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Highlights Three distinct forces are likely to make South Asia’s geopolitical risks increasingly relevant to global investors. First, India’s tensions with China stem from China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness and India’s shift away from traditional neutrality toward aligning with the US and its allies. This creates a security dilemma in South Asia, just as in East Asia. Second, India’s economy is sputtering in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, adding fuel to nationalism and populism in advance of a series of important elections. India will stimulate the economy but it could also become more reactive on the international scene. Third, the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan and negotiating a deal with Iran in an effort to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East and South Asia. This will create a scramble for influence across both regions and a power vacuum in Afghanistan that is highly likely to yield negative surprises for India and its neighbors. Traditionally geopolitical risks in South Asia have a limited impact on markets. India’s growth slowdown and forthcoming fiscal stimulus are more relevant for investors. However, a sharp rise in geopolitical risk would undermine India’s structural advantages as the West diversifies away from China. Stay short Indian banks. Feature Geopolitical risks in South Asia are slowly but surely rising. India-Pakistan and China-India are well-known “conflict-dyads” or pairings. Historically, these two sets have been fighting each other over their fuzzy Himalayan border with limited global financial market consequences. But now fundamental changes are afoot that are altering the geopolitical setting in the region. Specifically, the coming together of three distinct forces could trigger a significant geopolitical event in South Asia. The three forces are as follow: Force #1: Sino-Indian Tensions Get Real About a year ago, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in Ladakh, a disputed territory in the Kashmir region. Following these clashes China reduced its military presence in the Pangong Tso area but its presence in some neighboring areas remains meaningful. Besides the troop build-up along India’s eastern border, China is building more air combat infrastructure in its India-facing western theatre. China’s major air bases have historically been concentrated in China’s eastern region, away from the Indian border (Map 1). Consequently, India has historically enjoyed an advantage in airpower. But China appears to be working to mitigate this disadvantage. Map 1Most Of China’s Major Aviation Units Are Located Away From India Owing to China’s increased military focus along the Sino-India border, India’s threat perception of China has undergone a fundamental change in recent years. Notably, India has diverted some of its key army units away from its western Indo-Pak border towards its eastern border with China. India could now have nearly 200,000 troops deployed along its border with China, which would mark a 40% increase from last year.1 Turning attention to the Indo-Pak border, India’s problems with Pakistan appear under control for now. This is owing to the ceasefire agreement that was renewed by the two countries in February 2021. However, this peace cannot possibly be expected to last. This is mainly because core problems between the two countries (like Pakistan’s support of militant proxies and India’s control over Kashmir) remain unaddressed. History too suggests that bouts of peace between the two warring neighbors rarely last long. These bouts usually end abruptly when a terrorist attack takes place in India. With both political turbulence and economic distress in Pakistan rising, the fragile ceasefire between India and Pakistan could be upended over the next six months. In fact, two events over the last week point to the fragility of the ceasefire: Two drones carrying explosives entered an Indian air force station located in Jammu and Kashmir (i.e. a northern territory that India recently reorganized, to Pakistan’s chagrin). Even as no casualties were reported, this attack marks a turning point for terrorist activity in India as this was the first-time terrorists used drones to enter an Indian military base. Hours later, another drone attack struck an Indian base at the Ratnuchak-Kaluchak army station, the site of a major terrorist attack in 2002. Chart 1China, Pakistan And India Cumulatively Added 41 Nuclear Warheads Over 2020 Given that the ceasefire was agreed recently, any further increase in terrorist activity in India over the next six months would suggest that a more substantial breakdown in relations is nigh. Distinct from these recent tensions, China’s troop deployment along India’s eastern arm and Pakistan’s presence along India’s western arm creates a strategic “pincer” that increasingly threatens India. India is naturally concerned. China and Pakistan are allies who have been working closely on projects including the strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a collection of infrastructure projects in Pakistan that includes the development of a port in Gwadar where a future presence of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is envisaged. Gwadar has the potential of providing China land-based access to the Indian Ocean. Trust in the South Asian region is clearly running low. Distinct from troop build-ups and drone-attacks, China, Pakistan, and India cumulatively added more than 40 nuclear warheads over the last year (Chart 1). China is reputed to be engaged in an even larger increase in its nuclear arsenal than the data show.2 From a structural perspective, too, geopolitical risks in the South Asian peninsula are bound to keep rising. When it comes to the conflicting Indo-Pak dyad, India’s geopolitical power has been rising relative to that of Pakistan in the 2000s. However, the geopolitical muscle of the Sino-Pak alliance is much greater than that of India on a standalone basis (Chart 2). Chart 2India Has Aligned With The QUAD To Counter The Sino-Pak Alliance China’s active involvement in South Asia is responsible for driving India’s increasing desire to abandon its historical foreign policy stance of non-alignment. India’s membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the QUAD, whose other members include the US, Japan, and Australia) bears testimony to India’s active effort to develop closer relations with the US and its allies (Chart 2). India’s alignment with the US is deepening China’s and Pakistan’s distrust of India. Conventional and nuclear military deterrence should prevent full-scale war. But the regional balance is increasingly fluid which means geopolitical risks will slowly but surely rise in South Asia over the coming year and years. Force #2: A Growth Slowdown Alongside India’s Loaded Election Calendar The pandemic has hit the economies of South Asia particularly hard. South Asia historically maintained higher real GDP growth rates relative to Emerging Markets (EMs). But in 2021, this region’s growth rate is set to be lower than that of EM peers (Chart 3). History is replete with examples of a rise in economic distress triggering geopolitical events. South Asia is characterized by unusually low per capita incomes (Chart 4) and the latest slowdown could exacerbate the risk of both social unrest and geopolitical incidents materialising. Chart 3South Asian Economies Have Been Hit Hard By The Pandemic Chart 4South Asia Is Characterized By Very Low Per Capita Incomes To complicate matters a busy state elections calendar is coming up in India. Elections will be due in seven Indian states in 2022. These states account for about 25% of India’s population. State elections due in 2022 will amount to a high-stakes political battle. During state elections in 2021, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the incumbent in only one of the five states. In 2022, the BJP is the incumbent party in most of the states that are due for elections, which means it has the advantage but also has a lot to lose, especially in a post-pandemic environment. Elections kick off in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh next February. Last time this state faced elections Prime Minister Narendra Modi was willing to go to great lengths to boost his popularity ahead of time. Specifically, he upset the nation with a large-scale and unprecedented de-monetization program. Given the busy state election calendar in 2022, we expect the BJP-led central government to focus on policy actions that can improve its support among Indian voters. Two policies in particular are likely to come through: Fiscal Stimulus Measures To Provide Economic Relief: India has refrained from administering a large post-pandemic stimulus thus far. As per budget estimates, the Indian central government’s total expenditure in FY22 is set to increase only by 1% on a year-on-year basis. But the expenditure-side restraint shown by India’s central government could change. With elections and a pandemic (which has now claimed over 400,000 lives in India), the central government could consider a meaningful increase in spending closer to February 2022. Map 2Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India India’s Finance Minister already announced a fiscal stimulus package of $85 billion (amounting to 2.8% of GDP) earlier this week. Whilst this stimulus entails limited fresh spending (amounting to about 0.6% of India’s GDP), we would not be surprised if the government follows it up with more spending closer to February 2022. Assertive Foreign Policy To Ward-Off Unfriendly Neighbors: India’s northern states are known to harbor unfavorable views of Pakistan (Map 2). The roots of this phenomenon can be traced to geography and the bloody civil strife of 1947 that was triggered by the partition of British-ruled India into the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan. Given the north’s unfavorable views of Pakistan and given looming elections, Indian policy makers may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response, to any terrorist strikes from Pakistan or territorial incursions by China. This kind of response was observed most recently ahead of the Indian General Elections in April-May 2019. An Indian military convoy was attacked by a suicide-bomber in early February 2019 and a Pakistan-based terrorist group claimed responsibility. A fortnight later the Indian air force launched unexpected airstrikes across the Line of Control which were then followed by the Pakistan air force conducting air strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. While the next round of Pakistani and Indian general elections is not due until 2023 and 2024, respectively, it is worth noting that of the seven state elections due in India in 2022, four are in the north (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, and Himachal Pradesh). Force #3: Power Vacuum In Afghanistan The final reason to be wary of the South Asian geopolitical dynamic is the change in US policy: both the Iran nuclear deal expected in August and the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan in September. The US public has now elected three presidents on the demand that foreign wars be reduced. In the wake of Trump and populism the political establishment is now responding. Therefore Biden will ultimately implement both the Iran deal and the Afghan withdrawal regardless of delays or hang-ups. But then he will have to do damage control. In the case of Iran, a last-minute flare-up of conflict in the region is likely this summer, as the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran underscore their red lines before the US and Iran settle down to a deal. Indeed it is already happening, with recent US attacks against Iran-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. A major incident would push up oil prices, which is negative for India. But the endgame, an Iranian economic opening, is positive for India, since it imports oil and has had close relations with Iran historically. In the case of Afghanistan, the US exit will activate latent terrorist forces. It will also create a scramble for influence over this landlocked country that could lead to negative surprises across the region. The first principle of the peace agreement between the US and Afghanistan states that the latter will make all efforts to ensure that Afghan soil is not used to further terrorist activity. However, the enforceability of such a guarantee is next to impossible. Notably, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will revive the Taliban’s influence in the region. This poses major risks for India, which has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. The Taliban played a critical role in the release of terrorists into Pakistan following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999. Furthermore, the Haqqani network, which has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, has attacked Indian assets in the past. Any attack on India deriving from the power vacuum in Afghanistan would upset the precarious regional balance. Whilst there are no immediate triggers for Afghani groups to launch a terrorist attack in India, the US withdrawal will trigger a tectonic shift in the region. Negative surprises emanating from Afghanistan should be expected. Investment Conclusions Chart 5Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives We reiterate the need to pare exposure to Indian assets on a tactical basis. India’s growth engine is likely to misfire over the second half of the Indian financial year. Macroeconomic headwinds pose the chief risk for investors, but major geopolitical changes could act as a negative catalyst in the current context. So we urge clients to stay short Indian Banks (Chart 5). Financials account for the lion’s share of India’s benchmark index (26% weight). India could opt for an unexpected expansion in its fiscal deficit soon. Whilst we continue to watch fiscal dynamics closely, we expect the fiscal expansion to materialize closer to February 2022 when India’s most populous state (i.e. Uttar Pradesh) will undergo elections. Over the long run, India’s sense of insecurity will escalate in the context of a more assertive China, stronger Sino-Pakistani ties, and a power vacuum in Afghanistan. For that reason, New Delhi will continue to shed its neutrality and improve relations with the US-led coalition of democratic countries, with an aim to balance China. This process will feed China’s insecurity of being surrounded and contained by a hegemonic American system. This security dilemma is a source of South Asian geopolitical risk that will become more globally relevant over time. China’s conflict with the US and western world should create incentives for India to attract trade and investment. However, its ability to do so will be contingent upon domestic political factors and regional geopolitical factors.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, ‘India Shifts 50,000 Troops to China Border in Historic Move’, Bloomberg, June 28, 2021, bloomberg.com. 2 Joby Warrick, “China is building more than 100 missile silos in its western desert, analysts say,” Washington Post, June 30, 2021, washingtonpost.com.

Dear Client, Last week, I had the pleasure of participating in a debate with my colleague, Dhaval Joshi, on the future of cryptocurrencies. You can access a replay of the event here. Best regards, Peter Berezin Highlights The meme stock mania is unlikely to die down anytime soon. Fueled by zero-commission trading and an anti-establishment mindset, social media has given millions of retail traders the ability to coordinate attacks on individual companies. An examination of the most popular meme stocks reveals that returns were highest when both the closing price and volume during the prior day’s session were above their moving averages. For GameStop and AMC, in particular, returns averaged 11.0% and 13.9%, respectively, when both the prior day’s closing price and volume were above their 5-day moving averages, compared with -4.0% and -1.3%, respectively, when the price and volume were below their 5-day moving averages. Nearly 80% of the returns on meme stocks were earned overnight (i.e., between the close of trading and the following day’s open). The ups and downs of meme stocks have generally had little impact on the overall direction of the stock market. Nevertheless, growing interest in meme stocks is positive for equities over a medium-term horizon of about 12 months. This is because the meme stock phenomenon is drawing funds into the stock market, boosting prices and liquidity in the process. #HedgiesGetWedgies Chart 1Word Du Jour: Meme This January, the term “meme stock” entered the popular lexicon (Chart 1). That was the month that GameStop and a handful of other once-left-for-dead stocks soared to dizzying heights. Armed with stimulus checks, millions of amateur investors flocked to one of the few sources of entertainment still available to them: online trading. Tales of instant riches spread like wildfire, motivating yet more new investors to enter the fray. Whether it was stocks or cryptos, the allure of easy money was irresistible. The decision by most American brokerages to eliminate trading commissions in the fall of 2019 added fuel to the fire. Meanwhile, the proliferation of social media provided a ready-made mechanism for retail traders to coordinate attacks on individual stocks. And attack they did. Most of the companies targeted had high short interest, making them ripe for a short squeeze. The implosion of Melvin Capital demonstrated to the Reddit crowd that they, too, could beat hedge funds at their own game. “We can remain stupid longer than you can stay solvent” became their rallying cry. In a game of chicken, being perceived by your opponent as irrational boosts your odds of winning. Trading Meme Stocks For Fun And Profit If one were so inclined, how should one trade meme stocks? It helps to begin with some data. Table 1 displays average daily returns from the start of 2021 for six popular meme stocks: GameStop (GME), AMC Entertainment (AMC), Blackberry (BB), Nokia (NOK), Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) and Koss Corp (KOSS). A few observations stand out: There is strong price momentum. Looking across all six stocks, the average daily return was 5.9% when the prior day’s closing price was above its 5-day moving average, compared to 0.3% when the prior day’s close was below its 5-day moving average. The average daily return for stocks in our sample was 3.3%. Volatility predicts higher returns. Meme stocks gained 4.3%, on average, when the prior day’s return was positive compared to 2.4% when it was negative. Looking only at the subset of cases where the prior day’s return was either above 10% or below -10%, we find that meme stocks gained 11.3% when the price rose more than 10% during the prior day and gained a still-robust 7.5% when the price dropped more than 10% during the prior day. Strong volume predicts higher returns. Consistent with the volatility observation, meme stocks gained an average of 6.1% when the volume in the prior day’s trading session was above its 5-day moving average, compared to just 1.3% when the volume was below its 5-day moving average. Meme stocks do best after the close of trading. Nearly 80% of returns on meme stocks were earned overnight (i.e., between the close of trading and the following day’s open). We attribute this phenomenon to the tendency of many traders to exit positions before the closing bell and reopen them at the start of trading the following day. Such a pattern of selling and repurchasing tends to boost overnight returns. Historically, a similar pattern has held for most other US stocks (Chart 2). Table 1Meme Stock: Returns And Patterns Chart 2Bear By Day, Bull By Night In summary, meme stocks perform best when they are trading above their 5-day moving average. Both volatility and strong volume predict positive returns. Holding (hodling?)1 meme stocks overnight can significantly enhance returns. Be An Ape Chart 3The BUZZ ETF Is Off To A Lackluster Start Fans of AMC often refer to themselves as “apes.” The moniker is fitting, if not ironic, given the tendency of meme investors to ape one another in their trading decisions. The VanEck Vectors Social Sentiment ETF (BUZZ) tries to get in front of the apes and other meme investors by buying stocks that are garnering increasing attention from social media, news articles, blog posts, and other sources. While it is too early to assess the value of this approach, it should be noted that the fund has lagged the S&P 500 for most of the time since its inception in March (Chart 3). A potentially more fruitful approach, and one that I myself have adopted, is to seek out meme stocks before they become meme stocks. For example, Cinemark (CNK) is the second biggest publicly-listed movie theater chain in the US. The share of its float sold short is almost identical to AMC’s. Yet, the Reddit crowd has largely ignored it. Could that change? Only time will tell. Don’t Get A Wedgie: How To Short Meme Stocks Safely While meme stocks can benefit from positive price momentum in the short term, it is at the expense of lower returns down the road. By any reasonable measure, the leading meme stocks are grossly overvalued. Knowing when a meme stock will fall back to earth is no easy task, however. The discussion in this report provides one avenue for short-term traders to mitigate risk: Short meme stocks only when price and volume are trending lower. The average daily return for GME and AMC was 11.0% and 13.9%, respectively, when both the prior day’s closing price and volume were above their 5-day moving averages, compared with -4.0% and -1.3%, respectively, when the price and volume were below their 5-day moving averages. With that in mind, we are opening a new tactical trade going short an equally-weighted basket of AMC and GME. The trade will only be active when the prior day’s closing price and volume are below their 5-day moving averages.2  Longer-term investors looking to short meme stocks without having to frequently open and close positions should consider using the “exponential” shorting technique discussed in a recent report. The technique flips the usual risk-reward trade-off from going short on its head. Rather than facing unlimited losses and a maximum gain of only 100% of the initial position, our shorting strategy caps the loss at 100% but allows for unlimited gains. Broad Market Implications As Chart 4 illustrates, the ups and downs of meme stocks have generally had little impact on the overall direction of the stock market. Nevertheless, growing interest in meme stocks is positive for equities over a medium-term horizon of about 12 months. This is because the meme stock phenomenon is drawing funds into the stock market, boosting prices and liquidity in the process. Chart 4Meme Stock Roller-Coaster: Little Impact On The Broader Market Chart 5Global Equity Risk Premium Remains Quite High   While the “stimmy” checks have already been deposited into brokerage accounts, their impact on the stock market will linger on. As we explained in Savings Gluts, Asset Shortages, And The 60/40 Split, retail investors who bid up the price of stocks will generally force institutional investors to sell their holdings.3 This will leave institutions with excess cash on hand – cash that they can deploy in other parts of the stock market. The resulting game of “hot potato” will only end when the value of the stock market rises by enough to ensure that all investors are happy with how much stock they own in relation to how much cash they hold. Given that the equity risk premium remains quite high, this dynamic likely has further to run (Chart 5). Disclosure: At the time of writing, I am personally long CNK and short AMC and GME. I previously held a short position in KOSS. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 HODL stands for “Hold On for Dear Life”. The term is widely used by traders on Wallstreetbets and other online forums. 2 The equal-weighted trade should be initiated if the conditions are met for either stock (GME, AMC) in the basket. The conditions are as follows: Both the price and volume should be below their 5-day moving average. The price and volume at the end of the day determine whether one enters the trade the next day or not. 3 An exception is when retail investors buy stock from the company itself, as has happened several times with meme stocks. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores  

Highlights China's high-profile jawboning draws attention to tightness in metals markets, and raises the odds the State Reserve Board (SRB) will release some of its massive copper and aluminum stockpiles in the near future. Over the medium- to long-term, the lack of major new greenfield capex raises red flags for the IEA's ambitious low-carbon pathway released last week, which foresees the need for a dramatic increase in renewable energy output and a halt in future oil and gas investment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Copper demand is expected to exceed mined supply by 2028, according to an analysis by S&P, which, in line with our view, also sees refined-copper consumption exceeding production this year (Chart of the Week). A constitution re-write in Chile and elections in Peru threaten to usher in higher taxes and royalties on mining in these metals producers, placing future capex at risk. Chile's state-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, fears a bill to limit mining near glaciers could put as much as 40% of its copper production at risk. We remain bullish copper and look to get long on politically induced sell-offs as the USD weakens. Feature Politicians are inserting themselves in the metals markets' supply-demand evolutions to a greater degree than in the past, which is complicating the short- and medium-term analysis of prices. This adds to an already-difficult process of assessing markets, given the opacity of metals fundamentals – particularly inventories, which are notoriously difficult to assess. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) jawboning of market participants in iron ore, steel, copper and aluminum markets over the past two weeks has weakened prices, but, with the exception of steel rebar futures in Shanghai – down ~ 17% from recent highs, and now trading at ~ 4911 RMB/MT –  the other markets remain close to records.  Benchmark 62% Fe iron ore at the port of Tianjin was trading ~ 4% lower at $211/MT, while copper and aluminum were trading ~ 5.5% and 6.5% off their recent records at $4.535/lb and $2,350/MT, respectively. In addition to copper, aluminum markets are particularly tight (Chart 2). Jawboning aside, if fundamentals continue to keep prices elevated – or if we see a new leg up – China's high-profile jawboning could presage a release by the State Reserve Board (SRB) of some of its massive copper and aluminum stockpiles in the near term. In the case of copper, market guesses on the size of this stockpile are ~ 2mm to 2.7mm MT. On the aluminum side, Bloomberg reported CCP officials were considering the release of 500k MT to quell the market's demand for the metal. Chart of the WeekContinue Tightening In Copper Expected Chart 2Aluminum Remains Tight Brownfield Development Not Sufficient Our balances assessments continue to indicate key base metals markets are tight and will remain so over the short term (2-3 years). Economies ex-China are entering their post-COVID-19 recovery phase. This will be followed by higher demand from renewable generation and grid build-outs that will put them in direct competition with China for scarce metals supplies for decades to come. Markets will continue to tighten. In the bellwether copper market, we expect this tightness to remain a persistent feature of the market over the medium term – 3 to 5 years out – given the dearth of new supply coming to market. Copper prices are highly correlated with the other base metals (Chart 3) – the coefficient of correlation with the other base metals making up the LME's metals index is ~ 0.86 post-GFC – and provide a useful indicator of systematic trends in these markets. Chart 3Copper Correlation With LME Index Ex-Copper Copper ore quality has been falling for years, as miners focused on brownfield development to extend the life of mines (Chart 4). In Chart 5, we show the ratio of capex (in billion USD) to ore quality increases when capex growth is expanding faster than ore quality, and decreases when capex weakens and/or ore quality degradation is increasing. Chart 4Copper Capex, Ore Quality Declines Chart 5Capex-to-Ore-Quality Decline Set Market Up For Higher Prices Falling prices over the 2012-19 interval coincide with copper ore quality remaining on a downward trend, likely the result of previous higher prices that set off the capex boom pre-GFC. The lower prices favored brownfield over greenfield development. Goehring and Rozencwajg found in their analysis of 24 mines, about 80% of gross new reserves booked between 2001-2014 were due not to new mine discoveries but to companies reclassifying what was once considered to be waste-rock into minable reserves, lowering the cut-off grade for development.1 This is consistent with the most recent datapoints in Chart 5, due to falling ore grade values, as companies inject less capex into their operations and use it to expand on brownfield projects. Higher prices will be needed to incentivize more greenfield projects. A new report from S&P Global Market Intelligence shows copper reserves in the ground are falling along with new discoveries.2 According to the S&P analysts, copper demand is expected to exceed mined supply by 2028, which, in line with our view, sees refined-copper consumption exceeding production this year. Renewables Push At Risk Just last week, the IEA produced an ambitious and narrow path for governments to collectively reach a net-zero emissions (NZE) goal by 2050.3 Among its many recommendations, the IEA singled out the overhaul of the global electric grid, which will be required to accommodate the massive renewable-generation buildout the agency forecasts will be needed to achieve its NZE goals. The IEA forecasts annual investment in transmission and distribution grids will need to increase from $260 billion to $820 billion p.a. by 2030. This is easier said than done. Consider the build-out of China's grid, which is the largest grid in the world. To become carbon neutral by 2060, per its stated goals, investment in China’s grid and associated infrastructure is expected to approach ~ $900 billion, maybe more, over the next 5 years.4 The world’s largest fossil-fuel importer is looking to pivot away from coal and plans to more than double solar and wind power capacity to 1200 GW by 2030. Weening China off coal and rebuilding its grid to achieve these goals will be a herculean lift. It comes as no surprise that IEA member states have pushed back on the agency's NZE-by-2050 plan. This primarily is because of its requirement to completely halt fossil-fuel exploration and spending on new projects. Japan and Australia have pushed back against this plan, citing energy security concerns. Officials from both countries have stated that they will continue developing fossil fuel projects, as a back-up to renewables. Japan has been falling behind on renewable electricity generation (Chart 6). Expensive renewables and the unpopularity of nuclear fuel could make it harder for the world’s fifth largest fossil fuels consumer to move away from fossil fuels. Around the same time the IEA released its report, Australia committed $464 million to build a new gas-fired power station as a backup to renewables. Chart 6Japan Will Continue Building Fossil-Fuel Back-Up Generation Just days after the IEA report was published, the G7 nations agreed to stop overseas coal financing. This could have devastating effects for emerging and developing nations‘ electricity grids which are highly dependent on coal. In 2020 70% and 60% of India and China’s electricity respectively were produced by coal (Chart 7).5 Chart 7EM Economies Remain Reliant On Coal-Fired Generation Near-Term Copper Supply Risks Rise Even though inventories appear to be rebuilding, mounting political risks keep us bullish copper (Chart 8). Lawmakers in Chile and Peru are in the process of re-writing their constitutions to, among other things, raise royalties and taxes on mining activities in their respective countries. This could usher in higher taxes and royalties on mining for these metals producers, placing future capex at risk. In addition, Chile's state-owned Codelco, the largest copper producer in the world, fears a bill to limit mining near glaciers could put as much as 40% of its copper production at risk.6 None of these events is certain to occur. Peruvian elections, for one thing, are too close to call at this point, and Chile has a history of pro-business government. However, these are non-trivial odds – i.e., greater than Russian roulette odds of 1:6 – and if any or all of these outcomes are realized, higher costs in copper and lithium prices would result, and miners would have to pass those costs on to buyers. Bottom Line: We remain bullish base metals, especially copper. Another leg up in copper would pull base metals higher with it. We would look to get long on politically induced sell-offs, particularly with the USD weakening, as expected Chart 8Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Next Tuesday's OPEC 2.0 meeting appears to be a fairly staid affair, with little of the drama attending previous gatherings. Russian minister Novak observed the coalition would be jointly "calculating the balances" when it meets, taking into account the likely official return of Iran as an exporter, according to reuters.com. We expect a mid-year deal on allowing Iran to return to resume exports under the nuclear deal abrogated by the Trump administration in 2019, and reckon Iran has ~ 1.5mm b/d of production it can bring back on line, which likely would return its crude oil production to something above 3.8mm b/d by year-end. We are maintaining our forecast for Brent to average $64.45/bbl in 2H21; $75 and $78/bbl, in 2022 and 2023, respectively. By end 2023, prices trade to $80/bbl. Our forecast is premised on a wider global recovery going into 2H21, and continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 (Chart 9). Base Metals: Bullish Our stop-losses was elected on our long Dec21 copper position on May 21, which means we closed the position with 48.2% return. The stop loss on our long 2022 vs short 2023 COMEX copper futures backwardation recommendation also was elected on May 20, leaving us with a return of 305%. We will be looking for an opportunity to re-establish these positions. Precious Metals: Bullish We expect the collapse in bitcoin prices, the US Fed’s decision to not raise interest rates, and a weakening US dollar to keep gold prices well bid (Chart 10). China’s ban on cryptocurrency services and Musk’s acknowledgment of the energy intensity of Bitcoin mining sent Bitcoin prices crashing. The Fed’s decision to keep interest rates constant, despite rising inflation and inflation expectations will reduce the opportunity cost of holding gold. According to our colleagues at USBS, the Fed will make its first interest rate hike only after the US economy has reached "maximum employment". The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey reported that job openings rose nearly 8% in March to 8.1 million jobs, however, overall hiring was little changed, rising by less than 4% to 6 million. As prices in the US rise and the dollar depreciates, gold will be favored as a store of value. On the back of these factors, we expect gold to hit $2,000/oz. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn futures were trading close to 20% below recent highs earlier in the week at ~ $6.27/bu, on the back of much faster-than-expected plantings. Chart 9 Chart 10     Footnotes 1     Please refer to Goehring & Rozencwajg’s Q1 2021 market commentary. 2     Please see Copper cupboard remains bare as discoveries dwindle — S&P study published by mining.com 20 May 2021. 3    Please see Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published by the IEA. 4    Please see China’s climate goal: Overhauling its electricity grid, published by Aljazeera.  5    We discuss this in detail in Surging Metals Prices And The Case For Carbon-Capture published 13 May 2021, and Renewables ESG Risks Grow With Demand, which was published 29 April 2021.  Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see A game of chicken is clouding tax debate in top copper nation, Fujimori looks to speed up projects to tap copper riches in Peru and Codelco says 40% of its copper output at risk if glacier bill passes published by mining.com 24, 23 and 20 May 2021, respectively.    Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

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Highlights The selloff in crypto-currencies on May 19 may be overblown but the risk of government intervention is a rising headwind for this asset class. While environmental concerns are a threat to Bitcoin, the entire crypto-currency complex faces a looming confrontation over governance. Digital currencies are a natural evolution of money following coinage and paper. Moreover a sizable body of consumers is skeptical of governments and traditional banking. Loose monetary conditions are fueling a speculative mania. However, governments fought for centuries to gain a monopoly over money. As crypto-currencies become more popular, governments will step in to regulate and restrict them. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) threaten to remove the speed and transactional advantage of crypto-currencies, leaving privacy/anonymity as their main use-case. Feature The prefix “crypto” derives from the Greek kruptos or “hidden.” This etymology highlights one of the biggest problems confronting the crypto-currency craze in financial markets today. Speed and anonymity are the greatest assets of the digital tokens. But the former advantage is being eroded by competitors while the latter is becoming a political liability. In the 2020s, governments are growing stronger and more interventionist, not weaker and more laissez faire. Chart 1Loose Money Fuels Crypto Mania Bitcoin and rival crypto-currency Ethereum fell by 29.5% and 43.2% in intra-day trading on May 19, only to finish the day down by 13.8% and 27.2%, respectively. The market panicked on news that China’s central bank had banned firms from handling transactions in crypto-currencies. What really happened was that China’s National Internet Finance Association, China Banking Association, and Payment and Clearing Association issued a statement merely reiterating a 2013 and 2017 policy that already banned firms from handling transactions in crypto-currencies. These three institutions also warned about financial speculation regarding crypto-currencies.1 The crypto market suffered a spike in volatility because it is in the midst of a speculative mania. In the last five years, total market capitalization of crypto-currencies has risen from around $7 billion to $2.3 trillion,2 recording a 34,000% gain. Some crypto-currencies have even recorded returns in excess of that number over a shorter horizon. Price gains have been driven by retail buyers who may or may not know much about this new asset class (Chart 1). Prior to the May 19 selloff, prices had grown overextended and recent concerns over the environment, sustainability, and governance (ESG) had shaken confidence in Bitcoin and its peers. Chinese authorities have already banned financial firms from providing crypto services in a bid to deter ownership of crypto-currencies. And China is not alone. The latest market jitters are a warning sign that government interference in the crypto-currency market is a real threat. Regulation and sovereign-issued digital currencies are starting to enter the fray. While ultra-dovish central bank policies are not changing soon, and therefore crypto-currency price bubbles can continue to grow, crypto-currencies will remain subject to extreme volatility and precipitous crashes. In this report we argue that the fundamental problem with crypto-currencies is that they threaten the economic sovereignty of nation-states. Environmental degradation, financial instability, and black market crime, and other concerns about cryptos have varying degrees of merit. But they provide governments with ample motivation to pursue a much deeper interest in regulating a technological innovation that has the power to undermine state influence over the economy and society. Government scrutiny is a legitimate reason for crypto buyers to turn sellers. Does The World Need Crypto-Currencies? Broadly speaking, there are two primary justifications for crypto-currencies, centered on a transactional basis: speed and privacy/anonymity. The crux of crypto-currency creation rests on these two use cases.3 The speed of crypto-currencies comes from their ability to increase efficiency in local and global payment systems by facilitating financial transactions without the need of a third party (e.g. a financial institution). Cross-border settlement of traditional (fiat) currency transactions processed through the standard SWIFT communications system takes up to two business days. Most transactions involving crypto-currencies over a blockchain network are realized in less than an hour, cross-border or not.4 The fees involved with third-party payments are often more expensive than transacting with crypto-currencies. Simply put, excluding the “middleman” can save money. This is a selling point in a global market that expects to see retail cross-border transactions reach $3.5 trillion by the end of 2021, of which up to 5% are associated with transaction-based fees.5 But this breakthrough in payment system technology can be overstated and is not the main reason for using crypto-currency. Speculation drives current use, especially given that there is speculative behavior even among those who believe that cryptos are safe-haven assets or promising long-term investments (Chart 2). Chart 2Crypto-Currency Use Driven By Speculation Chart 3Consumers Growing Skeptical Of Banking Regulation If a person wants to buy an item from a company in a distant country, that person could use a crypto-currency just as he or she could use a credit card. Both parties would have a secure medium of exchange but, unlike with a credit card, both would avoid using fiat currencies. Neither party could conduct the same transaction using gold or silver. The crucial premise is the existence of an online community of individuals and firms who for one reason or another want to avoid fiat currencies. From a descriptive point of view, the crypto-currency phenomenon implies a lack of trust in modern governments, or at least their monetary systems, and an assertion of individual property rights. The list of crypto-currencies continues to grow. To date, there are approximately 9,800 of them. Some are trying to prove their economic value or use, while others have been created with no intended purpose or problem to solve. Even so, there has yet to be a crypto-currency that overwhelms the use of slower fiat money. In a recent Special Report, BCA Research’s Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor showed that crypto-currencies still have a long way to go to have a chance at replacing fiat monies. While crypto-currencies are showing signs of significant improvement as mediums of exchange, they still fall short as stores of value and units of account. The other primary case for crypto-currencies is privacy or anonymity. The bypassing of intermediaries implies a greater control of funds by the two parties of a transaction. Crypto-currencies are said to be more “private” compared to fiat money. Fiat money is controlled by governments and banks while crypto-currencies have only “owners.” Crypto-currencies are anonymous because they are stored in digital wallets with alphanumeric sequences – there is a limited personal data trail that follows crypto-currency compared to those of electronic fiat currency transactions. In a post-9/11, post-GFC, post-COVID world where a sizable body of consumers is growing more skeptical of government surveillance and regulation and banking industry practices (Chart 3), crypto-currencies give users more than just a means to transact with. However, privacy is not the same as security. Hacking and fraud can affect cryptos as well as other forms of money and attacks will increase with the value of the currencies. Bitcoin At The Helm Of Crypto-Currency Market Chart 4Bitcoin Slows Bitcoin has cemented its status as the number one currency in the crypto-verse.6 It is considered to be the first crypto-currency created, it is the most widely accepted, it is touted as a store of value or “digital gold,” and it is the most featured in quoting alternative crypto-currency pairs across crypto exchanges. As it stands, Bitcoin accounts for around 42% of total crypto-currency market capitalization.7 This share has declined from around 65% at the start of 2021 on the back of the frenzied rise of several alternative coins.8 But rising risks to Bitcoin’s standing will cause the entire crypto-market to retreat. In a Special Report penned in February, BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist Peter Berezin argued that Bitcoin is more of a trend than a solution and that its usefulness is diminishing. Bitcoin’s transaction speed is slowing and its transaction cost is rising (Chart 4). Slowing speed and rising cost on the Bitcoin network are linked to a scalability problem. The crypto-currency’s network has a limited rate at which it can process transactions related to the fact that records (or “blocks”) in the Bitcoin blockchain are limited in size and frequency. This means that one of its fundamental justifications, transactional speed, will become less attractive over time, should the network not address these issues. Bitcoin also consumes a significant amount of energy, a controversy that is gaining traction in the crypto-currency market after Elon Musk, the “techno-king” of Tesla, cited environmental concerns in reversing his decision to accept Bitcoin payment for his company’s electric vehicles. Energy consumption rises as more coins are mined, since mining each new Bitcoin becomes more computer-power intensive. The need for computing power and energy will continue to increase until all 21 million Bitcoins (total supply) are mined, which is currently estimated to occur by the year 2140. Strikingly, the energy needed to mine Bitcoin over a year are comparable to a small country’s annual power consumption, such as Sweden or Argentina (Chart 5). Chart 5Bitcoin Consumes More Energy Than A Small Country … Bitcoin also generates significant quantities of electronic waste (Chart 6). Chart 6… And Generates A Lot Of Electronic Waste Bitcoin mining is heavily domiciled in China, which accounts for 65% of global mining activity (Figure 1). China’s energy mix is dominated by coal power, which makes up approximately 65% of the country’s total energy mix even after a decade of aggressive state-led efforts to reduce coal reliance. Of this, coal powered energy makes up approximately 60% of Bitcoin’s energy mix in China.9 With several countries aiming to minimize carbon emissions, and with approximately 60% of Bitcoin mining powered by coal-fired energy globally,10 Bitcoin imposes a major negative environmental impact. Figure 1Bitcoin Mining Well Anchored In Asia Bitcoin does not shape up well when compared to gold’s energy intensity either. Bitcoin mining now consumes more energy than gold mining over a single year. While the energy difference is not large, the economic value is. Gold’s energy consumption to economic value trade-off is lower than that of Bitcoin. The production value of gold in 2020 was close to $200 billion, while Bitcoin was measured at less than $25 billion (Chart 7A). On a one-to-one basis, gold even has a lower carbon footprint than Bitcoin (Chart 7B). Chart 7AGold Outshines Bitcoin On Production Value And Carbon Footprint Chart 7BGold Outshines Bitcoin On Production Value And Carbon Footprint Crypto-currency energy consumption and carbon footprint will attract the attention of government regulators. Of course, not all crypto-currencies are heavy polluters. But if the supply of cryptos is constrained by mining difficulties then they will require a lot of energy. If the supply is not constrained then the price will be low. Government Regulation Is Coming Environmental concerns point to the single greatest threat to crypto-currencies – the Leviathan, i.e. the state. In this sense the crypto market’s wild fluctuations on May 19, at the mere whiff of tougher Chinese regulation, are a sign of what is to come. Governments around the world have so far left crypto-currencies largely unregulated but this laissez-faire attitude is already changing. Environmental regulation has already been mentioned. Governments will also be eager to expand their regulatory powers to “protect” consumers, businesses, and banks from extreme volatility in crypto markets. But investors will underrate the regulatory threat if they focus on these issues. At the most basic level, governments around the world will not sit idly by and lose what could become significant control of their monetary systems. The ability to establish and control legal tender is a critical part of economic sovereignty. Governments won control of the printing press over centuries and will not cede that control lightly. If crypto-currencies are adopted widely, then finance ministries and central banks will lose their ability to manipulate the money supply and the general level of prices effectively. Politicians will lose the ability to stimulate the economy or keep inflation in check. Most importantly, while one may view such threats as overblown, it is governments, not other organizations, that will make the critical judgment on whether crypto-currencies threaten their sovereignty. Throughout the world, most crypto-currency exchanges are regulated to prevent money laundering. Crypto-currencies are not legal tender and, aside from Bitcoin, their use is mostly banned in China (Table 1). However, more specialized regulation that targets energy and economic use has yet to be brought into law across the world. Table 1World Governments Will Not Relinquish Hard-Fought Monopolies Over Money Supply In China, initial coin offerings (ICOs – the equivalent of an initial public offering on the stock market) and trading platforms are banned from engaging in exchanges between the yuan and crypto-currencies or tokens. In fact, China recognizes crypto-currencies only as virtual commodities or virtual property. India is another country where exchanges and ICOs are banned. While crypto-currencies are not banned, they are not legal tender. Indian policymakers have recently proposed banning crypto-currencies, however. The proposed legislation is one of the world’s strictest policies against crypto-currencies. It would criminalize possession, issuance, mining, trading, and transferring crypto-assets. If the ban becomes law, India would be the first major economy to make holding crypto-currency illegal. Even China, which has banned mining and trading, does not penalize possession. In the US, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen has already expressed concerns regarding the illicit use of cryptos for supposed criminal gain.11 She is in alignment with European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde. Because of the anonymity of crypto-currencies, identifying users behind illicit transactions is difficult. This means regulators face headwinds in identifying transactions that are made for criminal gain, as compared to fiat transactions. Governments have long dealt with the anonymity of cash but they have ways of monitoring bank accounts and paper bills. Crypto-currencies are beyond their immediate sight of control and therefore will attract growing scrutiny and legislative action in this regard. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack on May 7, which temporarily shuttered about 45% of the fuel supply line for the eastern United States, illustrates the point. The DarkSide group of hackers who orchestrated the attack demanded a ransom payment of $4.4 million worth of Bitcoin, which Colonial Pipeline paid them on May 7. Shortly thereafter, unspecified “law enforcement agencies” clawed back the $4.4 million from the hackers’ account (transferring it to an unknown address) and DarkSide lost access to its payment server, DOS servers, and blog. This episode should not be underrated. It was a successful, large-scale cyber-attack on critical infrastructure in the world’s most powerful country. It highlighted the illicit uses to which crypto-currencies can be put. True, criminals demand ransoms in fiat money as well – and many crypto-currency operators will distance themselves from the criminal underworld. Nevertheless governments will give little slack to an emerging technology that presents big new law enforcement challenges and is not widely used by the general public. Ultimately governments will pursue their sovereign interests in controlling money, the economy, and trade, listening to their banking lobby, expanding their remit to “protect” consumers, and cracking down on illicit activity. Governments are not capable of abolishing crypto-currencies altogether, or the underlying technology of blockchain. But they will play a large and growing role in regulating them. Central Banks Advancing On Digital Currencies Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) will leave crypto-currencies in the realm of speculative assets. CBDCs are a form of digital money denominated in a country’s national unit of account and represent a liability on a central bank’s balance sheet. This is different from current e-money that represents a claim on a private financial institution’s balance sheet. It is also different from crypto-currencies, because there is a central authority behind a CBDC, unlike with crypto-currencies due to their decentralized nature. In China, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has suggested its rollout of a digital yuan is “ready” despite no release to date. Beta testing is ongoing in several provinces. The PBoC’s justification for a digital yuan comes from China’s growing cashless economy. The transition away from cash is largely thanks to mobile payment platforms like Alibaba’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat Pay, which, between the two of them, control almost the entire mobile payments market of some 850 million users. There is a significant amount of systemic risk in this system – one reason why Chinese authorities have recently subjected these companies to new scrutiny and regulation. Should Alibaba or Tencent go bankrupt, the local payment system will crash. The PBoC’s efforts will increase competition in the local payments space and reduce this systemic risk. Policymakers are also concerned that as Chinese citizens choose to hold their money in digital wallets provided by Alibaba and Tencent instead of bank accounts, liquidity is being drained from the traditional banking system, putting deposit levels at banks under strain, and posing risks to liability matching. The digital yuan will still involve a third party, unlike crypto-currencies which do not. Doing away with commercial banks is not a reality – indeed the Chinese Communist Party seeks to buttress the state-owned commercial banks in order to maintain control of the economy. What the digital yuan does, and other CBDCs will do too, is utilize blockchain technology, which is faster and more secure than traditional payment networks. In the US, the Fed has been studying the viability of a CBDC US dollar. The Fed has stated that it is carefully exploring whether a CBDC will lead to “safer, less expensive, faster, or otherwise more efficient payments.” While the Fed has yet to find a single standout case for a CBDC US Dollar, Fed Chair Jerome Powell said last year that the US has a “competitive payments market” with “fast and cheap services, particularly in comparison to other nations exploring a CBDC.” To date, the Fed’s observation is that many of the challenges that CBDCs hope to address do not apply to the US, including disuse of physical cash, narrow reach or high concentration of banking, and weak infrastructure for payment systems. Rather, the Fed is more focused on developing the FedNow real-time payment system for private banks. This is much the same as in Europe, where physical cash still plays a major role in day-to-day economic activity and where local payment systems are fast and secure. But central banks around the world continue to engage in work centered around CBDCs (Charts 8A and 8B) – and China’s progress will encourage others to move faster. Advanced economies are mostly interested in creating a safer and more efficient payment system, while emerging and developed economies have interest across several areas such as financial stability, monetary policy setting, and inclusiveness of banking, as well as efficiency and safety (Chart 9). CBDCs are especially attractive to emerging market policy makers at targeting those who lack access to traditional banking. Chart 8ACentral Banks Advancing On CBDC Work Chart 8BCentral Banks Advancing On CBDC Work Chart 9Central Banks CBDC Interest Areas In remote areas, access to banking is scarce and expensive. CBDCs can help solve this problem. Individuals would have CBDC accounts directly on a central bank ledger. They could then access their money and transact through a digital wallet application that is linked to the CBDC account. Giving people access to digital currency would allow them to transact quickly, in remote settings, without the need of hard currency. Monetary policy transmission is also better in advanced economies. In emerging markets, there are bottlenecks in local financial markets. Looser central monetary policy does not always translate into cheaper financing across the economy. In remote and poverty stricken areas, monetary policy transmission is sticky, meaning high costs of borrowing can persist even through accommodative policy cycles. This is a smaller issue in advanced economies. Payment systems in advanced economies are due an overhaul in security and efficiency, and CBDCs and blockchain technology will provide this. CBDCs will prove to be just as efficient to transact with as any crypto-currencies available today. CBDCs will also be legal tender and accepted by all vendors. The anonymity factor will be lost but this will not be a problem for most users (whereas legal issues will become a problem for crypto-currencies). The probability of central banks issuing CBDCs in both the short and medium term, both in the retail and wholesale space, is rising. If advanced economies like those of the G7 issue CBDCs soon, policy makers will undoubtedly ensure the use of it over the currently circulating and partially accepted crypto-currencies. The endgame will leave crypto-currencies in the highly speculative asset class, perhaps even in the black market where anonymity is valued for transactions that wish not to be tracked. Investment Takeaways Prices of crypto-currencies may continue to rise given sky-high fiat money creation amid the COVID pandemic and ultra-low interest rates. Digitalization is the natural next step in the evolution of money from precious metals to paper banknotes to electronic coin. But the market leader, Bitcoin, is encountering more headwinds. The primary case for the use of Bitcoin is challenged due to slowing transaction speeds and rising transaction costs. The virtual currency is primarily mined using coal-powered energy, resulting in growing scrutiny from governments and consumers. Government regulation is entering the ring and policymakers will take an increasingly heavy-handed role in trying to ensure that cryptos do not undermine economic sovereignty, financial stability, and law and order. When central banks begin to rollout digital currencies, especially those domiciled in advanced economies, crypto-currencies as medium of exchange will lose much of their allure. Crypto-currencies will remain as anti-fiat currencies and speculative assets. Risks To The View Given the controversy surrounding crypto-currencies, it is only fair to state outright the risks to our view. We would also recommend clients read our colleague Dhaval Joshi’s latest bullish take on Bitcoin. First, scaling up Bitcoin’s network and processing transactions in batches instead of single transactions will resolve transaction time and cost risks, restoring efficiency. This is a clear solution to efficiency concerns. However, scaling and batching transactions are not on the immediate horizon of Bitcoin developers. Bitcoin’s network will still need to undergo another “halving” in order for this risk to subside and for the network to scale. A halving of the network will only occur again in 2024.12 Second, on the environment: Bitcoin mining is not solely dependent on fossil fuel energy that gives it a “dirty” footprint. Renewables already make up some 25% of Bitcoin mining. Increasing the use of renewables in Bitcoin’s energy mix will help lower its environmental impact. However, this is easier said than done. Global renewable energy has yet to scale up to a point where it can consistently out-supply existing fossil-fuel energy. Mining hardware also has its associated carbon footprint that would need to be addressed. And location matters too. Crypto-currency mining farms are large-scale projects. Simply uprooting operations to a country that could lower the carbon footprint of a mining farm or two is not viable due to the costs involved. Hence crypto-currency mining will probably continue to be a “dirty” operation but a rapid shift to renewables would challenge our thesis. Bitcoin’s network is also based off a “proof of work” protocol. Miners must prove that a certain amount of computational effort has been expended for confirming blocks on the network, allowing transactions to be processed. Proof of work is energy intensive. Other crypto-currencies, like Ethereum, will adopt a “proof of stake” protocol. Simply put, transactions are confirmed by users and their stake in the associated crypto-currency. Proof of stake is less energy intensive compared to proof of work. Third, as to government regulation, the longer policymakers take to enact legislation targeting crypto-currencies, the larger their market will grow. Regulation in China and India may set a benchmark for major economies but not all will follow in the Asian giants’ footsteps. Some governments have been slow to study crypto-currencies, meaning legislation aimed at governing or regulating them may still be long in coming. Innovation is a good thing and free economies will not wish to restrain crypto-currencies or blockchain technology unduly, for fear of missing out. Fourth, on CBDCs, some central banks may only adopt them based on their respective economic needs. However, rising crypto-currency populism drives associated economic risks which can force the hands of central banks to adopt CBDCs in lieu of said needs. Each country faces unique challenges. Some central banks may not want to be left behind even if they believe their policy framework is facilitating economic activity efficiently. While the Fed has stated that it will not adopt a CBDC for the primary reason of ensuring payment security since it believes it already has a safe system in place, this view will change. The Fed could justify a move to a CBDC US dollar on the single basis of transitioning to a more sophisticated technology for the future. The Fed will not want to be caught behind the curve considering the PBoC is priming its digital yuan for release soon. Technological leadership is a strategic imperative of the United States and that imperative applies to financial technology as well as other areas.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Muyao Shen, “China Reiterates Crypto Bans From 2013 and 2017”, coindesk, May 18, 2021, coindesk.com. 2 As of May 11, 2021. 3 There are several other reasons or “problems” that crypto-currencies are created for or to solve, but speed and privacy form the basis of crypto-currencies first coming into existence. 4 Not all crypto-currencies transact in less than an hour. But there are many that transact in several minutes and in some cases, mere seconds. As the leading crypto-currency, Bitcoin takes approximately one hour for a transaction to be fully verified over its network. 5 “McKinsey’s Global Banking Annual Review”, McKinsey, Dec. 9, 2020, mckinsey.com. 6 We use Bitcoin as an example to understand the risk and impact of forthcoming government regulation and competition. Because of Bitcoin’s status, any significant risks that threaten the crypto-currency’s standing as the number one currency will threaten the entire market. 7 As of May 20, 2021. Figure varies daily. See www.coinmarketcap.com for more information. 8 Alternative currencies such as Ethereum, Ripple, Binance Coin, Dogecoin, and Cardano have chipped away at Bitcoin’s crypto-market dominance through 2021. 9 According to The Center For Alternative Finance, The University Of Cambridge. 10 According to The Center For Alternative Finance, The University Of Cambridge. 11 Data on the use of crypto-currencies for illicit activitiessays otherwise. Of all crypto-currency transactions, it is estimated that only 2.1% are used for illicit activities. See “2021 Crypto Crime Report”, Chainalysis, chainalysis.com. 12 A Bitcoin halving is when the reward for mining Bitcoin transactions is cut in half. This event also cuts Bitcoin's inflation rate and the rate at which new Bitcoins enter circulation, in half. Bitcoin last halved on May 11, 2020.

Highlights The reason to own stocks is not profit growth. The combination of unspectacular sales growth and down-trending profit margins means that global profit growth will be lacklustre, at best. The reason to own stocks is that the ultimate low in the T-bond yield is yet to come. This ultimate low in the T-bond yield will define the ultimate high in the global stock market’s valuation and the end of the structural bull market in stocks. Until that ultimate low in bond yields, long-term investors should own stocks… …and tilt towards long-duration growth sectors and growth-heavy stock markets such as the S&P500 that will benefit most from the final collapse in yields. The correction in DRAM, corn, and lumber prices suggests that the recent mania in inflation expectations is about to end. Fractal trade shortlist: copper and tin are fragile, go long T-bonds versus TIPS. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Profits Surged During The Credit Boom, But Have Gone Nowhere Since The main reason to own stocks is not what you think. The usual long-term argument to own stocks is based on profit growth – specifically, that an uptrend in profits drives up stock prices. Except that since 2008, this is not true (Chart of the Week and Chart I-2). Profits have barely grown, yet the global stock market has doubled.1 Chart I-2Since The Credit Boom Ended, Global Profits Have Barely Grown As profits have barely grown since 2008, the main reason that the global stock market has doubled is that the valuation paid for those profits has surged. Looking ahead, we expect this to remain the main reason to own stocks. The Reason To Own Stocks Is Not Profit Growth Profits are the product of sales and the profit margin on those sales. During the credit boom of the nineties and noughties, the strong tailwind of credit creation supercharged sales growth. At the same time, the profit margin on those sales trended higher (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Since The Credit Boom Ended, Sales Growth Has Slowed And Profit Margins Have Trended Lower Hence, in the decade leading up to 2008, global stock market profits surged, outstripping both sales and world GDP. Then the credit boom ended, and profits languished, because: Absent the tailwind from the credit boom, sales growth moderated. The profit margin trended lower. In the post-pandemic years, we expect both trends to persist. The credit boom is not coming back. Furthermore, as the pandemic recession was not protracted, sales are not at a depressed level from which they can play a sharp catch-up, as they did after the 2008 recession and the 2015 emerging markets recession. The structural downtrend in the profit margin will continue. Meanwhile, the structural downtrend in the profit margin will continue. Governments are desperate to mitigate – or at least, contain – the ballooning deficits that have paid for their pandemic stimuluses. Raising corporate taxes from structurally depressed levels is an easy and politically expedient response, as we have already seen from both the Biden administration in the US, and the Johnson administration in the UK. Higher corporate taxes will weigh on structural profit margins (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Corporate Taxes Will Rise From Structurally Depressed Levels The combination of unspectacular sales growth and down-trending profit margins means that global profit growth will continue to be lacklustre, at best. The Reason To Own Stocks Is That The Ultimate High In Valuations Is Yet To Come To repeat, the main reason that the global stock market has doubled since 2008 is that its valuation has surged (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Main Driver Of The Stock Market Has Been Valuation Expansion In turn, the stock market’s valuation has surged because bond yields have plummeted. Empirically, the valuation of the global stock market is tightly connected with the simple average of the (inverted) yields on the safest sovereign bond, the US T-bond, and the riskier sovereign bond, the Italian BTP. The main reason that the global stock market has doubled since 2008 is that its valuation has surged. Through 2012-13, the decline in the Italian BTP yield, by signifying the fading of euro break-up risk, boosted stock valuations. In more recent years though, it has been the US T-bond yield that has been more influential in driving the global stock market’s valuation (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Stock Market's Valuation Expansion Is Due To Lower Bond Yields But the crucial point to grasp is that the relationship between the declining bond yield and stock market valuation becomes exponential. This is because as bond yields approach their lower bound, bond prices have less additional upside but considerably more downside. This extra riskiness of bonds means that investors demand a diminishing risk premium on equities versus bonds. So, as bond yields decline, the required return on equities – which equals the bond yield plus the risk premium – collapses. And as valuation is just the inverse of required return, valuations soar. Chart I-7 and Chart I-8 demonstrate this exponential relationship in practice. Note that the bond yield is on the logarithmic left scale while the stock market’s valuation is on the linear right scale. The logarithmic versus linear scale visually demonstrates that at a lower bond yield, a given change in the bond yield has a much greater impact on the stock market’s valuation. Chart I-7The Relationship Between Lower Bond Yields And Stock Market Valuation Expansion Is Exponential Chart I-8When Bond Yields Reach Their Ultimate Low, Stock Market Valuations Will Surge Specifically, if the 30-year yield in the US reached the recent low achieved in the UK, it would boost the stock market’s valuation by nearly 50 percent. We fully expect this to happen at some point in the coming years because of The Shock Theory Of Bond Yields which we introduced in last week’s report. In a nutshell, the shock theory of bond yields states that each successive deflationary shock takes the bond yield to a lower structural level, until it can go no lower. Although it is impossible to predict the timing and nature of individual shocks such as the pandemic, it is easy to predict the statistical distribution of shocks. On this basis, the likelihood of a net deflationary shock is 50 percent within the next three years, and 81 percent within the next five years. Whatever that deflationary shock is, and whenever it arrives, it will mark the ultimate low in the 30-year T-bond yield – at a level close to the recent low in the UK. This ultimate low in the T-bond yield will also define the ultimate high in the global stock market’s valuation and the end of the structural bull market in stocks. Until that ultimate low in bond yields, long-term investors should own stocks. And tilt towards long-duration growth sectors that will benefit most from the final collapse in yields. Growth sectors and growth-heavy stock markets such as the S&P500 will continue to outperform, as they have done consistently since 2008. The Inflation Bubble Is Bursting   The last couple of months has seen a mania in inflation expectations. As industries reconfigured for the end of lockdowns, supply bottlenecks in some commodities led to understandable spikes in their prices. These commodity price increases then unleashed fears about inflation. As investors sought inflation hedges, it drove up commodity prices more broadly … which added to the inflation fears…which added further fuel to the mania in inflation expectations. And so, the indiscriminate rally in commodities continued. The inflation bubble is bursting. But now it seems that the indiscriminate rally is over. DRAM prices have rolled over, belying the thesis that there is widespread shortage in semiconductors (Chart I-9). More spectacularly in the past week, the corn price has tumbled by 12 percent while the lumber price has slumped by 25 percent (Chart I-10). Chart I-9DRAM Prices Have ##br##Rolled Over Chart I-10Lumber Prices Are Correcting, Will Other Commodities Follow? Given that the commodity rally was indiscriminate, there is a danger that any correction will spread into other commodities like the industrial metals, copper and tin – especially as their fractal structures are at a level of fragility that has identified previous turning points in 2008, 2011, 2015, 2017 and 2020 (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). Chart I-11Copper's Fractal Structure Is Fragile Chart I-12Tin's Fractal Structure Is Fragile In any case, the mania in inflation expectations is about to end. An excellent way to play this is to expect compression in the market implied inflation rate in T-bond yields versus TIPS yields (Chart I-13). Chart I-13The Mania In Inflation Expectations Is About To End Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to go long the 10-year T-bond versus the 10-year TIPS, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.6 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  To clarify, Chart 2 shows world stock market earnings per share, both 12-month forward and 12-month trailing. Whereas Charts 1 and 3 show sales and net profits (not per share). Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Non-US stocks have greatly underperformed US equities over the last decade, but a leadership change might be underway. As such, equity flows could be an important factor in dictating currency trends over a cyclical horizon. The narrative in favor of non-US stocks includes a recovery in profits, cheap valuations, and a secular theme that will favor capital spending in traditionally “heavy” industries. Non-US growth should also overtake the US beyond 2021, when most of the global population is vaccinated. Cyclical currencies have historically tracked the relative performance of their respective bourses. This implies a lower dollar. Higher bond yields also present a formidable headwind for the outperformance of US stocks, relative to other markets. An outperformance of non-US bourses will be particularly favorable for the AUD, NOK, SEK, and GBP. The yen will likely play catchup towards the middle of the cycle. Feature Currencies respond to broad inflows, including into bonds, equities or foreign direct investment. For most of 2020, the dominant currency flows were from fixed income investors. As most short rates are now anchored near zero, the story is morphing towards the potential winners from a recovery, especially in the equity market sphere. Non-US stocks tend to outperform the US when the dollar is falling. That said, the causality-effect link is not so clear-cut, as we penned in our Special Report last year.1 Admittedly, a lower dollar boosts the common-currency returns for US-based investors, leading to more capital deployment in offshore markets. Meanwhile, commodities tend to do well when the dollar declines, benefiting emerging market and commodity-producing countries. Financing costs for non-US corporations borrowing in dollars are also eased. Historically, profit growth has been the ultimate driver of stock prices and profitability is more contingent on productivity gains than translation effects. This suggests the starting point for gauging relative equity flows, and the potential impact on currencies, is to evaluate which countries/economies could be primed for outperformance. Relative Growth As A Starting Point One of the key drivers of relative earnings growth between two countries is relative economic performance. Chart I-1 shows that earnings-per-share in the G10 relative to the US tended to improve when growth was shifting in favor of the rest of the world. This, in turn, has been a key driver of relative equity performance. Chart I-1Relative Profits And Relative Growth What is remarkable is that this relationship has been pretty consistent across countries, including those that have huge exposures to the global economy such as Sweden, Norway, or even the United Kingdom. In general, relative economic performance has driven relative EPS growth (Chart I-2A & 2B). The reason is that these bourses still have a sizeable dependence on the domestic economy. Chart I-3 shows that for even the most export-driven economies, exposure to domestic sales is still at least 20%. Australia, a commodity country has almost 60% of sales from domestic sources. Our bias is that non-US growth will start to outperform towards the backend of this year. This will pressure the dollar lower (Chart I-4). This conviction rests on three critical pillars: Chart I-2AA Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth Chart I-2BA Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth   Chart I-3Domestic Sales Matter A Lot For Global Equity Bourses Chart I-4The Dollar Trends With ##br##Relative Growth   The rest of the world will catch up in vaccination campaigns relative to the US. This is almost a fait accompli. Canada is well behind in terms of vaccination progress compared to the US or the UK (Chart I-5). But in Quebec, where BCA is headquartered, Premier François Legault has suggested that everyone who wants a vaccine will be able to get their first dose by June 24. Relative employment growth in Canada is already picking up, and the central bank has already begun tapering asset purchases ahead of the Fed. The broader message is that the service sector has been held hostage by relatively closed economies outside the US. This will change as economies open up.   Producer prices (PPI) are picking up globally and the US is leading the pack. This will also rotate in favor of other economies. Producer prices first took off in the US as the sectors that benefited from the pandemic were those related to technology and healthcare. Norway also gained from the rebound in oil prices. Other countries should begin to catch up, as demand for goods and services broadens beyond the pandemic-related scope (Chart I-6). From a longer-term perspective, PPI usually peaks and troughs in the US ahead of other economies. Again, as we exit a recession, consumption tends to broaden from defensive goods towards more discretionary spending. Given that other economies are bigger producers of these discretionary items, this should start to shift relative pricing power towards these countries (Chart I-7). Non-US growth has been held hostage to cascading crises since the US housing market bust. In 2010, we had the euro area debt crisis. In 2011, the Fukushima disaster knocked down Japanese growth. In 2015, tight monetary policy in China led to a global manufacturing recession. In short, rest-of-world growth has not been able to catch breath for a decade. Chart I-5Many Countries Will Replicate The US and UK Vaccination Success Chart I-6Global PPIs Are ##br##Picking Up   Chart I-7US PPI Usually Leads Other Countries The silver lining is that the COVID-19 crisis has ushered in coordinated global monetary and fiscal stimulus. For the first time in a long while, non-US growth can start to outperform, according to IMF estimates (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The IMF Expects Non-US Growth To Outperform Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns, and this is certainly the case when US versus non-US stocks are concerned. If we accept the premise that relative growth matters for equity allocations, then it also makes sense that relative equity performance will coincide with currency performance, due to portfolio flows. Across the G10 economies, getting the equity call right has usually been synonymous with having the appropriate currency strategy (Chart I-9). This is especially the case since equity flows have been supportive of the dollar (Chart I-10). Chart I-9ACurrencies And Equities Move Together Chart I-9BCurrencies And Equities Move Together Chart I-10Equity Flows Have Been Supportive Of The Dollar A More Quantitative Approach While relative growth is important, it is not the sole factor in determining which countries or sectors will outperform. Most investors have at least two other powerful tools that have stood the test of time in making equity allocations. These include the valuation starting point, and the historical return on capital. Valuation is the easiest place to start. Over time, non-US bourses have tended to outperform the US when the relative valuation starting point was attractive. This has been especially true around recessions, when leadership changes tend to occur. Chart I-11A, 11B, 11C, and 11D show that countries such as Japan, Mexico, and Germany should sport more attractive returns over the next decade compared to the US. The list is not comprehensive, but our previous work suggests this valuation tool works across many countries and various geographies. Chart I-11AValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Chart I-11BValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Chart I-11CValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Chart I-11DValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns   Not surprisingly, the currencies that are the most undervalued in our models also have cheap equity markets. These include the Scandinavian currencies, commodity plays, the Japanese yen, and the pound. A rerating of these markets will be synonymous with a rerating in their currencies (Chart I-12). The rise in global bond yields will also prove to be a formidable headwind for US stocks. Technology constitutes 28% of the US equity market, the largest allocation within the G10. Together with defensive sectors such as health care and consumer staples, this ratio rises to 60%. As a result, the relative performance of the US equity market has been inversely correlated to bond yields (Chart I-13). Should bond yields continue to gravitate higher over the next few years, this will lead to a powerful rotation towards more cyclical bourses. The rise in yields will be particularly favorable for deep value sectors like banks (due to rising net interest margins) and commodities (due to inflation protection). Chart I-12The Dollar Remains ##br##Expensive Chart I-13US Outperformance Has Dovetailed With Lower Bond Yields Going forward, expected return on capital will be more difficult to gauge, but countries that have a history of providing superior shareholder returns are a good place to start. For example, we know that the winners of the last decade have had the largest returns on equity, as was the case for the winners during the prior decade. Given the mammoth task of performing this exercise on a cross-country basis, and across factors, we enlisted the help of our colleagues who run BCA’s Equity Analyzer platform. The EA platform provides a BCA score of 0 to 100 for all developed market stocks, according to their ranking on 30 carefully selected and curated factors. Crunching the numbers revealed a few interesting results: A long strategy based on selecting the top decile stocks according to their EA score outperformed both domestic and global indices (Chart I-14). The quality factor has been one of the better determinants of future stock market returns. The EA quality score is based on return on equity, asset growth, accruals, and margins. On this basis, the bourses with a higher concentration of quality stocks in their indices are found outside the US (Chart I-15). Using an overall blended score, which includes not only the quality factor, but also others such as value, size, and momentum, suggests investors will be rewarded by tilting away from the US. For example, 20%-30% of stocks in Scandinavian bourses make it into the top decile EA portfolio (Chart I-16). Even if one focuses solely on growth sectors such as technology and health care, non-US companies are still more attractive (Chart I-17). Chart I-14The BCA EA Platform Allows Investors To Pick Winners Chart I-15Quality Stocks Are Heavily Weighted Outside The US Chart I-16A Composite Score Ranks US Stocks Poorly Chart I-17Lots Of Attractive Growth Stocks Outside The US In a nutshell, non-US markets are attractive from a valuation standpoint and across a swathe of other metrics that have been useful in benchmarking future returns. An outperformance of non-US stocks will favor cyclical currencies, as portfolio flows gravitate to these markets. We are already selectively long a basket of Scandinavian currencies; we will be gradually accumulating other currencies such as the GBP, the CAD, and the JPY on weakness. Specifically, the yen is becoming interesting not only as portfolio insurance, but also as a play on the cyclical Japanese market. We will be covering these currencies in depth in upcoming reports. Housekeeping Three important central banks met this week. The general tone was dovish. The Bank of England kept policy roughly unchanged, but there were three important takeaways. First, the BoE suggested any pickup in UK inflation will be transitory. Second, the BoE will slow its bond purchases, as they approach the central bank’s target. And finally, growth estimates were revised upward. Our take is that the meeting was a non-event for cable in the near term and bullish longer term. The message from the Reserve Bank of Australia was bit more dovish. They kept open the possibility of additional measures on the July 6 meeting. Our bias is that the RBA is trying to fend off deflationary pressures from a strong currency. This only delays the bullish backdrop for the AUD. Next Tuesday’s budget will provide some information about additional support to the Aussie economy. The Norges bank remains on the path to hike interest rates later this year. This supports our bullish NOK thesis. We have been reluctant to establish fresh long positions as we enter a seasonally strong month for the dollar. However, our buy list is growing as we highlighted above. For now our open positions are highlighted on page 14.    Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate," dated July 10, 2020. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The recent data out of the US were mildly positive. The ISM Manufacturing PMI came in at 60.7 in April, well below an estimate of 65. The ISM Manufacturing New Orders Index came in at 64.3 in April, slightly below an expectation of 66.6. The trade deficit for March was -74.4B USD, in line with expectations. Personal Spending for March was 4.2% month-on-month, as expected. The dollar DXY index rose by 0.8% this week. While the PMI data for April came in on the mild side, inflationary pressures continue to build up as reflected in the robust New Orders, Backlog of Orders as well as the Prices Paid indices. That said, the Fed’s current stance is that price surges will likely be transitory. This is near-term negative for the greenback since it implies policy will not be tightened anytime soon. Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The recent Euro data have been mildly positive. Unemployment rate for March was 8.1%, slightly better than the predicted 8.3%. GDP fell 1.8% year-on-year, compared to an expected 2% decrease. CPI came in at 1.6% for April year-on-year, in line with expectation. German Retail Sales for March came in at 7.7% month-on-month comfortably beating a 3% expectation. Overall euro area retail sales surged 12% year-on-year in March, comfortably outpacing consensus of a 9.4% rise. The euro was down 0.9% against USD this week. However, as the weekly vaccination increase in both the US and the UK are slowing down, it continues to rise in the euro area.  Infections are stabilizing in Germany and the Netherlands, and are on a downtrend in France and Italy. This puts a floor under the euro. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 The recent data out of Japan have been strong. The unemployment rate for March came in at 2.6%. Industrial Production for March came in at 2.2% month-on-month, versus the estimate of -2%. Tokyo Core CPI came in at -0.2%, below market consensus. Vehicles sales surged by 22.2% year-on-year in April. The Japanese yen was flat against USD this week. A lagging vaccine campaign, rising COVID-19 case count, and the state of emergency continue to drag down sentiment towards Japan. However, the yen’s real effective exchange rate is trading at one standard deviation below fair value and our intermediate-term indicator is hinting at a rebound. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 The recent data out of UK have been positive. The Nationwide HPI for April was 7.1% higher than a year ago, beating an expectation of 5%. The BoE kept interest rates at 0.1% and its asset purchase target at £895bn. The pound was flat against the USD this week. The Bank of England kept policy on hold this week, but there were three important takeaways. First, the BoE sees any near-term pickup in inflation as temporary. This should keep a near-term lid on rate hike expectations and the pound. Second, the BoE will slow its bond purchases, as they approach the central bank’s target. And finally, growth estimates were revised upward, especially for 2022. This is bullish cable longer term. On the political front, a potential surprise of another Scottish independence may put some downward pressure on the currency. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The recent data out of Australia have been strong. The AIG Manufacturing Index for April came in at 61.7, higher than the prior 59.9 reading. The AIG Construction Index for April came in at 59.1, below the 61.8 print in March. The trade balance for March came in at AUD 5.6bn, below an expectation of AUD 8bn. The RBA cash rate remained at 0.1%. The Australian dollar was flat this week against the USD. The RBA provided a dovish tone at its meeting this week, extending QE until February, and kept open the possibility of additional measures on the July 6 meeting. In the near term, upbeat economic data continue to provide support for the AUD. However, the tourism industry (6% of employment) is needed to get Australia back to full employment. Our bias is that the RBA will continue to fight against an appreciating currency, until the economy reaches escape velocity. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The recent data out of New Zealand have been strong. Employment grew by 0.6% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. The Labor Cost Index for Q1 came in at 0.4% over prior quarter, and 1.6% year-on-year. The unemployment rate for Q1 declined to 4.7%, from 4.9%. Building consents increased 17.9% month-on-month in March. The New Zealand dollar was down 0.5% against USD this week. As we indicated in our report last week, the NZD is overpriced by several measures and the elevated equity market is of particular concern. The weakening GlobalDairyTrade Price Index could potentially be a harbinger of peaking agricultural prices in the coming months. This will lead the NZD to underperform other commodity currencies.  Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The recent data out of Canada have been soft. The trade balance for March came in at -1.14bn CAD versus CAD 1.42bn the previous month. Building permits rose 5.7% month-on-month in March. The CAD was flat against USD this week. Despite concerns over elevated commodity prices and a vaccination campaign that is lagging other advanced economies, recent strong employment growth and the tapering of asset purchases by the BoC should continue to boost the currency, the top performing among G10 so far this year. In the near term, Canadian exports will benefit from US fiscal stimulus, which will also provide support for the loonie. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The recent Swiss data have been strong. The KOF Leading Indicator for April came in at 134, beating the 119.5 estimate.  CPI for April came in at 0.3%. SECO Consumer Climate for Q2 came in at -18, higher than the -30 back in Q1. The Swiss franc was down 0.5% against the USD this week. The Swiss economy continues to surprise to the upside. With our intermediate-term indicator on a downward path, we remain optimistic on our long EUR/CHF position for now, despite potential upside risks to the franc given the Indian COVID-19 outbreak. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The recent data out of Norway have been strong. The unemployment rate for April came in at 4%, from 4.2% the prior month. The house price index for April came in at 12.2% year-on-year, similar to the 12.5% reading of March. Interest rate were held at 0% by the Norges Bank. The NOK was down 1.8% against the USD this week. The krone is the winning currency since the pandemic hit, suggesting some consolidation was much due. With Norwegian inflation rising sharply above the central bank’s 2% target earlier this year, the Norges Bank reiterated during its meeting on Thursday that a rate hike later this year is well in sight. Against the backdrop of the impending European recovery this summer and Norway’s own commendable vaccination progress, we continue to be long the NOK against the USD and EUR.  Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The recent Swedish data have been strong. Industrial Production for March came in at 1.1% month-on-month. Year-on-year, IP is rising by 5.7%. Industrial New Orders for March came in at 10% year-on-year. GDP in Q1 was 1.1% higher than the prior quarter, beating the estimate of 0.5%. The Swedish krona was down 1.4% against the USD this week. BCA Research’s European Investment Strategy service indicated that there is significantly more upside to Swedish stocks against both Eurozone and US equities over the remainder of the cycle. Sweden is levered to the global industrial cycle with exports representing 45% of GDP. The recovery in both Europe and across the globe should continue to benefit the krona. The tapering of asset purchases by the Riksbank later this year will also provide support to the currency in the meantime. We continue to be long SEK/USD and SEK/EUR. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Informe especial

El Foro de Asignación Global de Activos (GAA) de BCA Research se llevará a cabo en línea el 18 de mayo. Hemos reunido un excelente grupo de ponentes para discutir cuestiones importantes para los CIOs y los asignadores de activos. Estos incluyen las ideas más recientes sobre construcción de carteras, inversión por factores, alternativas y ESG. Nuestro orador principal será Keith Ambachtsheer, fundador de KPA Advisory y autor de numerosos libros sobre gestión de inversiones, incluyendo "The Future of Pension Management: Integrating Design, Governance and Investing" (2016). Su presentación será seguida por un panel de destacados CIOs, entre ellos Maxime Aucoin de CDPQ, James Davis de OPTrust y Catherine Ulozas del Endowment de la Drexel University. El evento es gratuito para todos los suscriptores de GAA, que pueden ver la agenda completa y registrarse aquí. Otros pueden inscribirse aquí. Esperamos que pueda acompañarnos el 18 de mayo en lo que debería ser un día estimulante e informativo de ideas y discusión. Destacados La búsqueda de rendimiento por parte de los inversores en los últimos años les llevó a considerar los préstamos apalancados como una inversión atractiva. Caracterizados por baja volatilidad y rendimientos ajustados por riesgo atractivos, los préstamos apalancados pueden aportar valor a una cartera. Los préstamos apalancados tienden a superar a sus contrapartes de tasa fija (por ejemplo, los bonos high-yield) en un entorno de subida de tipos y partiendo de una valoración atractiva. Actualmente solo se cumple el primer criterio. Sin embargo, existen riesgos. El aumento de la proporción de emisiones covenant-lite y el incremento del apalancamiento en el sector corporativo son particularmente preocupantes. En los próximos 6 a 12 meses, no esperamos que las tasas suban sustancialmente, lo que hace que la clase de activo sea algo poco atractiva a corto plazo. No obstante, la perspectiva a más largo plazo resulta atractiva, ya que es probable que las tasas suban conforme la inflación aumente en los próximos años. Artículo En el entorno actual de política monetaria ultraaccesible, con tipos de interés bajos y valoraciones poco atractivas para activos de riesgo de renta fija, los inversores no tienen más opción que mirar más allá de los instrumentos convencionales de renta fija y aumentar su apetito por el riesgo. En este Informe Especial, repasamos la mecánica del mercado de préstamos apalancados. Analizamos las características históricas de riesgo y retorno y comparamos los préstamos apalancados con otros activos. También evaluamos su comportamiento durante periodos de tensión en los mercados financieros así como en periodos de subida de tipos e inflación. Finalmente, discutimos los riesgos asociados a la tenencia de préstamos apalancados. ¿Qué son los préstamos apalancados? Los préstamos apalancados son un tipo de préstamo sindicado otorgado a empresas por debajo del grado de inversión. Generalmente, estas empresas tienen un alto endeudamiento y bajas calificaciones crediticias. Un préstamo sindicado es estructurado, organizado y administrado por uno o varios bancos comerciales o de inversión.1 La mayoría de estos préstamos son préstamos garantizados senior y se basan en una tasa flotante, mayoritariamente LIBOR más una prima (más de 150-200 puntos básicos) para reflejar su mayor riesgo y atraer a inversores institucionales no bancarios. Los tipos de interés de estos préstamos se ajustan a intervalos regulares para reflejar cambios en los tipos de interés a corto plazo; esto constituye un beneficio para los inversores preocupados por la subida de tipos. Las definiciones varían cuando se trata de categorizar los préstamos apalancados. Algunos los agrupan según el riesgo del prestatario y su calificación crediticia. Otros consideran métricas de apalancamiento como deuda sobre capital o deuda sobre EBITDA. Otras clasificaciones analizan el spread en la emisión o el propósito de la captación de fondos, que puede incluir financiar fusiones y adquisiciones (M&A), adquisiciones apalancadas (LBO), refinanciación de deuda existente o financiación general. En los últimos cinco años, aproximadamente el 50% de los préstamos apalancados emitidos en EE. UU. fueron para fines de refinanciación (Gráfico 1, panel 1). Dentro de las tres categorías, la financiación de LBO se considera la más arriesgada, lo que se refleja en su mayor spread (Gráfico 1, panel 2). El mercado de préstamos apalancados se volvió particularmente popular a mediados de los años 80 cuando la actividad de M&A se disparó (Gráfico 2). Gráfico 1 Usos de los préstamos apalancados ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Gráfico 2 El auge de la actividad corporativa en los años 80 impulsó el crecimiento de los préstamos apalancados El auge de la actividad corporativa en la década de 1980 impulsó el crecimiento de los préstamos apalancados El auge de la actividad corporativa en la década de 1980 impulsó el crecimiento de los préstamos apalancados Existen dos tipos comunes de facilidades de financiación:2 Préstamos a plazo: Un acuerdo para pedir prestada una suma de dinero que se devuelve según un calendario de pagos determinado. Estos préstamos son proporcionados principalmente por entidades no bancarias. Facilidades revolventes: Un tipo de préstamo que puede ser dispuesto y reembolsado repetidamente. Estos préstamos son en su mayoría originados y mantenidos por bancos. Las estimaciones del tamaño del mercado de préstamos apalancados varían según los criterios y definiciones utilizados. El tamaño del mercado de préstamos apalancados, tras un rápido crecimiento desde el inicio de la última década, se estima en más de $1.2 billones a finales del segundo trimestre de 2020.3 Aunque esto representa solo una pequeña porción de la deuda corporativa total (es solo el 15% del tamaño del mercado de bonos corporativos), las interconexiones entre los participantes clave del mercado y el papel de los bancos en el mercado han llamado la atención de varios reguladores como la secretaria del Tesoro de EE. UU., Janet Yellen, inversores de deuda como Howard Marks, e instituciones internacionales como el Bank For International Settlements (BIS). El foco de sus preocupaciones ha sido el deterioro de los estándares de crédito para los préstamos apalancados – en particular, el incremento en la emisión de préstamos “covenant-lite” (cov-lite), definiciones inconsistentes de EBITDA en los acuerdos de préstamo, el aumento en el uso de “añadidos de EBITDA”,4 y la precisión de las calificaciones de los préstamos apalancados.5 Discutimos algunas de esas preocupaciones en la sección de Riesgos. Tabla 1 Los préstamos arriesgados están principalmente en manos de entidades no bancarias… ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Durante las últimas décadas, el papel de los bancos en proporcionar capital al mercado de préstamos apalancados se ha reducido y ha sido reemplazado por prestamistas no bancarios como fondos mutuos, hedge funds, compañías de seguros y gestores de activos.6 Datos del programa Shared National Credit (SNC)7 muestran que las entidades no bancarias en EE. UU. ahora poseen cerca del 83% de todos los préstamos a plazo no investment-grade (Tabla 1). Además, estimaciones del Bank of England8 muestran que una cuarta parte del stock global de préstamos apalancados (que estima en cerca de $3.4 billones) se mantiene a través de obligaciones colateralizadas de préstamos (CLOs)9 y aproximadamente la mitad es propiedad de instituciones no bancarias. A su vez, esas instituciones no bancarias poseen una porción significativa de los CLOs – particularmente los tramos más arriesgados. Esto no significa que los bancos no estén expuestos a los préstamos apalancados. Pero los bancos invierten predominantemente en los tramos más altos, AAA, de los CLOs, y en préstamos con grado de inversión.10 Los préstamos con calificaciones más riesgosas son sostenidos por CLOs, fondos mutuos y otros prestamistas como los hedge funds (Gráfico 3).11 Gráfico 3 …Particularmente aquellos calificados por debajo de BB ¿Es este el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es este el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Riesgo y retorno históricos Gráfico 4 El desempeño relativo de los préstamos apalancados se mueve con las tasas de interés El rendimiento relativo de los préstamos apalancados se mueve con las tasas de interés El rendimiento relativo de los préstamos apalancados se mueve con las tasas de interés Desde 1997, los préstamos apalancados12 han retornado un 4.9% anualizado, 25 puntos básicos por encima de los Treasuries de EE. UU. y aproximadamente 100 y 200 puntos básicos menos que los bonos corporativos investment-grade y high-yield de EE. UU., respectivamente. Han tenido un desempeño inferior a las acciones estadounidenses por 400 puntos básicos anualizados en el mismo periodo. La caída de las tasas durante las últimas dos décadas es la razón más probable por la que los préstamos apalancados han quedado rezagados respecto a sus contrapartes de tasa fija. El desempeño relativo de los préstamos apalancados frente a los bonos investment-grade ha seguido de cerca la trayectoria de los rendimientos del Treasury (Gráfico 4). Aunque el caso no es tan claro para el desempeño relativo frente a los bonos high-yield, la tendencia es similar. Sin embargo, en términos de retorno ajustado por riesgo, debido a la menor volatilidad, los préstamos apalancados superaron tanto a las acciones como a los bonos corporativos high-yield (Tabla 2). No obstante, creemos que la volatilidad está probablemente subestimada dada la elevada curtosis. La mayor asimetría negativa y la curtosis excesiva podrían indicar probabilidades más altas de grandes rendimientos negativos (Gráfico 5).   Tabla 2 Características históricas de riesgo-retorno ¿Es este el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es este el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Gráfico 5 Los retornos de los préstamos apalancados muestran alta curtosis y asimetría negativa Los rendimientos de los préstamos apalancados presentan alta curtosis y sesgo negativo Los rendimientos de los préstamos apalancados presentan alta curtosis y sesgo negativo ¿Por qué deberían los inversores considerar los préstamos apalancados? Gráfico 6 Las tasas en alza apoyan un mayor rendimiento de los préstamos apalancados... Tasas al alza respaldan un mayor rendimiento de los préstamos apalancados... Tasas al alza respaldan un mayor rendimiento de los préstamos apalancados... Nuestros estrategas de bonos de EE. UU. han mostrado que las probabilidades de que los préstamos apalancados superen a los bonos high-yield de tasa fija aumentan cuando se cumplen ciertos criterios – especialmente cuando las valoraciones están inclinadas a favor de los préstamos y los rendimientos del Treasury están subiendo.13 Actualmente solo se cumple el último criterio. En lo que va del año, los préstamos apalancados han retornado 2.2%, por encima del -3.2%, -3.4%, 1.6% y -3.4% de los Treasuries de EE. UU., bonos investment-grade, bonos high-yield y deuda soberana de mercados emergentes, respectivamente (Gráfico 6). Durante el mismo periodo, los rendimientos del Treasury aumentaron 65 puntos básicos. Observamos que los periodos de subida de los rendimientos del Treasury se asocian con mayores flujos hacia la clase de activo (Gráfico 7). Más interesante aún, los préstamos apalancados superan a los bonos basura cuando los rendimientos del Treasury suben más de lo que descuentan las curvas a plazo durante los siguientes 12 meses (Gráfico 8). Gráfico 7 ...Así como mayores flujos hacia los fondos ...Así Como Mayores Flujos de Fondos ...Así Como Mayores Flujos de Fondos Gráfico 8 Los préstamos apalancados se beneficiarán si las tasas aumentan más de lo que descuenta la curva forward Los préstamos apalancados se beneficiarán si los tipos de interés suben más de lo que está descontado en la curva a plazo Los préstamos apalancados se beneficiarán si los tipos de interés suben más de lo que está descontado en la curva a plazo     Sin embargo, hoy esto no parece ser el caso, con el forward a 1 año sobre 5 años aproximadamente 40 puntos básicos por encima del rendimiento actual del Treasury a 5 años. Esto está en línea con nuestra visión de que es poco probable que las tasas suban sustancialmente en los próximos 6 a 12 meses. La inflación, más allá de un pico temporal en los próximos meses, debería mantenerse contenida, al menos hasta que el empleo vuelva a un nivel que ejerza presión al alza sobre los salarios. Esto es improbable antes de 2023. También es importante considerar la trayectoria potencial de la política monetaria así como los cambios en los rendimientos a largo plazo. La Fed, a través de su dot plot, está señalando que no habrá incremento en la tasa de los fondos federales antes de 2024, pero el mercado se está preocupando por las presiones inflacionarias y está anticipando una subida de la Fed antes. Creemos que es improbable que la Fed eleve las tasas antes de lo que el mercado espera, a menos que el mercado laboral vuelva a un nivel de “empleo máximo” en los próximos 12 meses. El rendimiento de los préstamos apalancados ha sido inferior al de los bonos high-yield durante la mayor parte del periodo del que disponemos de datos, salvo a principios de 2020. Dada la posición senior de los préstamos apalancados en la estructura de capital de una empresa, tiene sentido que sus rendimientos sean más bajos. Además, la composición sectorial de los dos mercados juega un papel: los préstamos apalancados están más expuestos a los sectores de Tecnología y Comunicaciones y tienen una asignación limitada (promediando 1% en los últimos siete años) al sector Energía, a diferencia de los bonos high-yield de tasa fija (donde el peso de Energía ha promediado 13%) (Gráfico 9). Esto fue especialmente evidente cuando la diferencia de rendimiento se colapsó por debajo de -3% durante el choque del petróleo de 2014/2015 (Gráfico 10). Gráfico 9 Pesos sectoriales de los préstamos apalancados ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Gráfico 10 Los spreads de los préstamos no parecen atractivos Los diferenciales de los préstamos no parecen atractivos. Los diferenciales de los préstamos no parecen atractivos. Gráfico 11 La demanda reciente de inversores elevó los precios de los préstamos apalancados La reciente demanda de inversores elevó los precios de los préstamos apalancados. La reciente demanda de inversores elevó los precios de los préstamos apalancados. Sin embargo, la diferencia de rendimiento ha estado tendiendo al alza desde entonces y, a los precios actuales, el potencial de revalorización puede ser limitado. El reciente aumento de la demanda de inversores ha reducido los rendimientos de los préstamos apalancados recién emitidos, llevando el precio medio de oferta de los préstamos apalancados por encima de su máximo prepandemia (Gráfico 11). En la siguiente sección, analizamos cómo se comportaron los préstamos apalancados durante recesiones y otros periodos de tensión en los mercados financieros.   Tensión en los mercados financieros Desempeño en crisis Dada la corta historia del índice, solo podemos cubrir las últimas tres recesiones (el estallido de la burbuja puntocom, la Crisis Financiera Global (GFC) y la recesión por COVID-19). También analizamos el Taper Tantrum de 2013 y el choque del precio del petróleo de 2014/2015. En todos los casos, los préstamos apalancados cayeron y posteriormente se recuperaron junto con otras clases de renta fija. El Taper Tantrum fue el más favorable para los préstamos apalancados: los rendimientos del Treasury a 10 años subieron 100 puntos básicos en cuatro meses (Gráfico 12). Tabla 3 muestra que los periodos de subida de tipos son un mejor entorno para los préstamos apalancados que los de caída de tipos. También analizamos un periodo de ciclos de endurecimiento y relajación de la Fed –aunque la sincronización de los ciclos de relajación coincide con recesiones, lo que lastró el desempeño de los préstamos apalancados. También evaluamos el impacto de la inflación en los préstamos apalancados usando el marco de nuestro Informe Especial sobre cobertura frente a la inflación,14 que descomponía la inflación en cuatro cuartiles/regímenes: niveles de inflación por debajo de 2.3%, entre 2.3% y 3.3%, entre 3.3% y 4.9%, y por encima de 4.9%. Añadimos a nuestro análisis periodos de inflación decreciente. Observamos, sin embargo, que solo hubo un periodo en que la inflación superó el umbral de 4.9%. Gráfico 12 Los préstamos apalancados se comportaron bien en periodos de tensión crediticia y específica por sector Los préstamos apalancados resistieron bien durante periodos de estrés crediticio y de dificultades específicas por sector Los préstamos apalancados resistieron bien durante periodos de estrés crediticio y de dificultades específicas por sector   Tabla 3 Desempeño de los préstamos apalancados durante diferentes ciclos de tipos... ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Tabla 4 ...Y regímenes de inflación ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Durante periodos en el primer y segundo cuartil de inflación, los préstamos apalancados, en términos absolutos, tuvieron los mayores retornos anualizados medios, 8.1% y 10% respectivamente. Esto tiene sentido ya que en esos regímenes las tasas de política son bajas y los rendimientos de los bonos comienzan a subir ante un crecimiento sólido. Sin embargo, los préstamos apalancados tuvieron un desempeño inferior al de los bonos de tasa fija durante esos periodos. La inflación por encima del 3.3% representa un entorno en el que la economía comienza a recalentarse y el crecimiento a debilitarse. Este régimen mostró que los préstamos apalancados superaron a los bonos high-yield por 1.5% anualizado. Los periodos de inflación decreciente también mostraron retornos anualizados moderadamente positivos para los préstamos apalancados (Tabla 4).   Riesgos Gráfico 13 La salud corporativa ha empeorado... La salud corporativa ha empeorado... La salud corporativa ha empeorado... El crecimiento del mercado de préstamos apalancados refleja múltiples tendencias pero, lo más importante, un aumento general del apalancamiento corporativo, impulsado por la caída de los tipos de interés y la mayor disponibilidad de financiación barata. La ratio deuda/activos de las empresas no financieras, un indicador del apalancamiento corporativo, está en su nivel más alto en 20 años (Gráfico 13, panel 1). Esto plantea preocupaciones sobre la salud general del sector corporativo –en particular la capacidad de las empresas para atender su deuda– ya que la mediana de la ratio de cobertura de intereses está cerca de un nivel visto por última vez durante la GFC. Esta medida es incluso negativa para las empresas dentro del percentil 25, lo que significa que las compañías en ese grupo carecen de fondos para mantener sus pagos de intereses (Gráfico 13, panel 2). Las tendencias en el mercado de préstamos apalancados muestran un panorama similar. La proporción de préstamos recién emitidos por las empresas más apalancadas –aquellas con una ratio deuda/EBITDA de 6x o superior– ha alcanzado nuevos máximos, llegando al 37% de los nuevos préstamos en el tercer trimestre de 2020 (Gráfico 14). Gráfico 14 ...Incluso para préstamos apalancados ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Gráfico 15 Las emisiones cov-lite representan casi el 80% de las nuevas emisiones ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? Los proveedores de capital tienen parte de la culpa. Incluso con el deterioro de los estándares de crédito, las empresas que buscaban capital pudieron, en su mayor parte, encontrarlo. La proporción de estructuras cov-lite –préstamos que carecen de las cláusulas protectoras presentes en los préstamos tradicionales– sigue creciendo y ahora comprende casi el 80% de las nuevas emisiones (Gráfico 15). Los préstamos cov-lite normalmente no tienen covenants de mantenimiento, requisitos para mantener ciertos ratios como los de apalancamiento o cobertura de intereses.15 En su lugar, incluyen covenants de incurencia que deben cumplirse solo si el emisor desea realizar acciones concretas, como asumir más deuda.16 Esta relajación de los términos de crédito es principalmente una función del aumento de la demanda, especialmente por parte de compradores de CLO y otros inversores institucionales no bancarios, en un entorno de bajos rendimientos. Algunos incluso han advertido que las vulnerabilidades en el mercado de préstamos apalancados podrían causar perturbaciones en el sistema financiero en general. En particular, los recuerdos de la GFC y las preocupaciones sobre el modelo "originar-para-distribuir" –por el cual los bancos originan préstamos pero solo retienen una fracción en sus balances– han llevado a algunos observadores a sugerir que todo esto podría conducir a una expansión de crédito arriesgada y desencadenar una nueva crisis financiera. Gráfico 16 Los préstamos apalancados tienen calificaciones crediticias medias más altas… ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? ¿Es el momento adecuado para los préstamos apalancados? No compartimos ese escepticismo. La exposición de los bancos a los préstamos apalancados es principalmente a través de los tramos más altos de los CLOs. Los requisitos de liquidez de los bancos han aumentado desde la GFC y, por tanto, la contagión debería ser mínima en caso de problemas en el mercado de préstamos. Un informe reciente de la Government Accountability Office (GAO) de EE. UU. no encontró evidencia de que la concesión de préstamos apalancados representara una amenaza significativa para la estabilidad financiera.17 Además, casi todos los préstamos apalancados son de primer gravamen, tienen una posición garantizada senior en la estructura de capital, calificaciones crediticias medias superiores a las de los bonos high-yield (Gráfico 16), y tasas de impago más bajas (Gráfico 17). Además, su tasa de recuperación promedio a cinco años del 63% supera al 40% de los bonos senior no garantizados (Gráfico 18). Gráfico 17 ...Tasas de impago más bajas... ...Menores Tasas de Incumplimiento,... ...Menores Tasas de Incumplimiento,... Gráfico 18 ...Y tasas de recuperación más altas que los bonos high-yield ...Y tasas de recuperación más altas que las de los bonos de alto rendimiento ...Y tasas de recuperación más altas que las de los bonos de alto rendimiento   Conclusión En un periodo de tipos de interés ultra bajos y valoraciones estiradas para activos de riesgo, los préstamos apalancados han surgido como una clase de activo interesante para los inversores. Debido a su menor volatilidad, los préstamos apalancados han producido históricamente mayores retornos ajustados por riesgo que los bonos high-yield de tasa fija. Sin embargo, la volatilidad probablemente esté subestimada dada la elevada curtosis. Históricamente, las subidas de los rendimientos del Treasury y un punto de partida de valoración atractivo proporcionaron una señal de sobrerendimiento para los préstamos apalancados. Actualmente solo se cumple uno de esos dos criterios. En los próximos 6 a 12 meses, no creemos que las tasas suban sustancialmente, lo que hace que esta clase de activo sea algo poco atractiva a corto plazo. Sin embargo, la perspectiva a más largo plazo para los préstamos apalancados es atractiva. A medida que la inflación, y por tanto las tasas, aumenten en los próximos dos a tres años, una asignación moderada a préstamos apalancados podría ser una cobertura útil para los inversores.   Amr Hanafy Analista senior amrh@bcaresearch.com   Notas al pie 1 Consulte “LCD Loan Primer – Syndicated Loans: The Market and the Mechanics,” S&P Global Market Intelligence. 2 Consulte “Leverage Lending FAQ & Fact Sheet,” SIFMA, febrero de 2019. 3 Consulte “Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report,” noviembre de 2020. 4 Los “añadidos de EBITDA” suman gastos y ahorros de costos a las ganancias y podrían inflar la capacidad proyectada de los prestatarios para reembolsar sus préstamos. 5 Consulte Todd Vermilyea, “Perspectives On Leveraged Lending,” The Loan Syndications and Trading Association 23rd Annual Conference, Nueva York, 24 de octubre de 2018. 6 Consulte “Global Financial Stability Report: Vulnerabilities in a Maturing Credit Cycle, Chapter 1,” IMF, abril de 2019. 7 El Programa SNC es un programa interinstitucional diseñado para revisar y evaluar el riesgo en los créditos más grandes y complejos compartidos por múltiples instituciones financieras. El Programa SNC está gobernado por un acuerdo interinstitucional entre las tres agencias federales reguladoras bancarias - la Junta de Gobernadores del Sistema de la Reserva Federal (FRB), la Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), y la Office Of the Comptroller Of The Currency (OCC). 8 Consulte “Financial Stability Report,” Bank of England, agosto de 2020. 9 Los CLOs son valores respaldados por activos emitidos por un vehículo de propósito especial que adquiere una cartera de préstamos apalancados. 10 Consulte “Turns Out Leveraged Loans Aren’t a Systemic Risk After All,” Bank Policy Institute, 8 de febrero de 2020. 11 Consulte Seung Jung Lee, Dan Li, Ralf R. Meisenzahl, y Martin J. Sicilian, “The U.S. Syndicated Term Loan Market: Who holds what and when?”, 25 de noviembre de 2019. 12 Para los fines de este informe, usamos el S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index, que sigue el desempeño ponderado por mercado de las carteras institucionales de préstamos apalancados denominadas en dólares. 13 Consulte el US Bond Strategy Report, “The Price Of Safety,” con fecha 27 de enero de 2015. 14 Consulte el Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” con fecha 22 de mayo de 2019. 15 Consulte Eric Goodison And Margot Wagner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison Llp, “Covenant-Lite Loans: Overview,” agosto de 2019. 16 Consulte Scott Essexx, Alexander Ott, Partners Group, “The Current State Of The Leveraged Loan Market: Are There Echoes Of The 2008 Subprime Market?”, marzo de 2019. 17 Consulte “Financial Stability: Agencies Have Not Found Leveraged Lending To Significantly Threaten Stability But Remain Cautious Amid Pandemic,” United States Government Accountability Office, diciembre de 2020.

En lugar del informe de estrategia de la próxima semana, presentaré el primer webcast de Counterpoint titulado ‘Mega-Temas, Choques Venideros y Mejores Operaciones’. Espero que pueda unirse. Aspectos destacados La teoría económica estándar asume que el dinero es perfectamente fungible. Pero en la práctica, el dinero no es fungible, porque las personas asignan diferentes emociones a sus cuentas mentales de ingresos y ahorros. Esto se conoce como 'sesgo de contabilidad mental'. El sesgo de contabilidad mental significa que es más probable que utilicemos la enorme acumulación de ahorros acumulada durante la pandemia para pagar deudas que para gastar. El sesgo de contabilidad mental también significa que estamos pagando en exceso por las acciones de alto rendimiento. Los inversores a largo plazo deberían evitar los bancos y deberían evitar el 'value'. Calculada correctamente, la prima de riesgo de la renta variable ahora es casi inexistente. Los rendimientos de los bonos a largo plazo de EE. UU. tienen mucho más margen para bajar que para subir. Lista breve de operaciones fractales: acciones frente a bonos, PKR y acciones de Nueva Zelanda. Artículo principal Gráfico de la semana El consumo se explica por los salarios... El consumo se explica por los salarios... El consumo se explica por los salarios... Gráfico de la semana ...no por los cheques de estímulo ...No mediante cheques de estímulo ...No mediante cheques de estímulo Muchos economistas predicen que, una vez que las economías vuelvan a abrir completamente, la enorme acumulación de ahorros de los hogares acumulada durante la pandemia desatará un tsunami de gasto de los hogares. Pero los economistas no son las personas adecuadas para hacer esta predicción. La respuesta a si los hogares gastarán o no su acumulación de ahorros no pertenece al ámbito de la Economía. Pertenece al ámbito de la Psicología. Si gastamos dinero depende de la 'cuenta mental' que ocupe En Una anomalía importante en el mercado de bonos señalamos que la propensión a gastar a partir del ingreso es alta, pero la propensión a gastar a partir de la riqueza es baja. Esto significa que si el ingreso no gastado se gasta depende de si los hogares lo clasifican como ingreso adicional o como riqueza adicional. Esto planteó una pregunta de seguimiento. ¿Cómo puede la decisión de gastar dinero depender de si alguien lo clasifica como ingreso o como riqueza? La respuesta proviene de la Psicología y de un fenómeno conocido como 'sesgo de contabilidad mental'. El psicólogo y premio Nobel Daniel Kahneman señala que categorizamos nuestro dinero en diferentes cuentas, que a veces son físicas y otras veces solo mentales, y que existe una jerarquía clara en nuestra disposición a recurrir a estas cuentas para gastar. Existe una jerarquía clara en nuestra disposición a gastar a partir de nuestras 'cuentas mentales'. En la cima de la jerarquía está nuestro salario mensual, seguido por el dinero en nuestra cuenta corriente. Estas cuentas de 'ingreso' estamos dispuestos a gastarlas. Más abajo en la jerarquía están nuestra cuenta de ahorros y nuestra cartera de inversión. Estas cuentas de 'ahorro' o de 'riqueza' no estamos dispuestos a gastarlas. La teoría económica estándar asume que el dinero es perfectamente fungible, de modo que una libra en una cuenta corriente no es diferente a una libra en una cuenta de ahorros. Pero en la práctica, el dinero no es fungible, porque las personas asignan diferentes emociones a sus cuentas mentales de ingresos y ahorros. Cuando transferimos dinero de nuestros salarios o de nuestra cuenta corriente a nuestra cuenta de ahorros, nuestra disposición a gastarlo se derrumba. Esto explica por qué el consumo sigue de cerca a los salarios que dominan nuestra cuenta mental de ingresos, pero no tiene una conexión significativa con los cheques de estímulo que en gran medida terminan en nuestra cuenta mental de ahorro (Gráfico de la semana y Gráfico I-2). Gráfico I-2 Los cheques de estímulo no tuvieron un impacto significativo en las tendencias de consumo Los cheques de estímulo no tuvieron un impacto significativo en las tendencias de consumo. Los cheques de estímulo no tuvieron un impacto significativo en las tendencias de consumo. Sin embargo, aunque no estemos dispuestos a gastar nuestra cuenta mental de ahorros, sí estamos dispuestos a reducir la deuda con ella. De hecho, al darse cuenta de esta conexión emocional entre nuestros ahorros y nuestra deuda, muchos prestamistas ofrecen hipotecas que 'compensan' una cuenta de ahorros contra la deuda hipotecaria. Uniendo todo esto, es improbable que la acumulación de ahorros de los hogares acumulada durante la pandemia impulse las tendencias de consumo. Es más probable que se utilice para reducir la deuda de los hogares. En tal caso, parte del reciente aumento de la deuda pública terminará simplemente pagando deuda privada, como ocurrió en Japón durante la década de 1990 (Gráfico I-3). Gráfico I-3 En Japón, la deuda pública terminó pagando la deuda privada En Japón, la deuda pública acabó pagando la deuda privada En Japón, la deuda pública acabó pagando la deuda privada Esto presagia problemas para el crecimiento de los activos bancarios. El 'value' no ofrece valor El sesgo de contabilidad mental también explica el fenómeno dominante en los mercados financieros de los últimos años: la llamada 'búsqueda de rendimiento'. A primera vista, la búsqueda de rendimiento tiene sentido, pero al pensarlo más profundamente la distinción entre rendimiento y apreciación del capital es irracional. Al igual que con el ingreso y la riqueza, el dinero que proviene del rendimiento de una inversión y el dinero que proviene de su apreciación de capital es perfectamente fungible (suponiendo un tratamiento fiscal igual). Sin embargo, en la práctica, muchos inversores ponen el rendimiento y la apreciación de capital en cuentas mentales separadas, clasificando el rendimiento de una inversión como dinero para gastar y su capital como dinero para ahorrar. Por lo tanto, esos inversores —por ejemplo, los jubilados— que quieren que sus activos generen dinero para su cuenta mental de gasto tienen un sesgo irracional hacia inversiones que generan rendimiento. Mientras que aquellos inversores que quieren que sus activos aumenten su cuenta mental de ahorro tienen un sesgo hacia inversiones que generan crecimiento de capital. Para reiterar, dado que el dinero es perfectamente fungible, estas cuentas mentales son irracionales. En circunstancias normales, estos sesgos irracionales no son un problema porque hay suficientes inversiones disponibles tanto para la cuenta mental de gasto como para la de ahorro. Pero en los últimos años, los activos que normalmente generarían el ingreso seguro para la cuenta de gasto —efectivo y bonos del gobierno— ya no lo están haciendo. Por lo tanto, en la estampida por el rendimiento, los inversores fijados en el ingreso han sufrido una visión de túnel peligrosa. Al fijarse en el rendimiento de una acción en lugar de en su rendimiento total prospectivo, los inversores en busca de rendimiento están pagando en exceso por acciones de alto rendimiento y, por lo tanto, sacrificando su riqueza a largo plazo. Al fijarse en el rendimiento de una acción en lugar de en su rendimiento total prospectivo, los inversores están pagando en exceso por acciones de alto rendimiento. Un caso concreto. El rendimiento por beneficios futuros del 8 por ciento en el sector financiero global parece ofrecer considerablemente más valor que el 5 por ciento en salud y el 3,5 por ciento en tecnología. Pero lo que realmente importa es cómo ese rendimiento por beneficios futuros se traduce en la rentabilidad total prospectiva. En esta base, el aparente valor en los financieros resulta ser una ilusión. Utilizando la relación posterior a la crisis financiera entre el rendimiento por beneficios futuros y la rentabilidad prospectiva, los financieros de alto rendimiento estaban, hasta hace muy poco, valorados para ofrecer una rentabilidad inferior a la de la tecnología de bajo rendimiento. Y los financieros siguen valorados para ofrecer una rentabilidad inferior a la de la salud de menor rendimiento. Para ofrecer la misma rentabilidad a largo plazo que la salud, la valoración de los financieros tendría que disminuir en un 20 por ciento (Gráfico I-4 - Gráfico I-6). Gráfico I-4 Rendimiento por beneficios del 8 % en financieros = una rentabilidad prospectiva del 2 % El rendimiento por ganancias del 8% de las financieras = un rendimiento prospectivo del 2% El rendimiento por ganancias del 8% de las financieras = un rendimiento prospectivo del 2% Gráfico I-5 Rendimiento por beneficios del 5 % en salud = una rentabilidad prospectiva del 8 % La rentabilidad por beneficios del 5 % del sector sanitario = Una rentabilidad prospectiva del 8 % La rentabilidad por beneficios del 5 % del sector sanitario = Una rentabilidad prospectiva del 8 % Gráfico I-6 La tecnología está cara La tecnología es cara La tecnología es cara Por lo tanto, el sesgo de contabilidad mental es un doble golpe para los bancos. Presagia problemas para el crecimiento de los activos bancarios y hace que los inversores paguen en exceso por acciones de alto rendimiento. Esto crea la paradoja definitiva de la inversión. La característica definitoria del 'value' es que ¡no ofrece valor! Los inversores a largo plazo deberían evitar los bancos y deberían evitar el value. Los rendimientos de los bonos de EE. UU. tienen más margen para bajar que para subir El análisis anterior también tiene importantes implicaciones sobre el enfoque correcto para valorar las acciones y, específicamente, la prima de riesgo de la renta variable, es decir, la rentabilidad excesiva prospectiva de las acciones frente a los bonos de alta calidad. El enfoque común e incorrecto es tomar el rendimiento por beneficios futuros de las acciones y restar el rendimiento del bono a 10 años. Utilizando un rendimiento por beneficios futuros de EE. UU. del 4,5 por ciento, esto sugeriría que la prima de riesgo de la renta variable es un cómodo 3 por ciento frente al rendimiento nominal del bono del 1,5 por ciento. O un muy cómodo 5,5 por ciento frente al rendimiento real del bono de -1 por ciento. El error evidente de este enfoque es que está restando peras de manzanas. El rendimiento del bono a 10 años es la rentabilidad que recibirás del bono durante los próximos 10 años. Pero como acaba de ver, el rendimiento por beneficios futuros no es la rentabilidad que recibirás de las acciones durante los próximos 10 años. Para restar peras de peras debemos primero traducir el rendimiento por beneficios futuros en una rentabilidad total prospectiva a 10 años. La traducción actual resulta ser una rentabilidad nominal del 2 por ciento (Gráfico I-7 - Gráfico I-8) o una rentabilidad real del 0 por ciento (Gráfico I-9 - Gráfico I-10). Comparando estas con los rendimientos nominales o reales de los bonos, encontramos que la prima de riesgo de la renta variable es casi inexistente. Gráfico I-7 Convierta el rendimiento por beneficios en una rentabilidad nominal prospectiva... Convertir el rendimiento por beneficios en un rendimiento nominal prospectivo... Convertir el rendimiento por beneficios en un rendimiento nominal prospectivo... Gráfico I-8 …para descubrir que la prima de riesgo de la renta variable es casi inexistente …Para descubrir que la prima de riesgo de la renta variable es casi inexistente …Para descubrir que la prima de riesgo de la renta variable es casi inexistente Gráfico I-9 Convierta el rendimiento por beneficios en una rentabilidad real prospectiva... Convierte el rendimiento de las ganancias en un rendimiento real prospectivo... Convierte el rendimiento de las ganancias en un rendimiento real prospectivo... Gráfico I-10 ...para descubrir que la prima de riesgo de la renta variable es casi inexistente ...Descubrir que la prima de riesgo accionario es casi inexistente ...Descubrir que la prima de riesgo accionario es casi inexistente La prima de riesgo de la renta variable casi inexistente significa que las acciones están altamente valoradas y que esta valoración elevada depende de que los rendimientos de los bonos no aumenten significativamente. Además, no solo las acciones están altamente valoradas. Como señalamos en El camino hacia la inflación termina en la deflación, la valoración de 300 billones de dólares de bienes raíces globales también depende en gran medida de que los rendimientos de los bonos no aumenten significativamente. Las acciones están altamente valoradas y esa valoración elevada depende de que los rendimientos de los bonos no aumenten significativamente. Concluimos que, desde los niveles actuales, los rendimientos de los bonos a largo plazo de EE. UU. tienen mucho más margen para bajar que para subir. Candidatos para una reversión de la contratendencia El fuerte repunte de las acciones frente a los bonos desde el mínimo de la pandemia ha alcanzado un punto de fragilidad fractal similar al visto al final de la corrida alcista de 2013 y al final de la caída de principios de 2020 (Gráfico I-11). Como tal, el repunte actual merece una pausa. Gráfico I-11 El repunte de las acciones frente a los bonos merece una pausa El repunte de las acciones frente a los bonos necesita un respiro. El repunte de las acciones frente a los bonos necesita un respiro. En la región de Asia Pacífico, observamos que el reciente fuerte desempeño de la rupia pakistaní es susceptible a una venta en contra-tendencia (Gráfico I-12). Gráfico I-12 Subponderar el PKR Infraponderar el PKR Infraponderar el PKR Por último, el mercado de valores de Nueva Zelanda, ultra defensivo, ha tenido un rendimiento muy inferior durante el último año. Pero la fragilidad en sus estructuras fractales de 130 y 65 días sugiere que está listo para una sobreperformance contraria (Gráfico I-13). Gráfico I-13 Sobreponderar Nueva Zelanda Sobrepeso en Nueva Zelanda Sobrepeso en Nueva Zelanda En consecuencia, la recomendación de esta semana es sobreponderar Nueva Zelanda frente al mundo, estableciendo el objetivo de beneficio y el stop-loss simétrico en 4 por ciento.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Sistema de Trading Fractal Operaciones fractales Recomendaciones a 6 meses Recomendaciones estructurales Operaciones fractales cerradas Operaciones cerradas Rendimiento de activos Rendimiento del mercado de renta variable   Indicadores a observar - Rendimientos de los bonos Gráfico II-1 Indicadores a observar - Rendimientos de los bonos - ##br##Área del euro Indicadores a vigilar - Rendimientos de los bonos - Zona del euro Indicadores a vigilar - Rendimientos de los bonos - Zona del euro Gráfico II-2 Indicadores a observar - Rendimientos de los bonos - ##br##Europa fuera del Área del euro Indicadores a vigilar - Rendimientos de los bonos - Europa (fuera de la zona euro) Indicadores a vigilar - Rendimientos de los bonos - Europa (fuera de la zona euro) Gráfico II-3 Indicadores a observar - Rendimientos de los bonos - ##br##Asia Indicadores a seguir - Rendimientos de bonos - Asia Indicadores a seguir - Rendimientos de bonos - Asia Gráfico II-4 Indicadores a observar - Rendimientos de los bonos - ##br##Otros desarrollados Indicadores a vigilar - Rendimientos de bonos - Otros mercados desarrollados Indicadores a vigilar - Rendimientos de bonos - Otros mercados desarrollados   Indicadores a observar - Expectativas de tipos de interés Gráfico II-5 Indicadores a observar - Expectativas de tipos de interés Indicadores a Vigilar - Expectativas de Tasas de Interés Indicadores a Vigilar - Expectativas de Tasas de Interés Gráfico II-6 Indicadores a observar - Expectativas de tipos de interés Indicadores a vigilar - Expectativas de tasas de interés Indicadores a vigilar - Expectativas de tasas de interés Gráfico II-7 Indicadores a observar - Expectativas de tipos de interés Indicadores a vigilar - Expectativas de tasas de interés Indicadores a vigilar - Expectativas de tasas de interés Gráfico II-8 Indicadores a observar - Expectativas de tipos de interés Indicadores a seguir - Expectativas de las tasas de interés Indicadores a seguir - Expectativas de las tasas de interés    

Highlights Fiscal stimulus is no longer a free lunch. US mortgage applications are down by 20 percent since the start of February. With rising bond yields now starting to choke private sector borrowing, bond yields are nearing an upper-limit, and even a reversal point. In which case, the tide out of defensives into cyclicals, and growth into value, will be a tide that reverses. New 6-month recommendation: underweight US banks (XLF) versus consumer staples (XLP). Fractal trade shortlist: US banks, bitcoin, ether, and GBP/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekMortgage Applications Are Down 20 Percent Why would anybody not get excited about trillions of dollars of fiscal stimulus? The two word answer is: crowding out. If a dollar that is borrowed and spent by the government (or even forecast to be borrowed and spent by the government) pushes up the bond yield, it makes it more expensive for the private sector to borrow and spend. If, as a result, the private sector scales back its borrowing by a dollar, the dollar of government spending has crowded out a dollar of private sector spending. In this case, fiscal stimulus will have no impact on GDP. The fiscal multiplier will be zero. Under some circumstances though, fiscal stimulus does not crowd out the private sector and the fiscal multiplier is extremely high. 2020 was the perfect case in point. As the pandemic gripped the world, much of the private sector was on its knees. Or to be more precise, in lockdown at home, doing nothing, receiving no income, and unwilling and unable to borrow. In such a crisis, the government became the ‘borrower of last resort’. It could, and had to, borrow at will to replace the private sector’s lost income and thereby to stabilise the collapse in demand. With no competition from private sector borrowers for the glut of excess savings, bond yields stayed depressed. Meaning that fiscal stimulus was a free lunch: it had lots of benefit with little cost (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Fiscal Stimulus Was A Free Lunch In 2020, But Not In 2021 Fiscal Stimulus Is No Longer A Free Lunch Covid-19 is still with us, and could be with us forever. Yet the economy will adapt and even thrive with structural changes, such as decentralisation, hybrid office/home working, a shift to online shopping, and less international travel. In fact, all these structural changes were underway long before Covid-19. Meaning that the pandemic was the accelerant rather than the cause of what was happening to the economy anyway. As the private sector now gets back on its feet to restructure, spend, and invest accordingly, fiscal stimulus is no longer a free lunch. Fiscal stimulus is most effective when it is not pushing up the bond yield. To repeat, last year’s massive fiscal stimulus was highly effective because it had little impact on the bond yield, so there was no crowding out of private sector borrowing. The markets have fully priced the 2021 stimulus, but not the crowding out. However, the most recent stimulus package has pushed up the bond yield or, at least, is a major culprit for the recent spike in yields. Hence, there will be some crowding out of private sector borrowing. Worryingly, US mortgage applications, for both purchasing and refinancing, are down by 20 percent since the start of February (Chart of the Week and Chart I-3). Chart I-3Mortgage Applications For Refi Are Down 20 Percent The resulting choke on private sector borrowing and investment will at least partly negate any putative boost from this fiscal stimulus. The concern is that the markets have fully priced the stimulus, but not the crowding out. Time To Rotate Back In our February 18 report, The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational, we warned that high-flying tech stocks were at a point of vulnerability. Specifically, since 2009, the technology sector earnings yield had always maintained a minimum 2.5 percent premium over the 10-year T-bond yield, defining the envelope of a ‘rational bubble.’ In February, this envelope was breached, indicating that tech stock valuations were in a new and irrational phase (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Rational Bubble Turned Irrational The warning proved to be prescient. In the second half of February, tech stocks did sell off sharply and entered a technical correction.1 As a result, tech-dominated stock markets such as China and the Netherlands also suffered sharp declines. Proving once again that regional and country stock market performance is nothing more than an extension of sector performance (Chart I-5). Chart I-5As Tech Corrected, So Did Tech-Heavy Markets But the aggregate stock market has remained more resilient than we expected, and is only modestly down versus its mid-February peak. The reason is that while highly-valued growth stocks suffered the anticipated correction, value stocks continued to advance (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Time To Rotate Back We can explain this divergence in terms of the three components of stock market valuation: The bond yield. The additional return or ‘risk premium’ for owning stocks. The expected growth of earnings. Tech and other growth stocks are ‘long-duration’ assets meaning that their earnings are weighted into the distant future. Hence, for growth stocks the relevant valuation comparison is a long-duration bond yield, say the 10-year yield. Whereas for ‘shorter-duration’ value stocks the relevant valuation comparison is a shorter-duration bond yield, say the 2-year yield. Given that the 10-year yield has risen much more than the 2-year yield, the pain has been much more pronounced for growth stock valuations. Turning to the ‘risk premium’ for owning stocks, at ultra-low bond yields the risk premium just moves in tandem with the bond yield. Hence, as the 10-year yield has spiked, the combination of a rising yield plus a rising risk premium has doubled the pain for growth stock valuations. For a detailed explanation of this dynamic please see our February 18 report. Regarding the expected growth of earnings, the market believes that stimulus is much more beneficial for economically sensitive value stocks than for economically insensitive growth stocks. But now that we are at the point where rising bond yields are starting to choke private demand, the rise in bond yields is nearing a limit, and even a reversal point. In which case, the strong tide out of defensives into cyclicals will also be a tide that reverses. On this basis, and supported by the strong technical arguments in the next section, we are opening a new 6-month position: Underweight US banks versus US consumer staples, expressed as underweight XLF versus XLP. US Banks, Bitcoin, Ether, And The Pound This week we have identified susceptibilities to countertrend moves in three areas. The bullish groupthink in US banks is at an extreme. First, based on its fragile fractal structure, the (bullish) groupthink in US banks versus consumer staples is at an extreme approaching February 2016 (bearish), December 2016 (bullish), and March 2020 (bearish). All these previous extremes in fragility proved to be turning points in relative performance. If this proves true again, the next six months could see a reversal of US bank outperformance (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The Groupthink In US Banks Is At An Extreme Second, we are extremely bullish on the structural prospects for cryptocurrencies, and are preparing a report detailing the compelling investment case. Look out for it. That said, the composite fractal structures of both bitcoin and ethereum indicate that they are technically very overbought (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). Accordingly, we are hoping for pullbacks that provide better strategic entry points for bitcoin at $40,000, and for ethereum at $1300. Chart I-8Bitcoin Is Technically Overbought Chart I-9Ethereum Is Technically Overbought Third, the UK’s Covid-19 vaccination program was one of the fastest out of the blocks. As the vaccination rate quickly rose to over half the adult population (based on at least one vaccination dose), the pound was a major beneficiary. But now, the UK vaccination program is facing the hurdle of reduced supplies. Additionally, there is the danger that the third wave of infections in Continental Europe washes onto the shores of Britain. Hence, the recent strong rally in the pound is susceptible to a countertrend reversal (Chart 10). This week’s recommended trade is short GBP/JPY setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 2.2 percent. Chart I-10The Pound Is Susceptible To A Reversal Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 A technical correction is defined as a 10 percent price decline. Fractal Trading System Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Euro Area Chart II-2Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Asia Chart II-4Other Developed   Interest Rate Chart II-5Expectations Chart II-6Expectations Chart II-7Expectations Chart II-8Expectations ​​​​​​

Highlights Stimulus checks will not be inflationary. Most households will regard them as additional wealth, and the propensity to spend additional wealth is very low. The bond market’s model for predicting inflation is the precise opposite of what happens in the real world. The bond market’s expectations for inflation are positively correlated with commodity prices, whereas actual prospective inflation is negatively correlated with commodity prices. When, as now, the crude oil price is above $50, long-term investors should overweight T-bonds versus Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). The real bond yield is much higher than the bond market is pricing, which means that equities and other risk-assets are more expensive than they appear. Fractal trades shortlist: stocks versus bonds, 30-year T-bond, NOK/PLN. Feature Chart of the WeekCrude Oil Above $50 Results In Prospective Deflation Major anomalies should not exist in the financial markets, and least of all in the government bond market which is supposed to be the most efficient market of all. But a major anomaly does exist. The anomaly is in the way that the bond market prices inflation. More about that in a moment, but let’s first discuss whether the current surge in inflation expectations is warranted. The Inflationary Impact Of Stimulus Checks Is Exaggerated Inflation expectations have risen. And they have risen especially in the US, for two reasons. First, compared with Europe, the US vaccination roll-out appears to be going relatively smoothly. Second, the US government has been more pro-active in stimulating the economy, especially in the form of issuing stimulus checks to households, as well as other so-called ‘personal current transfer payments.’ Given that this has boosted incomes while spending has been constrained, the US household sector has amassed a war chest of savings. The argument goes that as social restrictions and voluntary social distancing are eased, this war chest will get spent, unleashing a tsunami of pent-up demand which will drive up inflation. But is this argument correct? Even if social restrictions do fully ease – a big if – is it correct to assume that unspent income will get spent? A recent study by the Bank of England points out that whether unspent income gets spent depends on whether households regard it as additional income or additional wealth.1 Whether unspent income gets spent depends on whether households regard it as additional income or additional wealth. The propensity to consume out of additional income is relatively high, with estimates ranging up to 50 percent. But the propensity to consume out of additional wealth is tiny, with international estimates centred around just 5 percent. This begs the question: will households regard the stimulus checks as additional income or additional wealth? The answer depends on whether the household has a low income or a high income. Lower income households, that have borne the brunt of job losses and furloughs, have suffered big drops in their income relative to consumption. Hence, they will regard the stimulus checks as additional income. But to the extent that the additional income is just (partly) replacing lost income, it will not boost their consumption versus what it would have been absent the lost income. On the other hand, higher income households and retirees have largely maintained their incomes while their consumption has fallen. This is where the surge in savings is concentrated. But not being ‘income or liquidity constrained’, these higher income households are more likely to deposit the stimulus checks into their savings accounts (or the stock market), regarding it as additional wealth. Hence, any boost to consumption will be modest and short-lived. In fact, this was precisely what happened after previous issues of stimulus checks, such as in 2008 and 2009. Stimulus checks had no meaningful impact on consumption or inflation trends (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Stimulus Checks Had No Meaningful Impact On Consumption Or Inflation Trends A Major Anomaly In The Bond Market The recent surge in inflation expectations has moved in perfect lockstep with higher prices for commodities, especially crude oil. At first glance, this relationship seems intuitive. After all, we associate higher commodity prices with higher inflation. But on further thought, the tight positive correlation between inflation expectations and commodity price levels is counterintuitive. The first issue is basic maths. Inflation is a change in a price, so it should not move in lockstep with the level of any price. But there is a much bigger issue. Whether the commodity price is driving inflation expectations or whether inflation expectations are driving the commodity price, a higher price today will feed back into lower prospective inflation. In fact, a crude oil price above $50 has consistently predicted prospective deflation in the oil price, leading to CPI inflation underperforming its 2 percent target (Chart of the Week). The bond market’s model for predicting inflation is the precise opposite of what happens in the real world. The important takeaway is that the bond market’s model for predicting inflation is the precise opposite of what happens in the real world. The bond market’s expectations for inflation are positively correlated with commodity prices, but actual prospective inflation is negatively correlated with commodity prices (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3The Bond Market's Expectations For Inflation Are Positively Correlated With Commodity Prices... Chart I-4...But Actual Prospective Inflation Is Negatively Correlated With Commodity Prices This major anomaly in the bond market creates a great opportunity for long-term bond investors. When the (Brent) crude oil price is above $50, long-term investors should overweight T-bonds versus Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). And vice-versa when crude falls below $50. With Brent now at $68, the appropriate long-term stance is to overweight T-bonds versus TIPS (Chart I-5). Chart I-5When The (Brent) Oil Price Is Above , Long-Term Investors Should Overweight T-bonds Versus TIPS There are also implications for other investors. Given that the bond market is useless at predicting inflation, it is also useless at assessing real interest rates. Specifically, when crude is above $50, the ex-post (realised) real bond yield will be higher than the ex-ante (assumed) real bond yield (Chart I-6). The important takeaway right now is that in any comparison with the real bond yield, equities and other risk-assets are even more expensive than they appear. Chart I-6When The (Brent) Oil Price Is Above , The Realised Real Bond Yield Will Be Higher Than Assumed Embrace The Fractal Market Hypothesis The Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) is a breakthrough in the understanding of financial markets, replacing the defunct Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The breakthrough insight from the Fractal Market Hypothesis is that the market is not always efficient. The market is efficient only when a wide spectrum of investment time horizons is setting the price, signified by the market having a rich fractal structure. The Fractal Market Hypothesis (FMH) is a breakthrough in the understanding of financial markets. The corollary is that when the fractal structure becomes extremely fragile, it tells us that the information and interpretation of long-term investors is missing from the recent price setting, and is likely to reappear. At which point, the most recent price trend, fuelled by short-term groupthink, will break down. As most investors are unaware of the Fractal Market Hypothesis, it gives a competitive advantage to the few investors that do embrace it. Through the past five years, our proprietary Fractal Trading System has identified countertrend trading opportunities with truly excellent results. After 207 trades, the ‘win ratio’ stands at 61 percent. Yet as we understand more about this breakthrough theory of finance, we believe we can do even better. Today, we are very pleased to upgrade the trading system with innovations to the calculations of fractal structure, the countertrend profit opportunity, and the optimal holding period, all detailed in Box I-1. Box 1: Fractal Trading System Principles Countertrend opportunities in an investment will be identified by a fragile composite fractal structure, based on 65-day, 130-day, and 260-day fractal dimensions approaching their lower bounds. The countertrend profit target will be based on a Fibonacci retracement. There will be a symmetrical stop-loss. The maximum holding period will be trade-specific and vary from 33 to 130 business days (broadly 6 weeks to 6 months). From today, we will also identify a larger number of fragile fractal structures and especially highlight those that are evident in mainstream investments. From this shortlist of candidates, we will choose the most compelling to add into our portfolio. In many cases, the alignment of a fundamental argument with a fragile fractal structure will reinforce the investment case. Among our most recent recommendations, underweight China versus New Zealand achieved its 9 percent target, short Korean won versus US dollar achieved its 2.5 percent target, and long Russian rouble versus South African rand expired at 1.5 percent profit. This week, we highlight that the composite fractal structures of stocks versus bonds and the 30-year T-bond are becoming extremely fragile (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). To be clear, this does not guarantee a countertrend move, but it does indicate an elevated susceptibility to a countertrend move. Hence, for the time being, we remain tactically neutral stocks versus bonds.  Chart I-7The Fractal Structure Of Stocks Versus Bonds Is Becoming Fragile Chart I-8The Fractal Structure Of The 30-Year T-Bond Is Becoming Fragile In the foreign exchange markets, we note that the strong advance in the Norwegian krone, fuelled by the rally in crude oil, is vulnerable to a pullback (Chart I-9). Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short NOK/PLN, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop at 2.6 percent. Chart I-9Short NOK/PLN   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Bank of England, An update on the economic outlook by Gertjan Vlieghe, 22 February 2021 Fractal Trading System Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Euro Area Chart II-2Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Asia Chart II-4Other Developed   Interest Rate Chart II-5Expectations Chart II-6Expectations Chart II-7Expectations Chart II-8Expectations