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Oriente Medio y África del Norte

Informe especial

Investors should maintain a conservative and defensive strategy until recession risks are clearly reduced.

Over the past week, the South African rand was a key underperformer in the currency space. Despite broad-based dollar weakness, USD/ZAR ended the weak 2.4% higher. Heightened domestic political uncertainty triggered the South African currency’s depreciation.…

The Chinese government will repress social unrest, then relax Covid-19 social restrictions to try to stabilize the economy. Russia will be aggressive in the short term but will pursue a ceasefire before March 2024. European and Italian risk will stay high on energy constraints.

Expect the Middle East to create new and unexpected energy supply disruptions on top of the Russian energy shock.

OPEC 2.0’s decision to cut 2mm b/d of output beginning in December telescopes the loss of Russian volumes we expect over the course of the coming year. OPEC 2.0 clearly is not playing by the G7’s or the US’s rules. This will keep prices volatile.

Investors should go long US treasuries and stay overweight defensive versus cyclical sectors, large caps versus small caps, and aerospace/defense stocks. Regionally we favor the US, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, while disfavoring China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

Executive Summary The US inflation surprise increases the odds of both congressional gridlock and recession, which increases uncertainty over US leadership past 2024 and reduces the US’s ability to lower tensions with China and Iran.   Despite the mainstream media narrative, the Xi-Putin summit reinforces our view that China cannot reject Russia’s strategic partnership. The potential for conflict in Taiwan forces China to accept Russia’s overture. For the same reason the US and China cannot re-engage their economies sustainably, even if Biden and Xi somehow manage to reduce tensions after the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. Russia could reduce oil exports as well as natural gas, intensifying the global energy shock. Ukraine’s counter-offensive and Europe’s energy diversification increase the risk of Russian military and economic failure. The Middle East will destabilize anew and create a new source of global energy supply disruptions. US-Iran talks are faltering as expected. Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 19.1% Bottom Line: Stay long US stocks, defensive sectors, and large caps. Avoid China, Taiwan, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Feature Several notable geopolitical developments occurred over the past week while we met with clients at the annual BCA Research Investment Conference in New York. In this report we analyze these developments using our geopolitical method, which emphasizes constraints over preferences, capabilities over intentions, reality over narrative. We also draw freely from the many valuable insights gleaned from our guest speakers at the conference.  China Cannot Reject Russia: The Xi-Putin Summit In Uzbekistan Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Uzbekistan as we go to press and Putin has acknowledged China’s “questions and concern” about the war in Ukraine.1 They last met on February 4 when Xi gave Putin his blessing for the Ukraine invasion, promising to buy more Russian natural gas and to pursue a “no limits” strategic partnership (meaning one that includes extensive military cooperation). The meeting’s importance is clear from both leaders’ efforts to make it happen. Putin is leaving Russia despite rising domestic criticism over his handling of the Ukraine war and European energy war. Ukraine is making surprising gains in the battlefield, particularly around Kharkiv, threatening Russia’s ability to complete the conquest of Donetsk and the Donbas region. Meanwhile Xi is leaving China for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak, despite the fact that he is only one month away from the most important political event of his life: the October 16 twentieth national party congress, where he hopes to clinch another five, ten, or fifteen years in power, expand his faction’s grip over the political system, and take over Mao Zedong’s unique title as chairman of the Communist Party. We do not yet know the full outcome of the Uzbek summit but we do not see it as a turning point in which China turns on Russia. Instead the summit reinforces our key point to investors all year: China cannot reject Russia. Russia broke energy ties with Europe and is fighting a proxy war with NATO. The Putin regime has lashed Russia to China’s side for the foreseeable future. China may not have wanted to move so quickly toward an exclusive relationship but it is not in a position to reject Russia’s diplomatic overture and leave Putin out to dry. The reason is that China is constrained by the US-led world order and like Russia is attempting to change that order and carve a sphere of influence to improve its national security. Beijing’s immediate goal is to consolidate power across the critical buffer territories susceptible to foreign interests. It has already consolidated Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and to some extent the South China Sea, the critical approach to Taiwan. Taiwan is the outstanding buffer space that needs to be subjugated. Xi Jinping has taken it upon himself to unify China and Taiwan within his extended rule. But Taiwanese public opinion has decisively shifted in favor of either an indefinite status quo or independence. Hence China and Taiwan are on a collision course. Regardless of one’s view on the likelihood of war, it is a high enough chance that China, Taiwan, the US, and others will be preparing for it in the coming years. Chart 1US Arms Sales To Taiwan The US is attempting to increase its ability to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It believes it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine – and Taiwan is far more important to US economy and security than Ukraine. The US is already entering discussions with Taiwan and other allies about a package of severe economic sanctions in the event that China attacks – sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. The US Congress is also moving forward with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which will solidify US support for the island as well as increase arms sales (Chart 1).2  Aside from China's military preparation – which needs to be carefully reviewed in light of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine and the much greater difficulty of invading Taiwan – China must prepare to deal with the following three factors in the event of war: 1. Energy: China is overly exposed to sea lines of communication that can be disrupted by the United States Navy. Beijing will have to partner with Russia to import Russian and Central Asian resources and attempt to forge an overland path to the Middle East (Chart 2). Unlike Russia, China cannot supply its own energy during a war and its warfighting capacity will suffer if shortages occur or prices spike. 2. Computer Chips: China has committed at least $200 billion on a crash course to build its own semiconductors since 2013 due to the need to modernize its military and economy and compete with the US on the global stage. But China is still dependent on imports, especially for the most advanced chips, and its dependency is rising not falling despite domestic investments (Chart 3). The US is imposing export controls on advanced microchips and starting to enforce these controls on third parties. The US and its allies have cut off Russia’s access to computer chips, leading to Russian shortages that are impeding their war effort.  Chart 2China’s Commodity Import Vulnerability Chart 3China's Imports Of Semiconductors     3. US Dollar Reserves: China is still heavily exposed to US dollar assets but its access will be cut off in the event of war, just as the US has frozen Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan, and Cuban assets over the years. China is already diversifying away from the dollar but will have to move more quickly given that Russia had dramatically reduced its exposure and still suffered severely when its access to dollar reserves was frozen this year (Chart 4). Where will China reallocate its reserves? To developing and importing natural resources from Russia, Central Asia, and other overland routes. Chart 4China's US Dollar Exposure Russia may be the junior partner in a new Russo-Chinese alliance but it will not be a vassal. Russia has resources, military power, and regional control in Central Asia that China needs. Of course, China will maintain a certain diplomatic distance from Russia because it needs to maintain economic relations with Europe and other democracies as it breaks up with the United States. Europe is far more important to Chinese exports than Russia. China will play both sides and its companies will develop parallel supply chains. China will also make gestures to countries that feel threatened by Russia, including the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the crucial point is that China cannot reject Russia. If the Putin regime fails, China will be diplomatically isolated, it will lose an ally in any Taiwan war, and the US will have a much greater advantage in attempting to contain China in the coming years and decades. Russo-Chinese Alliance And The US Dollar Many investors speculate that China’s diversification away from the US dollar will mark a severe downturn for the currency. This is of course possible, given that Russia and China will form a substantial anti-dollar bloc. Certainly there can be a cyclical downturn in the greenback, especially after the looming recession troughs. But it is harder to see a structural collapse of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency. The past 14 years have shown how global investors react to US dysfunction, Russian aggression, and Chinese slowdown: they buy the dollar! The implication is that a US wage-price spiral, a Russian détente with Europe, and a Chinese economic recovery would be negative for the dollar – but those stars have not yet aligned. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThe Geopolitical Consequences Of The Ukraine War The reason China needs to diversify is because it fears US sanctions when it invades Taiwan. Hence reducing its holdings of US treasuries and the dollar signals that it expects war in future. But will other countries rush into the yuan and yuan-denominated bonds if Xi is following in Putin’s footsteps and launching a war of choice, with damaging consequences for the economy? A war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe and would send other countries plunging into the safe-haven assets, including US assets.   Nevertheless China will diversify and other countries will probably increase their yuan trade over time, just as Russia has done. This will be a cyclical headwind for the dollar at some point. But it will not knock the US off the premier position. That would require a historic downgrade in the US’s economic and strategic capability, as was the case with the United Kingdom after the world wars. China will continue to stimulate the economy after the party congress. A successful Chinese and global economic rebound next year – and a decision to pursue “jaw jaw” with the US and Taiwan rather than “war war” – would be negative for the dollar. Hence we may downgrade our bullish dollar view to neutral on a cyclical basis before long … but not yet and not on a structural basis.  Bottom Line: Favor the US dollar and the euro over the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Underweight Chinese and Taiwanese assets on a structural basis. Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive And A Russian Oil Embargo Ukraine launched a counter-offensive against Russia in September and achieved significant early victories. Russians fell back away from Kharkiv, putting Izyum in Ukrainian hands and jeopardizing Russia’s ability to achieve its war aim of conquering the remaining half of Donetsk province and thus controlling the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Russian positions also crumbled west of the Dnieper river, which was always an important limit on Russian capabilities (Map 1). Map 1Status Of Russia-Ukraine War: The Ukrainian Counter-Offensive (September 15, 2022) Some commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama in the Washington Post, have taken the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a sign that the Ukrainians will reconquer lost territory and Russia will suffer an outright defeat in this war.3 If Russia cannot conquer the Donbas, its control of the “land bridge” to Crimea will be unsustainable, and it may have to admit defeat. But we are very skeptical. It will be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to drive the Russians out of all of their entrenched positions. US military officials applauded Ukraine’s counter-offensive but sounded a cautious note. The chief problem is that neither President Putin nor the Russian military can afford such a defeat. They will have to double down on the Donbas and land bridge. The war will be prolonged. Ultimately we expect stalemate, which will be a prelude to ceasefire negotiations. But first the fighting will intensify and the repercussions for global economy and markets will get worse. Russia’s war effort is also flagging because Europe is making headway in finding alternatives for Russian natural gas. Russia has cut off flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany, the Yamal pipeline to Poland, and partially to the Ukraine pipeline system, leaving only Turkstream operating normally. Yet EU gas storage is in the middle of its normal range and trending higher (Chart 5).   Chart 5Europe Handling Natural Gas Crisis Well … So Far Of course, Europe’s energy supply is still not secure. Cold weather could require more heating than expected. Russia has an incentive to tighten the gas flow further. Flows from Algeria or Azerbaijan could be sabotaged or disrupted (Chart 6). Chart 6Europe’s NatGas Supply Still Not Secure Chart 7Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Russia’s intention is to inflict a recession on Europe so that it begins to rethink its willingness to maintain a long-term proxy war. Recession will force European households to pay the full cost of the energy breakup with Russia all at once. Popular support for war will moderate and politicians will adopt more pragmatic diplomacy. After all they do not have an interest in prolonging the war to the point that it spirals out of control. Clearly the economic pain is being felt, as manufacturing expectations and consumer confidence weaken (Chart 7). Europe’s resolve will not collapse overnight. But the energy crisis can get worse from here. The deeper the recession, the more likely European capitals will try to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire.   However, given Ukraine’s successes in the field and Europe’s successes in diversification, it is entirely possible that Russia faces further humiliating setbacks. While this outcome may be good for liberal democracies, it is not good for global financial markets, at least not in the short run. If Russia is backed into a corner on both the military and economic fronts, then Putin’s personal security and regime security will be threatened. Russia could attempt to turn the tables or lash out even more aggressively. Already Moscow has declared a new “red line” if the US provides longer-range missiles to Ukraine. A US-Russia showdown, complete with nuclear threats, is not out of the realm of possibility. Russia could also start halting oil exports, as it has threatened to do, to inflict a major oil shock on the European economy. Investors will need to be prepared for that outcome.  Bottom Line: Petro-states have geopolitical leverage as long as global commodity supplies remain tight. Investors should be prepared for the European embargo of Russian oil to provoke a Russian reaction. A larger than expected oil shock is possible given the risk of defeat that Russia faces (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock US-Iran Talks Falter Again This trend of petro-state geopolitical leverage was one of our three key views for 2022 and it also extends to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which are faltering as expected. Tit-for-tat military action between Iran and its enemies in the Persian Gulf will pick up immediately – i.e. a new source of oil disruption will emerge. If global demand is collapsing then this trend may only create additional volatility for oil markets at first, but it further constrains the supply side for the foreseeable future. It is not yet certain that the talks are dead but a deal before the US midterm looks unlikely. Biden could continue working on a deal in 2023-24. The Democratic Party is likely to lose at least the House of Representatives, leaving him unable to pass legislation and more likely to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Biden administration wants the Iran deal to tamp down inflation and avoid a third foreign policy crisis at a time when it is already juggling Russia and China. The overriding constraints in this situation are that Iran needs a nuclear weapon for regime survival, while Israel will attack Iran as a last resort before it obtains a nuclear weapon. Yes, the US is reluctant to initiate another war in the Middle East. But public war-weariness is probably overrated today (unlike in 2008 or even 2016) and the US has drawn a hard red line against nuclear weaponization. Iran will retaliate to any US-Israeli aggression ferociously. But conflict and oil disruptions will emerge even before the US or Israel decide to launch air strikes, as Iran will face sabotage and cyber-attacks and will need to deter the US and Israel by signaling that it can trigger a region-wide war. Chart 9If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further Recent social unrest in Iraq, where the nationalist coalition of Muqtada al-Sadr is pushing back against Iranian influence, is only an inkling of what can occur if the US-Iran talks are truly dead, Iran pushes forward with its nuclear program, and Israel and the US begin openly entertaining military options. The potential oil disruption from Iraq presents a much larger supply constraint than the failure to remove sanctions on Iran (Chart 9). A new wave of Middle Eastern instability would push up oil prices and strengthen Russia’s hand, distracting the US and imposing further pain on Europe. It would not strengthen China’s hand, but the risk itself would reinforce China’s Eurasian strategy, as Beijing would need to prepare for oil cutoffs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s attempts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be seen in this context. Ultimately the only factor that could still possibly convince Iran not to make a dash for the bomb – the military might of the US and its allies – is the same factor that forces China and Russia to strengthen their strategic bond. The emerging Russo-Chinese behemoth, in turn, acts as a hard constraint on any substantial reengagement of the US and Chinese economies. The US cannot afford to feed another decade of Chinese economic growth and modernization if China is allied with Russia and Central Asia. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi and Biden administrations will try to prevent a total collapse of US-China relations in 2023. If China is not yet ready to invade Taiwan then there is a brief space for diplomacy to try to work. But there is no room for long-lasting reengagement – because the US cannot simply cede Taiwan to China, and hence China cannot reject Russia, and Russia no longer has any options. Bottom Line: Expect further oil volatility and price shocks. Sell Middle Eastern equities. Favor North American, Latin American, and Australian energy producers. Investment Takeaways Recession Risks Rising: The inflation surprise in the US in August necessitates more aggressive Fed rate hikes in the near term, which increases the odds of rising unemployment and recession. US Policy Uncertainty Rising: A recession will greatly increase the odds of US political instability over the 2022-24 cycle and reduce the incentive for foreign powers like Iran or China to make concessions or agreements with the US. European Policy Uncertainty Rising: We already expected a European recession. Russia’s setbacks make it more likely that it will adopt more aggressive military tactics and economic warfare. Chinese Policy Uncertainty Rising: China will continue stimulating next year but its economy will suffer from energy shocks and its stimulus is less effective than in the past. It will likely increase economic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the US will increase punitive measures against China. It is not clear that it will launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan – that is not our base case – but it is possible so investors need to be prepared. Long US and Defensives: Stay long US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Buy safe-havens like the oversold Japanese yen. Long Arms Manufacturers: Buy defense stocks and cyber-security firms. Short China and Taiwan: Favor the USD and EUR over the CNY. Favor US semiconductor stocks over Taiwanese equities. Favor Korean over Taiwanese equities. Favor Indian tech over Chinese tech. Favor Singaporean over Hong Kong stocks. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Tessa Wong and Simon Fraser, “Putin-Xi talks: Russian leader reveals China's 'concern' over Ukraine,” BBC, September 15, 2022, bbc.com. 2     US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” foreign.senate.gov. 3    Greg Sargent, “Is Putin facing defeat? The ‘End of History’ author remains confident,” Washington Post, September 12, 2022, washingtonpost.com.                                                                                         Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix
Executive Summary US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz A US-Iran deal would make for a notable improvement in the geopolitical backdrop during an otherwise gloomy year. It would remove the risk of a major new oil shock. We maintain our 40% subjective odds of a deal, which is well below consensus. The risk of failure is underrated. Our conviction level is only moderate because President Biden can make concessions to clinch a deal – and Supreme Leader Khamenei may want to earn some money and time. Yet we have high conviction in our view that the US will ultimately fail to provide Iran with sufficient security guarantees while Iran will pursue a nuclear deterrent. Hence the Middle East will present a long-term energy supply constraint. In the short term, global growth and recession risk will drive oil prices, not any Iran deal. Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / BROAD MARKET EQUITIES 2020-11-27 9.3% Bottom Line: Any US-Iran deal will be marginally positive for risky assets. However, the failure of a deal would sharply increase the odds of oil supply disruptions in the short run. Feature Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remain in a critical phase. Rumors suggest Iran has agreed to rejoin the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) with the United States. But these rumors are unconfirmed, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) just announced that Iran has started operating more advanced centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear site.1 In this report we provide a tactical update on the topic. A US-Iran nuclear deal is one item on our checklist for global macro and geopolitical stability (Table 1). We are pessimistic about a deal but it would be a positive outcome for markets. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 A decision could come at any moment so investors should bear in mind our key conclusions about a deal: Chart 1Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga 1.  Any deal will be a short-term, stop-gap measure to delay a crisis until 2024 or beyond. This is not a small point because a crisis could lead to a large military conflict. 2.  The short-run implication of any deal is oil volatility, not a drop in oil prices (Chart 1). Global demand is wobbly and OPEC could cut oil production in reaction to a deal. 3.  Over the long run, global supply and demand balances will remain tight even if a deal is agreed. 4.  If there is no deal, then a major new source of global supply constraint will emerge immediately due to a new spiral of conflict in the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program will continue which will prompt threats from Israel and the Gulf Arab states and Iranian counter-threats. We are sticking with our subjective 40/60 odds that a deal will occur – i.e. our conviction level is medium, not high. The Biden administration wants a deal and has the executive authority to conclude a deal. Iran wants sanctions lifted and can buy time with a short-term deal. Our pessimism stems from the fact that neither side can trust the other, the US can no longer give credible security guarantees, and Iran has a strategic interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. A deal can happen but its durability depends on the 2024 US election. Status Of Negotiations Table 2Iran’s Three Demands Of US For Rejoining 2015 Nuclear Deal Ostensibly there were three outstanding Iranian demands over the month of August that needed to be met to secure a deal (Table 2). Iran reportedly dropped the first demand: that the US remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the US State Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This concession prompted the news media to become more optimistic about a deal. This leaves two outstanding demands. Iran wants the IAEA conclude a “safeguards” investigation into unexplained uranium traces found at unauthorized sites in Iran, indicating nuclear activity that has not been accounted for. The IAEA will be very reluctant to halt such a probe on a political, not technical, basis. But it could happen under US pressure. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter Iran also wants the US to provide a “guarantee” that future presidents will not renege on the nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions like President Trump did in 2019. President Biden cannot give any credible guarantee because the JCPA is an executive action, not a formal treaty, so a different president could reverse it. (The deal always lacked sufficient support in the Senate, even from top Democrats.) Iran is demanding certain diplomatic concessions and/or an economic indemnity in the event of another American reversal. Aside from attempting to incarcerate former President Trump, Biden can only offer empty promises on this front. In what follows we review the critical constraints facing the US and Iran. The US’s Constraints The first constraint on the US is the stagflationary economy. High inflation and oil prices pose a threat to President Biden and the Democrats not only in this year’s midterm elections but also in the 2024 presidential election. A recession is not at all unlikely by that time, given the inverted yield curve (Chart 2). If the US can help maintain stability in the Middle East, then the odds of another major oil supply shock (on top of Russia) will be reduced. Lifting sanctions on Iran will free up around 1 million barrels of oil to feed global demand. With Europe and the US imposing an oil and oil shipping embargo on Russia, the world is likely to lose around two million barrels of crude per day that the Gulf Arab states can only partially make up for, according to our Chief Commodity Strategist Bob Ryan (Table 3). This is a notable material constraint – and the main reason that Bob is more optimistic about an Iran deal than we are. Chart 2US Economic Constraint: Stagflation​​​​​ Table 3The Oil Math Behind Any Iran Deal However, Saudi Arabia would be alienated by a US-Iran détente. The American view is that Iranian production would threaten Saudi market share and force the Saudis to produce more. But the Saudis are seeing weakening global demand and have signaled that they will cut production. There is still an economic basis for an Iran deal but it is not clear that it will lower prices, especially in the short run. Over the long run the Saudis are a more reliable oil producer than Iran for both economic and geopolitical reasons. The second constraint is political. The US public is primarily concerned about the economy. Stagflation or recession could ultimately bring down the Biden administration. However, in the short run, American voters are much more concerned about domestic social issues (such as abortion access) than they are about foreign policy. In the long run, American voters are likely to maintain their long-held negative view of Iran (Chart 3). So the Biden administration has an incentive to prevent geopolitical events from hurting the economy but not to join arms with Iran in a major diplomatic agreement. The third constraint is military. Americans are not as war-weary today as they were in 2008 or 2016 but they are still averse to any new military conflicts in the Middle East. An Iranian nuclear bomb could change that view – but until a bomb is tested it will persist. Chart 3US Political Constraint: Americans Ignore Foreign Policy, Dislike Iran​​​​​​ Chart 4US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz If Iran freezes its nuclear program then it will reduce the odds of a Middle Eastern war and large-scale oil supply disruptions. If Iran does not freeze its nuclear program, then Israel will have to demonstrate a credible military threat against nuclear weaponization, and then Iran will have to demonstrate its region-wide militant capabilities, including the ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz (Chart 4). The Biden administration wants to delay this downward spiral or avoid it altogether. Chart 5US Strategic Constraint: Avoid Mideast Quagmires The fourth constraint is strategic. The Biden administration wants to avoid conflict if possible because it is attempting to reduce America’s burden in the Middle East so that it can focus on emerging great power competition in Eastern Europe and East Asia. The original motivation for the Iran deal was to enable the US to “pivot to Asia” and counter China. Iranian hegemony in the Middle East is less of a threat than Chinese hegemony in East Asia (Chart 5). This logic is sound if Iran can really be brought to halt its nuclear program. The Europeans need to stabilize and open up the Middle East to create an alternative energy supply to Russia. The Americans need to avoid a nuclear arms race and war in the Middle East that distracts them from China. However, if Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapon, then the US suffers strategically for doing a short-term deal that provides Iran with time and access to funds. Ultimately the only thing that can dissuade Iran from going nuclear is American power projection in the Middle East – and this capability is also one of the US’s greatest advantages over China. Bottom Line: The US has a strategic, military, and economic interest in concluding a deal that freezes Iran’s nuclear program. It arguably has an interest in a deal even if Iran violates the deal and pursues nuclear weaponization, since that will provide a legitimate basis for what would then become a necessary military intervention. The Biden administration faces some political blowback for a deal but will suffer more if failure to get a deal leads to a Middle Eastern oil shock. For all these reasons Biden administration is attempting to clinch a deal. But Iran is the sticking point. Iran’s Constraints Our reasons for pessimism regarding the nuclear talks hinge on Iran, not the United States. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s goal is to secure the regime and arrange for a stable succession in the coming years. A deal with the Americans made sense in that context. But going forward, if dealing with the Americans does not bring credible security guarantees and yet makes the economy vulnerable again to a future snapback of sanctions, then the justification for the deal falls apart. We cannot read Khamenei’s mind any more than we can read Biden’s mind, so we will look at the material limitations. Chart 6Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation First, the economic constraint: The Iranian economy suffered a huge negative shock from the reimposition of sanctions in 2019 (Chart 6). However, the economy has sputtered through this shock and the Covid-19 shock without collapsing. Social unrest is an ever-present risk but it has not spiraled out of control. There has not been an attempted democratic revolution like in 2009. The upswing in the global commodity cycle has reinforced the regime. Sanctions do not prevent exports entirely. There is still a huge monetary incentive to let the Biden administration lift sanctions if it wants to do so: a deal is estimated to free up $100 billion dollars per year in revenue for the regime for ten years.2 Realistically this should be understood as more than $275 billion for two years since the longevity of the deal is in question. The problem is that Iran’s economy would be fully exposed to sanctions again if the US changed its mind. The bottom line is that the economic constraint does not force Iran to accept a deal but it is enticing. Second comes the political constraint. President Ebrahim Raisi hopes to become supreme leader someday and is loath to put his name on a deal with weak foundations. He originally opposed the deal, was vindicated, and does not now want to jeopardize his political future by making the same mistake as his hapless predecessor, Hassan Rouhani. Opinion polls may not be reliable in putting Raisi as the most popular politician in Iran but they probably are reliable in showing Rouhani at the bottom of the heap (Chart 7). There is a significant political constraint against rejoining the deal. Chart 7Iran’s Political Constraint: Risk Of American Betrayal Chart 8Iran’s Military Constraint: Outgunned, Unsure Of Allies Third comes the military constraint. While Iran is extremely vulnerable to Israeli and American military attack, it is also a fortress of a country, nestled in mountains, and airstrikes may not succeed in destroying the entire nuclear program or bringing down the regime. An attack by Israel could convert an entirely new generation to the Islamic revolution. And Iran may believe that the US lacks the popular support for military action in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran may also believe that China and Russia will provide military and economic support (Chart 8). Ultimately, America has demonstrated a willingness to attack rogue states and Iran will try to avoid that outcome, since it could succeed in toppling the regime. But if Iran believes it can acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon in a few short years, then it may make a dash for it, since this solution would be a permanent solution: a nuclear deterrent against western attack, as opposed to temporary diplomatic promises. We often compare Iran’s strategic predicament to that of Ukraine, Libya, and North Korea. Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear weapons after the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which promised that Russia, the US, the UK, France, and China would guarantee its security. Yet Russia ended up invading 20 years later – and none of the others prevented it or sent troops to halt the Russian advance. Separately Libya gave up its nuclear program in 2003 but NATO attacked and toppled the regime in 2011 anyway. Meanwhile North Korea played the diplomatic game with the US, ever inching along on the path toward nuclear weapons, and today has achieved nuclear-armed status and greater regime security. The outflow of refugees from the various regimes shows why Iran will emulate North Korea (Chart 9). Chart 9Iran’s Strategic Constraint: The Need For A Nuclear Deterrent Bottom Line: Iran has a short-term economic incentive to agree to a deal and a long-term military incentive. But ultimately the US cannot provide ironclad security guarantees that would justify halting the quest for a nuclear deterrent. A nuclear deterrent would overcome the military constraint. Therefore Iran will continue on that path. Any deal will be a ruse to buy time. Final Assessment The 2015 deal occurred in a context of Iranian strategic isolation, when American implementation was credible, oil prices were weak, and Iran had not achieved nuclear breakout capacity. Today Iran is not isolated (thanks to US quarrels with Russia and China), American guarantees are not credible (thanks to the polarization of foreign policy), oil prices are not weak (thanks to Russia), and Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout (Table 4). Table 4Iran’s Nuclear Program Status Check, Aug. 31, 2022 The US’s strategic aim is to create a balance of power in the region but Iran’s strategic aim is to ensure regime survival. The US’s emerging balancing coalition (Israel and the Gulf Arab states) increases the strategic threat to Iran and hence its need for a nuclear deterrent. While Russia and China formally support the 2015 deal, they each see Iran as a valuable asset in a great power struggle with the United States. Iran sees them the same way. Russia needs Iran as a partner to bypass western sanctions. Regardless, it benefits from Middle Eastern instability, which could entangle the United States. China must develop a deep long-term partnership with Iran for its own strategic reasons and does not look forward to a time when the US divests from that region to impose tougher strategic containment on China. China can survive a US conflict with Iran – and such a conflict could reduce the US ability to defend Taiwan. While neither Russia nor China positively desire Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, neither power stopped North Korea from obtaining the bomb – far from it. Russia assumes that Israel and the US will take military action to prevent weaponization, which would be catastrophic for the region but positive for Russia. China also assumes Israel and the US will act, which reinforces its need to diversify energy options so that it can access Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern oil via pipeline. Investment Takeaways Our negative view on the global economy and geopolitical backdrop is once again being priced into global financial markets as equities fall anew. An Iran deal would delay a notable geopolitical risk for roughly the next 24 months and hence remove a major upside risk for oil prices. This would be marginally positive for global equities, although it will not be the driver. Europe’s and China’s economic woes are the drivers. The failure of a deal would bring major upside risks for oil into the near term and as such would be negative for equities – and could even become the global driver, as Middle Eastern oil disruptions will follow promptly from any failure of the deal. We continue to recommend that investors overweight US equities relative to global, defensive sectors relative to cyclicals, and large caps relative to small caps. We are overweight aerospace and defense stocks, India and Southeast Asia within emerging markets, and underweight China and Taiwan.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Iran International, “Exclusive: Ex-IAEA Official Says US And Iran To Sign Deal Soon,” August 30, 2022, iranintl.com. See also Francois Murphy, “Iran enriching uranium with more IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz -IAEA,” Reuters, August 31, 2022, reuters.com. 2     See Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Tehran’s $1 Trillion Deal: An Updated Forecast of Iran’s Financial Windfall From a New Nuclear Agreement,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 19, 2022, fdd.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix
Informe especial Resumen Ejecutivo Con la materialización de la cuarta crisis del Estrecho de Taiwán, las probabilidades de una gran guerra entre las potencias mundiales han aumentado. Nuestros árboles de decisión sugieren que las probabilidades son alrededor del 20%, o el doble de lo que estaban sólo por la guerra rusa en Ucrania. El mundo está jugando a la “ruleta rusa” … con un revólver de cinco cartuchos. De cara al futuro, nuestro caso base es que las tensiones sobre Taiwán se aplanarán (pero no disminuirán) después de que concluyan los eventos políticos domésticos en EE. UU. y China este otoño. Sin embargo, si China intensifica las tensiones después del vigésimo congreso nacional del partido, entonces las probabilidades de una invasión aumentarán significativamente. Si estalla un conflicto en Taiwán, entonces las probabilidades de que Rusia se vuelva aún más agresiva en Europa aumentarán. Es muy probable que Irán persiga armas nucleares.   Pocos Catalizadores Positivos en la 2.ª Mitad de 2022 Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros Recomendación TácticaFecha de InicioRetorno IR LARGO EN TESOROS A 10 AÑOS DE EE. UU.2022-04-141.3% IR LARGO EN VALORES DEFENSIVOS / CICLÍCOS GLOBALES2022-01-2013.8% Conclusión: Los inversores deberían mantenerse posicionados de forma defensiva al menos hasta que el congreso del partido chino y las elecciones intermedias de EE. UU. concluyan este otoño. El riesgo geopolítico del próximo año dependerá de las acciones de China en el Estrecho de Taiwán. Artículo   Gráfico 1 Crece la Especulación Sobre la Tercera Guerra Mundial Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros Los pesimistas que prestan atención a los acontecimientos mundiales se han preocupado en los últimos años por el riesgo de que pueda estallar la tercera guerra mundial. El término ha aumentado en las búsquedas en línea desde 2019, aunque es la tendencia subyacente de multipolaridad global, más que los eventos críticos específicos, lo que justifica la preocupación (Gráfico 1).1 ¿Cuáles son las probabilidades de una gran guerra entre EE. UU. y China, o EE. UU. y Rusia? ¿Cómo podría calcularse eso? En este informe presentamos una serie de “árboles de decisión” para formalizar los diferentes escenarios y probabilidades. Si definimos la Tercera Guerra Mundial (WWIII) como una guerra en la que Estados Unidos se involucra en combate directo con Rusia o China, o con ambos, entonces llegamos a una probabilidad del 20% de que estalle la Tercera Guerra Mundial en los próximos un par de años. Esas son probabilidades inquietantemente altas, pero la historia enseña que estas probabilidades no son irreales y que los inversores no deben ser complacientes. El politólogo Graham Allison ha mostrado que las probabilidades de una guerra entre EE. UU. y China a largo plazo son de aproximadamente el 75% basándose en analogías históricas. La conclusión es que las naciones tendrán que afrontar este riesgo de Tercera Guerra Mundial y rechazarlo para que el entorno político global mejore. Lo más probable es que lo hagan, ya que la Tercera Guerra Mundial, y el riesgo de guerra nuclear que conllevaría, constituyen la restricción última. Pero el comportamiento actual de las grandes potencias sugiere que aún no han reconocido sus restricciones y están dispuestas a continuar con maniobras de riesgo a corto plazo. Las Probabilidades de Una Invasión China de Taiwán La primera pregunta es si China invadirá Taiwán. En abril de 2021 predijimos que la cuarta crisis del Estrecho de Taiwán ocurriría dentro de 12-24 meses pero que no derivaría en una guerra a gran escala. Esta opinión ahora está siendo puesta a prueba. En Diagrama 1 ofrecemos un árbol de decisión para trazar las opciones políticas de China hacia Taiwán y asignar probabilidades a cada opción. Diagrama 1 Árbol de Decisión para la Cuarta Crisis del Estrecho de Taiwán (Próximos 24 Meses) Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros   Aunque China ha alcanzado la capacidad para invadir Taiwán, las probabilidades de fracaso siguen siendo demasiado altas, especialmente sin mayor progreso en su tríada nuclear. Por lo tanto, damos sólo un 20% de probabilidad a que China se movilice para una invasión de inmediato. No hace falta decir que cualquier signo concreto de que China está planeando una invasión debe tomarse en serio. Los inversores y los medios subestimaron la acumulación militar de Rusia en torno a Ucrania en 2021 en su detrimento. Al mismo tiempo, existe una buena probabilidad de que EE. UU. y China simplemente estén probando el statu quo en el Estrecho de Taiwán, que se reforzará tras el episodio actual. Después de todo, esta crisis fue la cuarta crisis del Estrecho de Taiwán: ninguna de las crisis anteriores condujo a la guerra. Si los presidentes Biden y Xi Jinping simplemente están mostrando músculo antes de importantes eventos políticos domésticos este otoño, entonces ya han logrado su objetivo. No son necesarias más demostraciones de fuerza por ninguna de las partes, al menos durante los próximos años. Damos un 40% de probabilidad a este escenario, en el cual las tensiones de la semana pasada persistirán pero se reforzará el statu quo. En ese caso, el problema estructural del Estrecho de Taiwán volvería a estallar en algún momento después de las elecciones presidenciales de EE. UU. y Taiwán en 2024, es decir, fuera del marco temporal del diagrama. Desafortunadamente somos pesimistas a largo plazo y daríamos alta probabilidad a la guerra en Taiwán. Por esa razón, otorgamos probabilidades iguales (40%) a una situación que se deteriore dentro de los próximos dos años. Si China amplía los simulacros y las sanciones después del congreso del partido, una vez que Xi haya consolidado el poder, entonces quedará claro que Xi no está simplemente actuando para su audiencia interna. De manera similar, si la administración Biden continúa presionando por controles de exportación de alta tecnología más estrictos contra China después de las elecciones intermedias, e insiste en que los aliados y socios de EE. UU. hagan lo mismo, entonces EE. UU. implícitamente cree que China se está preparando para algún tipo de operación ofensiva. El peligro de invasión aumentaría del 20% al 40%. Incluso en ese caso, aún se debería creer que la diplomacia de crisis entre EE. UU. y China evitará una guerra a gran escala en 2023-24. Pero el riesgo de cálculo erróneo sería muy alto. El último elemento de este árbol de decisión sostiene que China preferirá las “tácticas de zona gris” o la guerra híbrida en lugar de una invasión anfibia convencional del tipo visto en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Las razones son varias. Primero, las invasiones anfibias son las operaciones militares más difíciles. Segundo, las fuerzas chinas son inexpertas mientras que EE. UU. y sus aliados están atrincherados. Tercero, la guerra híbrida sembrará división entre los aliados de EE. UU. sobre la mejor respuesta. Cuarto, Rusia ha demostrado varias veces en los últimos 14 años que la guerra híbrida funciona. Es una forma de maximizar los beneficios estratégicos y minimizar los costos. El mundo sabe cómo reacciona Occidente ante invasiones pequeñas: aplica sanciones económicas. Aún no sabe cómo reaccionaría Occidente ante invasiones grandes. Por eso China estará incentivada a dar mordiscos pequeños. Y, sin embargo, en el caso de Taiwán esas tácticas pueden no ser sostenibles. Nuestro árbol de decisión sobre Taiwán no contempla la probabilidad de que una guerra híbrida o una “guerra por poder” evolucione hacia una guerra mayor. Pero esa probabilidad es, de hecho, alta. Así que no estamos sobreestimando el riesgo de una gran guerra entre EE. UU. y China. Conclusión: En los próximos dos años, las probabilidades subjetivas de una guerra por poder entre EE. UU. y China por Taiwán son de aproximadamente el 32%, mientras que las probabilidades de una guerra directa EE. UU.-China son de alrededor del 4%. La verdadera prueba llega después de que Xi Jinping consolide el poder en el congreso del partido de este otoño. Esperamos que Xi se concentre en reiniciar la economía por lo que seguimos favoreciendo los mercados emergentes asiáticos excluyendo China y Taiwán. Las Probabilidades de Guerra de Rusia con la OTAN La segunda pregunta es si la guerra de Rusia en Ucrania derivará en una guerra más amplia con Occidente. Las probabilidades de una gran guerra Rusia-Occidente son mayores en este caso que en el de China, ya que una guerra ya está en curso, mientras que las tensiones en el Estrecho de Taiwán hasta ahora son meros desfiles de fuerza. El caso base de un inversor debería mantener que la guerra en Ucrania permanecerá contenida en Ucrania, ya que los europeos no quieren pelear una guerra devastadora con Rusia sólo por el Donbás. Pero a menudo las cosas salen mal en tiempos de guerra. La pregunta crítica es si Rusia atacará a algún miembro de la OTAN. Eso desencadenaría el Artículo Cinco del tratado de la alianza, que establece que “un ataque armado contra uno o más [miembros de la alianza] en Europa o América del Norte se considerará un ataque contra todos ellos,” justificando el uso de la fuerza armada si es necesario para restaurar la seguridad. Desde la invasión rusa de Ucrania este año, el presidente Biden ha declarado repetidamente que EE. UU. “defenderá cada pulgada del territorio de la OTAN,” incluidos los estados bálticos de Letonia, Lituania y Estonia, que se unieron a la OTAN en 2004. Esto no es un cambio de política pero sí es la línea roja de EE. UU. y es muy probable que sea defendida. Por lo tanto, es una restricción importante para Rusia. En Diagrama 2 trazamos las diferentes opciones de Rusia y asignamos probabilidades. Diagrama 2 Árbol de Decisión para la Guerra Rusia-Ucrania (Próximos 24 Meses) Ruleta con un revólver de cinco disparos Ruleta con un revólver de cinco disparos   Damos un 55% de probabilidad de que Rusia declare la victoria tras completar la conquista de la región del Donbás en Ucrania y el corredor terrestre hacia Crimea. Comenzará a buscar legitimar sus conquistas mediante algún acuerdo diplomático, es decir, un alto el fuego. Este es nuestro caso base para 2023. Hay evidencia de que Rusia ya está empezando a moverse hacia la diplomacia.2 La razón es que la economía rusa está sufriendo, los precios globales de las materias primas están cayendo, se está gastando sangre y tesoro ruso. El presidente Putin habrá logrado en gran medida su objetivo de incapacitar a Ucrania mientras controle la boca del río Dniéper y el resto del territorio que ha invadido. Putin necesita sellar sus conquistas e intentar rescatar la economía y la sociedad. Cuanto antes mejor para Rusia, de modo que se pueda prevenir que Europa forme un consenso e implemente un embargo total de gas natural en los próximos años. Sin embargo, existe el riesgo de que la ambición de Putin lo supere. Por eso damos un 35% de probabilidad a que la invasión se expanda al suroeste de Ucrania, incluyendo la estratégica ciudad portuaria de Odesa, y al este de Moldavia, donde tropas rusas están estacionadas en la región separatista de Transnistria. Esta nueva campaña dejaría a Ucrania totalmente sin salida al mar, neutralizaría a Moldavia y daría a Rusia mayor acceso marítimo. Pero unificaría a la UE, precipitaría un embargo de gas natural y debilitaría a Rusia hasta un punto en que podría volverse desesperada. Podría contraatacar y esa represalia podría concebirse que conduzca a una guerra más amplia. Asignamos sólo un 7% de probabilidad a que Putin ataque a Finlandia o Suecia por intentar unirse a la OTAN. Stalin fracasó en Finlandia y el ejército de Putin ni siquiera pudo conquistar Kiev. El Reino Unido se ha comprometido a apoyar a estos estados, por lo que un ataque contra ellos muy probablemente desencadenaría una guerra con la OTAN. Una decisión de atacar a Finlandia solo ocurriría si Rusia creyera que la OTAN planea desplegar bases militares allí, es decir, la línea roja declarada de Rusia. Cualquier ataque ruso contra los estados bálticos es menos probable porque ya están en la OTAN. Pero existe cierto riesgo de que ocurra si Putin se vuelve desesperado. Ponemos el riesgo de una invasión de los bálticos en un 3%. En resumen, si Rusia usa su estrangulamiento energético sobre Europa no para negociar un alto el fuego favorable sino para expandir sus invasiones, entonces las probabilidades de una guerra más amplia aumentarán. Conclusión: El resultado es una probabilidad del 55% de desescalada durante los próximos 24 meses, un 35% de una pequeña escalada (por ejemplo Odesa, Moldavia) y un 10% de una escalada mayor que involucre a miembros de la OTAN y probablemente conduzca a una guerra OTAN-Rusia. Tácticamente, los inversores deberían comprar moneda y activos de mercados desarrollados europeos si la economía global se recupera y Rusia realiza un claro giro hacia detener su campaña militar y perseguir conversaciones de alto el fuego. Cíclicamente, se necesita una comprensión más profunda entre EE. UU. y Rusia para un mercado alcista duradero en activos europeos. Las Probabilidades de Ataques de EE. UU. e Israel contra Irán La tercera crisis geopolítica que tiene lugar este año podría posponerse mientras salimos a impresión, si el presidente Biden y el ayatolá Ali Khamenei acuerdan reincorporarse al acuerdo nuclear EE. UU.-Irán de 2015. Pero seguimos siendo escépticos. La administración Biden quiere reincorporarse al acuerdo nuclear de 2015 y liberar alrededor de un millón de barriles por día de crudo iraní para reducir los precios en la bomba antes de las elecciones intermedias. La gran estrategia de EE. UU. también quiere comprometerse con Irán y estabilizar Oriente Medio para que EE. UU. pueda reorientarse hacia Asia. La UE propone el acuerdo ya que tiene una necesidad aún mayor de los recursos iraníes y quiere prevenir que Irán obtenga armas nucleares. Rusia y China también apoyan porque quieren eliminar las sanciones estadounidenses para comerciar con Irán y no necesariamente desean que Irán tenga armas nucleares. Solo hay un problema: Irán necesita armas nucleares para asegurar la supervivencia de su régimen a largo plazo. La pregunta es si Khamenei está dispuesto a autorizar un acuerdo con los estadounidenses por segunda vez. El primer acuerdo fue traicionado a gran costo para su régimen. El presidente Ebrahim Raisi, que espera reemplazar al supremo Khamenei de 83 años antes o después, seguramente se opone firmemente a apostar su carrera y seguridad personal a que los republicanos ganen las elecciones de 2024. Irán ya ha alcanzado la capacidad de ruptura nuclear – tiene suficiente uranio enriquecido al 60% para construir dispositivos nucleares – y no está claro por qué alcanzaría esta capacidad si no pretendiera finalmente obtener un elemento disuasorio nuclear. Especialmente dado que podría necesitar algún día proteger su régimen de ataques militares por parte de EE. UU. y sus aliados. Sin embargo, nuestro nivel de convicción es medio porque el presidente Biden quiere levantar las sanciones y puede hacerlo unilateralmente. La administración Biden no ha tomado ninguna de las acciones preliminares para que un acuerdo se materialice, pero eso podría cambiar.3 Hay un buen caso cíclico que favorecería un acuerdo temporal y de corta duración. Según Bob Ryan, estratega de materias primas y energía de BCA, Arabia Saudita y los EAU sólo tienen aproximadamente 1.5 millones de barriles de capacidad de producción de petróleo excedente entre ambos. El embargo petrolero de la UE y las sanciones occidentales sobre Rusia forzarán la detención de alrededor de dos millones de barriles por día, absorbiendo la mayor parte de la capacidad de la OPEP. Por tanto, la administración Biden necesita el millón de barriles que Irán puede aportar. No podemos negar que los iraníes podrían firmar un acuerdo para permitir que Biden levante las sanciones. Eso beneficiaría su economía. Podrían permitir inspectores nucleares mientras secretamente desplazan su foco al desarrollo de ojivas y misiles balísticos. Aunque Irán no renunciará a la larga a la búsqueda de un disuasivo nuclear, es experto en ganar tiempo. Aun así, la política doméstica de Irán no respalda un acuerdo, y su gran estrategia sólo apoya un acuerdo si EE. UU. puede proporcionar garantías de seguridad creíbles, cosa que EE. UU. no puede hacer porque su política exterior es inconsistente. La gran estrategia de EE. UU. apoya un acuerdo pero sólo si es verificable, es decir, no si Irán lo utiliza como cobertura para perseguir una bomba de todas formas. Irán no se ha rendido después de tres años de sanciones máximas de EE. UU., una pandemia y la agitación global. Y Irán ve una perspectiva mucho mayor de extraer beneficios estratégicos de Rusia y China ahora que se han vuelto agresivos contra Occidente. Moscú y Pekín pueden ser socios estratégicos debido a su acrimonia compartida hacia Washington. Mientras que EE. UU. puede traicionar a la administración Raisi tan fácilmente como traicionó a la de Rouhani, con el resultado de que la economía volvería a ser zarandeada y el Líder Supremo y el establecimiento político serían, a los ojos del público, el doble de engañados. Diagrama 3 expone las opciones de Irán. Diagrama 3 Árbol de Decisión para la Crisis Nuclear de Irán (Próximos 24 Meses) Ruleta con un revólver de cinco disparos Ruleta con un revólver de cinco disparos   Si las negociaciones colapsan (50% de probabilidad), entonces Irán dará una carrera loca por un arma nuclear antes de que EE. UU. e Israel ataquen. Si EE. UU. e Irán acuerdan un pacto (40%), entonces Irán podría cumplir los términos del acuerdo hasta las elecciones de EE. UU. de 2024, retirando el tema de las preocupaciones de los inversores por ahora. Pero su interés a largo plazo en obtener un disuasivo nuclear no cambiará y el conflicto se reavivará después de 2024. Si las conversaciones continúan sin resolución (10%), Irán hará progresos graduales en su programa nuclear sin las restricciones del acuerdo (aunque puede que no necesite apresurarse). En resumen, Rusia y China necesitan a Irán independientemente de si éste congela su programa nuclear, mientras que EE. UU. e Israel formarán una alianza Abraham de equilibrio de poder para contener a Irán incluso si congela su programa nuclear. Conclusión: Los inversores deberían asignar un 40% de probabilidad a un acuerdo nuclear temporal y de corta duración entre EE. UU. e Irán. La caída del precio del petróleo sería fugaz. La oferta a largo plazo no se expandirá porque EE. UU. no puede proporcionar a Irán las garantías de seguridad que necesita para detener irreversible su programa nuclear. Las Probabilidades de la Tercera Guerra Mundial Ahora viene la parte imposible, donde intentamos poner estas tres crisis geopolíticas juntas. En lo que sigue estamos simplificando en exceso. Pero el propósito es formalizar nuestro pensamiento sobre los diferentes actores y sus opciones. Diagrama 4 comienza con nuestras conclusiones respecto al conflicto China/Taiwán, ajusta las probabilidades de una guerra rusa más amplia como resultado, y añade nuestra opinión de que es muy probable que Irán persiga armas nucleares. De nuevo, el marco temporal es de dos años. Diagrama 4 Árbol de Decisión para la Tercera Guerra Mundial (Próximos 24 Meses) Ruleta con un revólver de cinco disparos Ruleta con un revólver de cinco disparos   El escenario alternativo de conflicto a la Tercera Guerra Mundial consiste en “guerras limitadas”: un concepto peligroso que se refiere a guerras híbridas y por poder en las que EE. UU. no está involucrado, o sólo está involucrado de forma indirecta. O podría ser un conflicto con Irán que no involucre a Rusia y China. Comenzamos con China porque es la potencia global más capaz y ambiciosa en la actualidad. El ascenso estratégico de China está trastornando el orden global y desafiando a Estados Unidos. También empezamos por China porque tenemos alguna evidencia este año de que Rusia no pretende expandir la guerra más allá de Ucrania. O China toma acciones agresivas adicionales en Taiwán – creando una oportunidad única para que Rusia asuma mayores riesgos – o no. Si no, las probabilidades de la Tercera Guerra Mundial caerán drásticamente durante el período de dos años. Este escenario es nuestro caso base. Pero si China ataca Taiwán y EE. UU. defiende a Taiwán, damos una alta probabilidad a que Rusia invada los bálticos. Si China realiza ataques híbridos y EE. UU. sólo apoya a Taiwán de forma indirecta, entonces aumentamos las probabilidades de agresión rusa sólo marginalmente. El resultado es una probabilidad del 20% de la Tercera Guerra Mundial, es decir, una guerra directa entre EE. UU. y Rusia, o China, o ambos. Si esta guerra podría permanecer limitada es debatible. Los ejercicios de guerra desde 1945 muestran que cualquier guerra entre grandes potencias nucleares es más probable que escale que lo contrario. Pero las armas nucleares traen destrucción mutuamente asegurada, la restricción última. El riesgo de escalada nuclear es la razón por la que redondeamos a la baja la probabilidad de la Tercera Guerra Mundial en nuestros árboles de decisión. El escenario más probable del 59% de “guerras limitadas” puede parecer un resultado positivo, pero incluye aumentos importantes en las tensiones geopolíticas respecto al nivel actual, como una guerra híbrida china contra Taiwán. Conclusión: Según este ejercicio, las probabilidades de la Tercera Guerra Mundial podrían ser tan altas como el 20%. Esto es el doble del nivel en nuestro árbol de decisión sobre Rusia, lo cual es apropiado dado que nuestro pronóstico sobre la crisis de Taiwán se ha materializado. El factor crítico es si Pekín continúa escalando la presión sobre Taiwán después del congreso del partido este otoño. Eso podría desencadenar una peligrosa reacción en cadena. La economía global y los mercados financieros todavía enfrentan riesgo a la baja por la geopolítica, pero 2023 podría ver mejoras si Rusia se mueve hacia un alto el fuego y China retrasa la acción contra Taiwán para reiniciar su economía. Conclusiones para la Inversión Cuando Rusia invadió Ucrania a principios de este año, nuestro colega Peter Berezin, estratega global jefe, argumentó que las probabilidades de un Armagedón nuclear eran del 10%. Como mínimo, esta es una probabilidad razonable para las probabilidades de que Rusia y la OTAN lleguen a las manos. Ahora la esperada crisis de Taiwán se ha materializado. Calculamos que las probabilidades de una gran guerra se han duplicado al 20%. La correlación es una probabilidad del 80% de un mejor resultado. Analíticamente, seguimos viendo a Rusia persiguiendo un objetivo limitado – neutralizar a Ucrania para que no sea próspera ni militarmente poderosa – mientras que China también persigue un objetivo limitado – intimidar a Taiwán para que busque la subordinación en vez de la condición de nación. A menos que estos objetivos cambien, todavía estamos lejos de la Tercera Guerra Mundial. El mundo puede convivir con una Ucrania lisiada y un Taiwán subordinado. Sin embargo, no se puede negar que la trayectoria de los asuntos globales desde la crisis financiera global de 2008 ha seguido un camino incómodamente similar al que condujo a la Segunda Guerra Mundial: crisis financiera, recesión económica, deflación, agitación interna, depreciación de la moneda, proteccionismo comercial, monetización de la deuda, rearme militar, inflación y guerras de agresión. Si la ruleta es el juego, entonces las probabilidades de una guerra global son de una sexta parte o 17%, no muy lejos del resultado del 20% de nuestros árboles de decisión. Incluso suponiendo que seamos alarmistas, el hecho de que podamos formular un argumento coherente y formal de que las probabilidades de la Tercera Guerra Mundial son tan altas como el 20% sugiere que los inversores deberían esperar a que las tensiones actuales sobre Ucrania y Taiwán disminuyan antes de hacer grandes apuestas nuevas y arriesgadas. Una lista de comprobación simple muestra que el contexto macro global y geopolítico es sombrío (Tabla 1). Necesitamos mejoras en la lista antes de mostrarnos más optimistas. Tabla 1 Pocos Catalizadores Positivos en la 2.ª Mitad de 2022 Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros Ruleta con un revólver de cinco tiros     Gráfico 2 Mantenerse en Posición Defensiva en la 2.ª Mitad de 2022 Manténgase en posición defensiva en el segundo semestre de 2022 Manténgase en posición defensiva en el segundo semestre de 2022 Específicamente, lo que los inversores necesitan es estar razonablemente tranquilos de que Rusia no expandirá la guerra a la OTAN y de que China no invadirá Taiwán en el corto plazo. Esto requiere un nuevo entendimiento diplomático entre Washington y Moscú y entre Washington y Pekín que evite el conflicto. Ese tipo de entendimiento sólo puede forjarse en la crisis. Las crisis relevantes están en curso pero aún no han concluido. Es probable que haya más caídas para los inversores en renta variable global antes de que los riesgos de guerra se disipan mediante la solución habitual: la diplomacia. Espere mejoras concretas y creíbles en el sistema global antes de adoptar una postura generalmente sobreponderada hacia activos de riesgo. Favorezca los bonos gubernamentales sobre las acciones, las acciones estadounidenses sobre las globales, los sectores defensivos sobre los cíclicos, y desfavorezca la moneda y los activos chinos y taiwaneses (Gráfico 2).     Matt Gertken Director de Estrategia Geopolíticamattg@bcaresearch.com  Notas al Pie 1      Véase Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Nueva York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 2     Por ejemplo, el acuerdo mediado por Turquía para enviar grano desde Odesa, el apoyo diplomático para reincorporarse al acuerdo nuclear de Irán de 2015, los referendos en territorios conquistados como Jersón y los intentos de aumentar la influencia en conversaciones de reducción de armamentos. Cortar la energía de Europa es en última instancia un plan para coaccionar a Europa a aceptar un alto el fuego favorable para Rusia. 3     Irán sigue planteando demandas extraneous – más recientemente que el OIEA deje de investigar cómo ciertas partículas de uranio producidas por el hombre aparecieron en sitios nucleares no divulgados en Irán. El OIEA no ha abandonado esta investigación y su credibilidad sufriría si lo hiciera. Mientras tanto, Biden está aumentando y no reduciendo sanciones sobre Irán, aunque el alivio de sanciones es una demanda iraní central. Biden no ha eliminado a la Guardia Revolucionaria Iraní ni a la Fuerza Quds de la lista de terrorismo. Ninguno de estos obstáculos es prohibitivo pero al menos esperaríamos ver algún movimiento antes de cambiar nuestra opinión de que un acuerdo es más probable que fracase que que tenga éxito. Temas Estratégicos Posiciones Tácticas Abiertas (0-6 Meses) Recomendaciones Cíclicas Abiertas (6-18 Meses) Matriz Regional de Riesgo Geopolítico "Promedio de Aciertos": Operaciones de Estrategia Geopolítica ()
Executive Summary Oil Markets Remain Tight US and Iranian negotiators received an EU proposal for reviving the Iran nuclear deal on Monday, which could return ~ 1mm b/d of oil to markets.  The EU’s embargo of Russian seaborne crude imports, which commences December 5, will remove 90% of seaborne imports of Russian crude (~ 2.3mm b/d) by year-end.  In February 2023, another 800k b/d of refined products will be embargoed.  December also will usher in insurance and reinsurance sanctions on shipping Russian oil – arguably the strongest sanctions the EU, UK and US can impose. Without those Iranian barrels, the determination of the EU, UK and US to enforce a Russian oil embargo will be suspect. We give odds of 60% to a US-Iran deal getting done in the near term.  Our Geopolitical Strategy maintains the likelihood of a deal is 40% at best. Bottom Line: Oil markets are pricing in the likelihood of large energy supply dislocations over the next couple of months.  The evolution of prices hinges upon the degree to which the EU’s embargo on Russian oil imports is implemented.  A revived Iran nuclear deal with the West would offset some of the embargoed Russian oil.  Even so, oil balances still will remain tilted to deficit conditions in 2023.  We continue to expect Brent will move above our 2022 $110/bbl expectation by 4Q22, and average $117/bbl next year. Feature US and Iranian negotiators received a proposal from EU negotiators for reviving the Iran nuclear deal on Monday.1 If the US and Iran can agree, the door opens for 1mm b/d of Iranian oil to return to markets. These barrels are becoming increasingly important to the EU, especially following the suspension of southerly flows of oil on Russia’s Druzhba pipeline due to a payment dispute.2 Brent popped ~ $1.50/bbl Tuesday morning as the Druzhba news broke, and the backwardation in the forward market increased (Chart 1). Brent gave back these early gains by the end of trading, following news a Hungarian refiner transferred the fee required to use the Ukrainian section of the pipeline.3 Chart 1Oil Markets Remain Tight Complicated Motives On All Sides The EU obviously has an interest in freezing Iran’s nuclear program and accessing more Iranian fossil fuels while it is locked in an energy struggle with Russia – hence the its proposal to revive the Iran nuclear deal. However, the US and Iranian positions are more complicated. Iranian’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has an interest in removing the US’s economic sanctions – and in obtaining deliverable nuclear weapons, notes Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s chief geopolitical strategist. Khamenei’s plan is to develop a nuclear weapon so that Iran can deter any aggression from a future US administration or the Abraham alliance. This is the path to regime survival, power succession, and national security. Hence Iran will not freeze its nuclear program over the long run. But Khamenei may wish to buy time while the Democrats still run the White House. Chart 2KSA, UAE Preserving Spare Capacity We’ve noted repeatedly the Biden administration has been pressing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – the only states in OPEC 2.0 able to raise output and maintain production at higher levels – to increase output for the better part of this year. These efforts yielded only a 100k b/d production increase earlier this month. KSA and the UAE insist they are close to the maximum levels of oil they can supply to the market, given their current production and the need to maintain minimal spare capacity (Chart 2).4 KSA’s max capacity is 12mm b/d. The Kingdom will be producing at or slightly above 11mm b/d later this year to offset declines in non-core OPEC 2.0 production. KSA’s trying to get its max capacity to 13mm b/d, but that will take until 2027, according to the state oil company ARAMCO. UAE’s max capacity is 4mm b/d. It will be producing at or close to 3.5mm b/d this year, and after that they’ll want to hang on to that last bit as spare capacity. UAE’s trying to get its spare capacity to 5mm b/d, but that’s going to take until 2030, according to its state oil company ADNOC. There’s an increasing risk to the Russian output arising from the EU embargo scheduled to take effect December 5, and sanctions on providing insurance and reinsurance to ships carrying Russian material. If the EU/UK/US embargo is successful and results in Russia being forced to shut in 2mm b/d by the end of next year, per our expectation, KSA and UAE spare capacity will not cover the loss of production, and falling output within OPEC 2.0. Given these dynamics – and the expectation at least some of the sanctions will stick after Dec. 5 – KSA and UAE have to hang on to those last barrels to be able to meet the increasingly likely loss of Russian shut-in production. Additional spare capacity is not available in the US shales, or in any of the other producing provinces outside OPEC 2.0 sufficient to cover the loss of Russian barrels. Indeed, output from OPEC 2.0 outside the core producers has been trending lower for years (Chart 3).5 Complicating a deal with Iran is the possibility it could re-open the breach between the US and KSA. If KSA wanted to express its displeasure with a US-Iran deal it wouldn’t need to do much to re-balance the market: If the Kingdom does not offset production losses by the rest of OPEC 2.0, or step up to cover, e.g., Libyan production – now back on the market with just under 500k b/d – global supply falls and prices rise, all else equal.6 Chart 3KSA, UAE Are Core OPEC 2.0 Our Geopolitical Strategy gives 40% odds of an Iran deal and 60% odds that negotiations fall apart (or drag on without resolution). We make the odds higher – 60% chance of success – given the compelling interest of the Biden administration to get more oil into the market going into midterms in November, and a general interest in the West to offset potential losses of Russian volumes to sanctions that kick in in December. The difference in these views hinges on what Iran will do, as the Biden administration is seeking a deal. Sanctions Kicking In In December The EU is set to roll into its embargo of Russian oil imports on December 5. If fully implemented, ~ 2.3mm b/d of seaborne imports of Russian crude oil will be excluded from EU markets by year-end. Beginning in February, another 800k b/d of refined products will be embargoed. EU, UK and US shipping insurance and reinsurance sanctions also are set to kick in in December. These arguably are the strongest sanctions available to the West in its effort to take Russian oil and refined products off the market (no insurance means no shipping). The EU recently relaxed sanctions on buying and transporting Russian crude oil, which will allow additional volumes of oil to be purchased and transported to end-use markets.7 While this will let a little more Russian oil into the market in the near term, we believe it opens the possibility of additional exceptions being made by the EU to make more oil available, if prices move sharply higher on the back of increasing supply scarcity. The EU and US are looking a bit wobbly on the insurance and reinsurance bans due to kick in in December.8 If they relax or forego these sanctions in some fashion, more Russian crude and products will flow to market in 4Q22 than currently is anticipated. This would undermine US efforts to secure a price cap on Russian oil sales. Slower sanction enforcement is a path available to Biden that does not involve bowing to Iran’s various demands. Some, but not all, of the Russian volumes lost to EU exports will continue to be scooped up by China and India, which have become the largest buyers of Russian oil following the sanctions imposed by the West after the invasion of Ukraine.9 India loaded 29.5mm barrels of Russian crude in July – a record – while China loaded 18.1mm barrels. These levels likely will fall, but these two states will remain big buyers of Russian crude and products going forward. Household Budgets Will Remain Strained High energy prices – particularly for gasoline and diesel fuel – and falling real incomes have eaten into US household budgets, and are a key factor for Biden’s low approval ratings (Chart 4). July US CPI was unchanged from June and was 8.5% higher y-o-y. While the gasoline price index dropped from June, it remained one of the main contributors to the high energy index. (Chart 5).10 Based on the sharp increase in gasoline prices over the first six months of this year, we estimate the cost of running a car is 50% higher in 1H22 vs. 1H21 in the US. Chart 4Wealth Destruction Key To Low Biden Approval Chart 5Energy Driving High US Prices US gasoline and distillate prices have rolled over since mid-June, driven by high refined-product prices, which weakened demand, and fear of global recession as central banks tighten monetary policy. Higher Russian crude output in 1H22 – up 3.6% to ~ 10.1mm b/d – partly contributed to weaker product prices. However, this trend likely will reverse: Russian crude output in 2Q22 was down 1.1% y/y to 9.7mm b/d, based on our estimates. We expect prices of gasoline and diesel fuel to remain at elevated levels, given low inventories (Chart 6), and a second consecutive year of lower US refining capacity (Chart 7). Higher crude oil prices brought about by Russian oil and product embargoes will feed into these refined product prices, pushing them higher. Chart 6Low Product Stocks… Chart 7…And Refining Capacity Are Bullish For Petrol Products There is scope for an increase in gasoline demand over the rest of the driving season, while elevated US and overseas distillate demand will support diesel and heating oil prices. The eurozone’s record high inflation in July was driven by energy prices (Chart 8), indicating high energy prices are a problem for households worldwide. According to the Household Electricity Price Index, residential electricity prices in EU capitals were more than 70% higher in 1H22 y/y. The IMF expects high fuel prices will increase EU households’ share of energy expenditure by 7% in 2022.11 In response to high energy prices, governments are enacting policies such as price caps and direct transfers to lower the damage to household wealth.12 An unintended consequence of this will be high prices for longer, as consumers will not register the signal the market is sending via higher prices to encourage lower demand. This will result in continued draws on inventories. Chart 8High Energy Prices Responsible For Eurozone Inflation Investment Implications With EU sanctions scheduled to become effective December 5, oil markets are focused on supply measures that could sharply reduce Russian oil exports. This makes the US-Iran negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal critically important. Agreement to restore the deal could return 1mm b/d of oil to markets at a time when supplies are at risk of contracting sharply going into 2023. Failure to restore these volumes will tighten supply significantly if the EU’s embargo of Russian oil imports is successful. We give the restoration of the Iran nuclear deal a 60% chance of success. In and of itself, the return of Iranian oil exports will not offset all of the potential loss of Russian crude oil exports to the EU. That said, the evolution of crude oil prices hinges upon the degree to which the EU’s embargo on Russian oil imports is implemented. There's a subtle point to be aware of in the evolution of US-Iran negotiations: The Biden administration could just turn a blind eye to Iranian crude sales, without agreeing to revive the nuclear deal being negotiated. Signing a deal, on the other hand, would be more positive for supply than merely not contesting Iranian's renewed exports of 1mm b/d of crude. It is worthwhile bearing in mind that the point of the deal is that Iran pauses its nuclear program, which reduces war risk in the medium term, or as long as deal is in force. Reducing the level of agita in the region, at least for a couple of years, is a net benefit. Our geopolitical strategist Matt Gertken notes, "If Iranians sign a deal, then they are endorsing Biden and the Democratic Party for 2024, meaning they want a Democratic White House in the US through 2028. There would be no reason to sign it unless you plan to implement at least through 2024." We remain bullish oil, and continue to expect Brent to trade above $110/bbl on average this year, and $117/bbl next year. We remain long the XOP ETF to retain our exposure to oil and gas E+Ps.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The EIA expects US natural gas inventories to finish the injection season at ~ 3.5 Tcf – 6% below the five-year average – at the end of October (Chart 9). LNG exports are expected to average 11.2 Bcf/d, which, if realized, will be 14% over 2021 levels. The EIA increased its estimate of LNG exports on the back of an earlier-than-expected return of Freeport LNG exports. For 2023, the EIA expects US LNG exports will average 12.7 Bcf/d. Close to 70% of the 57 bcm of US LNG exports are being shipped to Europe, where it is helping offset the cutoff of Russian gas supplies following the war in Ukraine. In 1H22, the US became the world’s largest exporter of LNG. Dry gas production in the US is expected to average just under 97 Bcf/d in 2022, a 3% increase over 2021 levels. Base Metals: Bullish Total Chinese copper imports for July were up 9.3% at ~464kt for July, despite economic weakness and a property market slowed by companies' payment defaults and lower consumer confidence in real estate groups. Copper in SHFE warehouses were at 35kt which is 65% lower y/y as of the week ending August 5th, while stocks in China’s copper bonded inventories were 40% lower y/y at 262kt for the month of June. Low copper prices and Chinese stocks, and high imports indicate that the world’s largest copper consumer is capitalizing on weak prices to restock low inventories. Precious Metals: Bullish The World Gold Council reported gold ETF outflows for the third consecutive month in July at 80.1 tons (Chart 10) due to low gold prices, a strong USD and a hawkish Fed. The latest July US CPI data was unchanged from June, as high prices due to pandemic induced supply chain bottlenecks eased. Inflation remains well above target. Despite the mildly positive inflation data, we expect the Fed to hike interest rates again in September. The magnitude of this hike will depend on the August US CPI and employment prints, given the Fed’s data dependency. By year-end, if the Russian oil embargo and insurance bans on shipping vessels are implemented in their current form, high crude oil prices will feed into inflation, and the Fed will be forced to remain aggressive. Chart 9 Chart 10     Footnotes 1     Please see Agreement on nuclear deal within reach but obstacles remain published by politico.com on August 8, 2022. 2     Please see Russia suspends oil exports via southern leg of Druzhba pipeline due to transit payment issues published by reuters.com on August 9, 2022. 3    Please see Oil drops on Druzhba pipeline news and U.S. inflation expectations published by reuters.com on August 10, 2022.  According to the International Association of Oil Transporters, the Druzhba pipeline capacity is ~ 1.3mm b/d.  In July, its southern leg supplying Hungary, the Czech Republic and was carrying ~ 230k b/d, according to OilX, a satellite service monitoring oil and shipping movements globally. 4    Please see Tighter Oil Markets On The Way, which we published on July 21, 2022, for additional detail. 5    Please see footnote #4. 6    The background factor in this situation is Russia’s involvement in Libya’s civil disorder.  We noted in our July 14, 2022 report Russia Pulls Oil, Gas Supply Strings: “Sporadic force majeure declarations and output losses in Libya, where Russian mercenaries actively support Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), continue to make supply assessments difficult.” 7     Please see How the EU Will Allow a Slight Increase in Russian Oil Exports published by Bloomberg.com on August 1, 2022. 8    Please see US warns of surge in fuel costs as it renews push for Russian oil price cap published by ft.com on July 26, 2022. 9    Please see Russian crude prices recover on strong India, China demand, and Column-Russian crude is more reliant on India and China, but signs of a peak: Russell | Reuters, published by reuters.com on August 7 and August 9, 2022. 10   After fuel oils, the 44% y-o-y increase in the gasoline price index was the largest contributor to the increase in the energy index. 11    Please see Surging Energy Prices in Europe in the Aftermath of the War: How to Support the Vulnerable and Speed up the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels, published by the IMF on July 29, 2022. 12    For an example of such policy, please see State aid: Commission approves Spanish and Portuguese measure to lower electricity prices amid energy crisis     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022