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Highlights The selloff in crypto-currencies on May 19 may be overblown but the risk of government intervention is a rising headwind for this asset class. While environmental concerns are a threat to Bitcoin, the entire crypto-currency complex faces a looming confrontation over governance. Digital currencies are a natural evolution of money following coinage and paper. Moreover a sizable body of consumers is skeptical of governments and traditional banking. Loose monetary conditions are fueling a speculative mania. However, governments fought for centuries to gain a monopoly over money. As crypto-currencies become more popular, governments will step in to regulate and restrict them. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) threaten to remove the speed and transactional advantage of crypto-currencies, leaving privacy/anonymity as their main use-case. Feature The prefix “crypto” derives from the Greek kruptos or “hidden.” This etymology highlights one of the biggest problems confronting the crypto-currency craze in financial markets today. Speed and anonymity are the greatest assets of the digital tokens. But the former advantage is being eroded by competitors while the latter is becoming a political liability. In the 2020s, governments are growing stronger and more interventionist, not weaker and more laissez faire. Chart 1Loose Money Fuels Crypto Mania Bitcoin and rival crypto-currency Ethereum fell by 29.5% and 43.2% in intra-day trading on May 19, only to finish the day down by 13.8% and 27.2%, respectively. The market panicked on news that China’s central bank had banned firms from handling transactions in crypto-currencies. What really happened was that China’s National Internet Finance Association, China Banking Association, and Payment and Clearing Association issued a statement merely reiterating a 2013 and 2017 policy that already banned firms from handling transactions in crypto-currencies. These three institutions also warned about financial speculation regarding crypto-currencies.1 The crypto market suffered a spike in volatility because it is in the midst of a speculative mania. In the last five years, total market capitalization of crypto-currencies has risen from around $7 billion to $2.3 trillion,2 recording a 34,000% gain. Some crypto-currencies have even recorded returns in excess of that number over a shorter horizon. Price gains have been driven by retail buyers who may or may not know much about this new asset class (Chart 1). Prior to the May 19 selloff, prices had grown overextended and recent concerns over the environment, sustainability, and governance (ESG) had shaken confidence in Bitcoin and its peers. Chinese authorities have already banned financial firms from providing crypto services in a bid to deter ownership of crypto-currencies. And China is not alone. The latest market jitters are a warning sign that government interference in the crypto-currency market is a real threat. Regulation and sovereign-issued digital currencies are starting to enter the fray. While ultra-dovish central bank policies are not changing soon, and therefore crypto-currency price bubbles can continue to grow, crypto-currencies will remain subject to extreme volatility and precipitous crashes. In this report we argue that the fundamental problem with crypto-currencies is that they threaten the economic sovereignty of nation-states. Environmental degradation, financial instability, and black market crime, and other concerns about cryptos have varying degrees of merit. But they provide governments with ample motivation to pursue a much deeper interest in regulating a technological innovation that has the power to undermine state influence over the economy and society. Government scrutiny is a legitimate reason for crypto buyers to turn sellers. Does The World Need Crypto-Currencies? Broadly speaking, there are two primary justifications for crypto-currencies, centered on a transactional basis: speed and privacy/anonymity. The crux of crypto-currency creation rests on these two use cases.3 The speed of crypto-currencies comes from their ability to increase efficiency in local and global payment systems by facilitating financial transactions without the need of a third party (e.g. a financial institution). Cross-border settlement of traditional (fiat) currency transactions processed through the standard SWIFT communications system takes up to two business days. Most transactions involving crypto-currencies over a blockchain network are realized in less than an hour, cross-border or not.4 The fees involved with third-party payments are often more expensive than transacting with crypto-currencies. Simply put, excluding the “middleman” can save money. This is a selling point in a global market that expects to see retail cross-border transactions reach $3.5 trillion by the end of 2021, of which up to 5% are associated with transaction-based fees.5 But this breakthrough in payment system technology can be overstated and is not the main reason for using crypto-currency. Speculation drives current use, especially given that there is speculative behavior even among those who believe that cryptos are safe-haven assets or promising long-term investments (Chart 2). Chart 2Crypto-Currency Use Driven By Speculation Chart 3Consumers Growing Skeptical Of Banking Regulation If a person wants to buy an item from a company in a distant country, that person could use a crypto-currency just as he or she could use a credit card. Both parties would have a secure medium of exchange but, unlike with a credit card, both would avoid using fiat currencies. Neither party could conduct the same transaction using gold or silver. The crucial premise is the existence of an online community of individuals and firms who for one reason or another want to avoid fiat currencies. From a descriptive point of view, the crypto-currency phenomenon implies a lack of trust in modern governments, or at least their monetary systems, and an assertion of individual property rights. The list of crypto-currencies continues to grow. To date, there are approximately 9,800 of them. Some are trying to prove their economic value or use, while others have been created with no intended purpose or problem to solve. Even so, there has yet to be a crypto-currency that overwhelms the use of slower fiat money. In a recent Special Report, BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor showed that crypto-currencies still have a long way to go to have a chance at replacing fiat monies. While crypto-currencies are showing signs of significant improvement as mediums of exchange, they still fall short as stores of value and units of account. The other primary case for crypto-currencies is privacy or anonymity. The bypassing of intermediaries implies a greater control of funds by the two parties of a transaction. Crypto-currencies are said to be more “private” compared to fiat money. Fiat money is controlled by governments and banks while crypto-currencies have only “owners.” Crypto-currencies are anonymous because they are stored in digital wallets with alphanumeric sequences – there is a limited personal data trail that follows crypto-currency compared to those of electronic fiat currency transactions. In a post-9/11, post-GFC, post-COVID world where a sizable body of consumers is growing more skeptical of government surveillance and regulation and banking industry practices (Chart 3), crypto-currencies give users more than just a means to transact with. However, privacy is not the same as security. Hacking and fraud can affect cryptos as well as other forms of money and attacks will increase with the value of the currencies. Bitcoin At The Helm Of Crypto-Currency Market Chart 4Bitcoin Slows Bitcoin has cemented its status as the number one currency in the crypto-verse.6 It is considered to be the first crypto-currency created, it is the most widely accepted, it is touted as a store of value or “digital gold,” and it is the most featured in quoting alternative crypto-currency pairs across crypto exchanges. As it stands, Bitcoin accounts for around 42% of total crypto-currency market capitalization.7 This share has declined from around 65% at the start of 2021 on the back of the frenzied rise of several alternative coins.8 But rising risks to Bitcoin’s standing will cause the entire crypto-market to retreat. In a Special Report penned in February, BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist Peter Berezin argued that Bitcoin is more of a trend than a solution and that its usefulness is diminishing. Bitcoin’s transaction speed is slowing and its transaction cost is rising (Chart 4). Slowing speed and rising cost on the Bitcoin network are linked to a scalability problem. The crypto-currency’s network has a limited rate at which it can process transactions related to the fact that records (or “blocks”) in the Bitcoin blockchain are limited in size and frequency. This means that one of its fundamental justifications, transactional speed, will become less attractive over time, should the network not address these issues. Bitcoin also consumes a significant amount of energy, a controversy that is gaining traction in the crypto-currency market after Elon Musk, the “techno-king” of Tesla, cited environmental concerns in reversing his decision to accept Bitcoin payment for his company’s electric vehicles. Energy consumption rises as more coins are mined, since mining each new Bitcoin becomes more computer-power intensive. The need for computing power and energy will continue to increase until all 21 million Bitcoins (total supply) are mined, which is currently estimated to occur by the year 2140. Strikingly, the energy needed to mine Bitcoin over a year are comparable to a small country’s annual power consumption, such as Sweden or Argentina (Chart 5). Chart 5Bitcoin Consumes More Energy Than A Small Country … Bitcoin also generates significant quantities of electronic waste (Chart 6). Chart 6… And Generates A Lot Of Electronic Waste Bitcoin mining is heavily domiciled in China, which accounts for 65% of global mining activity (Figure 1). China’s energy mix is dominated by coal power, which makes up approximately 65% of the country’s total energy mix even after a decade of aggressive state-led efforts to reduce coal reliance. Of this, coal powered energy makes up approximately 60% of Bitcoin’s energy mix in China.9 With several countries aiming to minimize carbon emissions, and with approximately 60% of Bitcoin mining powered by coal-fired energy globally,10 Bitcoin imposes a major negative environmental impact. Figure 1Bitcoin Mining Well Anchored In Asia Bitcoin does not shape up well when compared to gold’s energy intensity either. Bitcoin mining now consumes more energy than gold mining over a single year. While the energy difference is not large, the economic value is. Gold’s energy consumption to economic value trade-off is lower than that of Bitcoin. The production value of gold in 2020 was close to $200 billion, while Bitcoin was measured at less than $25 billion (Chart 7A). On a one-to-one basis, gold even has a lower carbon footprint than Bitcoin (Chart 7B). Chart 7AGold Outshines Bitcoin On Production Value And Carbon Footprint Chart 7BGold Outshines Bitcoin On Production Value And Carbon Footprint Crypto-currency energy consumption and carbon footprint will attract the attention of government regulators. Of course, not all crypto-currencies are heavy polluters. But if the supply of cryptos is constrained by mining difficulties then they will require a lot of energy. If the supply is not constrained then the price will be low. Government Regulation Is Coming Environmental concerns point to the single greatest threat to crypto-currencies – the Leviathan, i.e. the state. In this sense the crypto market’s wild fluctuations on May 19, at the mere whiff of tougher Chinese regulation, are a sign of what is to come. Governments around the world have so far left crypto-currencies largely unregulated but this laissez-faire attitude is already changing. Environmental regulation has already been mentioned. Governments will also be eager to expand their regulatory powers to “protect” consumers, businesses, and banks from extreme volatility in crypto markets. But investors will underrate the regulatory threat if they focus on these issues. At the most basic level, governments around the world will not sit idly by and lose what could become significant control of their monetary systems. The ability to establish and control legal tender is a critical part of economic sovereignty. Governments won control of the printing press over centuries and will not cede that control lightly. If crypto-currencies are adopted widely, then finance ministries and central banks will lose their ability to manipulate the money supply and the general level of prices effectively. Politicians will lose the ability to stimulate the economy or keep inflation in check. Most importantly, while one may view such threats as overblown, it is governments, not other organizations, that will make the critical judgment on whether crypto-currencies threaten their sovereignty. Throughout the world, most crypto-currency exchanges are regulated to prevent money laundering. Crypto-currencies are not legal tender and, aside from Bitcoin, their use is mostly banned in China (Table 1). However, more specialized regulation that targets energy and economic use has yet to be brought into law across the world. Table 1World Governments Will Not Relinquish Hard-Fought Monopolies Over Money Supply In China, initial coin offerings (ICOs – the equivalent of an initial public offering on the stock market) and trading platforms are banned from engaging in exchanges between the yuan and crypto-currencies or tokens. In fact, China recognizes crypto-currencies only as virtual commodities or virtual property. India is another country where exchanges and ICOs are banned. While crypto-currencies are not banned, they are not legal tender. Indian policymakers have recently proposed banning crypto-currencies, however. The proposed legislation is one of the world’s strictest policies against crypto-currencies. It would criminalize possession, issuance, mining, trading, and transferring crypto-assets. If the ban becomes law, India would be the first major economy to make holding crypto-currency illegal. Even China, which has banned mining and trading, does not penalize possession. In the US, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen has already expressed concerns regarding the illicit use of cryptos for supposed criminal gain.11 She is in alignment with European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde. Because of the anonymity of crypto-currencies, identifying users behind illicit transactions is difficult. This means regulators face headwinds in identifying transactions that are made for criminal gain, as compared to fiat transactions. Governments have long dealt with the anonymity of cash but they have ways of monitoring bank accounts and paper bills. Crypto-currencies are beyond their immediate sight of control and therefore will attract growing scrutiny and legislative action in this regard. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack on May 7, which temporarily shuttered about 45% of the fuel supply line for the eastern United States, illustrates the point. The DarkSide group of hackers who orchestrated the attack demanded a ransom payment of $4.4 million worth of Bitcoin, which Colonial Pipeline paid them on May 7. Shortly thereafter, unspecified “law enforcement agencies” clawed back the $4.4 million from the hackers’ account (transferring it to an unknown address) and DarkSide lost access to its payment server, DOS servers, and blog. This episode should not be underrated. It was a successful, large-scale cyber-attack on critical infrastructure in the world’s most powerful country. It highlighted the illicit uses to which crypto-currencies can be put. True, criminals demand ransoms in fiat money as well – and many crypto-currency operators will distance themselves from the criminal underworld. Nevertheless governments will give little slack to an emerging technology that presents big new law enforcement challenges and is not widely used by the general public. Ultimately governments will pursue their sovereign interests in controlling money, the economy, and trade, listening to their banking lobby, expanding their remit to “protect” consumers, and cracking down on illicit activity. Governments are not capable of abolishing crypto-currencies altogether, or the underlying technology of blockchain. But they will play a large and growing role in regulating them. Central Banks Advancing On Digital Currencies Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) will leave crypto-currencies in the realm of speculative assets. CBDCs are a form of digital money denominated in a country’s national unit of account and represent a liability on a central bank’s balance sheet. This is different from current e-money that represents a claim on a private financial institution’s balance sheet. It is also different from crypto-currencies, because there is a central authority behind a CBDC, unlike with crypto-currencies due to their decentralized nature. In China, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has suggested its rollout of a digital yuan is “ready” despite no release to date. Beta testing is ongoing in several provinces. The PBoC’s justification for a digital yuan comes from China’s growing cashless economy. The transition away from cash is largely thanks to mobile payment platforms like Alibaba’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat Pay, which, between the two of them, control almost the entire mobile payments market of some 850 million users. There is a significant amount of systemic risk in this system – one reason why Chinese authorities have recently subjected these companies to new scrutiny and regulation. Should Alibaba or Tencent go bankrupt, the local payment system will crash. The PBoC’s efforts will increase competition in the local payments space and reduce this systemic risk. Policymakers are also concerned that as Chinese citizens choose to hold their money in digital wallets provided by Alibaba and Tencent instead of bank accounts, liquidity is being drained from the traditional banking system, putting deposit levels at banks under strain, and posing risks to liability matching. The digital yuan will still involve a third party, unlike crypto-currencies which do not. Doing away with commercial banks is not a reality – indeed the Chinese Communist Party seeks to buttress the state-owned commercial banks in order to maintain control of the economy. What the digital yuan does, and other CBDCs will do too, is utilize blockchain technology, which is faster and more secure than traditional payment networks. In the US, the Fed has been studying the viability of a CBDC US dollar. The Fed has stated that it is carefully exploring whether a CBDC will lead to “safer, less expensive, faster, or otherwise more efficient payments.” While the Fed has yet to find a single standout case for a CBDC US Dollar, Fed Chair Jerome Powell said last year that the US has a “competitive payments market” with “fast and cheap services, particularly in comparison to other nations exploring a CBDC.” To date, the Fed’s observation is that many of the challenges that CBDCs hope to address do not apply to the US, including disuse of physical cash, narrow reach or high concentration of banking, and weak infrastructure for payment systems. Rather, the Fed is more focused on developing the FedNow real-time payment system for private banks. This is much the same as in Europe, where physical cash still plays a major role in day-to-day economic activity and where local payment systems are fast and secure. But central banks around the world continue to engage in work centered around CBDCs (Charts 8A and 8B) – and China’s progress will encourage others to move faster. Advanced economies are mostly interested in creating a safer and more efficient payment system, while emerging and developed economies have interest across several areas such as financial stability, monetary policy setting, and inclusiveness of banking, as well as efficiency and safety (Chart 9). CBDCs are especially attractive to emerging market policy makers at targeting those who lack access to traditional banking. Chart 8ACentral Banks Advancing On CBDC Work Chart 8BCentral Banks Advancing On CBDC Work Chart 9Central Banks CBDC Interest Areas In remote areas, access to banking is scarce and expensive. CBDCs can help solve this problem. Individuals would have CBDC accounts directly on a central bank ledger. They could then access their money and transact through a digital wallet application that is linked to the CBDC account. Giving people access to digital currency would allow them to transact quickly, in remote settings, without the need of hard currency. Monetary policy transmission is also better in advanced economies. In emerging markets, there are bottlenecks in local financial markets. Looser central monetary policy does not always translate into cheaper financing across the economy. In remote and poverty stricken areas, monetary policy transmission is sticky, meaning high costs of borrowing can persist even through accommodative policy cycles. This is a smaller issue in advanced economies. Payment systems in advanced economies are due an overhaul in security and efficiency, and CBDCs and blockchain technology will provide this. CBDCs will prove to be just as efficient to transact with as any crypto-currencies available today. CBDCs will also be legal tender and accepted by all vendors. The anonymity factor will be lost but this will not be a problem for most users (whereas legal issues will become a problem for crypto-currencies). The probability of central banks issuing CBDCs in both the short and medium term, both in the retail and wholesale space, is rising. If advanced economies like those of the G7 issue CBDCs soon, policy makers will undoubtedly ensure the use of it over the currently circulating and partially accepted crypto-currencies. The endgame will leave crypto-currencies in the highly speculative asset class, perhaps even in the black market where anonymity is valued for transactions that wish not to be tracked. Investment Takeaways Prices of crypto-currencies may continue to rise given sky-high fiat money creation amid the COVID pandemic and ultra-low interest rates. Digitalization is the natural next step in the evolution of money from precious metals to paper banknotes to electronic coin. But the market leader, Bitcoin, is encountering more headwinds. The primary case for the use of Bitcoin is challenged due to slowing transaction speeds and rising transaction costs. The virtual currency is primarily mined using coal-powered energy, resulting in growing scrutiny from governments and consumers. Government regulation is entering the ring and policymakers will take an increasingly heavy-handed role in trying to ensure that cryptos do not undermine economic sovereignty, financial stability, and law and order. When central banks begin to rollout digital currencies, especially those domiciled in advanced economies, crypto-currencies as medium of exchange will lose much of their allure. Crypto-currencies will remain as anti-fiat currencies and speculative assets. Risks To The View Given the controversy surrounding crypto-currencies, it is only fair to state outright the risks to our view. We would also recommend clients read our colleague Dhaval Joshi’s latest bullish take on Bitcoin. First, scaling up Bitcoin’s network and processing transactions in batches instead of single transactions will resolve transaction time and cost risks, restoring efficiency. This is a clear solution to efficiency concerns. However, scaling and batching transactions are not on the immediate horizon of Bitcoin developers. Bitcoin’s network will still need to undergo another “halving” in order for this risk to subside and for the network to scale. A halving of the network will only occur again in 2024.12 Second, on the environment: Bitcoin mining is not solely dependent on fossil fuel energy that gives it a “dirty” footprint. Renewables already make up some 25% of Bitcoin mining. Increasing the use of renewables in Bitcoin’s energy mix will help lower its environmental impact. However, this is easier said than done. Global renewable energy has yet to scale up to a point where it can consistently out-supply existing fossil-fuel energy. Mining hardware also has its associated carbon footprint that would need to be addressed. And location matters too. Crypto-currency mining farms are large-scale projects. Simply uprooting operations to a country that could lower the carbon footprint of a mining farm or two is not viable due to the costs involved. Hence crypto-currency mining will probably continue to be a “dirty” operation but a rapid shift to renewables would challenge our thesis. Bitcoin’s network is also based off a “proof of work” protocol. Miners must prove that a certain amount of computational effort has been expended for confirming blocks on the network, allowing transactions to be processed. Proof of work is energy intensive. Other crypto-currencies, like Ethereum, will adopt a “proof of stake” protocol. Simply put, transactions are confirmed by users and their stake in the associated crypto-currency. Proof of stake is less energy intensive compared to proof of work. Third, as to government regulation, the longer policymakers take to enact legislation targeting crypto-currencies, the larger their market will grow. Regulation in China and India may set a benchmark for major economies but not all will follow in the Asian giants’ footsteps. Some governments have been slow to study crypto-currencies, meaning legislation aimed at governing or regulating them may still be long in coming. Innovation is a good thing and free economies will not wish to restrain crypto-currencies or blockchain technology unduly, for fear of missing out. Fourth, on CBDCs, some central banks may only adopt them based on their respective economic needs. However, rising crypto-currency populism drives associated economic risks which can force the hands of central banks to adopt CBDCs in lieu of said needs. Each country faces unique challenges. Some central banks may not want to be left behind even if they believe their policy framework is facilitating economic activity efficiently. While the Fed has stated that it will not adopt a CBDC for the primary reason of ensuring payment security since it believes it already has a safe system in place, this view will change. The Fed could justify a move to a CBDC US dollar on the single basis of transitioning to a more sophisticated technology for the future. The Fed will not want to be caught behind the curve considering the PBoC is priming its digital yuan for release soon. Technological leadership is a strategic imperative of the United States and that imperative applies to financial technology as well as other areas.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Muyao Shen, “China Reiterates Crypto Bans From 2013 and 2017”, coindesk, May 18, 2021, coindesk.com. 2 As of May 11, 2021. 3 There are several other reasons or “problems” that crypto-currencies are created for or to solve, but speed and privacy form the basis of crypto-currencies first coming into existence. 4 Not all crypto-currencies transact in less than an hour. But there are many that transact in several minutes and in some cases, mere seconds. As the leading crypto-currency, Bitcoin takes approximately one hour for a transaction to be fully verified over its network. 5 “McKinsey’s Global Banking Annual Review”, McKinsey, Dec. 9, 2020, mckinsey.com. 6 We use Bitcoin as an example to understand the risk and impact of forthcoming government regulation and competition. Because of Bitcoin’s status, any significant risks that threaten the crypto-currency’s standing as the number one currency will threaten the entire market. 7 As of May 20, 2021. Figure varies daily. See www.coinmarketcap.com for more information. 8 Alternative currencies such as Ethereum, Ripple, Binance Coin, Dogecoin, and Cardano have chipped away at Bitcoin’s crypto-market dominance through 2021. 9 According to The Center For Alternative Finance, The University Of Cambridge. 10 According to The Center For Alternative Finance, The University Of Cambridge. 11 Data on the use of crypto-currencies for illicit activitiessays otherwise. Of all crypto-currency transactions, it is estimated that only 2.1% are used for illicit activities. See “2021 Crypto Crime Report”, Chainalysis, chainalysis.com. 12 A Bitcoin halving is when the reward for mining Bitcoin transactions is cut in half. This event also cuts Bitcoin's inflation rate and the rate at which new Bitcoins enter circulation, in half. Bitcoin last halved on May 11, 2020.

Aspectos destacados Las acciones globales son muy vulnerables a una corrección. Pero cíclicamente la Fed está comprometida con un exceso de inflación y la economía global se está recuperando. El impulso fiscal y de crédito de China cayó bruscamente, lo que deja a las acciones cíclicas globales y a las materias primas expuestas a una retirada. Más allá del corto plazo, la necesidad de China de estabilidad política debería evitar un endurecimiento excesivo de la política. El riesgo está concentrado en el corto plazo. El censo de población de China subraya uno de nuestros megatemas: la política interna de China es inestable y puede traer sorpresas negativas. Las elecciones estatales de India, celebradas en medio de una enorme ola de COVID-19, sugieren que el partido gobernante sigue siendo favorito en 2024. Esto implica continuidad en las políticas. Mantener un sesgo cíclico alcista pero estar preparado para cambiar si China comete un error de política. Artículo principal Gráfico 1 La inflación asoma la cabeza La inflación asoma la cabeza La inflación asoma la cabeza Los mercados globales se estremecieron esta semana ante un dato fuerte de inflación subyacente en EE. UU. así como por temores más amplios al resurgimiento de la inflación tras un largo letargo (Gráfico 1). Cíclicamente todavía esperamos que los inversores roten fuera de las acciones de EE. UU. hacia acciones internacionales y que el dólar estadounidense caiga a medida que la economía global se recupere (Gráfico 2). Sin embargo, esta visión también implica que las acciones de mercados emergentes deberían comenzar a superar a sus pares de mercados desarrollados, lo cual no se ha materializado hasta ahora este año. Los mercados emergentes no solo son intensivos en tecnología y vulnerables a la subida de los rendimientos de los bonos estadounidenses, sino que además se ven ahora desafiados por el hecho de que el estímulo de China ha alcanzado su pico. Gráfico 2 El mercado de acciones tiembla El mercado bursátil tiembla El mercado bursátil tiembla Gráfico 3 La economía global y el sentimiento se recuperan La economía global y el sentimiento se recuperan La economía global y el sentimiento se recuperan Gráfico 4 Cíclicos globales frente a defensivos vacilando Cíclicos globales frente a defensivos vacilan Cíclicos globales frente a defensivos vacilan Lo único en lo que podemos confiar es que el despliegue de la vacuna contra el COVID-19 continuará permitiendo una recuperación del crecimiento global (Gráfico 3). El dólar estadounidense está señalando algo similar. El billete verde rebotó en el primer trimestre por el mejor desempeño relativo del crecimiento de EE. UU., pero desde entonces ha retrocedido. Un dólar en caída es positivo para las acciones cíclicas frente a las defensivas, aunque las cíclicas indican que la operación de reflación está sobreextendida en el corto plazo (Gráfico 4). El crecimiento de China se convierte ahora en el punto focal crítico. Un error de política en China trastocaría la visión alcista cíclica. El endurecimiento de la política monetaria y fiscal en China es un riesgo político global importante que hemos señalado este año y que ahora se está materializando. No obstante, también hemos señalado las limitaciones al endurecimiento. En la actualidad China se encuentra justo en el umbral del sobreendurecimiento según nuestros puntos de referencia. Si China endurece más, adoptaremos una postura fundamentalmente más defensiva. También en este informe revisaremos los resultados del censo de población de China y las implicaciones de las recientes elecciones estatales de India frente a la última gran oleada de infecciones por COVID-19. Por ahora no haremos cambios a nuestra visión alcista sobre India, pero la ponemos bajo vigilancia. China: El riesgo de sobreendurecimiento Los problemas de China provienen del cambio en curso de su modelo económico, que pasa de depender del comercio exterior a depender de la demanda interna. Esta fue una decisión estratégica que el Partido Comunista tomó antes del ascenso del presidente Xi Jinping. Xi también ha llegado a encarnar y reforzar esta visión estratégica y la confrontación con Estados Unidos. El objetivo de Pekín era gestionar una transición suave y estable. La turbulencia financiera de 2015 y la guerra comercial de 2018-19 pusieron en peligro ese objetivo, pero los responsables de la política finalmente prevalecieron. Luego estalló el COVID-19 y causó la primera contracción económica real desde la década de 1970. Aunque China contuvo el virus y rebotó con otra ronda masiva de estímulo (13,8% del PIB desde el inicio de la guerra comercial hasta el pico de 2021), ahora enfrenta una transición aún más difícil. Gráfico 5 Aumento de la propensión al ahorro en China La creciente propensión de China a ahorrar La creciente propensión de China a ahorrar La necesidad de mejorar la calidad de vida es más urgente dado que el PIB potencial se ha desacelerado. La necesidad de contener el riesgo financiero sistémico es más urgente dado el gran nuevo aumento de la deuda. Y la necesidad de diversificar la economía es más urgente dado que EE. UU. está ahora formando una coalición de democracias para confrontar a China en una serie de políticas. El aumento en la “propensión marginal al ahorro” entre personas y empresas chinas —medida por la proporción de depósitos a plazo largo frente a depósitos a corto plazo— es una indicación de que el país está aquejado de problemas y que los ánimos empresariales están deprimidos (Gráfico 5). El impulso fiscal y de crédito de China está girando a la baja tras la gran expansión de 2018-21. Los responsables de la política han señalado desde el año pasado que retirarían el estímulo de emergencia y ahora el impacto es aparente en los datos reales. El dinero, el crédito y los impulsos combinados de crédito y fiscal de China se correlacionan con el crecimiento económico tras un rezago de seis a nueve meses. Esto es cierto independientemente de qué indicadores se usen para los ciclos de dinero y crédito y la actividad económica de China (Gráficos 6A y 6B). El impulso económico de China está en su punto máximo y se convertirá en un viento en contra para la economía global más adelante este año y en 2022, aunque el resto del mundo disfruta de los vientos favorables de la vacunación y la reapertura económica. Gráfico 6A El impulso fiscal y de crédito de China cae bruscamente … El impulso fiscal y crediticio de China cae bruscamente... El impulso fiscal y crediticio de China cae bruscamente... Gráfico 6B … al igual que los impulsos de dinero y crédito ... Al igual que los impulsos de dinero y crédito ... Al igual que los impulsos de dinero y crédito La desaceleración del impulso fiscal y de crédito presagia una caída de la demanda de materias primas, materiales y otros bienes que China importa, especialmente para el consumo interno. (Las importaciones chinas de piezas e insumos que forman parte de sus exportaciones manufacturadas al resto del mundo se ven más saludables a medida que el resto del mundo se recupera). Este cambio dificultará que los elevados precios de los metales y otras apuestas vinculadas a China, como las acciones suecas, sigan subiendo sin una corrección (Gráfico 7). La posición especulativa favorece en gran medida a las materias primas en este momento. La divergencia entre China y los mercados de metales que domina parece insostenible a corto plazo (Gráfico 8). Gráfico 7 Las operaciones de reflación de China cerca de los picos Operaciones de reflación en China cerca de máximos Operaciones de reflación en China cerca de máximos Gráfico 8 Choque entre el ciclo del dinero y los precios de las materias primas El ciclo monetario y los precios de las materias primas chocan El ciclo monetario y los precios de las materias primas chocan La transición global hacia sistemas de energía verdes o renovables (es decir, la descarbonización) es alcista para los metales, especialmente el cobre, pero no podrá compensar la caída de la demanda china en el corto plazo, como ha mostrado nuestra Estrategia de Mercados Emergentes. Los usos internos del cobre en China para la construcción y la industria representan aproximadamente el 56,5% de la demanda mundial de cobre, mientras que la carrera por la energía verde —es decir, la producción de paneles solares, aerogeneradores, coches eléctricos— representa solo alrededor del 3,5% de la demanda mundial. Este número subestima algo el programa verde ya que también se prevé el reacondicionamiento y la adaptación de sistemas y estructuras existentes, como las redes eléctricas. Pero el punto es que una caída en el consumo de cobre de China actuará en contra del gran aumento del consumo en Estados Unidos y Europa, sobre todo dado que el programa de infraestructura de EE. UU. no empezará hasta 2022 como muy pronto. Por lo tanto, la demanda mundial de cobre se ralentizará en los próximos 12 meses en respuesta a China, aunque la demanda del resto del mundo esté subiendo. Los responsables de la política chinos aún no han señalado que estén preocupados por un sobreendurecimiento de la política o que vayan a aflojar la política de nuevo. La reunión del Politburó a finales de abril no contenía un cambio de política importante respecto a la Conferencia Central de Trabajo Económico en diciembre o al Informe de Trabajo del Gobierno en marzo (Tabla 1). Pero si hubo una diferencia significativa, residió en reducir aún más el sentido de emergencia del año pasado al tiempo que se proyectaba algún tipo de esquema para responsabilizar a los funcionarios locales por la deuda oculta. La implicación es la continuación de una política estricta, y por ende el riesgo de sobreendurecimiento sigue siendo sustancial. Tabla 1 Declaraciones macroeconómicas recientes de la política de China: eliminando el estímulo China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo Gráfico 9 Puntos de referencia para el endurecimiento de la política en China Puntos de referencia para el endurecimiento de la política en China Puntos de referencia para el endurecimiento de la política en China Cierto es que las señales de la reunión de abril pueden leerse de varias maneras. La declaración de abril omitió frases sobre “mantener el apoyo de política necesario” en la orientación macroeconómica general, lo que implicaría menos apoyo para la economía. Pero también omitió el objetivo de mantener el crecimiento de la oferta monetaria (M2) y del crédito (financiación social total) en línea con el crecimiento del PIB nominal, lo que podría verse como permitir un repunte en el crecimiento del crédito. Sin embargo, el Banco Popular de China mantuvo este objetivo de crédito en su informe de política monetaria del primer trimestre, por lo que no se puede estar seguro. Observa que, según este criterio, China está justo en el umbral del “sobreendurecimiento” de la política que hemos utilizado para medir el riesgo (Gráfico 9). Basándonos en la formulación de políticas china durante las últimas dos décadas, esperaríamos que cualquier punto de inflexión importante se anuncie en la reunión del Politburó de julio, no en la de abril. No consideramos que abril suponga un cambio importante respecto a las reuniones previas – ni lo considera nuestra Estrategia de Inversión en China. Por lo tanto, el endurecimiento excesivo de la política sigue siendo un riesgo real para la economía china y global durante los próximos 12 meses. Nuestra lista de verificación para el endurecimiento excesivo subraya este punto (Tabla 2). Tabla 2 Lista de verificación para el endurecimiento de la política china China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo El descenso del impulso fiscal y de crédito de China está ocurriendo antes del vigésimo congreso nacional del partido, que tendrá lugar a lo largo de 2022 y culminará con la rotación del liderazgo superior (el Comité Permanente del Politburó) en otoño. La economía está suficientemente estimulada para el centenario del Partido Comunista el 1 de julio de este año, por lo que los responsables de la política están centrados en prevenir excesos. La prevención del riesgo financiero, la regulación antimonopolio y la contención de la burbuja inmobiliaria son las órdenes del día. El aumento de los impagos y quiebras de bonos corporativos y gubernamentales subraya la disposición del liderazgo a avanzar con la reestructuración económica y la reforma, lo cual está bien documentado en los últimos años (Gráfico 10). Gráfico 10 Destrucción creativa en China China al borde del endurecimiento excesivo China al borde del endurecimiento excesivo Los inversores no pueden asumir que el congreso del partido en 2022 sea una razón para que el liderazgo afloje la política. Ocurrió lo contrario en la antesala del congreso de 2017. Sin embargo, los inversores tampoco pueden asumir que China se sobreendurezca y hunda su propia economía antes de un evento tan importante. La estabilidad será el objetivo, como ocurrió en 2017 y en congresos anteriores, y esto significa que en algún momento habrá un alivio de la política si la ronda actual de endurecimiento se vuelve demasiado dolorosa financiera y económicamente. Los activos vinculados a China son vulnerables en el corto plazo hasta que los responsables de la política alcancen su punto de inflexión. De paso, la aproximación del vigésimo congreso nacional del partido será un imán para la intriga política y eventos impactantes. El líder máximo normalmente destituye a un rival prominente antes de un congreso como muestra de fuerza en el proceso de promoción de su facción. El gobierno también endurece el control de los medios y reprime a los disidentes, que pueden alzar la voz o protestar en torno al evento. Pero en 2022 las apuestas son más altas. Originalmente se esperaba que el presidente Xi dimitiera en 2022, pero ahora no lo hará, lo que suscitará al menos cierta oposición. Además, bajo Xi, China ha emprendido tres revoluciones políticas históricas: está adoptando un modelo de liderazgo autoritario, en detrimento del modelo de liderazgo colectivo bajo los dos presidentes anteriores; está enfatizando la autosuficiencia económica, en detrimento de la liberalización y la apertura; y está enfatizando el estatus de gran potencia, en detrimento de la cooperación con Estados Unidos y sus aliados. Conclusión: Las acciones globales, las materias primas y las “apuestas vinculadas a China” están en riesgo de una corrección sustancial como resultado del endurecimiento de la política en China. Nuestro caso base es que China evitará el sobreendurecimiento, pero los últimos números de dinero y crédito rozan nuestro umbral para cambiar esa visión. Otra caída pronunciada en estos indicadores exigirá un cambio. Fuerza laboral desaparecida de China En última instancia, una de las limitaciones al sobreendurecimiento de la política es la caída del crecimiento potencial del PIB de China como resultado de su población en edad laboral en disminución. El séptimo censo de población de China se publicó esta semana y subrayó los profundos cambios estructurales que afectan al país y su economía. El crecimiento de la población en los últimos diez años se desaceleró hasta el 5,4%, la tasa más baja desde el primer censo en 1953. La tasa de fecundidad cayó a 1,3 en 2020, por debajo de la tasa de reemplazo de 2,1 y del objetivo de 1,8 establecido cuando las autoridades chinas relajaron la política del hijo único en 2016. La tasa de fecundidad también es más baja que las estimaciones del Banco Mundial (1,7 en 2019) e incluso que la de Japón. La tasa de natalidad (nacimientos por 1.000 personas) también cayó, con el número de recién nacidos en 2020 en el punto más bajo desde 1961, el año de la Gran Hambruna. La tasa de natalidad se ha convergido con la de los países de ingresos altos, lo que implica que el desarrollo económico está teniendo el mismo efecto de desalentar la procreación en China, aunque China está menos desarrollada que esos países. Gráfico 11 La población en edad laboral de China cae más rápido que la de Japón en los años 90 China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo La cohorte más joven aumentó del 16,6% al 17,95% de la población, la cohorte más anciana aumentó del 8,9% en 2010 al 13,5% hoy, mientras que la cohorte en edad laboral cayó del 75,3% al 68,6%. La población en edad laboral alcanzó su pico en 2010 y cayó 6,79 puntos porcentuales en los últimos diez años. En contraste, la población en edad laboral de Japón alcanzó su pico en 1992 y cayó 2,18 puntos porcentuales en la década posterior (Gráfico 11). En otras palabras, China está experimentando la transición demográfica que afectó a Japón a principios de los años 90, pero la población en edad laboral de China podría caer incluso más rápido. El país está experimentando este cambio tectónico socioeconómico en un nivel de riqueza per cápita más bajo del que Japón había alcanzado. El desafío demográfico presionará el sistema socioeconómico y político de China. El milagro chino, como otros milagros asiáticos, se basó en el uso de la manufactura orientada a la exportación para generar grandes cantidades de ahorro que podían reorientarse para el desarrollo nacional. La caída de la población en edad laboral de China coincide con el desarrollo económico y una probable disminución de la tasa de ahorro a largo plazo. Esto se muestra en el Gráfico 12, que presenta dos imágenes diferentes de la población trabajadora de China junto con la tasa de ahorro nacional bruta. A medida que aumenta la ratio de dependencia, la tasa de ahorro caerá y habrá menos fondos disponibles para repropositar. El costo del capital aumentará y la reestructuración económica se acelerará. En el caso de Japón, el cambio demográfico coincidió con la crisis financiera de 1990 y luego con un cambio nacional en el comportamiento económico. La tasa de ahorro cayó a medida que la economía evolucionó, pero los ahorros generados aún superaron la inversión debido a la falta de demanda privada y a la presión de grandes cargas de deuda. Las empresas se centraron en pagar la deuda en lugar de expandir la inversión y la producción (Gráfico 13). Todo esto ocurrió cuando el entorno externo era benigno, mientras que China enfrenta un desafío demográfico similar en el contexto de una creciente presión económica debido a tensiones geopolíticas. Gráfico 12 Los trabajadores chinos son cada vez más escasos Trabajadores chinos cada vez más escasos Trabajadores chinos cada vez más escasos Gráfico 13 Altos niveles de ahorro permiten derroches de deuda hasta que la deuda abruma Los altos ahorros permiten un derroche de deuda hasta que esta se vuelve abrumadora. Los altos ahorros permiten un derroche de deuda hasta que esta se vuelve abrumadora. China hasta ahora ha evitado una crisis financiera debilitante y un colapso de los precios de la vivienda que condenaría al país a una trampa de liquidez traumática. Las autoridades chinas son dolorosamente conscientes del peligro de la burbuja inmobiliaria y por ello están ansiosas por prevenir excesos financieros y frenar la actividad con rasgos de burbuja. Esto es lo que hace que el riesgo de sobreendurecimiento sea significativo. Pero un error en cualquiera de las dos direcciones puede conducir a una caída hacia la deflación. La administración de Xi ha estimulado la economía cada vez que la actividad se ralentizaba excesivamente o la inestabilidad financiera amenazaba con salirse de control, como se ha señalado arriba, pero este es un acto de equilibrio difícil, razón por la cual vigilamos tan de cerca el riesgo de endurecimiento excesivo. Algunos otros puntos notables del censo de población de China incluyen: La política de dos hijos no está teniendo éxito hasta ahora. COVID-19 podría haber tenido un efecto negativo en la fecundidad, pero no podría haber afectado mucho a los nacimientos debido al momento. Así que las tendencias no pueden estar demasiado distorsionadas por la pandemia. La urbanización rápida continúa, con la tasa alcanzando el 64% de la población, 14 puntos porcentuales más que en 2010. Las discusiones de política enfatizan elevar la edad de jubilación; ofrecer incentivos financieros para tener hijos; una serie de controles de precios para hacer más asequible tener hijos, destacando la supresión de la burbuja inmobiliaria; y medidas para asegurar que los precios de la vivienda no caigan demasiado rápido en las ciudades más pequeñas a medida que continúa la migración desde el campo. La población de minorías étnicas de China, que constituye el 9% de la población total, creció mucho más rápido (tasa del 10%) durante la última década que la mayoría Han, que representa el 91% de la población (creciendo al 5%). Las minorías están exentas de la política del hijo único (y de la de dos hijos). Sin embargo, han surgido tensiones étnicas, particularmente en regiones autónomas como Xinjiang, lo que ha provocado un mayor escrutinio internacional de las políticas de China hacia las minorías. El desafío demográfico de China es ampliamente conocido, pero el último censo refuerza la magnitud del reto. El crecimiento potencial de China está disminuyendo mientras que la ratio de dependencia creciente subraya cambios sociales que exigirán más al gobierno. Mayores necesidades de gasto fiscal y social requerirán difíciles compensaciones económicas y decisiones políticas impopulares. El cambio económico y el movimiento de personas también profundizarán las disparidades regionales y de riqueza. Todos estos puntos subrayan uno de nuestros megatemas constantes de Estrategia Geopolítica: los riesgos políticos internos de China están subestimados. Conclusión: El censo de 2020 de China refuerza el declive demográfico que está en la raíz de los crecientes desafíos socioeconómicos y políticos de China. Aunque China tiene un gobierno central fuerte con el poder consolidado bajo un solo partido gobernante y un historial de gestión exitosa de sus distintos desafíos en las últimas décadas, la magnitud de los cambios que están ocurriendo es abrumadora y traerá sorpresas económicas y políticas negativas. India: las elecciones estatales no representan un punto de inflexión contra Modi En el apogeo de la segunda ola de COVID-19 en India, se celebraron elecciones en cinco estados indios. Los resultados para el estado de Bengala Occidental fueron los más importantes. Bengala Occidental es un estado grande, que representa casi una décima parte de los legisladores en la asamblea nacional de India, y el gobernante Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) del primer ministro Narendra Modi había declarado que ganaría cerca del 70% de los 294 escaños allí. Al final, Bengala Occidental entregó una victoria aplastante al All India Trinamool Congress (AITMC), un partido regional. A pesar de que el AITMC enfrentaba una anti-incumbencia de dos mandatos, el recuento de escaños del AITMC alcanzó un máximo histórico. Pocos lo habían previsto, como lo demuestra el hecho de que el desempeño del AITMC superó las previsiones hechas por la mayoría de encuestadores. ¿Qué deben hacer los inversores con la pérdida del BJP en este estado clave? ¿Fue una reacción contra la gestión de la pandemia por parte de Modi? ¿Presagia un cambio de gobierno y de política nacional en las elecciones generales de 2024? No realmente. Aquí destacamos tres conclusiones clave: Conclusión n.º 1: El desempeño del BJP fue notable Gráfico 14 India: el BJP consigue penetrar en Bengala Occidental China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo Si bien el BJP no alcanzó sus objetivos en Bengala Occidental, el estado no es un bastión del BJP. Se sabe que el BJP tiene tracción natural en las regiones de habla hindi de India y Bengala Occidental es un estado de habla no hindi donde tradicionalmente se veía al BJP como un forastero. Además, este estado es conocido por ser inusualmente renuente al cambio. Por ejemplo, antes del AITMC, la Izquierda estuvo en el poder durante un récord de 34 años en este estado. En ese contexto, el desempeño del BJP en 2021 en Bengala Occidental es notable: el partido aumentó su número de escaños a 77, en comparación con solo 3 escaños en 2016 (Gráfico 14). Este desempeño catapulta ahora al BJP a convertirse en el principal partido de oposición en Bengala Occidental. También indica que el BJP puede tardar, pero tiene lo necesario para construir tracción en estados que no son bastiones tradicionales. Dado que logró esta hazaña en un estado donde tiene poca fuerza histórica, su actuación es significativa como señal de que el BJP sigue siendo una fuerza a tener en cuenta. Conclusión n.º 2: La popularidad del BJP se resintió pero aún se le considera favorito para mantener el poder en 2024 Aunque el descontento contra el BJP está aumentando por su mala gestión del COVID-19 y la consiguiente angustia económica, no existe una alternativa viable al BJP a nivel nacional. Las recientes elecciones estatales, no solo en Bengala Occidental, confirman que la oposición, el Indian National Congress (INC), aún no ha organizado su actuación. El partido del Congreso se hundió de 44 escaños en Bengala a 0 escaños. Más importante aún, el Congreso aún no ha resuelto dos cuestiones críticas, es decir, la necesidad de designar o elegir a un líder interno con atractivo masivo y la necesidad de desarrollar una agenda política identificable. La debilidad del Congreso significa que, aunque el número de escaños del BJP podría disminuir respecto a su rendimiento máximo de 2019, nuestro escenario base para 2024 sigue siendo el de un gobierno liderado por el BJP que mantiene el poder en India. La continuidad de las políticas y la posibilidad de alguna reforma estructural siguen siendo el caso base. Conclusión n.º 3: El auge constante de los partidos regionales de India El ascenso del BJP en la última década ha coincidido con pérdidas de escaños tanto por parte del Congreso como de los partidos regionales de India. Sin embargo, la ronda más reciente de elecciones estatales indica que el BJP no puede comprimir drásticamente la cuota de escaños de los partidos regionales. Por ejemplo, en Bengala Occidental consiguió 77 escaños por sí solo, pero esto no fue a expensas del AITMC, que es el actor dominante en este estado. En otro estado grande donde se celebraron elecciones a principios de este mes, es decir, Tamil Nadu, el control continúa fluctuando entre dos partidos regionales bien afianzados. Gráfico 15 India: el BJP alcanzó su pico en 2019 pero sigue siendo favorito para 2024 China, al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo China, al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo Las elecciones generales de 2019 vieron que la cuota de los partidos regionales (definidos como todos los partidos excluyendo al BJP y al Congreso) cayó al 35% desde casi el 40% observado en las elecciones generales de 2014 (Gráfico 15). Las elecciones de 2024 podrían de hecho ver aumentar un punto la cuota de escaños de los partidos regionales, ya que el conteo máximo de escaños del BJP podría disminuir respecto a los máximos de 2019. El próximo auge de los partidos regionales de India es una tendencia arraigada en una dinámica simple. Con el BJP como incumbente de dos mandatos en las elecciones de 2024, los votantes podrían optar por gratificar a los partidos regionales en el margen, en ausencia de cualquier alternativa al BJP a nivel nacional. El BJP sigue en condiciones de ser el partido más grande de India en 2024 con un número de escaños superior a la marca de la mitad. ¿Podría surgir una situación en la que el partido gobernante incorpore a un partido regional para mantenerse por delante de la marca de la mitad con un amplio colchón? Absolutamente. Pero, por supuesto, 2024 aún está lejos. Gestionar el COVID-19 y sus secuelas económicas hará más difícil de lo habitual para el BJP superar su rendimiento de 2019. La siguiente tanda de elecciones estatales clave en India está prevista para febrero de 2022 y el estado más grande de India, Uttar Pradesh, celebrará elecciones. Con el BJP actualmente en el poder en este estado de habla hindi, las elecciones de febrero de 2022 arrojarán más luz sobre la capacidad del BJP para mitigar el efecto de anti-incumbencia de la pandemia y el shock económico. Conclusión: La popularidad del BJP en India se ha sacudido pero no de forma dramática. El BJP sigue firmemente en una posición para ser el partido más grande en India con un número de escaños que debería superar la marca de la mitad en 2024. Así que la estabilidad gubernamental no es una preocupación en este mercado emergente por ahora. A la luz de los riesgos políticos internos de China y de la continuidad política en India, mantendremos nuestras apuestas en India por el momento (Gráficos 16A y 16B). Sin embargo, estamos llevando a cabo una revisión de India en su conjunto y actualizaremos a los clientes con nuestras conclusiones en un próximo informe especial. Gráfico 16A Mantener posiciones largas en bonos indios frente a mercados emergentes Mantener posiciones largas en bonos indios frente a los mercados emergentes (EM) Mantener posiciones largas en bonos indios frente a los mercados emergentes (EM) Gráfico 16B Mantener largo en India / corto en China Manténgase largo en India / corto en China Manténgase largo en India / corto en China Conclusiones de inversión Mantener operaciones refugio a corto plazo. Cerrar posiciones largas en futuros de gas natural con una ganancia del 19.8%. Mantener una posición alcista cíclica (12 meses) con preferencia por las acciones de valor sobre las de crecimiento. Mantener posiciones largas en materias primas, incluidos los metales de tierras raras, y en mercados emergentes. Pero estar preparado para recortar estas operaciones si China sobreendurece la política según nuestros puntos de referencia. Por ahora, continuar sobreponderando bonos indios en moneda local respecto a pares de mercados emergentes y acciones indias respecto a acciones chinas. Pero estamos revisando nuestra postura alcista sobre India. Gráfico 17 Las acciones de ciberseguridad se animan en medio de la caída tecnológica Las acciones de ciberseguridad repuntan en medio del desplome del sector tecnológico Las acciones de ciberseguridad repuntan en medio del desplome del sector tecnológico Mantener posiciones largas en acciones de ciberseguridad, aunque seguir prefiriendo aeroespacial y defensa sobre ciberseguridad como una apuesta geopolítica de “vuelta al trabajo”. Las acciones de ciberseguridad se animaron respecto al sector tecnológico durante la venta general de tecnología en la última semana. El ataque masivo de ransomware a Colonial Pipeline en EE. UU. cerró temporalmente una red importante que suministra alrededor del 45% del combustible de la Costa Este (Gráfico 17). No obstante, el ataque a la infraestructura crítica destaca que la ciberseguridad es un tema secular y los inversores deberían mantener exposición. Las acciones de ciberseguridad han superado al sector tecnológico en general desde el descubrimiento de la vacuna (Gráfico 18). Gráfico 18 La ciberseguridad es un tema secular La Ciberseguridad Es Un Tema Secular La Ciberseguridad Es Un Tema Secular Matt Gertken Vicepresidente Estrategia Geopolítica mattg@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma Asociada de investigación yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Ritika Mankar, CFA Editora/Estratega Ritika.Mankar@bcaresearch.com

Informe especial

Highlights The Scottish parliamentary election does not present a near-term risk of a second referendum on Scottish independence. Independence is possible down the road but very unlikely due to a host of economic and geopolitical challenges still relevant in the twenty-first century. Book gains on long CHF-GBP. Go long FTSE 100 versus developed markets excluding the United States. Feature British equities have underperformed developed markets over the past decade – even if we exclude the market-leading United States (Chart 1). The British equity market is heavily concentrated in cyclical sectors like financials and materials and has a low concentration in information technology and communications services. As such the bourse has sprung to life since the advent of the COVID-19 vaccine and the prospect of a government-stimulated global growth recovery. In keeping with our strategic preference for value over growth we also look constructively at British equities. A potential source of geopolitical and political risk is Britain’s ongoing constitutional crisis, which flared up with the failed Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the successful referendum to leave the EU in 2016. Tensions within the UK and between the UK and EU are part of the same problem – a loss of popular confidence and trust in the current nation-state and governing institutions in the aftermath of hyper-globalization.1 This constitutional crisis added insult to injury for UK stocks by jacking up policy uncertainty and undermining the attractiveness of domestic-oriented UK companies that suffered from trade disruptions with the European Union. Chart 1UK Referendums Added Insult To Injury Chart 2Post-Brexit Trading Range For GBP-EUR Now the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath have changed the global scene entirely and Brexit is no longer Britain’s chief concern. But there is still a lingering question over Scotland’s status. The Scottish question has recently weighed on the British pound and reinforced the new trading range for the GBP-EUR exchange rate in the aftermath of a “hard” exit from the European Union (Chart 2). Scotland voted for a new parliament on May 6 and the preliminary results are coming in as we go to press. The pro-independence Scottish National Party is still the most popular party and even if it falls short of a majority, as online betting markets expect, it has pro-independence allies with which it could form a coalition (Chart 3). Its leader, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, has promised to pursue a second popular referendum on seceding from the United Kingdom by 2023. Chart 3Betting Markets Doubt Single-Party Majority For SNP British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, backed by a strong Conservative Party parliamentary majority, has vowed not to allow a second referendum, arguing that the 2014 plebiscite was supposed to lay the question to rest for a while. Scottish opinion in favor of secession stands at 43.6% today, right near the 44.7% that nationalists achieved in 2014 (Chart 4). Chart 4Support For Independence Ticks Down, Still Shy Of Majority Our takeaway is to fade the Scottish risk. Book gains on our long CHF-GBP tactical trade. Go long British equities relative to DM-ex-US on the expectation of global economic normalization, which is beneficially for the outwardly oriented British multinationals that dominate the British bourse. Does Scotland Have Grand Strategy? The history of Scotland is marked by internal differences that prevent it from achieving unity and independence. Even in the twenty-first century, when many factors have coalesced to make Scottish independence more likely than at any time since the eighteenth century, the 2014 referendum produced a 10% gap in favor of remaining in the United Kingdom. This majority is all the more compelling when viewed from the perspective of geography because cross-regional support for the union is clear (Map 1). Map 1Scottish Independence Referendum Result, 2014 Why is Scotland always divided? Because it is trapped by the sea and adjacent to a greater power, England. England is usually strong enough to keep Scotland from consolidating power and asserting control over its maritime and land borders. Specifically, Scotland contains a small population (at 5.5 million today) and small economic base (GBP 155 billion in economic output at the end of 2022) dispersed over an inconvenient geography. The low-lying plains around the Firth of Forth that form the historic core of Scotland share a porous border with England. The highlands provide a retreat for Scottish forces during times of conflict, which makes it extremely difficult for southern forces, whether Roman or Anglo-Saxon, to conquer Scotland. But the highlands are equally hard for any standalone Scottish state to rule. Meanwhile the western isles are even more remote from the seat of Scottish power and vulnerable to foreign maritime powers. Since England could never conquer Scotland, its solution was to coopt the Scottish elite, who reciprocated, culminating in a merger of the two monarchies and then the two states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The British empire provided Scotland with peace, prosperity, and access to the rest of the world. History and geopolitics do not imply that Scottish independence is impossible, i.e. that union with the rest of Britain is inevitable and permanent. The Anglo-Scots union is only 314 or 418 years old, whereas Scotland existed as a recognizable kingdom for roughly six centuries prior to the joining of the crowns in 1603. It is entirely possible for Scotland to secede and break up the union known as Great Britain. The principle of rule by consent and modern democratic ideology make it difficult for London and Westminster to force Scotland into subjection like in the old days. In particular, American hegemony over Europe since WWII and the rise of the European Union have created a pathway for Scottish independence. England is no longer the indispensable gateway to peace and prosperity. Scotland can exist independently under the EU’s economic umbrella and the American security umbrella.   Europe has always played a major role in Scotland’s political fate and has always held the key to independence. Independence usually failed because European powers failed to devote large and steady resources to supporting Scotland militarily and economically. France was Scotland’s greatest patron and would lend its support for Scottish rebellion. But France also consistently failed Scotland (and Ireland) at critical junctures when independence might have been obtained. This is because France’s interests lay in distracting England rather than adopting Scotland. Chart 5Scottish Energy Production In Decline Today’s unified European continent could be a much greater patron than France ever was alone. The EU could assure Scotland of investment and access to markets even in the face of British resistance. However, the EU is still not politically unified: some members fear separatism in their own borders and therefore tend to oppose Scottish accession. It is possible that the EU could overcome this difficulty but only after a series of major events (on which more below). It took an American empire to clear the way for Irish independence. But Ireland has the moat of the Irish Sea – and the United Kingdom still retained Northern Ireland. Today the United States can be expected to keep its distance from quarrels within the UK or between the UK and EU. However, it does not have an interest in Scottish secession or any other disintegration of the UK, whether from a global security point of view (the West’s conflict with Russia) or even from the point of view of US grand strategy relative to Europe (prevention of a European empire that could challenge the US). An independent Scotland would struggle economically. Its declining base of fossil fuel reserves illustrates the problem of generating sufficient revenue to maintain the Scandinavian-style social welfare state that Scotland’s nationalists imagine (Chart 5). Scottish nationalists are keen to embrace renewable energy – and the Scottish Greens are pro-independence – yet Scotland is not a manufacturing powerhouse that will produce its own solar panels and windmills. In the face of economic difficulties, Scotland would become politically divided like it was for most of its history prior to union with England. England would revert to an obstructive or sabotaging role. It is telling that the Scottish voter turnout in the 2014 independence referendum was very strong – much stronger than in other recent elections and plebiscites, including the Brexit referendum in Scotland (Table 1). The implication is that it is much harder for Scotland to strike out on its own than it appears. Opinion polling cited above suggests that neither Brexit nor the COVID-19 pandemic has moved the needle decisively in the direction of independence. If anything it is the opposite. The Scottish National Party has lost momentum since 2014 and is losing momentum in advance of today’s local election, which has been pitched as the opportunity to make a second go at independence (Chart 6). Table 1Scotland: High Turnout In 2014 Independence Referendum Implies Firm Conclusion To Stay In UK Chart 6Scottish National Party Losing Momentum Just Ahead Of Holyrood Election Bottom Line: History suggests that the geopolitical and macroeconomic barriers to a unified and independent Scottish state are higher and stronger than they may appear at any given time, including the inevitable periods of tensions with England like today. The UK’s Saving Graces A fair question is whether the UK’s decision to leave the EU since 2016 has changed Scotland’s calculus. Brexit may also have affected the international context, reducing the EU’s willingness to intervene on the UK’s behalf and discourage Scottish ambitions. However, a handful of factors supports the continuation of the union despite Scotland’s grievances. The UK proved a boon amid COVID-19: While 62% of Scots voted against Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and recession have supplanted Brexit as the nation’s chief cause of concern. The UK and Scotland saw a higher rate of deaths during the biggest waves of the pandemic but now the pandemic is effectively over in the UK and Scotland, in stark contrast with the European Union (Chart 7). The UK has provided a net benefit to Scotland by inventing the vaccine and distributing it effectively (Chart 8). Scottish voters would have been worse off had they left the UK in 2014. Of course, Scottish nationalism is apparent in the fact that voters give the credit to Edinburgh while blaming London over its handling of the pandemic (Chart 9). But the underlying material reality – that being part of the UK provided a net benefit – will discourage independence sentiment. The Scottish Conservative Party and Labour Party are both in favor of sustaining the union and have benefited in opinion polling since the pandemic peaked. Chart 7COVID Deaths Collapse In ##br##United Kingdom Chart 8Scotland Benefited From UK Vaccine And Rollout   Chart 9Scots Praise Edinburgh, Blame London On COVID Handling Brexit is a cautionary economic tale: If Brexit is relevant to Scottish voters, it is not the source of grievance that it could have been. Prime Minister Boris Johnson achieved an exit and trade deal at the end of 2019-20 that largely preserves economic ties with the EU. True, the deal has problems that undermine the UK economy and enhance Scottish grievances. But these also serve as a warning to Scots who would attempt to exit the UK, highlighting the economic pitfalls of raising borders and barriers against one’s chief market. The UK’s trade is far more critical to Scotland’s economy than that of the EU (Chart 10).   Chart 10Major Constraint On Scottish Independence Unlike in the case of the UK and EU, Scotland shares the same currency and central bank with the UK. Scotland’s large banking sector stands to suffer drastically if the Bank of England ceases to be a lender of last resort. This would become a major problem at least until Scotland could be assured of admission into the EU and Euro Area. Otherwise redenomination into a national currency would deal an even greater financial and economic blow. Scots  would face a far more painful economic divorce from the UK than the UK faced with the EU. The UK’s fiscal blowout helped Scotland: Since the bank run at Northern Rock in 2007, the UK and Scotland have suffered a series of crises. This instability should discourage risk appetite today when contrasted with the possibility of stimulus-fueled economic recovery. In particular, the UK government is no longer pursuing fiscal austerity – an economic policy that fanned the flames of Scottish secession back in 2012. Indeed, the UK tops the ranks of global fiscal stimulus, according to the change in government net lending and borrowing as reported by the IMF. The UK’s outlier status ensures that Scotland receives more fiscal support than it otherwise would have (Chart 11). A brief comparison with comparable countries – Ireland, Belgium, France, Norway, Portugal – reinforces the point. Chart 11Scotland Benefited From UK Fiscal Blowout The UK’s aggressive policy of monetary and fiscal reflation is not a coincidence. It stems from the past two decades’ constitutional and political struggles – it is an outgrowth of domestic instability and populism. It includes an industrial policy, a green energy policy, and other rebuilding measures to combat the erosion of the state in the wake of hyper-globalization. Essentially the UK, even under a Tory government, is now about debt monetization and nation-building. While Scotland would have trouble bargaining for its share of EU resources, it benefits from the UK’s shift to government largesse and can use the threat of independence to receive greater funds from the United Kingdom. Geopolitics discourages a fledgling Scottish nation. Scotland hosts naval and air bases of considerable value to the UK, US, and broader NATO alliance. Former US President Trump’s punitive measures against the European allies and open doubts about the US’s commitment to NATO’s collective security illustrated the dangers of western divisions in the face of autocratic regimes like Russia and China. The US and EU are now recommitting to their economic and security bonds under the Biden administration. Scottish independence would undermine this recommitment and as such the small country would pit itself against the US, EU, and NATO. While the US and NATO would ultimately admit Scotland into collective security, for fear of cultivating a neutral Scotland that could eventually be exploited by Russia, they would likely discourage independence ahead of time to prevent a historic division within the UK and NATO. Chart 12No Urgency For A Second Referendum As for the EU, the Spanish government has indicated that it would be willing to make an exception for Scottish independence if it were negotiated amicably with the United Kingdom.2 Such statements are doubtful, however, as any successful secession would lend ideological credibility to Spanish secessionism – not only in Catalonia but also in the Basque country and elsewhere. And Spain is not the only country that harbors deep hesitations over Scottish accession to the European Union. Belgium, Slovakia, and Cyprus could also oppose it. It only takes a single veto to halt the whole accession process. Ultimately the EU could accept Scotland, just as would NATO, to avoid the dangers of having a neutral state in a strategic location. But the point is that Scottish voters cannot be certain. For example, Scotland cannot secure EU accession prior to leaving the UK and yet to leave the UK and fail to achieve EU accession would render it a fledgling. This explains why Scottish voters are not eager to hold a new independence referendum (Chart 12). Bottom Line: The UK offers medical, economic, fiscal, and geopolitical advantages to Scotland that independence would revoke. The context of Great Power struggle with Russia and China means that an independent Scotland would probably ultimately be admitted into NATO and the EU – but Scottish voters cannot be certain, a factor that discourages independence at least in the short and medium run. Scottish Hurdles Table 2 highlights the historic results of Scottish elections according to political party, popular vote share, and share of seats in parliament. Early, tentative signs suggest that the Scottish National Party maxed out in 2011. The party has suffered from a leadership schism, offshoot parties, and a distraction of its key message since 2014. The implication is not only that Scottish independence is on ice for now but also that the tumultuous constitutional disagreements are subsiding and voters want to focus on economic recovery. Table 2Scottish National Party Hit High-Water Mark In 2011? If the Scottish National Party manages to form a majority coalition capable of pushing forward a second referendum, it will face several hurdles. It will need a UK Supreme Court ruling on the legality of a referendum. If a referendum is declared legal (as it very likely will be), Scotland will need to forge an agreement with Prime Minister Boris Johnson to hold a referendum. If a referendum eventually is held and passes, an exit will need to be negotiated. In a post-Brexit world, investors cannot assume that any referendum will fail or that a referendum is a domestic political ploy that the ruling party has no serious intention of following through. Nevertheless it is true that the Scottish National Party could use the threat of a referendum to agree to negotiate a greater devolution of power from Westminster. The party could hold up England’s concessions as a victory while retaining the independence threat as leverage for a later date. Devolution in the past has strengthened the independence cause, as in the creation of the Scottish parliament in 1999. After all, a referendum loss would be devastating for the nationalists, whereas the threat of a referendum could yield victories without depriving the nationalists of their reason for being. It is notable that First Minister Nicola Sturgeon promised not to hold a “wildcat” referendum, in which Scotland holds a referendum regardless of what Westminster or the UK Supreme Court say. The implication is that Scottish nationalism is looking for a stable way to exit. But if stability is the hope then there is dubious support for independence in the first place. A wildcat referendum is theoretically still an option but a formal process with popular support is much more likely to result in a successful referendum than an informal process with dubious popular support. Chart 13Scotland’s Chronic Deficits If Scottish independence succeeded in any wildcat referendum, an extreme controversy would follow as Edinburgh tried to translate this result to the formal political and constitutional sphere. If the referendum were not recognized by the UK then Scotland would be forced to secede unilaterally at greater economic cost. Otherwise a third referendum (second formal referendum) would need to be held to confirm the results. Any third referendum would be irrevocable. As with Brexit, the secessionists would have to carry one or more subsequent elections to execute the political will in the event of secession. The point for investors is that volatility would be prolonged as was the case with Brexit. A major complication in Scottish independence remains the problem of public finances. Scotland’s fiscal standing is weak. Scotland ran a 9.4% of GDP budget deficit prior to COVID-19, excluding transfers from the UK, which compensates for a gap of about 6% of GDP (Chart 13).3 The country maintains generous social spending alongside a low-tax regime. There is no sign of correction as all Scottish parties are proposing more expansive social spending in the parliamentary election. The Scottish National Party is even proposing universal basic income. Scotland’s emergency COVID deficits are larger than the UK’s as well and projections over the coming years suggest that they will stay elevated. Historically economic growth keeps closely in line with the rest of the UK and there is no reason to believe independence would boost growth. The implication is that Scotland would have to curtail spending or raise taxes to come into line with UK-sized deficits, which are not small (Chart 14).4 Of course Scotland would not embrace austerity unless financial market pressure forced it to do so. Chart 14Scottish Deficit Projected Larger Than UK Scotland would become a high-debt economy. Its public debt-to-GDP ratio would be about 97%, on a back-of-the-envelope calculation. Back in 2013 estimates ranged around 80% of GDP.5 The Scottish National Party’s Sustainable Growth Commission projected in 2018 – before the pandemic blew an even wider hole in the budget deficit – that deficits would nearly have to be cut in half (i.e. capped at 5% of GDP and falling) to achieve a 50% debt-to-GDP ratio over 10 years.6 This is not going to happen. Scotland would also have to take on a portion of the UK’s national debt if it were to have an amicable divorce from the UK and retain the pound sterling. But then much of its newfound independence would be compromised from the beginning by legacy debt and monetary policy shackles. Similar restrictions would come with EU and euro membership. Any accession process after the pandemic would require conformity to the EU’s growth and stability pact, which limits deficits and debt. Redenomination into a national currency, as noted, would dilute domestic wealth, zap the financial industry, and self-impose austerity. Bottom Line: Even if the Scottish nationalists manage to put together a pro-independence majority in Edinburgh, they face a complex process in setting up a referendum. Its passage is doubtful based on the current evidence. But obviously in the wake of Brexit investors should not assume that a referendum attempt will fail or that a successful referendum will be thwarted by parliament after a “leave” vote. The timeline for a second referendum is not imminent – and Scottish independence is highly unlikely, albeit possible at some future date given that middle-aged Scots lean in favor of independence.   Investment Takeaways We will conclude with two market takeaways: Chart 15UK Stocks Recovering From Referendum Fever Chart 16Hindsight On How To Play A Constitutional Struggle The UK’s referendum fever has compounded political uncertainty and contributed to negative factors for the UK equity market over the past decade. A segmentation of the FTSE 100 according to country shows that Scottish-based companies’ share prices rolled over in the aftermath of the 2014 referendum, while the non-Scottish segment performed better (Chart 15). The implication is not that the referendum caused stocks to fall but that the 2014 independence push was the result of national exuberance supercharged by high commodity prices. Enthusiasm for independence has been flat since that time. What is clear is that financial markets look even less favorably upon Scottish equities than other British equities – another sign of the economic problems that will ultimately discourage Scottish voters from going it alone. In advance of the Scottish election, we went tactically long the Swiss franc relative to the British pound to capitalize on jitters that we expected to hit the currency. This trade was in keeping with the long fall of GBP-CHF over the past decade (Chart 16). But the stronger forces of global stimulus, vaccination, economic normalization, and recovery will soon provide a tailwind for sterling yet again. Therefore we are booking 1% gains and shifting to a more optimistic outlook on the pound. With the Brexit saga and the COVID crisis in the rear view mirror, and the tail risk of Scottish independence unlikely, the pound can resume its upward trajectory – at least relative to the Swiss franc. International equities and cyclicals are also poised to continue rising as the world recovers. We recommend investors go long the FTSE 100 relative to developed markets excluding the United States. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Jeremy Black, “The Legacy of the Scottish Referendum,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, September 22, 2014, fpri.org. 2 See Akash Paun et al, "Scottish Independence: EU Membership And The Anglo-Scottish Border," Institute For Government, March 2021, instituteforgovernment.org.uk. 3 See Eve Hepburn, Michael Keating, and Nicola McEwen, "Scotland’s New Choice: Independence After Brexit," Centre on Constitutional Change, 2021, centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk. 4 See David Phillips, "Updated projections of Scotland’s fiscal position – and their implications," Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 29, 2021, ifs.org.uk. 5 Granting that the UK’s general government gross debt stood at GBP 1.88 trillion at the end of 2020, and assuming that Scotland takes on a share of this debt equivalent to Scotland’s share of the UK’s total population and output (roughly 8%), the Scottish debt would stand at GBP 150 billion out of a Scottish GDP at current market prices of GBP 156 billion, or 97% of GDP. For the 2013 estimate of at least 80% of GDP, see David Bell, "Scottish Independence: Debt And Assets," Centre on Constitutional Change, December 3, 2013, centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk.  6 Scottish National Party, "Part B: The Framework & Strategy for the Sustainable Public Finances of an Independent Scotland," Sustainable Growth Commission, May 2018, sustainablegrowthcommission.scot. The commission’s debt curbs will have to be revised in the wake of COVID-19. For discussion see Chris Giles and Murie Dickie, "Independent Scotland would face a large hole in its public finances," Financial Times, April 2, 2021, ft.com.  

Dear Client, In addition to our regular report, this week we are sending a Special Report written by my colleague Lucas Laskey from BCA Research’s Equity Analyzer service titled “Is The Reopening Trade Closed?”. The report discusses the state of the reopening trade through the lens of Equity Analyzer's factor model. I hope you find the report insightful. Additionally, please join us next week on Friday, May 7, 2021 at 10am EDT as I moderate a debate between my colleagues Arthur Budaghyan, BCA Research’s Chief Emerging Market Strategist, and Robert Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist. Titled “A Debate On Commodities,” Arthur and Bob will discuss the outlook for commodities, touching on the trajectory both DM and China/EM growth will follow, the path for the US dollar, and other cyclical and structural forces currently shaping commodity markets. During the webcast, Arthur and Bob will highlight the areas they disagree on and the reasons behind their differing views. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Highlights Bitcoin is on a collision course with ESG. ESG interests will win out. Widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies, if it were to happen, would erode the purchasing power of traditional money, while robbing governments of billions of dollars in seigniorage revenue. Governments have already begun to take steps to thwart such an outcome. Restrictions on the use of cryptocurrencies will only increase over the coming years. The rollout of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) represents an existential threat not only to cryptos, but potentially to credit card companies and online payment processors such as PayPal, Square, Venmo, WeChat Pay, and Alipay. Shorting cryptocurrencies, meme stocks, or any other high-flying asset is risky business. Fortunately, there is a way to flip the usual risk-reward from going short on its head. Rather than facing unlimited losses and a maximum gain of only 100% of the initial position, we outline a shorting strategy that caps the loss at 100% but allows for unlimited gains. Bitcoin’s Questionable ESG Record Crypto critics have often blamed cryptocurrencies for facilitating illicit transactions and enlarging the world’s carbon footprint. There is some truth to both claims. Motivated to avoid detection, online scammers, smugglers, and terrorists have been drawn to cryptocurrencies. Cryptos have also been used to evade capital controls and conceal wealth from the tax authorities. On the environmental side, Bitcoin mining now consumes more energy than entire countries such as Sweden, Argentina, and Pakistan (Chart 1). Moreover, about 70% of Bitcoin mining currently takes place in China, mainly using electricity generated by burning coal. A lot of the remaining mining occurs in countries such as Russia and Iran with questionable governance records. Chart 1How Dare You, Bitcoin Cryptos And Inequality One criticism of Bitcoin that is less frequently mentioned is its role in exacerbating wealth inequality. We are not just talking about the small number of “whales” who amassed huge fortunes by buying or mining Bitcoin shortly after it was created. If these whales sell their coins at today’s prices and the price of  Bitcoin eventually crashes, those early investors will have ended up profiting at the expense of smaller investors who bought at the top. While such a transfer of income may be unsavory, it is not much different from what happens when someone sells a high-flying stock to the proverbial bagholder just as the stock is peaking. The more interesting question is what happens if Bitcoin prices do not crash. It might be tempting to think that in such a scenario, no one would be worse off. But that is incorrect. There would still be losers, and importantly, these losers would consist of people who never bought or sold Bitcoin in their lives. To see why, ask yourself who suffers from counterfeit currency. One possibility is shopkeepers who inadvertently accept counterfeit cash and find themselves stuck with worthless money. But even if the counterfeit money is never detected, there would still be losers: Fake money dilutes the value of genuine money, making everyone who holds the genuine money worse off. Crypto evangelists like to argue that cryptocurrencies offer protection against the “debasement of fiat money.” Ironically, the widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies could produce a self-fulfilling cycle that leads to just such an inflationary outcome. If enough people decide to swap fiat currencies for cryptos, the dollar and other fiat monies could become “hot potatoes.” The price of cryptos would rise in relation to dollars. Feeling more wealthy, crypto holders would spend some of their wealth on goods and services. As long as the economy is operating below potential, this would not be such a bad thing since increased spending would generate more output and employment. However, once the output gap disappears, more spending would result in higher inflation. The purchasing power of fiat currencies would decline. The Empire Strikes Back Will governments allow such a massive transfer of wealth from holders of fiat currencies to holders of crypto currencies to occur? It seems highly unlikely. In order to entice people to hold on to their fiat currency bank deposits, central banks would have to raise interest rates. Debt-strapped governments would not like that. Governments also generate significant revenue from their ability to print currency and then exchange it for goods and services. For the US, this “seigniorage revenue” is around $100 billion per year (Chart 2). No government will want to part with this revenue. A financial system where loans and deposits are denominated in cryptocurrencies would be highly unstable. Even if the supply of each individual cryptocurrency were capped, the rise and fall of competing cryptocurrencies could still result in large shifts in the aggregate cryptocurrency money supply. Moreover, wild swings in cryptocurrency prices, both versus fiat currencies and one another, could destroy any semblance of price stability. The value of bank loans made in Bitcoin or other cryptos would experience great fluctuations. Powerless to issue cryptocurrencies themselves, central banks would not be able to provide unlimited liquidity support to commercial banks as they do now. The situation would resemble the US in the late 19th century when myriad currencies competed with one another and the financial system veered from one crisis to another (Chart 3). Chart 2Governments Will Not Part With Seigniorage Revenue Chart 3An Inelastic Money Supply Historically Led To More Banking Crises   What Is It Good For? One might argue that the ultimate aim of cryptocurrencies is not to displace fiat money. Okay, but if Bitcoin can never truly function as a medium of exchange or a unit of account, what exactly underpins its utility as a store of value? At least with gold, you get an extremely rare metal, forged in the collision of neutron stars billions of years ago, that has great aesthetic value. With cryptos, you get fairy dust. In past reports, we referred to Bitcoin as a “solution in search of a problem.” In retrospect, that characterization was much too charitable. Bitcoin is a problem in search of a problem. Whereas the Visa network can process over 20,000 transactions per second, the Bitcoin network can barely process five (Chart 4). Bitcoin transactions take 10 minutes-to-an hour to complete compared to just a few seconds for most debit or credit card transactions. The average fee for a Bitcoin transaction is around $30. This fee has been rising, not falling, over the past few years (Chart 5). Chart 4Bitcoin: The Speed Of Transactions, Or Lack Of It Chart 5Bitcoin: The Cost Per Transaction Is Rising     Look Out Below Table 1A Growing List Of Cryptocurrency Bans Cryptos are heading for a world of pain. ESG concerns will force companies to step back from their newfound infatuation with these magic beans. Meanwhile, governments will tighten the screws on cryptocurrencies while rolling out their own digital monies. As my colleague Chester Ntonifor pointed out last week, a growing list of countries have already moved to ban Bitcoin transactions (Table 1). In addition, most G10 central banks have outlined their own digital currency plans (Map 1). Not only will Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) squeeze out decentralised cryptocurrencies, they will also pose an existential risk to credit card companies and online payment processors such as PayPal, Square, Venmo, WeChat Pay, and Alipay. Map 1Many Central Banks Are Planning A Digital Currency The Risk Of Shorting Bitcoin These days, there is no shortage of ways to short Bitcoin. Many cryptocurrency platforms permit short selling. In addition, one can bet against Bitcoin through the futures market. To the extent that the fortunes of companies such as Coinbase are tied to the crypto market, one can also express a short view on cryptos through listed equities. Yet, shorting cryptos is a risky strategy. Cryptocurrencies do not have any intrinsic value. What you think a Bitcoin is worth depends on what others think it is worth and vice versa. At present, the value of all Bitcoins that have ever been issued is about $1 trillion. Eighteen cryptocurrencies have valuations exceeding $10 billion (Table 2). The market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies in circulation stands at $2 trillion. In contrast, the value of all the gold that has ever been mined is around $10 trillion (Chart 6). It is certainly possible that euphoric investors will push up the value of cryptocurrencies to the point that they are collectively worth more than all the gold in the world. Table 2Close To 20 Cryptos Have A Market Cap In Excess Of US$10bn Chart 6Gold Versus Cryptocurrencies     To guard against this risk, one needs a prudent strategy for shorting not just high-flying cryptocurrencies, but any security whose price can rise significantly. Luckily, such a strategy exists. How To Short Without Losing Your Shorts Clients sometimes ask me what I invest my money in. The answer is that most of my liquid wealth is held in publicly traded US small cap stocks. I have been investing in this space for over two decades (prior to joining Goldman, I even wrote a blog about it). I used my knowledge of stock picking to develop an early version of BCA’s Equity Analyzer. David Boucher and his team have since transformed it into a powerful, state-of-the-art stock selection service. Table 3Don’t Be Like Melvin Shorting small cap stocks is risky business. To limit the risk, I have employed a strategy that flips the usual risk-reward from shorting on its head. Normally, when you short a stock, your gain is capped at 100% of the initial position whereas your potential loss is unlimited. With my shorting technique, your potential loss is capped at 100% while your potential gain is unlimited. To illustrate how the strategy works, let us consider shorting one particular overpriced “meme” stock that has been in the news a lot this year. I won’t single out the name of the company, other than to note that it begins with “G” and ends with “stop.” At the time of writing, this mystery stock was trading at $180 per share. Suppose you shorted 1,000 shares at that price. The basic idea is to then short 2% more shares if the price falls by 1% and cover 2% of your shares if the price rises by 1%. So, in this case, you would increase your short position to 1020 shares if the price were to fall to around $178 but cover 20 shares (leaving you with 980 shares short) if the price were to rise to $182. Table 3 shows the number of shares you would need to be short for any given price between $5 and $360. If the price of the shares were to fall to $10 (double what it was last August), the strategy would generate roughly $3,060,000 in profits.1 In contrast, if the price were to rise to $360 per share, the strategy would incur a loss of $90,000. Even if the price went to infinity, the most you would lose is $180,000. There are a number of challenges to implementing this strategy: 1) It requires frequent trading; 2) gap downs and gap ups in the price could meaningfully hurt the results; 3) it is not always possible to short a stock and even when it is, the borrowing costs could be high, etc. Nevertheless, as a “rule of thumb,” I have found this strategy to be extremely effective in mitigating risk.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Notice that the profit of $3,060,000 from going short 1,000 shares in the case where the price of the stock falls from $180 to $10 is equal to 17 times the initial short position of $180,000 (i.e., $3,060,000 divided by 180,000 is 17). This is exactly the same return that one would earn if one went long the stock and the price rose from $10 to $180. In this case, the profit would also be equal to 17 times the initial investment (i.e., $1,800,000-$100,000 divided by $100,000 is 17). 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Highlights Biden’s first 100 days are characterized by a liberal spend-and-tax agenda unseen since the 1960s. It is not a “bait and switch,” however. Voters do not care about deficits and debt. At least not for now. The apparent outcome of the populist surge in the US and UK in 2016 is blowout fiscal spending. Yet the US and UK also invented and distributed vaccines faster than others. US growth and equities have outperformed while the US dollar experienced a countertrend bounce. While growth will rotate to other regions, China’s stimulus is on the wane. Of Biden’s three initial geopolitical risks, two are showing signs of subsiding: Russia and Iran. US-China tensions persist, however, and Biden has been hawkish so far. Our new Australia Geopolitical Risk Indicator confirms our other indicators in signaling that China risk, writ large, remains elevated. Cyclically we are optimistic about the Aussie and Australian stocks. Mexico’s midterm elections are likely to curb the ruling party’s majority but only marginally. The macro and geopolitical backdrop is favorable for Mexico. Feature US President Joe Biden gave his first address to the US Congress on April 28. Biden’s first hundred days are significant for his extravagant spending proposals, which will rank alongside those of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, if not Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, in their impact on US history, for better and worse. Chart 1Biden's First 100 Days - The Market's Appraisal The global financial market appraisal is that Biden’s proposals will turn out for the better. The market has responded to the US’s stimulus overshoot, successful vaccine rollout, and growth outperformance – notably in the pandemic-struck service sector – by bidding up US equities and the dollar (Chart 1). From a macro perspective we share the BCA House View in leaning against both of these trends, preferring international equities and commodity currencies. However, our geopolitical method has made it difficult for us to bet directly against the dollar and US equities. Geopolitics is about not only wars and trade but also the interaction of different countries’ domestic politics. America’s populist spending blowout is occurring alongside a sharp drop in China’s combined credit-and-fiscal impulse, which will eventually weigh on the global economy. This is true even though the rest of the world is beginning to catch up in vaccinations and economic normalization. As for traditional geopolitical risk – wars and alliances – Biden has not yet leaped over the three initial foreign policy hurdles that we have highlighted: China, Russia, and Iran. In this report we will update the view on all three, as there is tentative improvement on the Russian and Iranian fronts. In addition, we will introduce our newest geopolitical risk indicator – for Australia – and update our view on Mexico ahead of its June 6 midterm elections. Biden’s Fiscal Blowout From a macro point of view, Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was much larger than what Republicans would have passed if President Trump had won a second term. His proposed $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan (AJP) is also larger, though both candidates were likely to pass an infrastructure package. The difference lies in the parts of these packages that relate to social spending and other programs, beyond COVID relief and roads and bridges. The Republican proposal for COVID relief was $618 billion while the Republicans’ current proposal on infrastructure is $568 billion – marking a $3 trillion difference from Biden. In reality Republicans would have proposed larger spending if Trump had remained president – but not enough to close this gap. And Biden is also proposing a $1.8 trillion American Families Plan (AFP). Biden’s praise for handling the vaccinations must be qualified by the Trump administration’s successful preparations, which have been unfairly denigrated. Similarly, Biden’s blame for the migrant surge at the southern border must be qualified by the fact that the surge began last year.1 A comparison with the UK will put Biden’s administration into perspective. The only country comparable to the US in terms of the size of fiscal stimulus over 2019-21 so far – excluding Biden’s AJP and AFP, which are not yet law – is the United Kingdom. Thus the consequence of the flare-up of populism in the Anglo-Saxon world since 2016 is a budget deficit blowout as these countries strive to suppress domestic socio-political conflict by means of government largesse, particularly in industrial and social programs. However, populist dysfunction was also overrated. Both the US and UK retain their advantages in terms of innovation and dynamism, as revealed by the vaccine and its rollout (Chart 2). Chart 2Dysfunctional Anglo-Saxon Populism? No sharp leftward turn occurred in the UK, where Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservatives had the benefit of a pre-COVID election in December 2019, which they won. By contrast, in the US, President Trump and the Republicans contended an election after the pandemic and recession had virtually doomed them to failure. There a sharp leftward turn is taking place. Going forward the US will reclaim the top rank in terms of fiscal stimulus, as Biden is likely to get his infrastructure plan (AJP) passed. Our updated US budget deficit projections appear in Chart 3. Our sister US Political Strategy gives the AJP an 80% chance of passing in some form and the AFP only a 50% chance of passing, depending on how quickly the AJP is passed. This means the blue dashed line is more likely to occur than the red dashed line. The difference is slight despite the mind-boggling headline numbers of the plans because the spending is spread out over eight-to-ten years and tax hikes over 15 years will partially offset the expenditures. Much will depend on whether Congress is willing to pay for the new spending. In Chart 3 we assume that Biden will get half of the proposed corporate tax hikes in the AJP scenario (and half of the individual tax hikes in the AFP scenario). If spending is watered down, and/or tax hikes surprise to the upside, both of which are possible, then the deficit scenarios will obviously tighten, assuming the economic recovery continues robustly as expected. But in the current political environment it is safest to plan for the most expansive budget deficit scenarios, as populism is the overriding force. Chart 3Biden’s Blowout Spending Biden’s campaign plan was even more visionary, so it is not true that Biden pulled a “bait and switch” on voters. Rather, the median voter is comfortable with greater deficits and a larger government role in American life. Bottom Line: The implication of Biden’s spending blowout is reflationary for the global economy, cyclically negative for the US dollar, and positive for global equities. But on a tactical time frame the rotation to other equities and currencies will also depend on China’s fiscal-and-credit deceleration and whether geopolitical risk continues to fall. Russia: Some Improvement But Coast Not Yet Clear US-Russia tensions appeared to fizzle over the past week but the coast is not yet clear. We remain short Russian currency and risk assets as well as European emerging market equities. Tensions fell after President Putin’s State of the Nation address on April 21 in which he warned the West against crossing Russia’s “red lines.” Biden’s sanctions on Russia were underwhelming – he did not insist on halting the final stages of the Nord Stream II pipeline to Germany. Russia declared it would withdraw its roughly 100,000 troops from the Ukrainian border by May 1. Russian dissident Alexei Navalny ended his hunger strike. Putin attended Biden’s Earth Day summit and the two are working on a bilateral summit in June. Chart 4Russia's Domestic Instability Will Continue De-escalation is not certain, however. First, some US officials have cast doubt on Russia’s withdrawal of troops and it is known that arms and equipment were left in place for a rapid mobilization and re-escalation if necessary. Second, Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists will be emboldened, which could increase fighting in Ukraine that could eventually provoke Russian intervention. Third, the US has until August or September to prevent Nord Stream from completion. Diplomacy between Russia and the US (and Russia and several eastern European states) has hit a low point on the withdrawal of ambassadors. Fourth, Russian domestic politics was always the chief reason to prepare for a worse geopolitical confrontation and it remains unsettled. Putin’s approval rating still lingers in the relatively low range of 65% and government approval at 49%. The economic recovery is weak and facing an increasingly negative fiscal thrust, along with Europe and China, Russia’s single-largest export destination (Chart 4). Putin’s handouts to households, in anticipation of the September Duma election, only amount to 0.2% of GDP. More measures will probably be announced but the lead-up to the election could still see an international adventure designed to distract the public from its socioeconomic woes. Russia’s geopolitical risk indicators ticked up as anticipated (Chart 5). They may subside if the military drawdown is confirmed and Biden and Putin lower the temperature. But we would not bet on it. Chart 5Russian Geopolitical Risk: Wait For 'All Clear' Signal Bottom Line: It is possible that Biden has passed his first foreign policy test with Russia but it is too soon to sound the “all clear.” We remain short Russian ruble and short EM Europe until de-escalation is confirmed. The Russian (and German) elections in September will mark a time for reassessing this view. Iran: Diplomacy On Track (Hence Jitters Will Rise) While Russia may or may not truly de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, the spring and summer are sure to see an increase in focus on US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Geopolitical risks will remain high prior to the conclusion of a deal and will materialize in kinetic attacks of various kinds. This thesis is confirmed by the alleged Israeli sabotage of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility this month. The US Navy also fired warning shots at Iranian vessels staging provocations. Sporadic attacks in other parts of the region also continue to flare, most recently with an Iranian tanker getting hit by a drone at a Syrian oil terminal.2 The US and Iran are making progress in the Vienna talks toward rejoining the 2015 nuclear deal from which the US withdrew in 2018. Iran pledged to enrich uranium up to 60% but also said this move was reversible – like all its tentative violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) so far (Table 1). Iran also offered a prisoner swap with the US. Saudi Arabia appears resigned to a resumption of the JCPA that it cannot prevent, with crown prince Mohammed bin Salman offering diplomatic overtures to both the US and Iran. Table 1Iran’s Nuclear Program And Compliance With JCPA 2015 Still, the closer the US and Iran get to a deal the more its opponents will need to either take action or make preparations for the aftermath. The allegation that former US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shared Israeli military plans with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is an example of the kind of political brouhaha that will occur as different elements try to support and oppose the normalization of US-Iran ties. More importantly Israel will underscore its red line against nuclear weaponization. Previously Iran was set to reach “breakout” capability of uranium enrichment – a point at which it has enough fissile material to produce a nuclear device – as early as May. Due to sabotage at the Natanz facility the breakout period may have been pushed back to July.3 This compounds the significance of this summer as a deadline for negotiating a reduction in tensions. While the US may be prepared to fudge on Iran’s breakout capabilities, Israel will not, which means a market-relevant showdown should occur this summer before Israel backs down for fear of alienating the United States. Tit-for-tat attacks in May and June could cause negative surprises for oil supply. Then there will be a mad dash by the negotiators to agree to deal before the de facto August deadline, when Iran inaugurates a new president and it becomes much harder to resolve outstanding issues. Chart 6Iran Deal Priced Into Oil Markets? Hence our argument that geopolitics adds upside risk to oil prices in the first half of the year but downside risk in the second half. The market’s expectations seem already to account for this, based on the forward curve for Brent crude oil. The marginal impact of a reconstituted Iran nuclear deal on oil prices is slightly negative over the long run since a deal is more likely to be concluded than not and will open up Iran’s economy and oil exports to the world. However, our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects the Brent price to exceed expectations in the coming years, judging by supply and demand balances and global macro fundamentals (Chart 6). If an Iran deal becomes a fait accompli in July and August the Saudis could abandon their commitment to OPEC 2.0’s production discipline. The Russians and Saudis are not eager to return to a market share war after what happened in March 2020 but we cannot rule it out in the face of Iranian production. Thus we expect oil to be volatile. Oil producers also face the threat of green energy and US shale production which gives them more than one reason to keep up production and prevent prices from getting too lofty. Throughout the post-2015 geopolitical saga between the US and Iran, major incidents have caused an increase in the oil-to-gold ratio. The risk of oil supply disruption affected the price more than the flight to gold due to geopolitical or war risk. The trend generally corresponds with that of the copper-to-gold ratio, though copper-to-gold rose higher when growth boomed and oil outperformed when US-Iran tensions spiked in 2019. Today the copper-to-gold ratio is vastly outperforming the oil-to-gold on the back of the global recovery (Chart 7). This makes sense from the point of view of the likelihood of a US-Iran deal this year. But tensions prior to a deal will push up oil-to-gold in the near term. Chart 7Biden Passes Iran Test? Likely But Not A Done Deal Bottom Line: The US-Iran diplomacy is on track. This means geopolitical risk will escalate in May and June before a short-term or interim deal is agreed in July or August. Geopolitical risk stemming from US-Iran relations will subside thereafter, unless the deadline is missed. The forward curve has largely priced in the oil price downside except for the risk that OPEC 2.0 becomes dysfunctional again. We expect upside price surprises in the near term. Biden, China, And Our Australia GeoRisk Indicator Ostensibly the US and Russia are avoiding a war over Ukraine and the US and Iran are negotiating a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Only US-China relations utterly lack clarity, with military maneuvering in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and tensions simmering over the gamut of other disputes. Chart 8Biden Still Faces China Test The latest data on global military spending show not only that the US and China continue to build up their militaries but also that all of the regional allies – including Japan! – are bulking up defense spending (Chart 8). This is a substantial confirmation of the secular growth of geopolitical risk, specifically in reaction to China’s rise and US-China competition. The first round of US-China talks under Biden went awry but since then a basis has been laid for cooperation on climate change, with President Xi Jinping attending Biden’s virtual climate change summit (albeit with no bilateral summit between the two). If John Kerry is removed as climate czar over his Iranian controversy it will not have an impact other than to undermine American negotiators’ reliability. The deeper point is that climate is a narrow basis for US-China cooperation and it cannot remotely salvage the relationship if a broader strategic de-escalation is not agreed. Carbon emissions are more likely to become a cudgel with which the US and West pressure China to reform its economy faster. The Department of Defense is not slated to finish its comprehensive review of China policy until June but most US government departments are undertaking their own reviews and some of the conclusions will trickle out in May, whether through Washington’s actions or leaks to the press. Beijing could also take actions that upend the Biden administration’s assessment, such as with the Microsoft hack exposed earlier this year. The Biden administration will soon reveal more about how it intends to handle export controls and sanctions on China. For example, by May 19 the administration is slated to release a licensing process for companies concerned about US export controls on tech trade with China due to the Commerce Department’s interim rule on info tech supply chains. The Biden administration looks to be generally hawkish on China, a view that is now consensus. Any loosening of punitive measures would be a positive surprise for Chinese stocks and financial markets in general. There are other indications that China’s relationship with the West is not about to improve substantially – namely Australia. Australia has become a bellwether of China’s relations with the world. While the US’s defense commitments might be questionable with regard to some of China’s neighbors – namely Taiwan (Province of China) but also possibly South Korea and the Philippines – there can be little doubt that Australia, like Japan, is the US’s red line in the Pacific. Australian politics have been roiled over the past several years by the revelation of Chinese influence operations, state- or military-linked investments in Australia, and propaganda campaigns. A trade war erupted last year when Australia called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 and China’s handling of it. Most recently, Victoria state severed ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the rise in Sino-Australian tensions, the economic relationship remains intact. China’s stimulus overweighed the impact of its punitive trade measures against Australia, both by bidding up commodity prices and keeping the bulk of Australia’s exports flowing (Chart 9). As much as China might wish to decouple from Australia, it cannot do so as long as it needs to maintain minimum growth rates for the sake of social stability and these growth rates require resources that Australia provides. For example, global iron ore production excluding Australia only makes up 80% of China’s total iron ore imports, which necessitates an ongoing dependency here (Chart 10). Brazil cannot make up the difference. Chart 9China-Australia Trade Amid Tensions Chart 10China Cannot Replace Australia This resource dependency does not necessarily reduce geopolitical tension, however, because it increases China’s supply insecurity and vulnerability to the US alliance. The US under Biden explicitly aims to restore its alliances and confront autocratic regimes. This puts Australia at the front lines of an open-ended global conflict. Chart 11Introducing: Australia GeoRisk Indicator (Smoothed) Our newly devised Australia GeoRisk Indicator illustrates the point well, as it has continued surging since the trade war with China first broke out last year (Chart 11). This indicator is based on the Australian dollar and its deviation from underlying macro variables that should determine its course. These variables are described in Appendix 1. If the Aussie weakens relative to these variables, then an Australian-specific risk premium is apparent. We ascribe that premium to politics and geopolitics writ large. A close examination of the risk indicator’s performance shows that it tracks well with Australia’s recent political history (Chart 12). Previous peaks in risk occurred when President Trump rose to power and Australia, like Canada, found itself beset by negative pressures from both the US and China. In particular, Trump threatened tariffs and the Australian government banned China’s Huawei from its 5G network. Today the rise in geopolitical risk stems almost exclusively from China. There is potential for it to roll over if Biden negotiates a reduction in tensions but that is a risk to our view (an upside risk for Australian and global equities). Chart 12Australian GeoRisk Indicator (Unsmoothed) What does this indicator portend for tradable Australian assets? As one would expect, Australian geopolitical risk moves inversely to the country’s equities, currency, and relative equity performance (Chart 13). Australian equities have risen on the back of global growth and the commodity boom despite the rise in geopolitical risk. But any further spike in risk could jeopardize this uptrend. Chart 13Australia Geopolitical Risk And Tradable Assets An even clearer inverse relationship emerges with the AUD-JPY exchange rate, a standard measure of risk-on / risk-off sentiment in itself. If geopolitical risk rises any further it should cause a reversal in the currency pair. Finally, Australian equities have not outperformed other developed markets excluding the US, which may be due to this elevated risk premium. Bottom Line: China is the most important of Biden’s foreign policy hurdles and unlike Russia and Iran there is no sign of a reduction in tension yet. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator supports the point that risk remains very elevated in the near term. Moreover China’s credit deceleration is also negative for Australia. Cyclically, however, assuming that China does not overtighten policy, we take a constructive view on the Aussie and Australian equities. Biden’s Border Troubles Distract From Bullish Mexico Story The biggest criticism of Biden’s first 100 days has been his reduction in a range of enforcement measures on the southern border which has encouraged an overflow of immigrants. Customs and Border Patrol have seen a spike in “encounters” from a low point of around 17,000 in 2020 to about 170,000 today. The trend started last year but accelerated sharply after the election and had surpassed the 2019 peak of 144,000. Vice President Kamala Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, both with Mexico and Central American states. She does not have much experience with foreign policy so this is her opportunity to learn on the job. She will not be able to accomplish much given that the Biden administration is unwilling to use punitive measures or deterrence and will not have large fiscal resources available for subsidizing the nations to the south. With the US economy hyper-charged, especially relative to its southern neighbors, the pace of immigration is unlikely to slacken. From a macro point of view the relevance is that the US is not substantially curtailing immigration – quite the opposite – which means that labor force growth will not deviate from its trend. What about Mexico itself? It is not likely that Harris will be able to engage on a broader range of issues with Mexico beyond immigration. As usual Mexico is beset with corruption, lawlessness, and instability. To these can be added the difficulties of the pandemic and vaccine rollout. Tourism and remittances are yet to recover. Cooperation with US federal agents against the drug cartels is deteriorating. Cartels control an estimated 40% of Mexican territory.4 Nevertheless, despite Mexico’s perennial problems, we hold a positive view on Mexican currency and risk assets. The argument rests on five points: Strong macro fundamentals: With China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse slowing sharply, and US stimulus accelerating, Mexico stands to benefit. Mexico has also run orthodox monetary and fiscal policies. It has a demographic tailwind, low wages, and low public debt. The stars are beginning to align for the country’s economy, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy. US and Canadian stimulus: The US and Canada have the second- and third-largest fiscal stimulus of all the major countries over the 2019-21 period, at 9% and 8% of GDP respectively. Mexico, with the new USMCA free trade deal in hand, will benefit. US protectionism fizzled: Even Republican senators blocked President Trump’s attempted tariffs on Mexico. Trump’s aggression resulted in the USMCA, a revised NAFTA, which both US political parties endorsed. Mexico is inured to US protectionism, at least for the short and medium term. Diversification from China: Mexico suffered the greatest opportunity cost from China’s rise as an offshore manufacturer and entrance to the World Trade Organization. Now that the US and other western countries are diversifying away from China, amid geopolitical tensions, Mexico stands to benefit. The US cannot eliminate its trade deficit due to its internal savings/investment imbalance but it can redistribute that trade deficit to countries that cannot compete with it for global hegemony. AMLO faces constraints: A risk factor stemmed from politics where a sweeping left-wing victory in 2018 threatened to introduce anti-market policies. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) and his MORENA party gained a majority in both houses of the legislature. Their coalition has a two-thirds majority in the lower house (Chart 14). However, we pointed out that AMLO’s policies have not been radical and, more importantly, that the midterm election would likely constrain his power. Chart 14Mexico’s Midterm Election Looms These are all solid points but the last item faces a test in the upcoming midterm election. AMLO’s approval rating is strong, at 63%, putting him above all of his predecessors except one (Chart 15). AMLO’s approval has if anything benefited from the COVID-19 crisis despite Mexico’s inability to handle the medical challenge. He has promised to hold a referendum on his leadership in early 2022, more than halfway through his six-year term, and he is currently in good shape for that referendum. For now his popularity is helpful for his party, although he is not on the ballot in 2021 and MORENA’s support is well beneath his own. Chart 15AMLO’s Approval Fairly Strong MORENA’s support is holding at a 44% rate of popular support and its momentum has slightly improved since the pandemic began. However, MORENA’s lead over other parties is not nearly as strong as it was back in 2018 (Chart 16, top panel). The combined support of the two dominant center-right parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the National Action Party, is almost equal to that of MORENA. And the two center-left parties, the Democratic Revolution Party and Citizen’s Movement, are part of the opposition coalition (Chart 16, bottom panel). The pandemic and economic crisis will motivate the opposition. Chart 16MORENA’s Support Holding Up Despite COVID Traditionally the president’s party loses seats in the midterm election (Table 2). Circumstances are different from the US, which also exhibits this trend, because Mexico has more political parties. A loss of seats from MORENA does not necessarily favor the establishment parties. Nevertheless opinion polling shows that about 45% of voters say they would rather see MORENA’s power “checked” compared to 41% who wish to see the party go on unopposed.5 Table 2Mexican President’s Party Tends To Lose Seats In Midterm Election While the ruling coalition may lose its super-majority, it is not a foregone conclusion that MORENA will lose its majority. Voters have decades of experience of the two dominant parties, both were discredited prior to 2018, and neither has recovered its reputation so quickly. The polling does not suggest that voters regret their decision to give the left wing a try. If anything recent polls slightly push against this idea. If MORENA surprises to the upside then AMLO’s capabilities would increase substantially in the second half of his term – he would have political capital and an improving economy. While the senate is not up for grabs in the midterm, MORENA has a narrow majority and controls a substantial 60% of seats when its allies are taken into account. In this scenario AMLO could pursue his attempts to increase the state’s role in key industries, like energy and power generation, at the expense of private investors. Even then the Supreme Court would continue to act as a check on the government. The 11-seat court is currently made up of five conservatives, two independents, and three liberal or left-leaning judges. A new member, Margarita Ríos Farjat, is close to the government, leaving the conservatives with a one-seat edge over the liberals and putting the two independents in the position of swing voters. Even if AMLO maintains control of the lower house, he will not be able to override the constitutional court, as he has threatened on occasion to do, without a super-majority in the senate. Bottom Line: AMLO will likely lose some ground in the lower house and thus suffer a check on his power. This will only confirm that Mexican political risk is not likely to derail positive underlying macro fundamentals. Continue to overweight Mexican equities relative to Brazilian.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix 1 The market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd and as such our Geopolitical Risk Indicators were not designed to predict political risk but to answer the question of whether and to what extent markets have priced that risk. Our Australian GeoRisk Indicator (see Chart 11-12 above) uses the same simple methodology used in our other indicators, which avoid the pitfall of regression-based models. We begin with a financial asset that has a daily frequency in price, in this case the AUD, and compare its movement against several fundamental factors – in this case global energy and base metal prices, global metals and mining stock prices, and the Chilean peso. Australia is a commodity-exporting country. It is the largest producer of iron ore and is among the largest producers of coal and natural gas. It is also a major trading partner for China. Due to the nature of its economy the Australian dollar moves with global metal and energy prices and the global metals and mining equity prices. Chile, another major commodity producer also moves with global metal prices, hence our inclusion of the peso in this indicator. The AUD has a high correlation with all of these assets, and if the changes in the value of the AUD lag or lead the changes in the value of these assets, the implication is that geopolitical risk unique to Australia is not priced by the market. We included the peso as Chile is not as affected as Australia by any conflict in the South China Sea or Northeast Asia, which means that a deviation of the AUD from CLP represents a unique East Asia Pacific risk. Our indicator captures the involvement of Australia in a few regional and international conflicts. The indicator climbed as Australia got involved in the East Timor emergency and declined as it exited. It continued declining even as Australia joined the US in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which showed that investors were unperturbed by faraway wars, while showing measurable concern in the smaller but closer Timorese conflict. Risks went up again as the nation erupted in labor protests as the Howard government made changes to the labor code. We see the market pricing higher risk again during the 2008 financial crisis, although it was modest and Australia escaped the crisis unscathed due to massive Chinese stimulus. Since then, investors have been climbing a wall of worry as they priced in Northeast Asia-related geopolitical risks. These started with the South Korean Cheonan sinking and continued with the Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku islands. They culminated with the Chinese ADIZ declaration in late 2013. In 2016, Australia was shocked again when Donald Trump was elected, and investor fears were evident when the details of Trump-Turnbull spat were made public. The risk indicator reached another peak during the trade wars between the US and the rest of the world. Investors were not worried about COVID-19 as Australia largely contained the pandemic, but the recent Australian-Chinese trade war pushed the risk indicator up, giving investors another wall of worry. If the Biden administration forces Australia into a democratic alliance in confrontation with autocratic China then this risk will persist for some time.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com We Read (And Liked) ... The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, And The Fate Of Liberty This book is a sweeping review of the conditions of liberty essential to steering the world away from the Hobbesian war of all against all. In this unofficial sequel to the 2012 hit, Why Nations Fail: The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty, Daron Acemoglu (Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and James A. Robinson (Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago) further explore their thesis that the existence and effectiveness of democratic institutions account for a nation’s general success or failure. The Narrow Corridor6 examines how liberty works. It is not “natural,” not widespread, “is rare in history and is rare today.” Only in peculiar circumstances have states managed to produce free societies. States have to walk a thin line to achieve liberty, passing through what the authors describe as a “narrow corridor.” To encourage freedom, states must be strong enough to enforce laws and provide public services yet also restrained in their actions and checked by a well-organized civil society. For example, from classical history, the Athenian constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes “were helpful for strengthening the political power of Athenian citizens while also battling the cage of norms.” That cage of norms is the informal body of customs replaced by state institutions. Those norms in turn “constrained what the state could do and how far state building could go,” providing a set of checks. Though somewhat fluid in its definition, liberty, as Acemoglu and Robinson show, is expressed differently under various “leviathans,” or states. For starters, the “Shackled Leviathan” is a government dedicated to upholding the rule of law, protecting the weak against the strong, and creating the conditions for broad-based economic opportunity. Meanwhile, the “Paper Leviathan” is a bureaucratic machine favoring the privileged class, serving as both a political and economic brake on development and yielding “fear, violence, and dominance for most of its citizens.” Other examples include: The “American Leviathan” which fails to deal properly with inequality and racial oppression, two enemies of liberty; and a “Despotic Leviathan,” which commands the economy and coerces political conformity – an example from modern China. Although the book indulges in too much jargon, it is provocative and its argument is convincing. The authors say that in most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Importantly, many states believe that once liberty is achieved, it will remain the status quo. But the authors argue that to uphold liberty, state institutions have to evolve continuously as the nature of conflicts and needs of society change. Thus society's ability to keep state and rulers accountable must intensify in tandem with the capabilities of the state. This struggle between state and society becomes self-reinforcing, inducing both to develop a richer array of capacities just to keep moving forward along the corridor. Yet this struggle also underscores the fragile nature of liberty. It is built on a precarious balance between state and society; between economic, political, and social elites and common citizens; between institutions and norms. If one side of the balance gets too strong, as has often happened in history, liberty begins to wane. The authors central thesis is that the long-run success of states depends on the balance of power between state and society. If states are too strong, you end up with a “Despotic Leviathan” that is good for short-term economic growth but brittle and unstable over the long term. If society is too strong, the “Leviathan” is absent, and societies suffer under a pre-modern war of all against all. The ideal place to be is in the narrow corridor, under a shackled Leviathan that will grow state capacity and individual liberty simultaneously, thus leading to long-term economic growth. In the asset allocation process, investors should always consider the liberty of a state and its people, if a state’s institutions grossly favor the elite or the outright population, whether these institutions are weak or overbearing on society, and whether they signify a balance between interests across the population. Whether you are investing over a short or long horizon, returns can be significantly impacted in the absence of liberty or the excesses of liberty. There should be a preference among investors toward countries that exhibit a balance of power between state and society, setting up a better long-term investment environment, than if a balance of power did not exist.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia Footnotes 1 "President Biden’s first 100 days as president fact-checked," BBC News, April 29, 2021, bbc.com. 2 "Oil tanker off Syrian coast hit in suspected drone attack," Al Jazeera, April 24, 2021, Aljazeera.com. 3 See Yaakov Lappin, "Natanz blast ‘likely took 5,000 centrifuges offline," Jewish News Syndicate, jns.org. 4 John Daniel Davidson, "Former US Ambassador To Mexico: Cartels Control Up To 40 Percent Of Mexican Territory," The Federalist, April 28, 2021, thefederalist.com. 5 See Alejandro Moreno, "Aprobación de AMLO se encuentra en 61% previo a campañas electorales," El Financiero, April 5, 2021, elfinanciero.com. 6 Penguin Press, New York, NY, 2019, 558 pages. Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Informe especial

Highlights Cryptocurrencies have a long march ahead to be able to displace fiat currencies. While cryptocurrencies are improving tremendously as a medium of exchange, they lag fiat as a store of value and a unit of account. Contrary to popular belief, fiat money has outperformed anti-fiat assets over time as a store of value. Many central banks will replicate the advantages and success of bitcoin through the issuance of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Cryptocurrencies are unlikely to disappear anytime soon and can be wonderful speculative investments. However, conservative investors should stick with gold and silver. Feature Chart I-1Spectacular Returns From Cryptocurrencies The rise in the prices of various cryptocurrencies1 has taken many investors by surprise. $1000 invested in bitcoin at the start of 2012 is worth around $10 million today. If you were lucky enough to get in on the first day of trading, when it was worth a fraction of a cent, your initial $1000 investment will be worth around $60 billion today. Meanwhile, many other cryptocurrencies are also sporting legendary returns, not even replicable in the most obscure corners of the options market (Chart I-1). There is some merit to cryptocurrencies, or more specifically, blockchain technology that is the bedrock of their invention. In this decentralized, peer-to-peer system, the need for an intermediary to validate transactions and arbitrate disputes is eliminated. This can greatly reduce transaction costs, especially when compared to banking/legal fees. The autonomy and anonymity that comes with their use is also a desirable feature. For example, anti-fiat enthusiasts welcome the fact that the creation, distribution, and use of cryptocurrencies is outside the purview of central banks. As this asset class continues to garner popularity and capture the imagination of investors, the implications run the gamut from potential future returns (or losses) to the impact on other asset classes. For currency investors, the key question is whether any of these seemingly attractive features have a sizeable impact on the value and use of other developed market currencies. In short, will cryptocurrencies displace fiat? To answer this question, we have to start from the very basic definition of what money is.  Is Bitcoin Money? The three basic functions of money are a store of value, unit of account and a medium of exchange. On at least two of these three basic functions, bitcoin fails. Bitcoin has been improving as a medium of exchange. The ability to swap fiat currency into bitcoins and back is fairly easy. More importantly, more and more merchants are accepting bitcoin as a form of payment. Globally, the turnover of cryptocurrencies is about $200 billion or roughly 3% of overall foreign exchange turnover. This is higher than daily trading in the Mexican peso, the New Zealand dollar, and the Swedish krona, an impressive feat (Chart I-2). This is also evidenced by the rise in the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies, to around $2 trillion today (Chart I-3). Chart I-2An Improving Medium Of Exchange Chart I-3Gold Versus Cryptocurrencies However, as Peter Berezin, our Chief Global Strategist has pointed out, this does not necessarily trump the use of fiat money.2  The Visa network, for example, handles over 5,000 times more transactions a second than the bitcoin mempool (the pool of unconfirmed transactions). Meanwhile, if one were to take a vacation in exotic places like Manila or Mumbai, what medium of exchange will one hold? Cryptocurrency, gold or the US dollar? Experience tells us you will be much better off holding greenbacks or even gold. Bitcoin is certainly not a store of value. The drawdown in cryptocurrency prices has been around 80% a year or 40%-50% over three months. This is much more volatile than currencies such as the Turkish lira or Argentinian peso, from countries fraught with political instability and economic fragility (Chart I-4). It appears that the lack of central bank oversight is a vice and not a virtue. Stability in a currency allows for confidence in savings, future purchases, and investment decisions. A monetary system based on cryptocurrencies deprives citizens of this basic tenet.   Chart I-4Bitcoin Is A Poor Store Of Value Bitcoin’s inherent volatility also makes it unsuitable as a unit of account. Prices quoted in bitcoin units will need to be revised daily. Although not a parallel comparison, this is reminiscent of hyperinflationary Zimbabwe, where retail store prices were adjusted several times a day to reflect the rapid depreciation in the currency. This is hardly a monetary regime suitable for the developed world, or any other economy for that matter. In a nutshell, cryptocurrencies do not yet satisfy the basic functions of money. Yes, they are portable, divisible, fungible and in limited supply. However, they have yet to gain wider acceptance, and are not a store of value nor a unit of account. As such, they remain speculative investments rather than money. The Demise Of Fiat Is Exaggerated Even if bitcoin is not money, the question remains whether it should be held in currency portfolios as insurance against fiat money debasement. After all, central bank quantitative easing since the global financial crisis has benefited other monetary assets such as gold and silver. Should investors also accumulate cryptocurrencies? The answer will depend on the type of investor. Dedicated currency investors need not worry about bitcoin. As a starting point, the US dollar very much remains the reserve currency today. About 60% of global reserve allocation is in USD. This position has often been challenged over the last few decades but has never been threatened (Chart I-5). This puts cryptocurrencies a long way from the starting line. Chart I-5The US Dollar Remains King It is worth noting that over time, fiat assets have done much better than anti-fiat alternatives. Using Bank of England data from the 19th century, we can see that over time, government bonds did much better than gold, or even stocks and real estate (Chart I-6). The reason is that most currencies provide a yield, while cryptocurrencies and gold do not. Chart I-6Fiat Versus Anti-Fiat Assets Chart I-7The DXY Has Faced Strong Resistance At 100 If one is worried about the path of the US dollar (like us), there are many other established fiat currencies to choose from. Since 2015, global allocation of FX Reserves to US dollars has fallen from almost 66% to around 60% today. The rotation has favored other currencies such as the Japanese yen, Chinese yuan and even gold (Chart I-7). From a longer-term perspective, this will place a durable floor under developed market currencies. Cryptocurrencies Versus Gold The degree to which cryptocurrencies can benefit from a shift away from dollars will depend on whether private investors or central banks drive the outflows. Central banks have a natural imperative to defend fiat currencies, since these are the very tools they use to implement monetary policy. As such, when diversifying out of dollars, their choice is other fiat currencies or gold, the latter having been a monetary standard for centuries. Private investors, some wanting to cut the cord to a centralized monetary system, may chose cryptocurrencies. Since the peak in the DXY index in 2020, both gold and US Treasuries are down significantly, while bitcoin has catapulted to new highs (Chart I-8). This has occurred because of a change in leadership, where the biggest sellers of US Treasuries have not been official concerns, but private investors (Chart I-9). Foreign central banks still dominate the holding of US Treasuries, to the tune of 60% versus 40% for private investors (bottom panel). But the bulk of outflows has been coming from private investors. Chart I-8Bitcoin Thrives When Mainstream Havens Are Rolling Over Chart I-9A Treasury Liquidation From ##br##Private Investors Central banks (the biggest holders of US Treasuries) tend to have stronger hands. This is because central banks are ideological while private investors can be swayed by momentum. For example, China and Russia have a geopolitical imperative to diversify out of dollars. As a result, Russia now has almost 25% of its foreign exchange reserves in gold and China almost 4%. A conservative investor looking to diversify out of fiat currency should naturally choose gold, which is backed by strong buyers. For more speculative investors, a simple rule of thumb could work: Buy cryptocurrencies when they drop 50% and sell when they overtake their previous highs. As we showed in Chart I-3, cryptocurrencies drop at least 40%-50% every year or so, providing ample opportunity to accumulate long positions. It is worth noting that my colleagues have a different approach. Dhaval Joshi, who heads our Counterpoint product, suggests holding cryptocurrencies in inverse proportion to their relative volatility to gold. In other words, given that bitcoin is three times more volatile than gold, your anti-fiat portfolio should have a 25% allocation to cryptocurrencies.3 Peter Berezin, our Chief Global Strategist, will not touch bitcoin. We tend to agree that cryptocurrencies could be a playable mania but would not recommend this asset class for the longer term. Central Bank Digital Currencies   One argument for why cryptocurrencies may not survive over the longer term is that there is a natural limit to how much widespread acceptance they will achieve before central banks start clamping down on them. The first reason will be due to the loss in seigniorage revenue for central banks. Between 2009 and 2019, the US and China generated about $140bn a year in seigniorage revenue (Chart I-10). These are non-negligible sums, which the rapid proliferation of cryptocurrencies threaten. Moreover, as the turnover in cryptocurrencies overtakes global trading in various domestic currencies, many countries are moving to ban bitcoin transactions (Table I-1). Chart I-10Seigniorage Revenue Is Significant Table 1A Rising List Of Cryptocurrency Bans Second, the use of cryptocurrencies can encourage the proliferation of illegal activities. This is a well-known flaw, and something governments will push back against. Meanwhile, many central banks are moving to establish their own digital currencies. Some of these could be based off the same blockchain technology that underpins bitcoin. This will provide many of the advantages of using a cryptocurrency without some of the known pitfalls. Map I-1 highlights that most G10 central banks have a digital currency plan. Map I-1Many Central Banks Are Planning A Digital Currency Some advocates for bitcoin point to its limited supply (21 million coins) as evidence for monetary prudence. Even the gold standard had more flexibility, since gold mining expanded about 2% a year. Yet that still proved to be extremely deflationary. A monetary standard that includes both paper currency and CBDCs provides the flexibility that central bankers need to smooth out economic cycles. A bitcoin-based standard will take us back to the middle ages. Once CDBCs become mainstream, the need for alternative cryptocurrencies will not disappear but fall greatly. This will also happen as the number of cryptocurrencies being created will likely balloon, given the very impressive price rallies in recent years. The IPO of Coinbase, an exchange for trading cryptocurrencies, may have heralded the peak in sentiment. Investment Conclusions The dollar faces many headwinds over the next 12 months. A rebound in global growth that begins to favor non-US economies will benefit pro-cyclical currencies. The Federal Reserve’s liquidity injections have assuaged the dollar shortage that held markets hostage last year. Interest rates are now moving against the dollar. Meanwhile, the greenback is expensive (Chart I-11), with a negative balance of payments backdrop. Chart I-11The US Dollar Is Expensive Chart I-12Hold Precious Metals Our favorite vehicles to play against coming weakness in the dollar have been the Scandinavian currencies, precious metals and commodity currencies. Within the precious metals sphere, we like both gold and silver but are short the gold/silver ratio as a hedged trade with little downside and much upside (Chart I-12). In particular, precious metals benefit from reserve diversification out of US dollars. In this light, cryptocurrencies could have intermittent rallies. However, given the regulatory and structural issues they face, we will not be holders for the long term.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We use bitcoin and cryptocurrencies interchangeably in this text. We do acknowledge that there are various other cryptocurrencies and these are shown in Chart 1. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin: A Solution In Search Of A Problem," dated February 26, 2021. 3 Please see Counterpoint Strategy Special Report, "Why Cryptocurrencies Are Here To Stay And Bitcoin Is Worth $120,000," dated April 8, 2021. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 March housing starts came in at 1.7 million, versus expectations of 1.6 million. This was a 19.4% month-on-month rise. Building permits were equally strong at 1.8 million for the month of March. The University of Michigan sentiment indicator rose to 86.5 in April from 84.9. The jump in the current conditions component from 93 to 97.2 was noteworthy. Initial jobless claims continue to decline, coming in at 547K for the week of April 17. Existing home sales remained strong at 6 million, even though they fell 3.7% month-on-month. The DXY Index fell by 0.3% this week. Speculators pared back a bit of their bullish positioning on the dollar. The overhang of a risk-off event continues to anchor dollar bulls, but interest rate differentials are now moving against the greenback. Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent euro area data have been mixed. The trade balance came in at €18.4 billion in February, versus €24.2 billion the previous month. This supported a current account balance of €25.9 billion. Construction output fell 5.8% year-on-year in February. Consumer confidence came in at -8.1 in April, versus -10.8 in March. The euro rose by 0.3% this week. The ECB kept monetary policy on hold this week, leaving the deposit facility rate at -0.5% and the marginal lending facility at 0.25%. This garnered little market reaction. With a few euro area countries under lockdown, this was the correct stance. Covid-19 will continue to dictate the near-term path of policy and the euro, but we remain bullish longer term. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been robust. Exports surged 16.1% year-on-year in March. Imports were also robust at +5.7% year-on-year. This boosted the trade balance to ¥298 billion. Tokyo condominiums for sale are rising 45% year-on-year. Supermarket sales rose 1.3% year-on-year in March. This is a tentative but positive sign of a consumption recovery. The Japanese yen rose 0.6% this week. The yen has been the best performing currency this week, a sign that sentiment was overly bearish and the currency was much oversold. Our intermediate-term indicator remains at bombed-out levels and speculators are still short the yen. This provides further upside for this defensive currency. As a portfolio hedge, we are short EUR/JPY. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 There was an avalanche of positive data from the UK this week. Rightmove house prices came in at 5.1% year on year in April. The labor report was mixed. While the UK lost 73 thousand jobs in February, this was below expectations of a 145 thousand loss. Core CPI came in at 1.1% in March. The RPI index came in at 1.5% year-on-year, in line with expectations. The CBI business optimism survey came in at 38 in April, versus -22 the previous month. Cable rose by 0.4% this week. The UK economy continues to benefit from its strong vaccination campaign. With the prospect of the rest of the world catching up, this trade is now long in the tooth. In short, we are neutral the pound in the short term, but remain bullish longer-term. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Australia this week. The NAB business confidence index came in at 17 in Q1 versus 14 the prior quarter. The Australian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The Aussie came out of the Covid-19 crisis as one of the best performing currencies, so some measure of consolidation is to be expected. Our intermediate-term indicator continues to blast downward, while sentiment towards the Aussie remains quite elevated. However, we believe that this will be a healthy consolidation in what could prove to be a multi-year bull market in the Australian dollar. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of New Zealand this week. CPI came in at 1.5% in Q1, in line with expectations. The Kiwi fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. Like Australia, New Zealand has managed the Covid-19 crisis quite well and the new travel bubble between the two countries will help lift economic activity. From a technical perspective however, room for further consolidation in the Kiwi remains. Our intermediate-term indicator continues to drift lower, while speculators are slightly long the cross. In our models, the Kiwi also appears overvalued. We were long AUD/NZD but were stopped out this week for modest profits. We will look to reestablish the trade. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The recent data out of Canada has been quite strong. Foreigners continue to flock into Canadian capital markets, to the tune of C$8.5bn in February. Housing starts came in at 335 thousand in March, the highest since the 70s. The Teranet house price index rose 10.8% year-on-year in March. The CPI release for March was better than expected. Headline was at 2.2%, the core median was at 2.1% and the trimmed mean came in at 2.2%. The Canadian dollar rose by 0.3% this week. The Bank of Canada kept rates on hold, but trimmed asset purchases. This follows a very generous budget from the Liberal party earlier this week. The loonie loved the news and Canadian government bonds sold off. We remain bullish CAD/USD on valuation grounds, spillovers from US fiscal stimulus and a constructive oil backdrop.  Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The recent data out of Switzerland has been quite strong. Producer and import prices fell by 0.2% year-on-year in March. This is a tremendous improvement from the previous 1.1% drop. M3 money supply continues to expand at a robust 5.6% clip. Exports rose 4.5% month-on-month in March. Watch exports surged 37% year-on-year. The Swiss franc rose 0.5% this week. The Swiss franc is the second best performing currency this week after the yen. With US interest rates stabilizing, the rationale for CHF carry trades is slowly fading. Our intermediate-term indicator shows the franc at bombed-out levels, and speculators are still short. This provides some margin for further upside. We are long EUR/CHF, but with very tight stops. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week. Industrial confidence came in at 8.2 in Q1, versus a prior reading of 3.1. The Norwegian krone was flat against the US dollar this week. Norway is setting the tone in terms of what monetary policy and sovereign wealth management could look like for many countries in the coming years. First, the Norges Bank announced they would be testing digital currency solutions over the coming two years. This is the way forward for central banks. Second, the sovereign wealth fund, the biggest in the world, is using its influence to effect policy changes towards the environment. Should the returns from its investments pay off in the years ahead, this could generate powerful repatriation flows for Norway. We are strategically bullish the NOK. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 There was no data out of Sweden this week. The Swedish krona rose by 0.2% this week. Swedish 2-year real rates recently punched above US levels, suggesting downward pressure on the krona should soon be abating. Our intermediate-term indicator suggests weakness in the krona is mostly done, while the currency appears cheap in most of our models. The handicap for Sweden is successfully dealing with the pandemic, after having a model that stood apart from what other countries were following. Over the longer-term, we are bullish SEK, just like the NOK, against both the euro and the dollar. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Informe especial

Aspectos destacados Es probable que Los Verdes obtengan el control del gobierno de Alemania en las elecciones federales del 26 de septiembre. Al menos serán muy influyentes en la nueva coalición. Alemania ha logrado muchas de sus metas geopolíticas a largo plazo dentro de la UE. Existe consenso sobre políticas monetarias y fiscales acomodaticias y una política medioambiental beligerante. Los mayores cambios vendrán desde el exterior. La relación entre EE. UU. y Alemania es más difícil. Aunque ambos se oponen a la agresión rusa y china, Alemania se resistirá a la agresión estadounidense. Los Demócratas Cristianos tienen un 65% de probabilidad de permanecer en el gobierno, lo que limitaría la controvertida y ambiciosa agenda fiscal de Los Verdes. La probabilidad del 35% de una coalición de izquierdas adelantará el estímulo fiscal para favorecer la recuperación. La economía muestra signos de mejora y un relajamiento fiscal liderado por Los Verdes supercargará la recuperación. Sin embargo, la política de coalición probablemente no abordará la mala demografía de Alemania, la productividad en deterioro y los altos ahorros excedentes. En términos cíclicos, sobreponderar bonos periféricos europeos frente a los bunds; EUR/USD; y acciones italianas y españolas frente a las alemanas. Análisis Gráfico 1 Los alemanes recurren a una mujer joven y a una ecologista Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Alemania está a punto de convertirse en el primer país importante gobernado por un partido verde. Como mínimo, las elecciones alemanas del 26 de septiembre verán una sorpresa en la que el partido gobernante rinda por debajo de lo esperado y Los Verdes por encima de lo esperado (Gráfico 1). En un 30%, los mercados de apuestas en línea están subestimando las probabilidades de que Annalena Baerbock se convierta en la primera canciller verde en 2022, y la primera canciller elegida proveniente de un tercer partido (Gráfico 2). La “cuestión alemana” —el problema de cómo unificar Alemania y al mismo tiempo mantener la paz con los vecinos— estuvo en el corazón de Europa durante los últimos dos siglos, pero hoy parece sustancialmente resuelta: una Alemania pacífica y unificada está en el centro de una Europa mayormente pacífica y en gran parte unificada. Hay una serie de riesgos en el horizonte, pero debe reconocerse este trasfondo positivo. Gráfico 2 El mercado despierta ante la candidatura de Baerbock a la cancillería Vientos de Cambio: Alemania se Vuelve Verde Vientos de Cambio: Alemania se Vuelve Verde Todos los escenarios más probables para las elecciones alemanas reforzarán la situación actual al perpetuar políticas que apuntan a la solidaridad de la zona euro. Incluso el giro verde ya está en marcha, aunque un gobierno liderado por Los Verdes lo supercargará. No obstante, las elecciones de este año son importantes porque anuncian un giro hacia la izquierda en Alemania y darán forma a la política fiscal, energética, industrial y comercial durante, al menos, los próximos cuatro años. Un barrido de izquierdas generaría entusiasmo en el mercado de acciones a corto plazo —una sorpresa fiscal positiva que supercargaría el rebote pospandemia— pero, a largo plazo, traería mayor incertidumbre política porque supondría una ruptura con el pasado y posiblemente un cambio económico estructural (Gráfico 3). Los Verdes están a favor de aumentos sustanciales en impuestos y regulación, así como de grandes cambios en la política industrial y energética. En ausencia de un barrido de izquierdas, la política de coalición será confusa y las políticas actuales de Alemania continuarán. Gráfico 3 Aumento de la incertidumbre sobre la política alemana Aumenta la incertidumbre política en Alemania Aumenta la incertidumbre política en Alemania Independientemente de lo que ocurra dentro de Alemania, el entorno geopolítico es cada vez más peligroso. Alemania intentará evitar verse arrastrada a las grandes luchas de poder de EE. UU. con Rusia y China, pero puede que no tenga elección. La geopolítica de Alemania La dificultad de la unificación alemana está en el centro de la historia europea moderna. Debido a la gran y productiva población germanoparlante, la unificación en 1871 supuso una amenaza de seguridad para los vecinos, culminando en las guerras mundiales. La reunificación pacífica de Alemania tras la Guerra Fría creó el potencial para que la UE tuviera éxito y estableciera paz y prosperidad en el continente. Este arreglo ha sobrevivido a desafíos recientes. La relación de Alemania con la UE estuvo amenazada por la crisis financiera, la Primavera Árabe y la oleada migratoria, el Brexit y los aranceles comerciales del presidente Trump. Pero al final estos eventos consolidaron la realidad de que Alemania y Europa están fortaleciendo sus lazos frente a presiones externas. Alemania consiguió lo que buscaba desde hace tiempo —la preeminencia en el continente— al evitar un papel militar, mantenerse junto a Francia en lo económico y evitar el conflicto con Rusia. Dado que Alemania ha alcanzado muchas de sus metas estratégicas de larga data, no ha sucumbido a una reacción nacionalista en la última década como sí ocurrió en EE. UU. y el Reino Unido. Sin embargo, Alemania no es inmune al populismo o al sentimiento anti-establecimiento. Los dos principales bloques políticos, los Demócratas Cristianos y los Socialdemócratas, han sufrido pérdida de apoyo popular en elecciones recientes, obligándolos a formar una gran coalición juntos. El sentimiento anti-establecimiento en Alemania ha movido al electorado hacia la izquierda, a favor de Los Verdes. Los Verdes han ido subiendo inexorablemente durante la última década y ahora han tomado el impulso a solo cinco meses de las elecciones (Gráfico 4). Aun así, Los Verdes en Alemania son básicamente un partido político establecido. Participan en 11 de 16 gobiernos estatales y actualmente ocupan la posición principal en Baden-Württemberg, el tercer estado más poblado y productivo de Alemania. Entre 1998 y 2005 participaron en el gobierno, manchándose con reformas estructurales neoliberales y despliegues militares en el extranjero. Además, Los Verdes no pueden gobernar en solitario, sino que deberán gobernar en coalición, lo que moderará sus políticas más controvertidas. Gráfico 4 Auge de Los Verdes, tropiezo de los Demócratas Cristianos Los Verdes se disparan, los Demócratas Cristianos flaquean Los Verdes se disparan, los Demócratas Cristianos flaquean Hoy Alemania marcha al compás de Francia y la UE cumpliendo tres condiciones clave: plena acomodación monetaria (los desafíos del tribunal constitucional alemán al Banco Central Europeo son ineficaces), plena acomodación fiscal (la canciller Angela Merkel accedió a la emisión conjunta de deuda y a un control laxo de déficits en medio de la crisis del COVID-19, además de políticas robustas de energía verde) y plena acomodación en seguridad (el rearme alemán existe dentro del contexto de la OTAN y las aspiraciones de seguridad europeas se emprenden en sintonía con los franceses). Estas condiciones no cambiarán en las elecciones de 2021 incluso si Los Verdes llegaran al poder al frente de una coalición de izquierdas. Conclusión: Alemania ha prácticamente alcanzado sus grandes objetivos estratégicos de unificar y liderar Europa. Ningún gobierno alemán desafiará esta situación y todos los gobiernos alemanes se esforzarán por solidificarla. Los mayores riesgos para este arreglo provienen del exterior más que del interior. ¿El retorno de la cuestión alemana? La posición geopolítica de Alemania puede resumirse en el Gráfico 5, que muestra las opiniones populares hacia distintos países e instituciones. Los alemanes ven positivamente a la UE y a instituciones globales como las Naciones Unidas y menos a la OTAN. Ven de forma desfavorable a todo lo demás. Tienen una opinión desfavorable hacia Rusia, pero no de manera dramática, lo que muestra su falta de interés en un conflicto con Rusia: no quieren ser el campo de batalla ni las murallas de otra gran guerra europea. No les gustan Estados Unidos y China aún más, y con igual intensidad. Aunque las actitudes hacia EE. UU. han mejorado desde las elecciones de 2020, la desfavorabilidad neta es significativa. Gráfico 5 ¿Alemania más favorable hacia Rusia que hacia EE. UU.? Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Desde la crisis financiera global, y especialmente desde la invasión rusa de Ucrania en 2014, Alemania ha reforzado su ejército. Este aumento se realiza bajo el estímulo de Estados Unidos y en consonancia con los aliados de la OTAN, que reaccionan a la acción militar rusa para restaurar su esfera de influencia en el antiguo espacio soviético (Gráfico 6). No obstante, el gasto militar de Alemania sigue por debajo del objetivo de la OTAN del 2% del PIB. No se la verá como una amenaza para sus vecinos mientras permanezca integrada con Francia y Europa y orientada a disuadir a Rusia. Gráfico 6 Alemania y la OTAN aumentan el gasto militar Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Gráfico 7 Vigilar las relaciones ruso-alemanas por grietas en el edificio europeo Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde La agresividad de Rusia debería seguir empujando a alemanes y europeos a estrechar sus lazos. Esto podría cambiar si Putin apuesta por la diplomacia en lugar de la coerción militar, ya que entonces podría dividir a Alemania del este de Europa. La posibilidad es clara por la insistencia actual de Rusia y Alemania en completar el gasoducto Nord Stream 2 a pesar de las objeciones de EE. UU. y de Europa del Este. El gasoducto está previsto que se complete para septiembre, justo a tiempo para las elecciones —en no poca medida porque Los Verdes se oponen—. Si EE. UU. insiste en detener el gasoducto, estallaría una crisis con Rusia que humillaría a Merkel y a los Demócratas Cristianos. Pero EE. UU. podría abstenerse de hacerlo ante amenazas militares rusas (las probabilidades son 50/50). El despliegue ruso de más de 100.000 tropas en la frontera con Ucrania este año —y ahora supuestamente ordenando su regreso a la base para el 1 de mayo— equivale a una prueba de las relaciones ruso-alemanas. Putin puede ampliar fácilmente la huella rusa en Ucrania y las tensiones permanecerán elevadas al menos hasta las elecciones legislativas rusas en septiembre. Los alemanes responderían a otra invasión con sanciones, aunque probablemente suavizando las sanciones más duras propuestas por los estadounidenses. Lo que realmente cambiaría el juego sería una conquista rusa de toda Ucrania. Esto es poco probable —precisamente porque uniría firmemente a Alemania, a los europeos y a los estadounidenses contra Rusia, con pérdidas económicas y desventajas estratégicas para ésta (Gráfico 7). El ascenso de China también debería mantener a Alemania vinculada a Europa. Los alemanes temen el avance tecnológico y manufacturero de China, incluida la participación china en infraestructuras y redes digitales. Los Verdes critican la forma en que los bienes chinos intensivos en carbono socavan los precios de los bienes alemanes bajos en carbono. Baerbock favorece tarifas de ajuste por carbono, un término elegante para aranceles. Sin embargo, los alemanes quieren mantener relaciones comerciales con China y no temen mucho su poder militar. Por tanto, existe el riesgo de una ruptura entre EE. UU. y Alemania en la cuestión china. Si Alemania llegara a alinearse consistentemente con Rusia y China frente a las objeciones estadounidenses, correría el riesgo de atraer atención hostil de EE. UU. y de otros europeos, que eventualmente temerían que el poder alemán se volviera excesivo al formar relaciones con gigantes fuera de la UE. Pero este no es hoy el riesgo principal. EE. UU. está cortejando a Alemania y buscando renovar la alianza transatlántica. Mientras tanto, Alemania necesita el apoyo estadounidense contra las prácticas comerciales de China y la amenaza militar rusa. Las relaciones EE. UU.-Alemania mejorarán a menos que EE. UU. obligue a Alemania a un conflicto abierto con las potencias autocráticas. Conclusión: La relación entre EE. UU. y Alemania es más difícil ahora que en el pasado, pero comparten el interés de disuadir la agresión rusa y las ambiciones tecnológicas y comerciales de China. El intento de Biden de confrontar a estas potencias de manera multilateral está limitado por la aversión al riesgo de Alemania. Escenarios para las elecciones de 2021 Hay varios escenarios realistas para el resultado electoral alemán. Nuestra expectativa de que Los Verdes formarán gobierno se basa en una serie de factores fundamentales. La opinión pública ahora se ha desplazado claramente a favor de nuestra perspectiva, con Los Verdes ganando impulso a solo cinco meses de las elecciones. Agrupar los partidos en bloques ideológicos muestra que la carrera está empatada. Nuestra apuesta es que el momentum se romperá a favor de la oposición verde, que explicamos a continuación. Mientras tanto, los Demócratas Libres deberían desempeñarse bien, robando votos a los Demócratas Cristianos. La derecha Alternativa für Deutschland (AfD), aunque no obtiene buenos resultados, es lo suficientemente persistente como para arañar algunos votos a los Demócratas Cristianos. Estos son votos “perdidos” para los conservadores, ya que ninguno de los demás partidos se unirá a ellos en una coalición (Gráfico 8). Gráfico 8 El votante medio de Alemania se desplaza a la izquierda El votante medio de Alemania se desplaza hacia la izquierda El votante medio de Alemania se desplaza hacia la izquierda Los Demócratas Cristianos muestran todos los signos de un gobierno agotado y vulnerable. Han estado en el poder durante 16 años y su desempeño en elecciones estatales y federales se ha erosionado recientemente, incluso este año (Tabla 1). El público es susceptible a la poderosa idea de que es hora de un cambio. La aprobación de la canciller Merkel sigue rondando el 60%, pero está en caída libre, y su legado exitoso no es suficiente para salvar a su partido, que muestra todos los signos de pánico: problemas de sucesión, indecisión, luchas internas, escándalos de corrupción. Los Verdes serán unos izquierdistas “impuestos-y-gasto”, pero la coalición importa en términos de lo que realmente se puede legislar (Tabla 2).1 Tabla 1A Los Demócratas Cristianos caen, Los Verdes suben, en elecciones estatales recientes Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Tabla 1B Los Demócratas Cristianos caen, Los Verdes suben, en elecciones estatales recientes Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Tabla 2 Plataformas políticas del Partido Verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde El hecho de que los Demócratas Cristianos y su partido hermano bávaro, la Unión Social Cristiana, hayan tenido una contienda tan dura por el candidato a canciller es un mal presagio. Además, las élites del partido optaron por la opción segura del sucesor escogido por Merkel, Armin Laschet, en lugar del más popular Markus Söder (Gráfico 9), en una división que probablemente perseguirá al partido más adelante este año. Gráfico 9 Demócratas Cristianos y Unión Social Cristiana divididos antes de las elecciones Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Laschet ha recibido un repunte en las encuestas con la nominación, pero será temporal. No había destacado en ninguna encuesta previa a la nominación. Gráfico 10 El descontento apunta a un cambio de gobierno Vientos de Cambio: Alemania se Vuelve Verde Vientos de Cambio: Alemania se Vuelve Verde Ha discutido abiertamente con Merkel y la coalición sobre la gestión de la pandemia. En cualquier caso, no fue su primera opción de sucesor —esa fue Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, que cayó en desgracia por controversias sobre el más mínimo indicio de cooperación con la AfD. Existe un problema manifiesto para llenar los zapatos de Merkel. Aún más importante que las luchas internas por la coalición es el hecho de que Alemania, como el resto del mundo, ha sufrido un shock histórico en su economía y sociedad. La pandemia y la recesión se agravaron luego por una mala implementación de la vacunación. El descontento general es alto, otra señal negativa para el partido en el poder (Gráfico 10). Por supuesto, las elecciones aún están a cinco meses. La vacuna hará su recorrido, la economía se reabrirá y los consumidores mejorarán su confianza —véase más abajo el giro macro muy positivo que Alemania debería esperar entre ahora y las elecciones. Los votantes en gran medida han apoyado medidas pandémicas estrictas y Merkel aún tendrá una larga influencia. Los Demócratas Cristianos y la Unión Social Cristiana han gobernado la Alemania moderna durante todo el periodo salvo 15 años y no han caído por debajo del 33% del voto popular desde la reunificación. Los Verdes con frecuencia han generado más energía en las encuestas que en las urnas. Con estos puntos en mente, ofrecemos los siguientes escenarios electorales con nuestras probabilidades subjetivas: Coalición Verde-Rojo-Rojo – Los Verdes gobiernan sin los Demócratas Cristianos – 35% de probabilidad. Coalición Verde-Negro – Los Verdes gobiernan con los Demócratas Cristianos – 30% de probabilidad. Coalición Negro-Verde – Los Demócratas Cristianos gobiernan con Los Verdes – 25% de probabilidad. Gran coalición (status quo) – Los Demócratas Cristianos gobiernan sin Los Verdes – 10% de probabilidad. Nuestras probabilidades subjetivas se basan en las encuestas de opinión y las apuestas en línea citadas arriba, pero ajustadas por el impulso de Los Verdes, las divisiones internas de los Demócratas Cristianos, el factor “es hora de un cambio” y la presencia de un shock económico y social exógeno histórico. Pueden ocurrir sorpresas geopolíticas antes de las elecciones, pero lo más probable es que refuercen a Los Verdes, ya que han adoptado una postura beligerante contra Rusia y China. Conclusión: Es probable que Los Verdes lideren el próximo gobierno alemán, pero como mínimo tendrán una gran influencia. Impactos políticos de los escenarios electorales La composición de la coalición gobernante determinará los parámetros de la nueva política. La política fiscal cambiará según el resultado electoral —tanto el gasto como los impuestos. Los Verdes serán unos izquierdistas “impuestos-y-gasto”, pero la coalición importa en términos de lo que realmente se puede legislar.2 La idea de Los Verdes es “dirigir” el proceso de reconstrucción mediante la política medioambiental. Pero si la izquierda carece de una mayoría sólida, las medidas más controvertidas y punitivas de Los Verdes no pasarán. Las políticas transformadoras recaerán con fuerza sobre las clases bajas (Gráfico 11). Gráfico 11 La ambiciosa política climática encontrará resistencia Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Las disposiciones políticas de los distintos candidatos a canciller ayudan a ilustrar el alto grado de consenso político en Alemania. La Tabla 3 analiza a los candidatos según si son “beligerantes” (activos u ofensivos) o “palomas” (pasivos o defensivos) en un área política determinada. Lo que destaca es el acuerdo entre los distintos candidatos a pesar de las diferencias partidarias. Nadie es un halcón fiscal o monetario. Solo Baerbock puede clasificarse como beligerante en comercio.3 Nadie es beligerante en inmigración. Casi todos son beligerantes en la lucha contra el cambio climático. Y las actitudes se están volviendo más escépticas respecto a Rusia y China, aunque no abiertamente beligerantes. Tabla 3 Consenso político entre los candidatos a canciller de Alemania Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Alemania no abandonará sus iniciativas verdes incluso si Los Verdes rinden por debajo de lo esperado. La actual gran coalición impulsó un paquete climático debido a la presión popular incluso con Los Verdes en la oposición. Los alemanes son considerablemente más proambientales que otros europeos (Gráfico 12). El giro verde también está ocurriendo en todo el mundo. EE. UU. ahora se une a la carrera verde mientras que China se reafirma por sus propias razones. Véase el Apéndice para los objetivos y medidas verdes actuales, que se han actualizado tras una oleada de anuncios antes de la cumbre climática del Día de la Tierra de Biden los días 22 y 23 de abril. Gráfico 12 A los alemanes les importa aún más el medio ambiente que a otros europeos Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Cualquier coalición aumentará el gasto más que los impuestos, ya que se centrará en la recuperación económica post-COVID. Ha habido un largo preludio al giro fiscal proactivo de Alemania —tiene permanencia y no debe descartarse. Una coalición demócrata-cristiana trataría de restaurar la disciplina fiscal antes que de otro modo, pero solo hay un 5% de probabilidad de que tenga el poder para hacerlo según los escenarios anteriores. El resto de Europa se sentirá motivado a gastar agresivamente mientras los límites fiscales de la UE estén en pausa en 2022, especialmente si el gobierno alemán toma un giro más acomodaticio. Más aún que EE. UU. y el Reino Unido, Alemania se está alejando del Consenso de Washington neoliberal. Pero los alemanes no están experimentando ningún tipo de oleada de polarización y populismo al estilo estadounidense. Al menos, no todavía. Podría ser un riesgo a largo plazo, dependiendo del destino de los Demócratas Cristianos, la AfD y diversos desarrollos internos y externos. Conclusión: Alemania tiene un consenso nacional que consiste en políticas monetarias, fiscales, comerciales y migratorias acomodaticias y una política medioambiental beligerante (pro-verde). Alemania se vuelve menos pacífica en conflictos geopolíticos con Rusia y China. Dado que es probable un gobierno de coalición, este consenso probablemente determinará la política real tras las elecciones de este año. Algunas cosas están claras independientemente de la coalición gobernante. Primero, Alemania busca la demanda interna como nueva fuente de crecimiento, para reequilibrar su economía y profundizar la integración europea. Segundo, Alemania acelera su impulso hacia la energía verde. Tercero, Alemania no puede aceptar estar en medio de una nueva guerra fría con Rusia. Cuarto, Alemania tiene una política ambivalente hacia China. Perspectiva macro de Alemania Incluso antes de considerar el panorama fiscal más amplio, las perspectivas de la actividad económica alemana durante los próximos 12 a 24 meses ya eran positivas. Nuestro escenario base para las elecciones de septiembre, que prevé un gobierno de coalición liderado por el Partido Verde, solo confirma esta visión optimista. Sin embargo, Alemania sigue afrontando desafíos estructurales significativos y, hasta ahora, no ha habido consenso político para abordar adecuadamente estos vientos en contra estructurales. Los Verdes ofrecen algunas soluciones, pero no todas sus propuestas son constructivas y mucho dependerá de su fuerza parlamentaria. Mirando al corto plazo… La economía alemana se beneficiará de la continua recuperación del ciclo económico global, que es una visión en el núcleo de la perspectiva actual de BCA Research.4 Alemania sigue siendo una potencia comercial y manufacturera, y por tanto cosechará un dividendo significativo del repunte manufacturero global continuado. La manufactura y el comercio representan el 20% y el 88% del PIB alemán, el porcentaje más alto de cualquier economía importante. Alternativamente, según la OCDE, la demanda exterior de bienes alemanes representa casi el 30% del valor agregado doméstico, una participación incluso mayor que la de una economía más pequeña como Corea (Gráfico 13). Además, vehículos de carretera, maquinaria y otros equipos de transporte, así como productos químicos y afines, representan el 53% de las exportaciones alemanas. Estos productos son particularmente sensibles al ciclo económico global. Por tanto, mejorarán el desempeño de la economía alemana durante los próximos dos años. El comercio con el resto de Europa constituye otro impulso para la economía alemana en el futuro. Los envíos al área del euro y al resto de la UE representan el 34% y el 23% de las exportaciones alemanas, o un 57% en total. Ahora mismo, la economía rezagada de Europa es un lastre para Alemania; sin embargo, Europa tiene más demanda reprimida que EE. UU., y el consumo de bienes duraderos se disparará una vez que avance la campaña de vacunación (Gráfico 14). Esto creará un beneficio significativo para Alemania, pues esperamos que el consumo europeo aumente notablemente en los próximos 12 a 18 meses.5 Gráfico 13 Alemania depende del comercio global Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Gráfico 14 Europa tiene más demanda reprimida que EE. UU. Europa Tiene Más Demanda Acumulada Que Estados Unidos Europa Tiene Más Demanda Acumulada Que Estados Unidos Gráfico 15 Progreso en la vacunación Progreso de la vacunación Progreso de la vacunación Las fuerzas internas también apuntan a una economía alemana fuerte, no solo factores externos. El ritmo de vacunación se acelera rápidamente en Alemania (Gráfico 15). El anuncio reciente de la compra de 50 millones de dosis adicionales para el trimestre y hasta 1.8 mil millones de dosis más durante los próximos dos años por parte de la UE apunta a mejoras adicionales. Un esfuerzo de vacunación más amplio catalizará los vientos favorables subyacentes al consumo. Los ingresos de los hogares alemanes también avanzarán significativamente. El programa Kurzarbeit fue fundamental para contener la tasa de desempleo durante la crisis, que solo alcanzó un pico del 6.4% desde el 5% a principios de 2020. Sin embargo, el programa no pudo evitar una fuerte caída en las horas totales trabajadas del 7%, ya que por definición forzó a seis millones de empleados a trabajar menos horas (Gráfico 16). Uno de los grandes beneficios del programa es que evita una ruptura del vínculo entre trabajadores y empleadores. Así, la economía sufre menos desempleo friccional a medida que la actividad se recupera y los ingresos de los hogares no sufren daños duraderos. Mientras tanto, es probable que el gobierno alemán extienda el apoyo a hogares y empresas como resultado del uso retrasado del freno de la deuda. Los Verdes proponen revisar el freno de la deuda en lugar de restablecerlo en 2022 como prometen los conservadores. Gráfico 16 Kurzarbeit salvó la situación Kurtzarbeit salvó el día Kurtzarbeit salvó el día La fortaleza del balance de los hogares alemanes significa que tendrán capacidad para gastar estos ingresos crecientes. Los precios de la vivienda residencial están subiendo a un ritmo anual del 8%, lo que empuja la ratio activos/ingreso disponible a niveles récord. Mientras tanto, la ratio deuda/activos y el nivel de tipos de interés también son muy bajos, lo que significa que la carga de servicio de las obligaciones existentes es mínima (Gráfico 17). En este contexto, el gasto en bienes duraderos se acelerará, lo que impulsará el gasto cíclico total, incluso si los hogares alemanes no gastan gran parte de los EUR 120.000 millones en ahorros excedentes acumulados durante el último año. Como muestra el Gráfico 18, mientras que el gasto en bienes duraderos de EE. UU. ya ha superado sus máximos previos al COVID, el de Alemania continúa cercano a su tendencia a largo plazo. Por tanto, cuando la economía se reabra este verano, y aumenten los ingresos y el empleo, el consiguiente aumento de la confianza del consumidor permitirá una recuperación del gasto cíclico. Gráfico 17 Sólidos balances de los hogares Sólidos balances de los hogares Sólidos balances de los hogares Gráfico 18 Alemania también tiene más demanda reprimida que EE. UU. Alemania también tiene más demanda acumulada que Estados Unidos Alemania también tiene más demanda acumulada que Estados Unidos Gráfico 19 Mensaje positivo de muchos indicadores Mensaje Positivo de Muchos Indicadores Mensaje Positivo de Muchos Indicadores Varios indicadores económicos ya apuntan hacia el próximo auge económico alemán. Los pedidos manufactureros son fuertes y la confianza en la mayoría de los sectores está aumentando. Mientras tanto, el optimismo del consumidor forma un fondo, y las matriculaciones de coches nuevos están subiendo rápidamente. Lo más positivo es que las existencias de productos terminados se han desplomado, lo que sugiere que la producción aumentará para satisfacer la demanda futura (Gráfico 19). Conclusión: La economía alemana está lista para acelerar en la segunda mitad del año y hacia 2022. Como es habitual, Alemania disfrutará de un saludable dividendo por el robusto crecimiento global, pero el programa de vacunación en expansión, así como las sólidas relaciones empleado-empleador, los fuertes balances de los hogares y la demanda reprimida por bienes duraderos también impulsarán la economía doméstica. Nuestro escenario base, de que la política fiscal se mantendrá acomodaticia tras un giro político a la izquierda en Berlín en septiembre, solo supercargará esta recuperación inevitable. … y a largo plazo En contraste con la brillante perspectiva a corto plazo, las perspectivas a largo plazo para la economía alemana siguen siendo pobres. Las políticas de cualquier nueva coalición gobernante probablemente no abordarán los problemas de la mala demografía de Alemania, la productividad en deterioro y los altos ahorros excedentes. Existe potencial para un impulso de productividad en el contexto de una carrera global por la energía verde y las tecnologías avanzadas, pero por ahora eso sigue siendo una especulación. El problema más obvio que enfrenta Alemania es su población envejecida, contrarrestada por una tasa de fecundidad de solo 1.6. En el transcurso de las próximas tres décadas, la ratio de dependencia de Alemania aumentará hasta el 80%, impulsada por un incremento de la ratio de dependencia de ancianos del 20% (Gráfico 20). La población en edad laboral se reducirá un 18% para 2050, lo que recortará el crecimiento potencial del PIB. Las perspectivas de crecimiento de la productividad alemana también son pobres. El crecimiento de la productividad de Alemania ha estado en declive a largo plazo, cayendo del 5% en 1975 a menos del 1% en 2019. Contrariamente a ideas comunes, entre 1999 y 2007, el crecimiento de la productividad laboral alemana solo igualó al de Francia o España; desde 2008, ha quedado rezagada respecto a estas dos naciones, aunque ha superado a Italia. Una razón crucial para el escaso rendimiento de la productividad alemana es la falta de inversión. Parte de esto refleja la austera política fiscal del país. Por ejemplo, en 2019 la inversión pública de Alemania se situó en el 2.4% del PIB, lo que se compara pobremente con el promedio de la OCDE del 3.8%, o incluso con el de EE. UU., donde la inversión pública fue del 3.6% del PIB. Esta mala estadística ni siquiera toma en cuenta la depreciación del stock de capital público alemán. Desde la introducción del euro, la inversión pública neta ha promediado un 0.03% del PIB. El mayor problema sigue siendo el nivel municipal. De 2012 a 2019, la inversión neta a nivel federal y estatal promedió 0.2% del PIB, mientras que la inversión neta municipal restó 0.2% del PIB en promedio. Esperemos que el nuevo gobierno pueda abordar esta deficiencia de la economía alemana. Los Verdes son los más proactivos, pero enfrentarán obstáculos. El problema mayor para la productividad alemana es la inversión de las empresas (capex). Las inversiones corporativas han sido bajas en este país. Desde la introducción del euro, la contribución de la intensidad de capital a la productividad en Alemania ha igualado a la de Italia y ha rendido menos que Francia y España. Como resultado, la antigüedad del stock de capital alemán está en un nivel récord y se sitúa muy por encima de la media de EE. UU. o la eurozona (Gráfico 21). Gráfico 20 Alemania tiene una demografía pobre Germany Has Poor Demographics Germany Has Poor Demographics Gráfico 21 El stock de capital de Alemania está envejeciendo El stock de capital de Alemania está envejeciendo. El stock de capital de Alemania está envejeciendo. La composición del capex alemán agrava la desventaja de productividad. Según un estudio del Bundesbank, la contribución a la productividad laboral del gasto en capital en tecnologías de la información y la comunicación (TIC) promedió 0.05 puntos porcentuales anuales entre 2008 y 2012. En esta métrica, Alemania quedó por detrás de Francia y EE. UU., pero superó a Italia. De 2013 a 2017, la contribución de la inversión en TIC a la productividad cayó a 0.02 puntos porcentuales, aún por debajo de Francia y EE. UU., pero en línea con Italia. Al observar el nivel absoluto de inversión en TIC o capital basado en el conocimiento (KBC), se pone de manifiesto el desafío de Alemania. En 2016, la inversión total en equipo TIC, software y bases de datos, I+D y productos de propiedad intelectual, y otros activos KBC (que incluyen capital organizativo y formación) representó menos del 8% del PIB. En Francia, EE. UU. o Suecia, estos desembolsos representaron el 11%, 12% y 13% del PIB, respectivamente (Gráfico 22, panel superior). Esta falta de inversión perjudica directamente la capacidad de innovación de Alemania. El panel inferior del Gráfico 22 muestra que, para las ocho categorías más importantes de patentes TIC (que representan el 80% del total), Alemania se queda sorprendentemente atrás respecto a EE. UU., Japón, Corea o China. Gráfico 22 Alemania rezaga en inversión TIC Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Una fuente importante de la desventaja de Alemania en inversión en TIC y KBC proviene de las pequeñas empresas, que han sido particularmente reacias a desplegar capital. Un estudio de la OCDE muestra que, entre 2010 y 2019, la brecha en la adopción de herramientas y actividades TIC entre las pequeñas y grandes empresas de Alemania se deterioró respecto al promedio de la OCDE (Gráfico 23). La falta de inversión de capital de riesgo probablemente exacerba estos problemas. En 2019, la inversión de capital de riesgo representó el 0.06% del PIB de Alemania. Esto está por debajo del nivel de inversión de riesgo en Francia o el Reino Unido (0.08% y 0.1% del PIB, respectivamente), y mucho por debajo de Corea del Sur, Canadá, Israel o EE. UU. (0.16%, 0.2%, 0.4% y 0.65%, respectivamente). Los Verdes afirman que crearán nuevos fondos de capital de riesgo, pero su capacidad en este dominio es cuestionable. Gráfico 23 Las rezagadas capacidades TIC de las pequeñas empresas alemanas Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Dado que es probable que el crecimiento de la productividad de Alemania siga siendo inferior al del resto de la OCDE y que esté por detrás incluso del de Francia o Reino Unido, la única manera de que Alemania proteja su competitividad será controlar los costes. Esto significa que Alemania no puede permitir que su reciente pérdida de competitividad continúe mucho más (Gráfico 24). Por tanto, el bajo crecimiento de la productividad limitará los salarios reales en Alemania. Gráfico 24 La competitividad de Alemania está en declive La competitividad de Alemania está disminuyendo La competitividad de Alemania está disminuyendo Esta restricción salarial impactará negativamente el consumo. Más allá de un repunte en los próximos 12 a 24 meses, el consumo alemán probablemente permanecerá deprimido, como lo estuvo en la primera década y media del siglo, tras las reformas laborales Hartz IV que también perjudicaron los salarios reales. Los Verdes, por su parte, pretenden aumentar las prestaciones sociales, elevar el salario mínimo y reducir la aplicación de Hartz IV. Conclusión: Los ahorros excedentes de Alemania seguirán siendo amplios de forma estructural. Sin un repunte significativo en capex, las empresas no financieras alemanas seguirán siendo prestamistas netas. Mientras tanto, los hogares que se preocuparon por su futuro financiero en un mundo de bajo crecimiento salarial real también continuarán ahorrando una parte significativa de sus ingresos. En consecuencia, los ahorros excedentes que Alemania desarrolló desde el cambio de milenio están aquí para quedarse (Gráfico 25). En otras palabras, Alemania seguirá exhibiendo un gran superávit por cuenta corriente y ejercerá una influencia deflacionaria sobre Europa y el resto del mundo. La política prescrita por los distintos partidos que concurren a las elecciones de septiembre no necesariamente resultará en leyes nuevas que reviertan los problemas de bajo capex y baja inversión TIC. Los Verdes empeorarán la sobre-regulación de la economía. Salvo una revolución política que tenga éxito en todos sus objetivos (tarea difícil), podemos esperar más de lo mismo para Alemania —es decir, una economía en declive lento. Gráfico 25 Demasiados ahorros, no suficientes inversiones Demasiado ahorro, no suficientes inversiones Demasiado ahorro, no suficientes inversiones Gráfico 26 Alemania destaca en energía renovable Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Dicho esto, existen algunos puntos brillantes. Alemania se está convirtiendo en líder en energías renovables y puede capitalizar la ampliación de esta tendencia para ampliar su mercado de exportación (Gráfico 26). Implicaciones para la inversión Mercados de bonos La perspectiva económica para Alemania y la eurozona en su conjunto es consistente con infraponderar los bunds alemanes dentro de las carteras de renta fija europeas. Los bunds se encuentran entre los mercados de bonos más caros del mundo, lo que los hará extremadamente vulnerables a sorpresas económicas positivas en Europa a finales de este año, especialmente si la política fiscal alemana se relaja más tras las elecciones de septiembre (Gráfico 27). Además, una política fiscal alemana más laxa debería ayudar a los bonos periféricos europeos, especialmente a los baratos BTP italianos que el BCE actualmente compra agresivamente. Por tanto, continuamos sobreponderando BTPs y añadimos bonos griegos y portugueses a la lista. Gráfico 27 Los bunds alemanes son caros Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Gráfico 28 Los rendimientos alemanes ya incorporan bastante pesimismo sobre Europa Los rendimientos alemanes ya incorporan bastante pesimismo sobre Europa. Los rendimientos alemanes ya incorporan bastante pesimismo sobre Europa. En relación con los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU., las perspectivas para los bunds son más complejas. Por un lado, el BCE no endurecerá la política tanto como la Fed más adelante en este ciclo; además, es probable que la inflación europea permanezca por debajo de los niveles de EE. UU. este año y a lo largo del ciclo económico. Por otro lado, los bunds ya incorporan una prima de término y una proxy de tasa terminal real significativamente más baja que los Treasury Notes (Gráfico 28). En balance, el servicio de Estrategia Global de Renta Fija de BCA Research considera que los bunds deberían rendir mejor que los Treasurys este año, porque tienen una beta más baja, que es una característica valiosa en un entorno de aumento de rendimientos.6 Vigilaremos de cerca los riesgos alrededor de esta visión, porque es probable que la recuperación económica europea sea el catalizador para la próxima subida de rendimientos globales, caso en el que los bunds alemanes podrían temporalmente tener un rendimiento inferior. En términos estructurales, mientras no se aborden los problemas de productividad de Alemania desde Berlín, los bunds alemanes probablemente seguirán siendo un ancla para los rendimientos globales. Alemania permanecerá inundada de ahorros excedentes, que actuarán como un ancla deflacionario, a la vez que limitarán el alza a largo plazo de las tasas reales europeas. Los ahorros excedentes resultan en un gran superávit por cuenta corriente; así, Alemania continuará exportando sus ahorros al extranjero y actuará como un factor que contenga los rendimientos globales. El euro La perspectiva a medio plazo apunta a una apreciación significativa del euro. Nuestra expectativa de una sorpresa positiva de crecimiento europea y alemana en los próximos 12 meses es coherente con una mejoría del euro. El hecho de que los inversores hayan estado moviendo fondos fuera de la Eurozona hacia EE. UU. a un ritmo casi constante durante los últimos 10 años sólo da credibilidad a este argumento (Gráfico 29). Nuestra visión sobre la política fiscal alemana contribuye al brillo del euro. Mayores déficits presupuestarios alemanes ayudan a la actividad económica europea y reducen las primas de riesgo en la Eurozona. Este proceso es doblemente positivo para el euro. Primero, menores primas de riesgo en la periferia invitan a entradas de capital hacia la eurozona, especialmente porque los rendimientos griegos, portugueses, italianos o españoles ofrecen mejor valor que las alternativas. Segundo, un crecimiento más fuerte y primas de riesgo más bajas alivian la presión sobre el BCE como único reflacionador de la Eurozona. En el margen, este proceso debería impulsar la proxy de tasa terminal extremadamente deprimida para Europa y ayudar al EUR/USD. La robusta actividad económica global añade atractivo al euro, más allá de las fuerzas nacionales positivas en juego en Europa. El dólar es una moneda contracíclica; por tanto, los repuntes del ciclo económico global coinciden con un dólar débil, lo que aumenta el atractivo de EUR/USD. No obstante, si el impulso del crecimiento global emana de EE. UU., entonces el dólar puede fortalecerse. Este fenómeno estuvo en juego en el primer trimestre de 2021. Sin embargo, el liderazgo del crecimiento global está llamado a alejarse de EE. UU. en los próximos 12 meses, lo que implica que la relación inversa normal entre el dólar y el crecimiento global se reasentará en beneficio del euro. La dinámica europea de la balanza de pagos consolidará la atracción del euro. El superávit por cuenta corriente de Alemania y de la Eurozona seguirá siendo amplio, especialmente en comparación con el déficit gemelo en expansión que afecta a EE. UU. Más allá de los próximos 12 a 24 meses, la falta de vigor estructural de la economía alemana y europea probablemente moverá al euro hacia una moneda refugio, como el yen y el franco suizo. Una fuerte balanza de pagos y bajos tipos de interés (todos síntomas de ahorros excedentes) son las características definitorias de las monedas de financiación, y serán atributos permanentes de la zona euro si las reformas no abordan su malestar de productividad. La posición internacional neta de la Eurozona ya está aumentando y su baja inflación dará un sesgo al alza estructural a las estimaciones de paridad de poder adquisitivo del euro (Gráfico 30). Esos desarrollos ya han sido evidentes en Japón y Suiza, y probablemente extinguirán la prociclicidad del euro con el paso del tiempo. Gráfico 29 Los inversores ya infraponderan activos europeos Los inversores ya están infraponderados en activos europeos Los inversores ya están infraponderados en activos europeos Gráfico 30 Sesgo al alza en el valor justo del euro Sesgo Alcista En El Valor Razonable Del Euro Sesgo Alcista En El Valor Razonable Del Euro Gráfico 31 Alemania no ha superado al resto de la Eurozona Alemania no ha superado al resto de la eurozona Alemania no ha superado al resto de la eurozona Acciones alemanas En términos absolutos, el DAX y las acciones alemanas aún poseen un amplio potencial alcista en los próximos 12 a 24 meses. BCA Research mantiene una postura positiva sobre las acciones, y un mercado de alta beta como Alemania puede beneficiarse.7 Además, la elevada sensibilidad de las acciones alemanas a la actividad económica global acentúa su atractivo. A BCA Research le gustan las acciones europeas, y las alemanas no son la excepción.8 La cuestión más compleja es cómo posicionar las acciones alemanas dentro de una cartera de acciones europea. Tras un rendimiento masivo entre 2003 y 2012, las acciones alemanas se han movido en línea con el resto de la Eurozona desde entonces (Gráfico 31). Además, las acciones alemanas ahora cotizan con descuento en todos los principales indicadores de valoración respecto al resto de la Eurozona (Gráfico 31, panel inferior). Las fuerzas macro globales que dictan las perspectivas de las acciones alemanas respecto al resto de la Eurozona envían actualmente mensajes contradictorios. Por un lado, las acciones alemanas normalmente superan cuando suben los precios de las materias primas o cuando el euro se aprecia (Gráfico 32). Por otro lado, sin embargo, las acciones alemanas también rinden menos cuando suben los rendimientos globales, o tras periodos en los que caen las reservas excedentes de China, como estamos presenciando hoy. Con esta falta de claridad de las fuerzas globales, la respuesta a la pregunta sobre el rendimiento relativo de Alemania yace en la dinámica económica europea. Alemania está perdiendo competitividad respecto al resto de la Eurozona (Gráfico 24 página 22), lo que sugiere que las acciones alemanas se beneficiarán menos que sus pares de un euro más fuerte en comparación con su desempeño en la última década. Además, las acciones alemanas baten cuando el PMI manufacturero alemán sube respecto al del conjunto de la eurozona. La brecha entre el PMI manufacturero de Alemania y el de la eurozona está cercana a máximos históricos y es probable que se reduzca a medida que el resto de la Eurozona se ponga al día. Esto debería influir en el desempeño de las acciones alemanas (Gráfico 33). Gráfico 32 Antecedentes globales mixtos para el rendimiento relativo de Alemania Panorama Global Mixto Para el Rendimiento Relativo de Alemania Panorama Global Mixto Para el Rendimiento Relativo de Alemania Gráfico 33 Una recuperación económica europea perjudicaría a las acciones alemanas Una recuperación económica europea perjudicaría a las acciones alemanas Una recuperación económica europea perjudicaría a las acciones alemanas Finalmente, la dinámica sectorial puede ser el árbitro definitivo. La Tabla 4 destaca la limitada diferencia en ponderaciones sectoriales entre Alemania y el resto de la Eurozona, lo que ayuda a explicar la estabilidad en el rendimiento relativo durante los últimos nueve años. Sin embargo, la varianza es mayor entre Alemania y naciones europeas específicas. En este enfoque, la postura negativa de BCA sobre las acciones de crecimiento se correlaciona con una sobreponderación de Alemania respecto a los Países Bajos. Además, nuestra perspectiva positiva sobre los financieros y los rendimientos de los bonos sugiere que Alemania debería tener un rendimiento inferior respecto a las acciones italianas y españolas. Tabla 4 Desglose sectorial en las principales bolsas europeas Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Apéndice: compromisos globales de política climática Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Vientos de cambio: Alemania se vuelve verde Notas a pie de página 1 Véase Matthew Karnitschnig, "Los conservadores alemanes atrapados en ‘el pantano’," Politico, 24 de marzo de 2021, politico.eu. 2 Los Verdes están interesados en una gama de impuestos, incluido un impuesto al carbono, un impuesto sobre servicios digitales y un impuesto sobre transacciones financieras. También les interesan las cuotas industriales que exigirían a los fabricantes de acero y de automóviles vender cierta proporción de acero neutro en carbono y vehículos eléctricos. Véase una excelente entrevista con la Sra. Baerbock en Ileana Grabitz y Katharina Schuler, "No tengo que convertir al conductor de SUV en Prenzlauer Berg," Zeit Online, 2 de enero de 2020, zeit.de. 3 Véanse sus comentarios a Zeit Online. 4 Véase el Panorama de la estrategia de inversión global de BCA Research "Panorama de estrategia del segundo trimestre de 2021: ¿Viene la inflación?", fechado el 26 de marzo de 2021, disponible en gis.bcareseach.com. 5 Véase el Informe Especial de Estrategia de Inversión Europea de BCA Research "Un desacoplamiento temporal", fechado el 5 de abril de 2021, disponible en eis.bcareseach.com. 6 Véase el Informe de Estrategia de Renta Fija Global de BCA Research "Más duro, mejor, más rápido, más fuerte", fechado el 16 de marzo de 2021, disponible en gfis.bcareseach.com. 7 Véase el Panorama de la estrategia de renta global de BCA Research "Panorama de estrategia del segundo trimestre de 2021: ¿Viene la inflación?", fechado el 26 de marzo de 2021, disponible en gis.bcareseach.com. 8 Véase el Informe de Estrategia de Renta Europea de BCA Research "Tiempo y atracción", fechado el 12 de abril de 2021, disponible en eis.bcareseach.com.

Highlights The Biden administration is combining Trumpian nationalism with a renewed push for US innovation in a major infrastructure bill that is highly likely to become law. Populism and Great Power struggle with China and Russia are structural forces that give enormous momentum to this effort. Don’t bet against it. President Biden’s $2.4 trillion infrastructure and green energy plan has a subjective 80% chance of passing into law by the end of the year, as infrastructure is popular and Democrats control Congress. The net deficit increase will range from $700 billion to $1.3 trillion depending on the size of corporate tax hikes in the final bill. The second part of Biden’s plan, the roughly $2 trillion American Families Plan, has a much lower chance of passage – at best 50/50 – as the 2022 midterm elections will loom and fiscal fatigue will set in. While the US infrastructure package is a positive cyclical catalyst, it was largely expected, and the Biden administration still faces early stress-tests on China/Taiwan, Russia, Iran, and even North Korea. Game theory helps explain why financial markets cannot ignore the 60% chance of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. A full-fledged war is still low-probability but Taiwan remains the world’s preeminent geopolitical risk. In emerging markets, stay short Russian and Brazilian currency and assets – and continue favoring Indian stocks over Chinese. Feature The “arsenal of democracy” is a phrase that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used to describe the full might of US government, industry, and labor in assisting the western allies in World War II. The US is reviving this combination of productive forces today, with President Joe Biden’s $4 trillion-plus American Jobs and Families Plan unveiled in Pittsburgh on March 31. The context is once again a global struggle among the Great Powers, albeit not world war (at least not yet … more on that below). The US is reviving its post-WWII pursuit of global liberal hegemony – symbolized by its role, growing once again, as the world’s chief consumer and chief warrior (Chart 1). Biden promoted his plan to build up the US’s infrastructure and social safety net explicitly as a historic and strategic investment – “in 50 years, people are going to look back and say this was the moment that American won the future.”1 It is critical for investors to realize that they are not witnessing another round of COVID-19 fiscal relief. That task is already completed with the Republican spending of 2020 and Biden’s own $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), which together with the vaccine rollout are delivering a jolt to growth (Chart 2). Chart 1America Pursues Hegemony Anew Chart 2Consensus Expects 6.5% US GDP Growth After American Rescue Plan Our own back-of-the-envelope estimates of growth suggest that there is considerable upside risk even under current law (Chart 3). The output gap is also guesstimated here, and it will tighten faster than expected, especially as the service sector revives on economic reopening. Chart 3Back-Of-Envelope: US GDP And Output Gap Show Upside Risk After American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) A growth overshoot is even more likely considering that the first part of Biden’s proposal, the $2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan consisting mostly of infrastructure and green energy, is highly likely to pass Congress (by July at earliest and December at latest, most likely late fall). Our revised estimates for the US budget deficit show that this bill will add considerably to the deficit in the coming years, peaking in three or four years, thus averting the “fiscal cliff” in 2022-23 and adding to aggregate demand in the years after the short-term COVID-era cash handouts dry up (Chart 4). The net deficit increase will be $700 billion if Biden gets all of his tax hikes and $1.3 trillion if he only gets half of them, according to our sister US Political Strategy. Chart 4US Budget Deficit Will Remain Fat In Coming Years We give Biden’s $2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan an 80% chance of passing through Congress by the end of the year. Infrastructure is broadly popular – as President Trump’s own $2 trillion infrastructure campaign proposal revealed – and Democrats have just enough votes to push it through the Senate via budget reconciliation, which requires zero votes from Republicans. Biden’s political capital is still strong given that his approval rating will stay above 50% as long as Trump is the obvious alternative and the Republicans are deeply divided over their own future (Chart 5).2 The second part of his plan, the $1.95 trillion American Families Plan, is much less likely to pass before the 2022 midterm elections – we would say 50/50 odds at best, if the infrastructure deal passes quickly. Chart 5Biden’s Political Capital Is Sufficient To Pass Another Major Law Of course there are very important differences between Biden’s $2.4 trillion infrastructure plan and the similarly sized proposal that Trump would have unveiled this month had he been re-elected: Biden’s proposal is probably heavier on innovation and research and development, and certainly heavier on unionization and labor regulation, than Trump’s would have been. Biden’s plan integrates infrastructure with sustainability, renewable energy, and climate change initiatives that will help the US catch up with Europe and China on the green front. The plan will consist of direct government spending – rather than government seed money to promote private investment. It will be partially offset by repealing the corporate tax cuts in Trump’s signature Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Most importantly – from a geopolitical point of view – Biden is making a bid for the US to resume its post-WWII quest for global liberal hegemony. He argued that the US stands at the crossroads of a global choice between “democracies and autocracies” and that rebuilding US infrastructure is ultimately about proving that democracies can create consensus and “deliver for their people.” Autocratic regimes, fairly or not, routinely call attention to the divisiveness of modern party politics in the West and the resulting policy gridlock which produces bad outcomes for many citizens, resulting in greater domestic dysfunction and “chaos.” It is important to note that this bid for hegemony will be more, not less, destabilizing for global politics as it will make the US economy more self-sufficient and insulated from the world. It will intensify the US-China and US-Russia strategic competition while making it more difficult for Biden to conduct bilateral diplomacy with these states given their differences in moral values and frequent human rights violations. What is happening now is the culmination of political shifts that pre-date the pandemic, but were galvanized by the pandemic, and it is of global, geopolitical significance for the coming decade and beyond.3 Biden and the establishment Democrats – embattled by populism on their right and left flanks – are shamelessly coopting President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” nationalism with a larger-than-life, infrastructure-and-manufacturing initiative that emphasizes productivity as well as “Buy American” protectionism. Biden explicitly argued that Americans need to boost innovation to “put us in a position to win the global competition with China in the upcoming years.” At Biden’s first press conference on March 25, he made a similar point about China: So I see stiff competition with China. China has an overall goal, and I don’t criticize them for the goal, but they have an overall goal to become the leading country in the world, the wealthiest country in the world, and the most powerful country in the world. That’s not going to happen on my watch because the United States are going to continue to grow and expand.4 The US trade deficit is set to widen a lot further under this massive domestic buildout. It aims to be the largest government investment program since Dwight Eisenhower’s building of the highways or the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon space race. But it explicitly aims to diminish China’s role as a supplier of US goods and materials and the US trade deficit already shows evidence of economic divorce (Chart 6). The US is bound to have a larger trade deficit due to its own savings-and-investment imbalances but it has a powerful interest in redistributing this trade deficit to its allies and reducing over-dependency on China, which is itself pursuing strategic self-sufficiency and military modernization in anticipation of an ongoing rivalry this century. Chart 6Biden's Coopts Trump's Trade And Manufacturing Agenda Bottom Line: Biden’s $2.4 trillion American Jobs Plan has an 80% chance of passing Congress later this year with a net increase to the fiscal thrust of between $700 billion and $1.3 trillion, depending on how many and how high the corporate tax hikes. The other $2 trillion social spending part of Biden’s plan has only a 50/50 chance of passage. The infrastructure and green energy rebuild should be understood as a return of Big Government motivated by populism and Great Power competition – it is a geopolitical theme with enormous momentum. The result will be faster US growth and higher inflation expectations, with the upside risk of a productivity boom (or boomlet) from the combination of public and private sector innovation. Investors should not bet against the cyclical bull market even though any increase in long-term potential GDP is speculative. A Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis And The Cuban Missile Crisis Biden’s American Jobs Plan reserves $50 billion for US semiconductor manufacturing, a vast sum, larger than expectations and far larger than the relatively small public investments that helped revolutionize the US chip industry in the 1980s. But it will take a long time for these investments to pay off in the form of secure and redundant supply chains, while a semiconductor shortage is raging today that is already entangled with the US-China rivalry and tensions over the Taiwan Strait. The risk of a diplomatic or military incident is urgent because the chip shortage exacerbates China’s vulnerabilities at a time when the Biden administration is about to make critical decisions regarding the tightness of new export controls that cut off China’s access to US semiconductor chips, equipment, and parts. If the Biden administration appears to pursue a full-fledged tech blockade, as the Trump administration seemed bent on doing, then China will retaliate economically or militarily. Before going further we should point out that there are still areas of potential US-China cooperation under the Biden administration that could reduce tensions this year (though not over the long run). Biden and Xi Jinping might meet virtually as early as this month to discuss carbon emission reduction targets. Meanwhile China is positioning itself to serve as power-broker on two major foreign policy challenges – Iran and North Korea. Biden expressly seeks Chinese and Russian assistance based on the mutual interest in nuclear non-proliferation. Notably, Beijing’s renewed strategic dealings with Iran over the past month highlight its confidence that Biden does not have the appetite to stick with Trump’s “maximum pressure” but rather will seek to reduce sanctions and restore the 2015 nuclear deal. Hence China will seek to parlay influence over Tehran in exchange for reduced US pressure on its trade and economy (Chart 7). Beijing is making a similar offer on North Korea. Chart 7China Holds The Key To Iran, As With North Korea? Ironically both Iranian and North Korean geopolitical tensions should skyrocket in the short term since high-stakes negotiations are beginning, even though they are ultimately more manageable risks than the mega-risk of US-China conflict over Taiwan. China cannot gain the advanced technology it needs to achieve a strategic breakthrough if the US should impose a total tech blockade, e.g. draconian export controls enforced on US allies. Yet it is highly unlikely to gain the tech by seizing Taiwan, since war would likely destroy the computer chip fabrication plants and provoke global sanctions that would crush its economy. The result is that China is launching a massive campaign of domestic production and indigenous innovation while circumventing US restrictions through cyber and other means. Still, a dangerous strategic asymmetry is looming because the US will retain access to the most advanced computer chips via its alliances and on-shoring, whereas China will remain vulnerable to a tech blockade via Taiwan. This brings us to our chief global geopolitical risk: a US-China showdown in the Taiwan Strait. Highlighting the urgency of the risk, Admiral John Aquilino, the nominee for Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that China might not wait six years to attack Taiwan: “My opinion is that this problem is much closer to us than most think and we have to take this on.”5 To illustrate the calculus of such a showdown – and our reasons for maintaining an alarmist tone and building up market hedges and safe-haven investments – we turn to game theory. Game theory is not a substitute for empirical analysis but a tool to formalize complex international systems with multiple decision-makers. An obvious yet fair analogy to a US-China-Taiwan crisis is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.6 The standard construction of the Cuban missile crisis in game theory goes as follows: if the US maintains a blockade and the Soviets withdraw their missiles a compromise is achieved and war is averted; if the US conducts air strikes and the Soviets maintain or use their missiles then war ensues. The payouts to each player are shown in the matrix in Diagram 1. Diagram 1Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 One concern about this construction is that the payouts may underestimate the costs of war since nuclear arms could be used. We insert a comment into the diagram highlighting that the payouts could be altered to account for nuclear war. Note that this alteration does not change the final outcome: the equilibrium scenario is still US blockade and Soviet withdrawal, which is what happened in reality. If we model a US-China-Taiwan conflict along similar lines, the US takes the role of the Soviet Union while China stands where the US stood in 1962 (Diagram 2). This is a theoretical scenario in which the US offers Taiwan a decisive improvement in its security or offensive military capabilities. However, because of the unique circumstances of the Chinese civil war, in which the victors established the People’s Republic of China in Beijing in 1949 and the defeated forces retreated to Taiwan, China’s regime legitimacy is at stake in any showdown over Taiwan. If Beijing suffered a defeat that secured Taiwan’s independence while degrading Beijing’s regime legitimacy and security, the Chinese regime might not survive the domestic blowback.7 Diagram 2Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis – What Happens If The US Offers Game-Changing Military Support To Taiwan? Thus we reduce the Chinese payout in the case of American victory. In the top right cell of Diagram 2, the row player’s payout falls from two points (2ppt) in the first diagram to one point (1ppt) in this diagram. This seemingly slight change entirely alters the outcome of the game. Beijing now faces equally bad outcomes in the event of defeat, whereas victory remains preferable to a tie. Therefore as long as China believes that the US will not resort to nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan (a reasonable assessment) then it may make the mistake of opting for military force to ensure victory. Fortunately for global investors the US is not providing Taiwan with game-changing military capabilities, although it is ultimately up to China to decide what threatens its security and the US is in the process of upgrading Taiwan’s defense in an effort to deter Beijing from forceful reunification. Thus the exercise demonstrates why we do not expect immediate war – no game-changer yet – but at the same time it shows why war is much likelier than the consensus holds if the military or political status quo changes in a way that China deems strategically unacceptable. A lower-degree Taiwan crisis should be expected – i.e. one in which the US maintains tech restrictions, offers arms sales or military training that do not upend the military balance, or signs free trade agreements or other significant upgrades to the US-Taiwan relationship.8 We would give a 60% probability to some kind of crisis over the next 12-24 months. The global equity market could at least suffer a 10% correction in a standard geopolitical crisis and it could easily fall 20% if US-China war appears more likely. What would trigger a full-fledged Taiwan war? We would grow even more alarmed if we saw one of three major developments: Chinese internal instability giving rise to a still more aggressive regime; the US providing Taiwan with offensive military capabilities; or Taiwan seeking formal political independence. The first is fairly likely, the second lends itself to miscalculation, and the third is unlikely. But it would only take one or two of these to increase the war risk dramatically. Bottom Line: The Taiwan Strait is still the critical geopolitical risk and Biden’s policy on China is still unclear. Iranian and North Korean tensions will escalate in the short run but the fundamental crisis lies in Taiwan. Since some kind of showdown is likely and war cannot be ruled out we advise clients to accumulate safe-haven assets like the Japanese yen and otherwise not to bet headlong against the US dollar until it loses momentum. Emerging Markets Round-Up In this section we will briefly update some important emerging market themes and views: Chart 8Favor USMCA Over Putin's Russia Russia: US-Russia tensions are escalating in the face of Biden’s reassertion of the US bid for liberal hegemony, which poses a direct threat to Russia’s influence in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is expected to see a renewed conflict this spring. The top US and Russian military commanders spoke on the phone for the second time this year after Ukrainian military reports indicated that Russia is amassing forces on the border. We also assign a 50/50 chance that the US will use sanctions to prevent the completion of the NordStream II pipeline from Russia to Germany, an event that would shake up the German election as well as provoke a Russian backlash. The Russian ruble has suffered a long slide since Putin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 and the country’s currency and equities have not staged much of a comeback amid the global cyclical upswing and commodity price rally post-COVID. We recommend investors favor the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso as oil plays in the context of American stimulus and persistent Russian geopolitical risk (Chart 8). We also favor developed market European stocks over emerging Europe, which will suffer from renewed US-Russia tensions. Brazil: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s domestic political troubles are metastasizing as expected – the rally-around-the-flag effect in the face of COVID-19 has faded and his popular approval rating now looks dangerously like President Trump’s did, relative to previous presidents, which is an ominous warning for the “Trump of the South,” who faces an election in October 2022 (Chart 9). The COVID-19 deaths are skyrocketing, with intensive care units reaching critical levels across the country. The president has reshuffling his cabinet, including all three heads of the military in an unprecedented disruption that compounds fears about his willingness to politicize the military.9 Meanwhile the judicial system looks likely (but not certain) to clear former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to run against Bolsonaro for the presidency, a potent threat (Chart 10). Bolsonaro’s three pillars of political viability have cracked under the pandemic: the country remains disorderly, the systemic corruption and the “Car Wash” scandal under the former ruling party are no longer at the center of public focus, and fiscal stimulus has replaced structural reform. Chart 9Brazil: Will ‘Trump Of The South’ Face Trump’s Fate? Our Brazilian GeoRisk Indicator has reached a peak with Bolsonaro’s crisis – and likely breaking of the fiscal spending growth cap put in place at the height of the political crisis in 2016 – while Brazilian equities relative to emerging markets have hit a triple bottom (Chart 11). It is too soon for investors to buy into Brazil given that the political upheaval can get worse before it gets better and a Lula administration is no cure for Brazil’s public debt crisis, though a short-term technical rally is at hand. Chart 10Brazil’s Lula Looks To Be A Contender In 2022? Chart 11Brazil: Policy Risk Peaks, Equities Hit Triple-Bottom Versus EM India: A lot has happened since we last updated our views on India, South Asia, and the broader Indian Ocean basin. Farmer protests broke out in India, forcing Prime Minister Narendra Modi to temporarily suspend his much-needed structural reforms to the agricultural sector, while China-backed military coup broke out in Myanmar, and the US election set up a return to negotiations with Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire, despite boiling tensions over India’s decision to make Jammu and Kashmir a federal union territory. The ceasefire is temporary but it does highlight a changing geopolitical dynamic in the region. India and Pakistan ceased fire along the Line of Control where they have fought many times. The ceasefire does not resolve core problems – Pakistan will not stop supporting militant proxies and India will not grant Kashmir autonomy – but it does show their continued ability to manage the intensity of disputes while dealing with the global pandemic. An earlier sign of coordination occurred after the exchange of air strikes in early 2019, which preceded the Indian election and suggested that India and Pakistan had the ability to control their military encounters. India’s move to revoke the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, along with various militant operations, created the basis for another major conflict this year. After all, the Kargil war in 1999 followed nuclear weaponization, while the 2008 conflict followed the Mumbai attack. But instead India and Pakistan have agreed to a temporary truce. A major India-Pakistan conflict would be a “black swan” as nobody is expecting it at this point. Not coincidentally, India and China also reduced tensions after the flare-up in their Himalayan territorial disputes in 2020. China may be reducing tensions now that it no longer has to distract its population from Trump and the US election. China is shifting its focus to the Myanmar coup, another area where it hopes to parlay its influence with a Biden administration preoccupied with democracy and human rights. Sino-Indian tensions will resume later, especially as China continues its infrastructure construction at the farthest reaches of its territory for the sake of economic stimulus, internal control, and military logistics. The Biden administration is adopting the Trump administration’s efforts to draw India into a democratic alliance. But more urgently it is trying to withdraw from Afghanistan and cut a deal with Iran, which means it will need Indian and Pakistani cooperation and will want India to play a supportive role. Typically India eschews alliances and it will disapprove of Biden’s paternalism. For both China and Pakistan, making a temporary truce with India discourages it from synching up relations with the US immediately. Still, we expect India to cooperate more closely with the US over time, both on economic and security matters. This includes a beefed up “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) with Japan and Australia, which already have strong economic ties with India. Biden’s attempt to frame US foreign policy as a global restoration of democracy and liberalism will not go very far if he alienates the largest democracy in the world and in Asia. Nor will his attempt to diversify the US economy away from China or counter China’s regional assertiveness. Therefore Biden will have to take a supportive role on US-India ties. We are sticking with our contrarian long India / short China equity trade (Chart 12). India cannot achieve its geopolitical goals without reforming its economy and for that very reason it will redouble its structural reform drive, which is supported by changing voting patterns in favor of accelerating nationwide economic development. India will also receive a tailwind from the US and its allies as they seek to diversify production sources and reduce supply chain dependency on China, at least for health, defense, and tech. Meanwhile China’s government is pursing import substitution, deleveraging, and conflict with its neighbors and the United States. While Chinese equities are much cheaper than Indian equities on a P/E basis, they are not as pricey on a P/B and P/S basis (Chart 13) – and valuation trends can continue under the current macro and geopolitical backdrop. Indian equities are more volatile but from a long-term and geopolitical point of view, India’s moment has arrived. Chart 12Contrarian Trade: Stick To Long India / Short China Bottom Line: Stay long Indian equities relative to Chinese and stay short Russian and Brazilian currencies and assets. These views are based on political and geopolitical themes that will remain relevant over the long run but are also seeing short-term confirmation. Chart 13Indian Stocks Not As Over-Priced On Price-To-Book, Price-To-Sales Investment Takeaways To conclude we want to highlight two investment takeaways. First, while the market has rallied in expectation of the US stimulus package, Biden must now get the package passed. This roller coaster process, combined with the inevitable European recovery once the vaccine rollout gets on its feet (Chart 14), will power an additional rally in cyclicals, value stocks, and commodities. This is true as long as China does not tighten monetary and fiscal policy too abruptly, a risk we have highlighted in previous reports. Chart 14Europe's Vaccination Problem While the US is pursuing “Buy American” provisions within its stimulus package, its growing trade deficit shows that it will be forced to import goods and services to meet its surging demand. This is beneficial for its nearest trade partners, Canada and Mexico, and Europe – as well as China substitutes further afield in some cases. Our European Investment Strategist Mathieu Savary has pointed out the opportunities lurking in Europe at a time when vaccine troubles and lockdowns are clouding the medium-term economic view, which is brightening. He recommends going long the “laggard” sectors and sub-sectors that have not benefited much relative to “leaders” that rallied sharply in the wake of last year’s stimulus, vaccine discovery, and defeat of President Trump (Chart 15). The laggard sectors are primed to outperform on rising US interest rates and decelerating Chinese economy as well (Chart 16). Therefore we recommend going long his basket of Euro Area laggards and short the leaders. Chart 15Europe’s Laggards And Leaders Chart 16Macro Forces Favor The Laggards over the Leaders Chart 17Will OPEC 2.0 Maintain Production Discipline To Keep Oil Supplies Tight? Commodities – especially base metals – will continue to benefit from the global and European reopening as well as the US infrastructure buildout, assuming that China does not shoot its economy in the foot. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy highlights that global oil prices should remain in a $60-$80 per barrel range over the coming years on the back of tight supply/demand balances and ongoing OPEC 2.0 production management (Chart 17). We continue to see upside oil price risks in the first half of the year but downside risks in the second half. The US pursuit of a deal with Iran may trigger sparks initially – i.e. unplanned supply outages – but this will be followed by increased supply from Iran and/or OPEC 2.0 as a deal becomes evident.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 White House, "Remarks by President Biden on the American Jobs Plan," Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, March 31, 2021, whitehouse.gov. 2 A bipartisan bill is conceivably, barely, since Republicans face pressure to join with such a popular bill, but they cannot accept the corporate tax hikes, unionization, or green boondoggles that will inevitably occur. 3 The pandemic and President Trump’s hands-off attitude toward it helped galvanize this revival of Big Government, but the revival was already well on its way prior to the pandemic. 4 White House, "Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference," March 25, 2021, whitehouse.gov. 5 Again, "the most dangerous concern is that of a military force against Taiwan," though he implied that Beijing would wait until after the February 2022 Winter Olympics before taking action. He requested that the US urgently increase regional military defense. See Senate Armed Services Committee, "Nomination – Aquilino," March 23, 2021, armed-services.senate.gov. 6 At that time the Soviet Union stationed nuclear missiles in Cuba that threatened the US homeland directly and sent a convoy to make the missile installation permanent. The US imposed a blockade. A showdown ensued, at great risk of war, until the Soviets withdrew and the Americans made some compromises regarding missiles in Turkey. 7 Note that this was not the case for the US in 1962: Cuba did not have special significance for the legitimacy of the American republic and the American regime would have survived a defeat in the showdown, although its security would have been greatly compromised. 8 Taiwan is proposing to buy a missile segment enhancement for its Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile defense system for delivery in 2025, though this is not yet confirmed by the Biden administration. See for example Yimou Lee, "Taiwan To Buy New U.S. Air Defence Missiles To Guard Against China," Reuters, March 31, 2021, reuters.com. 9 See Monica Gugliano, "I Will Intervene! The Day Bolsonaro Decided To Send Troops To The Supreme Court," Folha de São Paulo, August 2020, piaui.folha.uol.com.br.

Highlights Biden’s policy on China is hawkish so far, as expected, but temporary improvement is possible. We are cyclically bearish on the dollar but are taking a neutral tactical stance as the greenback’s bounce could go higher than expected if US-China relations take another downward dive. US-Iran tensions are on track to escalate in the second quarter as the pressure builds toward what we think will be a third quarter restoration of the 2015 nuclear deal. Oil price volatility is the takeaway. The anticipated US-Russia conflict has emerged and will bring negative surprises, especially for Russian and emerging European markets. Europe still enjoys relative political stability. A German election upset would bring upside risk to the euro and bund yields, while Scottish independence risk is contained for now. In this report we are launching the first in a new series of regular quarterly outlook reports that will supplement our annual Geopolitical Strategy strategic outlook. Feature The decline in global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk that attended the US election and COVID-19 vaccine discovery has largely played out. Global investors have witnessed successful vaccine rollouts in the US and UK and can look forward to other countries, namely the EU-27, catching up. They have witnessed a splurge of US fiscal spending – $2.8 trillion since December – unprecedented in peacetime. And they have seen the Chinese government offer assurances that monetary tightening will not undermine the economic recovery. The risk of the US doubling down on belligerent trade protectionism has fallen by the wayside along with the Trump presidency. Going forward, there are signs that policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will revive. First, as the global semiconductor shortage and Suez Canal blockage highlight, the world economy will sputter and strain at the sudden eruption of economic activity as the pandemic subsides and vast government spending takes effect. Financial instability is a likely consequence of the sudden, simultaneous adoption of debt monetization across a range of economies combined with a global high-tech race and energy overhaul. Second, the defeat of the Trump presidency does not reverse the secular increase in geopolitical tensions arising from America’s internal divisions and weakening hand relative to China, Russia, and others. On the contrary, large monetary and fiscal stimulus lowers the economic costs of conflict and encourages autarkic, self-sufficiency policies that make governments more likely to struggle with each other to secure their supply chains. Chart 1AThe Return Of Geopolitical Risk Chart 1BThe Return Of Geopolitical Risk If we look at simple, crude measures of geopolitical risk we can see the market awakening to the new wall of worry for this business cycle – Great Power struggle, the persistence of “America First” with a different figurehead, China policy tightening, and a vacuum of European leadership. The US dollar is rising, developed market equities are outperforming emerging markets, safe-haven currencies are ticking up against commodity currencies, and gold is perking back up (Charts 1A & 1B). The cyclical upswing should reverse most of these trends over the medium term but investors should be cautious in the short term. US Stimulus, Chinese Tightening, And The Greenback The US remains the world’s preponderant power despite its political dysfunction and economic decline relative to emerging markets. The US has struggled to formulate a coherent way to deal with declining influence, as shown by dramatic policy reversals toward Iraq, Iran, China, and Russia. The pattern of unpredictability will continue. The Biden administration’s longevity is unknown so foreign states will be cautious of making firm commitments, implementing deals, or taking irrevocable actions. This does not mean the Biden administration will have a small impact – far from it. Biden’s national policy seeks to fire up the American economy, refurbish alliances, export liberal democratic ideology, and compete with China and Russia. The firing up is largely already accomplished – the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and Biden’s forthcoming “Build Back Better” proposals will ultimately rank with Johnson’s Great Society. The Fed estimates that US GDP growth will hit 6.5% this year, higher than the consensus of economic forecasts estimates 5.5%, driven by giant government pump-priming (Chart 2). The US, which is already an insulated economy, is virtually inured to foreign shocks for the time being. Chart 2US Injects Steroids Next comes the courting of allies to form a united democratic front against the world’s ambitious dictatorships. This process will be very difficult as the allies are averse to taking risks, especially on behalf of an erratic America. Chart 3US Stimulus Briefly Halts Decline In Global Economic Share The Obama administration spent six full years creating a coalition to pressure an economically miniscule Iran into signing the 2015 nuclear deal. Imagine how long it will take Biden to convince the EU-27 and small Asian states to stick their necks out against Xi Jinping’s China. Especially if they suspect that the US’s purpose is to force China to open its doors primarily for the Americans. If the US grows at the rate of consensus forecasts then its share of global GDP will be 17.6% by 2025 (Chart 3). However, the US’s decline should not be exaggerated. Consider the lesson of the past year, in which the US seemed to flounder in the face of the pandemic. The US’s death count, on a population basis, was in line with other developed markets and yet its citizens exercised a greater degree of individual freedom. It maintained the rule of law despite extreme polarization, social unrest, and a controversial election. Its development of mRNA vaccines highlighted its ongoing innovation edge. And it has rolled out the vaccines rapidly. Internal divisions are still extreme and likely to produce social instability (we are still in the zone of “peak polarization”). But the US economic foundation is now fundamentally supported – political collapse is improbable. Chart 4US Vs China: The Stimulus Impulse In short, the US saw the “Civil War Lite” and has moved onto “Reconstruction Lite,” with a big expansion of the social safety net and infrastructure as well as taxes already being drafted. Meanwhile General Secretary Xi has managed to steer China into a good position for the much-ballyhooed 100th anniversary of the Communist Party on July 1. His administration is tightening monetary and fiscal policy marginally to resume the fight against systemic financial risk. China faces vast socioeconomic imbalances that, if left unattended, could eventually overturn the Communist Party’s rule. So far the tightening of policy is modest but the risk of a policy mistake is non-negligible and something global financial markets will have to grapple with in the second quarter. Comparing the US and China reveals an impending divergence in relative monetary and fiscal stimulus (Chart 4). China’s money and credit impulse is peaking – some signs of economic deceleration are popping up – even as the US lets loose a deluge of liquidity and pump-priming. The result is that the world is likely to experience waning Chinese demand and waxing US demand in the second half of the year. It is almost the mirror image of 2009-10, when China’s economy skyrocketed on a stimulus splurge while the US recovered more slowly with less policy support. The medium-to-long-run implication is that the US will have a bumpy downhill ride over the coming decade whereas China will recover more smoothly. Yet the analogy only goes so far. The structural transition facing China’s society and economy is severe and US-led international pressure on its economy will make it more severe. The short-run implication – for Q2 2021 – is that the US dollar’s bounce could run longer than consensus expects. Commodity prices, commodity currencies, and emerging market assets face a correction from very toppy levels. The global cyclical upswing will continue as long as China avoids a policy mistake of overtightening as we expect but the near-term is fraught with downside risk. Bottom Line: We are neutral on the dollar from a tactical point of view. While our bias is to expect the dollar to relapse, in line with the BCA House View and our Foreign Exchange Strategy, we are loathe to bet against the greenback given US stimulus and Chinese tightening. This is not to mention geopolitical tensions highlighted below that would reinforce the dollar. Biden’s China Policy And The Semiconductor Shortage Any spike in US-China strategic tensions in Q2 would exacerbate the above reasoning on the dollar. It would also lead to a deeper selloff in Chinese and EM Asian currencies and risk assets. A spike in tensions is not guaranteed but investors should plan for the worst. One of our core views for many years has been that any Democratic administration taking office in 2020 would remain hawkish on China, albeit less so than the Trump administration. So far this view is holding up. It may not have been the cause of the drop in Chinese and emerging Asian equities but it has not helped. However, the jury is still out on Biden’s China policy and the second quarter will likely see major actions that crystallize the relative hawkish or dovish change in policy. The acrimonious US-China meeting in Alaska meeting does not necessarily mean anything. The Biden administration has a full China policy review underway that will not be completed until around early June. The first bilateral summit between Biden and Xi could occur on Earth Day, April 22, or sometime thereafter, as the countries are looking to restart strategic dialogue and engage on nuclear non-proliferation and carbon emission reductions. Specifically China wants to swap its help on North Korea – which restarted ballistic missile launches as we go to press – for easier US policies on trade and tech. Only if and when a new attempt at engagement breaks down will the Biden administration conclude that it has a basis for pursuing a more offensive policy toward China. The problem is that new engagement probably will break down, sooner or later, for reasons we outlined last week: the areas of cooperation are limited – obviously so on health and cybersecurity, but even on climate change. Engagement on Iran and North Korea may have more success but the bigger conflicts over tech and Taiwan will persist. Ultimately China is fixated on strategic self-sufficiency and rapid tech acquisition in the national interest, leaving little room for US market access or removal of high-tech export controls. The threat that Biden will ultimately adopt and expand on Trump’s punitive measures will hang over Beijing’s head. The risk of a Republican victory in 2024 will also discourage China from implementing any deep structural concessions. The crux of the conflict remains the tech sector and specifically semiconductors.1 China is rapidly gaining market share but the US is using its immense leverage over chip design and equipment to cut off China’s access to chips and industry development. The ongoing threat of an American chip blockade is now being exacerbated by a global shortage of semiconductors as the economy recovers (Chart 5), exposing China’s long-term economic vulnerability. Chart 5Global Semiconductor Shortage There is room for some de-escalation but not much – and it is not to be counted on. The Biden administration, like the Obama administration, subscribes to the view that the US should prioritize maintaining its lead in tech innovation rather than trying to compete with China’s high-subsidy model, which is gobbling up the lower end of the computer chip market. Biden’s policy will at first be defensive rather than offensive – focused on improving US supply chain security rather than curtailing Chinese supply. Biden’s proposal for domestic infrastructure program will include funds for the semiconductor industry and research. While the Biden administration likely prizes leadership and innovation over the on-shoring of US chip production, the US government must also look to supply security, specifically for the military, so some on-shoring of production is inevitable.2 Ultimately the Biden administration can continue using export controls to slow China’s semiconductor development or it can pare these controls back. If it does nothing then China’s state-backed tech program will lead to a rapid increase in Chinese capabilities and market share as has occurred in other industries. If it maintains restrictions then it will delay China’s development, especially on the highest end of chips, but not prevent China from gaining the technology through circumventing export controls, subsidizing its domestic industry, and poaching from Taiwan and South Korea. Given that technological supremacy will lead to military supremacy the US is likely to maintain restrictions. But a full chip blockade on China would require expanding controls and enforcing them on third parties, and massively increases strategic tensions, should Biden ever decide to go this ultra-hawkish route. The Biden administration can adjust the pace and intensity of export controls but cannot give China free rein. Biden will want to block China’s access to the US market, or funds, or parts when these feed its military-industrial complex but relax pressure on China’s commercial trade. This is only a temporary fix. The commercial/military distinction is hard to draw when Beijing continually pursues “civil-military fusion” to maximize its industrial and strategic capabilities. Therefore US-China strategic tensions over tech will worsen over the long run even if Biden pursues engagement in the short run. Bottom Line: Biden’s China policy has started out hawkish as expected but the real policy remains unknown. The second quarter will reveal key details. Biden could pursue engagement, leading to a reduction in tensions. Investors should wait and see rather than bet on de-escalation, given that tensions will escalate anew over the medium and long term and therefore may never really decline. Iran And Oil Price Volatility Biden’s other foreign policy challenges in the second quarter hinge on Iran and Russia. The Biden administration aims to restore the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal and is likely to move quickly. This is not merely a matter of intention but of national capability since US grand strategy is pushing the US to shift focus to Asia Pacific, and an Iranian nuclear crisis divides US attention and resources. Biden has the ability to return to the 2015 deal with a flick of his wrist. The Iranians also have that ability, at least until lame duck President Hassan Rouhani leaves office in August – beyond that, a much longer negotiation would be necessary. US-Iran talks will lead to demonstrations of credible military threats, which means that geopolitical attacks and tensions in the Middle East will likely go higher before they fall on any deal. The past several years have already seen a series of displays of military force by the Iranians and the US and its allies and this process may escalate all summer (Map 1). Map 1Military Incidents In Persian Gulf Since Abqaiq Refinery Attack, 2019 It is too soon to draw conclusions regarding the Israeli election on March 23 but it is possible that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will remain in power (Chart 6). If this is the case then Israel will oppose the American effort to rejoin the Iranian nuclear deal, culminating in a crisis sometime in the summer (or fall) in which the Israelis make a major show of force against Iran. Even if Netanyahu falls from power, the new Israeli government will still have to show Iran that it cannot be pushed around. Fundamentally, however, a change in leadership in Israel would bring the US and Israel into alignment and thus smooth the process for a deal that seeks to contain Iran’s nuclear program at least through 2025. Any better deal would require an entirely new diplomatic effort. Chart 6Israeli Ruling Coalition Share Of Knesset Shares In Recent Elections The Russians or Saudi Arabians might reduce their oil production discipline once a deal becomes inevitable, so as not to lose market share to Iranian oil that will come back onto global markets. Thus oil markets could face unexpected oil supply outages due to conflict followed by OPEC or Iranian supply increases, implying that prices will be volatile. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy expects prices to average $65/barrel in 2021, $70/barrel in 2022, and $60-$80/barrel through 2025. Bottom Line: Oil prices will be volatile in the second quarter as they may be affected by the twists and turns of US-Iran negotiations, which may not reach a new equilibrium until July or August at earliest. Otherwise a multi-year diplomatic process will be required, which will suck away the Biden administration’s foreign policy capital, resulting either in precipitous reduction in Middle East focus or a neglect of greater long-term challenges from China and Russia. Russian Risks, Germany Elections, And Scottish Independence European politics are more stable than elsewhere in the world – marked by Italy’s sudden formation of a technocratic unity government under Prime Minister Mario Draghi. Draghi is focused on using EU recovery funds to boost Italian productivity and growth. Europe’s economic growth has underperformed that of the US so far this year. The EU is not witnessing the same degree of fiscal stimulus as the US (Chart 7). The core member states all face a fiscal drag in the coming two years and meanwhile the bloc has struggled to roll out COVID-19 vaccines efficiently. However, the vaccines are proven to be effective and will eventually be rolled out, so investors should buy into the discount in the euro and European stocks as a result of the various mishaps. Global and European industrial production and economic sentiment are bouncing back and German yields are rising albeit not as rapidly as American (Chart 8). Chart 7EU Stimulus Lags But Targets Productivity Chart 8Global And Euro Area Production To Accelerate Chart 9German Conservatives Waver in Polls The main exceptions to Europe’s relative political stability come from Germany and Scotland. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a lame duck and her party is falling in opinion polls with only six months to go before the general election on September 26 (Chart 9). Merkel even faced the threat of a no-confidence motion in the Bundestag this week due to her attempt to extend COVID lockdowns over Easter and sudden retreat in the face of a public backlash. Merkel apologized but her party is looking extremely shaky after recent election losses on the state level. The rise of a new left-wing German governing coalition is much more likely than the market expects. The second quarter will see the selection of a chancellor-candidate for her Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union. Table 1 highlights the likeliest chancellor-candidates of all the parties and their policy stances, from the point of view of whether they have a “hawkish,” hard-line policy stance or “dovish,” easy policy stance on the major issues. What stands out is that the entire German political spectrum is now effectively centrist or dovish on monetary and fiscal policy following the lessons of the 13 years since the global financial crisis. Table 1German Chancellor Candidates, 2021 In other words, while Germany’s conservatives will seek an earlier normalization of policy in the wake of the crisis, none of them are as hawkish as in the past, and an election upset would bring even more dovish leaders into power. Thus the German election is a political risk but not a global market risk. It should not fundamentally alter the trajectory of German equities or bond yields – which is up amid global and European recovery – and if anything it would boost the euro. The potential German chancellor candidates show more variation when it comes to immigration, the environment, and foreign policy. Germany has been leading the charge for renewable energy and will continue on that trajectory (Chart 10). However it has simultaneously pursued the NordStream II natural gas pipeline with Russia, which would bring 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas straight into Germany, bypassing eastern Europe and its fraught geopolitics. This pipeline, which could be completed as early as August, would improve Germany’s energy security and Russia’s economic security, which remain closely intertwined despite animosity in other areas (Chart 11). But the pipeline would come at the expense of eastern Europe’s leverage – and American interests – and therefore opposition is rising, including among the ascendant German Green Party. Chart 10Germany’s Switch To Renewables Chart 11Germany Puts Multilateralism To The Test Chart 12UK-EU Trade Deal Dampens Scots Nationalism While Merkel and the Christian Democrats are dead-set on completing the pipeline, global investors are underrating the possibility of a major incident in which the US uses diplomacy and sanctions to halt the project. This is not intuitive because Biden is focused on restoring the US alliance with Europe, particularly Germany. But he is doing so in order to counter Russian and Chinese authoritarianism. Therefore the pipeline could mark the first real test of Biden’s – and Germany’s – understanding of multilateralism. Importantly the US is not pursuing a diplomatic “reset” with Russia at the outset of Biden’s term. This has now been confirmed with Biden’s accusation that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a “killer” and the ensuing, highly symbolic Russian withdrawal of its ambassador to the United States, unseen even in the Cold War. The Americans are imposing sanctions in retaliation for Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 and 2020 elections. Russia is largely inured to US sanctions at this point but if the US wanted to make a difference it would insist on a stop to NordStream by cutting off access to the US market to the various European engineering and insurance companies critical to construction.3 Yet German leaders would have to be cajoled and it may be more realistic for the US to demand other concessions from Germany, particularly on countering China. The US-German arrangement will go a long way toward defining Germany’s and the EU’s risk appetite in the context of Biden’s proposal to build a more robust democratic alliance to counter revisionist authoritarian states. The Russians say they want to avoid a permanent deterioration in relations with the US, which they warn is on the verge of occurring. There is some space for engagement, such as on restoring the Iran deal, which Russia ostensibly supports. Biden may want to keep Russia pacified until he has an Iranian deal in hand. Ultimately, however, US-Russian relations are headed to new lows as the Biden administration brings counter-pressure on the Russians in retribution for the past decade of actions to undermine the United States. Germany’s place in this conflict will determine its own level of geopolitical risk. Clearly we would favor German assets over those of emerging Europe or Russian in this environment. One final risk from Europe is worth mentioning for the second quarter: the UK and Scotland. Scottish elections on May 6 could enable the Scottish National Party to push for a second independence referendum. So far our assessment is correct that Scottish independence will lose momentum after Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s post-Brexit trade deal with the European Union. Scottish nationalists are falling (Chart 12) and support for independence has dropped back toward the 45% level where the 2014 referendum ended up. Nevertheless elections can bring surprises and this narrative bears vigilance as a threat to the pound’s sharp rebound. Bottom Line: Europe’s relative political stability is challenged by US-Russia geopolitical tensions, the higher-than-expected risk of a German election upset, and the tail risk of Scottish independence. Of these only a US-Russia blowup, over NordStream or other issues, poses a major downside risk to global investors. We continue to underweight EM Europe and Russian currency and financial assets. Investment Takeaways Our three key views for 2021, in addition to coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, are largely on track for the year so far: China’s Headwinds: China’s renminbi and stock market are indeed suffering due to policy tightening and US geopolitical pressure. Risk to our view: if Biden and Xi make major compromises to reengage, and Xi eases monetary and fiscal policy anew, then the global reflation trade and Chinese equities will receive another boost. US-Iran Triggered Oil Volatility: The US and Iran are still in stalemate and the window of opportunity for a quick restoration of the 2015 deal is rapidly narrowing. Tensions are indeed escalating prior to any resolution, which would come in the third quarter, thus producing first upside then downside pressures for oil prices. Risk to our view: the Biden administration has no need for a new Iran deal and tensions escalate in a major way that causes a major risk premium in oil prices and forces the US to downgrade its pressure campaign against China. Europe’s Outperformance: So far this year the dollar has rallied and the EU has botched its vaccine rollout, challenging our optimistic assessment of Europe. But as highlighted in this report, we anticipated the main risks – government change in Germany, a Scots referendum – and the former is positive for the euro while the downside risk to the pound is contained. The major geopolitical problem is Russia, where we always expected substantial market-negative risks to materialize after Biden’s election. Risk to our view: A US-Russian reset that lowers geopolitical tensions across eastern Europe or a German status quo election followed by a tightening of fiscal policy sooner than the market expects.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For an excellent recent review of the issues see Danny Crichton, Chris Miller, and Jordan Schneider, "Labs Over Fabs: How The U.S. Should Invest In The Future Of Semiconductors," Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2021, issuu.com. 2 Alex Fang, "US Congress pushes $100bn research blitz to outcompete China," Nikkei Asia, March 23, 2021, asia.nikkei.com. In anticipation of the Biden administration’s dual attempt to promote, on one hand, innovation, and on the other hand, semiconductor supply security, the US semiconductor giant Intel has announced that it will build a $20 billion chip fabrication plant in Arizona. This is in addition to TSMC’s plans to build a plant in Arizona manufacturing chips that are necessary for the US Air Force’s F-35 jets. See Kif Leswing, "Intel is spending $20 billion to build two new chip plants in Arizona," CNBC, March 23, 2021, cnbc.com. 3 See Margarita Assenova, "Clouds Darkening Over Nord Stream Two Pipeline," Eurasia Daily Monitor 18:17 (2021), Jamestown Foundation, February 1, 2021, Jamestown.org.   Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The Federal Reserve’s ultra-dovish stance is not the only reason for markets to cheer. The US is booming, China is unlikely to overtighten monetary and fiscal policy, and Europe remains a source of positive political surprises. Still, the cornerstone of this cycle’s wall of worry has been laid: Biden faces a series of foreign policy challenges, the US is raising taxes, China is tightening policy, and Europe’s stimulus is not large enough to qualify as a game changer for potential GDP growth. Stay the course by maintaining strategic pro-cyclical trades yet building up tactical hedges and safe-haven plays. Feature Chart 1US Stimulus, Chinese Tightening, German Vaccine Hiccups The US is turning to tax hikes, China is returning to structural reforms, and Europe is bungling its vaccine rollout. Yet synchronized global debt monetization is nothing to underrate. Especially not in the context of a Great Power struggle that features a green energy race as well as a high-tech race. Governments are generating a cyclical growth boom and it is conceivably that their simultaneous pump-priming combined with a new capex cycle and private innovation could generate a productivity breakthrough. This upside risk is keeping global equity markets bullish even as it becomes apparent that construction has begun on this cycle’s wall of worry. The US dollar bounce should be watched closely in this context (Chart 1). After passing the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act, which consists largely but not entirely of short-term cash handouts (Chart 2), President Joe Biden’s policy agenda will now turn to tax hikes. Thus far the tax hike proposals are in line with Biden’s campaign literature (Table 1). It remains to be seen whether the market will “sell the news” that Biden is pivoting to tax hikes. After all, Biden was the most moderate of the Democratic candidates and his tax proposals only partially reverse President Trump’s tax cuts. Chart 2American Rescue Plan Act Table 1Biden’s Tax Hike Proposals On The Campaign Trail Nevertheless higher taxes symbolize a regime change in the US – it is very unlikely tax rates will go down anytime soon but they could go easily higher than expected in the coming decade – and the drafting process will bring negative surprises, as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen highlighted by courting Europe to cooperate on a 12% minimum corporate tax and halt the global race to the bottom in taxes on multinational corporations. At the same time Biden’s foreign policy challenges are rising across the board: China is demanding a rollback of Trump’s policies: If Biden says yes, he will sacrifice hard-won American leverage on matters of national interest. If he says no, the Phase One trade deal will be null and void, as will sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and the new economic sanctions on Taiwan will expand beyond mere pineapples.1 Russia is recalling its US ambassador: Biden vowed to make Russia pay for alleged interference in the 2020 US election and sanctions are forthcoming.2 The real way to make Russia pay is to halt the construction of the Nordstream II natural gas pipeline, which reduces the leverage of eastern European democracies while increasing Germany’s energy dependence on Russia. But Germany is dead-set on that pipeline. If Biden levies sanctions the centerpiece of his diplomatic outreach to Europe will be further encouraged to chart an independent course from Washington (though the rest of Europe might cheer). North Korea is threatening to restart missile tests: North Korea is pouring scorn on the Biden administration for trying to restart negotiations.3 The North wants sanctions relief and it knows that Biden is willing to offer it but it may need to create an atmosphere of crisis first. China would be happy were that to happen as it could offer the US its good services on North Korea instead of concrete trade concessions. Iran is refusing to rejoin negotiations over the 2015 nuclear deal: Biden has about five months to arrange for the US and Iran to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal. Beyond that he will enter into another long negotiation with the master negotiators, the Persians. But unlike President Obama from 2009-15, he will not have support from Russia and China … unless he sacrifices his doctrine of “extreme competition” from the get-go. It is not clear which of these challenges will be relevant to financial markets, or when. However, with US and global equities skyrocketing, it must be said that the geopolitical backdrop is not nearly as reassuring as the Federal Reserve, which announced on Saint Patrick’s Day that it will not hike interest rates until 2024 even in the face of a 6.5% growth rate and the prospect of an additional, yet-to-be passed $2 trillion in US deficit spending. Herein lies Biden’s first victory. He has stressed that boosting the American economy and middle class is critical to his foreign policy. He envisions the US regaining its global standing by defeating the virus, super-charging the economy, and then orchestrating a grand alliance of European and Asian democracies to write new global rules that will put pressure on China to reform its economy. “I say it to foreign leaders and domestic alike. It's never, ever a good bet to bet against the American people. America is coming back. The development, manufacturing, and distribution of vaccines in record time is a true miracle of science.”4 The pandemic and economic part of this agenda are effectively done and now comes the hard part: creating a grand alliance while China and Russia demonstrate to their neighbors the hard consequences of joining any new US crusade. The contradiction of Biden’s foreign policy is his desire to act multilaterally and yet also get a great deal done. The Europeans are averse to conflict with China and Russia. The Russians and Chinese are not inclined to do any great favors on Iran or North Korea. Nobody is opening up their economy – Biden himself is coopting Trump’s protectionism, if less brashly. Cooperation with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on nuclear proliferation is possible – as long as Biden aborts his democracy agenda and his trade agenda. We continue with our pro-cyclical investment stance but have started building up hedges as we are convinced that geopolitical risk will deliver a rude awakening. This awakening will be a buying opportunity given the ultra-stimulating backdrop … unless it portends war in continental Europe or the Taiwan Strait. In the remainder of this report we highlight the takeaways from China’s National People’s Congress as well as recent developments in Germany. Our key views remain the same: China will not overtighten monetary/fiscal policy; Biden will be hawkish on China; Germany’s election may see an upset but that would be market-positive. China: No Overtightening So Far China concluded its National People’s Congress – the “Two Sessions” of legislation every year – and issued its 2021 Government Work Report. It also officially released the fourteenth five-year plan covering economic development for 2021-25. Table 2 shows the new plan’s targets as compared to the just expired thirteenth five-year plan that covered 2016-20. Table 2China’s Fourteenth Five Year Plan (2021-25) For a full run-down of the National People’s Congress we recommend clients peruse BCA’s latest China Investment Strategy report. From a geopolitical point of view we would highlight the following takeaways: The Tech Race: China added a new target for strategic emerging industry value added as percent of GDP – it wants this number to reach 17% by 2025 but there is nothing solid to benchmark this against. The point is that by including such a target China is putting more emphasis on emerging industries, including: information technology, robotics, green energy, electric vehicles, 5G networks, new materials, power equipment, aerospace and aviation equipment, and others. China’s technological “Great Leap Forward” continues, with a focus on domestic production and upgrading the manufacturing sector that is bound to stiffen the competition with the United States. China’s removal of a target for service industry growth suggests that Beijing does not want de-industrialization to occur any faster – another reason for global trade tensions to stay high. Research and Development: For R&D spending, previous five-year plans set targets for the desired level. For example, over the last five years China vowed to increase annual R&D spending to 2.5% of GDP. A reasonable expectation for the coming five years would have been a 3% target of GDP. However, this time the government set a target of an annual growth rate of no less than 7% during 2021-2025. The point is that China is continuing to ascend the ranks in R&D spending relative to the US and West in coordination with the overarching goal of forging an innovative and high-tech economy. Unemployment: China has restored an unemployment rate target. In its twelfth five-year plan Beijing aimed to keep the urban surveyed unemployment rate below 5% but over the past five years this target vanished. Now China restored the target and bumped it up slightly to 5.5%. This target should not be hard to meet given the reported sharp decline in urban unemployment to 5.2% already. However, China’s unemployment statistics are notoriously unreliable. The real takeaway is that unemployment will be higher as trend growth slows, while social stability remains the Communist Party’s ultimate prize – and any reform or deleveraging process will occur within that context. The Green Energy Race: China re-emphasized its pledge to tackle climate change, aiming for peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. However, no detailed action plans were mentioned. Presumably China will not loosen its enforcement of existing environmental targets. Most of these were kept the same as over the past five years, except for pollution (PM2.5 concentration). Previously the government sought to reduce PM2.5 concentration by 18%. Now the target is set at 10% aggregate reduction, which is lower, though further reduction will be difficult after a 43% drop since 2014. Overall, China has not loosened up its environmental targets – if anything, enforcement will strengthen, resulting in an ongoing regulatory headwind to “Old China” industries. Military Power: Last week we noted that the government’s goals for the military have changed in a way that reinforces themes of persistently high geopolitical tensions. The info-tech upgrades to the People’s Liberation Army were supposed to be met by 2020, with full “modernization” achieved by 2035. However, last October the government created a new deadline, the one-hundredth anniversary of the PLA in 2027 (“military centenary goal”). No specific measures or targets are given but the point is that there is a new deadline of serious importance – an importance that matches the party’s much-ballyhooed centennial on July 1 of 2021 and the People’s Republic’s centennial in 2049. The fact that this deadline is only six years away suggests that a rapid program of military reform and upgrade is beginning. The official defense spending growth target of 6.8% is only slightly bigger than last year’s 6.6% but these targets mask the significance of the announcement. The takeaway is that the Chinese military is preparing for an earlier-than-expected contingency with the United States and its allies. What about China’s all-important monetary, fiscal, and quasi-fiscal credit targets? There is no doubt that China is tightening policy, as we highlight in our updated China Policy Tightening Checklist (Table 3). But will China overtighten? Probably not, at least not judging by the Two Sessions, but the risk is not negligible. Table 3A Checklist For Chinese Policy Tightening The government reiterated that money and credit growth should remain in a reasonable range in 2021, with “reasonable range” referring to nominal economic growth. Chinese economists estimate that the nominal growth rate will be around 8%-9% in 2021. The IMF projection is 8.1%, while latest OECD forecast is at 7.8%.5 Because China’s total private credit (total social financing) growth is inherently higher than M2 growth, we would use pre-pandemic levels as our benchmark for whether the government will tighten policy excessively: If total social financing growth plunges below 12%, then our view is disproved and Beijing is over-tightening (Chart 3). If M2 growth plunges below 8%, we can call it over-tightening. Anything above these benchmarks should be seen as reasonable and expected tightening, anything below as excessive. However, the Chinese and global financial markets could grow jittery at any time over the perennial risk of a policy mistake whenever governments try to prevent excessive leverage and bubbles. As for fiscal policy, the new quotas for local government net new bond issuance point to expected rather than excessive tightening. New bonds can be used to finance capital investment projects. The quota for total new bond issuance is 4.47 trillion CNY, down by 5.5% from last year. Though local governments may not use up all of the quota, the reduction is small. In fact, total local government bond issuance will be a whisker higher in 2021 than in 2020. The quota for net new bonds is only slightly below the 2020 level and much higher than the 2019 level. Therefore the chance of fiscal overtightening is small – and smaller than monetary overtightening. Chart 3China Policy Overtightening Benchmark Chart 4China’s Real Budget Deficit Is Huge China’s official budget balance is a fiction so we look at the IMF’s augmented net lending and borrowing, which reached a whopping -18.2 % of GDP in 2020. It is expected to decrease gradually to -13.8% by 2025. That level will be slightly higher than the pre-pandemic level from 2017-2019 (Chart 4).6 By contrast, China’s total augmented debt is expected to keep rising in the coming years and reach double the 2015 level by 2025. Efforts to constrain debt could lead to a larger debt-to-GDP ratio if growth suffers as a consequence, as our Global Investment Strategy points out. So China will tighten cautiously – especially given falling productivity, higher unemployment, and the threat of sustained pressure from the US and its allies. US-China: Biden As Trump-Lite Chinese and US officials will convene in Alaska on March 18-19. This is the first major US-China meeting under the Biden administration and global investors will watch closely to see whether tensions will drop. So far tensions have not fallen, highlighting a persistent and once again underrated risk to the global equity rally. Biden’s foreign policy team has not completed its review of China policy and Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are trying to schedule a bilateral summit in April – so nothing concrete will be decided before then. Chart 5US-China: Beijing's Standing Offer The Biden administration is setting up a pragmatic policy, offering areas to engage with China while warning that it will not compromise on democratic values or national interests. China would welcome the opportunity to work with the Americans on nuclear non-proliferation, namely North Korea and Iran, as this would expend US leverage on an area of shared interest while leaving China a free hand over its economic and technological policies. China at least partially enforced sanctions on these countries in response to President Trump’s demands during the trade war and official statistics suggest it continues to do so. Oil imports from Iran remain extremely low while Chinese business with North Korea is, on paper, nil (Chart 5). If this data is accurate then North Korea’s economy has not benefited from China’s stimulus and snapback. If true, then Pyongyang will offer partial concessions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. At the moment, instead of staging any major provocations to object to US-Korean military drills, the North is using fiery language and threatening to restart missile tests. This suggests a diplomatic opening. But investors should be prepared for Pyongyang to stage much bigger provocations than missile tests. In March 2010, while the world focused on the financial crisis, the North Koreans torpedoed a South Korean corvette, the Chonan, and shelled some islands, at the risk of a war. The problem under the Trump administration was that Trump wanted a verifiable and durable deal of economic opening for denuclearization whereas the North Koreans wanted to play for time, reduce sanctions, study the data from their flurry of missile tests during the Obama and early Trump years, and see if Trump would get reelected before offering any concrete concessions. Trump’s stance was not really different from Bill Clinton’s but he tried to accelerate the timeline and go for a big win. By Trump’s losing the election North Korea bought four more years on the clock. Chart 6US-China: Biden Lukewarm On China The Biden administration is willing to play for time if it gets concrete results in phases. This would keep North Korea at bay and retain a line of pragmatic engagement with Beijing. But if North Korea stages a giant provocation Biden will not hesitate to use threats of destruction like Clinton and Trump did. The American public is not much concerned about North Korea (or Iran) but is increasingly concerned about China, with a recent Gallup opinion poll showing that nearly 50% view China as America’s greatest enemy and Americans consistently overrate China’s economic power (Chart 6). Biden will not let grassroots nationalism run his policy. But it is true that he has little to gain politically from appearing to appease China. With progress at hand on the pandemic and economic recovery, Biden will devote more attention to courting the allies and attempting to construct his alliance of democracies to meet global challenges and to “stand up” to China and Russia. The allies, however, are risk-averse when it comes to confronting China. This is as true for the Europeans as it is for China’s Asian neighbors, who stand directly in its firing line. In fact, Europe’s total trade with China is equivalent to that of the US (Chart 7). The Europeans have said that they will pursue tougher trade enforcement through the World Trade Organization, which would tie the Biden administration’s hands. Biden and his cabinet officials insist that they will use the “full array” of tools at their disposal (e.g. tariffs and sanctions) to punish China for mercantilist trade policies. Chinese negotiators are said to be asking explicitly for Biden to roll back Trump’s policies. Some of these policies relate to trade and tech acquisition, others to strategic disputes. We doubt that Biden will compromise on the trade issues to get cooperation on North Korea and Iran. But he will have to offer major concessions if he wants durable denuclearization agreements on these rogue states. Otherwise it will be clear that his administration is mostly focused on competition with China itself and willing to sideline the minor nuclear aspirants. Our expectation is that Americans care about the China threat and the smaller threats will be used as pretexts with which to increase pressure and sanctions on China. Asian equities have corrected after going vertical, as expected. But contrary to our expectations geopolitics was not the cause (Chart 8). This selloff could eventually create a buying opportunity if the Biden administration is revealed to take a more dovish line on China, trade, and tech in exchange for progress on strategic disputes like North Korea. Any discount due to North Korean provocations in particular would be a buy. On Taiwan, however, China’s new 2027 military target underscores our oft-recited red flag. Chart 7EU Risk Averse On China Chart 8Asian Equity Correction And GeoRisk Indicators Bottom Line: Investors should stay focused on the US-China relationship. What matters is Biden’s first actions on tariffs and high-tech exports. So far Biden is hawkish as we anticipated. Investors should fade rumors of big new US-China cooperation prior to the first Biden-Xi summit. Any major North Korean aggression will create a buy-on-the-dips opportunity. Unless it triggers a war, that is – and the threshold for war is high given the Chonan incident in 2010. Germany: Markets Wake Up To Election Risk – And Smile This week’s election in the Netherlands delivered a fully expected victory to Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s liberal coalition. The German leadership ranks next to the Dutch in terms of governments that received an increase in popular support as a result of the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 9). However, in Germany’s case the election outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Chart 9German Leadership Saw Popularity Bounce As we highlighted in our annual forecast, an upset in which a left-wing bloc forms the government for the first time since 2005 is likelier than the market expects. This scenario presents an upside risk for equities and bund yields since Germany would become even more pro-Europe, pro-integration, and proactive in its fiscal spending. In the current context that would be greeted warmly by financial markets as it would reinforce the cyclical rotation into the euro, industrials, and European peripheral debt. Incidentally, it would also reduce tensions with Russia and China – even as the Biden administration is courting Germany. Recent state elections confirm that the electorate is moving to the left rather than the right. In Baden-Wurttemberg, the third largest state by population and economic output, and a southern state, the Christian Democrats slipped from the last election (-2.9%), the Social Democrats slipped by less (-1.7%), the Free Democrats gained (2.2%), the Greens gained (2.3%), and the far-right Alternative for Germany saw a big drop (-5.4%). In the smaller state of Rhineland-Palatinate the results were largely the same although the Greens did even better (Tables 4A & 4B).7 In both cases the Christian Democrats saw the worst result since prior to the financial crisis while the Greens tripled their support in Baden and doubled their support in the Palatinate over the same time frame. Table 4AGerman State Elections Show Voters’ Leftward Drift Continues Table 4BGerman State Elections Show Voters’ Leftward Drift Continues To put this into perspective: Outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel and her coalition have seen a net 6% increase in popular support since COVID-19. The coalition, led by the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, still leads national opinion polling. What we are highlighting are chinks in the armor. The gap with the combined left-leaning bloc is less than 10% points (Chart 10). Chart 10German Party Polling Merkel is a lame duck whose party has been in power for 17 years. She is struggling to find an adequate successor. Her current frontrunner for chancellor-candidate, Armin Laschet, is suffering in public opinion, especially after the state election defeats, while her previous successor was ousted last year. Other chancellor-candidates, like Friedrich Merz, Markus Söder, and Norbert Röttgen may find themselves to the right of the median voter, which has been shifting to the left. Merkel’s party’s handling of COVID-19 first received praise and now, in the year of the vote, is falling under pressure due to difficulties rolling out the vaccine. Even as conditions improve over the course of the year her party may struggle to recover from the damage, since the underlying reality is that Germany has suffered a recession and is beset by global challenges. While the Christian Democrats performed relatively well in the 2009 election, in the teeth of the global financial crisis, times have changed. Today the Social Democrats are no longer in free fall – ever since their Finance Minister Olaf Scholz led the charge for fiscal stimulus in 2019 – while third parties like the Free Democrats, Greens, and Die Linke all gained in 2009 and look to gain this year (Table 5). In today’s context it is even more likely that other parties will rise at the ruling party’s expense. Still, the Christian Democrats have stout support in polls and do not have to split votes with the far-right, which is in collapse. Table 5German Federal Election Results Show 2021 Could Throw Curveball For Ruling Party Therein lies the real market takeaway: right-wing populism has flopped in Germany. The risk to the consensus view that Merkel will hand off the baton seamlessly to a successor and secure her party another term in leadership is that the establishment left will take power (the Greens in Germany are essentially an establishment party). Chart 11German Bunds Respond To Macro Shifts, State Elections Near-term pandemic and economic problems have caused bund yields to fall and the yield curve to flatten so far this year (Chart 11). But that trend is unlikely to continue given the global and national outlook. Election uncertainty should work against this trend since the only possible uncertainty gives more upside to the fiscal outlook and bond yields. If the consensus view indeed comes to pass and the Christian Democrats remain in power, the election holds out policy continuity – at least on economic policy. Fiscal tightening would happen sooner under the Christian Democrats but it would not be aggressive or premature, at least not in the 2021-22 period. It is the current coalition that first loosened Germany’s belt – and it did so in 2019, prior to COVID-19. Germany’s and the EU’s proactive fiscal turn will have a major positive impact on growth prospects, at least cyclically, though it is probably too small thus far to create a structural improvement in potential growth. Fiscal thrust is negative over next two years even with the EU’s Next Generation Recovery Fund being distributed. A structural increase in growth is possible given that all of the major countries are simultaneously pursuing monetary and fiscal stimulus as well as big investments in technology and renewable energy that will help engender a new private capex cycle. But productivity has been on a long, multi-decade decline so it remains to be seen if this can be reversed. Geopolitically speaking, Germany’s and the EU’s policy shift arrived in the nick of time to deepen European integration before divisions revive. Integration is broadly driven by European states’ need to compete on a grand scale with the US, Russia, and China. But Putin, Brexit, and Mario Draghi demonstrate the more tactical pressures: Brexit discourages states from exiting, especially with ongoing trade disputes and the risk of a new Scottish independence referendum; Putin’s aggressive foreign policy drives eastern Europeans into the arms of the West; and the formation of a unity government in Italy encourages European solidarity and improves Italian growth prospects. The outlook for structural reforms is not hopeless. Prime Minister Draghi’s government has a good chance of succeeding at some structural reforms where his predecessors have failed. Meanwhile French President Emmanuel Macron is still favored to win the French election in 2022, which is good for French structural reform. The fact that the EU tied its recovery fund to reform is positive. Most importantly the green energy agenda is replacing budget cutting for the time being, which, again, is positive for capex and could create positive long-term productivity surprises. Of course, structural reform intensity slowed just prior to COVID, in Spain, France, and Italy. Once the recovery funds are spent the desire to persist with reform will wane. This is clear in Spain, which has rolled back some reforms and has a weak government that could dissolve any time, and Italy, where the Draghi coalition may not last long after funds are spent. If the global upswing persists and Chinese/EM growth improves, then Europe will benefit from a macro backdrop that enables it to persist with some structural reforms and crawl out of its liquidity trap. But if China/EM growth relapses then Europe will fall back into a slump. Thus it is a very good thing for Europe, the euro, and European equities that the US is engaged in an epic fiscal blowout and that China’s Two Sessions dampened the risk of overtightening. Incidentally, if the German government does shift, relations with Russia would improve on the margin. While US-Russia tensions will remain hot, German mediation could reduce Russia’s insecurity and lower geopolitical risks for both Russia and emerging Europe, which are very cheaply valued at present in part because they face a persistent geopolitical risk premium. Bottom Line: German politics will drive further EU integration whether the Christian Democrats stay in power or whether the left-wing parties manage a surprise victory. Europe will have to provide more fiscal stimulus but otherwise the global context is favorable for Europe. Investors should not be too pessimistic about short-term hiccups with the vaccine rollout. Investment Takeaways The US is stimulating, China is not overtightening, and German’s election risk is actually an upside risk for European and global risk assets. These points reaffirm a bullish cyclical outlook on global stocks and commodities and a bearish outlook on government bonds. It is especially positive for global beneficiaries of US stimulus excluding China, such as Canada and Mexico. It is also beneficial for industrial metals and emerging markets exposed to China over the medium term, after frenzied buying suffers a healthy correction. Any premium in European equities should be snapped up. However, the cornerstone has been laid for the wall of worry in this global economic cycle: the US is raising taxes, China is tightening policy, and Europe’s fiscal stimulus will probably fall short. Moreover a consensus outcome from the German election would be a harbinger of earlier-than-expected fiscal normalization. There is not yet a clear green light in US-China relations – on the contrary, our view that Biden would be hawkish is coming to pass. Biden faces foreign policy tests across the board and now is a good time to hedge against the inevitable return of downside risks given the remorseless increase in tensions between the Great Powers. Housekeeping A number of clients have written to ask follow-up questions about our contrarian report last week taking a positive view on cybersecurity stocks despite the tech selloff and a positive view on global defense stocks, especially in relation to cybersecurity. The main request is, Which companies offer the best value? So we teamed up with BCA’s new Equity Analyzer to highlight the companies that receive the best BCA scores utilizing a range of factors including value, safety, payout, quality, technicals, sentiment, and macro context – all relative to a universe of global stocks with a minimum market cap of $1 billion. The results are shown in the Appendix, which we hope will come in handy. Separately our tactical hedge, long US health care equipment versus the broad market, has stopped out at -5%. This makes sense in light of the pro-cyclical rotation. Health care equipment is still likely to outperform the rest of the US health care sector amid a policy onslaught of higher taxes, government-provided insurance, and pharmaceutical price caps.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Appendix Table ABCA Research Equity Analyzer Casts Light On Best Defense And Cybersecurity Stocks Appendix Table BBCA Research Equity Analyzer Casts Light On Best Defense And Cybersecurity Stocks Appendix Table CBCA Research Equity Analyzer Casts Light On Best Defense And Cybersecurity Stocks Footnotes 1 China is asking for export controls that have hamstrung Huawei and SMIC to be removed as well as for sanctions and travel bans on Communist Party members and students to be lifted. See Lingling Wei and Bob Davis, "China Plans To Ask U.S. To Roll Back Trump Policies In Alaska Meeting," Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2021, wsj.com; Helen Davidson, "Taiwanese urged to eat ‘freedom pineapples’ after China import ban," The Guardian, March 2, 2021, theguardian.com. 2 "Putin on Biden: Russian President Reacts To US Leader’s Criticism," BBC, March 18, 2021, bbc.com. 3 Pyongyang is likely to test a new, longer range intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time since its self-imposed missile test moratorium began in 2018 after President Trump’s summit with leader Kim Jong Un. See Lara Seligman and Natasha Bertrand, "U.S. ‘On Watch’ For New North Korean Missile Tests," Politico, March 16, 2021, politico.com. 4 See ABC News, "Transcript: Joe Biden delivers remarks on 1-year anniversary of pandemic", ABC News, Mar. 11, 2021, abcnews.com. 5 Please see IMF Staff, "World Economic Outlook Reports", IMF, Jan. 2021, imf.org and OECD Staff, "OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021", OECD, March 9, 2021, oecd.org. 6 Please see IMF Asia and Pacific Dept, "People’s Republic of China : 2020 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for the People's Republic of China", IMF, Jan. 8, 2021, imf.org. 7 The other state elections coming up this year will coincide with the federal election on September 26, with one minor exception (Saxony-Anhalt). Opinion polls show the Christian Democrats slipping below the Greens in Berlin and the Social Democrats in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The Alternative for Germany is falling in all regions.