アジア

Highlights Rising CO2 emissions on the back of stronger global energy growth this year will keep energy markets focused on expanding ESG risks in the buildout of renewable generation via metals mining (Chart of the Week).   EM energy demand is expected to grow 3.4% this year vs. 2019 levels and will account for ~ 70% of global energy demand growth.  Demand in DM economies will fall 3% this year vs 2019 levels.  Overall, global demand is expected to recover all the ground lost to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the IEA.  Rising energy demand will be met by higher fossil-fuel use, with coal demand increasing by more than total renewables generation this year and accounting for more than half of global energy demand growth. Demand for renewable power will increase by 8,300 TWh (8%) this year, the largest y/y increase recorded by the IEA.  As renewables generation is built out, demand for bulks (iron ore and steel) and base metals will increase.1  Building that new energy supply will contribute to rising CO2, particularly in the renewables' supply chains. Feature Energy demand will recover much of the ground lost to the COVID-19 pandemic last year, according to the IEA.2 Most of this is down to successful rollouts of vaccination programs in systemically important economies – e.g., China, the US and the UK – and the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed to carry the global economy through the pandemic. The risk of further lockdowns and uncontrolled spread of variants of the virus remains high, but, at present, progress continues to be made and wider vaccine distribution can be expected. The IEA expects a global recovery in energy demand of 4.6% this year, which will put total demand at ~ 0.5% above 2019 levels. The global rebound will be led by EM economies, where demand is expected to grow 3.4% this year vs. 2019 levels and will account for ~ 70% of global energy demand growth. Energy demand in DM economies will fall 3% this year vs 2019 levels. Overall, global demand is expected to recover all the ground lost to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the IEA. Chart of the WeekGlobal CO2 Emissions Will Rebound Post-COVID-19 Coal demand will lead the rebound in fossil-fuel use, which is expected to account for more than total renewables demand globally this year, covering more than half of global energy demand growth. This will push CO2 emissions up by 5% this year. Asia coal demand – led by China's and India's world-leading coal-plant buildout over the past 20 years – will account for 80% of world demand (Chart 2). Chart 2China, India Lead Coal-Fired Generation Buildout Demand for renewable power will post its biggest year-on-year gain on record, increasing by 8,300 TWh (8%) this year. This increase comes at the back of roughly a decade of an increasing share of electricity from renewables globally (Chart 3). As renewables generation is built out, demand for bulks (iron ore and steel) and base metals will increase.3 Building that new energy supply will contribute to rising CO2, particularly in the renewables' supply chains. Chart 3Share of Electricity From Renewables Has Been Increasing ESG Risks Increase With Renewables Buildout Governments have pledged to invest vast sums of money into the green energy transition, to reduce fossil fuels consumption and deforestation, thus curbing temperature increases. In addition, banks have pledged trillions will be made available to support the buildout of renewable technologies over the coming years. The World Bank, under the most ambitious scenarios considered (IEA ETP B2DS and IRENA REmap), projects that renewables, will make up approximately 90% of the installed electricity generation capacity up to 2050. This analysis excludes oil, biomass and tidal energy. (Chart 4). Building these renewable energy sources will be extremely mineral intensive (Chart 5). Chart 4Renewables Potential Is Huge … While we have highlighted issues such as a lack of mining capex and decreasing ore grades in past research – both of which can be addressed by higher metals and minerals prices – the environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks posed by mining are equally important factors for investors, policymakers and mining companies to consider.4 The mining industry generally uses three principal sources of energy for its operations – diesel fuel (mostly in moving mined ore down the supply chain for processing), grid electricity and explosives. Of these three, diesel and electricity consumption contributes substantially to mining’s GHG emissions. In the mining stage, land clearing, drilling, blasting, crushing and hauling require a considerable amount of energy, and hence emit the highest amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Chart 5… As Are Its Mineral Requirements The Environmental Impact Of Mining Under the scenarios depicted in Chart 5, copper suppliers could be called on to produce approximately 21mm MT of the red metal annually between now and 2050, which is equivalent to a 7% annual increase of supplies vs. the 2017 reference year shown in the chart. Mining sufficient amounts of copper, a metal which is critical to the renewable energy buildout, both in terms of quantity and versatility, will test miners' and governments' ability to extract sufficient amounts of ore for further processing without massively damaging the environment or indigenous populations' habitats (Chart 6). Chart 6Copper Spans All Renewables Technologies A recent risk analysis of 308 undeveloped copper orebodies found that for 180 of the orebodies – roughly equivalent to 570mm MT of copper – ore-grade risk was characterized as moderate-to-high risk.5 High risk implies a lower concentration of metal in the ore deposits. Mining in ore bodies with lower copper grades will be more energy intensive, and thus will emit more greenhouse gases. Table 1 is a risk matrix of the 40 mines that have the most amount of copper tonnage in this analysis: 27 of these mines displayed in the matrix have a medium-to-high grade risk. Table 1Mining Risk Matrix Another analysis established a negative relationship between the ore-grade quality and energy consumption across mines for different metals and minerals.6 This paper found that, as ore grade depletes, the energy needed to extract it and send it along the supply chain for further processing is exponentially higher (Chart 7). Lastly, a recent examination found that in 2018, primary metals and mining accounted for approximately 10% of the total greenhouse gases. Using a case study of Chile, the world’s largest producer of the red metal, the researchers found that fuel consumption increased by 130% and electricity consumption per unit of mined copper increased by 32% from 2001 to 2017. This increase was primarily due to decreasing ore grades.7 As ore grades continue to fall, these exponential relationships likely will persist or become more significant. Chart 7Energy Use Rises As Ore Quality Falls Bottom Line: While technology can improve extraction, it cannot reduce the minimum energy required for the mining process. This increased energy use will contribute to the total amount of CO2 and other GHGs emitted in the process of extracting the ores required to realize a low-carbon future. Trade-Off Between CO2 Emissions And Economic Development A recent Reuters analysis highlights the gap between EM and DM from the perspective of their renewable energy transition priorities.8 Of the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), “Taking action to combat climate change” takes precedence over the rest for DM economies. This is largely because they have already dealt with other energy and income intensive SDGs such as improvements in healthcare and poverty reduction. The large scale of unmet energy demand in developing countries poses a huge challenge to controlling CO2 emissions. The populations of these countries are growing fast and are projected to continue increasing over the next three decades. Rising populations, make the issue of a "green-energy transition" extremely dynamic – i.e., not only do EM economies need to replace existing fossil fuels, but they also need to add enough extra zero-emission fuel sources to meet the growth in energy demand. Bottom Line: Coupled with the increased amount of energy required to mine the same amount of metal (due to lower ore grades), rising energy demand resulting from a burgeoning population in EM economies - which use fossil fuels to meet their primary needs - will require more metals to be mined for the renewable energy transition. This will further increase the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from mine activity, and increase the risk to indigenous populations living close-by to the sources of this new metals supply. ESG risks will increase as a result, presenting greater challenges to attracting funding to these efforts.   Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 was expected to stick with its decision to return ~ 2mm b/d of supply to the market at its ministerial meeting Wednesday. Markets remain wary of demand slowing as COVID-19-induced lockdowns persist and case counts increase globally. The production being returned to market includes 1mm b/d of voluntary cuts by Saudi Arabia, which could, if needs be, keep barrels off the market if demand weakens. Base Metals: Bullish Front-month COMEX copper is holding above $4.50/lb, after breaching its 11-year high earlier this week. The proximate cause of the initial lift above that level was news of a strike by Chilean port workers on Monday protesting restrictions on early pension-fund drawdowns, according to mining.com. After a slight breather, prices returned to trading north of $4.50/lb by mid-week. Last week, we raised our Dec21 COMEX copper price forecast to $5.00/lb from $4.50/lb. Separately, high-grade iron ore (65% Fe) hit record highs, while the benchmark grade (62% Fe) traded above $190/MT earlier in the week on the back of lower-than-expected production by major suppliers and USD weakness. Steel futures on the Shanghai Futures Exchange hit another record as well, as strong demand and threats of mandated reductions in Chinese steel output to reduce pollution loom (Chart 8). Precious Metals: Bullish Rising COVID cases, especially in India, Brazil and Japan are increasing gold’s safe-haven appeal (Chart 9). The US CFTC, in its Commitment of Traders (COT) report for the week ending April 20, stated that speculators raised their COMEX gold bullish positions. At the end of the two-day FOMC meeting, the Fed decided against lifting interest rates and withdrawing support for the US economy. However, officials sounded more optimistic about the economy than they did in March. The decision did not give any sign interest rates would be lifted, or asset purchases would be tapered against the backdrop of a steadily improving economy.  Net, this could increase demand for gold, as inflationary pressures rise. As of Tuesday’s close, COMEX gold was trading at $1778/oz. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn and bean futures settled down by mid-week after a sharp rally earlier. After rising to a new eight-year high just below $7/bushel due to cold weather in the US, and fears a lower harvest in Brazil will reduce global grain supplies, corn settled down to ~ $6.85/bu at mid-week trading. Beans traded above $15.50/bu earlier in the week, their highest since June 2014, and settled down to ~ $15.36/bu by mid-week. Attention remains focused on global supplies. The uptrend in grains and beans remains intact. Chart 8 Chart 9   Footnotes 1     Please see Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand, published 26 November 2020, for further discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Global Energy Review 2021, the IEA's Flagship report for April 2021. 3    Please see Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand, published 26 November 2020, for further discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    We discussed these capex issues in last week's research, Copper Headed Higher On Surge In Steel Prices, which is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Please see Valenta et al.’s ‘Re-thinking complex orebodies: Consequences for the future world supply of copper’ published in 2019 for this analysis. 6    Please see Calvo et. al.’s ‘Decreasing Ore Grades in Global Metallic Mining: A Theoretical Issue or a Global Reality?’ published in 2016 for this analysis. 7     Please see Azadi et. al.’s ‘Transparency on greenhouse gas emissions from mining to enable climate change mitigation’ published in 2020 for this analysis. 8    Please see John Kemp's Column: CO2 emission limits and economic development published 19 April 2021 by reuters.com.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Developed economies continue to transition towards a post-pandemic state. Europe has further to go, but it is lagging the US at a constant rate and is thus merely delayed – not on a different path. This ongoing transition is also reflected in the global macro data, which continues to surprise to the upside. Widespread optimism about the outlook for economic activity and earnings over the coming year has led some investors to ask whether an imminent peak in the rate of growth could be a potentially negative inflection point for richly valued risky asset prices. Using our global leading economic indicator as a guide, we find that a peak in growth momentum in and of itself is not likely to be enough of a catalyst for meaningful risky asset underperformance versus government bonds. A sizeable shock to sentiment would likely be required, causing either a very serious growth slowdown, outright fears of recession, or some other event that negatively impacts earnings growth or raises the equity risk premium (“ERP”). We can identify several candidates for such a shock, including the emergence of new, vaccine-resistant variants of COVID-19, the impact of higher taxes on earnings, overtightening in China, and a potentially hawkish shift in monetary policy in the developed world. But none of these risks individually appears to be likely enough to warrant reducing cyclical portfolio exposure. We continue to expect positive absolute single-digit returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months, and would recommend that investors remain overweight stocks versus bonds in a multi-asset portfolio. We remain overweight global ex-US equities vs. the US, but expect that euro area stocks will have to do the heavy lifting, driven either by the underperformance of global technology stocks or the outperformance of euro area financials. Within a fixed-income portfolio, we recommend a modestly short duration stance, but do so primarily on a risk-adjusted basis. Feature Chart I-1Europe Is Behind The US, But On The Same Path Over the past month, developed economies have continued to transition towards a post-pandemic state. While the number of new confirmed COVID-19 cases remains relatively high on a per capita basis in the US and Europe, there continues to be significant progress on the vaccination front in all Western advanced economies. Europe continues to lag the US and the UK in terms of the share of the population that has received at least one dose of vaccine, but Chart I-1 highlights that the gap has remained constant at approximately six weeks (to the US). Panel 2 of Chart I-1 highlights that the US and UK both experienced either falling or a stable number of new cases once the number of first doses reached current European levels; Israel required significant further gains in the breadth of vaccinations before it altered COVID-19’s transmission dynamics in that country, but this appears to have occurred because of a much higher pace of spread earlier this year. The negative impact on advanced economies from reduced services activity is strongly linked to pandemic control measures (such as stay-at-home orders, curfews, forced business closures, etc). We have argued that, outside of the US, the implementation and removal of these measures is being driven by the impact of the pandemic on the medical system, rather than the sheer number of new cases and deaths. Chart I-2 highlights that, based on this framework, Europe still has further to go – current per capita hospitalizations remain much higher in France and Italy than in the US, UK, or Canada. But the nature of the disease means that hospitalizations begin to fall even if case counts remain relatively stable, and fall rapidly once new cases trend lower. Given the steady gains that European countries are making in providing first vaccine doses to their populations, it seems likely that hospitalizations there will peak sometime in the coming four to six weeks. This underscores that Europe is not on a different path than that of the US, it is simply further behind in the process (and will ultimately catch up). The transition towards a post-pandemic state is also reflected in the global macro data, which continues to positively surprise in all three major economies (Chart I-3). In Europe, the April services PMI rose back above the 50 mark, April consumer confidence surprised to the upside, and February retail sales came in better than expected (Table I-1). In the US, the March services PMI was also very strong, the labor market continued to meaningfully improve, and several measures of inflation surprised to the upside. Chart I-2Euro Area Hospitalizations Remain High, But Will Soon Decline Chart I-3The Macro Data Continues To Positively Surprise   Table I-1Services PMIs And The Labor Market Continue To Meaningfully Improve Chart I-4China's Current Contribution To Global Demand Is Strong In China, the recent tick higher in the surprise index likely reflects the recognition of some data series whose release was delayed due to the Chinese New Year, as well as significant base effects (compared with Q1 2020) in many data series recorded in year-over-year terms. On a quarter-over-quarter basis, Chinese economic activity decelerated last quarter to 0.6% from the upwardly revised 3.2% in Q4 2020 – which was below the anticipated 1.4% q/q. Still, Chinese RMB-denominated import growth closely matches (lagging) data on global exports to China (in US$ terms), with the former suggesting that China’s current contribution to global external demand remains strong (Chart I-4). This is also consistent with rising producer prices, which had fallen back into deflationary territory last year (panel 2). Peaking Growth Momentum: Should Investors Be Worried? The continued increase in the number of vaccine doses administered, positive data surprises, and bullish global growth forecasts for this year have understandably led to extremely optimistic investor sentiment. It has also naturally raised the question of “what could go wrong?”, with some investors pointing to an imminent peak in the rate of growth as a potentially negative inflection point for richly valued risky asset prices. Chart I-5 addresses this question by examining 12 episodes of waning growth momentum since 1990, defined as an identifiable peak in our global leading economic indicator. Panel 2 shows the 12-month rate of change in the relative performance of global equities versus a US$-hedged 7-10 year global Treasury index. Chart I-5Is Peaking Growth Momentum A Risk For Stocks? At first blush, the chart does support the notion that a peak in growth momentum is generally negative for risky asset prices. The subsequent 12-month relative return from stocks versus bonds following a peak in the LEI has been negative in 8 out of the 12 episodes, suggesting that the risks of an equity correction are currently quite elevated. However, there is more to the story than this simple calculation implies (Table I-2). First, two of the twelve episodes saw the global LEI peak in the context of an eventual US recession, so it is not surprising that stocks underperformed bonds in those episodes. Second, out of the six non-recessionary episodes, only two of them involved significant underperformance, in 2002 and in 2015. Table I-2Peak Growth Momentum Is An Insufficient Catalyst For Equity Underperformance US equities underperformed in the former case because of the persistently damaging impact of corporate excesses that built up during the dot-com bubble, and predominantly global ex-US equities underperformed bonds in the latter case because of a combination of the significant impact on global CAPEX from the 2014 dollar and oil price shock, as well as a major decline in global bond yields. In the four other non-recessionary examples of equity underperformance, stocks only modestly underperformed bonds, and often this occurred in the context of significant events: surprising Fed hawkishness in 1994, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, a major slowdown in China in 2013, and the combination of a domestically-driven Chinese economic slowdown coupled with the Sino/US trade war in 2017/2018. The key point for investors is that a peak in growth momentum is in and of itself not enough of a catalyst for meaningful risky asset underperformance versus government bonds. A sizeable shock to sentiment would likely be required, causing either a very serious growth slowdown, outright fears of recession, or some other event that negatively impacts earnings growth or raises the equity risk premium (“ERP”). What Else Could Go Wrong? There are four other plausible risks that we can identify to a bullish stance towards risky assets over the coming 6-12 months. We discuss each of these risks below. New COVID-19 Variants Chart I-6 highlights that bottom up analysts expect global earnings per share to be 12% higher than their pre-pandemic level in 12-months’ time. This expectation is driven by extraordinarily easy fiscal and monetary policy, but also the view that vaccination against COVID-19 will allow social distancing policies to end and services activity to fully recover. However, as India is clearly – and tragically – demonstrating at present, the emerging world is lagging in terms of vaccinating its population. India’s per capita case count has soared (Chart I-7), which is surprising given that the country’s COVID-19 infection rate has been significantly below that of more advanced economies over the past year. It is therefore likely that India’s case count explosion is due to new variants of the disease, and periodic outbreaks in less developed countries – as well as vaccine hesitancy in more developed economies – risks the emergence of even newer variants that may be partially or substantially vaccine-resistant. Chart I-6Earnings Expectations Already Price In A Normalization In Services Activity Chart I-7India's COVID-19 Situation Is Tragic, And Concerning   New variants of COVID-19 may prove to be less deadly, but the economic impact of the pandemic has come mainly from its potential to collapse the medical system via high rates of serious illness requiring hospitalization, not strictly from its lethality. As such, potentially new vaccine-resistant variants of the disease resulting in similar or higher rates of hospitalization pose a risk to a bullish economic outlook. Taxation Both corporate and individual tax rates are set to rise in the US over the coming 12-18 months which, at first blush, could certainly qualify as a non-recessionary event that negatively impacts earnings or raises the ERP. Corporate taxes are set to rise first as part of the American Jobs Plan, which our political strategists have argued will probably take the Biden administration most of this year to pass. The plan involves a proposed increase in the domestic corporate income tax rate to 28% from 21%, a higher minimum tax on foreign profits, and a 15% minimum tax on “book income”. In addition, as part of the American Families Plan, Biden is proposing to increase the top marginal income tax rate for households earning $400,000 or more to 39.6% (from 37%), and to substantially increase the capital gains tax rate for those earning $1 million or more from a base rate of 20% to 39.6%. The 3.8% tax on investment income that funds Obamacare would be kept in place, which would bring the total capital gain tax rate to 43.4% for that income group. Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, made two points about higher corporate taxes in a recent report.1 First, he noted that the changes would likely result in an 8% decline in forward earnings if passed as currently proposed, but that various tax credits as well as opposition to a 28% corporate tax rate from Democratic Senator Joe Manchin would likely cap the impact at 5%. Second, he argued that the behavior of 12-month forward earnings and the performance of stocks that benefitted the most from President Trump’s corporate tax cuts suggest that very little impact from these changes has been priced in. Peter argued in his report that the effect of strong economic growth will likely offset the negative impact of higher taxes on earnings, and we are inclined to agree. Chart I-8 highlights that a 5% reduction in 12-month forward earnings would reduce the equity risk premium by roughly 20-25 basis points, which would not be disastrous on its own. Still, the fact that these changes have not been priced in means that corporate tax hikes could be a more meaningful driver of lower stock prices if the impact is ultimately larger than we currently expect or if the growth outlook suddenly shifts in a negative direction. In terms of changes to individual taxes, our sense is that the proposed increase in the capital gains tax rate is more significant than the modest proposed change to the top marginal income tax rate for higher-income households. For individuals earning $1 million or more, Chart I-9 highlights that the proposed change to the capital gains rate would bring it to the highest level seen since the late 1970s. Given the rich valuation of equities, it seems inconceivable that such a change would not trigger some short-term selling of equities to lock in long-term gains at lower tax rates. Chart I-8Higher Corporate Taxes Will Only Modestly Reduce the Equity Risk Premium Chart I-9Biden's Capital Gains Tax Proposal Would Lead To Some Selling Of Stocks...   But like upcoming changes to corporate taxes, we see the potential for higher taxes on wealthy individuals as a risk to the equity market and not as a likely driver of stock prices over a cyclical time horizon. First, our political strategists see 50/50 odds that the American Families Plan will be passed this year, meaning that short-term tax avoidance selling may be postponed until 2022. In addition, Chart I-10 highlights that over the longer term, the relationship between the maximum capital gains tax rate and the ERP is weak or nonexistent. The chart highlights that the perception of a positive relationship rests entirely on the second half of the 1970s, when the maximum capital gains tax rate was between 30-40%. However, it seems clear from the chart that the stagflationary environment of that period was responsible for a high ERP, as the capital gains rate fell from 1977 to 1982 without any significant decline in risk premia. It took until the end of the 1982 recession and the beginning of the structural disinflationary period for the equity risk premium to decline, suggesting that there is effectively no relationship between the two (and therefore no reason to believe that higher capital gains taxes will lead to sustained declines in stock market multiples). Chart I-10…But The Effect Would Not Likely Last Overtightening In China Chart I-11Leading Indicators Of China's Economy Are Pointing Down, Not Up Even though Chart I-4 highlighted that Chinese import demand is currently strong, we expect China’s growth impulse to weaken in the second half of the year. Chart I-11 highlights that our leading indicator for China’s Li Keqiang index has done a good job of predicting Chinese import growth, and the indicator is now in a clear downtrend. Panel 2 presents the components of the indicator, and shows that all three are trending lower. Monetary conditions are potentially rebounding from extremely weak levels (due to past deflation and a rise in the RMB versus the US dollar and other Asian currencies), but money supply and credit measures are deteriorating. Leading indicators for China’s economy are deteriorating because Chinese policymakers have already tightened liquidity conditions in response to the country’s rebound from the pandemic and following a surge in the credit impulse. The 3-month repo rate returned to pre-pandemic levels in the second half of last year (Chart I-12), and consequently the private sector credit impulse (particularly that of corporate bond issuance) fell despite robust medium-to-long term loan growth. Chart I-12Chinese Interest Rates Have Already Returned To Pre-COVID Levels We noted in our January report that China’s credit impulse has consistently followed a 3½-year cycle since 2010, and this year has been no different. This cycle is not exogenous or mystical; it has been caused by the repeated “oversteering” of activity by Chinese policymakers who frequently oscillate between the need to fight deflation and the strong desire to curb additional private sector leveraging. Our base case view is that policymakers will not accidentally overtighten the economy, and that the credit impulse will settle somewhere between late 2019 levels and the peak rate reached in the latter half of last year. But the risk of significant oversteering cannot be ruled out, and will likely remain a downcycle risk for investors for several years to come. A Hawkish Shift In Monetary Policy In Developed Markets Last week the Bank of Canada announced that it would taper its pace of government debt purchases from 4 billion to 3 billion CAD per week. The announcement was noteworthy for many investors, as it suggested that asset purchase reductions could also be announced by the Fed and other major central banks by the end of the second or third quarter. Many investors are sensitive to the tapering question because of what transpired during the “Taper Tantrum” episode of 2013. During an appearance before Congress in late May of that year, then Chair Ben Bernanke stated that the Fed could “step down” the pace of its asset purchases in the next few FOMC meetings if economic conditions continued to improve. The result was that 10-year Treasurys fell roughly 10% in total return terms over the subsequent three-month period. While stocks rallied in response to the growth-positive implications of the move, this occurred from a much higher ERP starting point than exists today. The risk, in the minds of some investors, is that tapering today could thus lead to a correction in stock prices. There are two counterpoints to this view. First, bonds have already sold off meaningfully over the past several months in response to a significant improvement in the economic outlook, and investors already expect the Fed to raise interest rates earlier than it is publicly forecasting. It is thus difficult to see how an announcement of tapering from the Fed would significantly alter the outlook for monetary policy over the coming 6-18 months. Chart I-13Another Taper Tantrum-Like Selloff Would Necessitate Higher Expectations For R-star Second, it is notable that the “Taper Tantrum” began at yield levels at the front end of the curve that are roughly similar to what prevails today. 5-year/5-year forward bond yields stood at roughly 3% at the beginning of the “Tantrum”, compared with 2.3% today. Chart I-13 highlights how high forward bond yields would need to rise in order to generate another selloff of similar magnitude from 10-year Treasury yields (roughly 3.65%). In our view, a rise to this level over the coming year is essentially impossible without a major shift in investor expectations about the natural rate of interest. We highlighted the risk of such a shift in last month’s report,2 but for now it would likely necessitate hard evidence of little-to-no permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic. This is not our base case view, but it will be an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Investment Conclusions As noted above, there are several identifiable risks to a bullish outlook for risky assets, but none of these risks individually appear to be likely. Given this, we continue to expect positive absolute single-digit returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months, and would recommend that investors remain overweight stocks versus bonds in a multi-asset portfolio. We favor value versus growth stocks, cyclical versus defensive sectors, and small versus large cap stocks, although there is more return potential over the coming year in value versus growth than the latter two positions. We also remain short the US dollar over a cyclical time horizon. Within a global equity portfolio, we remain overweight global ex-US equities vs the US, but this position has moved against us over the past two months. Chart I-14 highlights that global ex-US equities have given back all of their October – January gains versus US equities, most of which has occurred since late-February. The chart also highlights that all of this underperformance has been driven by emerging market stocks, as euro area equity performance has been mostly stable year-to-date. Chart I-15 highlights that EM underperformance has occurred both in the broadly-defined tech sector as well as when measured in ex-tech terms. To us, this suggests that EM stocks are responding to the deterioration in leading indicators for the Chinese economy that we noted above, which implies that they are not likely to lead global ex-US equity performance higher over the course of the year barring an imminent shift in Chinese policy. We continue to expect that euro area stocks will have to do the heavy lifting, driven either by the underperformance of global technology stocks or the outperformance of euro area financials – which are extremely cheap relative to US banks and have much further scope for earnings to normalize as the pandemic draws to a close. Chart I-14Emerging Markets Have Caused Global Ex-US Stocks To Underperform Chart I-15EM's Underperformance Has Been Broad-Based   As a final point, investors should note that we are recommending a modestly short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio, but that we make this recommendation primarily on a risk-adjusted basis. Chart I-16 highlights that Treasury market excess returns (relative to cash) have historically been driven by whether the Fed funds rate increases by more or less than what is currently priced into the market. Over the past 12 months, the Treasury index has very substantially underperformed cash without a hawkish surprise, and the rate path that is currently implied by the OIS curve is already more hawkish than the Fed is (for now) projecting. On this basis, a neutral duration stance could be justified, but we would still prefer a modestly short duration stance due to the risk of a potential increase in investor expectations for the neutral rate of interest late this year or in early 2022. Chart I-16Policy Rate Surprises Tend To Drive The Duration Call Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst April 29, 2021 Next Report: May 27, 2021   II. In COVID’s Wake: Government Debt And The Path Of Interest Rates The US fiscal outlook has deteriorated substantially over the past two decades, as a consequence of the fiscal response to both the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. US government debt-to-GDP is now nearly as high as it was at the end of the Second World War, and is projected by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to explode higher over the coming 30 years. Some investors argue that extreme levels of government debt now virtually guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, and we test this claim alongside a scenario that limits the projected rise in the primary deficit. We find that US fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will likely be negative for health care stocks. We also note that even in a scenario where the US limits the size of its future primary budget deficit, net interest outlays will likely rise to elevated levels compared to history. A comparison with the Canadian experience in the 1990s suggests a structurally negative outlook for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point. Finally, we note that the US fiscal outlook does not necessarily prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in a scenario where investors raise their expectations for the neutral rate of interest, a possibility that we discussed in last month’s report. This scenario is not our base case view, but it is plausible and should actively be monitored by investors over the coming one to two years. For now, we do not expect that rising interest rates pose a risk to stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Investors should remain cyclically overweight equities within a multi-asset portfolio, and should maintain a below-benchmark level of duration on a risk-adjusted basis. In 2001, US government debt held by the public as a share of GDP stood at 31.5%, after having fallen roughly 16 percentage points from early 1993 levels. Today, as a result of both the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the debt to GDP ratio has risen to a whopping 100%, and is projected to rise meaningfully higher over the coming decades. In this report we review the long-term US fiscal outlook in the wake of the pandemic, with a focus on the implications for interest rates. Some investors argue that extreme levels of government debt now virtually guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, and we test this claim alongside a scenario that limits the projected rise in the primary deficit. We find that US fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will likely be negative for health care stocks, whose fundamental performance has outstripped that of the broad equity market since the mid-1990s (reflecting pricing power that stands to be curtailed through regulation). We also note that even in a scenario where the US limits the size of its future primary budget deficit, net interest outlays will likely rise to elevated levels compared to history. A comparison with the Canadian experience in the 1990s suggests a structurally negative outlook for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point. Finally, we note that the US fiscal outlook does not necessarily prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in the hypothetical scenario that we described in last month’s report,3 i.e., an environment where the narrative of secular stagnation is challenged and investor expectations for the neutral rate rise closer to trend rates of economic growth. This scenario is not our base case view, but it is plausible and should actively be monitored by investors over the coming one to two years. For now, investors should remain cyclically overweight equities within a multi-asset portfolio, and should maintain a below-benchmark level of duration on a risk-adjusted basis. Debt Sustainability, And The CBO’s Baseline Projection When analyzing the US fiscal outlook, the Congressional Budget Office’s Long-Term Budget Outlook report is typically the reference point for investors. The report provides annual projections for the budget deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio for the next three decades, as well as a breakdown of the projected deficit into its primary (i.e., non-interest) and net interest components. Charts II-1 and II-2 present the most recent baseline projections from the CBO, which clearly present a dire long-term outlook. The deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio are projected to be relatively stable over the next decade, but explode higher over the subsequent 20 years. In 2051, the CBO’s baseline projects that the budget deficit will be roughly 13% of GDP, with net interest costs accounting for approximately two-thirds of the deficit. Chart II-1The CBO’s Fiscal Outlook Is Extremely Negative Chart II-2In 2051, The CBO Projects A 13% Annual Budget Deficit In order to understand what is driving the CBO’s dire long-term budget and debt forecast, it is important to review the government debt sustainability equation shown below. The equation highlights that the change in a government’s debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately equal to 1) the primary deficit plus 2) net interest costs as a share of GDP, the latter being defined as the product of last year’s debt-to-GDP ratio and the difference between the average interest rate on the debt and the rate of GDP growth. Δ Debt-To-GDP Ratio ≈ Primary Deficit As A % Of GDP4 + (r-g)*(Prior Period Debt-To-GDP Ratio) Where: r = Average interest rate on government debt and g = Nominal GDP growth The equation highlights that expectations of a persistently rising debt-to-GDP ratio must occur either because of expectations of a persistent primary deficit, or expectations that interest rates will persistently exceed the rate of economic growth (or some combination of the two). This underscores why debt sustainability analysis often focuses on the primary budget balance, as a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio will be stable if no primary deficit exists and interest costs are at or below the prevailing rate of economic growth. Chart II-3 illustrates the source of the CBO’s projected rise in debt-to-GDP beyond 2031, by presenting the two components of the debt sustainability equation alongside the projected annual change in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The chart makes it clear that while the CBO is forecasting a sizeable primary deficit to continue, it is projected to grow at a slower pace than the debt-to-GDP ratio itself. The increasing rate at which the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to grow in the latter years of the CBO’s forecast period is clearly driven by the interest rate component, meaning that “r” is projected to be greater than “g”. Chart II-4 presents this point directly, by highlighting that the CBO is forecasting the average interest rate on government debt to exceed that of nominal GDP growth in 2038, and to continue to exceed growth (by an increasing amount) thereafter. Chart II-3Decomposing The CBO's Projected Change In The Debt-To-GDP Ratio Chart II-4The CBO's Projections Rest, In Part, On Rates Eventually Exceeding Growth   Three Adjustments To The CBO’s Baseline We make three adjustments to the CBO’s baseline in order to assess how the US fiscal outlook shifts under an interest rate path that is different than that projected by the CBO. First, we adjust the CBO’s projected budget deficit over the coming few years based on deficit forecasts from our US Political Strategy service following the passage of the American Recovery Plan act.5 Chart II-5We Test The Effect Of An Initially Higher, But More Sustainable, Rate Path Next, we adjust the interest component of the total budget deficit based on a new path for short- and long-term interest rates that models a scenario in which the neutral rate of interest rises to, but not above, GDP growth (Chart II-5). In last month’s report we outlined a scenario in which this could feasibly occur,3 and the hypothetical path for interest rates shown in Chart II-5 thus incorporates both the negative budgetary impact of an earlier rise in interest rates and the positive budgetary impact of “r” never rising above “g”. We explicitly exclude any crowding out effect on long-term interest rates, based on the view that term premia are likely to remain muted in a world of low potential economic growth, unless a fiscal crisis appears to be imminent (see Box II-1). Box II-1 Arguing Against The CBO’s Crowding Out Assumption The CBO’s projection that interest rates will ultimately rise above the rate of economic growth rests on the view that increased government spending will absorb savings that would otherwise finance private investment (a “crowding out” effect). We agree that crowding out can occur over the course of the business cycle, especially in a scenario where increased government spending pushes output above its potential (creating a cyclical acceleration in inflation and eventually an increase in interest rates). But the CBO is assuming that high government debt-to-GDP ratios will crowd out private investment on a structural basis, and on this basis we disagree. First, Chart Box II-1 highlights that there is essentially no empirical relationship across countries between a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio and its long-term government bond yield. Japan is a clear outlier in the chart, but including Japan implies that the relationship is negative, not positive. Chart Box II-1There Is No Empirical Relationship Between Debt-To-GDP And Interest Rates In addition, given that central banks directly control interest rates at the short-end of the curve, a structural crowding out effect can only manifest itself in the form of an elevated term premium embedded in longer-term government bond yields. Our bet is that term premia are likely to stay low in a world of low falling nominal growth, as evidenced by the experience of the past decade.6 Finally, we model the impact of two changes, beginning in 2031, that would work towards reducing the primary deficit: an increase in average government revenue to 20% of GDP (its peak level reached in 2000), and a slower pace of increase on major health care program spending. Despite the fact that population aging will increase mandatory spending on social security and health care over the coming three decades, the CBO has highlighted that the majority of the increase in spending towards these programs is projected to occur due to rising health care costs per person (Chart II-6). We thus model the impact of medical care cost control by limiting the rise in net mandatory outlays on health care programs between 2021 and 2051 to roughly half of what the CBO baseline projects. This adjustment does not prevent mandatory spending on health care programs from rising, given the strong political challenges involved in limiting spending increases that are caused by an aging population. Chart II-6The US Structural Primary Balance Is Heavily Impacted By Medical Costs Charts II-7 and II-8 illustrate how these three adjustments impact the long-term US fiscal outlook. Relative to the CBO’s baseline projections, the American Recovery Plan (ARP) budget deficit forecasts from our US Political Strategy service imply that the debt-to-GDP ratio will be approximately three to four percentage points higher over the very near term, and roughly ten points higher over the long term. Chart II-7Even With Higher Rates, The Fiscal Outlook Is Meaningfully Less Bad… Relative to this new baseline, an increase in interest rates to, but not above, the projected rate of nominal economic growth increases the debt-to-GDP ratio by an additional ten percentage points (20 points higher versus the CBO’s baseline) in the middle of the forecast period, but it lowers the debt-to-GDP ratio over the longer run by eliminating the effect of outsized interest rates magnifying a persistent primary deficit. Still, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise to a whopping 207% of GDP by 2051 in this scenario, with a budget deficit in excess of 10% of GDP. The third adjustment shown in Charts II-7 and II-8 underscores the impact on the US fiscal outlook of actions aimed at reducing the primary deficit. Increases in government revenue and the prevention of rising health care costs per person results in the debt-to-GDP ratio that is 64 percentage points lower in 2051 than in our normalized interest rate scenario. The budget deficit in this scenario still increases to approximately 6% of GDP thirty years from today, but in this case most of the deficit is due to the net interest component rather than the primary deficit, meaning that the debt-to-GDP ratio would be increasing at a much slower rate if interest rates were no higher than the rate of economic growth. Chart II-8 highlights that net interest spending in this scenario would rise to 4.5% of GDP, which would be meaningfully higher than the prior high of roughly 3% in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Chart II-8...With Higher Taxes And Medical Cost Control Chart II-9A Meaningful, But Not Unprecedented, Rise In Net Interest Outlays But that is far from unprecedented or necessarily consistent with a fiscal crisis. Chart II-9 also shows that Canada’s public debt charges rose to 6.5% of GDP in the early 1990s without triggering a public debt crisis. It is true that Canada subsequently embarked on a painful fiscal consolidation program in order to reduce its public debt burden, but this, in part, occurred because of a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of approximately 3% - twice as large as that projected for the US in 2051 in our adjusted scenario shown in Charts II-7 and II-8. Revenue And Health Care Cost Reform Our third adjustment to the CBO’s long-term budget outlook involved changes to revenue and health care cost control to reduce the US’ projected primary deficit. Are these adjustments achievable? In our view, the answer is yes: As noted above, our scenario modeled these changes taking place a decade from today, which allows for policymakers and stakeholders to have a substantial amount of time to act and adjust to these changes. On the revenue front, we noted above that US government revenue has reached 20% of GDP in the past, in the year 2000. Chart II-10 highlights that while raising taxes will likely reduce US competitiveness, the US maintains a sizeable tax advantage relative to other advanced economies, and that this was true prior to the tax cuts that took place under the Trump administration. On the health care cost front, Chart II-11 highlights that US healthcare expenditure is much larger as a share of GDP than other countries, which was not the case prior to the 1980s. Chart II-12 highlights that this cost difference is entirely due to inpatient (i.e., hospital) and outpatient (i.e., drug) costs. While it is not clear what form it will take, it seems likely that future reforms by policymakers to eliminate rising health care costs per person will occur and can be achieved. Chart II-10The US Government Can Afford To Raise Revenue Chart II-11The US Spends Much More On Health Care Than Other Countries   Chart II-12The US Significantly Outspends The World On Hospital And Drug Costs The key point for investors is not whether these changes should or should not occur, but whether there are any feasible scenarios in which spiraling government debt and interest payments are avoided without the Fed purposely maintaining monetary policy at levels persistently below the rate of economic growth – and thus risking major inflationary pressure. Our analysis above highlights that there are; the question is when policymakers will choose to act and in what form. A potential tipping point may be when US government spending on net interest as a % of GDP exceeds its prior high, which occurs in 2026 in the scenario modeled in Chart II-8. In a scenario where reforms fail to materialize or where financial markets force policymakers to act, a fiscal risk premium could certainly emerge in longer-term government bond yields, which could lead the Fed to maintain lower short-term interest rates than it otherwise would. But this scenario is only likely to emerge after interest rates converge towards rates of economic growth, as US government debt will remain highly serviceable for some time if "r" remains meaningfully lower than "g". Investment Conclusions There are three potential investment implications of our research. First, the fact that rising medical costs have such a significant impact on the CBO’s projections of the primary deficit implies that fiscal reform, when it eventually occurs, will be negative for US health care stocks. Chart II-13 highlights that US health care sector earnings have outperformed broad market earnings since the mid-1990s, and that the sector has consistently delivered an above-average return on equity. This historical performance likely reflects the sector’s pricing power, which stand to be curtailed through regulatory efforts in a world where rising health care costs per person collide with fiscal belt-tightening. Interestingly, Chart II-12 highlighted that US per capita spending on medical goods is not significantly higher than in other developed markets, suggesting that the health care equipment & supplies industry may fare better over a very long term time horizon than overall health care. Second, Charts II-7 and II-8 highlighted that even if the US does raise revenue as a share of GDP and limits excessive growth in medical costs, a primary deficit will still exist and net interest outlays will still rise to elevated levels compared to what has historically been the case. We noted that Canada experienced a higher public debt burden in the 1990s and did not suffer from a fiscal crisis, but Chart II-14 highlights that the fiscal situation did weigh on the Canadian dollar, which progressively traded 10-20% below its PPP-implied fair value level over the course of the 1990s. Thus, the implication is that eventual fiscal reform in the US may be structurally negative for the US dollar, from an overvalued starting point (panels 3 and 4 of Chart II-14). Chart II-13Eventual Fiscal Reform Will Likely Be Negative For Health Care Stocks Chart II-14The US Fiscal Outlook, Even With Some Reforms, Is Dollar-Negative   Finally, our scenario analysis highlights that very elevated levels of government debt do not guarantee that interest rates will remain structurally low, especially over the next decade when the US primary deficit is projected to remain relatively stable. For investors focused on forecasting the direction of 10-year Treasury yields from the perspective of valuation, it should be noted that the next decade is the relevant projection period for the Fed funds rate, not what occurs to net interest outlays in the two decades that follow. Over the very long run, it is true that there may ultimately be very strong political pressure on the Fed to keep interest rates below the prevailing rate of economic growth, as policymakers in 2030 will be able to avoid a structural adjustment to the primary deficit of roughly 1.1-1.3% of GDP for every percentage point that average interest rates on government debt are below nominal GDP growth. However, we noted above that this pressure is unlikely to build before the second half of this decade even in a scenario where interest rates rise significantly over the coming few years, and it remains an open questions whether the Fed will acquiesce to this pressure given its strong potential to fuel excess private sector leveraging. Over the coming one to two years, the key conclusion is that the US fiscal outlook is not likely to prevent an increase in interest rates over the coming few years in the hypothetical scenario that we described in last month’s report, i.e., an environment where the narrative of secular stagnation is challenged and investor expectations for the neutral rate rise closer to trend rates of economic growth. This remains a risk to our overweight stance towards risky assets and is not our base case view. But it does highlight the importance of monitoring long-dated rate expectations over the coming year, and argues, on a risk-adjusted basis, for a below-neutral duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but more modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields. The indicator remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain positive, and positive earnings surprises have risen to their strongest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, EM stocks have dragged down global ex-US performance, likely in response to deteriorating leading indicators for the Chinese economy. This implies that they are not likely to lead global ex-US equity performance higher over the course of the year barring an imminent shift in Chinese policy. We continue to expect that euro area stocks will have to do the heavy lifting, driven either by the underperformance of global technology stocks or the outperformance of euro area financials – which are extremely cheap relative to US banks and have much further scope for earnings to normalize as the pandemic draws to a close. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has edged lower over the past month, after having risen to levels that were extremely technically stretched. Despite this pause, our valuation index highlights that bonds are still expensive, and that yields could move higher over the cyclical investment horizon. We expect the rise to be more modest than our valuation index would imply, but we would still recommend a modestly short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. Commodity prices, particularly copper, lumber, and agricultural commodities, are screaming higher. This reflects bullish cyclical conditions, but also pandemic-induced supply shortages that are likely to wane later this year. Commodity prices are technically extended and sentiment is extremely bullish for most commodities, suggesting that a breather in commodity prices is likely at some point over the coming several months. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend, and global manufacturing PMIs are strong. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries (whose vaccination progress is lagging). Strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly later this year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME:   Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy "Taxing Woke Capital," dated April 16, 2021, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks," dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks," dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4 Presented in this fashion, a budget deficit (surplus) is recorded with a positive (negative) sign. 5 For more information, please see US Political Strategy report “Biden’s Pittsburgh Speech And Legislative Agenda,” dated April 1, 2021, available at usp.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see “Term premia: models and some stylised facts”, by Cohen, Hördahl, and Xia, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2008.

Highlights Clients countered our opinion that China’s economy has reached its cyclical peak. However, we have already incorporated the supporting facts into our analysis so they will not alter our cyclical outlook for the economy. The favorable external backdrop is a potential downside risk to China’s domestic economy, because the country’s pain threshold for reform is often positively correlated with global growth. We agree that an acceleration in local governments’ special-purpose bond issuance could boost infrastructure investment in the next six months, but we are skeptical about the magnitude of such support. China’s onshore and offshore stock markets remain firmly in a risk-off mode. For now, we recommend investors stay on the sidelines until some of the early indicators turn more bullish. Feature We spent the past week hosting virtual meetings with BCA’s clients in Europe and Asia. We presented our view that China’s economic recovery has likely peaked and escalating risks of a policy overtightening warrant an underweight position on Chinese stocks for the next six months. Most clients shared our concern that policymakers may keep financial and industry regulations more restrictive than the market is currently pricing in, leading to more downside surprises to risk asset prices. Clients also brought up a few opposing views which challenged our analytical framework. In this and next week’s reports we will highlight some of the counterpoints we discussed in these meetings. Interestingly, most of our clients - even ones who are more sanguine about China’s economic outlook - prefer to wait on the sidelines before jumping back into China’s equity market. They foresee sustained volatility in the coming months as the market continues to struggle between digesting high valuations and adjusting expectations for future earnings growth. Has China’s Economic Recovery Reached An Apex? The primary discussion centered around whether the strength in China’s economy has reached a cyclical peak. Q1 GDP points to slower sequential economic momentum from Q4 last year (Chart 1). Some of the high-frequency economic data also indicate that economic activity peaked in Q4 last year (Chart 2).  Chart 1Q1 Sequential Growth Was The Slowest In A Decade Chart 2Has Economic Activity Peaked? Chart 3Our Framework Suggests A Slower Growth Momentum Ahead The view fits perfectly into our analytical framework, which has worked well in the past decade. Historically, China’s credit formation has consistently led economic activity by about six to nine months. A turning point in the credit impulse occurred last October, which suggests that economic activity should start to slow in Q2 this year (Chart 3). However, our clients countered with the following arguments, which support a notion that sequential economic growth rate can still trend higher in the next six months: Aggregate demand in Europe and the US continues to improve, while the COVID-19 resurgence in major emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, has forced their production recoveries to pause. Thus, China’s exports will remain robust and should continue to make substantial contributions to the economy (Chart 4). Infrastructure spending could get a meaningful boost when local governments speed up issuing special-purpose bonds (SPB) in Q2 and Q3. Infrastructure investment growth was relatively weak in Q1, probably the result of a slower pace in credit growth and government expenditures (Chart 5). However, a delay in local government SPB issuance in Q1 this year means more support for infrastructure investment in the rest of the year (Chart 6). Chart 4Counterpoint #1: Chinese Exports Will Stay Strong   Chart 5Slower Credit Growth Led To A Subdued Q1 Infrastructure Investment Growth     Travel restrictions imposed during the Chinese New Year weighed heavily on the service sector in Q1 (Chart 7). If China’s domestic COVID-19 cases remain well controlled, then the trend could reverse and the pent-up demand for service consumption may usher in a significant improvement in Q2 when three major public holidays occur. The service sector accounts for more than half of China’s GDP, therefore, an improvement in this sector should significantly bolster future GDP growth. Chart 6Counterpoint #2: More LG SPBs, More Spending On Infrastructure Chart 7Counterpoint #3: Service Sector Activities Will Pick Up Our Analytical Framework The viewpoints expressed by clients have not changed our cyclical view of China’s economy, since our broad analysis of Chinese business cycle already incorporates the main points that clients raised. Additionally, data such as GDP growth figures are coincident and lagging indicators, and do not explain the direction of forward-looking financial markets. The authorities will shift their policy trajectories only if the data significantly deviate from expectations. We view Q1 GDP and underlying data broadly in line with Chinese leadership’s short- and medium-term economic growth targets and, therefore, will not lead to any policy adjustment. Chart 8If Demand For Chinese Exports Stays Strong, Reform Efforts Will Intensify To our clients’ point that strong exports ahead will support China’s overall GDP growth, we regard a favorable external backdrop as a potential downside risk to the domestic economy. The willingness of Chinese authorities to pursue painful reforms is often positively correlated with global growth (Chart 8). BCA has written extensively about how China has taken advantage of a stronger export sector by increasing the pace of domestic reforms and in the past has embarked on a multi-year reform plan that weighed on growth. At the beginning of this year, Chinese policymakers were set out to “keep credit growth in line with nominal GDP growth in 2021.” Nonetheless, policymakers’ targets for credit and nominal GDP growth rates could change during the year, contingent on their perception of the broad growth outlook and unemployment. Chart 9Both Credit And Economic Growth Rates Are Moving Targets And Subject To Policy Finetuning Even if policymakers keep the country’s leverage ratio steady in 2021, which is our base case view and assuming China’s nominal GDP grows by 11%, then the credit impulse (measured by the 12-month difference in total social financing as a percentage of GDP) will likely fall to about 28% of GDP, down from 32% of GDP in 2020 (Chart 9).  The rate of credit formation increased by 13.6% in the first three months from Q1 last year, above government’s target. We expect a further pullback in credit growth in the rest of the year, to bring the annual pace at or below 12%. Construction capex, which is sensitive to both credit creation and tightening regulations in the housing sector, will likely experience a slowdown. At more than 90% of GDP, China’s economy is mainly driven by domestic demand and a weakening in the domestic economy can more than offset positive contributions from a robust export sector. Infrastructure And Services We expect infrastructure investment will grow by 4-5% this year, which is in line with its rate of expansion in 2020. However, the sequential growth in the sector in Q2 – Q4 this year will be slower than during the same period in 2020 (Chart 10). We agree that a more concentrated issuance of local government SPBs in Q2 and Q3 could help to buttress infrastructure investment. However, SPBs made up only about 15% of overall infrastructure spending in the past three years, so we are dubious that SPBs can provide the crucial support. The rest of the gap for local governments to finance their spending on infrastructure projects will need to be filled through public-private partnerships (PPP) financing, government-managed funds’ (GMFs) revenues, government budgets and bank loans. Note that only non-household medium- and long-term (MLT) bank lending showed a positive impulse so far (Chart 11). While not all of MLT loans are used for infrastructure, they have a positive correlation with investments in infrastructure projects which are generally long term in nature. Chart 10Sequential Growth In Infrastructure Investment Will Be Slower Than In Q2 – Q4 Last Year Chart 11MLT Bank Loans Have Been Supportive To Infrastructure Spending... On the other hand, the contribution of PPPs to total infrastructure spending has been plunging in recent years due to tighter regulations aimed at controlling increased risks related to local government debt (Chart 12). Depressed revenues from land sales and extended corporate tax cuts this year will also curb the ability of local governments to finance infrastructure projects (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Public-Private Partnerships Have Become Too Small To Fill The Financing Gap Chart 13Government-Managed Funds Also Face Headwinds From Falling Land Sales Finally, although the service sector accounts for 54% of China’s GDP (2019 statistic), transport, retail and accommodation, which were hardest hit by COVID-19, accounted for less than 30% of China’s tertiary GDP. This compares with a slightly larger share of tertiary GDP from finance- and housing-related sectors (financial intermediation, leasing & business services, and real estate) –the sectors that have been thriving since the second half of last year when both the equity and housing markets boomed (Chart 14). Nonetheless, it is unreasonable to expect these areas to strengthen even more in an environment where the policy has shifted to contain risks in the financial and housing arenas. The net result to tertiary GDP growth is that the deterioration in finance- and real estate-related segments will likely offset an improvement in transport, retail and accommodation. Chart 14More Than 70% Of China’s Services Sector Is Finance And Real Estate Related Investment Conclusions The ultimate question we got from almost every client meeting was: What would make us turn bullish on Chinese stocks in the next 6 to 12 months?  Chart 15Changes In Domestic Policy Dominate Chinese Stock Performance Since most monthly and quarterly economic data do not provide enough market-moving catalysts, we rely on our assessment of the changes in policy direction, such as interbank liquidity conditions and excess reserves, in addition to overall credit growth (Chart 15). We will also continue to watch for the following signs before upgrading our tactical and cyclical calls from underweight to overweight: Chart 16 shows that cyclical stocks remain depressed relative to defensives in both onshore and offshore markets, underscoring investors’ concerns about China’s economy. A breakout in cyclicals versus defensives would signify a major improvement in investor sentiment towards policy support and economic growth. A technical breakdown in the performance of healthcare and utility stocks relative to investable stocks would be another bullish indicator (Chart 17). These equities have historically led China’s economic activity, core inflation and stock prices by one to three months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would signify that market participants anticipate a meaningful economic upturn in China.   Chart 16Waiting For A Telltale Sign... Chart 17...Before Upgrading Chinese Stocks   Given that the above mentioned indicators remain firmly in a risk-off mode, we maintain our view that China’s economy has reached its peak, and policy has tightened meaningfully. Our cyclical underweight position on Chinese stocks, in both absolute terms and within a global portfolio, is warranted.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

ハイライト 中国の鋼材需要の急増を受け、建築およびインフラプロジェクトが今年完了するにつれて上海鉄鋼先物が今月初めに5,200人民元/MT弱の史上高近くまで上昇したことから、銅価格はさらに上昇すると見込まれます（今週のチャート）。 銅は今年および来年にかけて実需ベースでの需給不足を記録し、在庫がさらに減少するとともに中国および世界的に銅スクラップの需要を押し上げるでしょう。 銅価格の上昇が続けば、現在の市場での口先介入が需要と価格上昇を抑えられない場合、中国の膨大な国家保有銅在庫（約200万MTと推定される）の一部を当局が放出する可能性があります。 強い鋼材マージンと製鉄所に対する新たな環境規制が高品位鉄鉱石（65% Fe）需要を押し上げており、同品は今週初めに約223ドル/MT弱の史上高を付けました。ベンチマークの鉄鉱石価格（62% Fe）は今週10年ぶり高値で取引され、約190ドル/MT手前でした。 当社は2021年12月の銅価格予想を4.50ドル/lbから5.00ドル/lbに引き上げます。さらに、本日の取引終了時に2022年物CME/COMEX銅をロングし、2023年物CME/COMEX銅をショートするポジションを取ります。より急峻なバックワーデーションを見込んでの取組みです。 特集 中国の唐山（Tangshan）製鉄拠点における汚染削減のための製鉄所稼働率の最大30%削減という政府指示は、建設およびインフラのブームに対応する既に逼迫した市場をさらに引き締めることになります（チャート2）。このブームは鋼材価格、そして結果的に鉄鉱石価格を急騰させました（チャート3）。過去と同様に、これが銅の強気相場の次の局面の舞台を整えます。 今週のチャート 鋼材の急騰が銅価格の更なる上昇を予告 鉄鋼の急騰は銅価格のさらなる上昇を示唆する 鉄鋼の急騰は銅価格のさらなる上昇を示唆する 当社のモデルでは、特に鉄筋（リバー）価格と銅価格の間に強い関係があることが今週のチャートで確認できます。鋼材は建築・インフラプロジェクトの前段階で使われ（鉄筋で補強されたコンクリートや圧延コイル製品など）、その後、完成したプロジェクトには銅が使われます（配線や配管の形で）。 チャート2 銅の強気相場は続く 銅の強気相場は続く 銅の強気相場は続く 建設・建築ブームに加え、製造業の継続的な回復が銅価格の追い風となり、2021年後半の世界的な活動回復がこれをさらに増幅します。チャート4は名目GDP水準と銅価格の関係を示しています。重要なのは、アジア（中国を含む）およびアジア以外の経済成長が銅価格とコインテグレーション（共積分）関係にあることで、すなわち経済成長と工業コモディティは長期的な均衡を共有しており、それが同時変動を説明します。 チャート3 鋼材ブームが鉄鉱石価格を押し上げる 鉄鋼ブームが鉄鉱石価格を押し上げる 鉄鋼ブームが鉄鉱石価格を押し上げる メディア報道はしばしば、中国の政府支出をGDP比で注目しがちです（例：社会融資総額のGDP比）。しかし商品価格動向を説明しようとする際に経済要因が除外されがちです。中国政府が民間部門（財・サービス面）をさらに拡大することに成功すれば、オーガニックな経済成長が中国のコモディティ需要を説明する上でより重要になります。 チャート4 世界経済の成長が銅価格を押し上げる 世界的な経済成長が銅価格を押し上げる 世界的な経済成長が銅価格を押し上げる 当社の銅モデルでは、名目中国GDP、新興アジア（EMアジア）GDPおよびアジア以外の新興国（EM）GDPに加え、鋼材と鉄鉱石価格が銅価格と共積分関係にあることが分かります。これは純粋な経済学的観点から期待される結果です。一方で、これらの工業用コモディティ価格と中国の名目GDPに対する社会融資総額の割合との間には共積分関係（経済的な共動性や共通トレンド）は見られません。これらのモデルにより、銅価格の説明や予測に役立たない偽の関係を回避できます。 チャート5 鉄鉱石・銅の需要はグリーン・エネルギーの整備で増加する 鉄鋼価格の急騰で銅が上昇 鉄鋼価格の急騰で銅が上昇 チャート6 再生可能エネルギーが新規増分発電を主導 銅、鉄鋼価格の急騰を受け上昇へ 銅、鉄鋼価格の急騰を受け上昇へ 長期的には、当社が過去の調査報告で指摘してきたように、分散型再生可能発電の導入、よりレジリエントな電力網、電気自動車（EV）への移行は、鉄鉱石や鋼材といったばら積み需要、および特に銅のようなベースメタルの需要成長の主要な源泉となります（チャート5）。1 すでに再生可能エネルギーは、世界の電力網に追加される新規増分発電の中で最も高い成長セグメントを占めています（チャート6）。 銅供給の増加にはより高い価格が必要 銅供給は短期（2022年末まで）では需要に対応するのが困難であり、再生可能エネルギーとEVの整備は大半がこれから始まる段階にあります。つまり中期（2025年末まで）および長期（2050年）において、需要を満たすためにはかなりの新供給を開発する必要があります。 短期的には、精錬銅の供給面、特に製錬所が半精製品として精製し製造入力にする凝縮物（コンデンセート）レベルが極めて低下しており、中国の製錬所におけるトリートメント料・精製料（TC/RC）の長期的な急落からも確認できます（チャート7）。先週およそ22ドル/MTで、これらの手数料は2013年に中国でのベンチマークTC/RC指数が開始されて以来の最低水準でした（reuters.comによる）。2 チャート7 供給減少で銅のTC/RCが低下、価格を押し上げる 銅のTCRCsが供給減で下落し、価格を押し上げる 銅のTCRCsが供給減で下落し、価格を押し上げる 銅の供給事情はチャート8にも表れており、年次の供給と需要を残高に換算すると、これが在庫市場を介して調整されます。国際銅研究グループ（ICSG）は、鉱山生産は昨年も前年並みで推移し、精銅供給はわずか1.5%の増加にとどまったと推定しています。 チャート8 実需の不足が銅在庫を引き下げる... 現物不足が銅在庫を取り崩す… 現物不足が銅在庫を取り崩す… ICSGの推定によれば消費は2.2%増加し、中国の保税倉庫在庫を調整後の今年の実需ベースの不足は456千MTが見込まれます。これで銅市場は4年連続の実需不足となり、2017年以降の平均不足は約414千MTです。その結果、在庫が再び供給ギャップを埋める頼みとなり、世界の在庫は前年比約25%減と低水準で今後も減少し続けるでしょう（チャート9）。 鉱業の設備投資が弱く、銅鉱石の品位が低下しているため、相当程度の新投資を促すにはより高い価格が必要です（チャート10）。しかし、これらプロジェクトのリードタイムは最良のケースでも5年であるため、鉱山会社は近い将来に最終投資判断を下してプロジェクトを承認する必要があります（チャート11）。 チャート9 ...結果として4年続く実需不足で在庫は低水準 …4年にわたる現物不足を経て低い …4年にわたる現物不足を経て低い チャート10 弱い投資と低下する鉱石品位を是正するにはより高い銅価格が必要 弱い設備投資と鉱石品位の低下を是正するには、銅価格のさらなる上昇が必要だ 弱い設備投資と鉱石品位の低下を是正するには、銅価格のさらなる上昇が必要だ チャート11 新規鉱山稼働までのリードタイムは短縮中だが時間は限られる 銅、鉄鋼価格の急騰で上昇へ 銅、鉄鋼価格の急騰で上昇へ 投資への含意 当社が銅に注目するのは、銅があらゆる再生可能技術に関わり、電気自動車（EV）にとっても重要であり、特にこの技術が広く普及した場合にその重要性が増すという単純な事実によります（チャート12）。 当社は短期・中期・長期の投資期間にわたり銅供給の課題が続くと予想しています。短期対応として、当社は2020年9月10日に2021年12月物銅をロングすることを推奨しており、このポジションは現在39.2%の含み益です。中長期をカバーするために、当社はS&P グローバル GSCI コモディティ・インデックスおよびiShares GSCI コモディティ ダイナミック ロール ストラテジー ETF（COMT）をそれぞれ2017年12月7日と2021年3月12日に推奨しており、これらは現時点でそれぞれ-2.3%および-0.8%となっています。 チャート12 電気自動車の普及が新たな銅需要を生む 鉄鋼価格の急騰で銅が上昇へ 鉄鋼価格の急騰で銅が上昇へ 本日の取引終了時に、上記の銅の需給ストーリーに基づく中期的な機会を捉えるために、2022年物CME/COMEX銅先物をロングし、2023年物CME/COMEX銅先物をショートするポジションを構築します。市場のさらなる引き締まりにより在庫が取り崩され、銅先物カーブのバックワーデーションがより急峻になると予想しています。 短期・中期・長期の当社ポジションに対する主なリスクは、世界的にCOVID-19パンデミックを抑制できないことであり、これは短期的なリスクだと考えています。第二のリスクは、中国国家備蓄局（別名：国家鉱物備蓄局）が保有する戦略的な銅コンセントレート備蓄の大規模放出です。後者のリスクに関して、同局の実際の保有量は不明ですが、約200万MTの範囲にあると考えられています。3 結論： 当社は工業用コモディティ、特に銅に対して強気の立場を維持します。 ロバート・P・ライアン チーフ・コモディティ＆エネルギー・ストラテジスト rryan@bcaresearch.com   コモディティ概要 エネルギー： 強気 米国エネルギー情報局（EIA）によれば、テキサス州は2022年末までに約10GWのユーティリティ規模の太陽光発電を追加する見込みです。テキサスは2020年に本格的に太陽光市場に参入し、2.5GWを導入しました。EIAは今後2年間で年平均約5GWを追加すると見ており、総太陽光容量は約15GW弱になる見込みです。この新規容量の約30%は米国で最も生産性の高い油田があるパーミアン盆地で建設される予定です。比較として、米国の太陽光発電の主要生産州であるカリフォルニアはEIAによれば3.2GWの新規太陽光容量を追加します（チャート13）。2022年末までに、新規太陽光発電の約3分の1がテキサスで追加される見込みで、同州はすでに国内で最大の風力発電地でもあります。風力の発電可能性は夜間に高く、太陽は昼間に最も豊富です。 貴金属： 強気 パラジウム価格は水曜日に約2,876ドル/ozで取引され、2020年2月の過去最高2,875.50ドル/ozを上回り3,000ドル/ozに迫っています。これは世界最大のパラジウム生産者であるロシアの金属メーカー、ノリリスクの生産見通し引き下げが続いているためです（チャート14）。同社は今週、以前の見通しを更新し、鉱山の浸水により銅・ニッケル・パラジウムの鉱山生産が今年最大20%減少する可能性があるとしました。パラジウムはガソリン車の触媒に使われ、世界がCOVID-19由来の需要破壊と自動車の供給を制限している半導体不足から回復するにつれて、自動車販売の回復が見込まれます。加えて、白金族金属（PGM）の生産は南アフリカの電力供給の不安定さにより妨げられており、国内の電力大手が需給調整のために計画停電を実施せざるを得ない状況です。当社は2020年4月23日にパラジウムのロングを推奨して以降、同金属のロングを維持しており、このポジションは35.6%の含み益です。 チャート13 鉄鋼価格の急騰で銅が上昇へ 鉄鋼価格の急騰で銅が上昇へ チャート14 パラジウム価格 パラジウム価格     脚注 1     例として当社が2020年11月26日に発表したレポート「Renewables, China's FYP Underpin Metals Demand」（再生可能エネルギー：中国の五カ年計画が金属需要を支える）をご覧ください。‌ ces.bcaresearch.comで入手可能です。   2     reuters.comに掲載された2021年4月14日付の記事「RPT-COLUMN-Copper smelter terms at rock bottom as mine squeeze hits: Andy Home」を参照してください。この記事は、鉱山と製錬所間の直接取引が10ドル/MT程度まで報告されたことを指摘しており、銅の実需サイドが現状いかに逼迫しているかを示しています。 3    reuters.comに掲載された2021年4月20日付の記事「Column: Supercycle or China cycle? Funds wait for Dr Copper's call」をご覧ください。    投資見解とテーマ 推奨 戦略的推奨 戦術的トレード コモディティ価格と取組の参考表 2021年にクローズしたトレード クローズ済みトレードの要約 より高いインフレが到来 より高いインフレが到来

ハイライト COVID-19感染者数の急増がインドの株式および通貨市場を動揺させている。 懸念すべきは、複数の潜在的なスーパースプレッダー・イベントが進行中であるため、インドの新規感染者数がしばらく例外的に高水準で推移する可能性があることだ。 それでも、中期および長期の見通しは依然として明るい。 ボラティリティ許容度が低い資産配分担当者は、EMエクイティ・ポートフォリオでインドを戦術的にニュートラルに格下げすることを検討してよい。長期投資家はインド株を引き続きオーバーウエイトすべきである。 特集 インドの新型COVID-19新規感染者数は過去数週間で急増し、以前のピークを大幅に上回っている。同国は現在、世界の1日当たり新規感染者の40%を占めている（図表1および図表2）。これにより新たなロックダウンの可能性が高まり、その結果インド株と通貨は売りが先行し始めている。 Chart 1 インドの日次COVID-19新規感染者数は最近急増している … インドは戦術的な格下げに値する インドは戦術的な格下げに値する Chart 2 … 世界の新規感染者の40%および死者の20%を占めている … インドは戦術的な格下げを正当化する インドは戦術的な格下げを正当化する 当社はインドの景気循環的および構造的見通しが良好であることから、EMエクイティ・ポートフォリオでインドをオーバーウエイトしてきた。見解自体は変わらないが、COVID-19新規感染者数の放物線的な急増はインドの株式および通貨市場に短期的なボラティリティをもたらす可能性が高いと考えている。 したがって、ボラティリティ許容度が低い資産配分担当者には、今後数か月間、インド株を戦術的にニュートラルに格下げすることを推奨する。以下に、この短期的な格下げの理由と中期から長期にかけてのより楽観的な理由を詳述する。 新規感染者数は高水準が続く可能性 Chart 3 … 再び厳格なロックダウンの恐れを生じさせている インドは戦術的な格下げを正当化する インドは戦術的な格下げを正当化する 人口密度が高く生活環境が理想的とは言えない同国では、感染拡大を社会的距離政策で抑える試みは極めて困難だ。それでも当局は昨年春に世界で最も厳格なロックダウン措置を課すことでまさにそれを試みた（図表3）。その結果、経済活動は完全に崩壊し、鉱工業生産は前年同期比で半減し、2020年第2四半期のGDPは前年同期比で22%縮小した。 現在、前例のない新規感染者数の急増に直面しており、市場は一部のロックダウンでも景気回復の芽を摘むのではないかと懸念している。 懸念されるのは、インドの新規感染者数がしばらくの間例外的に高水準を維持する可能性があることだ。理由は、いくつかの潜在的なスーパースプレッダー・イベントが進行中だからである。同国では、数万人規模の集会の前で候補者が遊説する５州での州選挙が行われている。現在、最大で300万人が集まっている宗教的集会も行われている。 Chart 4 罹患率および死亡率が上昇すれば、厳格なロックダウンが避けられなくなる可能性がある インドは戦術的な格下げを正当化する インドは戦術的な格下げを正当化する 罹患率および死亡率はまだ上昇していない（図表4）。これは重要な指標であり、当局のロックダウン措置の厳しさを決定するだろう。首相は厳格なロックダウンは最後の手段だと述べているが、入院率や死亡率が上昇し始めればその可能性は排除できない。投資家の懸念を高めている点は次のとおりだ： 株式のバリュエーションが昨年春よりもはるかに高いことが、市場をさらに急落しやすくしている（図表5）。 インド株は過去12か月で記録的な外国ポートフォリオ投資の流入（合計で$34 billion）に恩恵を受けてきた。したがって、再度のロックダウンの脅威が現実になれば、これらの資金の一部が短期的に逆流するリスクが高く、それは株式市場とルピーの両方にとって逆風となる（図表6）。 最後に、米ドル高と今後数か月にわたるEMエクイティの総じてのアンダーパフォーマンスは、インドからの資金流出を促すだろう。 Chart 5 高まったバリュエーションがインド株の脆弱性を高めている インドは戦術的なダウングレードを正当化する インドは戦術的なダウングレードを正当化する Chart 6 海外ポートフォリオ投資の逆流は株式とルピーの両方を下落させるだろう インドは戦術的な格下げに値する インドは戦術的な格下げに値する 景気循環の見通しは引き続き良好 短期的な懸念を超えて、インドの景気循環的な見通しは引き続き良好だ。回復は以下の指標が示すように堅調である： E-wayビルの発行数（事業活動のバロメーター）が財・サービス税（GST）徴収機構の一部として着実に増加している。GSTの徴収自体も堅調であり、同じメッセージを裏付けている（図表7）。 製造業およびサービス業のPMIは3月に55を超え、活動が力強く拡大していることを示している。 RBIおよびダン・アンド・ブラッドストリートの調査が示すように、企業の受注残は強い。これらの指標は今後の鉱工業生産の改善を予告している（図表8）。 Chart 7 インドの基調的な景気回復はこれまで堅調である … インドは戦術的なダウングレードに値する インドは戦術的なダウングレードに値する Chart 8 … 強い受注残によって支えられている … インドは戦術的なダウングレードに値する インドは戦術的なダウングレードに値する 要するに、上記のすべては、厳格なロックダウンがない限り、今後数か月で企業の売上高（トップライン）が改善することを示唆している。 一方で、企業の利益率も著しく回復している。RBIの2600社超の調査によれば、粗利益率および純利益率はいずれも2020年12月時点でパンデミック前の水準を上回っていた（図表9）。 利益率が広がっているため、売上高の回復は今後の数四半期で利益の加速につながるだろう。 利益の再加速が近い兆候として、企業は新たな工場や機械への投資を始めている。資本支出は既に2020年第4四半期に2019年同期比でプラスに転じていた。資本財の輸入も増加し始めており、企業の新たな設備投資計画を裏付けている（図表10）。 Chart 9 … 健全な利益率 … インドは戦術的なダウングレードを正当化する インドは戦術的なダウングレードを正当化する Chart 10 … それが企業の設備投資再開を促した インドは戦術的な格下げに値する インドは戦術的な格下げに値する 新たな設備投資は需要の強まりに自信がある場合にのみ行われる。さらに、設備投資は通常、利益の増加に続いて行われる。したがって、資本財の輸入増と資本支出の増加は、企業が今後の売上と利益の両方について楽観的であることを示している。 中央銀行は多数のオープンマーケットオペレーションを実施することで銀行システムの流動性を十分に保っている。銀行貸出の伸び率は6.3%と依然低いが、底打ちしているように見える。近年、大企業が銀行借入を自国通貨建て債務の発行で代替していることを除けば、貸出成長率は9%に達する（図表11）。 COVID-19の感染拡大による短期的な懸念を超えれば、経済活動の回復に伴って貸出は加速する可能性が高い。それは銀行株にとって追い風となる。ちなみに、銀行はインドの株価指数における最大の構成比を占めている。 最後に、インドの小型株は大型株に対して引き続きアウトパフォームしている（図表12）。インドの小企業は成長の鈍化や信用環境の引き締まりに対して脆弱だ。彼らがアウトパフォームを続けているという事実は、投資家が今回のパンデミック再拡大が経済に重大かつ長期的な影響を与えるとは見ていないことを示唆している。 Chart 11 拡張が続けば銀行貸出は増加するだろう インドは戦術的な格下げに値する インドは戦術的な格下げに値する Chart 12 小型株のアウトパフォームは投資家が成長と信用環境に楽観的であることを示唆している インドは戦術的な格下げに値する インドは戦術的な格下げに値する 景気循環的な回復を超えて、我々はインドの長期的見通しにも強気である。その理由は、インドが意味のある構造改革を実施している数少ない新興国の一つであるからだ。人口構成も非常に好都合である。これらおよび他の構造的課題については、今後のレポートでより詳述する予定だ。 投資結論 インド株および通貨は、COVID-19感染者数の急増が利食い・売りを誘発したため、変動の時期に入っている。ボラティリティ許容度の低いEMエクイティ・ポートフォリオは、したがってこの株式市場を数か月間戦術的にニュートラルに格下げすることを検討すべきである。絶対リターン投資家（米ドル建て）も、短期的なインド株価のボラティリティに備えるべきだ。 しかし中期から長期では、インド株はEMの同業他国を上回るパフォーマンスを示し、絶対値でも上昇する可能性が高い（図表13）。 インドの銀行株も現在のボラティリティで影響を受けている。しかし、インドの民間銀行は効率性が高くバランスシートも優れていることから、長期投資家は当社推奨のインド銀行株ロング／EM銀行株ショートのトレードを引き続き維持すべきである（図表14）。 Chart 13 短期的なボラティリティを超えれば、インド株はEMの同業他国を上回る … インドは戦術的格下げに値する インドは戦術的格下げに値する Chart 14 … 同様にインドの銀行株もEMの銀行を上回るだろう インドは戦術的なダウングレードに値する インドは戦術的なダウングレードに値する フィクスト・インカム投資家は引き続きインドで10年物スワップ金利を受けるポジションを維持すべきだ。降水量が豊富なため食料価格は下落する見込みで、これがインフレを抑制するだろう。COVID-19の感染拡大と潜在的なロックダウンはディスインフレ的であり、スワップ金利を押し下げるだろう。   Rajeeb Pramanik シニアEMストラテジスト rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com

ハイライト パンデミックとその反発局面でリスクが大幅に低下した後、地政学的リスクは再び高まっている。 バイデン政権は中国／台湾、ロシア／ウクライナ、イスラエル／イランの３つの重大な外交試練に直面している。 ロシアはウクライナへの軍事侵攻を行いリスクオフを引き起こす可能性がある。ただしウクライナ全土への全面侵攻は起きにくいため、世界市場は比較的速やかに持ち直すだろう。 イランはウラン濃縮の「ブレイクアウト」閾値に接近しており、核兵器化に対するイスラエルのレッドラインを示すさらなる示威行動を招くだろう。イランは報復する見込みだ。これまでの見方では、緊張は8月までに米国とイランの合意が成立する前にエスカレートする見通しで順調に進んでいる。 台湾はすべての地政学的リスクの中で市場に最も関連性が高い—しかし南シナ海も米中の威嚇行為の別の舞台である。ここでの危機は台湾と結びつく場合に最も重要になる。 CAD-RUB と CHF-GBP をロングする。 特集 チャート 1 世界で最も深刻な海峡における通行量 話し合いか戦争か？ 話し合いか戦争か？ 英国首相ハロルド・マクミランはウィンストン・チャーチル卿の言葉を引用してかつて「Jaw‑jaw は war‑war より良い」と述べた。1 ジョー・バイデン大統領は、台湾に対する中国の軍事的威圧、ウクライナ国境でのロシアの軍事的集結、イランの核開発の加速という戦争リスクの増加を伴う三つの差し迫った外交試練に直面しており、間違いなく対話を望んでいるだろう。 こうした紛争の深刻さを示す一つの方法は、関連する地理的な交通のボトルネック、つまり台湾海峡、マラッカ海峡、ホルムズ海峡、ボスポラス海峡を通過する世界貿易の量を見ることだ（チャート 1）。石油と石油製品は全体の交通量の代替指標として用いている。最近の一時的なスエズ運河の閉塞は、これらのグローバルなボトルネックのいずれかで紛争が発生した場合に起こり得る混乱の大きさを示唆している。 本レポートではバイデンの外交試練における最近の展開を概観する。 我々の見解は概ね順調である。投資家はグローバル金融市場に地政学リスクがより多く織り込まれることを戦術的に想定し、安全資産へのフローや場合によっては一般的な株式の調整に備えるべきだ。景気循環的には最悪ケースがない限り強気相場は続く。 バイデンの３つの外交試練 バイデンの３つの外交試練はいずれも本稿執筆時点で強まっている： 中国／台湾：中国は台湾島周辺で高強度の「戦闘訓練」や実弾演習を継続している。2 米国は北京の反対にもかかわらず台湾へ外交代表団を派遣し、比較的大規模な武器提供を行う予定だ。一方でワシントンは、バイデン大統領と習近平国家主席の首脳会談をアースデイに設定するために、同大統領の「気候担当特使」ジョン・ケリーを北京へ送っている。バイデンによる米中政策の総括的レビューは5月に予定されている。 ロシア／ウクライナ：ロシアはウクライナ国境とクリミアに8万5千人を超える部隊を集結させており、2014〜15年の侵攻以来の最大の兵力集中だ。ロシアはワシントンに対する大使を召還し、米国が新たな制裁を課すなら報復すると警告した。米国は実際にロシアのサイバー攻撃や選挙干渉に応じて新たな制裁を課しており、6月からのルーブル建てロシア国債の販売禁止などを含む。従ってロシアの報復は差し迫っている。 イスラエル／イラン：3月23日の選挙直後、イスラエルはナタンズ核燃料濃縮施設の地下施設を破壊工作し、イランはイスラエル領内で報復すると宣言した。イランはウランを60%レベルまで濃縮すると主張しており、これは核兵器製造に必要な90%以上に近づく数値だ。米国とイスラエルの当局者は以前、イランが4月から8月の間に「ブレイクアウト」レベルの兵器級ウランに到達すると示唆していた。交渉は続いているが、このプロセスは攻撃に見舞われやすいだろう。 我々は今年、台湾に関するダイナミクスについて広範に執筆してきた。本レポートではまずロシアとイランの状況を更新し、その後中国に進む。 結論：パンデミック中の一時的な和らぎの後、地政学リスクが再燃している。新しい米政権は同時に三つの深刻な外交試練に直面している。金融市場は緊張の高まりを大部分で無視してきたが、当面は安全資産が買われると予想する。しかし我々はまだ強気の景気循環見通しを変更していない。以下で説明するように、現時点では「Jaw‑jaw（対話）」の域にあると考えている。 ロシアと新興欧州はショートを継続 民主党の復権によりワシントンとモスクワの緊張は直ちに高まった。バイデン政権は外交的なリセットを避け、むしろ大国間競争を追求している。米国はウクライナへの武器提供やNATOの軍事演習を増やしている。ロシアのサイバー攻撃や選挙干渉に対する制裁を課し、長年待望されていたルーブル債購入への措置を取った。ワシントンはドイツに対してノルドストリームIIパイプラインの取消しを迫る可能性もある。 しかし緩和的な兆候もある。バイデン大統領はプーチン大統領と第三国での二国間首脳会談を提案しており、両者はアースデイのサミットで会う可能性がある。米海軍はまた、モスクワが黒海に入る米軍艦船は危険に晒されると警告した後に、USSドナルド・クックとUSSルーズベルトの駆逐艦を黒海に入らせるのを取りやめた。ワシントンの新たな制裁はロシアによる米国選挙への大規模介入と同等というほどではなく、ノルドストリームIIに関する新たな措置は含まれていない。 米国が建設完了前にドイツにノルドストリームの取消しを強いる動きを取れば、ロシアは報復するだろう。ノルドストリームの目的はウクライナを迂回してロシアとドイツの直接的経済関係を固めることにある。ドイツ政府はウクライナ国境でのロシアの集結や政治的反対者の弾圧にもかかわらずこのプロジェクトを支持している。米国がパイプラインを否認すれば、ロシアは正当な貿易ルートへのアクセスを奪われ、ウクライナ経由以外の輸出オプションが制限されることになる。もし同時に米国がウクライナとの軍事協力を強化すれば、それは暗にロシアの欧州向けエネルギーアクセスを制御しようとする試みとなる。ロシアはウクライナを罰することで報復する可能性が高い。 ロシアはノルドストリームやウクライナ向けの米国のアプローチにかかわらず、ウクライナや他の場所で攻勢の行動を取る可能性がある。ロシアは弱い国内経済と社会的不満に悩んでおり、人気が低下すると国外での冒険主義に走る前例がある。さらに立法選挙が9月に迫っている。したがってロシアは少なくとも今後半年間、ウクライナで紛争を引き起こす独自の理由を持ち得る。 能力から判断すると、ロシアは分離地域ドンバスに軍事侵攻を仕掛けるのに十分な部隊を配備している。国境でのロシア軍の増強は2014年以来最大であり、ロシア語圏のウクライナの大部分を危険にさらし得る規模だ。 ウクライナ全土への全面的なロシア侵攻は起きにくいが不可能ではない。それは占領のための血と財を極めて大きく消費するだけでなく、西側をロシアに対して結束させ、モスクワが望むものの逆結果を招く（チャート 2）。米国がノルドストリームを停止するかウクライナをNATOに加盟させようとしない限り、モスクワはこの結果を避けたいと考えるだろう。 チャート 2 ウクライナに対するロシアの制約 話し合いか戦争か？ 話し合いか戦争か？ 市場の観点からすれば、政府とロシア支援の反乱勢力とのウクライナ内での戦闘激化は現状維持である。これは避けられず、世界株式に大きな影響はないだろう。2014年のクリミア侵攻はS&P500で最大2%のドローダウンにとどまった。金融市場を揺さぶったのはロシアのウクライナ侵攻ではなく、マレーシア航空17便の撃墜だった。世界株は2.7%下落、ユーロストックス500は6.2%、ロシア株は10.7%下落した。 2014〜15年の戦闘には最終的にロシア軍が参加しており、単なるロシア支援の分離主義勢力だけではなかったことに留意すべきだ。したがって、紛争がウクライナ、特に争われている地域に限定され、米国とNATOが関与しなければ、世界の金融市場はその種の紛争に比較的耐えうる。 ロシアがウクライナ全土の完全征服を追求すれば、より大きな安全資産への逃避が生じるだろう。これは確率は低いが影響は大きい。欧州でのより大規模な戦争のリスクを初めて高めるため、世界的なリスクオフを引き起こす。 ロシアは大戦略と国家安全保障の観点からウクライナに執着しており、必要と判断すれば少なくとも何らかの軍事行動を取るだろう。投資家はエスカレーションに備えるべきだが、ワシントンもモスクワもまだ致命的な一手を打ってはいない。 ウクライナ側のいかなる攻撃的行動にも注意を払うことが重要だが、ウクライナが主導的要因というわけではない。現在の状況は2008年のグルジア（ジョージア）の事例に似ている。ロシアは当時ミハイル・サアカシュヴィリ大統領を扇動して分離主義者に対する行動を取らせ、その後介入してアブハジアと南オセチアを分離させた。ウクライナのヴォロディミル・ゼレンスキー大統領が挑発に乗せられる可能性はあるが、挑発を恐れて躊躇することがロシアに主導権を与えることもあり得る（2014年の出来事のように）。ウクライナにとっては「やれば地獄、やらなければ地獄」だ。ロシアの行動は大部分その利益次第で決まる。 これまでロシア株は他の新興市場株式やコモディティラリーに遅れを取ってきたが、これは部分的に政治・地政学リスクの上昇を反映している可能性がある（チャート 3）。ロシア株のトレンドはここからさらに悪化する可能性がある。 9月の選挙を控えたロシアの対西側紛争への関心を考えると、ロシア―ウクライナの緊張は今年の大半続く可能性がある。気候が改善する5月中旬以降に大規模軍事作戦の確率が高まるだろう。ロシア通貨と資産は引き続き圧力を受けるだろう。 我々はカナダドルをロシアルーブルに対してロングすることを推奨する。ルーブルは、クリミア紛争の2014年を踏まえると、コモディティ通貨を含む他のコモディティ通貨に対してアンダーパフォームするだろう（チャート 4）。一方でカナダやメキシコの通貨は、米国経済が過度に刺激されていることと迅速なワクチン接種の恩恵を受けるはずだ。 チャート 3 ロシアはコモディティ・ラリーに遅れ ロシアはコモディティ・ラリーに出遅れた ロシアはコモディティ・ラリーに出遅れた チャート 4 ルーブルよりルーニーとペソを優先 ルーニーとペソをルーブルより優先する ルーニーとペソをルーブルより優先する チャート 5 先進欧州ロング / 新興欧州ショート DMヨーロッパのロング / EMヨーロッパのショート DMヨーロッパのロング / EMヨーロッパのショート 我々は先進欧州をオーバーウェイトし、新興欧州をアンダーウェイトし続ける（チャート 5）。ポーランド、ハンガリー、チェコ、ルーマニア、バルト三国は現在の緊張によりリスクプレミアムを被るだろう。チェコは10月の立法選挙を巡る政治的不確実性に直面しており、ロシアの介入や反体制（とはいえ対EU）政党の台頭の機会となり得る。 バイデンとプーチンがどうすれば緊張を緩和できるかを問うと、米国とNATOはウクライナ関係を縮小し、民主主義促進や心理的な反戦作戦を格下げし、ノルドストリームの完成を容認することができる。ロシアは国境での兵力を削減し、イラン核合意やアフガニスタン撤退で協力の手を差し伸べることができる。これは我々の見方に対するリスクである。 結論：ロシアと新興欧州市場は、新興市場株式の中でも数少ない本当に割安な市場の一部である（表 1）。しかし現状の地政学的文脈はそれらを割安なままに保ちそうだ。現時点では西側とロシアの対立が大きくエスカレートすることに備えるべきである。少なくとも米国がノルドストリームIIの建設を停止するか否かが判明するまで、新興欧州に対してより強気な見方を取るのは控えるべきだ。 表 1 地政学的リスクがロシアと新興欧州を割安に保つ 話し合いか戦争か？ 話し合いか戦争か？ ウクライナに対するロシアの全面的な征服という最悪シナリオは確率は小さいが排除できない。 イラン交渉：先に爆発、次に核合意 イスラエルは3月23日の選挙後も政府を組織できておらず、ベンヤミン・ネタニヤフ首相が再び政権を率いる可能性があるため国家政策にはいまだ変化がない。さらにイスラエルの世論と政治体制はイランの地域的・核に関する野望に対して一致して反対している。 イランがナタンズ核施設で新しい遠心分離機を稼働させた直後の4月11日、イスラエルは同施設の地下施設に対する破壊工作を行ったとされる。この攻撃はサイバー手段に限定されないもので、複数の遠心分離機を無効化したとされる。イランの科学者がクレーターに落ちて負傷した。 イランはイスラエル領内で報復すると誓っている。より根本的には、政治が強硬化の方向へ動いており、6月の強硬派大統領の選出で相互敵対は一層激化するだろう。この権力移行は、我々が8月の就任を米国が2015年の核合意（包括的共同行動計画）に復帰するための重要な期限と特定した大きな理由である。バイデン政権がその時までに合意をまとめられなければ、より危険な数年にわたる交渉が始まるだろう。 ただしイスラエルの攻撃は短期的には交渉を止めていない。第二ラウンドの協議は本稿執筆時にウィーンで始まっている。米国はまた9月11日にアフガニスタンから撤退することを確認しており、これはイランに対してバイデンが地域における米国の戦略的足跡を縮小する決意があることを示し、米国の合意追求の動機を補強している。 今後数か月、イスラエルはイランの核・ミサイル計画に対するレッドラインを秘密裏の攻撃を通じて強調し続けるだろう。しかし彼らは2015年に米国の核合意を阻止できなかったし、今日も米国の動きを止める可能性は低い。イスラエルは米国との同盟を維持する必要があり、これがイランや中東全体の不安定性に対する長期的な安全保障を確保している（チャート 6）。 イランはイスラエルに報復し、今夏は報復の応酬が起きる可能性が高い。これには重要インフラへの攻撃も含まれる恐れがある。イランはイラクやサウジアラビアの敵に対する作戦も続ける可能性があり、これが予期せぬ石油供給停止を引き起こし原油価格を押し上げることがある。イスラエル、サウジ、UAEの株式市場を一目見れば、世界の投資家はこれまで地政学リスクを大部分無視してきたが、米国とイランの合意前に紛争がエスカレートする可能性に対して反応し始めているかもしれない（チャート 7）。 チャート 6 イランに対するイスラエルの制約 話し合いか、それとも戦争か？ 話し合いか、それとも戦争か？ 米国、ドイツ、フランス、ロシア、中国はイランを合意遵守に戻すことに公式に賛同している。遵守への復帰は米国の制裁緩和と段階的にリンクされる必要がある。イラン側は米国が2018年に一方的に協定から離脱し制裁を再課したため、まず米国が制裁を緩和することを要求している。 チャート 7 サウジ、UAE、イスラエルの株式が危険信号を示す サウジ、UAE、イスラエルの株式に危険信号 サウジ、UAE、イスラエルの株式に危険信号 最終的にバイデンは最初の一手を打つことが可能だ。米国民はイランに対して非常に関心が薄く、バイデン自身も地域を安定させ、米国がアジア太平洋により戦略的注意を向けられるようにするためにイラン合意が必要だというワシントンの強いコンセンサスに基づいて行動している。 ロシアと中国は、対米関係が同時に緊張している中でイラン合意を支持するだろうか？ 米国とイランが既存合意への復帰で満足する限り（合意は2025年に有効期限を迎える）、ロシアや中国が何かする必要はほとんどない。しかしワシントンがより良い合意を望むなら、モスクワと北京に対して大幅な譲歩を行わねばならず、新たでより良い合意は交渉に何年もかかるだろう。 チャート 8 露中協力の拡大 話し合いか戦争か？ 話し合いか戦争か？ ロシアと中国は核拡散を制限する機会として当初の核合意を支持した。中東での核軍拡は両国の力を希薄化させるからだ。イランはロシアと中国にとって中東における有用な戦略的パートナーであり、彼らはイランの経済が強くなることを政権の永続化にとって好ましいと考えている。彼らはイラン経済の自由化が政治の自由化につながらないと踏んでいる（ロシアや中国の例が示す通り）ため、経済的に強く影響力を持つ同盟国を維持できると見ている。 露中の戦略的パートナーシップは過去10年で劇的に成長した。両国は米国の世界的指導力を弱め、米国内の分断を煽る利害を共有している。両国は自国の国境近傍、特に安全保障と政治的正当性に不可欠と考える戦略的領域や海域での米軍の存在を減らすことに利害を同じくする。ロシアはますます中国の需要と中国の投資に依存して資源を開発している。双方とも貿易において相手の通貨を完全には信頼していないが、米ドルからの多様化という共通の利害を持っている（チャート 8）。 チャート 9 中国はイラン支援の手を差し伸べるか？ 中国はイランに支援の手を差し伸べるか？ 中国はイランに支援の手を差し伸べるか？ イラン問題で米国と協力する場合、ロシアと中国は自国の核心的利益に近い戦略分野での要求を米国に尊重することを期待するだろう。バイデン政権がウクライナや台湾との貿易・防衛関係を強化し続ければ、モスクワと北京は強硬に反発し、その時点でイラン合意を阻止または弱体化させる可能性がある。 中国は少なくとも公的にはイランへの制裁を執行している（チャート 9）。中国とイランの戦略的パートナーシップは米国が制裁体制を明確にするまで交渉の継続状態にある。明らかに中国は核の脅威に関する協力の見返りとして米国から譲歩を引き出したいと考えている。これは北朝鮮に関しても同様であり、ミサイル危機は中国にとって仲裁の必要性を生み出す好都合な出来事となる。中国はバイデンにトランプ大統領が課した制限を解除させる機会を見ている。今後数か月でバイデン政権の対中強硬姿勢が確認されれば、中国の協力意欲は変化するだろう。 結論：イスラエルはイランの核兵器化に対するレッドラインを強調しており、今春から夏にかけての紛争は増加するだろう。しかしそれでも米国とイランの2015年の核合意再交渉を妨げてはいない。我々は今もバイデンが8月までに合意に達するだろうと予想している。 台湾と南シナ海 グローバル金融市場にとってバイデンが直面する最重要の試練は米中関係と台湾海峡を巡る緊張だ。我々はこの問題に関して最近の調査と議論を繰り返すつもりはない。要するに、今後12〜24ヶ月の間に何らかの危機が発生する確率を60%と見ており、全面戦争の確率を5%と見積もっている。全面戦争の確率は国内の中国の不安定化、画期的な米国の軍事売却、あるいは台湾の独立宣言などが起きれば急速に上昇する可能性がある。 全面的な中国の台湾攻撃に対する最大の抑止要因—我々が現在5%の確率と見積もる理由—は、それが中国経済に壊滅的な打撃を与えるという点だ。中国の先進国との貿易は台湾を含め輸出の63%、GDPの11%を占める（チャート 10）。北京は最終的には「統一」のためにこの代償を支払う覚悟があるかもしれないが、それを軽々しく行うことはない。年を追うごとに中国はグローバルな経済的影響力と台湾に対する軍事能力を高めている。 チャート 10 台湾に対する中国の制約 話し合いか、それとも戦争か？ 話し合いか、それとも戦争か？ 中国は貿易戦争期に減少していた米国債の購入を増やしている（チャート 11）。中国は金利が上昇した際に購入を増やすことが多く、ワクチン発見以降国債利回りが急上昇していることを考えれば、これは中国が米国との全面戦争を準備していることを示す明確な兆候ではないが、限定的な指標で誤解を招く恐れはある。   戦争以外の危機とは何か？我々が台湾で「何らかの危機」と言うとき、何を意味するのか？ 大きなグレーゾーンとしては経済制裁や経済封鎖がある。2016年に名目上独立志向の政党が勝利した際、中国は観光を切り詰めたが、COVID‑19で観光は完全に停止した。それでも現時点でより広範な禁輸措置の証拠はない（チャート 12）。これは一夜にして変わり得る。米国法は台湾への禁輸を禁止しているが、ここは北京が米国のコミットメントを試すかもしれない領域である。 チャート 11 中国の米国債購入が増加 中国、米国トレジャリーズをさらに買い増し 中国、米国トレジャリーズをさらに買い増し 現在の台湾に対する高圧的状況は大部分が新たな米国の輸出管理と世界的な半導体不足が重なっていることに起因する。中国はまだ自国の半導体需要を満たせず、米国とその同盟国なしには先端チップを十分に開発できない（チャート 13）。 チャート 12 台湾に対する禁輸は（まだ）ない 台湾への禁輸はまだない 台湾への禁輸はまだない If the Biden administration pursues a full technological blockade then China may be forced to take tougher action on Taiwan. But if Biden pursues a more defensive strategy then a new equilibrium will develop that spares China the risks of war. チャート 13 中国の半導体需要 中国の半導体需要 中国の半導体需要 米国と中国は同時に南シナ海での海軍対立をエスカレートさせており、特にフィリピン周辺で緊張が高まっている。米中の空母群や艦艇が互いににらみ合っており、北京はフィリピンを威嚇して同国の米国との防衛条約への信頼を揺さぶろうとしている。中国は南シナ海を自国領と主張しており、米国の航行の自由を否定しようとする試みに対して米国は航行の自由を主張するため、艦船の沈没に至る可能性もある。 南シナ海の戦略的重要性は台湾海峡と似ている。中国がこれらの海域を掌握すれば、台湾、日本、韓国の供給保障が脅かされ、米国の地域における戦略的地位が弱まる。ベトナムやフィリピンでの代理戦争のリスクが高いことは以前から指摘しているが、これらは北東アジアの安全保障と比べると世界的関心事としては重要度が低い。台湾は半導体問題のために世界の投資家にとってはるかに重要だが、南シナ海でも危機が発生する機会は多い。この海での危機は周縁的だと片付けられない。直接的な米中衝突に発展するか、最悪の場合、台湾への行動の前触れとなる可能性があるためだ。中国は台湾への接近路を制御しようとするだろう。 この地域の最後のリスクは北朝鮮が弾道ミサイル試験を再開したことである。前述の通り、危機は中国にとって都合が良いタイミングで発生する可能性がある。しかし投資家にとって北朝鮮は重要な台湾海峡からの注意をそらすものに過ぎず、リスクオフ感情を助長する程度だ。 結論：米中関係は依然として不安定であり、南シナ海や朝鮮半島を巡って衝突が発生する可能性は台湾海峡での衝突と同様に存在する。台湾海峡は最も重要な地理的地点である。南シナ海での直接的な米中衝突は世界的な売りを引き起こす可能性があるが、台湾と結びつかない限り市場は比較的速やかに回復するだろう。 投資のポイント 地政学的リスクはCOVID‑19パンデミック期間の和らぎの後に再燃している。とはいえ、摩擦が直ちに戦争に直結するとは限らない。外交の余地は残されている。米中、ロシア、イランが「Jaw‑jaw（対話）」を選べば、世界株のラリーはさらに続く可能性がある。 しかし戦術的観点からは、上で示した議論はバイデンの早期の外交試練の少なくとも一つが地政学的事件へとエスカレートし、地域的または世界的な株式市場に悪影響を与える可能性があることを示している。 市場はこれらのリスクの顕在化に備えていない。主要国の標準的なグローバル政策不確実性指標は多くの国で急低下している点は注目に値する。政策不確実性が上昇している世界の数少ない国の二つに中国とロシアが含まれるのは注目に値する。後者は国内の不安定さによる可能性が高く、これは攻撃的な外交政策の大きな動機となる（チャート 14）。 チャート 14A 世界の政策不確実性は復活する グローバルな政策不確実性は再燃する グローバルな政策不確実性は再燃する チャート 14B 世界の政策不確実性は復活する グローバルな政策不確実性は再燃するだろう グローバルな政策不確実性は再燃するだろう 世界的な財政刺激は依然として非常に強力であり、今年がピークになる可能性が高い。チャート 15は主要国の最新の財政刺激の更新を示しており、COVID‑19危機と2008年の金融危機を比較している。このチャートの以前の版からは注目すべき変更がいくつかあり、主に昨年のショック後のGDPの改定、急速な経済の反発による税収の改定、刺激策の時期と規模の改定によるものだ。バイデン政権の2.3兆ドルのインフラ計画は当然含まれていない。チャート 15の第2パネルは2020年10月から2021年4月にかけてのIMFの推定値の変化を示している。本質的に2020年の財政刺激は過大評価されていた。多くの施策が発動せず、経済のスナップバックが予想より良かったためだ。一方で2021年の刺激は予想より大きい。ロシアと中国は他国より早く金融緩和を引き締めたことで、両年のIMF推定の財政刺激が減少した点が目立つ。 チャート 15 世界の財政刺激チャートの改訂 対話か戦争か？ 対話か戦争か？ コモディティは世界的な回復の大きな受益者であった（チャート 16）。中国の成長は今年減速する可能性が高く、これは地政学的危機とは別に下押しを引き起こすだろう。しかし景気循環的な観点からは、特に工業用金属は供給が限られる中で需要が急増しており恩恵を受けるはずだ。地政学的危機や戦争は当初はネガティブだが、その後金属にとってはポジティブとなるだろう。 チャート 16 地政学的紛争から恩恵を受けるコモディティ 地政学的対立で恩恵を受けるコモディティ 地政学的対立で恩恵を受けるコモディティ 注目すべきは、米国が中国やEUと並んで産業政策を受け入れている点だ。特にバイデンの2.3兆ドルのアメリカン・ジョブズ・プランには約3,700億ドルのグリーン関連イニシアチブが含まれており、今年後半に議会を通過する可能性が高い。象徴的には、バイデンはアースデイの4月22〜23日に世界サミットを主催することで中国や欧州のグリーン施策に追いつこうとする米国の試みを強調するだろう。 英ポンドについて一言。我々は2月にポンドに対する景気循環的な強気見通しを戦術的に一時停止した。これは5月6日のスコットランド議会選挙を見越しての判断だ。スコットランド国民党が強い成果を示せば、第二回独立住民投票につながる可能性がある。この党は世論で勢いを失っているが、独立志向は再び高まっており、ナショナリストの驚きが投票箱で起き得るという我々の指摘を補強している（チャート 17）。第二回住民投票の見通しが明確になれば、中期的なポンドの見通しも明らかになるだろう。 チャート 17 スコットランド選挙で短期的リスクに直面するポンド 英ポンド、スコットランドの選挙で短期的なリスクに直面 英ポンド、スコットランドの選挙で短期的なリスクに直面 チャート 18 戦術的取引としての CHF‑GBP ロング 戦術的トレードのためのCHF-GBPロング 戦術的トレードのためのCHF-GBPロング 短期的には我々は戦術的な安全資産のトレードとヘッジを継続する。スイスフランの戦術的ロングは3月25日に5%でストップとなった。しかし当社の為替ストラテジスト、チェスター・ントニフォアはその後フランが過度に割安であることを指摘している（チャート 18）。今回は政治リスクと上述の英国の政治リスクを踏まえ、戦術的にCHF‑GBPのロングを推奨する。   Matt Gertken バイスプレジデント 地政学ストラテジー mattg@bcaresearch.com   脚注 1 “Jaw‑Jaw Is Best, Macmillan Finds,” New York Times, 1958年1月30日, nytimes.com. 2 Taiwan – Province of China.