bond Buying Chart 10Bull-Flattening Yield Curve Pressures Easing Up A Bit Chart 11Fed & ECB Actions Should Help Steepen Up Curves The steepening seen so far must be put in context, however, as yield curves remain very flat across the DM world (Chart 10). Term premia on longer-term bonds remain very depressed, although those should start to increase as global growth stabilizes and the massive safe-haven demand for global government debt begins to dissipate. Some pickup in inflation expectations would also help impart additional bear-steepening momentum to yield curves – a more likely result now that the Fed and ECB have both cut interest rates and, more importantly, will start provide additional monetary easing by expanding their balance sheets (Chart 11). Bottom Line: The factors that have driven bond yields lower throughout 2019 – slowing growth, rising uncertainty, demand for safe assets and dovish monetary policy expectations – have all started to turn in a more bond-bearish direction. Reviewing Our Recommended Bond Allocations In light of these shifting global trends described above, the fixed income investment implications are fairly straightforward: Yields are rising around the world, suggesting that the current move is a shift higher driven by non-country-specific factors like more stable future global growth prospects. Duration: A moderate below-benchmark overall duration stance is warranted for global fixed income portfolios, with yields likely to continue drifting higher over at least the next six months. A big surge in yields is unlikely, as central banks will need to see decisive evidence that global growth is not only bottoming, but accelerating, before shifting away from the current dovish bias. Given the reporting lags in the economic data, such evidence is unlikely to appear until the first quarter of 2020 at the earliest. Yet given how flat yield curves are across the DM government bond markets, the trajectory of forward rates is quite stable relative to spot yield levels, making it much easier to beat the forwards by positioning for even a modest yield increase. Country Allocation: Yields are rising around the world, suggesting that the current move is a shift higher driven by non-country-specific factors like more stable future global growth prospects. In that case, using yield betas to the “global” bond yield is a good way to consider country allocation decisions within a fixed income portfolio. We looked at those yield betas in an August report, using Bloomberg Barclays government bond index data for the 7-10 year maturity buckets of individual countries and the Global Treasury aggregate (Chart 12).3 The rolling 3-year betas were highest in the U.S. and Canada, making them good countries to underweight within a global government bond portfolio in a rising yield environment. The yield betas were lowest in Japan, Germany and Australia, making them good overweight candidates. The U.K. was a unique case of having a relatively high historical yield beta prior to the 2016 Brexit referendum and a lower yield beta since then - making the U.K. allocation highly conditional on the resolution of the Brexit uncertainty. Spread Product Allocation: The backdrop described in this report, where global growth is bottoming out but where central banks maintain a dovish bias, is a perfect sweet spot for global spread product like corporate bonds and Peripheral European government debt. Thus, an overweight stance on overall global spread product versus governments is warranted. The backdrop described in this report, where global growth is bottoming out but where central banks maintain a dovish bias, is a perfect sweet spot for global spread product like corporate bonds and Peripheral European government debt. With regards to our current strategic fixed income recommendations and model bond portfolio allocations, we already have much of the positioning described above in place. We are below-benchmark on overall duration, underweight higher-beta U.S. Treasuries; overweight government bonds in lower-beta Germany, France, Japan and Australia (Chart 13); overweight investment grade corporate bonds in the U.S., euro area and U.K.; and overweight high-yield corporate bonds in the U.S. and euro area. Chart 12Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets There are areas where our positioning could change, however. Chart 13Lower-Beta Laggards Should Start To Outperform In terms of government bonds, we are currently overweight the U.K. and neutral Canada. A final Brexit deal would justify a downgrade of Gilts to at least neutral, if not underweight, as the Bank of England has signaled that rate hikes would be justified if the Brexit uncertainty was resolved. A downgrade of higher-beta Canadian government debt to underweight could also be justified, although the Bank of Canada is not signaling that a change in monetary policy (in either direction) is warranted. For now, we will hold off on any change to our U.K. stance, as it is now likely that there will be another extension of the Brexit deadline beyond October 31. As for Canada, we remain neutral for now but will revisit that stance in an upcoming Weekly Report. With regards to spread product, we are only neutral EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt, as well as Spanish sovereign bonds; and underweight Italian government debt. An EM upgrade to overweight would require two things that are not yet in place: a weaker U.S. dollar and accelerating Chinese economic growth. Chart 14Stay Overweight Corporates In The U.S. & Europe As for Peripheral governments, we have preferred to be overweight European corporate debt relative to sovereign bonds in Italy and Spain. The recent powerful rally in the Periphery, however, has driven the spreads over German bunds in those countries down to levels in line with corporate credit spreads (Chart 14). We will maintain these allocations for now, but will investigate the relative value proposition between euro area Peripheral sovereigns and corporates in an upcoming report. Bottom Line: Maintain a moderate below-benchmark stance on aggregate bond portfolio duration. Favor lower-beta countries with central banks that are more likely to stay relatively dovish as global yields drift higher, like core Europe, Australia and Japan. Stay overweight corporate bonds versus government debt in the U.S. and Europe, both for investment grade and high-yield. Maintain just a neutral stance on EM USD-denominated spread product, but look to upgrade if global growth improves further and the USD begins to weaken. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “What Is Driving The Improvement In The BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator?”, dated October 2, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Five Constraints For The Fourth Quarter”, dated October 11, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Where’s The Positive Carry In Bond Markets?", dated August 20, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

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Highlights Given that rising crop yields have been the main vehicle through which global supply of agricultural commodities grew to meet expanding demand, the risks posed to yields due to climate change are non-trivial. The impact of climate change will manifest itself in the form of two simultaneous trends: the gradual rise in temperatures alongside more frequent and severe weather events. While the latter will threaten immediate supply, the former is a slower moving process, and its net negative impact is unlikely to manifest before 2030. The implications of climate change on agriculture producers are non-uniform. Low-latitude countries with economies that are highly dependent on the agriculture sector will suffer most. Expect greater volatility in agriculture prices as the frequency of weather events will raise uncertainty. Feature The steady expansion of global population and rising per-capita calorie consumption has directly translated to growing demand for agricultural products of all types. However, these demand-side pressures increasingly will be met with disruptions to global supply of agricultural commodities, as the impact of climate change raises uncertainty. In any given year, the aggregate decisions of farmers all over the world – i.e., the choice of which crops to plant and how much acreage to dedicate to each crop – determine the supply and market prices of ags. In this competitive market, each farmer attempts to maximize his or her welfare by planting the crops that are expected to yield the greatest profit. Chart 12010/11 Shock Highlights Ag Vulnerability To Weather The collective action of these producers in reaction to perceived demand generally leads to stable prices, especially for staple commodities such as grains and oilseeds, which differ from industrial commodities in that they are not highly correlated with global business cycles. Demand trends are long-term and slow moving, and typically do not result in abrupt price pressures, as farmers have time to adjust and adapt to changing consumer preferences. Unforeseen, weather-induced supply-side shocks, therefore, are the main source of sudden price changes in ag markets. Such a shock was dramatically on display during the drought-induced crop failures in major grain and cereal producing regions in the most recent global food crisis of 2010/11. While this massive supply shock was not the first of its kind (Chart 1, on page 1), it highlighted the vulnerability of ag markets to weather risks and specifically the evolving environment under climate change. A 2019 study quantifies the impact of shifting weather patterns on the agricultural market, finding that year-to-year changes in climate factors during the growing season explain 20%-49% of change in corn, rice, soybean, and wheat yields, with climate extremes accounting for 18%-43% of this variation.1 In theory, the impact can manifest in several ways, sometimes contradictory: Extreme weather events: An increase in the frequency and intensity of droughts or floods which threaten to wipe out crops or reduce yields, creating unpredictable supply shocks. The gradual rise in temperature: Each crop has cardinal temperatures – defined by the minimum, maximum and optimum – that determine its boundaries for growth. Increases in temperatures induced by global warming may push the boundary, reducing yields in some regions. Changes in precipitation patterns: In many areas precipitation is projected to increase – both in short bursts and over longer periods. This will lead to greater soil erosion resulting in deterioration in the quality of soil. In other regions, precipitation will decrease, and drought is expected to become more frequent.2 Moreover, the interaction of these factors – along with other region-specific variables – will amplify the impact on crops: Rising temperatures and greater precipitation will result in greater amounts of water in the atmosphere, producing increased water vapor and greater cloud cover. This will reduce solar radiation, and will harm crop productivity. Elevated atmospheric carbon dioxide and CO2 fertilization: Greater CO2 concentrations brought on by continued growth in air pollution are positive for crops as they stimulate photosynthesis and plant growth. However, the impact differs across crops with plants such as soybeans, rice and wheat set to benefit relatively more than plants such as corn.3 Moreover, elevated atmospheric CO2 levels can help crops respond to environmental stresses and reduce yield losses due to ozone and crop water loss through partial stomatal closure and a reduction in ozone penetration into leaves. Temperature changes and the magnitude and intensity of precipitation impact soil moisture and surface runoff. Indirect effects of climate change – weeds, pests and pathogens – also present challenges as they require changes to management practices and may raise farming costs required. The impact of climate change on agriculture markets is already evident in increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. The confluence of these factors, and the region- and crop-specific nature of these variables, makes it impossible to estimate the impact of evolving climate conditions on ag products with great accuracy. Nevertheless, our research suggests that the impact of climate change on ag markets will create opportunities in this evolving and highly uncertain market. Abrupt Shocks Amid Gradual Warming: The Long And Short View The impact of climate change on agriculture markets is already evident in the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme-weather events such as heatwaves, floods, and droughts. Charts 2A, 2B, and 2C, illustrate the impact of major weather events in crop-producing regions of the U.S. on yields, production and acreage for the crop year in which the events took place. Chart 2AExtreme Weather Events Reduce U.S. Corn Supplies … Chart 2B… Soybean Supplies … Chart 2C… And Wheat Supplies In A Big Way Chart 3Climate-Induced U.S. Supply Shocks Associated With Price Spikes   While the individual losses are a function of the magnitude of the event, the events highlighted translate to a 16%, 10%, and 7% decline in corn, soybean, and wheat yields, respectively. These supply disruptions generally do not extend beyond the event year, as the new crop year offers farmers a clean slate to raise output and maximize profits. Given that the U.S. is a major global supplier of these crops, extreme weather events and the subsequent supply reductions lead to non-negligible price pressures (Chart 3). While crop conditions thus far have failed to deteriorate in trend (Chart 4), greater frequency and intensity of weather events raise the probability of a decline in overall crop and could lower supply.   Chart 4Crop Conditions Have Generally Held Up Expanding the analysis to other major crop-producing regions of the world, we find that once again, extreme-weather events are associated with a decline in yields and production in the corresponding crop year (Chart 5). This exercise also indicates that the impact of droughts is significantly more pronounced than the impact of floods.4 While the weather-induced supply shocks described above are unpredictable, abrupt, and have an immediate impact on output and prices, the gradual warming of temperatures is a slow-moving process. Consequently, the impact will manifest in the form of gradual changes that are difficult to capture and quantify, especially given the mitigating effect of CO2 fertilization – i.e., higher yields resulting from higher CO2 in the atmosphere. Nonetheless, rising temperatures will become a serious risk in crop-planting regions both in the U.S. and globally (Chart 6). While rising temperatures are expected to bring about increasingly more wide-ranging supply disruptions (Chart 7), the net impact over the coming decade is not a clear negative. Chart 5Weather Events, Especially Droughts, Hurt Global Supplies Chart 6Rising Global Temperatures Will Pose A Serious Risk … Chart 7… Especially Above The 2°C Mark One study expects the positive impact of CO2 fertilization on yields to overwhelm the negative effect of rising temperatures over the coming decade (Table 1). Elsewhere, studies forecast different responses, with some predicting incremental yield gains over the coming decade before temperatures rise to levels that overwhelm the benefits of greater CO2. Similarly, according to the FAO’s assessment, the net negative impact of climate change on global crop yields will only become apparent with a high degree of certainty post-2030.5 Table 1Estimates For The Response Of Global Average Crop Yields To Warming And CO2 Changes Over The Next Decades Bottom Line: Given that rising crop yields have been the main vehicle through which global ag supply grew to meet expanding demand, the risks posed to yields due to climate change are non-trivial. Supply disruptions generally do not extend beyond the event year, as the new crop year offers farmers a clean slate to raise output and maximize profits. The impact will manifest itself in the form of two simultaneous trends: the gradual rise in temperatures alongside more frequent and severe weather events. While the latter will threaten immediate supply, the former is a slower moving process, and its net negative impact is unlikely to manifest before 2030. The Winners … And Losers Rising temperatures are expected to result in a negligible impact on ag markets over the coming decade; yet this finding is not uniform across all regions. The FAO study cited above finds that by 2030, the projected impact on crop yields will be slightly net negative in developing countries. However, in developed countries, the effect will be net positive. In terms of global supply, the impact of climate change over the coming decade is expected to remain relatively contained, affecting certain regions at various times without causing major global disruptions. That said, as global warming and extreme weather persist, the ramifications will begin to extend beyond individual regions, and will cause supply shocks on a global scale. In part, this can be explained by a greater potential for net reductions in crop yields in warmer, low-latitude areas and semi-arid regions of the world.6 This non-uniform impact will create relative winners and losers. Producers located in temperate regions – where climate change does not yet pose as serious a threat – are set to profit from their increased role in global supply. Conversely, tropical regions are much more vulnerable to climate change. This is especially true for those whose economies are highly dependent on agriculture (Chart 8). Chart 8Agricultural Economies In Tropical Regions Are Most Vulnerable On net, the overall economies of DM countries – which generally are not economically dependent on agriculture and are located in northern regions – will be relatively more insulated from the impact of climate change on the agriculture sector. Aside from the impact on producers, the implications on consumers are also region-dependent. Clearly the direct impact of climate change on global agriculture will be higher food prices, which directly impacts the food component of inflation generally. As a result, consumers who spend a large share of their income to food – generally consumers in lower income countries – will be hardest hit (Chart 9). Chart 9Higher Food Prices Disproportionately Hurt Consumers In Lower Income Countries In theory, a food supply shock is transitory, and given that food is usually excluded from core inflation gauges targeted by central banks, monetary policy should not react to these price spikes. All the same, aside from this direct impact on inflation, food inflation can also pass-through into other components of the CPI basket, for example through wage pressures or inflation expectations. This would lead to a more persistent impact on core inflation, forcing policy makers to react to these transitory forces, complicating the monetary policy response function for these countries. Given that inflation expectations are less well-anchored in lower income economies and that food makes up a larger share of consumption expenditures in these economies, they are most vulnerable to weather-induced food shocks. Chart 10Subsidies Partially Insulate Against International Shocks In countries where food prices are highly subsidized, the impact of higher global food prices will not immediately translate to higher domestic prices. This explains why there is no one-to-one relationship between global food prices and domestic food prices (Chart 10). Instead, the higher prices are absorbed by the governments, resulting in an expansion in government expenditures. This distorts the local food market, as it prevents demand from adjusting to the higher prices, and could potentially result in an undershoot in inventories that makes global markets even more vulnerable to further supply shocks. Bottom Line: The implications of climate change on ag producers are non-uniform. While higher-latitude regions are set to benefit, at least in the short-run, low-latitude countries with economies that are highly dependent on the agriculture sector will suffer most. On the consumer side, individuals who spend a large share of their income on food are set to suffer most. While consumers in countries that subsidize the crops will be protected from the immediate inflation risk, they may feel a delayed impact due to an increase in budget expenditures needed to cover the larger import bill. Mitigation Efforts While the potential impact of climate change on the agriculture sector can be large, it will be at least partially managed through adoption of mitigation policies (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Adaptation Reduces Vulnerability A key question in determining the extent of this behavior is whether warming temperatures and the increased occurrence and intensity of extreme events will be sufficient to justify a major acceleration of investment in agriculture. These efforts would range from simple management changes on the part of farmers to technological advances that raise the productivity of farming or reduce the vulnerability of farmers to climate change. For example, farmers across the U.S. have been planting corn and soybeans earlier in the spring, resulting in an advancement in planting dates (Chart 11). The earlier planting has also been accompanied by a longer growing season with the average number of days in the season increasing. Farmers are also adapting by altering their decisions on which crops to plant. For example, since soybean and corn are planted in many of the same regions of the U.S., farmers often plant more soybeans than corn when experiencing weather shocks. Chart 11Weather Events, Especially Droughts, Hurt Global Supplies The agriculture sector is also using more efficient machinery that can plant and harvest crops much faster as well as developing heartier seeds and more potent fertilizers. In turn, farmers will alter their decision making by selecting crop varieties or species that are more resistant to heat and drought. Or they will change fertilizer rates, amounts and timing of irrigation, along with other water-management techniques. Farmers also are making wider use of integrated pest and pathogen management techniques, in order to raise the effectiveness of pest, disease, and weed control. Given that the number of firms in the agriculture sector are fewer in developed markets than in the rest of the world, management decisions can be more easily implemented in the former. Farmers across the U.S. have been planting corn and soybeans earlier in the spring, resulting in an advancement in planting dates. On the other hand, emerging market countries where ag output is driven by numerous individual farmers will have a more difficult time implementing policies. Individual farms may not have the means to support themselves, which raises the potential impact of climate change. What is more, climate-change mitigation efforts may require projects, programs, or funds set aside by the government to support these efforts. This is more likely to occur in wealthier developed countries. Bottom Line: Adaptation and mitigation measures on the part of farmers have the potential to reduce the impact of climate change. That said, farmers in richer countries with the funds and institutions in place to support the ag sector likely will fare better. Investment Implications Over the coming decade, the ramifications of climate change are likely to be contained to a regional level. Although global supply will be vulnerable to regional disruptions, the impact will, in part, be mitigated by inventories, which have been rising for years. These stocks will create a buffer against unpredictable supply shocks (Chart 12). Chart 12Higher Inventories Needed To Buffer Against Unpredictable Shocks However, given that the global soybean market resembles an oligopoly with Brazil, the U.S., and Argentina accounting for 81% of global supply, global soybean prices will be more vulnerable to supply events in these regions than other crops (Chart 13). Chart 13Soybeans Most Vulnerable To Shocks Affecting Major Producers At the other end of the spectrum, global wheat markets will be relatively more insulated from isolated weather events impacting any one major producer as each of these regions contributes a relatively small share to global wheat output. This analysis also finds that yields and supply generally recover in the crop year following an extreme climate event. This implies that while the extent of damage from these events can be severe, they are not persistent unless the increasing frequency of extreme events leads to a secular change. Aside from the price impact, the weather and temperature changes will manifest in the form of greater volatility in supply, translating to greater price volatility. Options-implied volatilities for corn, wheat and soybeans have been on a general downtrend since the two major global food scares in 2007/08 and 2010/11 (Chart 14). We expect the trend to reverse going forward as the frequency of weather events will create greater price uncertainty. We summarize the findings of this report in Table 3 (Appendix, on page 16). Chart 14Volatility Will Go Up Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Research Associate AmrH@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Isabelle Dimyadi Research Associate Isabelled@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table 2Extreme Weather Events In The U.S. Table 3Summary Table Footnotes 1 Please see Vogel et al, The effects of climate extremes on global agricultural yields, Environ. Res. Lett 14 054010, 2019. 2 As a consequence of greenhouse gas emissions precipitation is expected to increase in high altitude regions such as much of the U.S. and decrease in subtropical regions such as the southwest U.S., Central America, southern Africa, and the Mediterranean basin. 3 Plants can be broken down into either C3 or C4 based on the way they assimilate atmospheric CO2 into different physiological components. While rising CO2 causes C3 plants to raise the rate of photosynthesis and reduce the respiration rate, C4 plants do not experience a rise in photosynthesis since  photosynthesis is already saturated. For example, studies show that soybean yields increased 12%-15% under 550 ppm vs. 370 ppm CO2 concentrations while corn experienced negligible yield increases. 4 Please see Lesk C., P. Rowhani, and N. Ramankutty, Influence of extreme weather disasters on global crop production, Nature, 529(7584), 84-87, 2016. 5 Please see The State Of Food And Agriculture: Climate Change, Agriculture, And Food Security, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2016. 6 Please see Stevanovic et al., The impact of high-end climate change on agricultural welfare, Sci-Adv 2(8), 2016.

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Highlights As an introduction to a series of BCA Special Reports on the investment consequences of climate change, we review the science around the subject and suggest a framework for analyzing its implications. The scientific consensus is that global warming is a reality and most likely human-induced. However, the uncertainty around the magnitude of the impact of climate change is large. The consequences of climate change are delayed, uncertain and global. But, for investors, the prudent course of action is to accept the scientific consensus – and the impact it will have on policymakers – and hedge or invest appropriately.  Feature Chart 1Climate Change Global Perception Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has called climate change “the tragedy of the horizon.” It is now perceived as a major threat across the globe (Chart 1). As such, it is essential to assess its macro and market consequences. In this introduction to our Climate Change Special Series, we review the existing literature and suggest a framework to assess the market relevance of this phenomenon. Going forward, we will produce a series of market-driven reports designed to help investors both mitigate the risk to their portfolios and identify opportunities arising from climate change. We intend to cover topics such as green financing, energy, and the geopolitical aspect of climate change, just to cite a few.  These reports will incorporate both quantitative and qualitative analysis to generate actionable investment recommendations. What Is Climate Change? Climate science is not new. The initial understanding of the effect of heat-trapping gases on global temperature dates back to Joseph Fourier’s early 1800s study of planetary temperature. Subsequent research showed the importance of the greenhouse effect, a phenomenon whereby greenhouse gas molecules (e.g. CO2, CH4, N2O) absorb infrared radiation emitted from Earth before reemitting it in all directions, including back to the Earth’s surface, thus making it harder for this energy to leave the planet. This excess of energy stored in the planet, above its normal energy balance, causes temperature increases. The distribution of environmental damages caused by global warming will not be uniform around the world. The rate of warming and other climate changes will differ across regions due to climate processes and feedbacks linked to local conditions.1 Regardless, up to 14% of the global population will experience above 2°C (3.6°F) warming – a level seen by scientists as a trigger for permanent damages and changes – even if the increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST) were limited to 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 (CarbonBrief, 2018). The consequences of climate change are delayed, uncertain and global.  Even under the maximum policy effort scenario, studies assign 60% odds to an increase greater than 2°C (3.6°F) (Nordhaus, 2018). The longer policymakers, companies and investors delay tackling this issue, the less likely the world will stay below the 2°C threshold and the more rapid and abrupt the transition to a low-carbon economy will eventually be. A sudden transition will be more disruptive to the economy and damaging to investors. Defining The Issue: The Earth’s Atmosphere As A Global Common The Earth’s atmosphere - specifically its function as a sink for CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHG) - falls within the problem of the global commons.2 It is a natural resource requiring global cooperation for its sustainable use and provision. Problematically, the consequences of climate change are delayed, uncertain and global.  Delayed because the burden of climate change policies mainly falls on current generations, whereas the benefits of lower climate damage accrue to future generations, leading every generation to think it can survive the issue and let the next generations handle it. Uncertain because the list of harms from climate change lengthens with the advance in climate-science studies. We learn more and more about the extent to which human activities are at fault and the extent of the damage that will befall the planet. Global because it does not matter whether the emissions take place in China, Europe, or the U.S. since GHG mix immediately once in the atmosphere. In that sense, it is a collective-action problem in which every country’s interest is to shift the abatement costs onto its neighbor. The global aspect is crucial. The optimal emission level of one country does not follow the global social optimal. Hence, every country has an incentive to emit as much GHG as possible now, before any consequences occur (Combes, 2016). What We Know So Far: Historical Data Both climate-alarmist and climate-denier groups have captured the public debate.This polarization clouds the underlying facts about current trends and the difference between what is unlikely, likely, or very likely to happen. The resulting lack of consensus will lead to over- or under-adaptation by the various economic agents, depending on their interests. FACT 1: GLOBAL WARMING IS A REALITY Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) have risen steadily since the industrial revolution and at a brisk pace relative to the previous 12,000 years (Chart 2). Chart 2GHG Global Emissions Global Mean Surface Temperature - It rose by an estimated 1°C (1.8°F) from 1901 to 2016. According to NASA data, the 10 warmest years recorded in the past 139 years all occurred after 2005 (Chart 3). Chart 3Global Land And Ocean Temperature Global Mean Sea level - It has risen by an estimated 20.3cm (8 inches) since 1900 due to the expansion of waters and meltwater from shrinking ice sheets. Almost half of this rise happened in the last 25 years (Chart 4). Glacier and Ice Sheet - The melting of ice sheets will reduce the earth’s reflectivity, accelerating the warming process (Chart 5). The record low of sea ice extent in the Arctic and Antarctic was observed in 2012 and 2017, respectively. Chart 4Global Mean Sea Level Chart 5Glacier And Ice Sheet Precipitation - Historical changes in precipitation are much more volatile and region-specific than temperature and sea level changes. Moreover, there is a lack of data covering the period before 1951, which leads to low confidence in estimates of precipitation for this period and medium confidence post-1951. Annual average precipitation for global land areas increased slightly over the period 1901–2008, and the magnitude of observed changes varies across different datasets (Hartmann, 2013). Extreme Weather Events - These are defined, in a meteorological sense, as events at the “edges of the complete range of weather experienced in the past.” The frequency and severity of extreme weather events has been linked to global warming (Table 1) (Scott, 2016). Table 1Extreme Weather Events (1950 - Present) FACT 2: CLIMATE CHANGE IS HUMAN-INDUCED The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – considered the world’s most authoritative scientific body on climate change – concluded in 2013 that the probability that global warming was human-induced was at least 95% (Table 2).  Table 2Evolution Of The Assessments Of Human Influence On Climate Change Chart 6Global Warming & Global GHG Emissions Since the late nineteenth century, GHG emissions – mainly CO2 – and global land and ocean mean temperature have shared a common steep upward trend (Chart 6). A recent study by Mann et al. estimates that in the absence of GHG emissions, the odds that 13 out of the 15 warmest years ever measured would all have happened in the current century are extremely small.3 More recently, a report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) concluded that “[I]n many cases, it is now possible to make and defend quantitative statements about the extent to which human-induced climate change has influenced either the magnitude or the probability of occurrence of specific types of events or event classes.”  According to most recent peer-reviewed studies, at least 97% of actively publishing climate scientists now accept human-caused climate warming (Cook, 2016). While science is not a matter of popular vote, this level of consensus among experts suggests that for investors the most prudent course of action is to accept the scientific consensus and hedge or invest appropriately. Projections & Assumptions Chart 7Global Emissions Projections Climate economics deals with conditional projections based on unknown probability distributions, implying a high level of uncertainty. The level of confidence around the nearer segments of the projections is relatively elevated. Conversely, at the far end of the projected period, by 2100 for most studies, the uncertainty increases drastically. According to the United Nations Environment Programs’ 2018 Emissions Gap report,  the 2°C (3.6°F) target drafted in the Paris Agreement in 2015 would require global emissions to be capped at 40 gigatons of CO2 equivalent by 2030. Throughout our Climate Change Special Series, we will rely on the following assumptions based on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the summary estimates from around 150 academic papers, the majority of which were published in 2018 (CarbonBrief, 2018).  Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Global emissions rose in 2017 and are now ~14 GtCO2e above the required level by 2030. Current pledges are insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goals (Chart 7). Key factors driving changes in anthropogenic GHG emissions are mainly economic and population growth. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions vary over a wide range, depending on both socio-economic development and climate policy – which are fundamentally uncertain. Climate economics deals with conditional projections based on unknown probability distributions, implying a high level of uncertainty. The majority of models indicate that scenarios meeting levels similar to RCP2.6 (a scenario that aims to keep global warming likely below 2°C (3.6°F) above pre-industrial temperatures) are characterized by substantial net negative emissions by 2100, on average 2 GtCO2e per year.   Chart 8Global Mean Surface Temperature Projections Global Mean Surface Temperature - Under all assessed emission scenarios, surface temperature is projected to rise over the twenty-first century. The change over the 2016-2035 period will be very similar to 1986-2005, and will likely be in the range of 0.3°C to 0.7°C (0.5°F to 1.3°F). Beyond that, the mean temperature rise across IPCC scenarios for 2046-65 and 2081-2100 is estimated to be 1.4°C (2.5°F) and 2.2°C (4°F), respectively (Chart 8). These estimates imply that there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales. Global Mean Sea Level - It has been established that the likelihood sea levels will rise in more than 95% of the ocean area is very high. Under all IPCC scenarios, the rate of sea level rise will very likely exceed the observed rate during 1971-2010. About 70% of the coastlines worldwide are in fact projected to experience sea level change within +/- 20% of the global mean. Precipitation - There are likely more land regions where the number of heavy precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased. Recent detection of increasing trends in extreme precipitation and discharge in some catchments implies greater risks of flooding at regional scale (medium confidence). These changes will not be uniform, with high latitudes and the equatorial Pacific more likely to experience an increase in annual mean precipitation while many mid-latitude and subtropical dry regions are likely to experience a decrease in mean precipitation. It remains a challenge to determine long-term trends in precipitation for the global oceans. Extreme Weather Events - Projections on extreme weather events can only infer the probability distribution of such events, i.e. more or less likely to happen. With a 1°C (1.8°F) additional warming, risks from extreme weather events are high (medium confidence from IPCC). More importantly, we can say with high confidence that these risks increase progressively with further warming.     Embracing Uncertainty The uncertainty around the magnitude of the impact of climate change is large. Yet, bounded uncertainty is informational. We can extract the following important, actionable conclusions: Projections for economic variables are relatively more uncertain than for geophysical variables. The link between GHG emissions and rising temperature is more certain than the level of emissions, output, and damages (Nordhaus, 2018).  Therefore, the largest uncertainty comes from economic growth and the level of emissions. We do not rely on estimates of global GDP impacts. On the other hand, it is easier to build scenarios for geophysical variables and obtain investment-relevant information from these projections. Simulating the path of future emission allows us to map this onto future temperature, sea level, and extreme weather variations. Economic models suggest that the higher the uncertainty, the larger the weights on low-probability/high-impact scenarios. This implies a positive risk premium due to risk aversion and favors stricter mitigation policies as insurance to shattering outcomes. As climate models are fine-tuned and continuously point to large damage uncertainty, the desired strength of policy could increase. Win-Win or “no-regrets” investments are the most likely at first.4 The Kaya Identity provides a simple framework to project future GHG emissions to visualize the uncertainty associated with different assumptions. The identity links future emissions to observable macroeconomic variables (see the Appendix for more details): F = P * (G/P) * (E/G) *(F/E) Where F denotes global CO2 emissions from human sources, P represents global population, G equals global GDP, and E is global energy consumption. The identity provides a useful framework for policymakers. To reduce emissions, there needs to be a reduction in one or more of the identity's components. Altering demographic trends and reducing global GDP per capita are very unlikely to happen given the damaging impact it could have – both for individuals and politicians’ careers!  At a global level, this leaves us with energy efficiency and carbon intensity of energy as the only key and viable options to reduce CO2 emissions.  Why Does It Matter To Investors? Markets are probably still underpricing climate-related risks because the effects only materialize gradually and in the long term – exceeding most investors’ investment horizon. Investors such as pension funds, insurers, wealth managers, and endowments need to be responsive to the threat posed by climate change. They typically have multi-decade time horizons, with portfolio exposure across the global economy. Their increasing interest in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) measures fits well within this context.5 It reflects a need for more transparency and more stringent investing standards. Determining which firms or sectors will either win or lose the “green race” will be of the outmost importance to investors. Businesses are still navigating the financial and operational implications of climate change. To some extent, this can already be assessed based on the readiness of firms and sectors to adapt to a green economy – looking at the number of environmental technology patent applications, for example. Markets are probably still underpricing climate-related risks. The financing needed to mitigate climate change represents yet another opportunity for investors. Green bonds and sustainability-linked debt instruments are more widespread than ever. Sustainable debt issuance reached record levels last year, with a total of $260 billion issued, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance data. Year-to-date issuance has nearly reached $180 billion.  Green bonds offer two main benefits to issuers:  corporate branding that sends a strong signal to the market of their commitment to climate change, and a wider investor base. Our series of market-driven reports are intended to both identify the risks and opportunities arising from climate change in order to help investors mitigating the risk to their portfolios. They will rely on the simple framework we present below. Climate Change Framework In future reports in our Climate Change Special Series, we will summarize our findings using a comprehensive analytical framework developed by Batten (2018) to assess the impact of climate change via physical and transition risks with respect to the type of shock induced by each type of risk. Physical Risks Physical risks are the most visible and immediate source of risk to investors and the financial sector. They can be defined as those risks that arise from the interaction between climate-related events and human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt— e.g. the volatility in food prices following a drought or a flood.6 An increase in climate-induced physical risks – such as heat waves, floods and storm – will have a direct effect on insurers. If these risks are uninsured, the deterioration of the balance sheets of affected households and corporations is likely to hurt the banking system. Electrical utilities, real estate and transportation infrastructure are other physical assets at risk of capital losses. Transition Risks Chart 9Public Opinion Of Policy Options To Tackle Climate Change Transition risks can be defined as the risks of economic dislocation and financial losses associated with the transition to a lower-carbon economy. Detrimental effects manifest themselves through three possible channels: Reduced production and consumption of high carbon products, especially energy produced using fossil fuels, potentially leading to stranded assets. Improvement in the energy efficiency of existing products and processes – energy intensity. Moving to low-carbon energy production – that is reducing carbon intensity. Lower energy intensity and carbon intensity, highlighted in the Kaya Identity above, can be achieved through technological innovation. The relationship between climate change and policy or regulatory framework is manifold, as policymakers will need both to respond to the consequences of climate change and to shape future GHG emissions. The primary responsibility for strategic planning rests with governments, which have a variety of policy options at their disposal (Chart 9).  Table 3 provides a useful template to link both physical and transition risks to the type of shocks they can induce, and importantly, how it can ultimately turn into financial and geopolitical risks. Table 3A Simple And Useful Template To Summarize Our Findings Climate change can impact demand (from investment, consumption or trade) or supply (labor, capital stock, technology or other inputs). For example, transition risks such as distortions from asymmetric climate policies across countries could directly impact trade or investment (FDI). This is what is commonly referred to as the pollution haven hypothesis, which states that more stringent environmental regulations induce polluting industries to relocate to countries with relatively lax environmental regulations. Ensuing reports in the Climate Change Special Series will include this template as a mean to summarize our findings. APPENDIX The Kaya Identity And Uncertainty Feedback Loop7 Diagram 1The Uncertainty Feedback Loop The Kaya Identity links observable macroeconomic and demographic variables to GHG emissions: CO2 = P * (Y / P) * (E / Y) * (CO2 / E) Where denotes P global population, Y global GDP, and E primary energy consumption.    It highlights the large degree of uncertainty around the macroeconomic impact on GHG emissions – especially at the end of the forecast period when additional uncertainty emanates from the feedback loop illustrated in Diagram 1. Historical Trend In CO2 Emissions From 1990 to 2014 CO2 emissions growth was 2.1% p.a.8: Global CO2 emissions during this period were pushed higher by population growth (1.3% p.a.) and rising rates of GDP per capita (1.9% p.a.). This was partly offset by declining energy intensity (-1.3% p.a.) (Chart 10). Chart 10Kaya Identity Components: Global Level The extent of the impact of these variables on CO2 emissions is region-specific. Therefore, when the identity is expressed at an aggregate and global level, it can lead to inaccuracies in long-term scenario analysis since it does not account for dependencies across the variables and does not differentiate between high population growth in countries with low vs. high GDP per capita growth, or between high GDP per capita growth from countries with high vs. low carbon intensity energy sources.  Using The Kaya Identity To Project Future GHG Emissions Population - The UN currently expect the population to grow by an average 0.4% p.a. through 2100 in its medium variant scenario. GDP per capita - The OECD projects GDP per capita will grow 2.2% p.a. between 2018 and 2060. Energy Intensity - We assume a 1.5% p.a. decline in energy intensity over the 2018-2100 period – the trend over the past decade. Carbon Intensity - In line with scenario B2 of the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), we assume a 0.4% p.a. Combined, this leads to a 21% increase in CO2 emission by 2050, and a 63% increase by 2100. Accounting for other scenarios for each component results to a wide range of potential cumulative CO2 emissions; a median temperature between 2.6°C and 4.8°C by 2100 (Table 4). It is noteworthy that a rise in temperature above 2°C by 2100 is almost certain under all these scenarios. Table 4Scenarios Using The Kaya Identity Emission Reduction Possibilities Table 5Policy Approach Per Factor To reduce CO2 emissions, policies aimed at reducing the growth rate of one or more of the Kaya Identity’s components will be needed (Table 5). Assuming a constraint-free world, reducing average population and income growth rates to 0% from the projected 0.4% and 2.1% would reduce cumulative emission by 60% in 2100 vs. the baseline. Economic growth is the main driver of emissions growth. For instance, post-GFC, Europe’s emissions have been subdued due to poor economic growth. However, the constraints on these variables exist and are binding. These are not the area of focus to tackle climate change. Consequently, this leaves energy efficiency and carbon intensity of energy as the only viable options to reduce GHG emissions. In order to avoid breaching the 2°C target, the IPCC estimates CO2 concentration needs to be capped below 400 ppm by 2100. This can only be achieved by significant improvements to energy efficiency. Economic theory suggests that given that energy is a cost of production, energy efficiency will continue to improve. However, the required pace of reduction in energy intensity surpasses the incentive provided by the price mechanism. The externalities of an energy intensive economy are delayed and uncertain. Thus, these are not fully included in the cost-benefit analysis of investing in new technology. As a result, policies aimed at reducing the carbon intensity of global energy input will be an important source of CO2 reduction. This includes decreasing the carbon intensity of fossil fuels – e.g. switching coal to natural gas and developing carbon capture and storage technology – and reducing the share of fossil fuels in the energy mix – e.g. switching fossil fuel energy to renewables. We will expand on alternative sources of energy in a subsequent report. Importantly, the policy response should differ between regions. The drivers of emissions are heterogeneous and policies should fit the regional reality. The Kaya Identity can also be applied at the country or regional level. Chart 11The Kaya Identity Applied At The Country Level U.S. - Elevated income growth offset by increasing energy efficiency (Chart 11, panel 1). China - Robust income growth drove CO2 emissions higher (Chart 11, panel 2). Europe - Falling energy intensity and carbon intensity led to a decline in emissions (Chart 11, panel 3). References Fourier, J. (1827). Mémoire sur les Températures du Globe Terrestre et des Espaces Planétaires, Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, 7, 569-604. ‘Global’ warming varies greatly depending where you live, published by CarbonBrief on July 2, 2018. Nordhaus, William (2018). Projections and Uncertainties about Climate Change in an Era of Minimal Climate Policies, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(3): 333-360. Edenhofer, O. et al. (2015), The Atmosphere as a Global Common, The Oxford Handbook of the Macroeconomics of Global Warming. Hardin, Garrett (1968), The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162, no. 3859: 1243–1248. Jean-Louis Combes et al. (2016), A review of the economic theory of the commons, Revue d’économie du développement, Vol 27.  Climate Science as Culture War, Stanford Social Innovation Review (Fall 2012). The Fourth National Climate Assessment: Volume 2 Impact, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States, U.S. Global Change Research Program (2018) and Climatic Research Unit temperature database Hartmann et al. (2013), Observations: Atmosphere and Surface. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Scott, P. (2016), How climate change affects extreme weather events, Science 352(6293):1517-1518. Mann et al. (2016), The Likelihood of Recent Record Warmth, Scientific Reports 6:19831. Fischer, E. M., and R. Knutti, Anthropogenic Contribution to Global Occurrence of Heavy-Precipitation and High-Temperature Extremes, Nature Climate Change 5 (April 27, 2015): 560. Cook et al. (2016), Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming, Environmental Research Letters 11, 4:048002. The impacts of climate change at 1.5C, 2C and beyond, CarbonBrief (2018). The Emissions Gap Report 2018, United Nations (2018). Batten, Sandra (2018), Climate change and the macro-economy: a critical review, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 706. Robert S.J. Tol (2019), Climate Economics: Economic Analysis of Climate, Climate Change and Climate Policy, Cheltenham, U.K. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Research Analyst JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For instance, Canada is estimated to be warming at twice the global rate. 2 The term “global commons” is used to define common resources or environmental issues crossing national boundaries. They have either no well-defined property right (no individual or nation has private control of their use) or lack an international enforcement mechanism to control their use (Edenhofer, 2015). The market failures associated with common pool resources (CPR) were popularized in Garret Hardin’s famous 1968 paper “Tragedy of the Commons”. 3 The likelihood is between 1 in 5,000 and 1 in 170,000 chances. 4 No-regret strategies are cost-effective under multiple climate change and policy response scenarios. Win-win actions provide beneficial externality while contributing to adaptation to various climate change scenarios. Under uncertainty, these strategies are the most likely to be implemented to begin the adaptation process rather than a riskier wait-and-see approach. Please see “Examples of ‘no-regret’, ‘low-regret’ and ‘win-win’ adaptation actions,” published by climate exchange. It is available at climatexchange.org.uk. 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “ESG Investing: No Harm, Some Benefit,” dated November 21, 2018, and available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Special Reports, “Agriculture In The Age Of Climate Change,” dated October 23, 2019, and available at bca.bcaresearch.com 7 This section is largely inspired from Robert S.J. Tol (2019), Climate Economics: Economic Analysis of Climate, Climate Change and Climate Policy, Cheltenham, U.K. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 8 Lowercase letters denote annual growth rates of each component.

ハイライト 先週お会いした投資家は朗報を聞く準備ができていました： 当社が3日間のクライアントミーティングで語った建設的なシナリオはコンセンサス見解よりも楽観的ですが、クライアントはそれを検討する用意がありました。 世界的な経済減速と米国景気後退の高まるリスクが主要な懸念事項でした、…： 当社のグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー同僚が示唆するように、世界の製造業が本当に底を打ったこと、そして米国が景気後退の瀬戸際にいないことを投資家が確信するには時間がかかるでしょう。 … 次に貿易摩擦と企業の債務水準、…： 当社の小さなサンプルでは、投資家は米中対立の日々の増減に対して感覚が鈍くなっている可能性がありますが、企業経営陣の頭の中では依然として大きな懸念事項であると考えています。 … しかしエリザベス・ウォーレンの台頭が引き起こす不安には及びません： すべてのクライアントがウォーレン政権の可能性について尋ねました。 特集 先週の大半を、ウェルスマネジメントやファミリーオフィスのクライアントの一部と面会して過ごしました。彼らは相対リターンより絶対リターンに重点を置いていますが、主要な懸念点は相対リターン重視の仲間とほぼ同一でした。我々の会合では、景気拡張の行方、株式ブルマーケット、世界成長、米中貿易交渉について幅広い疑問が取り上げられました。クライアントはまたクレジット見通しやインフレが警戒すべきかどうかも尋ねましたが、全ての会合で最も熱心に話題にしたのはウォーレン氏またはサンダース氏の大統領就任の見込みでした。 Q: 債券市場は何を伝えていますか？ 我々は債券市場を金利（米国債）とクレジット（スプレッド商品）という2つの明確な要素に分けて考えています。2016年7月の底以来、10年物米国債利回りの定期的な戻りを見慣れてきましたが、昨年11月の3.25%から今年8月の1.5%へと急低下するのを目の当たりにして、米国経済に対する我々の建設的見解は試されました。しかし、利回りの低下が必ずしも差し迫った経済トラブルを示しているとは限らないため、景気後退が発生するのは2021年末〜2022年初を待たないと起きない、という見方を維持しています。 我々は今年の米国債利回りの低下を、景気減速の同時的な反映と見ており、景気後退の前兆とは考えていません。 純粋に国内要因だけを見れば、利回り低下の主因は金融政策期待の変化でした。FRBのハト派転換はもちろんどこか真空の中で起きたわけではありません。景気減速の明確な兆候が、ここでも海外でも緩和的な政策の舞台を整えました。FRBが常に相手をしていたかどうかにかかわらず、12か月先のフォワードフェドファンド金利期待の3回の段階的低下は、いずれも市場に緩和政策を予想させるように誘導されたタイミングで発生しました：3月のFOMC前（FRB関係者がインフレ期待の下振れリスクについて警告し始めた頃）、5月（利下げの準備が進められていた頃）、そして7月の会合後に7月の利下げが単発ではない可能性が示唆された時です（チャート 1）。 チャート 1 FRBのハト派転換、... FRBのハト派的転換、... FRBのハト派的転換、... 各国の利回りは完全に国内要因で決まるわけではなく、米国債利回りの弱さの多くは世界の他地域の利回りの軟調さを反映しています。今年これまで、10年物主権債利回りは大西洋の両側で足並みをそろえて動いており（チャート 2）、通貨ヘッジ済みの米国債、ギルト、ブンデンにおける裁定の余地は保たれています。原油価格も別のグローバル変数であり、その下落はインフレ期待のブレークイーブン（金利差）を押し下げ（チャート 3）、米国債買い手が要求するインフレ補償を抑制しました。金利の観点では、債券市場は世界成長が減速し、中央銀行が金融緩和姿勢を強め、原油価格が下落したことを伝えています。それは必ずしも成長にとって理想的な状況ではありませんが、拡張の終焉を意味するものでもありません。 チャート 2 ... そして欧州主権債の重力が米国債利回りを引き下げた ...そして欧州国債の牽引力が米国債利回りを押し下げている ...そして欧州国債の牽引力が米国債利回りを押し下げている クレジット市場も同意見です。拡張が危機に瀕しているという気配はまったく見られません。スプレッドは昨年の第4四半期のスパイクを速やかに解消し、その後はポスト危機以来の低水準付近に張り付いています（チャート 4）。非金融企業は拡張期を通じて負債を増やしてきましたが、利回りが史上低水準にあるため債務のサービスは決して過重ではありません（チャート 5）。当社のU.S. ボンド・ストラテジーサービスの独自のコーポレート・ヘルス・モニターは企業のバランスシートが弱まっていることを示唆しています（チャート 6、第3パネル）が、スプレッドの意味のある拡大に必要な他の要素――金融引締めサイクルの完了1（チャート6、第2パネル）や貸出基準の引き締め（チャート 6、下パネル）――はまだ整っていません。 チャート 3 原油安がインフレ懸念を抑え込んだ 原油価格の下落がインフレ懸念を抑え込んだ 原油価格の下落がインフレ懸念を抑え込んだ チャート 4 スプレッドはタイト、... スプレッドはタイト… スプレッドはタイト…   チャート 5 ... そして債務サービスは容易 ...そして債務返済は簡単です ...そして債務返済は簡単です Q: クレジットエクスポージャーを削減する時期ではありませんか？タイトなスプレッドは逆張りの警告サインかもしれません。 株式よりもはるかに安いならば企業の資金調達負担を債務に一部移すのは合理的ですが、債務負担の増加と契約条項の劣化を組み合わせるのは懸念材料です。低金利は債務サービスコストが負担にならないようにし、当面はデフォルトを抑える助けになりますが、債券市場は次第に脆弱になっています。 チャート 6 スプレッド拡大の条件はまだ整っていない スプレッド拡大の条件はまだ整っていない スプレッド拡大の条件はまだ整っていない チャート 7 インカム投資家は出番なし インカム投資家は対象外 インカム投資家は対象外 その脆弱性はあるものの、次のデフォルトサイクルが到来しても、住宅バブルの影響に比べればはるかに限定的でしょう。なぜなら銀行への直撃はほとんどないからです。米国の銀行システムは一戸建て住宅を担保にしており、企業債はレバレッジのかかっていない多様な投資家群が保有しています。レバレッジをかけていない投資家にとって損失は厳しいものですが、全体経済に大きな波紋を広げることはありません。今日の企業借入の蓄積は2006〜07年の住宅ローンの汚染地帯には相当せず、逆の主張は根拠が乏しいです。 企業レバレッジの高まりは脆弱性ですが、投資家が脆弱性を見つけるだけでは十分ではなく、それが破綻する触媒を特定する必要があります。非金融企業の債務水準は亀裂ですが、契約条項の緩みでその亀裂は長くなっています。市場が苦しむのは、その亀裂が十分に長く広がり、投資家が無視できない亀裂に変わった時です。我々の見方では、緩和的な金融環境は少なくとも数か月はその亀裂を視界と記憶から遠ざけ続けるでしょう。 デフォルトは借り手が満期債務を再資金調達できない時にのみ発生します。少なくとも一つの貸し手が管理可能な条件で新規融資を延長する意思がある限り、借り手は破綻しません。現在の金融政策の背景は、主要経済の多くでゼロ/マイナス金利政策が存在し、融資意思のある貸し手の安定供給をほぼ確実にしています。保険会社、年金基金、債務を相殺するために収益を必要とする基金は、収益を確保するためにリスクを取らざるを得ませんでした（チャート 7）。その結果、多少脆弱なクレジットに対して追加で50〜75ベーシスポイントを提供する貸し手の列ができあがっています。 世界の製造業はすでに景気後退に陥っていますが、サービス部門の堅調さが先進国経済の拡張を維持しています。 最も脆弱なクレジットは救済を見つけられないでしょうが、多くの怪しいものは救済を受けるでしょう。現在の超緩和的金融政策環境は、デフォルトが本格的に増加するような背景ではありません。中央銀行がもう少し寛容でなくなるまでは、限界貸し手は選別的にならず、盤は回り続け、スプレッド商品は現金や米国債に対して超過リターンを生み続けるでしょう。 Q: 米国外の状況はより悪く見えます。世界の成長見通しはどうですか？ チャート 8 製造業は底打ちかもしれない、... 製造業は底打ちの可能性がある… 製造業は底打ちの可能性がある… 世界の製造業セクターはリセッションにありますが、世界全体の経済はそうではありません（チャート 8）。製造業のリセッションが必ずしも全面的な景気後退につながるわけではなく、先進国のはるかに大きなサービス部門の継続的な拡張は製造業の苦戦に対して強力な防波堤を提供しています（チャート 9）。世界活動がいつ加速するかを結論づけるにはまだ時期尚早ですが、当社のグローバル先行経済指標とそれを導く拡散指標は、底打ち過程にあることを示唆しています（チャート 10）。 チャート 9 ... そしてサービスは減速を止めたかもしれない ... ... そしてサービスは減速が止まったかもしれない ... ... そしてサービスは減速が止まったかもしれない ... チャート 10 ... 先行指標が足場を固めたなら ... 先行指標が足場を固めたなら ... 先行指標が足場を固めたなら チャート 11 向かい風から追い風へ 逆風から追い風へ 逆風から追い風へ 当社のチャイナ・インベストメント・ストラテジーチームは、地方政府が今年末まで北京によって課された予算制約から解放される来年第1四半期に中国成長が勢いを取り戻す余地があると見ています。なお、9月のマネー・クレジット成長は予想を上回り、政策当局は預金準備率の引き下げなどささやかな景気刺激策を講じています。中国のクレジット成長の変化は、中国のクレジット依存の輸入チャネルを通じて世界の成長の変化に先行します（チャート 11）。中国の輸入は欧州、日本、アジア新興国、オーストラリア、ブラジル、チリの輸出です。彼らの輸出が増えれば総需要も増え、好循環が自己強化的に生まれます。 Q: ウォーレン氏が大統領になったら市場には何を意味しますか？ ウォーレン氏が大統領になることへの投資家の懸念はもっともです；ウォーレン上院議員は銀行、防衛関連企業、製薬企業、フラッキングに関与する石油会社、大手ハイテク企業に対して公然と、しばしば陽気に敵意を示しています。それは相当なリストであり、S&P500の時価総額のかなりの割合を占めます。ウォーレン政権は株式投資家にとって友好的ではないと言って差し支えありませんが、資産を清算して国外に逃げる前に念頭に置くべき点がいくつかあります。 彼女に民主党の指名を早々に与えるのは時期尚早です。2007年10月、賢明な投資家はヒラリー・クリントンがすでに決勝戦の座を確保したと確信していました。まだ知名度の低かったイリノイ州の新人上院議員は2004年大会での演説以外にあまり知られていませんでしたが、彼はオバマ大統領になりました。2月3日のアイオワ党員集会までにまだ多くのことが起こり得ます。 現職大統領を打倒するのは大きな挑戦です。景気が今から来年11月までにリセッションに入らず、政権が高プロファイルの政策失敗を被らずに政策成果を達成できる限り、当社のジオポリティカル・ストラテジー同僚はトランプが2020年選挙の推定勝者であるべきだと主張します。彼らの見立ては、誰が民主党の指名を獲得するかにかかわらず当てはまります。米国有権者は時間とともに左寄りにシフトしていますが（チャート 12）、それでもです。 ワシントンを根本的に変えるのは口で言うほど簡単ではありません。建国の父たちは連邦政府を大幅な変化に対してかなり耐性のあるものに設計しました。選挙人団は大統領選で国民感情の高まりを抑え、議会と裁判所は行政府の権力を制限します。上下両院で多数派を持つ政権でも、一つの大きな立法イニシアティブを達成して政治資本を使い果たすと（オバマ政権と医療保険制度改革のように）欲しいほどの自由は得られないことが常です。たとえ来年11月に民主党がウォーレン氏の追い風で議会を制圧したとしても、保守的またはスウィング地区・州の議員は彼女の提案全体に躊躇するでしょう。 チャート 12 民主党有権者はより左に傾いている 旅先からの質問 旅先からの質問 投資への示唆 我々のより楽観的な世界経済見通しは、世界各地域・ブロックにおける株式のより建設的な配分に反映されます。BCAのハウス・ビューは、戦術的（0〜3か月）および景気循環的（3〜12か月）の時間軸で、グローバル株式ポートフォリオ内で新興市場とユーロ圏へのイコールウェイト配分を推奨します。世界成長が加速し始めたら、我々は新興市場とユーロ圏の株式をオーバーウェイトに格上げし、米国株をオーバーウェイトから格下げすることを期待しています。また、データが我々のベースケースの成長シナリオを検証する態勢であれば、ドルに対してハイアベータの通貨を好み、円やスイス・フランのようなローアベータ通貨へのエクスポージャーは制限または回避することを支持します。 BCAの推奨は特にデータ依存的になっています。世界の投資家は明確に「証拠を見せてほしい（show-me）」モードに入っているようです。当社として、そして先週の会合から受けた印象に支えられた感触として、投資家は成長見通しやリスク資産に対して容易に楽観できないでいます。貿易関連のツイートに心をすり減らされ、最近の異例な金融政策措置が成長やインフレに目に見える影響を及ぼすとは懐疑的であり、転換の決定的な証拠を見て初めてポートフォリオポジションを調整したがります。この慎重さは、事業サイクル後期に出る矛盾するシグナルや地政学的不確実性の高止まりも反映しています。 もし我々の見通しどおり世界経済がまもなく反転するなら、世界の投資家はサイクリックなエクスポージャーをポートフォリオに追加する準備をしておくべきです。例えエリザベス・ウォーレンが民主党指名の現時点の有力候補として地位を固めたとしてもです。 この慎重さから、我々は0〜3か月の戦術的時間軸ではフィクスト・インカム・ポートフォリオにベンチマークのデュレーションエクスポージャーを推奨し続けていますが、近い将来を越えた金利エクスポージャーにはほとんど意欲がなく、3〜12か月の景気循環的および12か月超の戦略的時間軸ではベンチマーク以下のデュレーションです。12か月全体では、成長が強まれば良好な米国企業がより信用力のあるクレジットになると期待し、ZIRP/NIRPは残余の一部を引き続き保護すると見ているため、スプレッド商品を引き続き好みます。我々は相対的な米国株のリターンが鈍化する可能性を支持しますが、世界成長は絶対的な株式リターンを押し上げるはずであり、バランスド・ポートフォリオでは少なくともイコールウェイトの株式を維持することを推奨し続けます。 Doug Peta, CFA チーフ米国投資ストラテジスト dougp@bcaresearch.com 脚注 1 我々はパウエル議長が述べた見解に同意しており、今回の利下げはサイクルの中間で行う利下げであって、新たな緩和サイクルの始まりではないという認識です。

ハイライト 先週合意された暫定的な「フェーズ1」貿易協定は、米中貿易戦争におけるデタントに向けた重要な一歩を示しています。 ブレグジット交渉の今後にかかわらず、ハード・ブレグジットは回避される見込みです。ポンドをロングで保有し続けてください。 米国の企業業績の伸びは第3四半期に横ばいとなる可能性が高く、ボトムアップの予想にある前年比減少とは対照的です。 世界成長が年末までに再加速すれば、企業業績の伸びは回復するはずです。 世界成長の強まりは米ドルに下押し圧力をかけるでしょう。 12か月の期間では、債券に対してグローバル株式をオーバーウェイトのまま維持してください。 景気循環株はディフェンシブ株をアウトパフォームし始めるはずです。金融セクターはついに日の目を見るでしょう。 好ましい追い風 2週間前に公表した第4四半期ストラテジー・アウトルックでは、グローバル株式が「見せて」フェーズに入ったと主張しました。つまり、株価指数が上昇するには、貿易戦争のエスカレーションの緩和と世界成長の回復を示す具体的な証拠が必要だという意味です。1  先週金曜、貿易面でいくつかの好材料がありました。2500億ドル相当の中国からの輸入品に対し10月15日に25％から30％へ引き上げる予定だった関税の実施を見送ることと引き換えに、中国は年間で400～500億ドル分の米国農産物を購入し、米国の金融サービス企業への市場アクセスを改善し、為替管理の透明性を高めることに合意しました。 確かに、やるべきことはまだ多く残っています。協定文はまだ最終化されていません。両国は、11月16–17日のチリ・サンティアゴでのAPECサミットまでに合意をまとめることを目指しています。しかし、どのような執行・解決メカニズムが協定に盛り込まれるかなど多くの重要課題が未解決のままであることを考えると、さらに遅延したり、交渉が決裂したりする可能性もあります。 先週の暫定合意は、知的財産保護の扱いという厄介な問題を「フェーズ2」に先送りする形にもなっています。「フェーズ1」がまとまり次第、間もなく「フェーズ2」が始まる予定です。 独立かつ超党派の米国知的財産の窃盗に関する委員会によれば、米国の生産者は知的財産の窃盗により年間で約$225～$600 billionの損失を被っているとされています。2 中国はしばしば最悪の加害国の一つと見なされてきました。 知的財産問題の重要性を考えれば、約1600億ドル相当の中国からの輸入に対して15％の関税が12月15日に導入されないようにするには、実質的な進展が必要となるでしょう。 トランプは合意を望んでいる 多くの障害が残るものの、先週の展開は18か月に及ぶ貿易戦争のデタントの見込みを大きく高めました。自称「マスター交渉人」であるトランプ大統領は、交渉を「ラブフェスト」と表現し、この貿易協定は「我が偉大なる愛国的農家のために結ばれたこれまでで最大かつ最高の取引だ」と呼び、最終合意が達成されることに「ほとんど疑いはない」と述べて自らの信頼性を賭けています。NAFTAの後継であるUSMCAと同様に、トランプは交渉を自らの功績として宣伝するマーケティングモードに入る可能性が高く、米国民のために交渉した「驚くべき」新協定を大々的に宣伝するでしょう。 政治的観点から見ると、これは非常に理にかなっています。正否は別として、トランプ大統領は有権者から経済運営について他のどの分野よりも高い評価を受けています（チャート 1）。長引く貿易戦争は米国経済を弱体化させ、トランプの再選の見通しを損なうことになります。 チャート 1 トランプは経済運営について比較的高評価を得ているが、他はそれほどではない クンバヤ クンバヤ チャート 2 中国企業は関税の大部分を負担していない クンバヤ クンバヤ トランプの主張に反して、証拠は明確に米国の消費者が関税の大部分を負担していることを示唆しています。チャート 2は、対中輸入品に対する関税率が上昇する一方で、米国の輸入価格はほとんど下がっていないことを示しています。最近の関税の多くが米国や第三国に競合相手がほとんどいない中国製品に焦点を当てている以上、中国の生産者が関税コストを転嫁する能力はさらに高まります。 もし発表されたすべての関税引き上げが実施されれば、対中輸入品の実効関税率は8月下旬時点の約15％から12月には最大約25％にまで上昇することになります（チャート 3）。そのような関税率は、米国の可処分所得を1000億ドル以上減少させ、2017年の減税によるほとんどの恩恵を消し去ることになります。トランプは貿易戦争をそこまで進行させるわけにはいきません。 チャート 3 度重なる関税引き上げが積み重なり始めている 相次ぐ関税が積み重なり始めている 相次ぐ関税が積み重なり始めている 中国は強硬策に出るか？ 貿易戦争を有利に解決する上でのリスクの一つは、中国側がトランプを「合意に飢えている」と見なし、交渉で強硬姿勢をとる可能性があることです。このリスクは無視できませんが、我々は次の三つの理由でそれを過度に重視しません。 第一に、貿易戦争の期間、中国の輸出業者はある程度の価格決定力を維持してきたとしても、貿易量は依然として悪化しており、9月の対米輸出は前年同月比でほぼ22％減少しています。 第二に、ZTEに対する強力な制裁が示したように、中国は依然として米国の技術に大きく依存しています。これがトランプに交渉上の大きなレバレッジを与えています。 チャート 4 誰が2020年の民主党指名を勝ち取るか？ クンバヤ クンバヤ 第三に、トランプ自身がよく言うように、中国は彼の第1期目の任期中に彼と交渉する方が、第2期目になってから交渉するよりも容易だと考えるでしょう。数か月前、ジョー・バイデンが世論調査で高支持率だったときにはトランプの再選を望まない方が中国にとって理にかなっていたかもしれませんが、エリザベス・ウォーレンが民主党指名を獲得する有力候補として浮上したことで、その希望は消えました（チャート 4）。数週間前に述べたように、中国はウォーレンが貿易問題でトランプよりも手ごわくないとは考えないでしょう。3  これらすべてを総合すると、中国もトランプ同様、今後数週間で貿易緊張を和らげる方法を模索するだろうと示唆しています。 ブレグジットの突破口か？ 記事執筆時点で、ブレグジット合意の見通しは明るくなっています。詳細はまだ公表されていませんが、提案された合意は北アイルランドを事実上、欧州単一市場の一部でありながら同時に英国の一部でもあるという量子的な重ね合わせ状態に置くことになります。これは北アイルランドを英国の政治的管轄下に置きつつ、EUの規制基準と整合させ続けることで実現されます。 交渉が破綻する可能性は依然としてあります。ジョンソン首相が「素晴らしい新協定を取り付けた」と確約したにもかかわらず、保守党の連立相手である北アイルランドの民主統一党は依然として協定への支持を留保しています。労働党のジェレミー・コービン党首もこれを拒否し、テリーザ・メイが当初提案した協定よりもさらに悪いと述べています。 今後数日に何が起きようとも、我々はハード・ブレグジットは回避されると引き続き考えています。ブレグジット問題を通じて、英国の支配階級の中に無協議離脱を支持する十分な政治的支持は存在しないと我々は主張してきました。世論調査が示すように、再度国民投票が行われればEU残留を選ぶ有権者の割合が増えていることが明らかになるにつれ、その確信はさらに強まっています（チャート 5）。 我々は2017年8月3日以来、ユーロに対してポンドをロングしています。このトレードはこの期間で6.6％上昇しました。投資家はこのポジションを維持すべきです。実質金利差に基づけば、GBP/EURは現在の1.16ではなく1.30付近で取引されるべきであると考えられます（チャート 6）。ハード・ブレグジットリスクがさらに後退すれば、クロスは公正価値に向かうと予想します。 チャート 5 ブレグジット不安：後悔の事例 ブレグジット不安：ブレモースの場合 ブレグジット不安：ブレモースの場合 チャート 6 ポンドには大きな上値余地がある ポンドの大幅な上昇余地 ポンドの大幅な上昇余地   世界成長見通しは改善 チャート 7 成長減速はソフトデータでより顕著だった 景気の減速はソフト指標でより顕著になっている 景気の減速はソフト指標でより顕著になっている チャート 8 ISMの低迷の中で製造業生産は反発している 製造業の生産高がISM指数の低迷の中で反発 製造業の生産高がISM指数の低迷の中で反発 貿易戦争のデタントとブレグジット問題の解決は世界成長を下支えするはずです。経済データの弱さは、事業調査のような「ソフト」指標でより明確に現れており、工業生産などの「ハード」指標ほど顕著ではありません（チャート 7）。特に、ISM製造業指数が低迷する中でも、過去3か月間で米国の製造業生産は安定しています（チャート 8）。センチメントが回復すれば、ソフトデータも改善するでしょう。 世界の金融環境は、主に多くの中央銀行によるハト派転換のおかげで過去5か月で大幅に緩和されました（チャート 9）。政策金利を引き下げた中央銀行の純数は、一般に6～9か月先行して世界の製造業PMIをリードします（チャート 10）。加えて、FRBが再び国債買入れを開始した決定はドル流動性を増やし、金融環境の更なる緩和に寄与するでしょう。 チャート 9 緩和された金融環境が世界成長を押し上げる 金融環境の緩和が世界経済の成長を後押しする 金融環境の緩和が世界経済の成長を後押しする   チャート 10 金融緩和の効果は間もなく実体経済に波及するはずだ 金融緩和の効果は間もなく経済に波及するはずだ。 金融緩和の効果は間もなく経済に波及するはずだ。 中国による景気刺激の強化も世界成長の再加速を後押しするはずです。中国のマネーおよびクレジットの伸びは9月に予想を上回りました。中国人民銀行は預金準備率を引き下げており、これがインターバンク金利の低下に寄与しています。残りの今年期間で中期貸出制度（MLF）への更なる利下げが予想されます。中国のクレジット成長の変化は世界成長を約9か月先行します（チャート 11）。 チャート 11 中国の信用拡大が世界成長の回復を支える 中国のクレジットは世界経済の成長回復を支えるはずだ 中国のクレジットは世界経済の成長回復を支えるはずだ グローバル株式をオーバーウェイトのまま APECサミットまでに「フェーズ1」貿易協定をまとめる道のりはでこぼこ道である可能性が高いものの、我々は12か月の投資期間において債券に対してグローバル株式をオーバーウェイトするという推奨を引き続き強調します。 世界成長が底打ちしているという証拠をもう少し確認でき次第、数週間以内に新興国（EM）および欧州株式の評価を引き上げる見込みです。 最終的に株式の軌道は業績の動向に依存します。米国の決算シーズンは今週始まりました。先週時点でFactSetがまとめたデータによれば、アナリストはS&P500のEPSが第3四半期に前年同期比で4.6％減少すると予想していました。ただし、2015年以降、EPS成長は概ね予想を約4ポイント上回ってきたことを念頭に置いてください（チャート 12）。したがって、妥当な見方は、米国の業績は今四半期横ばいとなり、低い期待値のハードルをクリアするというものです。 チャート 12 実際のEPSは概ね予想を上回っている クンバヤ クンバヤ チャート 13 利益と名目GDP成長は同じ動きをする傾向がある 収益と名目GDP成長率は歩調を合わせて動く傾向がある 収益と名目GDP成長率は歩調を合わせて動く傾向がある これまでに決算を発表した63社のS&P500構成銘柄のうち83％が予想を上回っており、これは歴史的平均の64％を上回っています。これにより現在の第3四半期の見積りは悲観的すぎるという見方が支持されます。 先を見れば、名目GDP成長が加速するにつれて業績成長は回復するはずです（チャート 13）。 世界成長が加速すると、新興国（EM）と欧州株式は一般にグローバルベンチマークをアウトパフォームする傾向があります（チャート 14）。これはそれらの株式市場がより景気循環的であるためです。加えて、ドルは逆循環的通貨として、高成長環境では弱含む傾向があります。ドル安は景気循環株に対して相対的に大きな恩恵をもたらします（チャート 15）。  チャート 14 新興国およびユーロ圏の株式は世界成長が改善すると通常アウトパフォームする 世界経済の成長が改善すると、新興国株式とユーロ圏株式は通常アウトパフォームする 世界経済の成長が改善すると、新興国株式とユーロ圏株式は通常アウトパフォームする チャート 15 ドルが弱含めば景気循環株がアウトパフォームする ドル安になれば景気循環株がアウトパフォームする ドル安になれば景気循環株がアウトパフォームする 我々は金融株を景気循環セクターの定義に含めます。世界成長が改善すると、長期国債利回りは限界的に上昇します。中央銀行が急いで利上げする状況にはないため、イールドカーブはスティープ化するでしょう。これが銀行の利益と株価を押し上げます（チャート 16）。 景気循環株は現在ディフェンシブ株と比べてかなり割安です（チャート 17）。同様に、非米国株式は地域間のセクター構成の違いを調整しても、米国株に比べてかなり割安です。米国株はフォワードEPS倍率で17.5倍で取引されているのに対し、国際株式はより魅力的な13.7倍のフォワードPEで取引されています。より高い利益利回りとより低い海外金利の組み合わせは、米国外の株式リスクプレミアムが概ね2パーセントポイント高いことを示唆しています（チャート 18）。 チャート 16 利回り曲線の急勾配化は金融株に恩恵をもたらす より急勾配なイールドカーブは金融セクターに恩恵をもたらす より急勾配なイールドカーブは金融セクターに恩恵をもたらす チャート 17 景気循環株はディフェンシブ株より魅力的だ 景気循環株はディフェンシブ株より魅力的だ 景気循環株はディフェンシブ株より魅力的だ   チャート 18 株式リスクプレミアムはかなり高く、特に米国外で顕著だ 株式リスクプレミアムはかなり高く、特に米国外で顕著です。 株式リスクプレミアムはかなり高く、特に米国外で顕著です。 世界成長が底打ちするという証拠をもう少し確認でき次第、我々は数週間以内に新興国および欧州株式の評価を引き上げる見込みです。  ピーター・ベレジン、 チーフ・グローバル・ストラテジスト グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー peterb@bcaresearch.com 脚注 1本文は、グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジーの「第4四半期2019 ストラテジー・アウトルック：『見せて』市場」（2019年10月4日）を参照してください。 2 「Update to IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property」（2017年）、The National Bureau of Asian Research。 3本文は、グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー週次レポートの「エリザベス・ウォーレンと市場」（2019年9月13日）を参照してください。 ストラテジー＆マーケット動向 マクロクォント・モデルと現在の主観的スコア クンバヤ クンバヤ 戦略的推奨 クローズドトレード