アメリカ合衆国

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Highlights Macro winds are slowly changing, compelling investors to take a second look at highly cyclical sectors such as industrials. In this Special Report we highlight that the S&P industrials index is trading at a nearly 10% discount to the market on a forward P/E basis, meanwhile a list of welcoming omens has appeared on the horizon which will serve as a foundation for the relative share price outperformance. Increasing odds of a modest rebound in the US manufacturing PMI Stabilization in EM in general and Chinese economy in particular BCA’s House View of a weaker dollar Healthy industry operating metrics Table 1 Feature While US manufacturing remains in recession, investors have already positioned for a V-shaped recovery according to the spectacular run-up in the S&P 500. However, drilling beneath the surface is revealing. Instead of hypersensitive industrials equities sniffing out a recovery in the manufacturing sector, the SPX’s advance has been solely driven by tech mega caps, and thus leaving in the dust all their deep cyclical peers. Why? Because the industrials complex has borne the brunt of the trade war (Chart 1). However, our expectation remains for a natural healing of the economy sometime in the first half of the year, and a rotation out of tech equities into capital goods stocks. Industrials equities will be among the first beneficiaries of this improving macro backdrop. Specifically, four key themes underpin our bullish stance on the S&P industrials index: Increasing odds of a modest rebound in the US manufacturing PMI Stabilization in EM in general and Chinese economy in particular BCA’s House View of a weaker dollar Healthy industry operating metrics Chart 1Trade War Echoes The ISM Will Soon Turn The Corner ISM’s manufacturing PMI survey is still below the 50 boom/bust line, but much of the macro pessimism is likely already reflected in the data, as it is set to bottom by the end of Q1 2020 and rebound into Q2 2020. To be clear, we are not expecting a jump into the high 50s, but rather look for a more balanced recovery into the low 50s. Nevertheless, it is a 5-point rise from the current recessionary level, and the S&P industrials index will cheer a relief in macro data. Charts 2 & 3 clearly depict that the ISM manufacturing PMI is set to improve in the coming months. First, our demand/supply proxy for the overall US economy (comprising of retail and industrial production data) is signaling that industrial production will likely bottom by mid-2020, despite Boeing’s ails (Chart 2, bottom panel). Industrial production is also known to lag PMI by roughly three months, which translates into PMI bottoming in Q1 2020, if history at least rhymes. Moreover, the bond market is also sending a similar message (Chart 2, third panel). As a reminder, BCA’s House View calls for a sell-off in the bond market to a range of 2.25-2.5% for this year. Chart 2Long Term And … Chart 3… Short Term Drivers Are Positive Both coincident and short-term leading economic variables also emit a positive signal. Lumber prices have recovered sharply over the past year (Chart 3, second panel), and given their close correlation with the ISM manufacturing PMI, the move underscores that the bottoming process in the latter has already begun. Moreover, survey internals have made a modest turn on a three-month moving average basis, suggesting that the path of least resistance is to the upside (Chart 3, bottom panel). On the political front, our sister Geopolitical Strategy service has been right on Trump having to retreat and to agree on a “ceasefire” deal as the 2020 elections are looming. Following the October and December tariff “postponement/cancelation” coupled with lower chances of any tariff hikes at all until the 2020 election will likely provide a further boost to the “soft” survey data. As a reminder, the increase in trade policy uncertainty over 2018-2019 has been a large contributor to data deterioration (Chart 1). EM And Chinese Green Shoots A rising share of international sales for the S&P industrials index originates from the EM, as those countries are responsible for a large percent of world total commodity consumption and construction activity. The EM manufacturing PMI has done a good job at tracing the S&P industrials relative share price performance, and the current divergence between the two can serve as yet another catalyst for a rally (Chart 4, top panel). Most importantly, China is also enjoying green shoots. BCA’s Chinese credit & fiscal impulse has been grinding higher over the past year foreshadowing a further rebound in EM data, and consequently benefiting US industrials. Finally, Chinese infrastructure spending that managed to climb out of negative territory will, at the margin, further boost industrials end-demand (Chart 4, middle & bottom panels). Chart 4International Arena Improving The Dollar Is Petering Out Switching gears to the greenback, more good news is in store for the S&P industrials index. Forty-four percent of sales are international for the S&P industrials sector, making it sensitive to FX fluctuations. BCA’s House View for 2020 calls for a weaker USD and should it be proven correct, industrials P&Ls will enjoy positive currency translation tailwinds. Chart 5 shows a newly created dollar model first published by our sister The Bank Credit Analyst service, heralding a softer greenback in the coming months. The real trade-weighted US dollar has been a key driver for the S&P industrials’ sales ever since 1975 as they remained in positive territory even during the recent manufacturing recession. A turn in the US dollar will reignite sales growth and underpin the relative share price ratio (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5The Softening US Dollar … In addition, a depreciating US dollar has been synonymous with a relative multiple expansion phase, and a definitive fall in the dollar will likely serve as a catalyst to unlock excellent value in bombed out relative valuations (Chart 6, third panel). Looking at sales from a different angle, our industrials sector exports proxy has a tight inverse correlation with the USD, and is likely to hook higher given that the US dollar is flat on a year-over-year basis (Chart 6, second panel). Chart 6… Holds The Key … Chart 7… And So Do Our EPS Models Finally, our relative earnings growth model does an excellent job at encapsulating all the profit drivers and is signaling that an earnings-led outperformance period looms (Chart 7). Enticing Operating Metrics Drilling down and away from macro and toward industry-level data is instructive. First, industrials forward earnings breadth – defined as the net number of sub-sectors with higher forward earnings revisions – has bounced off extreme lows signaling that the sell-off in relative share prices is reaching exhaustion. Historically, similar sharp bounces have marked previous price reversals (Chart 8, second panel). Chart 8Selling Climax? Chart 9More Welcoming News Expanding profit margins since mid-2018 also reflect positive sector dynamics as the industry managed to shrug off falling selling prices at the expense of labor (Chart 8, third & fourth panels). Importantly, the CRB raw industrials index is tracing a bottom and a depreciating US dollar will assist in orchestrating a recovery in industrials PPI (Chart 9). With regard to balance sheet health, interest coverage and net debt-to-EBITDA ratios are not sounding alarm bells as they are comparable to the broad market. Industrials are also steadily pumping out healthy free cash flow numbers, which should be a welcoming sign for investors (Chart 10). Despite all these tailwinds, sell-side analysts are still overly pessimistic on relative long-term profit prospects (Chart 11, fourth panel). Chart 10Good B/S All Around Chart 11No Red Flags Neither BCA composite Valuations nor Technical Indicators caution against overweighting the S&P industrials index (Chart 11, second and third panels). In fact, on a forward P/E basis, the sector is trading at a nearly 10% discount to the broad market making it an historically “cheap” addition to one’s portfolio (Chart 11, bottom panel). Risks To Monitor There are a few key risks to our view. First, we treat the current de-escalation in the trade war as temporary. Should Trump get reelected in 2020 for another term, all of the pre-election constraints will be lifted, likely allowing him to get back to his tariff hawkishness. Second, the US economy has already suffered too much damage making it vulnerable to an external shock. Were a black swan to materialize, the dollar would skyrocket putting our industrials view offside. Finally, should the Chinese government miscalculate the amount of stimulus required to reignite their economy, US industrials will again be among the first ones to suffer the consequences via the final-demand link. Put simply, any combination of these risks would slay animal spirits and postpone capex-led US industrials sector recovery. Bottom Line: Increasing chances of a rebound in the ISM manufacturing PMI coupled with green shoots in the EM, expectations for a weaker US dollar and sound industry level data, argue for an above benchmark allocation in the S&P industrials index. Please stay tuned for an upcoming Special Report on how to position within the industrials complex.     Arseniy Urazov Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com  

Please note that next week’s US Bond Strategy Weekly Report will be replaced by a Special Report on Commercial Real Estate that was produced jointly with our US Investment Strategy team. That report will be published on Monday instead of Tuesday. Highlights Duration: Financial markets have taken the Fed’s dovish guidance on board, and the asset prices that are most sensitive to monetary policy are rallying strongly. If we follow the typical pattern, as was the case in 2015/16, accommodative policy will soon lead to a rebound in our preferred global growth indicators and higher bond yields. Keep portfolio duration low. Credit: The macro environment for corporate bonds remains attractive, but investors should favor high-yield bonds – particularly Caa-rated and energy debt – where spreads still have room to narrow. Yield Curve: Barbelled Treasury portfolios still make sense in the current macro environment. Specifically, we recommend that investors overweight a duration-matched 2-year/30-year barbell and underweight the 5-year bullet. Feature Bond yields have mostly trended sideways during the past few weeks, even as the S&P 500 surged. The result is that a wide gulf has opened up between the equity and bond markets (Chart 1). At times like this it becomes popular to ask whether the stock market or bond market is “right”. That is, are equities bound to sell off and re-converge with bonds? Or, will the stock market pull bond yields higher? We agree with our Global Investment Strategy team that the risk of a near-term equity sell-off is high.1 But we also think that both the equity and bond markets are responding rationally to an economic environment characterized by abundant central bank liquidity and global growth that has yet to convincingly rebound. Tech stocks are responsible for the bulk of the recent rally. To see why, we can take a look at the relative performance of different equity sectors. Technology stocks are responsible for the bulk of the recent rally, while defensive sectors have performed in-line with the benchmark index and cyclical sectors have lagged (Chart 2). This is consistent with an environment of depressed global growth and plentiful central bank liquidity. Chart 1Stocks Versus##br## Bonds Chart 2Cyclical (or Growth Sensitive) Sectors Have Lagged ... Many technology firms trade off the promise of large cash flows that will only be delivered in the distant future. In a sense, we can think of these stocks as long duration assets whose prices are very sensitive to the discount rate. The Fed’s highly accommodative interest rate guidance is the main reason for the tech sector’s outperformance. In contrast, cyclical equity sectors – like materials, industrials and energy – are less sensitive to Fed policy and more geared toward global economic growth. These sectors have lagged because global growth has yet to put in a decisive bottom. Like cyclical equity sectors, Treasury yields are also most sensitive to trends in global growth. In fact, the 10-year Treasury yield closely tracks the relative performance of cyclical versus defensive equity sectors (Chart 3). Commodity prices are also consistent with this picture (Chart 4). Gold has rallied sharply, something that often results from a shift toward more dovish monetary policy, while the growth-sensitive CRB Raw Industrials commodity index has only just begun to hook up. Historically, bond yields only rise when gains in the CRB index start to outpace gains in gold (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3... Consistent With Bond Yields Chart 4The CRB/Gold Ratio But we can’t think of monetary policy and global growth as completely separate issues. They tend to follow each other in a pattern explained by our Fed Policy Loop (Chart 5). Applying the Loop to the current environment, we see that the Fed eased policy after growth weakened last year and financial markets are currently responding to this shift in monetary conditions. The most interest rate sensitive assets – e.g. tech stocks and gold – are rallying. This represents an easing of financial conditions that will eventually lead to a rebound in global growth indicators. It is only when those global growth indicators increase that US bond yields will rise. Chart 5The Fed Policy Loop On that note, we also see signs that the economy is transitioning from the ‘Asset Price Inflation’ section of the Loop to the ‘Stronger Economic Growth’ section. The US ISM Manufacturing PMI is currently downbeat at 47.2, but it should be at 50.8 according to a model based on regional Fed manufacturing surveys (Chart 6). Further, the ISM non-Manufacturing index is well above 50 and moving higher (Chart 6, panel 2). Finally, industrial production growth is nowhere near as weak as it was in 2016, even though the PMI is lower (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 6ISM Will Soon Trough Bottom Line: Financial markets have taken the Fed’s dovish guidance on board, and the asset prices that are most sensitive to monetary policy are rallying strongly. If we follow the typical pattern, as was the case in 2015/16, accommodative policy will soon lead to a rebound in our preferred global growth indicators and higher bond yields. Keep portfolio duration low. Stay Long Junk It’s still early, but corporate bonds have so far not joined in with this year’s equity rally. Year-to-date, the investment grade corporate bond index is only up 8 bps versus Treasuries (Chart 7). High-yield bonds have fared better. They have outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 48 bps so far this year, and the segments of the junk market that were most beaten down in 2019 are leading the charge. Caa-rated junk bonds have outperformed Treasuries by 108 bps so far in 2020.  The energy sector has also fared well since December, and is up a decent 43 bps versus Treasuries in January. Chart 7Corporate Bond Returns Chart 8Favor HY Over IG We see the divergence between investment grade and high-yield returns continuing during the next few months, due to large differences in valuation. The investment grade corporate index spread is well below our cyclical target, while the high-yield index spread still looks cheap (Chart 8).2  High-yield’s attractiveness is mostly due to Caa-rated securities which underperformed dramatically in 2019 even as junk bonds overall delivered solid returns (Chart 8, bottom panel). As we discussed in a recent report, the underperformance of Caa-rated debt was in large part due to weakness in the shale oil sector.3 The yield curve is no longer deeply inverted out to the 5-year maturity point. Bottom Line: Corporate bonds will deliver solid returns as the economy transitions from the ‘Asset Price Inflation’ stage to the ‘Stronger Economic Growth’ stage of our Fed Policy Loop. However, relative valuation dictates that returns will concentrated in high-yield, especially Caa-rated and energy debt. Finding The Best Spot On The Yield Curve We have been recommending that investors run barbelled Treasury portfolios for some time, favoring the long and short ends of the curve at the expense of the belly (5-year/7-year). However, the shape of the curve has changed a lot since the 2/10 slope briefly inverted last August. Specifically, the curve is no longer deeply inverted out to the 5-year maturity point (Chart 9A). In light of this shift, it is worth considering whether our recommended curve positioning still makes sense. First, we take a look at the 12-month rolling yield for each point on the Treasury curve (Chart 9B). The 12-month rolling yield equals each security’s coupon return plus rolldown return. It is essentially the return you would earn in each maturity if the yield curve stayed completely unchanged during the next 12 months. Despite recent curve shifts, we still see a significant pick-up in rolling yield beyond the 5-year maturity point, as was the case last August. Chart 9APar Coupon Yield Curve Chart 9B12-Month Rolling Yield Curve But yield pick-up is just one consideration. We also need to think about how the shape of the curve will change during the next 6-12 months. One way to do this is to look at a sample of recent data – we use the past six months – and calculate how sensitive each point on the Treasury curve has been to changes in our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter.4 That is, if the market moves to price-in fewer Fed rate cuts during the next 12 months, as we expect, how should we expect each point on the Treasury curve to respond? To answer this question, Chart 10 shows how sensitive weekly changes in each Treasury yield have been to changes in our Discounter during the past six months. Chart 10Risk & Reward Along The Treasury Curve The first thing we notice is that the 5-year yield is the most sensitive to changes in our Discounter and the 2-year yield is the least sensitive. The 20-year and 30-year yields are relatively insulated from changes in the Discounter, and offer the greatest rolling yields. The second and third panels of Chart 10 show how these sensitivities change if we consider increases and decreases in our Discounter differently. Here we see that maturities from 5-20 years have been similarly sensitive to increases in the Discounter during the past six months. Meanwhile, the 5-year yield has been most sensitive to declines in the Discounter. The 2-year yield is not sensitive at all to a rising Discounter, but is fairly exposed to a falling Discounter. In general, since we expect the Discounter to move up during the next 6-12 months, the 2-year note looks like the safest place to camp out. Meanwhile, the 30-year bond looks attractive in terms of its yield pick-up per unit of sensitivity. The 2-year yield is least sensitive to changes in our Fed Funds Discounter. Another approach we can take is to look at how different parts of the yield curve respond to “risk on” and “risk off” market environments. To do this, we classify months as “risk on” if both the stock-to-bond total return ratio rises and the high-yield index spread tightens. Conversely, we classify months as “risk off” if both the stock-to-bond total return ratio falls and the high-yield index spread widens. Chart 11A shows the cumulative changes in different yield curve slopes since 2010 during “risk on” months only. The chart shows that, recently, “risk on” financial market behavior has coincided with the yield curve steepening out to the 7-year/10-year part of the curve, and then flattening beyond the 10-year point. Similarly, Chart 11B shows that “risk off” months have recently coincided with yield curve flattening out to the 7-year/10-year part of the curve, and steepening beyond that. Chart 11ASlope Changes In "Risk On" Environments Chart 11BSlope Changes In "Risk Off" Environments In other words, if recent correlations hold, a “risk on” environment during the next few months would cause the 7-year and 10-year yields to rise the most, while the 2-year and 30-year yields would have less upside. Investment Conclusions We expect economic growth to strengthen during the next 6-12 months, leading to “risk on” financial market behavior and a rising Fed Funds Discounter. Based on this view and our analysis of rolling yields and curve sensitivities, we conclude that a barbelled Treasury portfolio still makes the most sense. We want to be overweight the 2-year note because it should have less upside in a “risk-on” environment, and overweight the 30-year bond to get some extra yield pick-up while taking less risk than in the 5-year, 7-year or 10-year notes. In general, we want to avoid the 5-year, 7-year and 10-year maturities. According to our yield curve models, all three of those maturities look expensive relative to a duration-matched 2/30 barbell (Chart 12).5 Chart 12Butterfly Spread Fair Value Models If we wanted to get even more precise, we could note that a duration-matched 2/30 barbell offers 5 bps of yield pick-up compared to the 5-year note, only 1 bp of yield pick-up relative to the 7-year note and about the same yield as the 10-year note. To split hairs, those extra few basis points give us a slight preference for being short the 5-year bullet compared to the 7-year and 10-year notes, though we would prefer to avoid all three. Bottom Line: Barbelled Treasury portfolios still make sense in the current macro environment. Specifically, we recommend that investors overweight a duration-matched 2-year/30-year barbell and underweight the 5-year bullet.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Time For A Breather”, dated January 10, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 2 For details on how we arrive at our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caa-Rated Bonds: Warning Sign Or Buying Opportunity?”, dated November 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter measures the 12-month change in the fed funds rate that is currently priced into the overnight index swap curve. 5 For details on our yield curve models please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

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Highlights Strikes result from divergent perceptions of bargaining power: A strike reflects a negotiating failure, and negotiations fail when parties cannot agree on which side has the stronger position, typically because at least one of them overestimates its leverage. Once a strike starts, broad macro factors influence the outcome: Labor market slack, economic concentration, trends in labor relations law and regulations, and the gap between labor’s and management’s fortunes (if extreme) are the key macro determinants of negotiating leverage. Key factors that have bolstered management for decades are poised to reverse: Legal and regulatory trends have little room to improve from management’s perspective, and the gap between management’s and labor’s share of rewards is ripe for narrowing. A union resurgence is a low-probability, high-impact event: We view the potential for labor to gain the upper hand over management as a low-probability event that would have a significant impact on markets if it did come to pass, so it merits a close look. Feature We concluded Part 1 by highlighting two consistent themes from the modern history of the US labor movement: successful strikes beget strikes, and employees are unlikely to make gains if judges and government officials are disposed to favor management. In this installment, we will focus on the factors that encourage strikes and the non-government determinants of their success. Part 3 will focus on public opinion, elected officials and the judiciary. Our ultimate goal is to evaluate relative bargaining power, and the potential for organized labor to push wages significantly higher, upending the risk-friendly status quo. The Origin Of Strikes Strikes (and lockouts) occur when labor and management cannot reach a mutually acceptable settlement, often because at least one side overestimates its bargaining power. It is easy to agree when labor and management hold similar views about each side’s relative power, as when both perceive that one of them is considerably stronger. In that case, a settlement favoring the stronger side can be reached fairly quickly, especially if the stronger side exercises some restraint and does not seek to impose terms that the weaker side can scarcely abide. Restraint is rational in repeated games like employer-employee bargaining, and when both parties recognize that relative bargaining positions are fluid, they are likely to exercise it. History shows that the pendulum between labor and management swings, albeit slowly, as societal views evolve1 and the business cycle fluctuates. As a general rule, management will have the upper hand during recessions, when the supply of workers exceeds demand, and labor will have the advantage when expansions are well advanced, and capacity tightens. A high unemployment rate broadly favors employers, and a low unemployment rate favors employees. Neither the number of work stoppages (Chart 1, top panel), nor the number of workers involved (Chart 1, middle panel) correlates very well with the unemployment gap (Chart 1, bottom panel), in the Reagan-Thatcher era, however, as work stoppages have dwindled almost to zero. Chart 1Swamped By The Legal And Regulatory Tide Game theory is better equipped than simple regression models to offer insight into the origin of strikes. We posit a simple framework in which each side can hold any of five perceptions of its own bargaining power, resulting in a total of 25 possible joint perceptions. Management (M) can believe it is way stronger than Labor (L), M >> L; stronger than Labor, M > L; roughly equal, M ≈ L; weaker than Labor, L > M; or way weaker than Labor, L >> M. Labor also holds one of these five perceptions, and the interaction of the two sides’ perceptions establishes the path negotiations will follow. The fur flies when each party thinks the other should make the bulk of the concessions: labor negotiations over the next couple of years could be interesting. Limiting our focus to today’s prevailing conditions, Figure 1 displays only the outcomes consistent with management’s belief that it has the upper hand. For completeness, the exhibit lists all of labor’s potential perceptions, but we deem the two in which labor is feeling its oats (circled) to be most likely, given the success of recent high-profile strikes.2 Management’s confidence follows logically from four decades of victories, but may prove to be unfounded if its power has already peaked. Figure 1The Eye Of The Beholder Strike outcomes turn on which side has overestimated its leverage. The broad factors we use to assess leverage are overall labor market slack; economic concentration; regulatory and legal trends; and the sustainability of either side’s accumulated advantage, which we describe as the labor-management rubber band. Other factors that matter on a case-by-case basis, but are beyond the scope of our analysis, include industry-level slack, a labor input’s susceptibility to automation, and the degree of labor specialization/skill involved in that input. For these micro-level factors, a given group of workers’ leverage is inversely related to the availability of substitutes for their input. Labor Market Slack Chart 2Surprise Wage Retracements Despite muted wage growth (Chart 2), the labor market is demonstrably tight. The unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, the broader definition of unemployment is at the lowest level in its 26-year history, and the prime-age employment-to-population ratio is back to its 2001 levels, having surpassed the previous cycle’s peak (Chart 3). The job openings rate is high, indicating that demand for workers is robust, and so is the quits rate, indicating that employers are competing vigorously to meet it. The NFIB survey’s job openings and hiring plans series (Chart 4) echo the JOLTS findings. Chart 3Prime-Age Employment Is At An 18-Year High ... Chart 4... But There Are Still Lots Of Help Wanted Signs The lack of labor market slack decisively favors workers’ negotiating position. It is a sellers’ market when demand outstrips supply, and labor victories tend to be self-reinforcing. Successful strikes beget strikes, and management volunteers concessions as labor peace becomes a competitive advantage during strike waves. Given that the crisis-driven damage to the labor force participation rate has healed as the gap between the actual part rate (Chart 5, solid line) and its demographically-determined structural proxy has closed (Chart 5, dashed line), the burden of proof rests squarely with those who argue that there is an ample supply of workers waiting to come off the sidelines. Chart 5The Labor Force Participation Gap Has Closed Economic Concentration Chart 6Less Competition = More Power The trend toward economic concentration (Chart 6) has endowed the largest companies with greater market power, as evidenced by surging corporate profit margins. The greater the concentration of employment opportunities in local labor markets, the more closely they resemble monopsonies.3 Unfortunately for labor, monopsonies restrain prices just as monopolies inflate them. As our Bank Credit Analyst colleagues have shown,4 there is a robust inverse relationship between employment concentration and real wages (Chart 7). Chart 7One Huge Buyer + Plus Multiple Small Sellers = Low Prices Economic concentration has been a major driver of management’s Reagan-Thatcher era dominance. Sleepy to indifferent antitrust enforcement has helped businesses capture market power, and it will continue to prevail through 2024 unless the Democrats take the White House in November. The silver lining for workers is that concentration could have the effect of promoting labor organization in services, where unions have heretofore made limited progress. The only way for employees to combat employers’ monopsony power is to organize their way to becoming a monopoly supplier of labor. Regulatory And Legal Trends Over the last four decades, unions have endured a near-constant drubbing from state capitols, federal agencies and the courts, as union and labor protections have been under siege from all sides. Since the air traffic controllers’ disastrous strike, labor’s regulatory and legal fortunes have most closely resembled the competitive fortunes of the Harlem Globetrotters’ beleaguered opposition. But the regulatory and legal tide has been such a huge benefit for management since the beginning of the Reagan administration that it cannot continue to maintain its pace. Employees and employers need each other, and their tether can only be stretched so far before it starts pulling them back together. Investors seem to assume that it will, however, to the extent that they think about it at all. It stands to reason that employers may be similarly complacent. We will look more closely at the presidential election and its potential consequences in Part 3, but labor concerns and inequality are capturing more attention, even among Republicans. With Republicans’ inclination to side with business only able to go in one direction, the chances are good that it has peaked. The Labor-Management Rubber Band For all of the romantic allure of labor’s battles with management in the Colosseum era, employees and employers have a deeply symbiotic relationship. One can’t exist without the other, and pursuing total victory in negotiations is folly. Even too many incremental wins can prove ruinous, as the UAW discovered to its chagrin in 2008. A half-century of generous compensation and stultifying work rules saddled Detroit automakers with a burden that would have put them out of business had the federal government not intervened. Table 1Average Salaries Of Public School Teachers By State We think of labor and management as being linked by a tether with a finite range. Since neither side can thrive for long if the other side is suffering, the tether pulls the two sides closer together when the gap between them threatens to become too wide. When labor does too well for too long at management’s expense, profit margins shrink and the company’s viability as a going concern is threatened. When management does too well, deteriorating living standards drive the best employees away, undermining productivity and profitability. Before the low-paying entity’s work force becomes a listless dumping ground for other firms’ castoffs, it may rise up and strike out of desperation. Teachers’ unions might have appeared to be setting themselves up for a fall in 2018 by illegally striking in staunchly conservative West Virginia, Oklahoma and Arizona, but desperate times call for desperate measures. Per the National Education Association’s data for the 2017-18 academic year, average public school teacher pay in West Virginia ranked 50th among the 50 states and the District of Columbia, Oklahoma ranked 49th and Arizona ranked 45th (Table 1). Adjusting the nominal salaries for cost disparities across states, West Virginia placed 41st, Oklahoma 44th and Arizona 48th. Given that real teacher salaries had declined by 8% and 9% since 2009-10 in West Virginia and Arizona, respectively, the labor-management rubber band had stretched nearly to the breaking point. Consolidating The Macro Message Parties to negotiations derive leverage from the availability of substitutes. When alternative employment opportunities are prevalent, workers have a lot of leverage, because they can credibly threaten to avail themselves of them. Teaching is a skill that transfers easily, and every state has a public school system, so teachers in low-salary states have a wealth of ready alternatives. The converse is true for low-salary states; despite much warmer temperatures, it is unlikely that teachers from top-quintile states will be willing to take a 25-33% cost-of-living-adjusted pay cut to decamp to Arizona (Table 2). Table 2Cost Of Living-Adjusted Public School Teacher Salaries By State It is easy to see from Figure 2 why management has had the upper hand. Economic concentration and the legal and regulatory climate have increasingly favored it for decades. The immediate future seems poised to favor labor, however, as the legal and regulatory climate cannot get materially better for employers, and the labor-management rubber band has become so stretched that some sort of mean reversion is inevitable. We have high conviction that labor’s one current advantage, a tight labor market, will remain in its column over the next year or two. On a forward-looking basis, the macro factors as a whole are poised to support labor. Figure 2Macro Drivers Of Negotiating Leverage​​​​​​​ Takeaways After discussing this Special Report series with clients, we realized our views could easily be misinterpreted. We are not calling for an imminent union revival that drives wages higher across industries. To be clear, we think it is more likely than not that the labor movement in the United States will remain weak relative to its 1950s to 1970s heyday. We do think, however, that the probability that unions could rise up to exert the leverage that accrues to workers in a tight labor market is considerably larger than the great majority of investors perceive. Alpha – market-beating return – arises from surprises. An investor captures excess returns when s/he successfully anticipates something that the consensus does not. If the disparity involves a trivial outcome, then any excess return is likely to be trivial, but if the outcome is significant, the investor who zigged when the rest of the market zagged stands to separate him/herself from the pack. Management has been in the driver's seat, but the factors that have kept it there have a high risk of reversing. We think the outcome of a shift in leverage from employers to employees would be very large indeed. We would expect that aggregate wage gains of 4% or higher would quickly drive the Fed to impose restrictive monetary policy settings, eventually inducing the next recession and the end of the bull markets in equities, credit and property. A union revival may be a low-probability event, but it would have considerable impact on markets and the economy. Given our conviction that the probability, albeit low, is much greater than investors expect, we think the subject is well worth sustained attention. We will examine public opinion and its effect on elected officials and the courts in Part 3, which will conclude our examination of labor-management dynamics. We will publish that installment on February 3rd; next week we will publish a joint US Investment Strategy – US Bond Strategy Special Report on commercial real estate, lead-authored by Jennifer Lacombe.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We will discuss public opinion, and its impact on elected officials and courts, in Part 3. 2 Please see the January 13, 2020 US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Labor Strikes Back, Part 1: An Investor’s Guide To US Labor History,” available at www.bcaresearch.com. 3 A monopsony is a market with a single buyer, akin to a monopoly, which is a market with only one seller. 4 Please see the July 2019 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, “The Productivity Puzzle: Competition Is The Missing Ingredient,” available at bcaresearch.com.

Overweight The S&P software index has gone parabolic. SPX returns are extremely concentrated as we showed on Monday’s Weekly Report, with the S&P software & services GICS2 sector being responsible for 18% of the broad market’s gains since late-2018 (see bar chart below). We are participating in this rally via sustaining an overweight stance in the S&P software index – a positon that is currently up nearly 40% since inception in relative terms. However, we are compelled to raise our trailing stop to 32% (from 27% previously) as this concentrated nature of returns is making us uneasy. Should it get triggered, it will have a domino effect on our portfolio. The move to a benchmark S&P software index allocation will push the broad S&P technology sector to underweight, and consequently tilt the portfolio to a modest defensive over cyclical bent. Bottom Line: Remain overweight the S&P software index, but tighten the trailing stop to the 32% relative return mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SOFT: MSFT, ADBE, CRM, ORCL, INTU, NOW, ADSK, ANSS, SNPS, CDNS, NLOK, FTNT, CTXS.

Highlights We continue to have a positive view on global equities over the next 12 months, but see heightened risks of a near-term correction. Despite dwindling spare capacity, government bond yields are still lower today than they were shortly after the financial crisis. Many investors argue that bond yields cannot rise much because asset values would plunge if yields rose sharply, while debt burdens would quickly become unsustainable. We disagree. We think there is greater scope for yields to rise than is widely believed. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed-income portfolios, favoring inflation-linked over nominal bonds and positioning for steeper yield curves. Gold should also do well next year. As long as bond yields are rising in response to stronger growth, as will be the case for the next two years, equities will fare well. The stock market will buckle, however, once stagflation sets in around 2022. Stocks Need To Work Off Overbought Conditions Before Moving Higher Again In last week’s report, entitled “Time For A Breather,” we downgraded our tactical three-month view on global equities from overweight to neutral on the grounds that stocks had run up too hard, too fast. Net long positions in equity futures among asset managers and levered funds are now at levels that have historically preceded corrections (Chart 1). Chart 1Stocks Are At A Heightened Risk Of A Correction Chart 2Breadth Is Quite Narrow   Chart 3The Equity Risk Premium Is Fairly High, Especially Outside The US The rally has been lopsided, characterized by very narrow breadth. The top five stocks in the S&P 500 (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook) now comprise 18% of market cap, a higher share than in the late 1999/early 2000s (Chart 2). As my colleague, Anastasios Avgeriou, has pointed out, Apple’s $30 billion one day market cap gain on January 9th was greater than the market cap of the median stock in the S&P 500 index. Despite our near-term concerns, we continue to maintain a positive 12-month view on global equities. Easier financial conditions, a turn in the global inventory cycle, modestly looser fiscal policy in the UK and euro area, and re-upped fiscal/credit stimulus in China should all support global growth this year. Faster growth, in turn, will lift corporate earnings. The equity risk premium also remains quite high, particularly outside the US (Chart 3). A Fragile Trade Truce A de-escalation in the trade war should provide a further tailwind to equities. The “phase one” agreement signed on Wednesday features a commitment by China to purchase an additional $200 billion in US goods and services over the next two years relative to 2017 levels. In return, the US will halve tariffs, to 7.5%, on the $120 billion tranche in Chinese imports and suspend any further tariff hikes. No firm schedule exists to begin “phase two” talks, and at this point, it is quite likely that no negotiations will take place until after the US presidential election. Nevertheless, the tail risk of an out-of-control trade war has receded for the time being, which is positive for stocks. Better Chinese Trade Data Adding to growing optimism over the global economy and diminished trade tensions, Chinese trade data surprised on the upside this week. Exports rose 7.6% in December, well above the consensus estimate of 2.9%. Imports surged 16.3%, easily surpassing the consensus estimate of 9.6%. While base effects explain some of the improvement, the overall tone of the trade data is consistent with the strengthening Chinese PMIs and improvement in industrial production and retail sales (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Trade Data Is Improving Chart 5Better News Out Of China Has Propelled The Yuan Higher Versus The US Dollar Better news out of China has pushed the yuan to the strongest level against the US dollar since last summer (Chart 5). The Chinese currency is the most important driver of other EM currencies. If the yuan continues to strengthen, as we expect, EM assets – particularly EM stocks and local-currency bonds – should do well this year. How High Can Bond Yields (Realistically) Go? Despite rising over the past few months, global government bond yields are lower today than they were shortly after the financial crisis ended (Chart 6). The decline in yields has occurred alongside dwindling spare capacity. In most countries, the unemployment rate today is below 2007/08 lows (Chart 7). Many investors argue that bond yields cannot rise much from current levels because asset values would plunge if yields rose sharply, while debt burdens would quickly become unsustainable. If such an unfortunate turn of events were to occur, central bankers would have to shelve any tightening plans, just as Jay Powell had to do in late 2018. Chart 6Bond Yields Are Lower Today Than They Were After The Great Recession Chart 7Unemployment Rates Are Below Their Pre-Recession Lows In Most Economies Convexity Fears One argument often heard these days is that asset prices have become hypersensitive to changes in interest rates. There is some basis for thinking this. As Box 1 explains, the relationship between asset returns and interest rates tends to be “convex,” meaning that any given change in interest rates will have a bigger effect on returns if rates are low to begin with, as they are today. The effect is particularly pronounced for long duration assets such as long-term bonds, equities, or real estate. Nevertheless, while the theoretical presence of convexity in asset returns is crystal clear, many commentators overstate its practical importance. As Chart 8 shows, the average maturity of government debt stands at seven years. At that level of maturity, the effects of convexity tend to be quite small.1   Chart 8Average Debt Maturity Is Below 10 Years In Most Countries Granted, the overall stock of debt has increased in relation to GDP. However, much of that additional debt has been absorbed by central banks, reducing the amount of government debt available for the private sector. What about equities? The ratio of stock market capitalization-to-GDP has risen to 59%, up from a low of 24% in 2009, and close to its 2000 highs (Chart 9). Does that mean that stocks will sink if yields rise from current levels? Not necessarily. Remember that the discount rate is not the only thing that affects the present value of a stream of income. The expected growth rate of that income also matters. In fact, in the standard dividend discount model, it is simply the difference between the discount rate and the growth rate of dividends that determines how much a stock is worth. If higher bond yields coincide with rising growth expectations, stock prices do not need to fall at all. Chart 9Equity Market Cap Is Approaching Previous Highs Chart 10 shows that the monthly correlation between equity returns and bond yields remains as high as ever. This suggests that favorable economic news, to the extent that it leads investors to revise up the expected growth rate for earnings, usually more than compensates for a rising discount rate (Chart 11). Chart 10Correlation Between Equity Returns And Bond Yields Remains High Chart 11Earnings Estimates Tend To Move In Sync With Swings In Bond Yields So why are so many investors worried that higher bond yields will undercut stocks? The answer has less to do with convexity and more to do with the fear that bond yields will reach a level that chokes off growth. The combination of a rising discount rate and a falling growth rate would be toxic for equities and other risk assets. Debt Worries Likewise, it is not so much that corporate bond investors are worried that rising yields will cause interest payments to swell. After all, interest costs are still quite low as a share of cash flows for most firms (Chart 12). Rather, the fear is that higher yields will imperil growth, causing those cash flows to evaporate. Government debt is also much less of a problem than often assumed, at least in countries that issue bonds in their own currencies. The standard rule for debt sustainability says that the debt-to-GDP ratio will always converge to a stable level if the interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy.2 This is easily the case in almost all economies today (Chart 13). Chart 12US Corporate Sector: Interest Payments Are Not A Worry Chart 13Bond Yield Minus GDP Growth: Please Mind The Gap The only places where central banks are severely constrained in raising rates are in economies such as Canada, Sweden, and Australia where debt-financed housing bubbles have formed (Chart 14). However, even in these countries, the quality of mortgage underwriting has generally been strong, implying that a banking crisis would likely be avoided. Chart 14Canada, Sweden, And Australia Stand Out As Having Very Frothy Housing Markets It’s Really About The Neutral Rate The discussion above suggests that the main constraint to higher bond yields is the economy itself. If bond yields rise enough, the interest rate-sensitive sectors of the economy will weaken, and a recession will ensue. As long as bond yields are rising in response to stronger growth, as will be the case for the next two years, equities will be fine. Unfortunately, no one knows where the neutral rate – the interest rate demarcating the boundary between expansionary and contractionary monetary policy – really lies. Chart 15Rising Labor Share Of Income Occurring Alongside Labor Market Tightening Slower trend growth has probably reduced the neutral rate, as has the shift to a more “capital-lite” economy. On the flipside, other forces have probably raised the neutral rate over the past few years. A tighter labor market has increased workers’ share of national income (Chart 15). Since workers spend more of every dollar of income than companies, this has raised aggregate demand. Fiscal policy has also been loosened, while elevated asset prices have likely incentivized some spending that would otherwise not have taken place. Even though we do not know the exact value of the neutral rate, we do know that the unemployment rate has been falling in most countries for the past 10 years, a period during which bond yields were generally higher than today. This suggests that monetary policy remains in expansionary territory. True, global growth did slow in 2018, just as the Fed was raising rates. However, this probably had more to do with the natural ebb and flow of the global manufacturing cycle, exacerbated by the Chinese deleveraging campaign and the brewing trade war. If global growth recovers this year, as we expect, estimates of the neutral rate will rise. This will allow equity prices to increase even in an environment of modestly higher bond yields. Inflation Is Coming… Eventually While stronger economic growth will lift bond yields this year, the big move in yields will only come when inflation breaks out. Core inflation tends to track unit labor costs (Chart 16). Unit labor cost inflation has remained range-bound for most of the recovery in the United States, which explains the failure of inflation to take flight. Unit labor cost inflation has been even more moribund elsewhere. Chart 16Core Inflation Tends To Track Unit Labor Costs Chart 17Correlation Between Labor Market Slack And Wage Growth Remains Intact   Looking out, barring a major surge in productivity, rising wage growth should lead to accelerating unit labor cost inflation, first in the US and then in the rest of the world, which will translate into higher price inflation. We doubt that such a price-wage spiral will erupt this year. If anything, US wage growth has leveled off recently, with the year-over-year change in average hourly earnings falling back below the 3% mark. Nevertheless, the long-term correlation between labor market slack and wage growth remains intact (Chart 17). As wage growth reaccelerates, unit labor cost inflation will drift higher, setting the stage for a period of rising price inflation. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in global fixed-income portfolios, favoring inflation-linked over nominal bonds and positioning for steeper yield curves. Gold should also do well next year. As long as bond yields are rising in response to stronger growth, as will be the case for the next two years, equities will be fine. The stock market will buckle, however, once stagflation sets in around 2022. Box 1 Asset Prices And Interest Rates: The Role Of Convexity Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Assuming semi-annual compounding, the price of a 10-year bond with a 5% coupon rate falls by 7.9% if the yield increases from 1% to 2%, which is only slightly higher than the 7.6% decline that would be incurred if the yield increases from 4% to 5%. 2One might add that if the interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy, a higher starting point for the debt stock will allow for more debt issuance without leading to a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. As we have shown before, the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio can be expressed as  p/(r-g), where r is the interest rate, g is trend GDP growth, and p is the primary (i.e., non-interest) budget balance. Thus, for example, if the government wanted to achieve a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% and r-g is -2%, it would need to run a primary budget deficit of 0.5*0.02=1% of GDP. However, if the government targeted a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 200%, it could run a primary budget deficit of 2*0.02=4% of GDP.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades