イラン

Highlights Geopolitical risks are starting to abate as a result of material constraints influencing policymakers. China needs to ensure its economy bottoms and a debt-deflationary tendency does not take hold. President Trump needs to avoid further economic deterioration arising from the trade war. The U.K. is looking to prevent a recession induced by leaving the EU without an agreement. Iran and the risk of an oil price shock is the outstanding geopolitical tail risk. Feature Readers of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy know that what defines our research is our analytical framework – specifically the theory of constraints. Chart 1The Electoral College – An Overlooked Constraint The theory holds that policymakers are trapped by the pressures of their office, their nation’s global position, and the stream of events. These pressures emerge from the material world that we inhabit and as such are measurable. If a leader lacks popular approval, cannot command a majority in the legislature, rides atop a sinking economy, or suffers under stronger or smarter foreign enemies, then his policy preferences will be compromised. He will have to change his preferences to accommodate the constraints, rather than the other way around. Case in point is the U.S. electoral college: it proved an insurmountable political constraint on the Democratic Party in 2016. The college is intended to restrain direct democracy or popular passions; it also restrains the concentration of regional power. In 2012, Barack Obama won a larger share of the electoral college than the popular vote, while in 2016 Hillary Clinton won a smaller share (Chart 1). Clinton’s lack of appeal in the industrial Midwest turned the college and deprived her of the prize. The rest is history. In this report we highlight five key constraints that will shape the direction of the major geopolitical risks in the fourth quarter. We recommend investors remain tactically cautious on risk assets, although we have not yet extended this recommendation to the cyclical, 12-month time frame. China’s Policy: The Debt-Deflation Constraint We have a solid record of pessimism regarding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s willingness and ability to stimulate the economy – but even we were surprised by his tenacity this year. His administration’s effort to contain leverage, while still stimulating the economy, has prevented a quick rebound in the global manufacturing cycle. The constraint limiting this approach is the need to avoid a debt-deflation spiral. This is a condition in which households and firms become pessimistic about the future and cut back their spending and borrowing. The general price level falls and drives up real debt burdens, which motivates further cutbacks. A classic example is Japan, which saw a property bubble burst, destroying corporate balance sheets and forcing the country into a long phase of paying down debt amid falling prices. China has not seen its property bubble burst yet. Prices have continued to rise despite the recent pause in the non-financial debt build-up (Chart 2). Looser monetary and fiscal policy have sustained this precarious balance. But the result is a tug-of-war between the government and the private sector. If the government miscalculates, and the asset bubble bursts, then it will be extremely difficult for the government to change the mindset of households and companies bent on paying down debt. It will be too late to avoid the vicious spiral that Japan experienced – with the critical proviso that Chinese people are less wealthy than the Japanese in 1990 and the country’s political system is less flexible. A Japan-sized economic problem would lead to a China-sized political problem. This is why the recent drop in Chinese producer prices below zero is a worrisome sign (Chart 3). Policymakers have loosened monetary and fiscal policy incrementally since July 2018 and they are signaling that they will continue to do so. This is particularly likely in an environment in which trade tensions are reduced but remain fundamentally unresolved – which is our base case. Chart 2China's Property Bubble Intact Chart 3China's Constraint Is Debt-Deflation Are policymakers aware of this constraint? Absolutely. If the trade talks collapse, or the global economy slumps regardless, then China will have to stimulate more aggressively. Xi Jinping is not truly a Chairman Mao, willing to impose extreme austerity. He oversaw the 2015-16 stimulus and would do it again if he came face to face with the debt-deflation constraint. Is China still capable of stimulating? High debt levels, the reassertion of centralized state power, and the trade war have all rendered traditional stimulus levers less effective by dampening animal spirits. Yet policymakers are visibly “riding the brake,” so they can remove restraints and increase reflation if necessary. Most obviously, authorities can inject larger fiscal stimulus. They have insisted that they will prevent easy monetary and credit policies from feeding into property prices – and this could change. They could also pick up the pace when it comes to reducing average bank lending rates for small and medium-sized businesses.1 In short, stimulus is less effective, but the government is also preferring to save dry powder. This preference will be thrown by the wayside if it hits the critical constraint. The implication is that Chinese stimulus will continue to pick up over a cyclical, 12-month horizon. There is impetus to reduce trade tensions with the U.S., discussed below, but a lack of final resolution will ensure that policy tightening is not called for. Bottom Line: China’s chief economic constraint is a debt-deflation trap. This would engender long-term economic difficulties that would eventually translate into political difficulties for Communist Party rule. If a trade deal is reached, it is unlikely alone to require a shift to tighter policy. If the trade talks collapse, stimulus will overshoot to the upside. Trade War: The Electoral Constraint The U.S. and China are holding the thirteenth round of trade negotiations this week after a summer replete with punitive measures, threats, and failed restarts. Tensions spiked just ahead of the talks, as expected. Immediately thereafter President Trump declared he will meet with Chinese negotiators to give a boost to the process and reassure the markets.2 Trump’s major constraint in waging the trade war is economic, not political. Americans are generally sympathetic to his pressure campaign against China. Public opinion polls show that a strong majority believes it is necessary to confront China even though the bulk of the economic pain will be borne by consumers themselves (Chart 4). Yet Americans could lose faith in Trump’s approach once the economic pain fully materializes. Critically, the decline in wage growth that is occurring as a result of the global and manufacturing slowdown is concentrated in the states that are most likely to swing the 2020 election, e.g. the “purple” or battleground states (Chart 5). Chart 4Americans To Confront China Despite The Costs? Chart 5Trump Faces Pressure To Stage A Tactical Trade Retreat Furthermore, a rise in unemployment, which is implied by the recent decline in the University of Michigan’s survey of consumer confidence regarding the purchase of large household goods, would devastate voters’ willingness to give Trump’s tariff strategy the benefit of the doubt (Chart 6). Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, two critical states, have seen a net loss of manufacturing jobs on the year. The fear of an uptick in U.S. unemployment will prevent Trump from escalating the trade war. An uptick in unemployment would be a major constraint on Trump’s trade war – he cannot escalate further until the economy has stabilized. And that may very well require tariff rollback while trade talks “make progress.” We expect that Trump is willing to do this in the interest of staying in power. As highlighted above, the Xi administration is not without its own constraints. Our proxies for China’s marginal propensity to consume show that Chinese animal spirits are still vulnerable, particularly on the household side, which has not responded to stimulus thus far (Chart 7). Since this constraint is less immediate than Trump’s election date, Xi cannot be expected to capitulate to Trump’s biggest demands. Hence a ceasefire or détente is more likely than a full bilateral trade agreement. Chart 6Waning Consumer Confidence On Big Ticket Items Foreshadows Rise In Unemployment Trump’s electoral constraint also suggests that he needs to remove trade risks such as car tariffs on Europe and Japan (which we expect he will do). We have been optimistic on the passage of the USMCA trade deal but impeachment puts this forecast in jeopardy. Chart 7China's Trade War Constraint? Animal Spirits   Bottom Line: Trump will stage a tactical retreat on trade in order to soften the negative impact on the economy and reduce the chances of a recession prior to the November 3, 2020 election. China’s economic constraints are less immediate and it is unlikely to make major structural concessions. Hence we expect a ceasefire that temporarily reduces tensions and boosts sentiment rather than a bilateral trade agreement that initiates a fundamental deepening of U.S.-China economic engagement. U.S. Policy: The Economic Constraint The 2020 U.S. election is a critical political risk both because of the volatility it will engender and because of what we see as a 45% chance that it will lead to a change in the ruling party governing the world’s largest economy. Will Trump be the candidate? Yes. If Trump’s approval among Republicans breaks beneath the lows plumbed during the Charlottesville incident in 2017 (Chart 8A), then Trump has an impeachment problem, but otherwise he is safe from removal. Judging by the Republican-leaning pollster Rasmussen, which should reflect the party’s mood, Trump’s approval rating has not broken beneath its floor and may already be bouncing back from the initial hit of the impeachment inquiry (Chart 8B). The rise in support for impeachment and removal in opinion polls is notable, but it is also along party lines and will fade if the Democrats are seen as dragging on the process or trying to circumvent an election that is just around the corner. Chart 8ARepublican Opinion Precludes Trump’s Removal Chart 8BRepublican-Leaning Pollster Shows Support Holding Thus Far How will all of this bear on the 2020 election? Turnout will be high so everything depends on which side will be more passionate. A critical factor will be the Democratic nominee. Former Vice President Joe Biden, the establishment pick, has broken beneath his floor in the polling. His rambling debate performances have reinforced the narrative that he is too old, while the impeachment of Trump will fuel counteraccusations of corruption that will detract from Biden’s greatest asset: his electability. According to a Harvard-Harris poll from late September, 61% of voters believe it was inappropriate for Biden to withhold aid from Ukraine to encourage the firing of a Ukrainian prosecutor even when the polling question makes no mention of any connection with Biden’s son’s business interest there. Moreover, 77% believe it is inappropriate that Biden’s son Hunter traveled with his father to China while soliciting investments there. With Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s candidacy now defunct as a result of his heart attack and old age, Elizabeth Warren, the progressive senator from Massachusetts, will become the indisputable front runner (which she is not yet). In the fourth primary debate on October 15, she will face attacks from all sides reflecting this new status. Given her debate performances thus far, she will sustain the heightened scrutiny and come out stronger. This is not to say that Warren is already the Democratic candidate. Biden is still polling like a traditional Democratic primary front runner (Chart 9), while Warren has some clear weaknesses in electability, as reflected in her smaller lead over Trump in head-to-head polls in swing states. Nevertheless Warren is likely to become the front runner. Chart 9Biden Polling About Average Relative To Previous Democratic Primary Front Runners The recession call remains the U.S. election call. Two further considerations: Impeachment and removal of President Trump ensure a Democratic victory. There are hopes in some quarters that President Trump could be impeached and removed and yet his Vice President Mike Pence could go on to win the 2020 election, preserving the pro-business policy status quo. The problem with this logic is that Trump cannot be removed unless Republican opinion shifts. This will require an earthquake as a result of some wrongdoing by Trump. Such an earthquake will blacken Pence’s and the GOP’s name and render them toxic in the general election. Not to mention that Pence’s only act as president in the brief interim would likely be to pardon Trump and his accomplices. He would suffer Gerald Ford’s fate in 1976. Which means that a significant slide in Trump’s approval among Republicans will translate to higher odds of a Democratic win in 2020 and hence higher taxes and regulation, i.e. a hit to corporate earnings expectations. We expect this approval to hold up, but the market can sell off anyway because … The market is overrating the Senate as a check on Warren in the event she wins the White House. It is true that relative to Biden, Warren is less likely to carry the Senate. Democrats need to retain their Senate seat in Alabama, while capturing Maine, Colorado, and Arizona (or Georgia) in addition to the White House in order to control the Senate. Biden is more competitive in Arizona and Georgia than Warren. But this is a flimsy basis to feel reassured that a Warren presidency will be constrained. In fact, it is very difficult to unseat a sitting president. If the Democrats can muster enough votes to kick out an incumbent and elect an outspoken left-wing progressive from the northeast, they most likely will have mustered enough votes to take the Senate as well. For instance, unemployment could be rising or Trump’s risky foreign policy could have backfired. Chart 10Business Sentiment Threatens Trump Re-Election In our estimation the Democrats have about a 45% chance of winning the presidency, and Warren does not significantly reduce this chance. The resilient U.S. economy is Trump’s base case for success. But Trump’s trade policy and the global slowdown are rapidly eating away at the prospect that voters see improvement (Chart 10). This speaks to the constraint driving a ceasefire with China above, but it also speaks to the broader probability of policy continuity in the U.S. As Warren’s path to the White House widens, there is a clear basis for equities to sell off in the near term. Bottom Line: Trump’s approval among Republicans is a constraint on his removal via impeachment. But the status of the economy is the greater constraint. The recession call remains the election call. While we expect downside in the near term, we are still constructive on U.S. equities on a cyclical basis. War With Iran: The Oil Price Constraint The Senate will remain President Trump’s bulwark amid impeachment, notwithstanding the controversial news that Trump is moving forward with the withdrawal of troops from Syria, specifically from the so-called “safe zone” agreed with Turkey, giving Ankara license to stage a larger military offensive in Syria. This abandonment of the U.S.’s Kurdish allies at the behest of Turkey (which is a NATO ally but has been at odds with Washington) has provoked flak from Republican senators. However, it is well supported in U.S. public opinion (Chart 11). Trump is threatening to impose economic sanctions on Turkey if it engages in ethnic cleansing. The Turkish lira is the marginal loser, Trump’s approval rating is the marginal winner. The withdrawal sends a signal to the world that the U.S. is continuing to deleverage from the Middle East – a corollary with the return of focus on Asia Pacific. While the Iranians are key beneficiaries of this pivot, the Trump administration is maintaining maximum sanctions pressure on the Iranians. The firing of hawkish National Security Adviser John Bolton did not lead to a détente, as President Rouhani has too much to risk from negotiating with Trump. Instead the Iranians smelled U.S. weakness and went on the attack in Saudi Arabia, briefly shuttering 6 million barrels of oil per day. The response to the attack – from both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. – revealed an extreme aversion to military conflict and escalation. Instead the U.S. has tightened its sanctions regime – China is reportedly withdrawing from its interest in the South Pars natural gas project, a potentially serious blow to Iran, which had been hyping its strategic partnership with China. This reinforces the prospect for a U.S.-China ceasefire even as it redoubles the economic pressure on Iran. As long as the U.S. maintains the crippling sanctions on Iran, there is no guarantee that Tehran will not strike out again in an effort to weaken President Trump’s resolve. The fact that about 18% of global oil supply flows through the critical chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s ace in the hole (Chart 12). It is the chief constraint on Trump’s foreign policy, as greater oil supply disruptions could shock the U.S. economy ahead of the election. Trump can benefit from minor or ephemeral disruptions but he is likely to get into trouble if a serious shock weakens the economy at this juncture. Chart 11U.S. Opinion Constrains Foreign Policy Chart 12Oil Price Constrains U.S. Policy Toward Iran An oil shock does not have to originate in Hormuz shipping or sneak attacks on regional oil infrastructure. Iran is uniquely capable of fomenting the anti-government protests that have erupted in southern Iraq. The restoration of stability in Iraq has resulted in around 2 million barrels of oil per day coming onto international markets (Chart 13). If this process is reversed through political instability or sabotage, it will rapidly push up against global spare oil capacity and exert an upward pressure on oil prices that would come at an awkward time for a global economy experiencing a manufacturing recession (Chart 14). Chart 13Iran's Leverage Over Iraq Chart 14Global Oil Spare Capacity Constrains Response To Crisis Bottom Line: Iran’s power over regional oil production is the biggest constraint on Trump’s foreign policy in the region, yet Trump is apparently tightening rather than easing the sanctions regime. The failure of the Abqaiq attack to generate a lasting impact on oil prices amid weak global demand suggests that Iran could feel emboldened. The U.S. preference to withdraw from Middle Eastern conflicts could also encourage Iran, while the tightening of the sanctions regime could make it desperate. An oil shock emanating from the conflict with Iran is still a significant risk to the global bull market. Brexit: The No-Deal Constraint The fifth and final constraint to discuss in this report pertains to the U.K. and Brexit. We do not consider the October 31 deadline a no-deal exit risk. Parliament will prevail over a prime minister who lacks a majority. Nevertheless the expected election can revive no-deal risk, especially if Boris Johnson is returned to power with a weak minority government. Chart 15U.K.: Public Opinion Constrains Parliament And No-Deal Brexit While parliament is the constraint on the prime minister, the public is the constraint on parliament. From this point of view, support for Brexit has weakened and the Conservative Party is less popular than in the lead up to the 2015 and 2017 general elections. The public is aware that no-deal exit is likely to cause significant economic pain and that is why a majority rejects no-deal, as opposed to a soft Brexit. Unless the Tory rally in opinion polling produces another coalition with the Northern Irish, albeit with Boris Johnson at the helm, these points make it likely that a no-deal Brexit will become untenable when all is said and done (Chart 15). If Johnson achieves a single party majority the EU will be more likely to grant concessions enabling him to get a withdrawal deal over the line. We remain long GBP-USD but will turn sellers at the $1.30 mark. Investment Implications The path of least resistance is for China’s stimulus efforts to increase – incrementally if trade tensions are contained, and sharply if not. This should help put a floor beneath growth, but the Q1 timing of this floor means that global risk assets face additional downside in the near term. We continue to recommend going long our “China Play” index. U.S.-China trade tensions should decline as President Trump looks to prevent higher unemployment ahead of his election. China has reason to follow through on small concessions to encourage Trump’s tactical trade retreat, but it does not face pressure to make new structural concessions. We expect a ceasefire – with some tariff rollback likely – but not a big bang agreement that removes all tariffs or deepens the overall bilateral economic engagement. Stay long our “China Play” index. We remain short CNY-USD on a strategic basis but recognize that a ceasefire presents a short term (maximum 12-month) risk to this view, so clients with a shorter-term horizon should close that trade. We are long European equities relative to Chinese equities as a result of the view that China will stimulate but that a trade ceasefire will leave lingering uncertainties over Chinese corporates. U.S. politics are highly unpredictable but constraint-based analysis indicates that while the House may impeach, the Senate will not remove. This, combined with Warren’s likely ascent to the head of the pack in the Democratic primary race, means that Trump remains favored to win reelection, albeit with low conviction (55% chance) due to a weak general approval rating and economic risks. The risk to U.S. equities is immediate, but should dissipate. The U.S. is rotating its strategic focus from the Middle East to Asia Pacific, which entails a continued rotation of geopolitical risk. However, recent developments reinforce our argument in July that Iranian geopolitical risk is frontloaded relative to the China risk. This is true as long as Trump maintains crippling sanctions. Iran may be emboldened by its successes so far and has various mechanisms – including Iraqi instability – by which it can threaten oil supply to pressure Trump. This is a tail risk, but it does support our position of being long EM energy producers.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research, China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Mild Deflation Means Timid Easing,” October 9, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 China knows that Trump wants to seal a deal prior to November 2020 to aid his reelection campaign, while Trump needs to try to convince China that he does not care about election, the stock market, or anything other than structural concessions from China. Hence the U.S. blacklisted several artificial intelligence companies and sanctioned Chinese officials in advance of the talks. The U.S. opened a new front in the conflict by invoking China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which is also an implicit warning not to create a humanitarian incident in Hong Kong where protests continue to rage. These are pressure tactics but have not yet derailed the attempt to seal a deal in Q4.

ハイライト 米国の成長は、国内活動を牽引する堅固な要因とマネーおよびクレジット動向の強まりにより、まもなく回復するだろう。 米連邦準備制度理事会は緩和的なバイアスを維持し、再びバランスシートを拡大するだろう。 拡大する米連邦準備制度理事会のバランスシートは世界的な流動性環境の基調改善を触発し、世界経済を押し上げるだろう。 ブレグジット、中国、およびイランが主要リスクである。 ドルは下落し、債券利回りはさらに上昇し、銀は金をアウトパフォームするだろう。 株式は景気循環的および構造的な投資期間の両面で債券を上回るだろう。 金融株とエネルギーはテクノロジーとヘルスケアよりも魅力的である。したがって、欧州は米国に対して相対的にいっそう魅力的になりつつある。 特集 世界の株式は2018年1月の史上最高値からわずか5%下回るだけで、S&P 500は2019年7月の記録を上抜けしようとしている。いっぽうで利回りは反発し、バリュー株がモメンタム株を圧倒している。これらのトレンドは持続可能だろうか。 世界成長が鍵である。世界各地の経済活動が安定し最終的に改善することができれば、株式は上抜けし、来年にかけて債券価格は下落するだろう。そうでなければ、これら最近の金融市場の展開は元に戻るだろう。 たとえ現在の活動が弱いままであっても、貿易戦争、ブレグジット、中東の緊張、インターバンク市場の問題にもかかわらず、世界成長の見通しは改善しつつある。したがって、利回りの上昇余地が残っているため、我々は引き続き株式を債券より好む。ドルが弱まれば、当社のプロリスクの姿勢はさらに強まるだろう。 米国の成長ドライバーは健全である Chart I-1景気後退指標がイエローフラッグを示している 景気後退の指標が黄色信号を点滅させている 景気後退の指標が黄色信号を点滅させている 米国は強力なミッドサイクルの減速の終盤に近いが、景気後退は回避されるだろう。イールドカーブや先行指標の年率変化率などの主要な景気後退指標は依然として曖昧なシグナルを送っているものの（Chart I-1）、現状は来年の米国活動の改善を支える。 米国の成長は最終的にLEIを押し上げ、イールドカーブを再び急勾配化させる五つの基本要因により強まるだろう：住宅の回復の芽生え、堅調な家計支出、安定化する製造業、限定的なインフレ圧力、そしてマネーとクレジット動向の回復である。 住宅 住宅市場は安定している。要因は、家計形成の旺盛さ、まずまずの住宅の手頃さ、州および地方税控除上限によるショックの通過、そして2018年11月以降のモーゲージ金利の110ベーシスポイントの低下である。 住宅市場の指標はついに住宅ローン申請のような先行変数に追いつきつつある。過去9か月で、NAHB住宅市場指数は2018年12月以来の下落のほぼ3分の2を回復した。建築許可件数と住宅着工件数は、昨年大幅に落ち込んだにもかかわらず、2007年以来の高水準にある。既存住宅販売も12月以来11%増加しており、借入コスト低下による刺激のトレンドに沿っている（Chart I-2）。 Chart I-2住宅の回復は実在する 住宅市場の回復は確かだ 住宅市場の回復は確かだ 住宅投資は、過去6四半期でGDPレベルを1%押し下げていた後、まもなく経済活動を押し上げるはずだ。さらに、住宅活動の回復は政策が成長を抑制していないことを示唆する。不動産セクターは歴史的に金融環境に最も敏感である。 家計は依然健全である 米国のコア実質小売売上高は年率4%超のペースで増加を続けており、アトランタ連銀のGDPNowモデルは第3四半期の消費支出が年率3.1%の健全な増加を予測している。このレジリエンスは、経済的不確実性やISM製造業指数の50の景気分岐点割れを前にして特に印象的である。 家計の強固なバランスシートが重要である。12年間のデレバレッジの結果、家計債務は可処分所得比で37ポイント縮小し99%となった。その結果、債務返済コストは可処分所得のわずか10%を占め、45年以上で最低水準である。さらに、家計貯蓄率は税引後所得の7.9%と健全であり、これは過去最高の純資産と1985年以来の最低の負債対資産比率という文脈において特に高い。 家計所得は消費に追加の支えをもたらす。実質可処分所得は雇用創出が鈍化しているにもかかわらず年率3%のペースで拡大している。この一見した逆説はタイトな労働市場により説明される。当社が労働市場の余剰を測る上で最も重視する指標である主要労働年齢層の就業者比率は79.7%まで上昇し、これは賃金・給与の年率2.9%の伸びと整合的である（Chart I-3）。GMでのUAWのストライキ、18年ぶり高水準にある離職率、小規模企業が有能な労働者を見つける困難さは、賃金（したがって消費）が引き続きしっかり支えられることを示唆している（Chart I-3、下段）。 製造業見通しの改善 ISM製造業指数の弱さにもかかわらず、製造業活動は反発する見込みである。最近の鉱工業生産の数字はすでに改善している。月次の鉱工業生産は8月に月率0.6%で拡大したが、直近では4月に月率-0.6%で縮小していた。 米国の金融環境は今後およそ18か月間、資産価格と世界経済活動を支え続けるだろう。 自動車セクターはまもなく底打ちするだろう。弱い自動車生産が最近の世界的な製造業減速の主要因であった。GDPの自動車関連項目は第2四半期に驚くべき年率29.1%の縮小となった。しかし、米国のライトビークル販売は概ね横ばいである。この二極化は自動車セクターの在庫が急速に縮小していることを示唆している（Chart I-4）。 Chart I-3タイトな労働市場が消費を支える 2019年10月 2019年10月 Chart I-4自動車生産はまもなく回復するか？ 自動車生産は近いうちに回復するか？ 自動車生産は近いうちに回復するか？   設備投資（Capex）も回復するはずだ。前四半期には構造物および設備への投資がGDP成長を押し下げた。それ以前は設備投資意向が大幅に低下していたが、現在フィラデルフィア連銀の設備投資構成要素は安定化を試みている。グローバルな製造業が強化されるためには、設備投資は下落を止めなければならない。 限定的なインフレ圧力 米国のインフレ圧力は抑制されており、これは二つの方法で成長を支える。第一に、インフレが抑制されていることで米連邦準備制度理事会は金融緩和的な条件を維持できる。過度な債務返済コストが存在しない限り、緩和的な政策は拡張を保証する。第二に、低いインフレは実質所得の伸びを高く保ち、家計の福祉を高める。 コアCPIは2.4%で堅調だが、まもなく頭打ちするだろう。過去3年間、コア財価格が総合的なコア価格の変動を主導してきた一方で、サービス部門のインフレ率はこの期間2.7%で安定している。財のインフレは以下の理由でまもなく弱まるだろう： Chart I-5貿易戦争は経済のデフレ傾向を覆い隠している 貿易戦争は経済のデフレ傾向を覆い隠している 貿易戦争は経済のデフレ傾向を覆い隠している 世界的な経済活動の弱さが世界的なインフレを押し下げる。インフレは実物活動に遅行し、シンガポールのGDPのような世界経済の代理指標はOECDのコアCPIの弱さを示唆している（Chart I-5）。この弱さは米国の財価格に国際的要素が大きいため、米国インフレに対する下押し要因となる。 米国の輸入物価は15か月前にピークアウトしており、通常は財のインフレを約1年半先導する。 過去18か月で約15%上昇し史上最高に達した広義の貿易加重ドルの強さは財価格を圧迫するだろう。 米国の稼働率は2019年を通じて低下し、歴史的にコア財価格が過熱する80%水準を大きく下回っている。 ホワイトハウスの対中国関税はインフレを押し上げているが、この効果は一過性であろう。関税は課税対象となる財のインフレを押し上げる一方で、影響を受けない財はデフレを経験している（Chart I-5、下段）。関税は一度きりの影響を与えるため、インフレ期待が歴史的低水準近辺にとどまっている状況では、関税対象財のインフレは非関税財の基調に収れんしていくだろう。 強まるマネーとクレジットの動向 マネーとクレジットの動向は、最近の落ち込みが景気後退に転化しないことを示唆している。さらに、米国の民間セクターの流動性環境の改善はミッドサイクルの減速が終わりつつあることを示している。 Chart I-6流動性指標は成長の反発を示唆している 流動性指標は成長の反発を示唆している 流動性指標は成長の反発を示唆している 米国のブロードマネーは回復している。昨年11月に0.9%まで落ち込んだ後、米国の実質M2成長率は年率3%のペースで拡大しており、これはミッドサイクルの減速の終わりに一致するペースである。さらに、マネーはクレジット発行に対しても加速しており、これは歴史的に工業活動の加速を示してきた。同様に、当社の米国金融流動性指数は急速に上昇しており、これは通常ISM製造業指数の転換点に先行する動きである（Chart I-6）。 クレジット活動も回復している。社債発行は堅調であり、米連邦準備制度理事会のシニア・ローン・オフィサー調査によれば、ローン需要は全般的に反発している。利回りの急落はG-10全体でクレジット成長を押し上げている。 金は債券をアウトパフォームしており、これはミッドサイクルの減速が発生したことを確認する。インフレが問題でなければ、金は景気後退前に常に債券に劣後する。しかし、ミッドサイクルの下落の前には、金は一貫して債券をアウトパフォームしてきた（Chart I-7）。 Chart I-7景気後退の前に債券は金をアウトパフォームする 景気後退を控え、ボンドがゴールドを上回る 景気後退を控え、ボンドがゴールドを上回る さらなるFRBの緩和が差し迫っている 米国の金融環境は今後およそ18か月間、資産価格と世界的な経済活動を支え続けるだろう。FRB（連邦準備制度理事会）はさらに金融緩和を進める見込みであり、引き締めにはほど遠い。 先週、連邦公開市場委員会（FOMC）はフェデラルファンド金利の誘導目標を25ベーシスポイント引き下げて2％とした。さらに、中央値の予測はFRBメンバーが少なくとも今後18か月間は追加利下げを見込んでいないことを示しているが、現実はより微妙である。17人のFOMCメンバーのうち7人は年末までにフェデラルファンド金利をさらに25ベーシスポイント引き下げると予想し、8人は2020年後半により低い政策金利を見込んでいる。 米ドルは非常に割高であり、世界的な流動性環境が改善するにつれて下落するだろう。 我々は依然として今年中に25ベーシスポイントの利下げを3回行う見通しにある。FRBは依然としてデータに大きく依存しており、特に低迷したインフレ期待に敏感である。これは、金融環境が突然引き締まることによって生じる危険をFRBが鋭敏に認識していることを意味する。年末までに市場が2019年の追加利下げの織り込みを離れていなければ、FOMCはこの緩和を実施する可能性が高い。さもなければ、金融条件が突然引き締まり、インフレ期待と経済見通しを損ねるだろう。もし世界成長が2020年初めに回復しなければ、FRBは第1四半期にさらに一度利下げを行う可能性が高く、これはOISカーブに織り込まれた現行の12か月のプライシングを検証することになる。 チャート I-8十分な余剰準備金がない 超過準備金が不足している 超過準備金が不足している FRBは再びバランスシートの拡大を行うだろう。インターバンク市場はFOMCを追い込み、世界経済に歓迎される刺激を追加することを強いた。民間銀行の余剰準備金の再拡大を許容することは、単なる利下げよりも世界成長に対してより大きなプラスの影響をもたらすだろう。 先月、我々は余剰準備金の減少、プライマリー・ディーラーのレポ取引で調達された膨張した証券在庫、そして米国債の発行増加の組み合わせがレポ市場にもたらすリスクを指摘した1 。これらのリスクは先週顕在化し、担保付翌日物資金調達レート（SOFR）が突然5％を上回る水準に急騰した（チャート I-8）。市場を落ち着かせるために、FRBは先週火曜日から毎日750億ドルを注入し、レポ金利を超過準備金利（IOER）に近づけた。しかし、これは長期的な解決策ではない。 チャート I-9余剰準備金の増加は米ドルを押し下げ、世界成長を押し上げる 超過準備金の増加はドルに悪影響を与え、世界経済の成長を押し上げる 超過準備金の増加はドルに悪影響を与え、世界経済の成長を押し上げる 逆説的だが、レポ市場の緊張が顕在化したことは世界経済にとって好材料だ。なぜならそれがFRBに来月にもバランスシートを再拡大させることを強いるからだ。レポ市場への資金供給は恒久的に増加する必要があり、これは銀行の余剰準備金が再び拡大しなければならないことを意味する。先月示したように、余剰準備金の増加は米ドルを傷つけ、新興市場の為替を押し上げ、世界のPMIを押し上げるだろう（チャート I-9）。 余剰準備金の増加は世界的な流動性環境を緩和する。注入されたマネーは世界の他の地域へと流れていくだろう。米ドルは購買力平価の長期的な公正価値推定に対して約25％高値で取引されている。したがって、より大きなFRBのバランスシートによって間接的にファイナンスされる財政赤字の拡大は、米国の経常収支赤字を拡大させ、それが結果として世界の外貨準備高を押し上げるだろう。結果として、他の中央銀行のためにFRBが保管する証券保有高は増加する。こうして、ドルベースの世界的流動性は、それが支える米ドル建て外債のストックに対して縮小を停止することになる（チャート I-10）。 余剰準備金の増加はまた世界の金融条件を緩和する。ドルベースの流動性を高めることで、FRBのバランスシートの拡大はオフショアのドル金利を抑制するだろう。さらに、余剰準備金の増加は米ドルを減価させ、米ドルで借り入れる外国主体の資金調達コストをさらに引き下げる。この現象は新興市場（EM）にとって特に重要である。したがって、新興市場の為替レートに大きく依存するEMの金融状況は緩和されるはずだ。歴史的に見て、EMの金融状況の緩和は世界成長の強化につながる（チャート I-11）。 チャート I-10基礎的流動性は改善する見込み 強力な流動性は改善する見込み 強力な流動性は改善する見込み チャート I-11新興市場の金融状況指数（FCI）の緩和は成長加速につながるはず EMのFCI緩和は成長の加速をもたらすはずだ EMのFCI緩和は成長の加速をもたらすはずだ   リスク：英国、中国、イラン 見通しは概して世界成長の回復を示しており、リスク資産にとって良好な環境を作るだろうが、英国、中国、イランの状況は注意深く監視する必要がある。 英国 我々の基本見通しは穏当な結末を見込むものの、ブレグジットは依然として世界にとっての潜在的危険である。英国首相ボリス・ジョンソンがEUに譲歩を強いるためにノー・ディール・ブレグジットを仕掛ける手法は、誤算を招く可能性がある。そのような事態が起これば、すでに弱い世界貿易によって傷んでいる欧州経済は景気後退に陥るだろう。米ドルは強含み、世界の金融環境は引き締まり、世界成長はさらに打撃を受ける。 チャート I-12英国：潜在的な選挙を前に明確な勝者は見えない 英国：見込まれる選挙を前に明確な勝者は見えず 英国：見込まれる選挙を前に明確な勝者は見えず 今週の最高裁がジョンソンの議会休会決定に対して全会一致で判断を下したことを受け、ノー・ディールの確率は10％未満となっている。ジョンソンはハード・ブレグジットに強く反対する議会で過半数を欠いており、EU離脱期限である10月31日までに選挙を実行することができない。したがって、延期が最もあり得る結果であり、それによりEUと英国は議会が承認できるアイルランドのバックストップに関する合意に至る余地が生まれるだろう。 最終的には、英国は現状の膠着を打破するために再度の選挙を必要としており、これは11月か12月に実現する可能性がある。しかし、残留支持の票は労働党、自由民主党（Lib Dems）、スコットランド民族党（SNP）に分散している一方で、離脱支持の票はそれほど分散していない（チャート I-12）。したがって、ブレグジットは完全に世界成長への本格的な襲撃に変貌しないとしても、依然として背景に潜むリスクであり続けるだろう。 中国 チャート I-13中国の景気刺激策は依然として不十分で、決定的な効果を与えていない 中国の景気刺激策は、影響を与えるにはあまりに生ぬるいままだ 中国の景気刺激策は、影響を与えるにはあまりに生ぬるいままだ 中国の経済活動は引き続き減速している。8月には鉱工業生産と固定資産投資がそれぞれ前年比4.4％、5.5％に減速した。さらに、総社会融資の成長は年間ベースで鈍化し、中国全体の信用フローはGDP比で減少した（チャート I-13）。中国の政策によるリフレーションは、貿易不確実性と支出に対する限界傾向の弱さが生み出す下押しを覆すには依然として弱すぎる（チャート I-13、下段）。 米中貿易摩擦はここ数か月で大幅に緩和されたが、中国と世界にとって重要な不確実性の源であり続ける。中国と米国は来月再び高官級協議を行う予定であり、トランプ大統領は一部の関税引き上げを再度延期し、中国は再び中西部産の大豆と豚肉を購入している。しかし、中国当局による米国農場訪問の先週金曜の取りやめは、状況が非常に流動的であることを思い起こさせる。究極的には、中国と米国は長期的な地政学的ライバルである。トランプは2020年選挙によって制約を受けるかもしれないが、中国は依然として強硬な取引を仕掛ける可能性がある。したがって、交渉はストップ・アンド・ゴーのパターンになると見ておくのが賢明である。 チャート I-14デフレは実質借入コストの上昇という悪循環を引き起こす デフレーションは実質的な借入コストの上昇という悪循環を引き起こす デフレーションは実質的な借入コストの上昇という悪循環を引き起こす 弱い中国は自ら回復の芽を生むだろう。投資計画と信用需要に対する貿易不確実性の負の影響に加えて、北京は雇用の悪化とPPI（生産者物価）の-0.8％という状況に直面している（チャート I-14、上段）。PPIの下振れが拡大するにつれて、多額の債務を抱える企業借入者は実質金利の上昇に直面する（チャート I-14、下段）。この借入コストの上昇は、脆弱な経済をさらに弱め、悪循環を引き起こす。中国の政策当局がこの状況を長く容認することは考えにくい。2018年4月以降の預金準備率の累計400ベーシスポイントの引き下げは正しい方向の一歩だが、まだ十分ではない。政治局と国務院の文言のハト派化は、より大規模な刺激策が差し迫っていることを示している。したがって、信用拡大、地方政府の特別債券発行、そして財政刺激は2019年第4四半期にさらに顕著になるだろう。この政策は2020年に経済活動を目に見えて押し上げ、世界成長の加速を助けるはずだ。 イラン 緊張は再び高まりつつあり、原油価格の急騰は脆弱な世界経済を脅かすだろう。しかし、これは中心的なシナリオではなくリスクにとどまる。 我々は『ザ・バンク・クレジット・アナリスト』7月号で、イランとの緊張が世界成長とリスク資産に対する最大の目に見えるリスクであると警告した2。この危険は先週、サウジアラビアのフーライス油田とアブカイク石油処理施設へのドローン攻撃により顕在化し、世界の原油供給は日量570万バレルという前例のない規模、すなわち世界需要の5.5％分が削減された。予想どおり、ブレントは急速に12％上昇して68ドル/バレルとなった。 チャート I-15エネルギー効率の向上が世界をより強靭にする エネルギー効率の向上は世界をより強靭にする エネルギー効率の向上は世界をより強靭にする 原油価格の持続的な急騰は世界経済を景気後退に追い込みかねない。特に世界経済がすでに脆弱な足場にある現状ではそうだ。米国株式のチーフ・ストラテジスト、アナスタシオス・アヴゲリウは顧客に対して、ジェームズ・D・ハミルトン教授の2011年の有意義な論文によれば、原油価格の倍増が戦後の景気後退のほとんどの前兆となっていたことを注意喚起した3。しかし、原油が原因の景気後退は浅いものにとどまる可能性が高い。過去30年間で世界経済の石油強度は大幅に低下しているからだ（チャート I-15）。さらに、世界の財政当局は景気収縮に対して強力に対応するだろうため、このショックの影響は限定的となるだろう。 年末までに原油価格が倍増する可能性は低い。ブレントが100ドル/バレルまで急騰する必要があるが、サウジアラビアはすでに生産が数日内に危機前の水準へ戻り、一便の出荷も欠けることはないと表明している。この約束はさらなる在庫取り崩しを示唆する。アラムコも11月下旬までに最大生産を達成する見込みだ。さらに、原油価格の上昇は米国のシェール開発をさらに活性化させるだろう。したがって、今後3か月でブレントがさらに35ドル/バレルも急騰する可能性は低い。しかし、ブレントは来年75ドル/バレルまで上昇する可能性がある。というのも、原油需要は回復する見込みである一方で、投資家はサウジの供給途絶に対するリスクプレミアムをより多く織り込む必要があるからだ。 イランとの軍事衝突はテールリスクだが、もし現実化すれば原油は瞬時にして35ドル/バレル以上急騰するだろう。BCAのチーフ・ジオポリティカル・ストラテジスト、マット・ガートケンによれば、そのような衝突への米国の民意は低い5。トランプ大統領は孤立主義的傾向があり、また別の紛争に深入りすることを望んでいない。投資への含意 米ドル 米ドルは大幅な下落余地を抱えている。米ドルは非常に割高であり、世界的な流動性環境が改善すれば下落するだろう（チャート I-16）。これらの動きは米ドルの逆景気循環的性質を反映しており、上昇時も下落時も強い米ドルのモメンタムをもたらす。世界的な成長と流動性環境の改善に応じて米ドルは弱含み、ドル安は世界的な金融環境を緩和し、世界経済をさらに刺激する。そうした中で好循環が生まれる可能性がある。 Chart I-16Increasing Financial Liquidity Will Hurt The Greenback 金融流動性の増加は米ドルに打撃を与える 金融流動性の増加は米ドルに打撃を与える 本国還流は追い風から逆風へと転じるだろう。リスク回避の高まりとトランプの減税策に促されて、米国の経済主体は過去18か月で4610億ドルを本国還流させた。これが米ドルを強力に下支えしてきた（チャート I-17）。減税効果は薄れつつあり、世界的な成長の回復は米国の家計や企業に対して世界景気循環によりレバレッジされた外国資産を購入するインセンティブを与える。その過程で彼らは米ドルを売却するだろう。 Chart I-17Repatriation Will Not Support The Dollar For Much Longer 本国への資金還流は、もはや米ドルを長く支えないだろう 本国への資金還流は、もはや米ドルを長く支えないだろう ユーロは引き続き反ドルとして振る舞うだろう。これは両通貨ペアの豊富な市場流動性の結果である。さらに、ユーロは購買力平価均衡に対して17％のディスカウントで取引されている。先週の利下げと量的緩和の発表後、欧州中央銀行はこれ以上の緩和余地を残していない。代わりに、周辺国債スプレッドの最近の縮小が欧州の金融環境を緩めており、欧州の成長見通しを押し上げている。これがユーロをより魅力的にしている。 債券と貴金属 安全資産利回りは今後12～18か月で大幅に上振れするだろう。先月強調したように、債券は非常に高値で買われ過ぎかつ保有過多であり、サイクル的なリターンがマイナスになる確率が極めて高い（チャート I-18、左右のパネル）。さらに、米連邦準備制度理事会（FRB）がバランスシートの拡大を再開すると超過準備金は再び増加する。超過準備金の増加は利回り曲線の傾きの急勾配化をもたらす（チャート I-19）。短期金利は下押し余地が限定されているため、曲線は10年物利回りの上昇を通じてしか傾斜を強めることができない。 Chart I-18AValuation And Technicals Point Toward Higher Yields In 12 Months (I) バリュエーションとテクニカルは12か月で利回りの上昇を示唆（I） バリュエーションとテクニカルは12か月で利回りの上昇を示唆（I） Chart I-18BValuation And Technicals Point Toward Higher Yields In 12 Months (II) バリュエーションとテクニカル指標は12か月で利回りの上昇を示唆している（II） バリュエーションとテクニカル指標は12か月で利回りの上昇を示唆している（II）   Chart I-19Fed Purchases Will Steepen The Curve FRBの買い入れがイールドカーブをスティープ化する FRBの買い入れがイールドカーブをスティープ化する 短期の動きはより複雑だ。米国債利回りは9月3日の安値以降21ベーシスポイント上昇しており、主に貿易緊張の緩和が背景にある。以前のミッドサイクルの減速局面では、債券価格のピークはISM景況指数が底打ちしてから初めて顕在化した。我々はまだそこに達していない。予測不能な米中交渉と世界成長の現時点での回復不足を考慮すると、利回りは短期的に大きなボラティリティを示すと予想される。この移行過程において、景気循環型投資家は現在のような債券ラリーを利用して、フィクスト・インカム・ポートフォリオにベンチマークを下回るデュレーション・ポジションを構築すべきである。 貴金属の中では、我々は引き続き金よりも銀を選好している。私たちは6月下旬以来貴金属を推奨してきた6が、より高い債券利回りは金にとってはマイナスだ。一方で、中央銀行はインフレ・ブレイクイーブンを歴史的な標準である2.3％～2.5％に戻すことを狙ったハト派バイアスを維持している。この過程は来年末に経済が過熱する可能性を高める。今後12か月は、実質金利の上昇ではなくインフレ期待の高まりが債券利回りを押し上げるだろう。ドル安と相まって、この構成は金に対してやや強気である。銀は金よりもベータが高く工業用途が多いため、世界成長が回復すればアウトパフォームする期間が来るだろう。この文脈において、1970年以来の6パーセンタイルに位置する銀対金の比率は平均回帰狙いとして魅力的である（チャート I-20）。 Chart I-20The Silver-Gold Ratio Is A Bargain 銀と金の比率はお買い得だ 銀と金の比率はお買い得だ 株式 投資家は今後1年間、債券に対して株式を引き続き選好すべきである。株式は景気後退が始まる6か月前まで良好に推移する（表 I-1）。さらに、当社の金融およびテクニカル指標は強含みである（セクションIII参照）。加えてセンチメント調査は投資家の過度なコンプラセンシーを示しておらず（セクションIII参照）、これは逆張り的な観点からのリスクを限定する。一方で利回りには上振れ余地があり、これは株式が債券に対してアウトパフォームすることを意味する。 Table I-1The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession 2019年10月 2019年10月 短期的な状況はより複雑だ。PER拡大がS&P 500の上昇の90％を牽引してきた（2018年12月24日の底打ち以降）一方、当社のモデルによれば米国の営業利益は少なくともさらに8か月は縮小する見通しである（チャート I-21）。したがって、残りの期間に利回りが上昇すれば、マルチプルはおそらく縮小するだろう。S&P 500はその期間、もみ合いを続ける見込みだ。 Chart I-21U.S. Profits Still Have Downside 米国の利益は依然として下方余地がある 米国の利益は依然として下方余地がある このような状況では、ストラテジーは投資家に株式市場内部のダイナミクスに注目することを要求する。すなわち、投資家は以下の理由からテクノロジーとヘルスケアを割り引いて金融セクターとエネルギーを選好すべきである： 利回り上昇は金融セクターのネット金利マージンを押し上げる。また、長期キャッシュフローとターミナルバリューに多くの本質的価値を抱えるテクノロジー株のマルチプルを圧迫する。したがって、利回り上昇は金融がテクに対してアウトパフォームすることと相関する（チャート I-22）。さらに、金融のバリュエーションとテクニカルはテクに比べて非常に低迷しており、比較される利益見通しも同様に厳しい（チャート I-23）。最後に、当社の米国株式ストラテジーチームは金融セクターによる自社株買いが大幅に増加すると見込んでいる。7 Chart I-22If Yields Rise, Financials Will Beat Tech 利回りが上昇すれば、金融株はテック株を上回る 利回りが上昇すれば、金融株はテック株を上回る Chart I-23Valuations, Technicals And Sentiment Favor Financials Over Tech バリュエーション、テクニカル、センチメントはテクノロジー株に対して金融株を優位にしている バリュエーション、テクニカル、センチメントはテクノロジー株に対して金融株を優位にしている     利回り上昇はヘルスケア株にも打撃を与える。加えて、エリザベス・ウォーレン上院議員のような民主党内の進歩派の支持拡大により、投資家はヘルスケア株の価格にリスクプレミアムを織り込む必要がある（チャート I-24）。進歩派は医療保険の公的化を目指し、医薬品から病院に至るまで医療分野の利益率を圧縮しようとしている。 Chart I-24The Rise Of The Progressives Requires A Risk Premium In Health Care Stocks 2019年10月 2019年10月 我々は中東の緊張高まりに対するヘッジとしてエネルギー株を利用してきた。現在、当社の米国株式ストラテジーの同僚はこのセクターに対してよりポジティブになっている。エネルギーのバリュエーションとテクニカルはS&P 500と比べて非常に魅力的である（チャート I-25）。8世界成長が回復して世界的な債券利回りが上昇すれば、エネルギー株はアウトパフォームするだろう。 これらのセクター別の推奨は、投資家がまもなく米国株に対して欧州株を選好し始めるべきだという主張とも一致する。金融とエネルギーは欧州株式で比率が高く、テクノロジーとヘルスケアは米国で大きくオーバーウェイトされている（表 I-2）。さらに、欧州の景況は米国より世界的な経済モメンタムに対して感度が高い。したがって、世界的な利回りが上昇し世界経済が安定化すれば、欧州株は米国株をアウトパフォームするだろう（チャート I-26）。加えて、欧州の銀行は簿価の0.6倍で取引されており、これは金融環境の緩和と利回り上昇に非常にレバレッジの効いた究極のバリュー・プレイとなる。 Chart I-25Energy Is A Compelling Buy エネルギーは魅力的な買い エネルギーは魅力的な買い Table I-2Overweighting Europe Is Consistent With Our Sectoral Recommendations 2019年10月 2019年10月 Chart I-26Europe Will Soon Outperform The U.S. ヨーロッパはまもなく米国をアウトパフォームする ヨーロッパはまもなく米国をアウトパフォームする Chart I-27Long-Term Investors Should Favor Stocks Over Bonds 長期投資家は債券より株式を優先すべきだ 長期投資家は債券より株式を優先すべきだ これらのセクター・バイアスはバリュー株がグロース株をアウトパフォームするという見解とも整合する。しかし、BCAのグローバル・アセット・アロケーションサービスのXiaoli TangがセクションIIで論じているように、バリュー対グロースの問題は地理的地域や時価総額別に差別化する必要がある複雑な問題である。 最後に、長期投資家は株式を債券よりも選好すべきである。BCAのチーフ・グローバル・ストラテジストであるPeter Berezinによれば、現在のバリュエーション水準におけるグローバル株式は期待される10年実質リターン4.2％を提供する。歴史的基準から見るとこれは高いリターンではないが、政府債よりははるかに魅力的である。配当利回りに基づけば、米国、日本、欧州の株式はそれぞれ10年ベースで債券に劣後する前に18％、28％、40％下落する必要がある。これは大きな安全余地である（チャート I-27）。我々はより魅力的なバリュエーションと現地通貨での期待収益を持つ海外株式を好む。加えて、米ドルは割高であり5～10年の投資期間では弱含むだろう。 Mathieu Savary バイスプレジデント ザ・バンク・クレジット・アナリスト 2019年9月26日 次回レポート：2019年10月31日   II. バリュー？ グロース？ それは本当に状況次第！ 投資家は、学術的にも実務的にもバリューとグロースのストラテジーを評価する際に、定義と方法論に特に注意を払うべきである。 バリュー投資家は米国外市場、特に新興市場のスモールキャップ・ユニバースに注力すべきである。 グロース投資家はラージキャップ、特に米国のラージキャップ・ユニバースに注力すべきである。 スモールキャップ投資家はバリューに注力すべきである。 ラージおよびミッドキャップ投資家は、戦略的にバリューとグロースのどちらかに賭けるべきではない。タクティカルなスタイル・ローテーションは、バリュエーションのスプレッドが極端な水準に達した時にのみ行うべきである。  GAAはバリュー対グロースについてはニュートラルを維持しているが、スタイルの傾斜を実現するためにセクター・ポジショニング（景気循環株対ディフェンシブ、金融対テクノロジーおよびヘルスケア）や国別ポジショニング（ユーロ圏対米国）を用いることを好む。 スタイルによる投資は投資そのものと同じくらい古くからある手法である。最近の急激なスタイルの逆転を踏まえ、ここしばらくクライアントから最も頻繁に尋ねられる質問の一つがバリュー対グロースである。本レポートでは、バリュー対グロースに関してよく寄せられる質問にいくつか答えることを試みる。これらの疑問は五つの別個のセクションに整理した。 まず最初に、学術界が主にファマ＝フレンチの枠組みを使用してきたため、ファマ＝フレンチのバリューおよびグロースのポートフォリオに関する93年分の歴史を見て、バリュー、グロース、サイズが時間とともにどのように相互作用してきたかを検証する。 第二に、実務者は主にS&P、Russell、MSCIといった商用のインデックスをベンチマークとして使用するため、これらの米国のスタイル・インデックスがどれほど比較可能かを検討する。 第三に、MSCIのバリュー-グロース指数群（MSCIはグローバルカバレッジ下の各市場ごとにバリュー-グロース指数を作成する唯一のインデックス提供者であるため）を用いて、国際市場が米国と同じバリュー-グロースのパフォーマンス・サイクルを共有しているかを調査する。 第四に、S&PおよびRussellのピュア・スタイル指数と標準の対応する指数を比較することで、バリューとグロースへの純粋なエクスポージャーが実際にバリュー-グロースのパフォーマンス差を改善できるかを検証する。 最後に、投資結論のセクションでGAAのスタイル傾斜へのアプローチを提示する。 1. 長期的に見てバリューは本当にグロースをアウトパフォームするのか？ バリュー・プレミアムの存在を支持する圧倒的な学術的証拠が存在する。10 学術的には、「バリュー・プレミアム」、すなわちHML（ハイ・マイナス・ロー）ファクタープレミアム、またはバリューのアウトパフォーマンスは、最も割安な株式と最も割高な株式とのリターン差として定義される。ファマとフレンチは簿価対株価比率を唯一の評価基準として用いたが、11 多くの研究者は簿価対株価比率を収益対株価比率、売上対株価比率、配当利回りなどの他の評価指標と組み合わせている。12  また、「大型株においてはバリューのアウトパフォーマンスはほとんど存在しない」という学術的証拠もある。13 さらに2014年、ファマとフレンチは「A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model」というワーキングペーパーを公表し、大きな波紋を呼んだ。そこでは「HMLは冗長なファクターである」と示され、「平均HMLリターンはHMLの他ファクター（サイズ、収益性、投資パターンなど）へのエクスポージャーによって説明される」としている（1963年から2013年の米国データに基づく）。14 資産オーナーおよびアロケーターは、バリューおよびグロースのベンチマークを選定する際に特に注意を払うべきである。 非定量系の実務者、特にロングオンリー投資家にとって、バリューとグロースは学術上の「バリュー・ファクター」と同じ原理を共有しながらも別個の投資スタイルである。定義はS&P Dow Jones、FTSE Russell、MSCIがそれぞれのバリューおよびグロース指数をどのように定義しているかに示される通り異なる（次節を参照）。一般に、バリュー株は割安であり、平均を下回る収益成長の可能性を持つ一方、グロース株は平均を上回る収益成長の可能性を持つが非常に割高である。商用インデックス提供者が公表する指数は長い歴史を持たない場合が多いが、幸いにもファマ＝フレンチは公開ウェブサイト上でバリュー-グロース-サイズのポートフォリオを提供している。15 表 II-1 は、1926年7月から2019年6月までの93年間にわたり、よく知られたファマ＝フレンチの手法に基づく米国のバリュー・ポートフォリオが、等ウェイトであれマーケットキャップ加重であれ、そのグロースに相当するポートフォリオを上回ってきたことを示している。特に注目すべきは、イコールウェイトのスモールキャップ・バリューが絶対値で年間10％以上グロースをアウトパフォームし、リスク調整後リターンではグロースの2倍以上となっている点である。 表 II-1ファマ＝フレンチ バリュー-グロース-サイズ ポートフォリオのパフォーマンス* 2019年10月 2019年10月 一部の報道は、バリュー株は平均して「より大きくより確立された企業」であるため「ボラティリティが低い」と主張している。16 これは特定の期間では当てはまるかもしれない。しかしファマ＝フレンチがカバーする93年間では、この一般的な見解は支持されない。実際、ラージおよびスモールのユニバースにおいて、バリュー・ポートフォリオはコンポーネントの加重方法に関わらず一貫してグロース・ポートフォリオよりもボラティリティが高かった。しかしながら超過リターンは高いボラティリティを相殺し、四つのペアのうち三つではリスク調整後リターンを上回っている。例外はマーケットキャップ加重のラージキャップ・グロースであり、これはバリューの対応物よりもはるかに低いボラティリティのためにわずかに高いリスク調整後リターンを示している。非常に長期的な観点から見ると、バリューのアウトパフォーマンスはより高いリスクを取ることから生じている。 さらに調査すると、バリューがグロースに対して長期的に優位であったのは主にファマ＝フレンチの93年サンプルの最初の80年間に集中していることが分かる。2007年以降のより最近の期間では、四つのファマ＝フレンチのバリュー-グロースのペアのうち三つでバリューが大きく劣後しているが、イコールウェイトのスモールキャップ・バリュー‐グロースのペアだけは例外である（表 II-2参照）。イコールウェイトのスモールキャップ・バリューは最近の期間でも依然としてそのグロースの対応物を上回っているが、勝率（ヒット率）は最初の80年間の76％から54％に低下し、平均カレンダー年でのアウトパフォーマンスの大きさも最初の80年間の12.5％からわずか1.3％に落ち込んでいる。 表 II-2バリューとグロースの攻防* 2019年10月 2019年10月 統計的分析は選択する期間に敏感である。バリューとグロースは時間とともにどのようにパフォーマンスを示してきたのか？ 図 II-1 はバリュー、グロース、サイズの長期的なダイナミクスを示す。以下の結論が明確である： 図 II-1ファマ＝フレンチ バリュー-グロース-サイズのパフォーマンス動態* Fama-French バリュー・グロース・サイズ パフォーマンスの動態* Fama-French バリュー・グロース・サイズ パフォーマンスの動態* バリュー投資家はラージキャップよりもスモールキャップを選好すべきである。一方でグロース投資家はスモールキャップよりもラージキャップを選好すべきであるが、成功の可能性ははるかに低い（図 II-1、パネル1）。 スモールキャップ投資家はグロース株よりもバリュー株を選好すべきである（パネル2）。 ラージキャップ領域におけるバリューのアウトパフォーマンス（パネル3）は、スモールキャップ領域（パネル2）におけるそれよりもはるかに弱い。 ファマ＝フレンチは、CRSP（Center for Research In Security Prices）上の全NYSE銘柄の中央値時価総額に基づいてスモールとラージを定義し、NYSEの中央値サイズを用いてNYSE、AMEXおよびNASDAQ（1972年以後）をスモールキャップ・グループとラージキャップ・グループに分割している。バリューとグロースの分割は簿価対株価比率に基づき、下位30％がグロース、上位30％がバリューに分類される。興味深いことに、スモールキャップ・バリューとスモールキャップ・グロースは、図 II-2Aおよび図 II-2Bに示されているように、全ユニバースのごく一部しか占めていない。 バリュー株の平均時価総額は、ラージおよびスモールの両ユニバースにおいてグロース株の約半分である（図 II-2A、図 II-2Bのパネル3）。これもまた、バリュー株がより大きくより確立された企業であるという一部の報道の主張を支持するものではない。むしろ、すべての投資家がスモールキャップ・バリュー株を選好すべきだという主張を補強する。しかし残念ながら「スモールキャップ・バリュー」は非常に小さなユニバースである。2019年6月時点でのCRSPの米国株式時価総額合計は26.2兆ドルであり、スモールキャップ・バリューはそのうちわずか1.5％（約3,830億ドル）を占めるに過ぎない。ラージキャップ・バリューですら相対的に小さなウェイトで、約13％（約3.5兆ドル）にとどまる。 図 II-2Aスモールキャップ バリュー-グロース ポートフォリオ* スモールキャップ・バリュー・グロース・ポートフォリオ スモールキャップ・バリュー・グロース・ポートフォリオ 図 II-2Bラージキャップ バリュー-グロース ポートフォリオ* ラージキャップ・バリュー・グロース・ポートフォリオ ラージキャップ・バリュー・グロース・ポートフォリオ   米国市場はラージキャップ・グロース株が56％（2019年6月時点で約14.7兆ドル）という大きなウェイトで支配している。これは学術研究がラージキャップにおけるバリュー・プレミアムは弱いと示しているため、励みになる。ただしラージキャップにおけるバリューの弱さは主に2007年以降に始まっており、それ以前の80年間はラージキャップ・グロースに対して強さを示していた（図 II-1、パネル3）。 ファマ＝フレンチのアプローチは、1926年からの長い歴史を持つことから学術研究で広く用いられている。しかし非定量系の実務者、特にロングオンリー投資家にとっては、FTSE Russell、S&P Dow Jones、MSCIといった商用インデックスがパフォーマンスベンチマークとしてより頻繁に使われる。本レポートでは、米国およびグローバルの一連の商用バリュー-グロース・インデックスを検討し、バリュー-グロースのダイナミクスと資産アロケーターがそれらを意思決定プロセスにどのように組み込めるかについて考察する。2. すべての米国型スタイル指数が同じに作られているわけではない 主要なインデックス・プロバイダーは三社あり、スタイル指数を提供している。1987年に業界で最初のバリュー・グロース・インデックス群を立ち上げたFTSE Russell、S&P Dow Jones、そしてMSCIである。MSCIは、カバレッジ下の各個別市場すべてについて同一の方法論でフルスイートのバリュー・グロース指数を持つ唯一のプロバイダーである。三者はいずれも親指数の全構成を含む「標準」スタイル指数を提供しているが、FTSE RussellとS&P Dow Jonesはさらに「ピュア」スタイル指数も提供している。「標準」スタイル指数と「ピュア」スタイル指数の間には二つの大きな違いがある。1) 標準指数は時価総額加重であるのに対し、ピュア指数はスタイル・スコアに基づいてウェイト付けされる。2) 標準のバリューと標準のグロースは構成銘柄が重複するが、ピュア・バリューとピュア・グロースは共通の構成銘柄を持たない。 我々は戦術的にスタイルの傾きを実装する際にセクターおよび国のポジショニングを用いることを好む。 Fama‑Frenchのアプローチで用いられる簿価対株価以外に、三社はバリューとグロースの判定においてそれぞれ異なる変数を追加しており、表 II-3に示されている。これはまた、業界におけるバリューとグロースの理解の進化を反映している。例えば、MSCIが1997年にスタイル指数を初めて立ち上げた際には簿価対株価のみを用いていたが、2003年5月に現在の「マルチファクター二次元」のフレームワークへとアプローチを変更した。 表 II-3バリュー・グロース指数の基準 2019年10月 2019年10月 指数構築方法の違いのため、米国のバリュー・グロース指数は異なる挙動を示してきた。S&P 500、Russell 1000、そしてMSCIの標準（ラージおよびミッドキャップ）指数は1970年代に遡るバックテストの履歴があり、広く機関投資家に追随されるベンチマークである。チャート II-3は三社の相対的なバリュー／グロースのパフォーマンス動態と、インデックス・プロバイダーのアプローチと整合させるために時価総額加重としたFama and Frenchのものを示している。以下の点が観察できる： Chart II-3Which Value/Growth? バリュー／グロース、どちら？ バリュー／グロース、どちら？ 三つの組合せのどれもがFama‑Frenchの時価総額加重のバリュー／グロースと正確に一致していない。これは、Fama‑Frenchの長期にわたるバリュー／グロース・ポートフォリオに基づく歴史的分析を商用の指数にどのように適用すべきかという問題を提起する。 1975年から2000年2月までの最初のサイクルでは、三つの指数ペアはいずれも一巡し、バリューとグロースの間でフラットなパフォーマンスとなった。また、S&P 500とRussell 1000は互いの相関がMSCIよりも高かったものの、三者はかなり類似していた。 しかし2000年2月に始まった現在のサイクルでは、Russellのバリュー／グロースの反発が他の二つよりもはるかに強かった。だが、2007年に始まった下落局面では、三つの指数は互いにほぼ同等のパフォーマンスを示した（表 II-4参照）。 表 II-4米国スタイル指数のパフォーマンス* 2019年10月 2019年10月 さらに、S&PとRussellの差異は単にS&P 500とRussell 1000の間にあるだけではない。チャート II-4に示されるように、実際にはすべての時価総額セグメントに存在する。残念ながら、MSCIは詳細なキャップ・セグメントについて1975年からの履歴を提供していない。2000年2月以降の現サイクルでは、S&Pのバリューは2000年から2006年の間で最も小さく反発した。なぜだろうか？ Chart II-4ベンチマークを知る ベンチマークを把握する ベンチマークを把握する さらに調査すると、いくつか興味深い観察が得られる（チャート II-5参照）。 Chart II-5バリュー／グロース：Russell対S&P バリュー／グロース：ラッセル対エスアンドピー バリュー／グロース：ラッセル対エスアンドピー 集計レベルでは、S&P 1500、Russell 3000およびそれぞれのスタイル指数は、2000年2月から始まる最新サイクルにおいて概ね同等のパフォーマンスとなっており（チャート II-5、パネル4）、インデックスの収斂という業界トレンドを反映している。 しかし異なる時価総額セグメントでは、特にスモールキャップ領域（パネル1）で乖離が依然として顕著である。S&P 600はバリューとグロースの両カテゴリで一貫してRussell 2000をアウトパフォームしてきた。異なるスタイルファクターに加えて、この一貫性は異なるユニバース、サイズ分布、およびセクター・エクスポージャーを反映しており、これは以前のGAAのスペシャル・レポート（スモールキャップに関する）で説明した通りである。17 Russell 2000をパフォーマンス・ベンチマークとする運用者は、Russell 2000とS&P 600の間でトータルリターンのパフォーマンス入れ替えを行うだけで容易にベンチマークを上回ることができる。 結論：アセットオーナーおよび配分担当者は、バリューおよびグロースのベンチマークを選択する際に特に注意を払うべきである。 3. バリューとグロースはグローバルでどのようにパフォーマンスしたか？ MSCIは、同一の方法論を用いてグローバルなカバレッジ下の各株式市場ごとにバリュー・グロース指数を作成している唯一のインデックス・プロバイダーである。残念ながら、長期の履歴があるのは「標準」（すなわちラージおよびミッドキャップ）ユニバースのみで、その履歴は1974年12月から始まる。チャート II-6Aおよびチャート II-6Bは主要な先進国（DM）および新興国（EM）市場におけるバリュー／グロースの動態を示している。 MSCIの先進国（DM）におけるバリュー対グロースの相対パフォーマンスは、2000年以降の最新サイクルでは米国のパターンと類似しているが、2000年以前の期間では非常に異なる様相を示している（チャート II-6A）。新興国のラージおよびミッドキャップにおけるバリュー対グロースの比率は、先進国のピアのピークから約5年遅れて、2012年2月までピークに達さなかった（チャート II-6B、パネル1）。一方で、新興国のスモールキャップにおけるバリューは、ラージキャップの同等品とほぼ同時にピークを迎えた後、2016年初めからグロースに対して優位性を再び取り戻している。 Chart II-6A先進国でバリューは死んだのか？ DMでバリューは死んだのか？ DMでバリューは死んだのか？ Chart II-6B新興国でバリューは死んだのか？ EM（新興市場）でバリューは死んでいるのか？ EM（新興市場）でバリューは死んでいるのか？   グローバルなバリュー／グロースの動態はまた、「バリューがグロースをアウトパフォームする」効果がスモールキャップ領域でより顕著であることを示している。しかし、なぜスモールのバリューがほとんどの先進国市場でスモールのグロースに劣後しているのか。我々の説明は、新興国ユニバースは先進国ユニバースよりもはるかに非効率であるという点にある。これは、新興国スモールキャップ領域に専念するクオンツ・ファンドが多くないことに加え、一般に新興国のスモールキャップは先進国市場のそれよりも非常に小さいという事実による。これはまた、一般にファクター・プレミアムが新興国ユニバースでより顕著であるという我々の発見とも整合する。18 結論：バリュー・プレミアムは米国外市場、特に新興国のスモールキャップ市場でより顕著である。 4. ピュア・スタイル指数はパフォーマンスを改善するか？ S&P Dow JonesとFTSE Russellの両者はピュア・バリューおよびピュア・グロース指数を提供している。親指数の時価総額の約50％をターゲットとする標準のバリュー・グロース指数とは異なり、ピュア・スタイル指数は最も強いバリューおよびグロース特性を持つ銘柄のみを含む。両者の間に重複はない。 理論的には、ピュア・スタイル指数はスタイル・ファクターへの集中エクスポージャーのために標準スタイル指数をアウトパフォームするはずである。現実にはどうか。表 II-5は、絶対リターンの面では1998年から2019年の期間でS&PおよびRussellの18ペアのうち14ペアで実際にその通りであったことを示している。しかし、スタイル・ファクターへのより大きなエクスポージャーから得られた高いリターンは、18ペアのうち17ペアで大幅に高いボラティリティから来ている。一般にピュア・スタイルは標準スタイルよりもボラティリティが高く、唯一の例外はRussellのミッドキャップ・バリュー領域である。そのため、リスク調整ベースではピュア・スタイルが必ずしも優れているわけではない。 表 II-5ピュアであることが必ずしも良いとは限らない 2019年10月 2019年10月 チャート II-7Aおよびチャート II-7Bは、S&PとRussellファミリーのスタイル指数における異なるパフォーマンス動態を示している。 S&P指数については、ピュア・グロースは三つの時価総額セグメントのすべてで期間を通じて標準のグロースをアウトパフォームしたが、ピュア・バリューが標準の対応物を上回ったのはS&P 500のみであった。したがって、スタイル特性へのより集中したエクスポージャーがバリュー／グロース・スプレッドを改善したのはラージキャップ領域のみであり、ミッドおよびスモールキャップのユニバースでは実際にはバリュー／グロース・スプレッドを悪化させている（チャート II-7A）。 Chart II-7AS&P ピュア・スタイル* S&P ピュア・スタイルズ* S&P ピュア・スタイルズ* Chart II-7BRussell ピュア・スタイル* ラッセル・ピュア・スタイルズ* ラッセル・ピュア・スタイルズ*   Russell指数については、2000年のテック・バブルに向けて同社のピュア・グロース指数にははるかに多くのテック株が含まれていたことが明らかである。ピュア・グロースはバブル崩壊前に標準のグロースよりもはるかに急上昇し、崩壊後にはより甚だしく急落した。全体として、スタイル・ファクターへのより集中したエクスポージャーによってバリュー／グロース・スプレッドが改善したのはスモールキャップ領域のみである。しかし、この改善はピュア・スタイルが標準指数に対してアウトパフォームしたことによるものではない。実際、スモールキャップのユニバースにおけるピュア・バリューおよびピュア・グロースはともに標準の対応物に劣後しており、むしろピュア・グロースのほうがさらに悪い成績であった（チャート II-7Bおよび表 II-5）。5. 投資結論 バリューとグロースは非常に異なる意味を持ち、振る舞いも大きく異なり得る。学術的にも実務的にも、スタイル指数やストラテジーを評価する際には定義と方法論に特に注意を払うべきである。 投資家の運用指示（マンダテ）に応じて、以下を推奨する： バリュー投資家は米国以外の市場、特に新興市場の小型株ユニバースに注力すべきである。 グロース投資家は大型株（ラージキャップ）、特に米国の大型株セグメントに注力すべきである。 小型株投資家はバリューに注力すべきである。 大型株および中型株投資家は、戦略的にバリューとグロースの間で賭けをするべきではない。戦術的なスタイルのローテーションは、評価のスプレッドが極端な水準に達した場合にのみ行うべきである。 株価純資産倍率（Price-to-book）は、学術界および実務家がバリューとグロースを決定する際に使用する唯一の共通変数である。体系的なリターン予測子としての実績は芳しくなく、これはCharts II-8AおよびII-8Bのパネル2に示されている。私たちが長期のデータを持つもう一つの要素は配当利回りである。その予測力は株価純資産倍率よりもさらに劣っている（パネル3）。 Chart II-8A評価は米国でのタイミングツールとしては頼りにならない バリュエーションは米国ではタイミングを測るための有効なツールではない。 バリュエーションは米国ではタイミングを測るための有効なツールではない。 Chart II-8B評価は世界的に見てタイミングツールとしては頼りにならない バリュエーションはタイミングツールとしては不向きだ バリュエーションはタイミングツールとしては不向きだ   多くの要因が学術界および実務家によって株価純資産倍率と併用され、バリューとグロースのローテーションのタイミングに用いられてきた。しかし、その結果はまちまちである。過去に正しく予測した回帰モデルが将来も同様に機能するとは限らない。例えば、1982年1月から1999年10月のデータに基づく評価スプレッドと利益成長スプレッドに基づく回帰モデルは、2000年初頭に始まったバリューのアウトパフォームの反発を成功裏に予測したが19、過去数年にわたるバリュー・ファンドの普遍的な苦戦は、このモデルが多くの誤ったシグナルを出していた可能性を示唆している。 Chart II-9は、回帰モデルをバリューとグロースのローテーションのタイミングツールとして用いることがいかに困難であるかを示している。バリューとグロースのリターン差（以降60か月のリターン）と相対的な株価純資産倍率の間で単純回帰を行った。1974年12月から2019年7月のデータでは、MSCIワールドの決定係数は0.38、米国は0.09である。振り返れば、両モデルとも2000年初頭に始まったバリューのアウトパフォームを予測していた。しかし、実際のバリューとフィッティドバリューの間のギャップは2000年よりずっと前に開き始めていた。1998年末までにそのギャップは既に前サイクルの安値より広がっていたが、バリューがグロースに対して下振れを続けたため、2000年2月までギャップはさらに拡大した。 Chart II-9適合度はどれほど良いか？ 適合度はどれほど良いですか？ 適合度はどれほど良いですか？ これらのモデルに基づいて、現在投資家は何をすべきだろうか。ギャップは大きいが、2000年初めほど大きくはない。12年以上のアンダーパフォーマンスを経たバリューに対して、投資家はどの時点でバリューへシフトを開始すべきだろうか。 我々はしばしば、スタイルの傾きを実行する際にセクターおよび国別ポジショニングを用いることを好むと記してきた。20, 21 この方針は変わっていない。 バリューとグロースの指数は、時間とともに変化するセクター傾斜を持つ。現在、S&Pダウ・ジョーンズの大型・中型バリュー指数は、グロース系の対応指数と比較して金融株に明確なオーバーウェイトを持ち、一方で情報技術（テクノロジー）およびヘルスケアにアンダーウェイトとなっている（Table II-6）。 Table II-6バリューとグロース指数におけるセクターベット* 2019年10月 2019年10月 Chart II-10スタイルよりもセクターと国のポジショニングを優先する セクターおよびカントリー・ポジショニングをスタイル・ティルトより重視する セクターおよびカントリー・ポジショニングをスタイル・ティルトより重視する 我々はバリューとグロースについて中立の立場を取っているが、米国とユーロ圏の間の国別株式配分や、景気循環株とディフェンシブ株の間、さらには金融株と情報技術株の間でのセクター配分を変更する場合には、この見解を変える可能性が高い（Chart II-10）。 シャオリ・タン アソシエイト・バイスプレジデント グローバル・アセット・アロケーション III. 指標と参照チャート S&P 500は今年ももみ合いを続けるだろう。米国株は9月中を通じて急速に反発したが、センチメントは中立的である。それでも当面、株式が7月の高値を大きく上抜けるのは困難であろう。短期のモメンタム・オシレーターは買われ過ぎであり、米国企業の利益には依然下振れ余地がある。今年の株式ラリーはほぼ完全にマルチプル（評価倍率）によって牽引されたため、利回りが上昇する局面には株式は脆弱である。利回りは成長の改善を織り込んでいないため、成長に関するポジティブなサプライズは株価よりも利回りを押し上げる可能性が高い。しかし、成長が期待外れに終われば、低い金利が予想利益に対する打撃をある程度和らげるだろう。 この状況と整合して、我々の行動選好指標（Revealed Preference Indicator: RPI）は引き続き株式を敬遠している。RPIは市場のモメンタムの概念と評価および政策測定を組み合わせたものである。市場の強いモメンタムが政策と評価の示唆と揃えば強力な強気シグナルを提供する。逆に、強い市場モメンタムが評価や政策に裏付けられていない場合、投資家は市場トレンドに逆らう姿勢を取るべきである。世界の成長は依然として株式にとって最大の問題である。世界経済が底を打つまでは、利益見通しは悪く、我々のRPIは株式買いに反対するだろう。 来年の見通しは株式にとって建設的であり続ける。米国と日本の支払意思（Willingness-to-Pay: WTP）指標は著しく改善している。しかし、欧州では依然として悪化が続いている。WTP指標はフローを追跡するため、投資家が実際に何をしているかに関する情報を提供する。一方でセンチメント指標は投資家の感情を追跡する。 世界の利回りは非常に低く、極めて刺激的な水準にとどまっている。さらに、世界的にマネーサプライの伸びが加速し、各国の中央銀行は再び利下げとバランスシートの拡大を行っている。その結果、我々の金融指標は2015年初以来もっとも緩和的な水準にある。加えて、我々の複合テクニカル指標はもはや改善していないかもしれないが、それでもなお建設的な領域にある。したがって、4年前とは異なり、BCA複合バリュエーション指数が改善を続けていることもあり、株式は過大評価による逆風を回避する可能性がより高い。 10年物米国債は先月以降やや割安になったかもしれないが、依然として非常に割高である。さらに、現在の過大評価水準が我々のテクニカル指標が今日のように大幅に買われ過ぎの状態と重なる場合、安全資産である債券はその後12か月間にわたって顕著な価格下落を経験する。それとは言っても、利回りの上昇のタイミングは不確かである。過去のミッドサイクルの景気減速が示唆するところによれば、利回りは世界の製造業PMIが底を打つのを待ってから自由に上昇する必要があるかもしれない。それでも、現在の状況は長期債のポジションを追加することに反対する論拠を与えている。 購買力平価（PPP）ベースでは、米ドルはますます割高になっており、米国の経常収支は再び悪化している。現時点では、世界の製造業活動の弱さがドルを強く買われた状態に保っている。しかし、我々の複合テクニカル指標は勢いを失い、ドルの水準との間にネガティブ・ダイバージェンスを形成している。これは、成長が安定化するような局面においてドルが非常に脆弱であることを意味する。実際、我々は米ドルが世界成長が持続的な底を形成しつつあるかどうかを評価するための最良の変数となる可能性があると考えている。   株式： Chart III-1米国株式指標 米国エクイティ指標 米国エクイティ指標 Chart III-2リスクに対する支払意思 リスクに対して支払う意欲 リスクに対して支払う意欲 Chart III-3米国株式センチメント指標 米国エクイティ・センチメント指標 米国エクイティ・センチメント指標   Chart III-4行動選好指標 顕示選好指標 顕示選好指標 Chart III-5米国株式市場のバリュエーション 米国株式市場のバリュエーション 米国株式市場のバリュエーション Chart III-6米国の収益 米国決算 米国決算   Chart III-7グローバル株式市場と収益：相対パフォーマンス グローバル株式市場と業績：相対パフォーマンス グローバル株式市場と業績：相対パフォーマンス Chart III-8グローバル株式市場と収益：相対パフォーマンス グローバル株式市場と企業業績：相対パフォーマンス グローバル株式市場と企業業績：相対パフォーマンス   フィクスト・インカム： Chart III-9米国債と評価 米国債とバリュエーション 米国債とバリュエーション Chart III-10イールドカーブの傾き イールドカーブの傾き イールドカーブの傾き Chart III-11主要米国債利回り 主要な米国債利回り 主要な米国債利回り Chart III-1210年物米国債利回りの構成要素 10年米国債利回りの構成要素 10年米国債利回りの構成要素 Chart III-13米国社債とヘルスモニター 米国コーポレート債とヘルスモニター 米国コーポレート債とヘルスモニター Chart III-14グローバル債券：先進国市場 グローバル債券：先進国市場 グローバル債券：先進国市場 Chart III-15グローバル債券：新興市場 グローバル・ボンド：エマージング・マーケッツ グローバル・ボンド：エマージング・マーケッツ   通貨： Chart III-16米ドルと購買力平価 米ドルと購買力平価（PPP） 米ドルと購買力平価（PPP） Chart III-17米ドルと指標 米ドルとインジケーター 米ドルとインジケーター Chart III-18米ドルのファンダメンタルズ 米ドルのファンダメンタルズ 米ドルのファンダメンタルズ Chart III-19日本円のテクニカル 日本円のテクニカル分析 日本円のテクニカル分析 Chart III-20ユーロのテクニカル ユーロのテクニカル分析 ユーロのテクニカル分析 Chart III-21ユーロ/円のテクニカル ユーロ/円のテクニカル分析 ユーロ/円のテクニカル分析 Chart III-22ユーロ/英ポンドのテクニカル ユーロ/ポンドのテクニカル分析 ユーロ/ポンドのテクニカル分析  コモディティ： チャート III-23広範なコモディティ指標 幅広いコモディティ指標 幅広いコモディティ指標 チャート III-24コモディティ価格 コモディティ価格 コモディティ価格 チャート III-25コモディティ価格 コモディティ価格 コモディティ価格 チャート III-26コモディティ・センチメント コモディティ・センチメント コモディティ・センチメント チャート III-27投機的ポジショニング 投機的ポジショニング 投機的ポジショニング   経済： チャート III-28米国およびグローバルのマクロ的背景 米国およびグローバルのマクロ環境 米国およびグローバルのマクロ環境 チャート III-29米国のマクロ概況 米国マクロ・スナップショット 米国マクロ・スナップショット チャート III-30米国の成長見通し 米国の成長見通し 米国の成長見通し チャート III-31米国の循環的支出 米国の景気循環的支出 米国の景気循環的支出 チャート III-32米国の労働市場 米国労働市場 米国労働市場 チャート III-33米国の消費 米国消費 米国消費 チャート III-34米国の住宅 米国住宅 米国住宅 チャート III-35米国の債務とデレバレッジ 米国の債務とデレバレッジ 米国の債務とデレバレッジ   チャート III-36米国の金融環境 米国の金融環境 米国の金融環境 チャート III-37グローバル経済概況：ヨーロッパ グローバル経済スナップショット：ヨーロッパ グローバル経済スナップショット：ヨーロッパ チャート III-38グローバル経済概況：中国 グローバル経済スナップショット：中国 グローバル経済スナップショット：中国   Mathieu Savary 副社長 ザ・バンク・クレジット・アナリスト 脚注 1       詳細は ザ・バンク・クレジット・アナリスト セクション I、「2019年9月」、2019年8月29日付、bca.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 2       詳細は ザ・バンク・クレジット・アナリスト セクション I、「2019年7月」、2019年6月27日付、bca.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 3       詳細は 米国株式ストラテジー週間レポート、「オイル・ファクター」、2019年9月23日付、uses.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 4              J. D. Hamilton, "Historical Oil Shocks," NBER ワーキング・ペーパー No. 16790。 5       詳細は 地政学的ストラテジー特別レポート「政策リスクと不確実性が原油価格予測を曇らせる」、2019年9月19日付、gps.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 6       詳細は ザ・バンク・クレジット・アナリスト セクション I、「2019年7月」、2019年6月27日付、bca.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 7       詳細は 米国株式ストラテジー週間レポート、「ザ・グレート・ローテーション」、2019年9月16日付、uses.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 8       詳細は 米国株式ストラテジー週間レポート、「オイル・ファクター」、2019年9月23日付、uses.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 9       詳細は グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー特別レポート、「TINAは救済になるか？」、2019年8月23日付、gis.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください 10     Antti Ilmanen, Ronen Israel, Tobias J. Moskowitz, Ashwin Thapar, Franklin Wang, “Factor Premia and Factor Timing: A Century of Evidence,” AQR ワーキング・ペーパー, 2019年7月2日。 11     Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Common risk factors in the return on stocks and bonds,” ジャーナル・オブ・ファイナンシャル・エコノミクス, 33 (1993)。 12     Clifford Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel and Tobias Moskowitz, “Fact, Fiction, and Value Investing,” ジャーナル・オブ・ポートフォリオ・マネジメント, 第42巻 第1号、2015年秋。 13     Ronen Israel and Tobias J. Moskowitz, “The Role of Shorting, Firm Size and Time on Market Anomalies,” ジャーナル・オブ・ファイナンシャル・エコノミクス, 第108巻 第2号、2013年5月 14      Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model,” ワーキング・ペーパー, シカゴ大学、2014年9月。 15             ファマ＝フレンチのバリュー・グロース・サイズ・ポートフォリオ。 16     Mark P. Cussen, “Value or growth Stocks: Which are Better?” インベストペディア、2019年6月25日。 17     詳細は グローバル・アセット・アロケーション特別レポート「スモールキャップのアウトパフォーマンス：事実か神話か？」、2017年4月7日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください。 18     詳細は グローバル・アセット・アロケーション特別レポート「スマートベータはグローバル・アセット・アロケーションに有用なツールか？」、2016年7月8日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください。 19    Clifford S. Asness, Jacques A Friedman, Robert J. Krail and John M Liew, “Style Timing: Value versus Growth,” ザ・ジャーナル・オブ・ポートフォリオ・マネジメント, 2000年春。 20     詳細は グローバル・アセット・アロケーション 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し、「四半期報告 - 2016年3月」、2016年3月31日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください。 21     詳細は グローバル・アセット・アロケーション 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し、「四半期報告 - 2019年4月」、2019年4月1日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能をご参照ください。

Following drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the weekend, which removed ~ 5.7mm b/d of output, the U.S. is likely to conduct a limited retaliatory strike. In addition, the U.S. will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and prepare for a larger response if necessary. After this initial response, the Trump administration will likely seek to contain tensions, as neither Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in launching a large-scale conflict with Iran. But that does not mean that one will not happen – indeed, the odds are now higher that this risk could materialize. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes prolonged and unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the negative impact on the global and U.S. economy will grow. Faced with a recession – which is not our base case but is possible – the incentive for Trump to engage war with Iran will rise sharply. Attack On KSA Will Prompt U.S. Retaliation If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions. Over the weekend, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacks on two critical oil assets in Saudi Arabia, removing ~ 5.5% of world crude output – a historic shock to global oil supply, and the largest unplanned outage ever recorded (Chart 1).1 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of being behind the attacks and said there was no evidence that Houthis launched them from Yemen. As we go to press, neither Saudi Arabian officials nor President Trump have confirmed Iran was the culprit, although the sophistication of the attack’s targeting and execution suggest that they will. President Trump said the U.S. is “locked and loaded depending on verification” and offered U.S. support to KSA in a call to Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.2 Chart 1Oil Supply Disruption + Volume Lost A direct missile strike from Iran is the least likely source, as the Iranians have sought to act through proxies this year, in staging attacks to counter U.S. sanctions, precisely in order to maintain plausible deniability and avoid provoking a full-blown American retaliation. If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions, relative to a situation where militant groups in Iraq or Yemen (or even in Saudi Arabia) are found to be responsible. Assuming the strike came from outside Iran, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would presumably retaliate against its proxies in those locations – e.g., the Houthis in Yemen, or the Shia militias in Iraq. Washington is certain to dial up its military deterrent in the region and use the attacks to gain greater worldwide support for a tighter enforcement of sanctions to isolate Iran. This deterrence includes a multinational naval fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, where ~ 20% of the world’s crude oil supply transits daily. Electoral Constraints Facing Trump There are several reasons President Trump will not rush to a full-scale conflict with Iran. First, the attack did not kill U.S. troops or civilians. Miraculously, not even a single casualty is reported in Saudi Arabia. Yet, unlike the Iranian shooting of an American drone, which nearly brought Trump to launch air strikes on June 21, the latest attack clearly impacted critical infrastructure in a way that threatens global stability, making it more likely that some retaliation will occur. Second, Trump faces a significant electoral constraint from high oil prices. True, the U.S. economy is not as exposed to oil imports as it was (Chart 2). Also, global oil producers and strategic reserves including the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can handle the immediate short-term loss from KSA (Chart 3). However, the duration of the cut-off is unknown and further disruptions will occur if the U.S. retaliates and Iranian-backed forces attack yet again. Third, there is still a chance to show restraint in retaliation, contain tensions over the coming months, limit oil supply loss and price spikes, and thus keep an oil-price shock from tanking the U.S. economy. Chart 2U.S. Imports Continue Falling But as tensions escalate in the short term, they could hit a point of no return at which the economic damage becomes so severe that President Trump can no longer seek re-election based on his economic record (Chart 4). At that point the incentive is to confront Iran directly – and run in 2020 as a “war president” intent on achieving long-term national security interests despite short-term economic pain. Chart 3Key SPRs Are Still Adequate Chart 4An Oil Price Shock Lowers Trump's Re-Election Chances U.S.’s Volatile Attempt At Diplomacy What triggered the attack and what does it say about the U.S. and Iranian positions going forward? Ever since Trump backed away from air strikes in June, he has become more inclined to de-escalate the conflict he began with Iran by withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorists, and imposing crippling sanctions to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions. What prompted this backtracking was Iran’s demonstration of a higher pain threshold than Trump expected. President Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, were personally invested in the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, which they negotiated despite grave warnings from the regime’s conservative factions that they would be betrayed. Trump’s reneging on that deal confirmed their opponents’ expectations, while his sanctions have sent the economy into a crushing recession (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Sanctions Hammer Iran's Economy With Iranian parliamentary elections in February 2020, and a consequential presidential election in 2021 in which Rouhani will seek to support a political ally, the Rouhani administration needed to respond forcefully to Trump’s sanctions. Iran staged several provocations in the Strait of Hormuz to warn the U.S. against stringent sanctions enforcement (Map 1). And recently, even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions, a very high bar for talks. Map 1Abqaiq Is At The Very Core Of Global Oil Supply Realizing the large appetite for conflict in Tehran, and the ability to sustain sanctions and use proxy warfare damaging global oil supply, Trump took a step back – he withheld air strikes in late June, discussed a diplomatic path forward with French President Emmanuel Macron, and subsequently fired his National Security Adviser John Bolton, a known war hawk on Iran who helped mastermind the return to sanctions. The proximate cause of Bolton’s ouster was reportedly a disagreement about sanctions relief that would have been designed to enable a meeting with Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly next week. Such a summit could possibly have led to a return to the pre-2017 U.S.-Iran détente. If Trump had compromised, Iran could have gone back to observing the 2015 nuclear pact provisions, which it has only gradually and carefully violated. Moreover the French proposal to convince Iran to rejoin talks by offering a $15 billion credit line for sanctions relief was gaining traction. Apparently these recent moves toward diplomacy posed a threat to various actors in the region that benefit from U.S.-Iran conflict and sanctions. Hardliners in Iran want to weaken the Rouhani administration and prevent further Rouhani-led negotiations (i.e. “surrender”) to American pressure. On August 29, three days after Rouhani hinted that he might still be willing to talk with Trump, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weekly publication warned that “negotiations with the U.S. are definitely out of the question.”3 The IRGC and others continue to benefit from black market activity fueled by sanctions. And Iranian overseas militant proxies have their own reasons to fear a return to U.S.-Iran détente. Saudi Arabia and Israel also worry that President Trump will follow in President Obama’s footsteps with Iran and strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which has considerable popular support in the United States (Chart 6). Both the Saudis and Israelis have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s support and have expanded their regional military targeting of Iranian-backed forces, prompting Iranian pushback. The hard-line factions know that a full-fledged American attack would be devastating to Iranian missile, radar, and energy facilities and armed forces. The Iranians remember the devastating impact on their navy from Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. But with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions cutting oil exports nearly to zero, Iran’s economy is getting strangled and militant forces may feel they have no choice. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Moreover Trump’s electoral constraint – his need to make deals in order to achieve foreign policy victories and lift his weak approval ratings ahead of the election – means that foreign enemies have the ability to drive up the price of a deal. This is what the Iranians just did. But negotiations may be impossible now before 2020. Rouhani may be forced to play the hawk, Supreme Leader Khamenei is opposed to talks, and the hard-line faction is apparently willing to court conflict with America to consolidate its power ahead of the dangerous and uncertain period that awaits the regime in the near future, when Khamenei’s inevitable succession occurs. Bottom Line: We argued in May that the risk of U.S. war with Iran stood as high as 22%, on a conservative estimate of the conditional probability that the U.S. would engage in strikes if Iran restarted its nuclear program outside of the provisions of the JCPOA. Recent events make the risk even higher. This does not mean that Rouhani and Trump cannot make bold diplomatic moves to contain tensions, but that the risk of widening conflict is immediate. Supply Risk Will Remain Front And Center The risk to supply made manifest in these drone attacks will remain with markets for the foreseeable future. They highlight the vulnerability of supply in the Gulf region, and, importantly, the now-limited availability of spare capacity to offset unplanned production outages. There’s ~ 3.2mm b/d of spare capacity available to the market, by the International Energy Agency’s reckoning, some 2mm b/d or so of which is in KSA (Chart 7). These drone attacks highlight the need to risk-adjust this spare capacity. When the infrastructure needed to deliver it to markets comes under attack, its availability must be adjusted downward. Chart 7Limited Availability Of Spare Capacity To Offset Outages Chart 8Commercial Inventories Will Draw ... In the immediate aftermath of the temporary loss of ~ 5.7mm b/d of KSA crude production to the drone attacks, we expect commercial inventories to be drawn down hard, particularly in the U.S., where refiners likely will look to increase product exports to meet export demand (Chart 8). This will backwardate forward crude oil and product curves – i.e., promptly delivered oil will trade at a higher price than oil delivered in the future (Chart 9). Chart 9... Deepening Forward-Curve Backwardations We expect the U.S. SPR to monitor this evolution closely. It is near impossible to handicap the level of commercial inventories – or backwardation – that will trigger the U.S. SPR release, given the unknown length of the KSA output loss, however. Worth noting is the fact that U.S. crude-export capacity is limited to ~ 1mm b/d of additional capacity. Thus, the SPR cannot be directly exported to cover the entire loss of KSA barrels. Other members of OPEC 2.0 will be hard-pressed to lift light-sweet exports, which, combined with constraints on U.S. export capacity, mean the light-sweet crude oil market could tighten. Interestingly, these attacks come as the U.S. has been selling down its SPR. The sales to date have been to support modernization of the SPR, but, for a while now, the Trump administration has been signalling it no longer believes they are critical to U.S. security. That likely changes with these events. The EIA estimates net crude-oil imports in the U.S. are running at 3.4mm b/d. The SPR is estimated at 645mm barrels. There are 416mm barrels of commercial crude inventories in the U.S., giving ~ 1.06 billion barrels of crude oil in the SPR and commercial inventory in the U.S. This translates into about 312 days of inventory in the U.S. when measured in terms of net crude imports. China has been building its SPR, which we estimated at ~ 510mm barrels. As a rough calculation using only China imports of ~ 10mm b/d, and production of ~ 3.9mm b/d, net crude-oil imports are probably around 6mm b/d. With SPR of ~ 510mm barrels, the public SPR (i.e., state-operated stocks) equates to roughly 85 days of imports.4 Members of the IEA – for the most part OECD states – are required to have 90 days of oil consumption on hand. The IEA estimates its SPR totals 1.54 billion barrels, which consists of crude oil and refined products. Together, the IEA’s SPRs plus spare capacity likely could cover the loss of KSA’s crude exports, but the timing and coordination of these releases will be tested. KSA has ~ 190mm b/d of crude oil in storage as of June, the latest data available from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) Oil World Database. If the 5.7mm b/d of output removed from the market by these oil attacks persists, these stocks would be exhausted in 33 days. Based on press reports, repairs to the KSA infrastructure will take weeks – perhaps months – which means the longer it takes to repair these facilities the tighter the global oil market will become. This is exacerbated if additional pipelines or infrastructure in KSA come under attack or are damaged. Critical Next Steps How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. The next steps here are critical: Tactically, the Houthis or other Iranian proxies could continue with drone attacks aimed at KSA infrastructure. They’ve obviously figured out how to target Abqaiq, which is the lynchpin of KSA’s crude export system (desulfurization facilities there process most of the crude put on the water in the Eastern province). The Abqaiq facility has been hardened against attack, but these attacks show the supporting infrastructure remains vulnerable. In addition, militants could target KSA’s western operations on the Red Sea, which include pipelines and refineries. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the bottom of the Red Sea empties into the Arabia Sea. More than half the 6.2mm b/d of crude oil, condensates and refined-product shipments transiting the strait daily are destined for Europe, according to the U.S. EIA.5 In addition, the 750-mile East-West pipeline running across KSA terminates on the Red Sea at Yanbu. The Kingdom is planning to increase export capacity off the pipeline from 5mm b/d to 7mm b/d, a project that will take some two years to complete.6 During a July visit to India, former Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih stated importers of Saudi crude and products, “have to do what they have to do to protect their own energy shipments because Saudi Arabia cannot take that on its own.” On top of all this, Iran could ramp up its threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz once again. These actions could put the risk to supply into sharp relief in very short order. Even Iranian rhetoric will have a larger impact in this environment. In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage. How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. Whether the deal being brokered with France – and the $15 billion oil-for-money loan from the U.S. that goes with it – is now DOA, or is put on a fast track to reduce tensions in the region will be telling. It is entirely possible the U.S. launches an attack on Yemen to take out these drone bases and to neutralize the threat there. If Iraq is identified as the source of the attacks, the U.S., along with Iraqi forces, likely would stage a special-forces operation to take out the bases used to launch the drone attacks. The U.S. has significant forces in theater right now: The U.S. 5th Fleet is in Bahrain, with the Abe Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike force on station at the Strait of Hormuz; and the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are on patrol in the Red Sea under the command of the U.S. 5th Fleet (Map 2). In addition, the U.S. also deployed B52s earlier this year to Qatar to have this capability in theater. Map 2U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group Disposition, 9 September 2019 Bottom Line: In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage that removed 5.7mm b/d of crude-processing capacity from the market and damaged one Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields. We expect the U.S. will conduct a limited retaliatory strike, and will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a larger response if necessary. While neither President Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in a large-scale conflict with Iran, the risk of such an outcome has increased. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the risk of recession increases. While this is not our base case, it could push Trump to adopt a “war president” strategy going into the U.S. general election next year.   Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which produces close to 2mm b/d, were attacked on Saturday, September 14, 2019.  Since then, press reports claim the attack could have originated in Iraq or Iran, and could have included cruise missiles – a major escalation in operations in the region involving Iran, KSA and their respective allies – in addition to drones.  Please see Suspicions Rise That Saudi Oil Attack Came From Outside Yemen, published by The Wall Street Journal September 14, 2019. 2      Please see "Houthi Drone Strikes Disrupt Almost Half Of Saudi Oil Exports", published September 14, 2019, by National Public Radio (U.S.). 3      See Omer Carmi, "Is Iran Negotiating Its Way To Negotiations?" Policy Watch 3172, The Washington Institute, August 30, 2019, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. 4      China is targeting ~500mm bbls by 2020, and is aiming to have 90 days of import oil cover in its SPR. 5      Please see The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments, published by the EIA August 27, 2019. 6      Please see "Saudi Arabia aims to expand pipeline to reduce oil exports via Gulf," published by reuters.com July 25, 2019.

特別レポート

Following drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the weekend, which removed ~ 5.7mm b/d of output, the U.S. is likely to conduct a limited retaliatory strike. In addition, the U.S. will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and prepare for a larger response if necessary. After this initial response, the Trump administration will likely seek to contain tensions, as neither Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in launching a large-scale conflict with Iran. But that does not mean that one will not happen – indeed, the odds are now higher that this risk could materialize. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes prolonged and unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the negative impact on the global and U.S. economy will grow. Faced with a recession – which is not our base case but is possible – the incentive for Trump to engage war with Iran will rise sharply. Attack On KSA Will Prompt U.S. Retaliation If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions. Over the weekend, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacks on two critical oil assets in Saudi Arabia, removing ~ 5.5% of world crude output – a historic shock to global oil supply, and the largest unplanned outage ever recorded (Chart 1).1 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of being behind the attacks and said there was no evidence that Houthis launched them from Yemen. As we go to press, neither Saudi Arabian officials nor President Trump have confirmed Iran was the culprit, although the sophistication of the attack’s targeting and execution suggest that they will. President Trump said the U.S. is “locked and loaded depending on verification” and offered U.S. support to KSA in a call to Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.2 Chart 1Oil Supply Disruption + Volume Lost A direct missile strike from Iran is the least likely source, as the Iranians have sought to act through proxies this year, in staging attacks to counter U.S. sanctions, precisely in order to maintain plausible deniability and avoid provoking a full-blown American retaliation. If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions, relative to a situation where militant groups in Iraq or Yemen (or even in Saudi Arabia) are found to be responsible. Assuming the strike came from outside Iran, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would presumably retaliate against its proxies in those locations – e.g., the Houthis in Yemen, or the Shia militias in Iraq. Washington is certain to dial up its military deterrent in the region and use the attacks to gain greater worldwide support for a tighter enforcement of sanctions to isolate Iran. This deterrence includes a multinational naval fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, where ~ 20% of the world’s crude oil supply transits daily. Electoral Constraints Facing Trump There are several reasons President Trump will not rush to a full-scale conflict with Iran. First, the attack did not kill U.S. troops or civilians. Miraculously, not even a single casualty is reported in Saudi Arabia. Yet, unlike the Iranian shooting of an American drone, which nearly brought Trump to launch air strikes on June 21, the latest attack clearly impacted critical infrastructure in a way that threatens global stability, making it more likely that some retaliation will occur. Second, Trump faces a significant electoral constraint from high oil prices. True, the U.S. economy is not as exposed to oil imports as it was (Chart 2). Also, global oil producers and strategic reserves including the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can handle the immediate short-term loss from KSA (Chart 3). However, the duration of the cut-off is unknown and further disruptions will occur if the U.S. retaliates and Iranian-backed forces attack yet again. Third, there is still a chance to show restraint in retaliation, contain tensions over the coming months, limit oil supply loss and price spikes, and thus keep an oil-price shock from tanking the U.S. economy. Chart 2U.S. Imports Continue Falling But as tensions escalate in the short term, they could hit a point of no return at which the economic damage becomes so severe that President Trump can no longer seek re-election based on his economic record (Chart 4). At that point the incentive is to confront Iran directly – and run in 2020 as a “war president” intent on achieving long-term national security interests despite short-term economic pain. Chart 3Key SPRs Are Still Adequate Chart 4An Oil Price Shock Lowers Trump's Re-Election Chances U.S.’s Volatile Attempt At Diplomacy What triggered the attack and what does it say about the U.S. and Iranian positions going forward? Ever since Trump backed away from air strikes in June, he has become more inclined to de-escalate the conflict he began with Iran by withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorists, and imposing crippling sanctions to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions. What prompted this backtracking was Iran’s demonstration of a higher pain threshold than Trump expected. President Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, were personally invested in the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, which they negotiated despite grave warnings from the regime’s conservative factions that they would be betrayed. Trump’s reneging on that deal confirmed their opponents’ expectations, while his sanctions have sent the economy into a crushing recession (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Sanctions Hammer Iran's Economy With Iranian parliamentary elections in February 2020, and a consequential presidential election in 2021 in which Rouhani will seek to support a political ally, the Rouhani administration needed to respond forcefully to Trump’s sanctions. Iran staged several provocations in the Strait of Hormuz to warn the U.S. against stringent sanctions enforcement (Map 1). And recently, even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions, a very high bar for talks. Map 1Abqaiq Is At The Very Core Of Global Oil Supply Realizing the large appetite for conflict in Tehran, and the ability to sustain sanctions and use proxy warfare damaging global oil supply, Trump took a step back – he withheld air strikes in late June, discussed a diplomatic path forward with French President Emmanuel Macron, and subsequently fired his National Security Adviser John Bolton, a known war hawk on Iran who helped mastermind the return to sanctions. The proximate cause of Bolton’s ouster was reportedly a disagreement about sanctions relief that would have been designed to enable a meeting with Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly next week. Such a summit could possibly have led to a return to the pre-2017 U.S.-Iran détente. If Trump had compromised, Iran could have gone back to observing the 2015 nuclear pact provisions, which it has only gradually and carefully violated. Moreover the French proposal to convince Iran to rejoin talks by offering a $15 billion credit line for sanctions relief was gaining traction. Apparently these recent moves toward diplomacy posed a threat to various actors in the region that benefit from U.S.-Iran conflict and sanctions. Hardliners in Iran want to weaken the Rouhani administration and prevent further Rouhani-led negotiations (i.e. “surrender”) to American pressure. On August 29, three days after Rouhani hinted that he might still be willing to talk with Trump, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weekly publication warned that “negotiations with the U.S. are definitely out of the question.”3 The IRGC and others continue to benefit from black market activity fueled by sanctions. And Iranian overseas militant proxies have their own reasons to fear a return to U.S.-Iran détente. Saudi Arabia and Israel also worry that President Trump will follow in President Obama’s footsteps with Iran and strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which has considerable popular support in the United States (Chart 6). Both the Saudis and Israelis have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s support and have expanded their regional military targeting of Iranian-backed forces, prompting Iranian pushback. The hard-line factions know that a full-fledged American attack would be devastating to Iranian missile, radar, and energy facilities and armed forces. The Iranians remember the devastating impact on their navy from Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. But with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions cutting oil exports nearly to zero, Iran’s economy is getting strangled and militant forces may feel they have no choice. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Moreover Trump’s electoral constraint – his need to make deals in order to achieve foreign policy victories and lift his weak approval ratings ahead of the election – means that foreign enemies have the ability to drive up the price of a deal. This is what the Iranians just did. But negotiations may be impossible now before 2020. Rouhani may be forced to play the hawk, Supreme Leader Khamenei is opposed to talks, and the hard-line faction is apparently willing to court conflict with America to consolidate its power ahead of the dangerous and uncertain period that awaits the regime in the near future, when Khamenei’s inevitable succession occurs. Bottom Line: We argued in May that the risk of U.S. war with Iran stood as high as 22%, on a conservative estimate of the conditional probability that the U.S. would engage in strikes if Iran restarted its nuclear program outside of the provisions of the JCPOA. Recent events make the risk even higher. This does not mean that Rouhani and Trump cannot make bold diplomatic moves to contain tensions, but that the risk of widening conflict is immediate. Supply Risk Will Remain Front And Center The risk to supply made manifest in these drone attacks will remain with markets for the foreseeable future. They highlight the vulnerability of supply in the Gulf region, and, importantly, the now-limited availability of spare capacity to offset unplanned production outages. There’s ~ 3.2mm b/d of spare capacity available to the market, by the International Energy Agency’s reckoning, some 2mm b/d or so of which is in KSA (Chart 7). These drone attacks highlight the need to risk-adjust this spare capacity. When the infrastructure needed to deliver it to markets comes under attack, its availability must be adjusted downward. Chart 7Limited Availability Of Spare Capacity To Offset Outages Chart 8Commercial Inventories Will Draw ... In the immediate aftermath of the temporary loss of ~ 5.7mm b/d of KSA crude production to the drone attacks, we expect commercial inventories to be drawn down hard, particularly in the U.S., where refiners likely will look to increase product exports to meet export demand (Chart 8). This will backwardate forward crude oil and product curves – i.e., promptly delivered oil will trade at a higher price than oil delivered in the future (Chart 9). Chart 9... Deepening Forward-Curve Backwardations We expect the U.S. SPR to monitor this evolution closely. It is near impossible to handicap the level of commercial inventories – or backwardation – that will trigger the U.S. SPR release, given the unknown length of the KSA output loss, however. Worth noting is the fact that U.S. crude-export capacity is limited to ~ 1mm b/d of additional capacity. Thus, the SPR cannot be directly exported to cover the entire loss of KSA barrels. Other members of OPEC 2.0 will be hard-pressed to lift light-sweet exports, which, combined with constraints on U.S. export capacity, mean the light-sweet crude oil market could tighten. Interestingly, these attacks come as the U.S. has been selling down its SPR. The sales to date have been to support modernization of the SPR, but, for a while now, the Trump administration has been signalling it no longer believes they are critical to U.S. security. That likely changes with these events. The EIA estimates net crude-oil imports in the U.S. are running at 3.4mm b/d. The SPR is estimated at 645mm barrels. There are 416mm barrels of commercial crude inventories in the U.S., giving ~ 1.06 billion barrels of crude oil in the SPR and commercial inventory in the U.S. This translates into about 312 days of inventory in the U.S. when measured in terms of net crude imports. China has been building its SPR, which we estimated at ~ 510mm barrels. As a rough calculation using only China imports of ~ 10mm b/d, and production of ~ 3.9mm b/d, net crude-oil imports are probably around 6mm b/d. With SPR of ~ 510mm barrels, the public SPR (i.e., state-operated stocks) equates to roughly 85 days of imports.4 Members of the IEA – for the most part OECD states – are required to have 90 days of oil consumption on hand. The IEA estimates its SPR totals 1.54 billion barrels, which consists of crude oil and refined products. Together, the IEA’s SPRs plus spare capacity likely could cover the loss of KSA’s crude exports, but the timing and coordination of these releases will be tested. KSA has ~ 190mm b/d of crude oil in storage as of June, the latest data available from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) Oil World Database. If the 5.7mm b/d of output removed from the market by these oil attacks persists, these stocks would be exhausted in 33 days. Based on press reports, repairs to the KSA infrastructure will take weeks – perhaps months – which means the longer it takes to repair these facilities the tighter the global oil market will become. This is exacerbated if additional pipelines or infrastructure in KSA come under attack or are damaged. Critical Next Steps How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. The next steps here are critical: Tactically, the Houthis or other Iranian proxies could continue with drone attacks aimed at KSA infrastructure. They’ve obviously figured out how to target Abqaiq, which is the lynchpin of KSA’s crude export system (desulfurization facilities there process most of the crude put on the water in the Eastern province). The Abqaiq facility has been hardened against attack, but these attacks show the supporting infrastructure remains vulnerable. In addition, militants could target KSA’s western operations on the Red Sea, which include pipelines and refineries. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the bottom of the Red Sea empties into the Arabia Sea. More than half the 6.2mm b/d of crude oil, condensates and refined-product shipments transiting the strait daily are destined for Europe, according to the U.S. EIA.5 In addition, the 750-mile East-West pipeline running across KSA terminates on the Red Sea at Yanbu. The Kingdom is planning to increase export capacity off the pipeline from 5mm b/d to 7mm b/d, a project that will take some two years to complete.6 During a July visit to India, former Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih stated importers of Saudi crude and products, “have to do what they have to do to protect their own energy shipments because Saudi Arabia cannot take that on its own.” On top of all this, Iran could ramp up its threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz once again. These actions could put the risk to supply into sharp relief in very short order. Even Iranian rhetoric will have a larger impact in this environment. In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage. How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. Whether the deal being brokered with France – and the $15 billion oil-for-money loan from the U.S. that goes with it – is now DOA, or is put on a fast track to reduce tensions in the region will be telling. It is entirely possible the U.S. launches an attack on Yemen to take out these drone bases and to neutralize the threat there. If Iraq is identified as the source of the attacks, the U.S., along with Iraqi forces, likely would stage a special-forces operation to take out the bases used to launch the drone attacks. The U.S. has significant forces in theater right now: The U.S. 5th Fleet is in Bahrain, with the Abe Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike force on station at the Strait of Hormuz; and the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are on patrol in the Red Sea under the command of the U.S. 5th Fleet (Map 2). In addition, the U.S. also deployed B52s earlier this year to Qatar to have this capability in theater. Map 2U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group Disposition, 9 September 2019 Bottom Line: In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage that removed 5.7mm b/d of crude-processing capacity from the market and damaged one Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields. We expect the U.S. will conduct a limited retaliatory strike, and will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a larger response if necessary. While neither President Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in a large-scale conflict with Iran, the risk of such an outcome has increased. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the risk of recession increases. While this is not our base case, it could push Trump to adopt a “war president” strategy going into the U.S. general election next year.   Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which produces close to 2mm b/d, were attacked on Saturday, September 14, 2019.  Since then, press reports claim the attack could have originated in Iraq or Iran, and could have included cruise missiles – a major escalation in operations in the region involving Iran, KSA and their respective allies – in addition to drones.  Please see Suspicions Rise That Saudi Oil Attack Came From Outside Yemen, published by The Wall Street Journal September 14, 2019. 2      Please see "Houthi Drone Strikes Disrupt Almost Half Of Saudi Oil Exports", published September 14, 2019, by National Public Radio (U.S.). 3      See Omer Carmi, "Is Iran Negotiating Its Way To Negotiations?" Policy Watch 3172, The Washington Institute, August 30, 2019, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. 4      China is targeting ~500mm bbls by 2020, and is aiming to have 90 days of import oil cover in its SPR. 5      Please see The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments, published by the EIA August 27, 2019. 6      Please see "Saudi Arabia aims to expand pipeline to reduce oil exports via Gulf," published by reuters.com July 25, 2019.

特別レポート

Dear Client, Instead of our regular report, this week we are sending you a Special Report penned by Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist of our sister Geopolitical Strategy service, titled “The Polybius Solution.” In this report Matt argues that a full-fledged cold war with China would put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. We trust that you will find this Special Report useful and insightful. Best regards, Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist Highlights So What? U.S.-Iran risk is front-loaded, but U.S.-China is the greater risk overall. A full-fledged cold war with China will put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. War with Iran or trade war escalation with China are both ultimately dollar bullish – even though tactically the dollar may fall.  Feature The idea of the “Thucydides Trap” has gone viral in recent years – for good reason. The term, coined by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, refers to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC), author of the seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. The “trap” is the armed conflict that most often develops when a dominant nation that presides over a particular world order (e.g. Sparta, the U.S.) faces a young and ambitious rival that seeks fundamental change to that order (e.g. Athens, China).1 This conflict between an “established” and “revisionist” power was highlighted by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his translation of Thucydides in the seventeenth century; every student of international relations knows it. Allison’s contribution is the comparative analysis of various Thucydides-esque episodes in the modern era to show how today’s U.S.-China rivalry fits the pattern. The implication is that war (not merely trade war) is a major risk. We have long held a similar assessment of the U.S.-China conflict. It is substantiated by hard data showing that China is gaining on America in various dimensions of power (Chart 1). Assuming that the U.S. does not want to be replaced, the current trade conflict will metastasize to other areas. If the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. There is an important but overlooked corollary to the Thucydides Trap: if the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. Polarization fell dramatically during the Great Depression and World War II and remained subdued throughout the Cold War. It only began to rise again when the Soviet threat faded and income inequality spiked circa 1980. Americans were less divided when they shared a common enemy that posed an existential threat; they grew more divided when their triumph proved to benefit some disproportionately to others (Chart 2). Chart 1China Is Gaining On The U.S. Chart 2U.S. Polarization Falls During Crisis   If the U.S. and China continue down the path of confrontation, a similar pattern is likely to emerge in the coming years – polarization is likely to decline. China possesses the raw ability to rival or even supplant the United States as the premier superpower over the very long run. Its mixed economy is more sustainable than the Soviet command economy was, and it is highly integrated into the global system, unlike the isolated Soviet bloc. As long as China’s domestic demand holds up and Beijing does not suppress its own country’s technological and military ambitions, Trump and the next president will face a persistent need to respond with measures to limit or restrict China’s capabilities. Eventually this will involve mobilizing public opinion more actively. Further, if the U.S.-China conflict escalates, it will clarify U.S. relations with the rest of the world. For instance, Trump’s handling of trade suggests that he could refrain from trade wars with American allies to concentrate attention on China, particularly sanctions on its technology companies. Meanwhile a future Democratic president would preserve some of these technological tactics while reinstituting the multilateral approach of the Barack Obama administration, which launched the “Pivot to Asia,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and intensive freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These are all aspects of a containment strategy that would reinforce China’s rejection of the western order. Bottom Line: If the White House, any White House, were to pursue a consistent strategy to contain China, the result would be a major escalation of the trade conflict that would bring Americans together in the face of a common enemy. It would also encourage the U.S. to form alliances in pursuit of this objective. So far these things have not occurred, but they are logical corollaries of the Thucydides Trap and they will occur if the Thucydides thesis is validated. How Would China Fare In The Thucydides Trap? China would be in trouble in this scenario. The United States, if the public unifies, would have a greater geopolitical impact than it currently does in its divided state. And a western alliance would command still greater coercive power than the United States acting alone (Chart 3). External pressure would also exacerbate China’s internal imbalances – excessive leverage, pollution, inefficient state involvement in the economy, poor quality of life, and poor governance (Chart 4). China has managed to stave off these problems so far because it has operated under relative American and western toleration of its violations of global norms (e.g. a closed financial system, state backing of national champions, arbitrary law, censorship). This would change under concerted American, European, and Japanese efforts. Chart 3China Fears A Western 'Grand Alliance' Chart 4China's Domestic Risks Underrated Concerted external pressure would make it harder for China to manage its internal imbalances. How would the Communist Party respond? First, it could launch long-delayed and badly needed structural reforms and parlay these as concessions to the West. The ramifications would be negative for Chinese growth on a cyclical basis but positive on a structural basis since the reforms would lift productivity over the long run – a dynamic that our Emerging Markets Strategy has illustrated, in a macroeconomic context, in Diagram 1. This is already an option in the current trade war, but China has not yet clearly chosen it – likely because of the danger that the U.S. would exploit the slowdown. Diagram 1Foreign Pressure And Structural Reform = Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Alternatively the Communist Party could double down on confrontation with the West, as Russia has done. This would strengthen the party’s grip but would be negative for growth on both a cyclical and structural basis. The effectiveness of China’s fiscal-and-credit stimulus would likely decline because of a drop in private sector activity and sentiment – already a nascent tendency – while the lack of “reform and opening up” would reduce long-term growth potential. This option makes structural reforms look more palatable – but again, China has not yet been forced to make this choice. None of the above is to say that the West is destined to win a cold war with China, but rather that the burden of revolutionizing the global order necessarily falls on the country attempting to revolutionize it. Bottom Line: If the Thucydides Trap fully takes effect, western pressure on China’s economy will force China into a destabilizing economic transition. China could lie low and avoid conflict in order to undertake reforms, or it could amplify its aggressive foreign policy. This is where the risk of armed conflict rises. Introducing … The Polybius Solution The problem with the above is that there is no sign of polarization abating anytime soon in the United States. Extreme partisanship makes this plain (Chart 5). Rising polarization could prevent the U.S. from responding coherently to China. The Thucydides Trap could be avoided, or delayed, simply because the U.S. is distracted elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. A lesser known Greek historian – who was arguably more influential than Thucydides – helps to illustrate this alternative vision for the future. This is Polybius (208-125 BC), a Greek who wrote under Roman rule. He described the rise of the Roman Empire as a result of Rome’s superior constitutional system. Polybius explains domestic polarization whereas Thucydides explains international conflict. Polybius took the traditional view that there were three primary virtues or powers governing human society: the One (the king), the Few (the nobles), and the Many (the commons). These powers normally ran the country one at a time: a dictator would die; a group of elites would take over; this oligarchy would devolve into democracy or mob-rule; and from the chaos would spring a new dictator. His singular insight – his “solution” to political decay – was that if a mixture or balance of the three powers could be maintained, as in the Roman republic, then the natural cycle of growth and decay could be short-circuited, enabling a regime to live much longer than its peers (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Polybius: A Balanced Political System Breaks The Natural Cycle Of Tyranny And Chaos In short, just as post-WWII economic institutions have enabled countries to reduce the frequency and intensity of recessions (Chart 6), so Polybius believed that political institutions could reduce the frequency and intensity of revolutions. Eventually all governments would decay and collapse, but a domestic system of checks and balances could delay the inevitable. Needless to say, Polybius was hugely influential on English and French constitutional thinkers and the founders of the American republic. Chart 6Orthodox Economic Policy Has Made Recessions Less Frequent And Less Acute What is the cause of constitutional decay, according to Polybius? Wealth, inequality, and corruption, which always follow from stable and prosperous times. “Avarice and unscrupulous money-making” drive the masses to encroach upon the elite and demand a greater share of the wealth. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict between the commons and the nobles until either the constitutional system is restored or a democratic revolution occurs. Compared to Thucydides, Polybius had less to say about the international balance of power. Domestic balance was his “solution” to unpredictable outside events. However, states with decaying political systems were off-balance and more likely to be conquered, or to overreach in trying to conquer others. Bottom Line: The “Polybius solution” equates with domestic political balance. Balanced states do not allow the nation’s leader, the elite, or the general population to become excessively powerful. But even the most balanced states will eventually decline. As they accumulate wealth, inequality and corruption emerge and cause conflict among the three powers. Why Polybius Matters Today It does not take a stretch of the imagination to apply the Polybius model to the United States today. Just as Rome grew fat with its winnings from the Punic Wars and decayed from a virtuous republic into a luxurious empire, as Polybius foresaw, so the United States lurched from victory over the Soviet Union to internal division and unforced errors. For instance, the budget surplus of 2% of GDP in the year 2000 became a budget deficit of 9% of GDP after a decade of gratuitous wars, profligate social spending and tax cuts, and financial excesses. It is on track to balloon again when the next recession hits – and this is true even without any historic crisis event to justify it. U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. The rise in polarization has coincided with a rise in wealth inequality, much as Polybius would expect (Chart 7). In all likelihood the Trump tax cuts will exacerbate both of these trends (Chart 8). Even worse, any attempts by “the people” to take more wealth from the “nobles” will worsen polarization first, long before any improvements in equality translate to a drop in polarization. Chart 7Polarization Unlikely To Drop While Inequality Rises Chart 8Trump Tax Cuts Fuel Inequality Most importantly, from a global point of view, U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. Just as the George W. Bush administration launched a preemptive war in Iraq, destabilizing the region, so the Obama administration precipitously withdrew from Iraq, destabilizing the region. And just as the Obama administration initiated a hurried détente with Iran in order to leave Iraq, the Trump administration precipitously withdrew from this détente, provoking a new conflict with Iran and potentially destabilizing Iraq. Major foreign policy initiatives have been conducted, and revoked, on a partisan basis under three administrations. And a Democratic victory in 2020 would result in a reversal of Trump’s initiatives. In the meantime Trump’s policy could easily entangle him in armed conflict with Iran – as nearly occurred on June 21. Iranian domestic politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to go back to the 2015 setting. Despite Trump’s recent backpedaling, his administration runs a high risk of getting sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire as long as it enforces the sanctions on Iranian oil stringently. China would be the big winner if such a war occurred, just as it was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the long American distraction in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would benefit from another 5-10 years of American losses of blood and treasure. It would be able to pursue regional interests with less Interference and could trade limited cooperation with the U.S. on Iran for larger concessions elsewhere. And a nuclear-armed Iran – which is a long-term concern for the U.S. – is not in China’s national interest anyway. Bottom Line: The U.S. is missing the “Polybius solution” of balanced government; polarization is on the rise. As a result, the grand strategy of “pivoting to Asia” could go into reverse (Chart 9). If that occurs, the conflict with China will be postponed or ineffective. Chart 9Will The Pivot To Asia Reverse? Iran Is The Wild Card If the U.S. gets bogged down in the Middle East yet again, the “Pivot To Asia” will go into reverse and the “Thucydides Trap” with China will be delayed. A war with Iran manifestly runs afoul of the Trump administration’s and America’s national interests, whereas a trade war with China does not. First, although an Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on American troops would give Trump initial support in conducting air strikes, the consequences of war would likely be an oil price shock that would sink his approval rating over time and reduce his chances of reelection (Chart 10). We have shown that such a shock could come from sabotage in Iraq as well as from attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could be driven to attack if it believes the U.S. is about to attack. Second, not only would Democrats oppose a war with Iran, but Americans in general are war-weary, especially with regard to the Middle East (Chart 11). President Trump capitalized on this sentiment during his election campaign, especially in relation to Secretary Hillary Clinton who supported the war in Iraq. Over the past two weeks, he has downplayed the Iranian-backed tanker attacks, emphasized that he does not want war, and has ruled out “boots on the ground.” Chart 10Carter Gained Then Lost From Iran Oil Shock Third, it follows from the above that, in the event of war, the United States would lack the political will necessary to achieve its core strategic objectives, such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear program or its power projection capabilities. And these are nearly impossible to accomplish from the air alone. And U.S. strategic planners are well aware that conflict with Iran will exact an opportunity cost by helping Russia and China consolidate spheres of influence. The wild card is Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has an incentive to look tough and push the limits, given that he was betrayed on the 2015 deal. And the regime itself is probably confident that it can survive American air strikes. American military strikes are still a serious constraint, but until the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to go that far, Iran can test the boundaries. In doing so it also sends a message to its regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Israel – that the U.S. is all bark, no bite, and thus unable to protect them from Iran. This may lead to a miscalculation that forces Trump to respond despite his inclinations. The China trade war, by contrast, is less difficult for the Trump administration to pursue. There is not a clear path from tariffs to economic recession, as with an oil shock: the U.S. economy has repeatedly shrugged off counter-tariffs and the Fed has been cowed. While Americans generally oppose the trade war, Trump’s base does not, and the health of the overall economy is far more important for most voters. And a majority of voters do believe that China’s trade practices are unfair. Strategic planners also favor confronting China – unlike Trump they are not concerned with reelection, but they recognize that China’s advantages grow over time, including in critical technologies. Bottom Line: While the media and market focus on China and Iran risks can alternate in the short run, the Trump administration is likely to continue downgrading the conflict with Iran and upgrading the conflict with China over the next six-to-18 months. Neither politics nor grand strategy support a war with Iran, whereas politics might support a trade war with China and grand strategy almost certainly does. China Could Learn From Polybius Too China also lacks the Polybius solution. It suffers from severe inequality and social immobility, just like the Latin American states and the U.S., U.K., and Italy (Chart 12). But unlike the developed markets, it lacks a robust constitutional system. Political risks are understated given the emergence of the middle class, systemic economic weaknesses, and poor governance. Over the long run, Xi Jinping will need to step down, but having removed the formal system for power transition, a succession crisis is likely. China’s imbalances could cause domestic instability even if the U.S. becomes distracted by conflict in the Middle East. But China has unique tools for alleviating crises and smoothing out its economic slowdown, so the absence of outside pressure will probably determine its ability to avoid a painful economic slump. China also lacks the “Polybius solution” of balanced government – and it even lacks a robust constitutional system. This helps to explain China’s interest in dealing with the U.S. on North Korea. President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Pyongyang late last month helped pave the way for President Trump to resume negotiations with the North’s leader Kim Jong Un at the first-ever visit of an American president north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China does not want an unbridled nuclear North Korea or an American preventative war on the peninsula. If Beijing could do a short-term deal with the U.S. on the basis of assistance in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it could divert U.S. animus away from itself and encourage the U.S. to turn its attention toward the next rogue nuclear aspirant, Iran. It would also avoid structural economic concessions. Of course, a smooth transition today means short-term gain but long-term pain for Chinese and global growth. Productivity and potential GDP will decline if China does not reform (Diagram 3). But this kind of transition is the regime’s preferred option since Beijing seeks to minimize immediate threats and maintain overall stability. Diagram 3Stimulus And Delayed Reforms = Socialist Put = Stagflation If Chinese internal divisions do flare up, China’s leaders will take a more aggressive posture toward its neighbors and the United States in order to divert public attention and stir up patriotic support. Bottom Line: China suffers from understated internal political risk. While U.S. political divisions could lead to a lack of coherent strategy toward China, a rift in China could lead to Chinese aggression in its neighborhood, accelerating the Thucydides Trap. Investment Conclusions If the U.S. reverses the pivot to Asia, attacks Iran, antagonizes European allies, and exhausts its resources in policy vacillation, its budget deficit will balloon (Chart 13), oil prices will rise, and China will be left to manage its economic transition without a western coalition against it. The implication is a weakening dollar, at least initially. But the U.S. is nearing the end of its longest-ever business expansion and an oil price spike would bring forward the next recession, both of which will push up the greenback. Much will depend on the extent of any oil shock – whether and how long the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. Beyond the next recession, the dollar could suffer severe consequences for the U.S.’s wild policies. Chart 13An Iran War Will Bust The Budget Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, U.S.-China conflict will be the dominant marketmover. If the U.S. continues the pivot to Asia, and the U.S. and China proceed with tariffs, tech sanctions, saber-rattling, diplomatic crises, and possibly even military skirmishes, China will be forced into an abrupt and destabilizing economic transition. The U.S. dollar will strengthen as global growth decelerates. Developed market equities will outperform emerging market equities, but equities as a whole will underperform sovereign bonds and other safe-haven assets. Our highest conviction call on this matter is that any trade deal before the U.S. 2020 election will be limited in scope. It will fall far short of a “Grand Compromise” that ushers in a new era of U.S.-China engagement – and hence it will be a disappointment to global equities. Our trade war probabilities, updated on July 26, can be found in Diagram 4. The combined risk of further escalation is 60% -- meaning that the U.S. will either implement the final batch of tariffs or refuse to renew Huawei’s trade license, or both. We are maintaining our risk-off trades: long JPY/USD, long gold, long Swiss bonds, and long USD/CNY. Diagram 4U.S.-China Trade War Decision Tree (Updated July 26, 2019)   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, and Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

特別レポート

Highlights So What? U.S.-Iran risk is front-loaded, but U.S.-China is the greater risk overall. In the medium-to-long run the trade war with China should reaccelerate while the U.S. should back away from war with Iran. But for now the opposite is happening. A full-fledged cold war with China will put a cap on American political polarization, putting China at a disadvantage. By contrast, a U.S. war with Iran would exacerbate polarization, giving China a huge strategic opportunity. War with Iran or trade war escalation with China are both ultimately dollar bullish – even though tactically the dollar may fall. Feature Two significant geopolitical events occurred over the past week. First, U.S. President Donald Trump declared his third pause to the trade war with China. The terms of the truce are vague and indefinite, but it has given support to the equity rally temporarily. Second, Iran edged past the limits on uranium stockpiling, uranium enrichment, and the Arak nuclear reactor imposed by the 2015 nuclear pact. Trump instigated this move by walking away from the pact and re-imposing oil sanctions. If these events foreshadow things to come, global financial markets should position for lower odds of a deflationary trade shock and higher odds of an inflationary oil shock in the coming six-to-18 months. But is this conclusion warranted? Is the American “Pivot to Asia” about to shift into reverse? If the White House pursued a consistent strategy to contain China, it would bring Americans together and require forming alliances. In the short run, perhaps – but the conflict with China is ultimately the greater of the two geopolitical risks. We expect it to intensify again, likely in H2, but at latest by Q3 of 2020, ahead of the U.S. presidential election. Our highest conviction call on this matter, however, is that any trade deal before that date will be limited in scope. It will fall far short of a “Grand Compromise” that ushers in a new era of U.S.-China engagement – and hence it will be a disappointment to global equities. Our trade war probabilities, updated on June 14 to account for the expected resumption of negotiations at the G20, can be found in Diagram 1. The combined risk of further escalation is 68%. Diagram 1Trade War Decision Tree (Updated June 13, 2019 To Include G20 Tariff Pause) The risk to the view? The U.S.-Iran conflict could spiral out of control and the Trump administration could get entangled in the Middle East. This would create a very different outlook for global politics, economy, and markets over the next decade than a concentrated conflict with China.  The Missing Corollary Of The “Thucydides Trap” The idea of the “Thucydides Trap” has gone viral in recent years – for good reason. The term, coined by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, refers to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (460-400 BC), author of the seminal History of the Peloponnesian War. The “trap” is the armed conflict that most often develops when a dominant nation that presides over a particular world order (e.g. Sparta, the U.S.) faces a young and ambitious rival that seeks fundamental change to that order (e.g. Athens, China).1  This conflict between an “established” and “revisionist” power was highlighted by the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his translation of Thucydides in the seventeenth century; every student of international relations knows it. Allison’s contribution is the comparative analysis of various Thucydides-esque episodes in the modern era to show how today’s U.S.-China rivalry fits the pattern. The implication is that war (not merely trade war) is a major risk. We have long held a similar assessment of the U.S.-China conflict. It is substantiated by hard data showing that China is gaining on America in various dimensions of power (Chart 1). Assuming that the U.S. does not want to be replaced, the current trade conflict will metastasize to other areas. There is an important but overlooked corollary to the Thucydides Trap: if the U.S. and China really engage in an epic conflict, American political polarization should fall. Polarization fell dramatically during the Great Depression and World War II and remained subdued throughout the Cold War. It only began to rise again when the Soviet threat faded and income inequality spiked circa 1980. Americans were less divided when they shared a common enemy that posed an existential threat; they grew more divided when their triumph proved to benefit some disproportionately to others (Chart 2).    Chart 1China Is Gaining On The U.S. Chart 2U.S. Polarization Falls During Crisis   If the U.S. and China continue down the path of confrontation, a similar pattern is likely to emerge in the coming years – polarization is likely to decline. China possesses the raw ability to rival or even supplant the United States as the premier superpower over the very long run. Its mixed economy is more sustainable than the Soviet command economy was, and it is highly integrated into the global system, unlike the isolated Soviet bloc. As long as China’s domestic demand holds up and Beijing does not suppress its own country’s technological and military ambitions, Trump and the next president will face a persistent need to respond with measures to limit or restrict China’s capabilities. Eventually this will involve mobilizing public opinion more actively. Further, if the U.S.-China conflict escalates, it will clarify U.S. relations with the rest of the world. For instance, Trump’s handling of trade suggests that he could refrain from trade wars with American allies to concentrate attention on China, particularly sanctions on its technology companies. Meanwhile a future Democratic president would preserve some of these technological tactics while reinstituting the multilateral approach of the Barack Obama administration, which launched the “Pivot to Asia,” the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and intensive freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. These are all aspects of a containment strategy that would reinforce China’s rejection of the western order.   Bottom Line: If the White House, any White House, were to pursue a consistent strategy to contain China, the result would be a major escalation of the trade conflict that would bring Americans together in the face of a common enemy. It would also encourage the U.S. to form alliances in pursuit of this objective. So far these things have not occurred, but they are logical corollaries of the Thucydides Trap and they will occur if the Thucydides thesis is validated. How Would China Fare In The Thucydides Trap? China would be in trouble in this scenario. The United States, if the public unifies, would have a greater geopolitical impact than it currently does in its divided state. And a western alliance would command still greater coercive power than the United States acting alone (Chart 3). External pressure would also exacerbate China’s internal imbalances – excessive leverage, pollution, inefficient state involvement in the economy, poor quality of life, and poor governance (Chart 4).  China has managed to stave off these problems so far because it has operated under relative American and western toleration of its violations of global norms (e.g. a closed financial system, state backing of national champions, arbitrary law, censorship). This would change under concerted American, European, and Japanese efforts. Chart 3China Fears A Western 'Grand Alliance' Chart 4China's Domestic Risks Underrated How would the Communist Party respond? First, it could launch long-delayed and badly needed structural reforms and parlay these as concessions to the West. The ramifications would be negative for Chinese growth on a cyclical basis but positive on a structural basis since the reforms would lift productivity over the long run – a dynamic that our Emerging Markets Strategy has illustrated, in a macroeconomic context, in Diagram 2. This is already an option in the current trade war, but China has not yet clearly chosen it – likely because of the danger that the U.S. would exploit the slowdown. Diagram 2Foreign Pressure And Structural Reform = Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Alternatively the Communist Party could double down on confrontation with the West, as Russia has done. This would strengthen the party’s grip but would be negative for growth on both a cyclical and structural basis. The effectiveness of China’s fiscal-and-credit stimulus would likely decline because of a drop in private sector activity and sentiment – already a nascent tendency – while the lack of “reform and opening up” would reduce long-term growth potential. This option makes structural reforms look more palatable – but again, China has not yet been forced to make this choice. None of the above is to say that the West is destined to win a cold war with China, but rather that the burden of revolutionizing the global order necessarily falls on the country attempting to revolutionize it. Bottom Line: If the Thucydides Trap fully takes effect, western pressure on China’s economy will force China into a destabilizing economic transition. China could lie low and avoid conflict in order to undertake reforms, or it could amplify its aggressive foreign policy. This is where the risk of armed conflict rises. Introducing … The Polybius Solution The problem with the above is that there is no sign of polarization abating anytime soon in the United States. Extreme partisanship makes this plain (Chart 5). Rising polarization could prevent the U.S. from responding coherently to China. The Thucydides Trap could be avoided, or delayed, simply because the U.S. is distracted elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. A lesser known Greek historian – who was arguably more influential than Thucydides – helps to illustrate this alternative vision for the future. This is Polybius (208-125 BC), a Greek who wrote under Roman rule. He described the rise of the Roman Empire as a result of Rome’s superior constitutional system. Polybius explains domestic polarization whereas Thucydides explains international conflict. Polybius took the traditional view that there were three primary virtues or powers governing human society: the One (the king), the Few (the nobles), and the Many (the commons). These powers normally ran the country one at a time: a dictator would die; a group of elites would take over; this oligarchy would devolve into democracy or mob-rule; and from the chaos would spring a new dictator. His singular insight – his “solution” to political decay – was that if a mixture or balance of the three powers could be maintained, as in the Roman republic, then the natural cycle of growth and decay could be short-circuited, enabling a regime to live much longer than its peers (Diagram 3). Diagram 3Polybius: A Balanced Political System Breaks The Natural Cycle Of Tyranny And Chaos In short, just as post-WWII economic institutions have enabled countries to reduce the frequency and intensity of recessions (Chart 6), so Polybius believed that political institutions could reduce the frequency and intensity of revolutions. Eventually all governments would decay and collapse, but a domestic system of checks and balances could delay the inevitable. Needless to say, Polybius was hugely influential on English and French constitutional thinkers and the founders of the American republic. Chart 6Orthodox Economic Policy Has Made Recessions Less Frequent And Less Acute What is the cause of constitutional decay, according to Polybius? Wealth, inequality, and corruption, which always follow from stable and prosperous times. “Avarice and unscrupulous money-making” drive the masses to encroach upon the elite and demand a greater share of the wealth. The result is a vicious cycle of conflict between the commons and the nobles until either the constitutional system is restored or a democratic revolution occurs. Compared to Thucydides, Polybius had less to say about the international balance of power. Domestic balance was his “solution” to unpredictable outside events. However, states with decaying political systems were off-balance and more likely to be conquered, or to overreach in trying to conquer others. Bottom Line: The “Polybius solution” equates with domestic political balance. Balanced states do not allow the nation’s leader, the elite, or the general population to become excessively powerful. But even the most balanced states will eventually decline. As they accumulate wealth, inequality and corruption emerge and cause conflict among the three powers.  Why Polybius Matters Today It does not take a stretch of the imagination to apply the Polybius model to the United States today. Just as Rome grew fat with its winnings from the Punic Wars and decayed from a virtuous republic into a luxurious empire, as Polybius foresaw, so the United States lurched from victory over the Soviet Union to internal division and unforced errors. For instance, the budget surplus of 2% of GDP in the year 2000 became a budget deficit of 9% of GDP after a decade of gratuitous wars, profligate social spending and tax cuts, and financial excesses. It is on track to balloon again when the next recession hits – and this is true even without any historic crisis event to justify it. The rise in polarization has coincided with a rise in wealth inequality, much as Polybius would expect (Chart 7). In all likelihood the Trump tax cuts will exacerbate both of these trends (Chart 8). Even worse, any attempts by “the people” to take more wealth from the “nobles” will worsen polarization first, long before any improvements in equality translate to a drop in polarization. Chart 7Polarization Unlikely To Drop While Inequality Rises Chart 8Trump Tax Cuts Fuel Inequality Most importantly, from a global point of view, U.S. polarization is contaminating foreign policy. Just as the George W. Bush administration launched a preemptive war in Iraq, destabilizing the region, so the Obama administration precipitously withdrew from Iraq, destabilizing the region. And just as the Obama administration initiated a hurried détente with Iran in order to leave Iraq, the Trump administration precipitously withdrew from this détente, provoking a new conflict with Iran and potentially destabilizing Iraq. Major foreign policy initiatives have been conducted, and revoked, on a partisan basis under three administrations. And a Democratic victory in 2020 would result in a reversal of Trump’s initiatives. In the meantime Trump’s policy could easily entangle him in armed conflict with Iran – as nearly occurred on June 21. Iranian domestic politics make it very difficult, if not impossible, to go back to the 2015 setting. Despite Trump’s recent backpedaling, his administration runs a high risk of getting sucked into another Middle Eastern quagmire as long as it enforces the sanctions on Iranian oil stringently. Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, U.S.-China conflict will be the dominant market-mover. China would be the big winner if such a war occurred, just as it was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the long American distraction in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would benefit from another 5-10 years of American losses of blood and treasure. It would be able to pursue regional interests with less Interference and could trade limited cooperation with the U.S. on Iran for larger concessions elsewhere. And a nuclear-armed Iran – which is a long-term concern for the U.S. – is not in China’s national interest anyway. Chart 9Will The Pivot To Asia Reverse? Bottom Line: The U.S. is missing the “Polybius solution” of balanced government; polarization is on the rise. As a result, the grand strategy of “pivoting to Asia” could go into reverse (Chart 9). If that occurs, the conflict with China will be postponed or ineffective. Iran Is The Wild Card A war with Iran manifestly runs afoul of the Trump administration’s and America’s national interests, whereas a trade war with China does not. First, although an Iranian or Iranian-backed attack on American troops would give Trump initial support in conducting air strikes, the consequences of war would likely be an oil price shock that would sink his approval rating over time and reduce his chances of reelection (Chart 10). We have shown that such a shock could come from sabotage in Iraq as well as from attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could be driven to attack if it believes the U.S. is about to attack. Second, not only would Democrats oppose a war with Iran, but Americans in general are war-weary, especially with regard to the Middle East (Chart 11). President Trump capitalized on this sentiment during his election campaign, especially in relation to Secretary Hillary Clinton who supported the war in Iraq. Over the past two weeks, he has downplayed the Iranian-backed tanker attacks, emphasized that he does not want war, and has ruled out “boots on the ground.” Chart 10Carter Gained Then Lost From Iran Oil Shock Third, it follows from the above that, in the event of war, the United States would lack the political will necessary to achieve its core strategic objectives, such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear program or its power projection capabilities. And these are nearly impossible to accomplish from the air alone. And U.S. strategic planners are well aware that conflict with Iran will exact an opportunity cost by helping Russia and China consolidate spheres of influence. The wild card is Iran. President Hassan Rouhani has an incentive to look tough and push the limits, given that he was betrayed on the 2015 deal. And the regime itself is probably confident that it can survive American air strikes. American military strikes are still a serious constraint, but until the U.S. demonstrates that it is willing to go that far, Iran can test the boundaries. In doing so it also sends a message to its regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Israel – that the U.S. is all bark, no bite, and thus unable to protect them from Iran. This may lead to a miscalculation that forces Trump to respond despite his inclinations. The China trade war, by contrast, is less difficult for the Trump administration to pursue. There is not a clear path from tariffs to economic recession, as with an oil shock: the U.S. economy has repeatedly shrugged off counter-tariffs and the Fed has been cowed. While Americans generally oppose the trade war, Trump’s base does not, and the health of the overall economy is far more important for most voters. And a majority of voters do believe that China’s trade practices are unfair. Strategic planners also favor confronting China – unlike Trump they are not concerned with reelection, but they recognize that China’s advantages grow over time, including in critical technologies. Bottom Line: While short-term events are pushing toward truce with China and war with Iran, the Trump administration is likely to downgrade the conflict with Iran and upgrade the conflict with China over the next six-to-18 months. Neither politics nor grand strategy support a war with Iran, whereas politics might support a trade war with China and grand strategy almost certainly does. China Could Learn From Polybius Too China also lacks the Polybius solution. It suffers from severe inequality and social immobility, just like the Latin American states and the U.S., U.K., and Italy (Chart 12). But unlike the developed markets, it lacks a robust constitutional system. Political risks are understated given the emergence of the middle class, systemic economic weaknesses, and poor governance. Over the long run, Xi Jinping will need to step down, but having removed the formal system for power transition, a succession crisis is likely. China’s imbalances could cause domestic instability even if the U.S. becomes distracted by conflict in the Middle East. But China has unique tools for alleviating crises and smoothing out its economic slowdown, so the absence of outside pressure will probably determine its ability to avoid a painful economic slump. This helps to explain China’s interest in dealing with the U.S. on North Korea. President Xi Jinping’s first trip to Pyongyang late last month helped pave the way for President Trump to resume negotiations with the North’s leader Kim Jong Un at the first-ever visit of an American president north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China does not want an unbridled nuclear North Korea or an American preventative war on the peninsula. If Beijing could do a short-term deal with the U.S. on the basis of assistance in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it could divert U.S. animus away from itself and encourage the U.S. to turn its attention toward the next rogue nuclear aspirant, Iran. It would also avoid structural economic concessions. Of course, a smooth transition today means short-term gain but long-term pain for Chinese and global growth. Productivity and potential GDP will decline if China does not reform (Diagram 4). But this kind of transition is the regime’s preferred option since Beijing seeks to minimize immediate threats and maintain overall stability. Diagram 4Stimulus And Delayed Reforms = Socialist Put = Stagflation If Chinese internal divisions do flare up, China’s leaders will take a more aggressive posture toward its neighbors and the United States in order to divert public attention and stir up patriotic support. Bottom Line: China suffers from understated internal political risk. While U.S. political divisions could lead to a lack of coherent strategy toward China, a rift in China could lead to Chinese aggression in its neighborhood, accelerating the Thucydides Trap. Investment Conclusions Chart 13An Iran War Will Bust The Budget If the U.S. reverses the pivot to Asia, attacks Iran, antagonizes European allies, and exhausts its resources in policy vacillation, its budget deficit will balloon (Chart 13), oil prices will rise, and China will be left to manage its economic transition without a western coalition against it. The implication is a weakening dollar, at least initially. But the U.S. is nearing the end of its longest-ever business expansion and an oil price spike would bring forward the next recession, both of which will push up the greenback. Much will depend on the extent of any oil shock – whether and how long the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. Beyond the next recession, the dollar could suffer severe consequences for the U.S.’s wild policies. If the U.S. continues the pivot to Asia, and the U.S. and China proceed with tariffs, tech sanctions, saber-rattling, diplomatic crises, and possibly even military skirmishes, China will be forced into an abrupt and destabilizing economic transition. The U.S. dollar will strengthen as global growth decelerates. Developed market equities will outperform emerging market equities, but equities as a whole will underperform sovereign bonds and other safe-haven assets. Over the past week, developments point toward the former scenario, meaning that Persian Gulf risks are coming to the fore. But over the next six-to-18 months, we think the latter scenario will prevail.  We are maintaining our risk-off trades: long JPY/USD, long gold, long Swiss bonds, and long USD/CNY.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, and Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).  

Highlights So What? Economic stimulus will encourage key nations to pursue their self-interest – keeping geopolitical risk high. Why? The U.S. is still experiencing extraordinary strategic tensions with China and Iran … simultaneously. The Trump-Xi summit at the G20 is unlikely to change the fact that the United States is threatening China with total tariffs and a technology embargo. The U.S. conflict with Iran will be hard to keep under wraps. Expect more fireworks and oil volatility, with a large risk of hostilities as long as the U.S. maintains stringent oil sanctions. All of our GeoRisk indicators are falling except for those of Germany, Turkey and Brazil. This suggests the market is too complacent. Maintain tactical safe-haven positioning. Feature “That’s some catch, that Catch-22,” he observed. “It’s the best there is,” Doc Daneeka agreed. -Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (1961)   One would have to be crazy to go to war. Yet a nation has no interest in filling its military’s ranks with lunatics. This is the original “Catch-22,” a conundrum in which the only way to do what is individually rational (avoid war) is to insist on what is collectively irrational (abandon your country). Or the only way to defend your country is to sacrifice yourself. This is the paradox that U.S. President Donald Trump faces having doubled down on his aggressive foreign policy this year: if he backs away from trade war to remove an economic headwind that could hurt his reelection chances, he sacrifices the immense leverage he has built up on behalf of the United States in its strategic rivalry with China. “Surrender” would be a cogent criticism of him on the campaign trail: a weak deal will cast him as a pluto-populist, rather than a real populist – one who pandered to China to give a sop to Wall Street and the farm lobby just like previous presidents, yet left America vulnerable for the long run. Similarly, if President Trump stops enforcing sanctions against Iranian oil exports to reduce the threat of a conflict-induced oil price shock that disrupts his economy, then he reduces the United States’s ability to contain Iran’s nuclear and strategic advances in the wake of the 2015 nuclear deal that he canceled. The low appetite for American involvement in the region will be on full display for the world to see. Iran will have stared down the Great Satan – and won. In both cases, Trump can back down. Or he can try to change the subject. But with weak polling and yet a strong economy, the point is to direct voters’ attention to foreign policy. He could lose touch with his political base at the very moment that the Democrats reconnect with their own. This is not a good recipe for reelection. More important – for investors – why would he admit defeat just as the Federal Reserve is shifting to countenance the interest rate cuts that he insists are necessary to increase his economic ability to drive a hard bargain with China? Why would he throw in the towel as the stock market soars? And if Trump concludes a China deal, and the market rises higher, will he not be emboldened to put more economic pressure on Mexico over border security … or even on Europe over trade? The paradox facing investors is that the shift toward more accommodative monetary policy (and in some cases fiscal policy) extends the business cycle and encourages political leaders to pursue their interests more intently. China is less likely to cave to Trump’s demands as it stimulates. The EU does not need to fear a U.K. crash Brexit if its economy rebounds. This increases rather than decreases the odds of geopolitical risks materializing as negative catalysts for the market. Similarly, if geopolitical risk falls then the need for stimulus falls and the market will be disappointed. The result is still more volatility – at least in the near term. The G20 And 2020 As we go to press the Democratic Party’s primary election debates are underway. The progressive wave on display highlights the overarching takeaway of the debates: the U.S. election is now an active political (and geopolitical) risk to the equity market. A truly positive surprise at the G20 would be a joint statement by Trump and Xi plus some tariff rollback. Whenever Trump’s odds of losing rise, the U.S. domestic economy faces higher odds of extreme policy discontinuity and uncertainty come 2021, with the potential for a populist-progressive agenda – a negative for financials, energy, and probably health care and tech. Yet whenever Trump’s odds of winning rise, the world faces higher odds of an unconstrained Trump second term focusing on foreign and trade policy – a potentially extreme increase in global policy uncertainty – without the fiscal and deregulatory positives of his first term. We still view Trump as the favored candidate in this race (at 55% chance of reelection), given that U.S. underlying domestic demand is holding up and the labor market has not been confirmed to be crumbling beneath the consumer’s feet. Still Chart 1 highlights that Trump’s shift to more aggressive foreign and trade policy this spring has not won him any additional support – his approval rating has been flat since then. And his polling is weak enough in general that we do not assign him as high of odds of reelection as would normally be afforded to a sitting president on the back of a resilient economy. This raises the question of whether the G20 will mark a turning point. Will Trump attempt to deescalate his foreign conflicts? Yes, and this is a tactical opportunity. But we see no final resolution at hand. With China, Trump’s only reason to sign a weak deal would be to stem a stock market collapse. With Iran, Trump is no longer in the driver’s seat but could be forced to react to Iranian provocations. Bottom Line: Trump’s polling has not improved – highlighting the election risk – but weak polling amid a growing economy and monetary easing is not a recipe for capitulating to foreign powers. The Trump-Xi Summit On China the consensus on the G20 has shifted toward expecting an extension of talks and another temporary tariff truce. If a new timetable is agreed, it may be a short-term boon for equities. But we will view it as unconvincing unless it is accompanied with a substantial softening on Huawei or a Trump-Xi joint statement outlining an agreement in principle along with some commitment of U.S. tariff rollback. Otherwise the structural dynamic is the same: Trump is coercing China with economic warfare amid a secular increase in U.S.-China animosity that is a headwind for trade and investment. Table 1 shows that throughout the modern history of U.S.-China presidential-level summits, the Great Recession marked a turning point: since then, bilateral relations have almost always deteriorated in the months after a summit, even if the optics around the summit were positive. Table 1U.S.-China Leaders Summits: A Chronology The last summit in Buenos Aires was no exception, given that the positive aura was ultimately followed by a tariff hike and technology-company blacklistings. Of course, the market rallied for five months in between. Why should this time be the same? First, the structural factors undermining Sino-American trust are worse, not better, with Trump’s latest threats to tech companies. Second, Trump will ultimately resent any decision to extend the negotiations. China’s economy is rebounding, which in the coming months will deprive Trump of much of the leverage he had in H2 2018 and H1 2019. He will be in a weaker position if they convene in three months to try to finalize a deal. Tariff rollback will be more difficult in that context given that China will be in better shape and that tariffs serve as the guarantee that any structural concessions will be implemented. Bottom Line: Our broader view regarding the “end game” of the talks – on the 2020 election horizon – remains that China has no reason to implement structural changes speedily for the United States until Trump can prove his resilience through reelection. Yet President Trump will suffer on the campaign trail if he accepts a deal that lacks structural concessions. Hence we expect further escalation from where we are today, knowing full well that the G20 could produce a temporary period of improvement just as occurred on December 1, 2018. The Iran Showdown Is Far From Over Disapproval of Trump’s handling of China and Iran is lower than his disapproval rating on trade policy and foreign policy overall, suggesting that despite the lack of a benefit to his polling, he does still have leeway to pursue his aggressive policies to a point. A breakdown of these opinions according to key voting blocs – a proxy for Trump’s ability to generate support in Midwestern swing states – illustrates that his political base is approving on the whole (Chart 2). Yet the conflict with Iran threatens Trump with a hard constraint – an oil price shock – that is fundamentally a threat to his reelection. Hence his decision, as we expected, to back away from the brink of war last week (he supposedly canceled air strikes on radar and missile installations at the last minute on June 21). He appears to be trying to control the damage that his policy has already done to the 2015 U.S.-Iran equilibrium. Trump has insisted he does not want war, has ruled out large deployments of boots on the ground, and has suggested twice this week that his only focus in trying to get Iran back into negotiations is nuclear weapons. This implies a watering down of negotiation demands to downplay Iran’s militant proxies in the region – it is a retreat from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s more sweeping 12 demands on Iran and a sign of Trump’s unwillingness to get embroiled in a regional conflict with a highly likely adverse economic blowback. The Iran confrontation is not over yet – policy-induced oil price volatility will continue. This retreat lacks substance if Trump does not at least secretly relax enforcement of the oil sanctions. Trump’s latest sanctions and reported cyberattacks are a sideshow in the context of an attempted oil embargo that could destabilize Iran’s entire economy (Charts 3 and 4). Similarly, Iran’s downing of a U.S. drone pales in comparison to the tanker attacks in Hormuz that threatened global oil shipments. What matters to investors is the oil: whether Iran is given breathing space or whether it is forced to escalate the conflict to try to win that breathing space. Chart 4Iran’s Rial Depreciated Sharply The latest data suggest that Iran’s exports have fallen to 300,000 barrels per day, a roughly 90% drop from 2018, when Trump walked away from the Iran deal. If this remains the case in the wake of the brinkmanship last week then it is clear that Iran is backed into a corner and could continue to snarl and snap at the U.S. and its regional allies, though it may pause after the tanker attacks. Chart 5More Oil Volatility To Come Tehran also has an incentive to dial up its nuclear program and activate its regional militant proxies in order to build up leverage for any future negotiation. It can continue to refuse entering into negotiations with Trump in order to embarrass him – and it can wait until Trump’s approach is validated by reelection before changing this stance. After all, judging by the first Democratic primary debate, biding time is the best strategy – the Democratic candidates want to restore the 2015 deal and a new Democratic administration would have to plead with Iran, even to get terms less demanding than those in 2015. Other players can also trigger an escalation even if Presidents Trump and Rouhani decide to take a breather in their conflict (which they have not clearly decided to do). The Houthi rebels based in Yemen have launched another missile at Abha airport in Saudi Arabia since Trump’s near-attack on Iran, an action that is provocative, easily replicable, and not necessarily directly under Tehran’s control. Meanwhile OPEC is still dragging its feet on oil production to compensate for the Iranian losses, implying that the cartel will react to price rises rather than preempt them. The Saudis could use production or other means to stoke conflict. Bottom Line: Given our view on the trade war, which dampens global oil demand, we expect still more policy-induced volatility (Chart 5). We do not see oil as a one-way bet … at least not until China’s shift to greater stimulus becomes unmistakable.   North Korea: The Hiccup Is Over Chart 6China Ostensibly Enforces North Korean Sanctions The single clearest reason to expect progress between the U.S. and China at the G20 is the fact that North Korea is getting back onto the diplomatic track. North Korea has consistently been shown to be part of the Trump-Xi negotiations, unlike Taiwan, the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and other points of disagreement. General Secretary Xi Jinping took his first trip to the North on June 20 – the first for a Chinese leader since 2005 – and emphasized the need for historic change, denuclearization, and economic development. Xi is pushing Kim to open up and reform the economy in exchange for a lasting peace process – an approach that is consistent with China’s past policy but also potentially complementary with Trump’s offer of industrialization in exchange for denuclearization. President Trump and Kim Jong Un have exchanged “beautiful” letters this month and re-entered into backchannel discussions. Trump’s visit to South Korea after the G20 will enable him and President Moon Jae-In to coordinate for a possible third summit between Trump and Kim. Progress on North Korea fits our view that the failed summit in Hanoi was merely a setback and that the diplomatic track is robust. Trump’s display of a credible military threat along with Chinese sanctions enforcement (Chart 6) has set in motion a significant process on the peninsula that we largely expect to succeed and go farther than the consensus expects. It is a long-term positive for the Korean peninsula’s economy. It is also a positive factor in the U.S.-China engagement based on China’s interest in ultimately avoiding war and removing U.S. troops from the peninsula. From an investment point of view, an end to a brief hiatus in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy is a very poor substitute for concrete signs of U.S.-China progress on the tech front or opening market access. There has been nothing substantial on these key issues since Trump hiked the tariff rate in May. As a result, it is perfectly possible for the G20 to be a “success” on North Korea but, like the Buenos Aires summit on December 1, for markets to sell the news (Chart 7). Chart 7The Last Trade Truce Didn't Stop The Selloff Chart 8China Needs A Final Deal To Solve This Problem Bottom Line: North Korea is not a basis in itself for tariff rollback, but only as part of a much more extensive U.S.-China agreement. And a final agreement is needed to improve China’s key trade indicators on a lasting basis, such as new export orders and manufacturing employment, which are suffering amid the trade war. We expect economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated given our pessimistic view of U.S.-China trade relations (Chart 8). What About Japan, The G20 Host? Japan faces underrated domestic political risk as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo approaches a critical period in his long premiership, after which he will almost certainly be rendered a “lame duck,” likely by the time of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The question is when will this process begin and what will the market impact be? If Abe loses his supermajority in the July House of Councillors election, then it could begin as early as next month. This is a real risk – because a two-thirds majority is always a tall order – but it is not extreme. Abe’s polling is historically remarkable (Chart 9). The Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner Komeito are also holding strong and remain miles away from competing parties (Chart 10). The economy is also holding up relatively well – real wages and incomes have improved under Abe’s watch (Chart 11). However, the recent global manufacturing slowdown and this year’s impending hike to the consumption tax in October from 8% to 10% are killing consumer confidence. Chart 10Japan's Ruling Coalition Is Strong The collapse in consumer confidence is a contrary indicator to the political opinion polling. The mixed picture suggests that after the election Abe could still backtrack on the tax hike, although it would require driving through surprise legislation. He can pull this off in light of global trade tensions and his main objective of passing a popular referendum to revise the constitution and remilitarize the country. Chart 11Japanese Wages Up, But Consumer Confidence Diving We would not be surprised if Japan secured a trade deal with the U.S. prior to China. Because Abe and the United States need to enhance their alliance, we continue to downplay the risk of a U.S.-Japan trade war. Bloomberg recently reported that President Trump was threatening to downgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance, with a particular grievance over the ever-controversial issue of the relocation of troops on Okinawa. We view this as a transparent Trumpian negotiating tactic that has no applicability – indeed, American military and diplomatic officials quickly rejected the report. We do see a non-trivial risk that Trump’s rhetoric or actions will hurt Japanese equities at some point this year, either as Trump approaches his desired August deadline for a Japan trade deal or if negotiations drag on until closer to his decision about Section 232 tariffs on auto imports on November 14. But our base case is that there will be either no punitive measures or only a short time span before Abe succeeds in negotiating them away. We would not be surprised if the Japanese secured a deal prior to any China deal as a way for the Trump administration to try to pressure China and prove that it can get deals done. This can be done because it could be a thinly modified bilateral renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which had the U.S. and Japan at its center. Bottom Line: Given the combination of the upper house election, the tax hike and its possible consequences, a looming constitutional referendum which poses risks to Abe, and the ongoing external threat of trade war and China tensions, we continue to see risk-off sentiment driving Japanese and global investors to hold then yen. We maintain our long JPY/USD recommendation. The risk to this view is that Bank of Japan chief Haruhiko Kuroda follows other central banks and makes a surprisingly dovish move, but this is not warranted at the moment and is not the base case of our Foreign Exchange Strategy. GeoRisk Indicators Update: June 28, 2019 Our GeoRisk indicators are sending a highly complacent message given the above views on China and Iran. All of our risk measures, other than our German, Turkish, and Brazilian indicators, are signaling a decrease geopolitical tensions. Investors should nonetheless remain cautious: Our German indicator, which has proven to be a good measure of U.S.-EU trade tensions, has increased over the first half of June (Chart 12). We expect Germany to continue to be subject to risk because of Trump’s desire to pivot to European trade negotiations in the wake of any China deal. The auto tariff decision was pushed off until November. We assign a 45% subjective probability to auto tariffs on the EU if Trump seals a final China deal. The reason it is not our base case is because of a lack of congressional, corporate, or public support for a trade war with Europe as opposed to China or Mexico, which touch on larger issues of national interest (security, immigration). There is perhaps a 10% probability that Trump could impose car tariffs prior to securing a China deal. Chart 12U.S.-EU Trade Tensions Hit Germany Chart 13German Greens Overtaking Christian Democrats! Germany is also an outlier because it is experiencing an increase in domestic political uncertainty. Social Democrat leader Andrea Nahles’ resignation on June 2 opened the door to a leadership contest among the SPD’s membership. This will begin next week and conclude on October 26, or possibly in December. The result will have consequences for the survivability of Merkel’s Grand Coalition – in case the SPD drops out of it entirely. Both Merkel and her party have been losing support in recent months – for the first time in history the Greens have gained the leading position in the polls (Chart 13). If the coalition falls apart and Merkel cannot put another one together with the Greens and Free Democrats, she may be forced to resign ahead of her scheduled 2021 exit date. The implication of the events with Trump and Merkel is that Germany faces higher political risk this year, particularly in Q4 if tariff threats and coalition strains coincide. Meanwhile, Brazilian pension reform has been delayed due to an inevitable breakdown in the ability to pass major legislation without providing adequate pork barrel spending. As for the rest of Europe, since European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s dovish signal on June 18, all of our European risk indicators have dropped off. Markets rallied on the news of the ECB’s preparedness to launch another round of bond-buying monetary stimulus if needed, easing tensions in the region. Italian bond spreads plummeted, for instance. The Korean and Taiwanese GeoRisk indicators, our proxies for the U.S.-China trade war, are indicating a decrease in risk as the two sides moved to contain the spike in tensions in May. While Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin notes that the deal was 90% complete in May before the breakdown, there is little evidence yet that any of the sticking points have been removed over the past two weeks. These indicators can continue to improve on the back of any short-term trade truce at the G20. The Russian risk indicator has been hovering in the same range for the past two months. We expect this to break out on the back of increasing mutual threats between the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. has recently agreed to send an additional 1000 rotating troops to Poland, a move that Russia obviously deems aggressive. The Russian upper chamber has also unanimously supported President Putin’s decree to suspend the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, in the wake of the U.S. decision to do so. This would open the door to developing and deploying 500-5500 km range land-based and ballistic missiles. According to the deputy foreign minister, any U.S. missile deployment in Europe will lead to a crisis on the level of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Russia has also sided with Iran in the latest U.S.-Iran tension escalation, denouncing U.S. plans to send an additional 1000 troops to the Middle East and claiming that the shot-down U.S. drone was indeed in Iranian airspace. We anticipate the Russian risk indicator to go up as we expect Russia to retaliate in some way to Poland and to take actions to encourage the U.S. to get entangled deeper into the Iranian imbroglio, which is ultimately a drain on the U.S. and a useful distraction that Russia can exploit. In Turkey, both domestic and foreign tensions are rising. First, the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral election delivered a big defeat for Turkey’s President Erdogan on his home turf. Opposition representative Ekrem Imamoglu defeated former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim for a second time this year on June 23 – increasing his margin of victory to 9.2% from 0.2% in March. This was a stinging rebuke to Erdogan and his entire political system. It also reinforces the fact that Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not as popular as Erdogan himself, frequently falling short of the 50% line in the popular vote for elections not associated directly with Erdogan (Chart 14). This trend combined with his personal rebuke in the power base of Istanbul will leave him even more insecure and unpredictable. Second, the G20 summit is the last occasion for Erdogan and Trump to meet personally before the July 31 deadline on Erdogan’s planned purchase of S-400 missile defenses from Russia. Erdogan has a chance to delay the purchase as he contemplates cabinet and policy changes in the wake of this major domestic defeat. Yet if Erdogan does not back down or delay, the U.S. will remove Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and may also impose sanctions over this purchase and possibly also Iranian trade. The result will hit the lira and add to Turkey’s economic woes. Geopolitically, it will create a wedge within NATO that Russia could exploit, creating more opportunities for market-negative surprises in this area. Finally, we expect our U.K. risk indicator to perk up, as the odds of a no-deal Brexit are rising. Boris Johnson will likely assume Conservative Party leadership and the party is moving closer to attempting a no-deal exit. We assign a 21% probability to this kind of Brexit, up from our previous estimate of 14%. It is more likely that Johnson will get a deal similar to Theresa May’s deal passed or that he will be forced to extend negotiations beyond October.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com France: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar