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In the spring of 2018 we initiated a size preference of large caps at the expense of small caps. At the time, we went against the grain as the investment community was arguing that small caps would offer the best protection from President’s Trump trade hawkishness. The reasoning was that small caps are domestically oriented and would benefit from a rising dollar given low export exposure. While we were slightly offside for a quarter, this size preference recouped all the losses by October 2018 and never looked back since then. Our thesis was predicated upon relative indebtedness, relative profitability and relative profit margin outlook, all of which were in favor of large caps. Earlier this year when markets were convulsing we instituted a risk management metric with a rolling 10% stop on this size preference in order to protect profits for our portfolio.1 Bottom Line: This past Tuesday our 10% rolling stop was triggered and we are obeying this stop, monetizing 37% gains since inception and we are moving to the sidelines on the size bias. Please look forward to reading our upcoming Weekly Report for a more detailed discussion of why we are compelled to move to a neutral size bias. Footnotes 1    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, "Closing Out All High-Conviction Calls" dated March 20, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Analyses on Chinese autos and Brazil are available below. Highlights The Fed’s aggressive monetization of public and some private debt has inspired investors to allocate cash to risk assets However, a number of cyclical indicators continue to flash red or amber, suggesting this rally is not about a cyclical economic recovery.  Continue underweighting EM equities and credit markets versus their DM counterparts. We will wait for a correction to assess whether to maintain or close our shorts on EM currencies. Feature Neither the ongoing plunge in corporate profits nor a great deal of uncertainty about the economic outlook justify this rally. It seems the sole driver of the rally from March’s lows has been the Federal Reserve’s enormous purchases of various securities. These unprecedented actions are crowding out investors into riskier parts of fixed-income markets and persuading them to purchase equities. Neither the ongoing plunge in corporate profits nor a great deal of uncertainty about the economic outlook justify this rally. It Has Not Been About Profits And Valuations In the past two months, the S&P 500 index has experienced not only the fastest and steepest crash on record, but also the speediest rebound (Chart I-1). Investors have had to make swift investment decisions amid extremely low economic visibility. Chart I-1The S&P 500: The Fastest Crash And Speediest Recovery Indeed, it is fair to say that during the mayhem and carnage many investors operated on a “sell now, think later” principle, and on the subsequent rebound with a “buy now, ask questions later” framework. Remarkably, the plunge and subsequent recovery in global share prices has been so rapid that even equity analysts’ forward earnings estimates cannot keep up. The top panel of Chart I-2 illustrates that the global forward EPS usually tracks the world equity index. When share prices rally, analysts upgrade their earning expectations; when equities sell off, analysts’ downgrade their earnings outlooks. In the past month, analysts have continued to slash forward EPS estimates despite the strong equity rebound. As a result, the 12-month forward P/E ratio for global stocks is back to its post-2008 highs (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Chart I-2Rising Share Prices Amid Collapsing Forward Earnings Chart I-3China: A Decoupling Between Economy And Equities Elsewhere, Chart I-3 illustrates China’s domestic orders for 5000 industrial enterprises historically correlated with the Shanghai Composite equity index. Since early this year, domestic orders have plummeted due to the country-wide lockdown. Yet equity prices in China have not fallen enough to reflect the downfall in economic activity and corporate profits. This underscores that investors’ purchases of global and Chinese stocks in the past month have been driven by factors other than the corporate profit outlook.   This leaves two rationales for justifying roaring equity purchases in recent weeks: (1) liquidity overflows due to central banks’ balance sheet expansion, and (2) valuations. We examine the first argument in this report and will revisit the topic of equity valuations in forthcoming publications. In a nutshell, although equity valuations may be cheap in EM, Europe and Japan, they are expensive in the US. Nevertheless, the US stock market has been substantially outperforming EM and DM ex-US equities. Further, the most expensive stocks in the US – FAANGM – have by far outperformed the rest. Chart I-4China: A Decoupling Between New And Old Economy Stocks In China, the ChiNext index – a Nasdaq proxy of the onshore market – has massively outperformed the Shanghai Composite index, which is dominated by “old” economy stocks (Chart I-4). The trailing P/E ratios on the ChiNext and Shanghai Composite indexes are 62 and 14, respectively. In short, the fact that most expensive equity segments/sectors have outperformed suggests that cheap valuation have not been the key driver of this rally. Bottom Line: Neither profits nor considerations of equity valuations have been the driving factor behind the recent equity rally.  The Sole Driver Of This Rally The Fed’s aggressive monetization of public and some private debt has inspired investors to allocate cash to risk assets. The US broad money supply is surging at a record pace, both in nominal and real terms (Chart I-5). Is there too much money relative to the size of financial assets? Chart I-5US Broad Money Supply Is Booming Today we explore how the level of US broad money supply (M2) relates to the market cap of all bonds and stocks denominated in US dollars. US broad money (M2) supply encompasses all deposits and cash of residents and non-residents in and outside the US. Chart I-6 exhibits the ratio of US broad money supply (M2) relative to the sum of: Chart I-6The US: Broad Money Supply Relative To Equity And Bond Market Capitalization the US equity market capitalisation (the Wilshire 5000); the market cap values of all US-dollar bonds, including government, corporate, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities and commercial mortgage backed securities (the Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Index); the market cap value of US dollar-denominated bonds issued by EM governments and corporations; minus the Fed’s and US commercial banks’ holdings of all types of securities. The higher this ratio is, the more US dollar deposits (liquidity) is available per one dollar of outstanding securities – excluding those held by the Fed and US commercial banks. Based on the past 25 years, the US M2-to-market value of securities ratio is somewhat elevated. This means liquidity is relatively abundant. However, this may not preclude the ratio from drifting higher like it did in 2008. This scenario would be consistent with a renewed selloff in equity and credit markets. Interestingly, back in January, the ratio was almost at a 20-year low – i.e., money supply (liquidity) was tight relative to the market value of outstanding US dollar-denominated securities. This was contrary to the prevalent perception in the global investment community that in 2019 the advances in share prices and credit markets were liquidity-driven. We discussed what constitutes pertinent liquidity for financial assets in our January 16 report titled, A Primer On Liquidity. The key takeaways of the report were: Money supply – not central bank assets – is the ultimate liquidity available to economic agents to purchase goods and services as well as invest in both real and financial assets. Changes in the velocity of money are as important as those in money supply. Yet forecasting changes in the velocity of money is a near-impossible task, as it entails foreseeing the behavior of economic agents. A large and expanding stock of money in and of itself does not guarantee greater liquidity for asset markets. Gauging liquidity flows to asset markets boils down to predicting investor behavior. Liquidity flows into financial assets when “animal spirits” among investors improve, and vice versa. Bottom Line: Even though the US money supply is expanding at a record pace, the key to financial asset price fluctuations is willingness among investors to purchase those assets. In turn, willingness to allocate cash to securities is generally driven by (1) the potential income and cash flow generation by securities issuers; (2) uncertainty related to future income (the risk premium); and (3) the opportunity cost of holding cash. Presently, the opportunity cost of holding cash is the sole reason to buy risky securities. Cash flow/income generation is currently impaired for the majority of equities and credit instruments. Further, there is a great deal of uncertainty about issuers’ ability to generate cash/income for investors – i.e., the required risk premium should be very high. All of these circumstances make the risk-reward profile of this rally poor. Reasons To Fade This Rally There are several market-based indicators that do not corroborate a further run-up in EM and DM equity prices. Our Risk-On / Safe-Haven Currency Ratio has struggled to gain traction (Chart I-7, top panel). It is not confirming the rebound in EM share prices. It is essential to emphasize that this indicator is agnostic to the direction of the US dollar, as it is calculated as the ratio of cyclical commodities currencies (AUD, NZD, CAD, ZAR, BRL, MXN, CLP, RUB, and IDR) versus safe-haven currencies such as the Swiss franc and Japanese yen on a total-return basis – i.e., all exchange rates include the cost of carry. Chart I-7Various Reflation Indicators Have Been Slugish Our Reflation Confirming Indicator has not been sending a strong bullish reflation signal either (Chart I-7, bottom panel). This indicator is composed of an equally-weighted average of industrial metals, platinum and US lumber prices. The Global Cyclical-to-Defensive Equity Sectors Ratio has formed a classic head-and-shoulders pattern, and has broken down (Chart I-8, top panel). The latest rebound has not altered this pattern. Therefore, the path of least resistance for this ratio is still down, which entails underperformance of the global cyclical equity sector versus global defensives. The latter often occurs in selloffs. Similarly, the relative performance of Swedish versus Swiss non-financial stocks has failed to rebound, having experienced a major breakdown in March (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Swedish non-financial stocks are much more cyclical than Swiss ones. Finally, the global business cycle is experiencing its deepest recession in the post-World War II period, with the pace and nature of the recovery remaining highly uncertain. Chart I-9 portends global EPS in SDR, which is the proper measure given the greenback’s weight in SDR is 58%, the euro’s 39%, the yen’s 11%, and the yuan’s 1%. Chart I-8Global Cyclical Stocks Have Not Outperformed Chart I-9Global Corporate EPS In Perspective Global EPS shrank by 28% in 2001-2002 and by 40% in the 2008 recession. Given the current recession will be deeper, global EPS will likely shrink by about 50%. We do not think equity markets are discounting such a dire outcome after the recent rally. Bottom Line: A number of cyclical indicators continue to flash red or amber, suggesting this rally is not about a cyclical economic recovery.     Investment Strategy We closed our short position in EM equities on March 19, and on the March 26 report we argued that it was too late to sell but still too early to buy. Given the rally in global equities is overstretched from a short-term perspective, we will wait for a correction to assess whether to maintain or close our shorts on EM currencies. Chart I-10EM Currencies And S&P 500 That said, we maintained our underweights in both EM stocks and credit versus their DM peers. Also, we have continued to short EM currencies versus the US dollar. Chart I-10 demonstrates that EM currencies have failed to rally despite the strong rebound in the S&P 500.   Given the rally in global equities is overstretched from a short-term perspective, we will wait for a correction to assess whether to maintain or close our shorts on EM currencies. For dedicated EM equity managers, our recommended overweights are Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Russia, central Europe, Mexico and Peru. Our underweights are Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, India and the Philippines. We are neutral on other bourses. Last week we published two reports for fixed-income investors: EM: Foreign Currency Debt Strains and EM Domestic Bonds And Currencies. In the first report we assessed individual EM countries' vulnerabilities to foreign debt and discussed strategies for EM sovereign and corporate credits. In the second report, we upgraded our stance on EM local markets from underweight to neutral. Before upgrading to a bullish stance, we would first need to upgrade our stance on EM currencies.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Chinese Auto Sales: Disappointments Ahead Chinese automobile sales plunged 42% year-on-year over the first quarter of this year, due to the Covid-19 lockdowns (Chart II-1). We still expect auto sales in China to be flat or very mildly negative year-on-year over the period of April-December of this year. First, official data shows the growth rate for nominal disposable income was falling toward zero, but realistically it was probably negative in the first quarter (Chart II-2, top panel). Very sluggish household income growth – in combination with the still-elevated uncertainty of the job market (Chart II-2, bottom panel) – will restrain Chinese auto demand. Chart II-1Auto Sales In China: A Rate Of Change Recovery Ahead Chart II-2Sluggish Household Income Growth Will Constrain Chinese Auto Demand While household income growth will recover from current level later this year, it will likely remain much lower than the previous years’ 8-9% growth. Second, Chinese households are already quite leveraged. Their debt levels reached over 94% of annual disposable income, almost as high as in the US (Chart II-3). Third, peer-to-peer lending – an important source of auto loans in recent years – has shrunk considerably and is unlikely to pick up this year (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Chinese Household Debt Burden Is High Chart II-4Auto Financing Has Become More Scarce Bank lending rates for household consumption loans and peer-to-peer lending rates are currently about 5% and 10%, respectively. Such borrowing costs are restrictive given the tame growth of household income. Finally, the stimulus packages intended to boost automobile demand this year are no greater than they were last year. This entails that the net stimulus is close to zero. The focus of this year’s stimulus remains on the demand for new energy vehicles (NEV), which is in line with the central government’s strategic goal. Given that NEVs account for only 5% of auto sales, any boost to NEV demand is unlikely to make a huge difference in aggregate auto sales.  Another boost to auto sales is the relaxation of license controls in the first-tier cities. The extent of these measures is so far considerably smaller than it was last year. About 60,0001 additional new license plates have so far been added, accounting for only 0.2% of Chinese auto sales. This number was 180,000 last year.2  This year local governments in 16 cities announced cash subsidies for auto buyers.3 Despite larger geographic coverage, the amount of cash subsidies is similar to what it was last year – at about 3% of the retail price. This is too small to make any meaningful impact on auto sales. Investment Implications The lack of considerable new stimulus for auto purchases and lower household income growth will make the recovery in passenger car sales halting and hesitant. The lack of considerable new stimulus for auto purchases and lower household income growth will make the recovery in passenger car sales halting and hesitant. Chinese auto stock prices in the domestic A-share market are breaking down (Chart II-5). Lingering demand contraction as well as possible price cuts will further curtail auto producers’ profits. Disappointing Chinese auto sales will lead to sluggish auto production and, consequently, to weak demand for metals like steel, aluminum and zinc. Chinese auto exports will outpace its imports (Chart II-6). As China accounts for about 30% of global auto sales and production, rising net exports of automobiles from China may diminish other global producers’ margins. Chart II-5Avoid Chinese Auto Stocks For Now Chart II-6Rising Chinese Auto Net Exports Are Negative To Other Global Auto Producers   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Brazil: Not Out Of The Woods Yet We believe risks to Brazilian assets remain to the downside. Political infighting among various branches of power and state institutions will depress consumer and business confidence, lengthening the recession. Chart III-1Brazil: Recurring Crises Political infighting among various branches of power and state institutions will depress consumer and business confidence, lengthening the recession (Chart III-1). Political turmoil also reduces the probability of structural reforms. This combined with a delayed economic recovery will further strain the already precarious public debt dynamics.  First, the country is in a full-blown political crisis. The Supreme Court's decision to reject Bolsonaro's nomination for Director of the Federal Police manifests broad-based political infighting among Brazilian institutions. Further, the Supreme Court has started an investigation into the President as calls for impeachment intensify among both the public and the Congress. The rift between President Bolsonaro and Congressional President Maia is especially worrisome. Given Maia’s future political ambitions, we do not expect a truce between the two. On the contrary, they will continue to stand off in order to assert control over the fragmented Congress. As a result, structural reforms such as the national tax program and privatizations will be delayed. Second, Bolsonaro’s popularity is also plunging due to his slow and controversial response to the COVID-19 outbreak. This week, Bolsonaro’s disapproval ratings jumped above those of former president Lula da Silva, and public support for impeachment is now over 54%. Third, Congress has allowed the government to go over the limit of fiscal spending this year, which has resulted in almost 1.2 trillion reais in emergency fiscal spending, or about 16% of GDP. This will push the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio to well above 100% by the end of 2020. Chart III-2This Large Gap Makes Public Debt Dynamics Untenable In order to stabilize its public debt-to-GDP ratio, a government’s borrowing costs should be below nominal GDP growth. Brazil fails to meet this condition. Local currency interest rates at 5.5% are well above nominal GDP growth, which will likely be negative in 2020 (Chart III-2). This assures unsustainable debt dynamics. Finally, in terms of monetary policy, the central bank’s policy rate cuts have not been efficiently transmitted to the real economy, as discussed in our March 31st Special Report. Borrowing costs for companies and households remain elevated relative to their nominal income growth. Overall, the sole feasible way for Brazil to stabilize its public debt-to-GDP ratio is to push nominal GDP growth above interest rates. Further, this is only possible with falling interest rates and further material currency depreciation. The continued currency devaluation represents a risk to foreign investors holding local assets. Investment Recommendations Continue to underweight Brazil within EM equity and credit portfolios. We reiterate our trade to short the BRL versus the US dollar. Even though the BRL is moderately cheap (Chart III-3), there is still considerable downward pressure on the currency. The BRL is tightly correlated with commodities prices (Chart III-4). Until these do not bottom out, the real will continue depreciating. Critically, the real needs to depreciate to lift nominal GDP growth above borrowing costs. The latter is essential to stabilize public debt dynamics. Chart III-3The BRL Is Only Modestly Cheap Chart III-4The BRL Correlates With Commodities Prices Finally, we are underweight both local currency and US$ denominated bonds in Brazil due to worrisome public debt dynamics and high foreign currency stress.   Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Shanghai announced to add 40,000 new license plates this year while Hangzhou increased 20,000 new license plates. 2   There were 100,000 additional license plates approved by Guangzhou province and an additional 80,000 by Shenzhen in 2019. 3   The cash subsidies are about RMB1000-3000 for buying regular cars, RMB3000-5000 for car replacement (e.g., scrapping their autos with Emission Standard 3 and buying autos with new Emission Standard 6), and RMB5000-10,000 for NEV purchases. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The six-month increase in European bank credit flows amounts to an underwhelming $70 billion, compared to a record high $660 billion in the US and $550 billion in China. Underweight European domestic cyclicals versus their peers in the US and China. Specifically, underweight euro area banks versus US banks. Overweight equities on a long-term (2 years plus) horizon. The mid-single digit return that equities are offering makes them attractive versus ultra-low yielding bonds. But remain neutral equities on a 1-year horizon, until it becomes clear that we can prevent a second wave of the pandemic. Fractal trade: long bitcoin cash, short ethereum. Feature Chart I-1Bank Credit 6-Month Flow Up $70 Bn ##br##In The Euro Area… Chart I-2…But Up $700 Bn ##br##In The US Governments and central banks are dishing out an alphabet soup of stimulus. The question is: how much is reaching those that need it? Our preferred approach to assessing monetary stimulus is to focus on the evolution of bank credit flows and bond yields over a six-month period. Bank Credit Flows Have Surged In The US And China, Not In Europe On our preferred assessment, Europe’s monetary stimulus is underwhelming compared with that in the US and China. The six-month increase in US bank credit flows, at $660 billion, is the highest in a decade and not far from the highest ever. In China, the equivalent six-month increase is $550 billion. But in the euro area, the six-month increase in bank credit flows amounts to an underwhelming $70 billion (Charts I-1 - Chart I-4). Chart I-3Bank Credit 6-Month Flow Up $550 Bn In China… Chart I-4...And Up ##br##Globally Admittedly, US firms are drawing on pre-arranged bank credit lines rather than taking out new loans. Furthermore, the link between bank credit flows and final demand might be compromised during the current economic shutdown. For example, if firms are borrowing to pay workers who are not producing any output, then the transmission of a credit flow acceleration to a GDP acceleration would be weakened. Europe’s monetary stimulus is underwhelming compared with that in the US and China. Nevertheless, some bank credit flows will still reach the real economy. And the US and China are creating more bank credit flows than Europe. Focus On The Deceleration Of The Bond Yield Turning to the bond yield, it is important to focus not on its level, and not on its decline. Instead, it is important to focus on its deceleration. The focus on the deceleration of the bond yield sounds counterintuitive, but it results from a fundamental accounting identity. The next two paragraphs may seem somewhat technical but read them carefully, as they are important for understanding the transmission of stimulus. GDP is a flow. It measures the flow of goods and services produced in a quarter. Hence, GDP receives a contribution from the flow of credit. The flow of credit, in turn, is established by the level of bond yields. When we talk about stimulating the economy, we mean boosting the GDP growth rate from, say, -1 percent to +1 percent, which is an acceleration of GDP. This acceleration in the GDP flow must come from an acceleration in the flow of credit. This acceleration in the flow of credit, in turn, must come from a deceleration of bond yields. In other words, the bond yield decline in the most recent period must be greater than the decline in the previous period. Banks tend to perform better after bond yields have decelerated. The good news is that in the US and China, bond yields have decelerated; the bad news is that in Europe, they have not. Over the past six months, the 10-year bond yield has decelerated by 40 bps in the US and by 65 bps in China. Yet in France, despite the coronavirus crisis, the 10-year bond yield has accelerated by 60 bps (Charts I-5 - Chart I-8).1 Chart I-5The Bond Yield Has Accelerated ##br##In The Euro Area... Chart I-6...Decelerated ##br##In The US... Chart I-7...Decelerated In China... Chart I-8...And Decelerated Globally European bond yields are struggling to decelerate because of their proximity to the lower bound to bond yields, at around -1 percent. The inability to decelerate the bond yield constrains the monetary stimulus that Europe can apply compared to the US and China, whose bond yields are much further from the lower bound constraint. Compared to Europe, the US and China have much stronger decelerations in their bond yields and much stronger accelerations in their bank credit flows. This suggests underweighting European domestic cyclicals versus their peers in the US and China. Specifically, banks tend to perform better after bond yields have decelerated; and they tend to perform worse after bond yields have accelerated. On this basis, underweight euro area banks versus US banks (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Banks Perform Better After Bond Yields Have Decelerated, Worse After Bond Yields Have Accelerated Long-Term Asset Allocation Is Straightforward, Shorter-Term Is Not The level of the bond yield, or of so-called ‘financial conditions’, does not drive the short-term oscillations in credit flows. To repeat, it is the acceleration and deceleration of the bond yield that matters. Yet when it comes to the long-term valuation of assets, the level of the bond yield does matter, and when the bond yield is ultra-low it matters enormously. An ultra-low bond yield justifies a much lower prospective return on competing long-duration assets, like equities. The reason is that when bond yields approach their lower bound, bond prices can no longer rise, they can only fall. This higher riskiness of bonds justifies an abnormally low (or zero) ‘risk premium’ on equities. In this world of ultra-low numbers – for both bond yields and equity risk premiums – the low to mid-single digit long-term return that equities are offering makes them attractive versus bonds (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Equities Are Offering Mid-Single Digit Long-Term Returns But this long-term valuation argument only works for those with long-term investment horizons. What does long-term mean? There is no clear dividing line, but we would define long-term as two years at the very minimum. For a one-year investment horizon, the much more important question is: what will happen to 12-month forward earnings (profits)?  In the stock market recessions of 2008-09 and 2015-16, the stock market reached its low just before forward earnings reached their low. Assuming the same holds true in 2020-21, we must establish whether forward earnings are close to their low or not. In 2008-09, world forward earnings collapsed by 45 percent. In the current recession, which is putatively worse, world forward earnings are down by less than 20 percent to date. To have already reached the cycle low in forward earnings with only half the decline of 2008, the current recession needs to be much shorter than the 2008-09 episode (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). Chart I-11In The Global Financial Crisis, Forward Earnings Collapsed By 45 Percent Chart I-12In The Current Crisis, Forward Earnings Are Down 20 Percent. Is That Enough? Whether this turns out to be the case or not hinges on the pandemic and our response to it. A controlled easing of lockdowns will boost growth as more of the economy comes back to life. But too rapid an easing of lockdowns will unleash a second wave of the pandemic, requiring a second wave of economic shutdowns, a double dip recession and a new low in the stock market. Hence, if you have a long-term (2-year plus) investment horizon, the choice between equities and bonds is very straightforward: overweight equities. On this long-term horizon, German and Swedish equities are especially attractive versus negative-yielding bonds. On a 1-year investment horizon, the key question is: can we avoid a second wave of the pandemic? But if you have a 1-year investment horizon, the choice is less straightforward, because it hinges on whether we can avoid a second wave of the pandemic or not. Until it becomes clear that governments will not reopen economies too quickly, remain neutral equities on the 1-year horizon. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is a pair-trade within the cryptocurrency asset-class. Long bitcoin cash / short ethereum. Set the profit target at 21 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. The 12-month rolling win ratio now stands at 61 percent. Chart I-13Bitcoin Cash Vs. Ethereum When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the US, the 10-year bond yield has declined by 120 bps in the past six months compared with 80 bps in the preceding six months, which equals a deceleration of 40 bps; in China, the 10-year bond yield has declined by 73 bps in the past six months compared with 18 bps in the preceding six months, which equals a deceleration of 65 bps; but in France, the 10-year bond yield has increased by 12 bps in the past six months compared with a 48 bps decline in the preceding six months, which equals an acceleration of 60 bps. Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

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Dear Client, This week, in lieu of our regular report, we are sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan discusses the global fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and provides some perspective on whether the response will be enough to prevent an "L-shaped" economic outcome. I hope you find the report insightful. Last Friday, I participated in a webcast with my fellow BCA Strategists Caroline Miller and Arthur Budaghyan where we discussed the outlook for developed and emerging market equities over the immediate (0-3 month) and cyclical (12 month) horizon. You can access a replay of the webcast here. Please note we will be sending out our regular weekly report next week. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession. The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. Even when narrowly-defined, the announced (or likely) fiscal response of the US, China, and Germany is quite large and appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. This is not the case, however, in other euro area economies (France, Italy, and Spain), or in emerging markets. Our analysis also suggests that the global fiscal response will need to increase if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year. This underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. Feature The global economic expansion that began in 2009 has come to an abrupt end due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aggressive containment measures necessary to control the spread of the disease and prevent the collapse in health care systems around the world have caused a large and sudden stop in global economic activity, which has prompted unprecedented responses from governments around the world. In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession (characterized by a very prolonged return to trend growth). The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. But for now, we (tentatively) conclude that the fiscal response appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. However, there are two important caveats. First, while Germany has provided among the strongest fiscal responses globally, measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Second, the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year – more will have to be done. For policymakers, this underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. In this regard, the gradual re-opening of several US states by early-May, while positive for economic activity in the short-run, is a non-trivial risk to the US and global economic outlooks over the coming 6-12 months. This risk must be closely watched by investors. The Global Fiscal Response: Comparing Across Countries And Across Measures The flurry of policy announcements from national governments over the past six weeks has led to a great degree of confusion about the size and disposition of the global COVID-19 fiscal response. Our analysis is based heavily on the IMF’s tracking of these measures, albeit with a few adjustments. We also rely on analysis from Bruegel, a prominent European macroeconomic think-tank, as well as our own Geopolitical Strategy team and a variety of news reports. Chart 1 presents the IMF’s estimate of the total fiscal response to the crisis across major countries, as of April 23, broken down into “above-the-line” and “below-the-line” measures. Above-the-line measures are those that directly impact government budget balances (direct fiscal spending and revenue measures, usually tax deferrals), whereas below-the-line measures typically involve balance sheet measures to backstop businesses through capital injections and loan guarantees. Chart 1 makes it clear that the fiscal response of advanced economies is enormous when including both above- and below-the-line measures. By this metric, the response of most developed economies is on the order of 10% of GDP, and well above 30% in the case of Italy and Germany. However, using the sum of above- and below-the-line measures to gauge the fiscal response of any country may not be the ideal approach, given that below-the-line measures are contingent either on the triggering of certain conditions or on the provision of credit to households and firms from the financial system. Below-the-line measures also likely increase the liability position of the private sector, thus raising the odds of negative second-round effects. Chart 1The Global Fiscal Response Is Huge When Including All Measures Instead, Chart 2 compares the countries shown in Chart 1 based only on the IMF’s estimate of above-the-line measures, and with a 4% downward adjustment to Japan’s reported spending to account for previously announced measures.1 The chart shows that countries fall into roughly three categories in terms of the magnitude of their above-the-line response: in excess of 4% of GDP (Australia, the US, Japan, Canada, and Germany), 2-3% (the UK, Brazil, and China), and sub-2% (all other countries shown in the chart, including Spain, Italy, and France). Chart 2The Picture Changes When Excluding Below-The-Line Measures Analysis by Bruegel, provides somewhat different estimates of the global COVID-19 fiscal response for select European countries as well as the US (Table 1). Bruegel breaks down discretionary fiscal measures that have been announced into three categories: those involving an immediate fiscal impulse (new spending and foregone revenues), those related to deferred payments, and other liquidity provisions and guarantees. Bruegel distinguishes between the first and second categories because of their differing impact on government budget balances. Deferrals improve the liquidity positions of individuals and companies but do not cancel their obligations, meaning that they result only in a temporary deterioration in budget balances. Table 1 highlights that Bruegel’s estimates of the sum of above- and below-the-line measures are similar to the IMF’s estimates for the US, the UK, and Spain, but are smaller for Italy and larger for France and Germany (particularly the latter). These differences underscore the extreme uncertainty facing investors, who have to contend not only with varying estimates of the magnitude of government policies but also a torrent of news concerning the evolution of the pandemic itself. Table 1The Type Of Fiscal Response Varies Significantly Across Countries Chart 3 presents our best current estimate of the above-the-line fiscal response of several countries (the measure we deem to be most likely to result in an immediate fiscal impulse), by excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals to the best of our ability.2Chart 3 is based on a combination of data from the IMF, Bruegel analysis, and BCA estimates and news analysis. Chart 3When Narrowly Defined, Several Countries Are Responding Forcefully, But Many Countries Are Not Overall, investors can draw the following conclusions from Charts 1 – 3 and Table 1: When measured as the total of above- and below-the-line measures, nearly all large developed market countries have responded with sizeable measures. Emerging market economies are the clear laggards. Excluding below-the-line measures and using our approach, Australia, the US, China, Germany, Japan, and Canada appear to be spending the most relative to the size of their economies. While Japan’s “headline” fiscal number was inflated by including previously-announced spending, it is still decently-sized after adjustment. Outside of Germany, the rest of Europe appears to be providing a middling or poor above-the-line fiscal response. The UK appears to be providing between 4-5% of GDP as a fiscal impulse, whereas the fiscal response in Italy, Spain, and France looks more like that of emerging markets than of advanced economies. Measuring The Stimulus Against The Shock Despite the substantial amount of new information over the past six weeks concerning the evolution of the pandemic and the attendant policy response, it remains extremely difficult to judge what the balance between shock and stimulus will be and what that means for the profile of growth. Nonetheless, below we present a framework that investors can use to approach the question, and that can be updated as new information emerges concerning the impact of the shutdowns and the extent of the response. Our approach involves analyzing four specific questions: What is the size of the initial shock? What are the likely second-round effects on growth? What is the likely multiplier on fiscal spending? Will the composition of fiscal spending alter its effectiveness? The Size Of The Initial Shock Chart 4 presents the OECD’s estimates of the initial impact of partial or complete shutdowns on economic activity in several countries. The OECD first used a sectoral approach to estimating the impact on activity while lockdowns are in effect, assuming a 100% shutdown for manufacturing of transportation equipment and other personal services, a 50% decline in activity for construction and professional services, and a 75% decline for retail trade, wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and air travel. Chart 4 illustrates the total impact of this approach for key developed and emerging economies. Chart 4Annual GDP Will Be 1.5%-2.5% Lower For Each Month Lockdowns Are In Effect The OECD’s approach provides a credible estimate of the impact of aggressive containment policies, and implies that annual real GDP is likely to be 1.5-2.5% lower for major countries for each month that lockdown policies are in effect. This implies that output in major economies is likely to fall 3.5% - 6% for the year from the initial shock alone, assuming an aggressive 10-week lockdown followed by a complete return to normal. Estimating Potential Second Round Effects Chart 5 presents projections from the Bank for International Settlements on the spillover and spillback potential of a 5% initial shock to the level of global GDP from the COVID-19 pandemic (equivalent to a 20% impact on an annualized basis). The chart shows that the cumulative impact of the initial shock rises to 7-8% by the end of this year for the US, euro area, and emerging markets, and 6% for other advanced economies. These estimates account for both domestic second round effects of the initial shock, as well as the reverberating impact of the shock on global trade. Chart 5 also shows the devastating effect that a second wave of COVID-19 emerging in the second half of the year would have after including spillover and spillback effects, assuming that only partial lockdowns would be required. In this scenario, the level of GDP would be 10-12% lower at the end of the year depending on the region, suggesting that investors should be more concerned about the possibility of additional lockdown events than they should be about the after-effects of the first wave of infections (more on this below). Chart 5Additional Lockdown Events Are A Greater Risk Than First Wave After-Effects Will Fiscal Multipliers Be High Or Low? When examining the academic literature on fiscal multipliers, the first impression is that multipliers are likely to be extremely large in the current environment. Tables 2 and 3 present a range of academic multiplier estimates aggregated by the IMF, categorized by the stage of the business cycle and whether the zero lower bound is in effect. The tables tell a clear story: multipliers are typically meaningfully larger during recessions than during expansions, and extremely large when the zero lower bound (ZLB) is in effect. However, there are at least two reasons to expect that the fiscal multiplier during this crisis will not be as large as Tables 2 and 3 suggest. First, it is obviously the case that the multiplier will be low while full or even partial lockdowns are in effect, as consumers will not have the ability to fully act in response to stimulative measures. This will be partially offset by a burst of spending once lockdowns are removed, but the empirical multiplier estimates during recessions shown in Table 2 have not been measured during a period when constraints to spending have been in effect, and we suspect that this will have at least somewhat of a dampening effect on the efficacy of fiscal spending relative to previous recessions (even once regulations concerning store closures are removed). Table 2Fiscal Multipliers Are Much Larger During Recessions Than Expansions Table 3Models Suggest The Multiplier Is Quite High At The Zero Lower Bound Second, Table 3 likely overestimates the multiplier at the ZLB. These estimates have been based on models rather than empirical analysis, and appear to be in reference to the prevention of large subsequent declines in output following an initial shock. The modeled finding of a large multiplier at the ZLB occurs because increased deficit spending will not lead to higher policy rates in a scenario where the neutral rate has fallen below zero. But it seems difficult to believe that the fiscal multiplier during ZLB episodes, defined as the impact of fiscal spending on the path of output relative to the initial shock (not relative to a counterfactual additional shock), is larger than the highest empirical estimates of the multiplier during recessions. The only circumstance in which we can envision this being the case is an environment where long-term bond yields are capped and remain at zero, alongside short-term interest rates, as the economy improves. The IMF has provided a simple rule of thumb approach to estimating the fiscal multiplier for a given country. The IMF’s approach involves first estimating the multiplier under normal circumstances based on a series of key structural characteristics that have been shown to influence the economy’s response to fiscal shocks. Then, the “normal” multiplier is adjusted higher or lower depending on the stage of the business cycle, and whether monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. For the US, the IMF’s approach suggests that a multiplier range of 1.1 – 1.6 is reasonable, assuming the highest cyclical adjustment but no ZLB adjustment (see Box 1 for a description of the calculation). Given the unprecedented nature of this crisis, we are inclined to use the low end of this range (1.1) as a conservative assumption when judging whether fiscal responses to the crisis are sufficient. For investors, this means that governments should be aiming, at a minimum, for fiscal packages that are roughly 90% of the size of the expected shock of their economies, using our US fiscal multiplier assumption as a guide. Box 1The 'Bucket' Approach To Estimating Fiscal Multipliers The Composition Of The Response: Helping Or Hurting? The last of our four questions deals with the issue of composition and whether the form of a country’s fiscal response is likely to alter its effectiveness. We implicitly addressed the first element of composition, whether measures are above-the-line or below-the-line, by comparing Charts 1 - 3 on pages 3-5. Our view is that above-the-line measures are far more important than below-the-line measures, as the former provides direct income and liquidity support. Below-the-line measures are also important, as they are likely to help reduce business failure and household bankruptcies. The fiscal multiplier on these measures has to be above zero, but it is likely to be much lower than that of an above-the-line response. Chart 6Much Of The US Fiscal Response Is Going To Households And Small Businesses The second element of composition concerns the appropriate distribution of aid among households, businesses, and local governments. On this particular question, it remains extremely challenging to analyze the issue on a global basis, owing to a frequent lack of an explicit breakdown of fiscal measures by recipient. For now, we limit our distributional analysis to the US, and hope to expand our approach to other countries in future research. Chart 6 presents a breakdown of the US fiscal response by recipient, which informs the following observations. Households: Chart 6 highlights that US households will receive approximately $600 billion as part of the CARES Act, roughly half of which will occur through direct payments (i.e. “stimulus checks”) and another 40% from expanded unemployment benefits. In cases where the federal household response has been criticized by members of the public as inadequate, it has often been compared to income support programs of other countries. The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (“CERB”) is a good example of a program that seems, at first blush, to be superior: it provides $2,000 CAD in direct payments to individuals for a 4 week period, for up to 16 weeks (i.e. a maximum of $8,000 CAD), which seems better than a $1,200 USD stimulus check. However, Table 4 highlights that this comparison is mostly spurious. First, the CERB is not universal, in that it is only available to those who have stopped or will stop working due to COVID-19. At a projected cost of $35 billion CAD, the CERB program represents 1.5% of Canadian GDP. By comparison, $600 billion USD in overall household support represents 2.75% of US GDP; this number drops to 1.75% when only considering support to those who have lost their jobs, but this is still higher as a share of the economy than in Canada. Moreover, there is little question that Congress is prepared to pass more stimulus for additional weeks of required assistance.   Table 4US Household Relief Is Just As Generous As Seemingly Better Programs The discrepancy between the perception and reality of US household sector support appears to be rooted in the speed of payments. Speed is the one area where Canada’s household sector response appears to have legitimately outperformed the US; CERB payments are received by applicants within three business days for those registered for electronic payment, and in some cases they are received the following day. By contrast, it has taken some time for US States to start paying out the additional $600 USD per week in expanded unemployment benefits, but as of the middle of last week nearly all states had started making these payments.   Firms: On April 16 the Small Business Administration announced that the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) had expended its initial budget of $350 billion. While additional funds of $320 billion have subsequently been approved (plus $60 billion in small business emergency loans and grants), the run on PPP funds was, to some investors, an implicit sign that the CARES Act was inadequately structured.   Table 5Help For Small Businesses Will Replace A Significant Amount Of Lost Income However, the fact that the initial funds ran out in mid-April simply reflects the reality that social distancing measures had been in place for 3-4 weeks by the time that the program began taking applications. Table 5 highlights that $350 billion was large enough to replace nearly 90% of lost small business income for one month, assuming that overall small business revenue has fallen by 50% and that small businesses account for 44% of total GDP. The table also shows that a combined total of $730 billion is enough to replace almost 80% of lost small business income for 10 weeks, given these assumptions. With loan forgiveness at least partially tied to small businesses retaining employees on payroll for an 8-week period, the PPP is also essentially an indirect form of household income support. State & Local Governments: The magnitude of support for state & local (S&L) governments appears to be the least-well designed element of the US fiscal response.  The CARES Act provides for $170 billion in support to S&L, which at first blush seems large as it is approximately 25% of S&L current receipts in Q4 2019 (i.e. it stands to cover a 25% loss in revenue for one quarter). However, this does not account for the significant reported increase in S&L costs to combat the pandemic, nor does it provide S&L governments with any revenue certainty beyond June 30 when most of the assistance from CARES must be spent.   Chart 7Persistent State & Local Austerity Must Be Avoided This Time Unlike households or firms, who also face significant uncertainty, nearly all US states are subject to balanced budget requirements, which prevent them from spending more than they collect in revenue. When faced even with projected revenue losses in the second half of this year and into 2021, states are likely to aggressively and immediately cut costs in order to avoid budgetary shortfalls. Chart 7 highlights that S&L austerity was a significant element of the persistent drag on real GDP growth from overall government expenditure and investment in the first 3-4 years of the post-GFC economic expansion. A repeat of this episode would significantly raise the odds of an “L-type” recession (and thus should certainly be avoided). This is why Congress is moving to pass larger state and local aid. Our Geopolitical Strategy team argues that neither President Trump nor Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell will prevent the additional financial assistance that US states will require, despite their rhetoric about states going bankrupt.3 A near-term, temporary standoff may occur, but Washington will almost certainly act to provide at least additional short-term funding if state employment starts to fall due to budget pressure. So while we recognize that the state & local component of the US fiscal response is currently lacking, it does not seem likely to represent a serious threat to an eventual economic recovery in the US. Putting It All Together: Will It Be Enough? Chart 8 reproduces Chart 3 with an assumed fiscal multiplier of 1.1, and with shaded regions denoting the likely initial and total impact on GDP from aggressive containment measures (based on the OECD and BIS’ estimates). Based on our analysis of the US fiscal response, we make no adjustments for the composition of the measures beyond defining the fiscal response on a narrow basis (i.e. excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals). The chart highlights that the narrowly-defined fiscal response of three key economies driving global demand, the US, China, and Germany, is either at the upper end or above the total impact range. Thus, for now, we tentatively conclude that the fiscal response that has or will happen appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event, especially since Chart 8 explicitly excludes below-the-line measures. Chart 8Several Important Countries Seem To Be Doing Enough, But More Is Needed In Europe Ex-Germany However, there are two important caveats to this conclusion. First, Chart 8 makes it clear that measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Italy and France have provided a substantial below-the-line response, but it is far from clear that a debt-based response or one that only temporarily improves access to cash for households and businesses will be enough to prevent a prolonged fallout from the sudden stop in economic activity and income. Second, our analysis suggests that the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year or if these measures remain in place at half-strength for many months. This underscores how sensitive the adequacy of announced fiscal measures are to the amount of time economies remain under full or partial lockdown. As such, it is crucial for investors to have some sense of when advanced economies may be able to sustainably end aggressive containment measures. When Can The Lockdowns Sustainably End? Several countries and US states have already announced some reductions in their restrictions, but the question of how comprehensive these measures can be without risking a second period of prolonged stay-at-home orders looms large. Table 6 presents two different methods of estimating sustainable lockdown end dates for several advanced economies. First, we use the “70-day rule” that appears to have succeeded in ending the outbreak in Wuhan, calculated from the first day that either school or work closures took effect in each country.4 Second, using a linear trend from the peak 5-day moving average of confirmed cases and fatalities, we calculate when confirmed cases and fatalities may reach zero. Table 6By Re-Opening Soon, The US May Be Risking A Damaging Second Wave The table highlights that these methods generally prescribe a reopening date of May 31 or earlier, with a few exceptions. The UK’s confirmed case count and fatality trends are still too shallow to suggest an end of May re-opening, as is the case in Canada. In the case of Sweden, no projections can truly be made based on the 70-day rule because closures never formally occurred. But the most problematic point highlighted in Table 6 is that US newly confirmed cases are only currently projected to fall to zero as of February 2021. Chart 9 highlights that while new cases per capita in New York state are much higher than in the rest of the country, they are declining whereas they have yet to clearly peak elsewhere. Cross-country case comparisons can be problematic due to differences in testing, but with several US states having already begun the gradual re-opening process, this underscores that US policymakers may be allowing a dangerous rise in the odds of a secondary infection wave. Chart 9No Clear Downtrend Yet Outside Of New York State Investment Conclusions Our core conclusion that an “L-shaped” global recession is likely to be avoided is generally bullish for equities on a 12-month horizon. However, uncertainty remains extremely elevated, and the recent rise in stock prices in the US (and globally) has been at least partially based on the expectation that lockdowns will sustainably end soon, which at least in the case of the US appears to be a premature conclusion given the current lack of large-scale virus testing capacity. As such, we are less optimistic towards risky assets tactically, and would recommend a neutral stance over a 0-3 month horizon. As noted above, our cross-country comparison of narrowly-defined fiscal measures suggested that euro area countries (excluding Germany) will likely have to do more in order to prevent a long period of below-trend growth. In the case of highly-indebted countries like Italy, this raises the additional question of whether a significantly increased debt-to-GDP ratio stemming from an aggressive fiscal impulse will cause another euro area sovereign debt crisis similar to what occurred from 2010-2014. Chart 10Italy's Debt Sustainability Hurdle Is Lower Than It Used To Be Government debts are sustainable as long as interest rates remain below economic growth, and from this vantage point Italy should spend as much as needed in order to ensure that nominal growth remains above current long-term government bond yields. Chart 10 highlights that, despite a widening spread versus German bunds, Italian 10-year yields are much lower today than they were during the worst of the euro area crisis, meaning that the debt sustainability hurdle is technically lower. However, we have also noted in previous reports that high-debt countries often face multiple government debt equilibria; if global investors become fearful that that high-debt countries may not be able to repay their obligations without defaulting or devaluing, then a self-fulfilling prophecy will occur via sharply higher interest rates (Chart 11). Chart 11Multiple Equilibria In Debt Markets Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort For now, we view the risk of a renewed Italian debt crisis from significantly increased spending related to COVID-19 as minimal, and it is certainly lower than the status quo as the latter risks causing a sharp gap between nominal growth and bond yields like what occurred from 2010 – 2014. First, Chart 12 highlights that Italy has succeeded in somewhat reducing its structural balance, which averaged -4% for many years prior to the euro area crisis. Assuming an adequate global response to the crisis and that economic recovery ensues, it is not clear why global bond investors would be concerned that Italian structural deficits would persistently widen. Second, the ECB is purchasing Italian government bonds as part of its new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, which will help cap the level of Italian yields. Third, Chart 13 shows what will occur to Italy’s government debt service ratio (general government net interest payments as a percent of GDP) in a scenario where Italy’s gross debt to GDP rises a full 20 percentage points and the ratio of net interest payments to debt remains unchanged. The chart shows that while debt service will rise, it will still be lower than at any point prior to 2015. Chart 12Italy's Structural Budget Balance Has Improved Chart 13Italy's Debt Service Ratio Won't Go Up Much, If Yields Are Unchanged   So not only should Italy spend significantly more to combat the severely damaging nature of the pandemic, we would expect that Italian spreads would fall, not rise, in such an outcome.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 “Skeptical economists call Japan’s largest-ever stimulus package ‘puffed-up’, Keita Nakamura, The Japan Times, April 8, 2020. 2 Please note that Chart 3 differs somewhat from a chart that has been frequently shown by our Geopolitical Strategy service. Both charts are accurate; they simply employ different definitions of the fiscal response to the pandemic. 3 Indeed, McConnell has already walked back his comments that states should consider bankruptcy. President Trump is constrained by the election, as are Senate Republicans, and the House Democrats control the purse strings. Hence more state and local funding is forthcoming. At best for the Republicans, there may be provisions to ensure it goes to the COVID-19 crisis rather than states’ unfunded pension obligations. See Geopolitical Strategy, “Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update),” April 24, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 School and work closure dates have been sources from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores  

Table 1 Following up from last week’s SPX dividend discount model (DDM) update, we complement our research with two additional ways of approximating the SPX fair value: EPS and multiple sensitivity analysis, and a forward equity risk premium (ERP) analysis. The results are summarized in Tables 1 & 2. As a reminder, our DDM resulted in a 3,000 SPX fair value estimate, closely aligned with the forward ERP and sensitivity analyses. Consequently, we remain comfortable with our SPX 3,000 target, as well as with our view that the path of least resistance is higher for the SPX on a 9-12 month cyclical time horizon. For a more detailed discussion on the assumptions behind our twin analyses please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report. Table 2