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Highlights Joe Biden is the Democratic Party’s presumptive nominee following Super Tuesday. The onus is on Bernie Sanders to upset the race yet again. This is unlikely. Biden’s nomination is less market-negative than that of Sanders, but increases the risk of a Democratic Senate and hence tax hikes. The coronavirus threat to Trump’s reelection is two-pronged – and rising. Go long global equities ex-US on the basis that the virus fears will give way to public resilience and global stimulus. Feature A non-populist, non-protectionist candidate is emerging as the Democratic Party nominee for the US presidency – a positive development for global risk assets in 2020. Judging by preliminary results from the Democratic Party’s “Super Tuesday” primary elections, former Vice President Joe Biden has become the presumptive nominee, one of our key 2020 views. Our simple, back-of-the-envelope projection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 13-16 shows that as long as Biden maintains his average vote share thus far, he is narrowly on track to win a majority of pledged delegates and thus clinch the nomination by June (Chart 1).  Chart 1Projection Of Democratic Delegates To National Convention, Milwaukee, July 2020 The chief risk to our view – that Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, a left-wing populist, would run away with his momentum in February – has peaked. While Sanders won an average of 38% of the delegates on offer, he only won 28% of the popular vote, compared to Biden’s 44% of the delegates and 33% of the popular vote. The centrists as a bloc are outvoting the progressives and only two candidates are left. Ultimately Biden’s two-pronged path to victory in the Electoral College in November reinforces the Super Tuesday results, giving him greater electability and making him the likeliest victor of the Democratic Party primary. Super Tuesday Makes Biden Presumptive Nominee Biden racked up victories in key states including Texas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Virginia. He is now the leader in delegates to the party’s national convention (Chart 2), the popular vote, the number of states won, and the biggest states. The exception is California, one of the country’s most left-leaning states, where Sanders won, albeit with the combined progressive vote less than 50%. The voting pattern shows that Democrats still prefer centrist candidates to left-wing or “progressive” candidates by 50% to 40% on average (Chart 3). With two candidates left, this dynamic should favor Biden. Chart 2The Delegate Count Thus Far Chart 3Popular Vote: Biden/Centrists Versus Sanders/Progressives Chart 4Super Tuesday And Beyond By winning Texas and sweeping the South, Biden is heavily favored to win Florida on March 17 – always one of his strong suits vis-à-vis Sanders and a sign of electability in November. But his surprise victories over Sanders in Minnesota and Massachusetts show that he is competitive in the Midwest and Northeast, meaning that he is also likely favored to come out on top in Michigan and Ohio on March 10. The same goes for Illinois, the home state of his 2008-12 running mate Obama, on March 17 (Chart 4). True, in Minnesota and Massachusetts Biden benefited from Senator Elizabeth Warren’s clearing the 15% threshold, thus subtracting from Sanders’s vote share and delegate share. Warren may or may not drop out of the race. Sanders needs to arrest Biden’s Super Tuesday bounce and convince Democratic voters that he is more electable against Trump than Biden. This is a tall order for March 10-17, but Sanders has performed as well or better than Biden in the Northeast and Midwest as a whole, and these are the two regions that yield the most delegates in the rest of the primary (Chart 5).  Biden’s centrist rivals dropped out of the competition after his big win in South Carolina on February 29. His remaining centrist rival, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, suffered a humiliating defeat – pulling in Aspen, Colorado and Napa Valley California along with American Samoa despite spending over $400 million in advertisements (Chart 6). As we have argued, it takes votes, not just money, to win elections. Chart 5The Battle For The Northeast And Midwest Chart 6Bloomberg’s Folly It is a two-man race. If Biden can beat Sanders surrounded by competitors, then the onus is on Sanders to change the game from here. Otherwise Biden wins. Bottom Line: Biden is the likeliest winner. We will have to see another drastic change in momentum for this outcome to be overturned. Sanders’s underperformance on Super Tuesday suggests that his challenge to our base case (a centrist nomination) has peaked.    A Contested Convention? Still Unlikely Chart 7Biden’s Super Tuesday Bounce The coalescing of the centrist and progressive blocs, combined with a likely Super Tuesday bounce, will put Biden back in the lead in national polling (Chart 7). A contested Democratic convention remains unlikely, though it cannot be ruled out. Biden and Sanders are racing neck-and-neck for delegates and another twist in the race could deprive Biden of the simple majority of pledged delegates needed to clinch the nomination. The problem for Sanders is that in a close delegate matchup, a centrist candidate is favored to come out with the nomination. VIX futures suggest that this outlook is priced in, as they are falling for July (the month of the convention) relative to June (the conclusion of the primary election). Volatility induced by the primary election should gradually subside from now through July. Volatility will spike with the conventions in July mostly because of the uncertainty over the general election, and it should also pick up in September and October ahead of the November 3 vote. The spike in volatility that is always to be expected in the October ahead of a presidential election should continue increasing relative to July (Chart 8).   How can we be confident? The combination of the party establishment and the alternate or “reformist” centrist faction should be sufficient to overwhelm the combined “progressive” or anti-establishment bloc. Biden could fail to win the nomination on the first ballot, but the pro-establishment “super delegates” (party stalwarts who are not pledged to any particular candidate) would have the ability to swing subsequent ballots either in his favor or in favor of an alternate centrist (Chart 9). From a game-theoretical point of view, a sequential voting procedure is deadly to Sanders. His only hope was to rack up such a strong plurality in the primaries that he could take the convention by force. That is now unlikely. Chart 8VIX, Rightly, Not Pricing Contested Convention Chart 9Which Way Will The Super Delegates Swing? Even without a contested convention – and certainly with one – the Democratic Party could suffer from internal divisions that affect its challenge to the Republicans in November. The closer Sanders comes to Biden in delegate count, and especially if he should lead Biden yet still lose the nomination, the more his supporters will cry foul. In that case the party would send anywhere from 30%-40% of its voters away feeling disenfranchised. The worst-case scenario for the Democrats would be a convention troubled by open partisan rancor and social unrest, as occurred in the infamous 1968 convention in Chicago. Peace protesters against the Vietnam War and supporters of anti-war Senator Eugene McCarthy besieged the convention and were hounded and repressed by police forces under Chicago Mayor Richard Daley. Moderate Vice President Hubert Humphrey won the nomination despite the strong showing of anti-war sentiment in the primary election. The convention exposed the party’s rifts for all the nation to see. Humphrey went on to lose the election to Republican Richard Nixon. Chart 10Democrats Need To Avoid 1968 Replay Something akin to 1968 could occur this summer if Sanders’s supporters believe he has, for the second time, been deprived of the nomination unfairly in preference for a lackluster establishment candidate who will lose to Trump. But circumstances today are not (yet) so dire. The backdrop in 1968 was one of general upheaval, with opposition to the Vietnam War and the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr and Robert F. Kennedy, the latter directly contributing to the dispute over delegates at the convention. The labor market was extremely tight (as today), but inflation was spiking (unlike today), fueling domestic unrest (Chart 10). The Democratic Party establishment is neither as disconnected from its base nor as draconian as in 1968. Biden or any other centrist nominee will seek to placate the left wing, likely through a leftward shift on some policies and a progressive vice-presidential pick. Opposition to Trump will act as a unifying force among Democrats. Bottom Line: A contested convention remains unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out. Biden is more likely to win the nomination due to his Super Tuesday bounce and the tailwind for centrists over progressives within the primary voting patterns thus far. If the convention is contested, it will likely result in a centrist candidate and the alienation of the progressive wing, and thus favor Trump’s reelection odds. Implications For The General Election Since November 2018 we have emphasized that US presidential elections are referendums on the incumbent party. Only rarely can the opposition defeat a sitting president amid an expanding economy, even if the ruling party lost the midterm election (as did the GOP in 2018). Major scandals reduce the historic reelection rate, but Trump has been acquitted so his biggest scandal is largely neutralized (Chart 11). The uptick in his approval rating after signing trade deals with China, Canada, and Mexico and getting acquitted by his fellow Republicans in the Senate confirms that he should be seen as favored for reelection. His approval is historically low but not prohibitive, as it tracks with Obama’s ahead of the 2012 election – low approval being in part a structural indicator of highly partisan times (Chart 12).  Chart 11Unseating An Incumbent Is Difficult Chart 12Trump’s Low Approval Not Prohibitive Yet Trump is only slightly favored. The coronavirus outbreak – and more importantly, the fear of it – threatens to damage Trump’s economy and highlight his fatal policy flaw: health care. Most of his first year in office consisted of a failed attempt to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), leaving 28 million Americans without health insurance (uninsured individuals increased by 2 million in 2018, the first increase since Obamacare was passed). The Democrats weaponized this gaping policy vulnerability in the vital Rust Belt swing states during the midterm election. Anything that shifts the focus of the election to health, as opposed to the growing economy, is positive for the Democrats on the margin (Chart 13). Granted, the narrative over Trump’s handling of the coronavirus crisis will become a non-diagnostic partisan battle. Neither Xi Jinping nor Donald Trump are responsible for the virus outbreak, but Trump is accountable for the popular perception of his handling of it whereas Xi is not. Ultimately the underlying material conditions of the economy will prove decisive. If the fear factor at home and abroad results in a sharper slowdown and higher unemployment by November, Trump is doomed. The swing states are already vulnerable because they took a heavy blow as a result of Trump’s trade war with China (Chart 14). Chart 13Is Health Care Trump’s Fatal Flaw? Chart 14Virus Fears Threaten Trump's Economy On the other hand, if the fear factor subsides due to the virus’s non-apocalyptic death rate, globally coordinated stimulus – starting with China but reinforced by the Federal Reserve’s surprise 50 basis point rate cut on March 3 – could generate a rebound by Q4 that redounds to Trump’s favor. Doesn’t America’s extreme political polarization create a kind of tribalism that overwhelms traditional “pocketbook” variables in forecasting an election (Chart 15)? Aren’t Democrats sufficiently fired up against President Trump to generate massive voter turnout that wipes out his thin margins of victory in the key swing states? After all, turnout in some of the primary elections is on par with the year the Great Recession began (Chart 16). Chart 15Does Reality Matter Amid Polarization? YES Chart 16Democrats Not Turning Out At 2008 Levels Most likely the economy will be decisive. Democratic fury against Trump will not translate as easily to the broader public if the economy is decent or rebounding in the second half of the year. Voter turnout tends to correlate with unemployment, including in the swing states (Chart 17). The coronavirus shock to the economy, not the blame game surrounding the virus or health care system, will be the determining factor. Chart 17Voter Turnout Responds To Economy … Including In Key Swing States This offers little consolation for Trump, since the brunt of the coronavirus impact on the economy is yet to be felt. While we still give Trump the benefit of the doubt for reelection, our quantitative election model says that the election is “too close to call,” primarily because of weak state-by-state leading economic indicators for Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin (Chart 18). These indicators will tick down further due to the virus impact before they tick back up. Our base case is that the uptick will occur, but clearly the fear factor is the biggest risk to Trump’s reelection. Chart 18Quant Model Says US Election “Too Close To Call” The fact that Biden is a slightly more competitive candidate against Trump than Sanders will not help. Biden has a broader Electoral College pathway than Sanders. Both are competitive in the key Rust Belt swing states on which the 2016 election hinged – Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. But Biden is also competitive in Florida, Arizona, and North Carolina, states largely closed to Sanders. Still, the difference between the Democratic challengers is marginal as neither is extremely charismatic and the election is a referendum on the ruling party and national direction as a whole. The Senate race is critical to the general election outcome (Chart 19). A Democratic president will be constrained if the Republicans maintain control – Sanders’s revolutionary agenda would be put on ice from the beginning, whereas Biden would have to focus on compromise (and would be prevented from repealing Trump’s tax cuts). Because Republicans saw a banner year in the Senate election in 2014 they must defend a larger number of competitive seats this year (10) than Democrats do (3) (Chart 20). If Democrats win the White House then they also need to win all three “toss up” races (Arizona, Colorado, Maine) – which is very doable – as well as keeping hold of their weakest seat (Alabama) or winning one additional seat (Kansas? North Carolina? Iowa?) in order to get an even balance in the Senate. This would give them the minimum necessary for majority voting since the vice president casts the decisive vote in a tie. Chart 19Democrats Lead Generic Ballot Chart 20Balance Of Power In The US Senate, 2020   Winning this many seats seems extremely difficult, based on the voting patterns in 2016 and 2018 (Table 1, Appendix), unless one considers the type of national environment that would see the incumbent Trump removed from office: it is an environment in which either voter turnout or support rates have shifted, in which case voters who view the Republicans as discredited are less likely to retain Republican senators who carried Trump’s water in the impeachment trial. Note that Biden is an asset in every key Senate race mentioned above except Colorado, whereas Sanders is probably a liability. Chart 21Balance Of Power In the US House Of Representatives, 2020 By contrast the Democrats are defending many more seats than Republicans in the House of Representatives (Chart 21). Yet Republicans would have to retain their five toss-up seats, three vacant seats, while poaching 18 of the Democrats 19 toss-up seats, to reclaim a majority (Table 2, Appendix). This is possible if there is a strong economic rebound in the second half of the year and Trump is “winning” on other policies, but it is unlikely. Thus a second-term President Trump is much more likely to be constrained by the House than a first-term President Biden is likely to be constrained by the Senate. It follows that Trump would focus on foreign policy, where he faces the fewest constitutional constraints – and in a second term he would be unshackled from reelection concerns. He would only be constrained by the desire for a magnificent legacy that keeps Ivanka Trump electable someday. This is not a constraint worth betting money on, especially not in the first two years when he is fresh off reelection (2021-22). The implication is more trade war with China, Europe, or both. Meanwhile Biden with the Senate would focus on the Democrats’ domestic legislative agenda – and would be likely to rack up successes. Without the Senate he too would be driven toward foreign policy, and given his age he would face a limited reelection constraint, like Trump. Bottom Line: Biden’s likely nomination solidifies our view that if Democrats win, they are likely to eke out a bare one-vote majority in the Senate, though not guaranteed. Biden is a Democratic asset for key Senate races while Sanders would be more likely to be constrained by a Republican Senate. If Democrats lose, they would have to lose in the context of a big economic rebound (or some other policy windfall for Trump) in order to yield the House of Representatives. In the context of the coronavirus shock, this seems unlikely. But it is likeliest if the economy is rebounding and the Democrats run a “socialist” for the presidency. Economic Policy Implications The most important investment takeaway from Super Tuesday is that the “Bernie Sanders Panic Index” risk will now tend to subside and the key sectors of the US stock market – tech and health – plus financials and energy will no longer have as big of a threat of punitive regulation hanging over their heads (Chart 22). Chart 22Bernie Panic Index Will Subside Biden’s approach to health would be to restore and expand Obamacare, which is already the law of the land and thus not nearly as disruptive as the attempt by Sanders to create a universal single-payer program that would eliminate private insurance (a large source of uncertainty since it would have been extremely difficult to achieve yet central to his agenda). Incidentally, Big Pharma faces headwinds under Democrats or Republicans, as the populist demand for lower prices will carry the day. President Biden would certainly re-regulate, reversing the deregulatory tailwind for corporate profits and animal spirits under President Trump (Chart 23). But there is much less negative of an impact on business optimism and the job market under Biden than Sanders. Business concern over tax hikes, as outlined, will largely depend on the Senate outcome (Chart 24). The consolation for the financial markets is that, with Biden the presumptive nominee, the tax cut rollback would not be complete: Biden aims for a 28% corporate rate, which is still a net seven percentage point cut from 2016. Chart 23Trump’s De-Regulatory Shock Chart 24The Oval Office Has A Pen And A Phone   The financial industry has faced a long and rocky recovery since the 2008 crash, reminiscent of the tech sector in the wake of the dotcom bubble (Chart 25). A Democratic victory will be negative on the margin, as even Biden will need to sharpen his knives when it comes to the banks. Even the Wall Street candidate Bloomberg had proposed a financial transactions tax. By contrast, Trump would clearly benefit this sector – as long as the business cycle recovers and the yield curve steepens. Chart 25Regulation Returns To Financial Industry? The loser, in either outcome, is the tech sector – which is the most richly valued. Both Republicans and Democrats are investigating Big Tech for anti-competitive practices. Wealth inequality, and the eventual end of the bull market and business cycle, will generate public unrest and encourage the government to identify and punish scapegoats, as in the past with leading companies that had excessive market concentration (Chart 26). Yet neither Trump nor Biden will be as aggressive on this front as Sanders would be. Chart 26Anti-Trust Suits Distract From Inequality, Late-Cycle Woes Chart 27Infrastructure Stocks Will Reboot There is little difference between Trump and Biden (or Sanders for that matter) on the question of infrastructure. Americans want better infrastructure but an economic slowdown is required to provide the impetus. Democrats are unlikely to grant new spending to Trump prior to the election unless he is reelected or a full-blown economic collapse is occurring (in which it is his final act). The performance of BCA’s Infrastructure Basket will improve after the election given that both parties are embracing expansive fiscal spending while China is launching another stimulus mini-cycle (Chart 27). The fiscal trajectory of the United States is unlikely to correct anytime soon. Trumpism has routed the fiscal hawks within the Republican Party and Biden is attempting to lead a Democratic Party that is making increasingly extravagant spending demands. The median American voter is demanding greater government provision of services and social spending. If Democrats win the White House and Senate, they will be able to claw back some revenue by repealing Trump’s tax cuts, but the pressure to spend will outweigh their ability to increase taxes (Chart 28). They will need to expand non-defense discretionary spending even as mandatory outlays rise inexorably due to the aging of the population (Chart 29). Chart 28More Fiscal Profligacy In The US Outlook Chart 29Zero Chance Of Entitlement Cuts Investment Conclusions The US election is eight months away and much can change between now and then. What we know is that Biden now has the clearest path to the Democratic nomination, while Sanders would require another rapid reversal in momentum in order to take the lead. Even if he does, the Democratic convention will favor a centrist as long as Sanders falls short of a commanding lead, which is likely given the 50%-versus-40% split in favor of centrists over progressives thus far. A two-man race will favor Biden as long as this dynamic persists. Biden is slightly more competitive against Trump than Sanders, and slightly more likely to take the Senate for the Democrats. Yet ultimately Trump’s presidency will live or die based on the economy. Otherwise a significant policy humiliation (or surprise right-wing third party candidate) would be required to undo his reelection bid. Chart 30Valuations Favor Non-US Stocks Unfortunately for Trump, the coronavirus outbreak presents precisely this two-pronged risk of worsening economy and policy failure. If this risk fully materializes then he is finished, but markets will most likely have the consolation that it is Biden, not Sanders, waiting in the wings. Our base case remains constructive over the next twelve months, particularly for global stocks ex-US, which are much more heavily discounted and will benefit from Chinese stimulus (Chart 30). The virus shock is clearly a massive risk, but as long as the death rate does not surprise to the upside the ultimate impact will be public resilience and global stimulus.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table 1Democrats Likely To Win The Senate If They Win White House Table 2Republicans Unlikely To Reclaim House Even If They Keep White House Footnotes

Neutral Market events last week compelled us to take profits of 51% in the S&P software index above and beyond the S&P 500’s return since the late-2017 inception and downgrade exposure to neutral. Last Monday we wrote that AAPL’s profit warning was the tip of the iceberg and an avalanche of warnings would ensue.1 MSFT followed suit and issued their own profit warning and this negative backdrop is not yet reflected in the sell side’s S&P software profit and revenue forecasts. Tack on the message from the contracting software sector deflator and odds are high that sales will underwhelm in the coming quarters (third panel). The latest GDP report also revealed that, up to recently bulletproof, software capex growth sunk to nil in Q4 (bottom panel). Not only in absolute, but also in relative terms software outlays have petered out and have been decreasing in intensity as measured by the decelerating contribution to GDP growth (second panel). Bottom Line: We took profits of 51% since inception in the S&P software index and downgraded to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT – MSFT, ADBE, CRM, ORCL, INTU, NOW, ADSK, ANSS, SNPS, CDNS, FTNT, PAYC, CTXS, NLOK. For more details, please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report.   1    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Vertigo" dated February 24, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Recently, we have been inundated with client requests to update our analysis and incorporate the coronavirus epidemic to our adverse EPS scenario. The chart below shows that in our worst case scenario, EPS will contract by 2.41% in calendar 2020. Assuming final 2019 EPS comes in at 162.95, using I/B/E/S’ latest estimate, then the 2020 EPS level falls to 159.02. Assigning a trough multiple of 16x results in a 2,544 SPX ending value as a worst case outcome. Importantly, our newly weighted expected 2020 EPS falls to 164.48 versus 169.40 previously as we penciled in a 60% and 50% probability that our worst case scenario materializes in EPS and multiple assumptions, respectively. As a result our expected end-2020 SPX value falls to 2,755 which makes the S&P 500 still 8% overvalued. Bottom Line: We remain cautious on the prospects of the broad equity market on a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon. For more details on our EPS model, please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report.

Highlights Chart 1Making New Lows While the number of daily new COVID-19 cases is falling in China, the virus is spreading rapidly to the rest of the world. It is now clear that the outbreak will not be contained, though much uncertainty remains about the magnitude and duration of the global economic fallout. US bond yields have dropped dramatically, with the 10-year yield threatening to break below 1% for the first time ever (Chart 1). Interest rate markets are also pricing-in a rapid Fed response, with more than 100 bps of rate cuts priced for the next year and a 50 bps rate cut discounted for March. On Friday, BCA released a Special Alert making the case that stock prices have fallen enough to buy the market, even on a tactical (3-month) horizon. It is too early to make a similar call looking for higher bond yields. While risk assets will get near-term support from a dovish monetary policy shift, bond yields will stay low (and could even fall further) until global economic recovery appears likely. On a 12-month horizon, our base case scenario is that the Fed will not have to deliver the 110 bps of cuts that are currently priced. We therefore expect bond yields to be higher one year from now. But investors with shorter time horizons should wait before calling the bottom in yields.  Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 176 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -255 bps. Coronavirus fears pushed spreads wider in February, and the average spread for the overall investment grade index moved back above our cyclical target (Chart 2).1 As for specific credit tiers, Baa spreads are 9 bps above target and Aa spreads are 3 bps cheap. A-rated spreads are sitting right on our target, and Aaa debt remains 5 bps expensive. Looking beyond the economic fallout from the coronavirus, accommodative monetary conditions remain the key support for corporate bonds. Notably, both the 2-year/10-year and 3-year/10-year Treasury slopes steepened in February, and both remain firmly above zero. This suggests that the market believes that the Fed will keep policy easy. As we discussed two weeks ago, restrictive Fed policy – as evidenced by an inverted 3-year/10-year Treasury curve and elevated TIPS breakeven inflation rates – is required before banks choke off the supply of credit, causing defaults and a bear market in corporate spreads.2 Bottom Line: Corporate spreads will keep widening until coronavirus fears abate, but COVID-19 will not cause the end of the credit cycle. Once the dust settles, a buying opportunity will emerge in investment grade corporates, with spreads back above our cyclical targets. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 271 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -379 bps. The junk index spread widened 110 bps on the month and is currently 37 bps below its early-2019 peak. Ex-energy, the average index spread widened 93 bps in February. It is 71 bps below its 2019 peak. High-yield spreads were well above our cyclical targets prior to the COVID-19 outbreak and have only cheapened further during the past month. More spread widening is likely in the near-term, but an exceptional buying opportunity will emerge once virus-related fears fade. This is especially true relative to investment grade corporate bonds. To illustrate the valuation disparity between investment grade and high-yield, we calculated the average monthly spread widening for each credit tier during this cycle’s three major “risk off” phases (2011, 2015 and 2018). We then used each credit tier’s average option-adjusted spread and duration to estimate monthly excess returns for that amount of spread widening (Chart 3, bottom panel). The results show that, in past years, Baa-rated corporates behaved much more defensively than Ba or B-rated bonds. But now, because of the greater spread cushion and lower duration in the junk space, estimated downside risk is similar. In other words, the valuation disparity between investment grade and junk means that investment grade corporates offer much less downside protection than usual compared to high-yield. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 7 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -60 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility spread widened 1 bp on the month, driven by a 7 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread that was partially offset by a 6 bps reduction in expected prepayment losses (aka option cost). The 10-year Treasury yield has made a new all-time low, and the 30-year mortgage rate – at 3.45% – is only 14 bps above its own (Chart 4). At these levels, an increase in mortgage refinancing activity is inevitable, and indeed, the MBA Refi index has bounced sharply in recent weeks. MBS spreads, however, have not yet reacted to the higher refi index (panel 3). The nominal spread on 30-year conventional MBS is only 9 bps above where it started the year, and expected prepayment losses are 5 bps lower.3 Some widening is likely during the next few months, and we recommend that investors reduce exposure to Agency MBS. Even on a 12-month horizon, MBS spreads offer good value relative to investment grade corporate bonds for now (bottom panel), but investment grade corporates will cheapen on a relative basis if the current risk-off environment continues. This is probably a good time to start paring exposure to MBS, with the intention of re-deploying into corporate credit when spreads peak. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 86 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -99 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 270 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -367 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 162 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -189 bps. Local Authority debt underperformed Treasuries by 14 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +47 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 5 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -7 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. We continue to see little value in USD-denominated Sovereign debt, outside of Mexico and Saudi Arabia where spreads look attractive compared to similarly-rated US corporate bonds (Chart 5). The Local Authority and Foreign Agency sectors, however, offer attractive combinations of risk and reward according to our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C). Our Global Asset Allocation service just released a Special Report on emerging market debt that argues for favoring USD-denominated EM sovereign debt over both USD-denominated EM corporate debt and local-currency EM sovereign bonds.4 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 80 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -114 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio rose 11% on the month to 88%, remaining below its post-crisis mean (Chart 6). For some time we have been advising clients to focus municipal bond exposure at the long-end of the Aaa curve, where yield ratios were above average pre-crisis levels. But last month’s sell-off brought some value back to the front end (panel 2). Specifically, the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year M/T yield ratios are all back above their average pre-crisis levels at 85%, 83% and 86%, respectively. 20-year and 30-year maturities are still cheapest, at yield ratios of 93% and 94%, respectively. Investors should adopt a laddered allocation across the municipal bond curve, as opposed to focusing exposure at the long-end. Fundamentally, state and local government balance sheets remain solid. Our Municipal Health Monitor is in “improving health” territory and state & local government interest coverage has improved considerably in recent quarters (bottom panel). Both trends are consistent with muni ratings upgrades continuing to outpace downgrades going forward. Treasury Curve: Maintain A Barbell Curve Positioning Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-steepened dramatically in February, with yields down at least 30 bps across the board. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 9 bps on the month, reaching 27 bps. The 5/30 slope also steepened 9 bps to reach 76 bps. February’s plunge in yields was massive, but the fact that it occurred without 2/10 or 5/30 flattening signals that the market expects the Fed to respond quickly and that any economic pain will be relatively short lived. In fact, the front-end of the curve is now priced for 110 bps of rate cuts during the next 12 months (Chart 7). That amount of easing would bring the fed funds rate back to 0.48%, less than two 25 basis point increments off the zero lower bound. Though the drop in 12-month rate expectations didn’t move the duration-matched 2/5/10 or 2/5/30 butterfly spreads very much, the 5-year note remains very expensive relative to both the 2/10 and 2/30 barbells (bottom 2 panels). The richness in the 5-year note will reverse if the Fed delivers less than the 110 bps of rate cuts that are currently priced for the next year. At present, we view less than 110 bps of easing as the most likely scenario, and therefore maintain our position long the 2/30 barbell and short the 5-year bullet. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 159 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -232 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 24 bps to 1.42%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 21 bps to 1.50%. Both rates remain well below the 2.3%-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s inflation target. We have been recommending that investors own TIPS breakeven curve flatteners on the view that inflationary pressures will first show up in the realized inflation data and the short-end of the breakeven curve, before infecting the long-end.5 However, recent risk-off market behavior has caused long-end inflation expectations to fall dramatically, while sticky near-term inflation prints have supported short-dated expectations. Case in point, the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate declined 16 bps in February, compared to a 24 bps drop for the 10-year (Chart 8). Inflation curve flattening could continue in the near-term but will reverse when risk assets recover. As a result, we recommend taking profits on TIPS breakeven curve flatteners and waiting for a period of re-steepening before putting the trade back on. Fundamentally, we note that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 38 bps cheap according to our re-vamped Adaptive Expectations Model (bottom panel).6 Investors should remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on a 12-month horizon. ABS: Underweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +26 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 7 bps on the month. It currently sits at 33 bps, right on top of its minimum pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Our Excess Return Bond Map (see Appendix C) shows that Aaa-rated consumer ABS ranks among the most defensive US spread products. This explains why the sector has weathered the recent storm so well, and why it is actually up versus Treasuries so far this year. ABS also offer higher expected returns than other low-risk spread sectors such as Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals. For as long as the current risk-off phase continues, consumer ABS are a more attractive place to hide than Domestic Agencies or Supranationals. However, once risk-on market behavior re-asserts itself, consumer ABS will once again lag other riskier spread products. In the long-run, we also remain concerned about deteriorating consumer credit fundamentals, as evidenced by tightening lending standards for both credit cards and auto loans, and a rising household interest expense ratio (bottom 2 panels). Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 42 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +1 bp. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 9 bps on the month. It currently sits at 76 bps, below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). In a recent Special Report, we explored how low interest rates have boosted commercial real estate (CRE) prices this cycle and concluded that a sharp drawdown in CRE prices is likely only when inflation starts to pick up steam.7 In that report we also mentioned that non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS spreads look attractive relative to US corporate bonds in risk-adjusted terms (Appendix C), and that the macro environment is close to neutral for CMBS spreads. Both CRE lending standards and loan demand were close to unchanged during the past quarter, as per the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey (bottom 2 panels).  Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS performed in line with the duration-equivalent Treasury index in February, leaving year-to-date excess returns unchanged at +35 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month to reach 56 bps. Agency CMBS offer greater expected return than Aaa-rated consumer ABS, while also carrying agency backing (Appendix C). An overweight allocation to this sector remains appropriate. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track Record At present, the market is priced for 110 basis points of cuts during the next 12 months. We anticipate a flat fed funds rate over that time horizon, and therefore anticipate that below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will profit. We can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with 95% confidence intervals. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of February 28, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of February 28, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 50 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 50 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of February 28, 2020)   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For more information on how we calculate our spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Value In Corporate Bonds”, dated February 19, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Credit Cycle Is Far From Over”, dated February 18, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Expected prepayment losses (or option cost) are calculated as the difference between the index’s zero-volatility spread and its option-adjusted spread. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Understanding Emerging Markets Debt”, dated February 27, 2020, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2020 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 10, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com  6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Commercial Real Estate And US Financial Stability”, dated January 27, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Policy Responses To The Virus: Markets are now pricing in significant monetary policy easing in response to the growth shock from the COVID-19 outbreak and related financial market instability. It is not yet clear, however, that central banks will NOT ease by as much as currently discounted in the low level of bond yields – especially as risk assets will riot anew if policymakers are not dovish enough. Duration: Raise overall global duration exposure to neutral on a tactical basis (0-3 months) until there is greater clarity on the full magnitude of the hit to global growth from the virus. Spread Product: The widening of global corporate bond spreads during last week’s equity market correction was relatively modest, suggesting that the COVID-19 outbreak has not become a credit event that raises downgrade/default risks. Maintain an overall overweight allocation to global corporates versus government bonds. Downgrade US MBS to neutral, however, given the risk of higher prepayments from falling mortgage rates. Feature What a wild ride it has been for investors. Equity markets worldwide corrected sharply last week as investors were forced to downgrade global growth expectations with the COVID-19 outbreak spreading more rapidly outside of China. US equities were particularly savaged with the S&P 500 shedding -11% of its value in a mere five trading sessions, with the VIX index of implied equity volatility spiking over 40, evoking comparisons to some of the darkest days of the 2008 financial crisis. Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Concerns Causing Market Jitters Government bond yields have collapsed alongside plunging equity values, with the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield hitting an all-time intraday low of 1.04% yesterday. Investors are betting on aggressive rate cuts by global central bankers to offset weak growth momentum and disinflationary pressures that were already in place before the arrival of COVID-19. At the same time, corporate credit spreads widened worldwide last week, but the moves were relatively subdued and do not signal growing concern over future default losses (Chart of the Week). In this report, we discuss how to best position a global bond portfolio given these competing messages from government bond and credit markets. We conclude that maintaining selective strategic (6-12 months) overweights in global spread product versus governments, while also maintaining a neutral tactical (0-3 months) overall duration exposure - as a hedge against a more “U-shaped” recovery from the virus-driven downturn in global growth - is the best way to position for a backdrop where policymakers will need to be as easy as possible in a more uncertain world. What To Do Next On … Duration Risk assets were staging a massive rebound yesterday as we went to press, after policymakers worldwide signaled the need for stimulus measures to offset the COVID-19 growth shock. Both Fed Chairman Jerome Powell and Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor Haruhiko Kuroda promised to ease monetary policy, if necessary, to stabilize markets. Meanwhile, looser fiscal policy may finally be on the way in Europe. The government of virus-stricken Italy announced a €3.6 billion stimulus package, while the German Finance Minister has hinted at a temporary suspension of Germany’s constitutional “debt brake” on deficit spending. A true coordinated global easing of both monetary and fiscal policy, would be very bullish for beaten-down growth-sensitive assets like equities and industrial commodities that have been focused on the shutdown of China’s economy in February to combat the spread of the virus. A true coordinated global easing of both monetary and fiscal policy, would be very bullish for beaten-down growth-sensitive assets like equities and industrial commodities that have been focused on the shutdown of China’s economy in February to combat the spread of the virus (Chart 2). It’s a different story for government bonds, however, as a rebound in yields from current depressed levels is not assured, even if monetary policy is eased further. This is because central bankers must maintain a dovish bias until the virus-driven uncertainty over global growth begins to fade, or else risk assets will riot once again. It’s all about financial conditions now, especially in the US where COVID-19 and the stock market selloff have become front-page news in a presidential election year. Chart 2How Quickly Will China Rebound? For example, the entire US Treasury curve now trades below the mid-point of the fed funds target range, with the market now pricing in a very rapid dovish move by the Fed (Chart 3). Chart 3A Big Grab For Global Duration Yield curves are now very flat in other major developed market (DM) economies, as well. This is partly due to the risk aversion bid for safe assets, which is evident in the deeply negative term premium component of bond yields. Flat curves also reflect a more long-lasting component, with markets pricing in lower equilibrium rates in the future. Investors are not only demanding immediate rate cuts to boost growth and stabilize financial markets, but also see little chance of those cuts eventually being reversed in the future. Chart 4Markets Increasingly Pricing In Global ZIRP Our simple proxy for the market expectation of the nominal terminal rate- the 5-year overnight index swap (OIS) rate, 5-years forward – is between 0-1% for all major DM countries (Chart 4). The implication is that investors are not only demanding immediate rate cuts to boost growth and stabilize financial markets, but also see little chance of those cuts eventually being reversed in the future. Chart 5Our Central Bank Monitors Say More Easing Is Needed Chart 6Global Yields Reflect Dovish Rate Expectations At the moment, our global Central Bank Monitors – a compilation of economic and financial variables that influence monetary policy decisions – are all signaling a need for rate cuts (Chart 5). This is a function of sluggish growth & weak inflation. The plunge in global government bond yields already reflects that dovish shift in market expectations for central banks. Our 12-month discounters, which measure the expected change in short-term interest rates over the next year as extracted from OIS curves, are all priced for lower policy rates in the US (-97bps as of last Friday’s close), the euro area (-15bps) the UK (-35bps), Japan (-17bps), Canada (-72bps) and Australia (-46bps) (Chart 6). In the US, the current level of the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield is consistent with the extended slump in US industrial activity – as measured by the fall in the ISM manufacturing index – and risk-off sentiment measures like the CRB Raw Industrials/Gold price ratio (Chart 7). Yet at the same time, financial conditions remain very accommodative despite last week’s selloff, suggesting that the US economy can potentially weather a bout of COVID-19 uncertainty – as long as the Fed does not disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than the market is demanding and creating another down leg in the equity market. Chart 7UST Yields Need To Stay Lower For Longer Outside the US, other central banks that have non-zero policy rates – like the Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of Australia and Bank of England – can deliver on the rate cuts discounted in their OIS curves to fight a COVID-19 global growth downturn, if needed. Chart 8UST Bullishness Still Not At Historical Extremes The negative rate club of the ECB and BoJ, however, is far less likely to actually cut rates and will rely on greater asset purchases and forward guidance to try and provide more policy stimulus. We prefer to view duration exposure – on a tactical basis – as a hedge to owning risk assets like corporate bonds, where we see some value now opening up after last week’s selloff, rather than a way to express a directional view on interest rates where we have less visibility and conviction. So what should a bond investor do with duration exposure? It is a difficult call with so many uncertainties on global growth momentum, the spread of the virus outside China, the size of any monetary or fiscal policy stimulus measures, and the degree of risk aversion still evident in financial markets. We prefer to view duration exposure – on a tactical basis – as a hedge to owning risk assets like corporate bonds, where we see some value now opening up after last week’s selloff, rather than a way to express a directional view on interest rates where we have less visibility and conviction. Therefore, we are raising our recommended overall duration exposure to neutral this week on a tactical basis. At the same time, we are maintaining an underweight stance on government bonds versus an overweight on corporate debt. We think a true bottom in yields will be reached when there are more decisive signs that bond positioning has reached a bullish extreme, according to indicators like the JP Morgan duration survey and the Market Vane US Treasury bullish sentiment index (Chart 8). In our model bond portfolio, we are expressing that extension of duration by shifting exposure from shorter maturity buckets to longer duration buckets in most countries. While also increasing exposure to “higher-beta” government bond markets like the US and Canada, at the expense of lower-beta Japanese government bonds. Bottom Line: Raise overall global duration exposure to neutral on a tactical basis (0-3 months) until there is greater clarity on the full magnitude of the hit to global growth from the COVID-19 outbreak. Increase allocations to countries with higher yield betas, like the US and Canada, at the expense of low-beta markets like Japan. What To Do Next On … Spread Product Allocations Chart 9US HY Selloff Was Focused On Energy Names Last week’s equity market meltdown did spill over into corporate bond markets, with credit spreads widening for both investment grade and high-yield corporate debt in the US and Europe. In the US, however, the jump in high-yield spreads was particularly acute among Energy names, with the index option-adjusted spread (OAS) climbing over 1000bps as oil prices plunged (Chart 9). US high-yield ex-energy has been relatively more stable, with the spread climbing to 436bps, despite the surge in equity volatility. Stepping back and looking at US investment grade and high-yield corporates, more broadly, last week’s selloff has restored some value, most notably in high-yield. Stepping back and looking at US investment grade and high-yield corporates, more broadly, last week’s selloff has restored some value, most notably in high-yield.  According to our framework for calculating spread targets for global credit, last week’s selloff pushed US investment grade spreads back to our spread targets from very expensive levels (Chart 10).1 Baa-rated US investment-grade moved slightly above our spread target, but we would describe investment grade spreads as now overall fairly valued. US high-yield spreads, on the other hand, have widened well in excess of our spread targets across all credit rating tiers (Chart 11). Chart 10US Investment Grade Spreads Now Fairly Valued Chart 11US High-Yield Spreads Look Very Cheap In our framework, the spread targets are determined by looking at 12-month breakeven spreads – the amount of spread widening necessary to eliminate the yield cushion of owning corporates over government bonds on a one-year horizon – relative to their long-run history. We group those spreads according to phases of the monetary policy cycle, as defined by the slope of the US Treasury yield curve. The spread target is then calculated based on the median breakeven spread for that phase of the cycle. Currently, we are in “Phase 2” of the policy cycle, which means that the Treasury yield curve (10-year minus 3-year) is positively sloped between 0 and 50bps. In Charts 10 & 11, we add a new wrinkle to our existing way to present the spread targets. We also calculate the targets using the 25th and 75th percentile observations for the breakeven spreads for that phase of the monetary policy cycle. This gives us a range for the spread target that encompasses more of the historical data. Given the improved valuations in US junk bonds, however, we think increasing allocations in our model bond portfolio makes sense. The spread widening in US high-yield has very clearly restored value to spreads, which are well above the upper level of our spread target range. The same cannot be said for US investment grade, where spreads are in the middle of the target range. Chart 12European Corporates Now Offer Better Value Based on this analysis, we remain comfortable in maintaining our neutral recommended stance on US investment grade corporates and overweight stance on US high-yield. Given the improved valuations in US junk bonds, however, we think increasing allocations in our model bond portfolio makes sense. Thus, this week, we are adding to our recommended high-yield exposure (see Page 12). That increased allocation is “funded” by reducing our US Agency MBS exposure from overweight to neutral. Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy are concerned that MBS spreads are likely to widen in the next few months to reflect the higher prepayment risk from the recent steep fall in US mortgage rates. One final note: our spread target framework for euro area corporates also indicates that last week’s global risk-off event also restored some value to European credit (Chart 12). Thus, we are maintaining our recommended overweights for both euro area investment grade and high-yield. Bottom Line: The widening of global corporate bond spreads during last week’s equity market correction was relatively modest, suggesting that the COVID-19 outbreak has not become a credit event that raises downgrade/default risks. Maintain an overall overweight allocation to global corporates versus government bonds. Downgrade US MBS to neutral, however, given the risk of higher prepayments from falling mortgage rates.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We presented our framework for calculating global corporate spread targets, which builds on the work from our US Bond Strategy sister service, back in January. Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds", dated January 21, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns