Geopolitics
Highlights Investors are understating the risks that the Trump administration will enact protectionist trade policies. Contrary to popular belief, the economic costs to the U.S. of a protracted "trade war" would be low. The geopolitical impact, however, would be much more sizeable, as would the impact on S&P 500 profits. The near-term risks to global equities are on the downside, although firmer growth in developed economies should provide support to stocks over a 12-month horizon. Global bond yields will be higher this time next year, as will the dollar. The yen is especially vulnerable. We are closing our long Spanish/short Italian 10-year bond trade for a gain of 6.2%. Feature They come over here, they sell their cars, their VCRs. They knock the hell out of our companies. - Donald Trump in an interview with Oprah Winfrey discussing trade with Japan, 1988 Making Tariffs Great Again Donald Trump has flip-flopped on many issues. On trade, however, he has been perfectly consistent. As the quote above demonstrates, Trump has been advocating mercantilist policies ever since he entered the public spotlight in the 1980s. Even in the unlikely event that he wanted to pivot on this issue, he would be hard-pressed to do so. The Republican establishment and most Democrats will hate him no matter what he does. If Trump backpedals from his hardline stance on trade and immigration, he will lose a large chunk of his white, working-class base (Chart 1). One might argue that Trump would have no choice but to adopt a more conciliatory tone if the imposition of protectionist trade policies were to push the U.S. into a recession. However, contrary to widespread opinion, it is far from obvious that this would happen. While rising protectionism would have a major negative effect on many other economies, the impact on the U.S. would be modest, even if other countries were to match higher U.S. tariffs with retaliatory measures. Keep in mind that the U.S. is a relatively closed economy, with exports totaling only 12% of GDP. Exports to China and Mexico amount to 0.9% and 1.4% of GDP, respectively. And much of these exports are intermediate goods that are processed and reshipped back to the U.S. or some other third market. It would not make sense for China or Mexico to put up import barriers on these intermediate goods because this would just reduce domestic employment, without giving domestic firms much of a leg up. One should also remember that an appreciation of the dollar reduces U.S. export competitiveness in much the same way as higher tariffs placed by foreign governments on U.S.-made goods. The real trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 20% since mid-2014 (Chart 2). While this obviously has been unpleasant for U.S. exporters, it has not pushed the economy into recession. Neither will retaliatory foreign tariffs. Chart 1Trump's Supporters Are Not ##br##Free Trade Enthusiasts Chart 2The Dollar Has Been ##br##Appreciating Since Mid-2014 Why The Consensus On Trade Is Misleading The view expressed above is far outside the consensus and clashes strongly with the large number of studies arguing that the implementation of Trump's trade agenda would have grave consequences for the U.S. economy. Let me first enumerate the ways these studies fall short on strictly economic grounds, and then discuss why they may still ring true if one takes a broader perspective. As far as the pure economics are concerned, these studies all suffer from some combination of the following deficiencies: They assume that foreign producers can fully or almost fully pass on the cost of U.S. tariffs to their customers. In reality, the evidence suggests that foreign producers will absorb about half of the increase in tariffs through lower profit margins. In other words, the imposition of a 20% tariff would only raise U.S. import prices by around 10%. Granted, retaliatory tariffs would squeeze the profit margins of U.S. exporters. However, this effect would be mitigated by the fact that the U.S. runs large bilateral trade deficits with China and Mexico (Chart 3), as well as the fact that foreign producers have less pricing power in the relatively large U.S. market than American producers have abroad. On net, this implies that higher trade barriers could actually make the U.S. better off by shifting the terms of trade in its favor. Chart 3The U.S. Runs Large Bilateral Trade Deficits With China And Mexico These studies treat tariffs like regular old taxes. To the extent that tariffs are taxes whose burden is partly borne by domestic consumers, their imposition has a dampening effect on activity. However, to model the impact of higher tariffs simply as a tightening of fiscal policy implicitly assumes that any tariff revenue will be used to pay down debt, rather than being used to finance tax cuts and spending increases. Given that Trump is touting a program of fiscal stimulus, that is not a sensible assumption. Moreover, unlike, say, a sales tax hike, higher tariffs divert demand towards domestically-produced goods. This tends to boost employment. These studies overstate the adverse effect of tariffs on domestic investment. More than half of global trade consists of capital equipment and intermediate goods (Chart 4). To the extent that higher tariffs raise the cost of production, this can lower investment. Moreover, trade barriers tend to increase economic inefficiencies. This can lead to slower productivity growth, causing firms to reduce capital spending. In practice, however, neither effect is particularly significant. As we discussed two weeks ago, the negative impact of trade barriers on productivity growth is generally overstated, especially for large economies like the United States.1 Chart 5 shows that productivity growth was actually faster in the three decades following the Second World War than in the hyper-globalization era that began in the early 1980s. Chart 4Intermediate And Capital Goods ##br##Make Up Over Half Of Global Trade Chart 5Rising Trade Has Not ##br##Boosted Productivity Growth While the price of capital goods does influence investment spending, for the most part, firms tend to base their investment decisions on the expected demand for their products. Since the U.S. runs a trade deficit, an equal percentage-point decline in both exports and imports would increase final demand through the familiar Y=C+I+G+X-M identity. This should lead to higher investment. Moreover, even if higher trade barriers leave final demand unaffected, there are reasons to think that investment would still rise. Think about a closed economy where most households decide all of a sudden that they prefer strawberry ice cream over vanilla ice cream. Let us assume, just for the sake of argument, that shifting production from vanilla to strawberry ice cream is very difficult and requires a lot of new investment. What do you expect would happen to overall investment in this economy? The answer is that it would likely rise, as companies scramble to build out new strawberry ice cream-making capacity. Now extend the analogy to trade. If the U.S. slaps tariffs on manufacturing imports, this will lead to a wave of new domestic investment in industries that benefit from tariff protection. This is bad news for companies that must incur the cost of relocating production back onshore, but it is good news for American workers who can now find gainful employment. The Bigger Picture Our guess is that in purely economic terms, the U.S. would not suffer much if the Trump administration were to forge ahead with its protectionist trade agenda, and could actually benefit if America's trading partners felt restrained in how they could retaliate. Yet, focusing only on the economics misses the bigger picture. Trade agreements are also about politics - they help form the geopolitical glue that holds the global community together. As we noted two weeks ago, the real reason the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was so disastrous was not because it contributed to the Great Depression, but because it led to a breakdown of international relations among democratic governments at a time when fascism was on the rise.2 Donald Trump's threat to pull out of trade deals and unilaterally impose tariffs on countries that he feels are engaging in unfair trade practices is likely to accelerate the shift to a multipolar geopolitical order where competing countries strive to carve out their own spheres of influence. As Chart 6 shows, such geopolitical orders have often contributed to the breakdown of globalization, and at times, have even led to military conflict. Chart 6AIncreasing Multipolarity And De-Globalization Tend To Go Hand-In-Hand Chart 6BIncreasing Multipolarity And De-Globalization Tend To Go Hand-In-Hand The fact that rising protectionism could benefit the U.S. at the expense of other countries is bound to stoke anger abroad. China, the focus of much of Trump's rhetoric, is especially vulnerable. Trump has threatened to declare the country a "currency manipulator," even though it meets only one of the three criteria for such a designation as set out by the Treasury Department.3 Other countries should not breathe a sigh of relief, however. There is a certain logic about protectionism that makes it difficult to hike tariffs on just one or two countries. For example, if the U.S. raises tariffs on China, some of the existing demand for Chinese goods will be diverted to countries such as Korea or Vietnam, rather than back to the U.S. This creates an incentive to raise tariffs on those countries as well. It is easy to see how the whole global trading system can break down under such circumstances. Investment Conclusions Donald Trump's threat of across-the-border tariffs of 35% on Mexican goods and 45% on Chinese goods will likely turn out to be a negotiating ploy. That said, some increase in trade barriers seems inevitable. These need not even be explicit barriers. Trump's success in browbeating Carrier into keeping its plant open in Indiana is an example of things to come. Corporate America does a lot of business with the government, and the subtle threat of cancelled government contracts will make any CEO take notice. Good news for Main Street perhaps, but definitely bad news for Wall Street. For now, investors are focusing on the positive elements of Trump's agenda. That may change soon. Yes, increased infrastructure spending and corporate tax cuts are both bullish for stocks. However, effective U.S. corporate tax rates are already quite low thanks to numerous loopholes. Thus, any cuts to statutory rates may not boost S&P 500 profits by as much as investors are hoping (Chart 7). And while more infrastructure investment is welcome, there simply are not enough "shovel ready" projects around. Chart 7U.S. Effective Corporate Tax Rate Is Already Quite Low Moreover, Trump's plan to finance infrastructure spending through private-public partnerships greatly narrows the universe of possible projects. The U.S. Society Of Civil Engineers estimates that most of the "infrastructure gap" consists of deferred maintenance (i.e., potholes to fix, bridges to repair).4 It is difficult to get investors interested in such work, which is why it is typically financed directly through government budgets. Meanwhile, financial conditions have tightened via a stronger dollar and higher bond yields (Chart 8). Historically, such a tightening has been bearish for stocks (Table 1). We are tactically cautious on a three-month horizon, and are positioned for this by being short the NASDAQ 100 futures. Our guess is that global equities will correct by about 5%-to-10% from current levels, setting the stage for positive returns down the road. U.S. high-yield spreads, which are near post-crisis lows, are also likely to widen (Chart 9). Chart 8U.S. Financial Conditions Have Eased Chart 9U.S. High-Yield Spreads Likely To Widen Table 1Stocks Tend To Suffer When Bond Yields Spike A correction in risk assets could temporarily knock down Treasury yields. Nevertheless, the long-term path for global bond yields is to the upside. The three key features of Trump's platform - fiscal stimulus, tighter immigration controls, and trade protectionism - are all inflationary. Only JGB yields are likely to stay put for the foreseeable future due to the BOJ's well-timed decision to peg the 10-year yield at zero. As bond yields elsewhere rise, the yen will come under further downward pressure. We see USD/JPY reaching 125 in 12 months' time. Chart 10Global Growth Is Accelerating A weaker yen should boost Japanese stocks, at least in local-currency terms. European equities will also benefit from a somewhat cheaper euro and firming global growth (Chart 10). Steeper yield curves are helping to boost European bank shares, despite ongoing concerns about the health of the Italian financial sector. As we have discussed in the past, systemic risks around the Italian banks are overstated.5 With that in mind, we are closing our long Spanish/short Italian 10-year bond trade for a gain of 6.2%. The recent rally in commodity markets and the uptick in global activity indicators are welcome developments for emerging markets. Still, it will be hard for EM equities to muster a sustainable rally as long as the dollar remains in an uptrend and protectionist sentiment is on the rise. For now, a modest underweight in EM stocks is warranted. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1,2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Elusive Gains From Globalization," dated November 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The U.S. Treasury is allowed to define a country as a currency manipulator if: i) it runs a large trade surplus with the U.S.; ii) it has an excessively large current account surplus with the rest of the world; and iii) it is engaging in direct foreign exchange intervention in order to weaken its currency. While the first criterion arguably holds, the other two do not, given that China's overall current account surplus currently stands at 2.4% of GDP and recent currency intervention has been designed to prevent the yuan from depreciating more than it would have otherwise. 4 Please see "Failure to Act: Closing the Infrastructure Investment Gap for America's Economic Future," American Society of Civil Engineers (2016). 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Italian Bank Job," dated July 29, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights ECB QE has pushed the euro area's Target2 banking imbalance to an all-time high. Thereby, QE has raised the cost of euro break-up. The ECB must dial down QE because the Target2 banking imbalance is directly related to the size of asset purchases. Core euro area sovereign bonds offer poor relative value in the government bond universe. Long Italian BTPs / short French OATs is now appropriate as a tactical position. Italian bank investors might have to suffer more pain before Brussels ultimately allows a public rescue. Feature "We've eliminated fragmentation in the euro area." Mario Draghi, speaking on October 20, 2016 Mario Draghi is wrong. QE was meant to reduce economic and financial fragmentation within the euro area. But in one important regard, it has done the exact opposite. In an un-fragmented monetary union, banking system liquidity would be spread evenly across the euro area. Unfortunately, the trillions of euros of QE liquidity created by the ECB has concentrated in four northern European countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland (but interestingly, not France). This extreme fragmentation is captured in the euro area's Target2 banking imbalance (Box I-1), which is now at an all-time high (Chart of the Week). Box 1: What Is Target2? Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. It is the settlement system for euro payment flows between banks in the euro area. These payment flows result from trade or financial transactions such as deposit transfers, sales of financial assets or debt repayments. If the banking system in one member country has more payment inflows than outflows, its national central bank (NCB) accrues a Target2 asset vis-à-vis the ECB. Conversely, if the banking system has more outflows than inflows, the respective NCB accrues a Target2 liability. Target2 balances therefore show the cumulative net payment flows within the euro area. Chart of the WeekQE Has Pushed The Euro Area's Target2 Imbalance To An All-Time High To be absolutely clear, this geographical polarization of bank liquidity is not deposit flight in the strictest sense (Chart I-2). Investors are simply using the ECB's €80bn of monthly bond purchases to offload their Italian, Spanish and Portuguese bonds to the central bank, and hold the received cash in banks in perceived haven countries. Nevertheless, ECB QE has unwittingly facilitated a geographical polarization of bank liquidity more extreme than in the darkest days of 2012 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2No Funding Stresses At The Moment Chart I-3Target2 Imbalances Are The Result Of QE QE Has Exposed Euro Area Banking Fragmentation To understand how this polarization has arisen, it is necessary to grasp how Eurosystem accounting works. The following section is necessarily technical, but stick with it because it is important. The ECB delegates its QE sovereign bond purchases to the respective national central bank (NCB): the Bundesbank buys German bunds, the Bank of France buys OATs, the Bank of Italy buys BTPs, and so on. When the Bank of Italy buys a BTP from, say, an Italian investor, the investor gives up the bond, but simultaneously receives a corresponding asset - cash. If the investor then deposits this cash at an Italian bank, say Unicredit, then Unicredit would have a new liability - the investor deposit. But in line with Eurosystem accounting, Unicredit would simultaneously receive a corresponding credit at its NCB, the Bank of Italy.1 Completing the accounting circle, the Bank of Italy would now have a new liability - the Unicredit claim, but it would also have a corresponding asset - the BTP that it has just bought. Therefore, all three accounts would be in perfect balance (see Figure I-1). Figure I-1Italian Investor Sells A BTP To The Bank Of Italy And Deposits The Cash At Unicredit Now consider what happens if the Italian investor deposits the cash not at Unicredit, but at a German bank, say Commerzbank. In this case, it would be the Bundesbank that had a new liability - the Commerzbank claim. However, the Bundesbank would not have a corresponding asset. Conversely, the Bank of Italy would have a new asset - the BTP, but without a corresponding liability. In order to balance these Eurosystem accounts, the Bundesbank would accrue a Target2 asset vis-à-vis the ECB, while the Bank of Italy would accrue an equal and opposite Target2 liability (see Figure I-2). Figure I-2Italian Investor Sells A BTP To The Bank Of Italy And Deposits The Cash At Commerzbank Essentially, the Target2 imbalance captures the mismatch between a Bundesbank liability denominated in 'German' euros and a corresponding Bank of Italy asset denominated in 'Italian' euros. Aggregated over the whole euro area, these imbalances now amount to more than €1 trillion. Does any of this Eurosystem accounting gymnastics really matter? No, as long as the monetary union holds together and the 'German' euro equals the 'Italian' euro. But if Germany and Italy started using different currencies, then suddenly the Target2 imbalances would matter enormously. This is because the Bundesbank liability to Commerzbank would be redenominated into Deutschemarks, while the Bank of Italy asset would be redenominated into lira. Hence, the ECB might end up with much larger liabilities than assets. In which case, any shortfall would have to be borne by the ECB's shareholders - essentially, euro area member states pro-rata to GDP. The ECB Must Dial Down QE Unlike in the depths of the euro debt crisis, the current Target2 imbalances do not reflect deposit flight. Rather, they are the direct result of ECB QE. Nonetheless, the indisputable fact is that QE has increased the cost of euro break-up. And another six or more months of QE will just add to this cost. Some people might argue that by increasing the cost of a divorce, an actual split becomes less likely. But this reasoning is weak. As we have seen in this year's polling victories for Brexit and President-elect Trump, the biggest risk comes from a populist backlash against the status quo. And populist backlashes do not stop to do detailed cost benefit analysis. Although the ECB is unlikely to broadcast the unintended side-effects of its policy, it must be acutely aware that the costs of QE are rising while its benefits are diminishing. Given that the Target2 imbalances are directly related to the size of asset purchases, the ECB needs to indicate its intention to dial down QE purchases. And if it does need to loosen policy again in the future, it might be better off emulating the Bank of Japan - in targeting a yield rather than an asset purchase amount. The 6-9 month investment implication is that core euro area sovereign bonds offer poor relative value in the government bond universe. And within the core euro area, perhaps French OATs offer the least relative value. OATs are priced as haven sovereign bonds, yet interestingly Target2 imbalances suggest that banking liquidity flows do not regard France as a haven in the same way as Germany (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4French OATs Are Priced ##br##As Haven Bonds... Chart I-5...But Banking Liquidity Flows Do Not ##br##Regard France As A Haven Another implication is that the euro should be stable or stronger against a basket of other developed economy currencies. Indeed, expect euro/pound to lurch up in the first half of next year when the U.K. government triggers Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to formally begin Brexit negotiations. Only then will the EU27 reveal its own negotiating strategy, and it is highly unlikely to be a sweet deal for the U.K. Italian Referendum Result: A Postscript The financial markets have shrugged off the Italian public's resounding "no" to constitutional reform, and rightly so. The current constitution, created in the aftermath of the Second World was designed to prevent a repeat of a populist like Benito Mussolini gaining power. Irrespective of whether the next General Election is in 2017 or 2018, the no vote actually reduces political tail-risk. A tactical position that is long Italian BTPs and short French OATs is now appropriate. As we discussed last week in Italy: Asking The Wrong Question the bigger issue is how Italy will unburden its banks of its non-performing loans (NPLs). Monte de Paschi's efforts at raising equity are baby steps in the right direction. But Monte de Paschi's €23 billion of sour loans2 are just the tip of Italy' NPL iceberg, which sizes up at €320 billion in gross terms and €170 billion net of provisions. These numbers, expressed as a share of GDP, show striking parallels with peak NPLs in Spain's banking system (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Spain ultimately unburdened its banks with a government bailout. Italy may have to do the same. But this will require Brussels to let Italy bend the EU's new bail-in rules for troubled and failing banks. Chart I-6Spain Unburdened Its Banks ##br##With A Government Bailout... Chart I-7...Italy May Ultimately##br## Do The Same The danger for investors is that Italian bank equity and bond holders might have to suffer more pain before Brussels relents. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Unicredit and all other commercial banks use their accounts at their NCLs to make interbank payments. 2 MPS NPLs amount to €45bn in gross terms and €23bn net of provisions. Fractal Trading Model* Bucking the synchronized sell-off in global bonds, Greek sovereign bonds have actually rallied strongly in the last three months. But this rally could be near exhaustion, warranting a countertrend position. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights An Italian referendum 'no' is not really revolting. Some people are voting no for no change to the current constitution's vital checks and balances. Lean against any knee-jerk widening of the Italian sovereign yield spread versus France that followed a no vote. Lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote. A 50bps spike in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months is normally a bad omen for risk-asset performance. Retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Feature After shock victories for Brexit and Donald Trump at the polls, a 'no' vote in Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform would be the next worrying sign of a growing grassroots revolt against the establishment. Or would it? An Italian 'No' Is Not Really Revolting The votes for Brexit or Donald Trump were clearly votes for change. At first glance, an Italian no would also look like a revolt, with the potential to trigger political uncertainty and instability in the euro area's third largest economy. Chart of the WeekItalian Banks Are Tracking Japanese 'Zombie' Banks The truth is more nuanced. Clearly, some Italians are voting no to reject Prime Minister Renzi. But others - including former Prime Minister Mario Monti - are voting no for no change. These voters want to leave in place the current constitution's vital checks and balances. If Italians vote yes to constitutional reform, the upper house of parliament - the Senate - would be relegated to an advisory chamber. Meanwhile, an already approved new electoral law for the lower house of parliament - the Chamber of Deputies - hands an automatic 55 percent majority of seats to the largest party. Some people fear that this combination would amount to excessive executive power. So they are voting no to mitigate the danger. Granted, a no vote might also force Renzi to resign, but this would not necessarily trigger new elections. President Sergio Mattarella would likely explore options for a new government - perhaps a technocratic government - which the parties in the current governing coalition have a strong incentive to support until the next elections are due in 2018. Even if there were early elections, it is improbable that they would result in a government led by the populist 5 Star Movement. If 5 Star was the largest party, it would hold a 55 percent majority of seats in the lower house, but only 30 percent in the upper house, in proportion to its popular vote share (Chart I-2). Therefore, it could not form a government. Under the current constitution, the government needs the support of both houses. The irony is that a yes vote - by giving the executive excessive powers - would make it more likely for a populist party like 5 Star to form a government in 2018 or beyond. Still, even this might prove a tall order. Italy's constitutional court is reviewing the electoral law change that gives 55 percent of lower house seats to the largest party. The court will likely demand more proportionality, making it hard for any one party to win an outright majority. This means more coalition governments, which 5 Star rejects. Hence, an Italian no will not be the equivalent of the Brexit vote or U.S. election of Donald Trump. Fears that it will unleash a dangerous phase of populism and political instability in Italy are overblown. Yet in the last three months, the Italian sovereign yield spread has widened sharply versus France (Chart I-3). Note also that the 65-day fractal dimension of the Italy versus France sovereign bond performance is close to its technical limit, indicating excessive pessimistic groupthink. Chart I-2The 5 Star Movement Could Not Form A ##br##Government Under The Current Constitution Chart I-3Italy's Political Risk Premium Has ##br##Increased, But Is It Justified? If December 4 brings a no vote in the Italian referendum combined with the election of a far-right President of Austria - whose role is largely ceremonial - the knee-jerk market response might still be fright. In which case, a further widening in the Italy/France yield spread would be a tactical entry opportunity, given that political risk is overstated. Fixing Italian Banks Needs A 'Deep-V' Or A 'Long-L' The real question in Italy is not about an imminent populist backlash. The real question is what does the cure for Italy's banking malaise look like? The answer is either a 'deep-V', meaning a banking crisis forces a quick workout; or a 'long-L', meaning no banking crisis but a very long struggle back to normal health. As an investor, neither seems particularly appealing. Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the housing-related credit booms in Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown financial crises - requiring urgent government-led and central bank-led bailouts. Today, Italian banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) account for 18% of gross lending, and NPLs net of provisions equal 85% of equity capital. A few years ago, Irish banks looked even worse. Irish NPLs peaked at 25% of gross lending in 2013 and net NPLs peaked at 100% of equity capital. Following government bailouts Irish banks have recovered well (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Likewise, the Spanish government created a 'bad bank' in 2012 to offload bank NPLs. Subsequently, Spanish banks' NPLs as a share of gross lending has almost halved. Chart I-4Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy##br## For NPLs As A Share Of Loans Chart I-5Ireland Looked Worse Than Italy ##br##For NPLs As A Share Of Capital Compared to Ireland and Spain, Italy's avoidance of outright crisis (thus far) appears a blessing. Unfortunately, it is now a curse. In waiting so long, Italy cannot follow Ireland, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S. in their escapes from their banking woes. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which came into full force on January 1 2016, has blocked the bailout escape route. The BRRD does allow state intervention in a banking crisis. But the overarching aim is to protect banks' critical functions and stakeholders, specifically: payment systems, taxpayers and depositors. Therefore, in a banking crisis "other parts may be allowed to fail in the normal way... after shares in full... then evenly on holders of subordinated bonds and then evenly on senior bondholders." For bank investors, this would constitute the 'deep-V' cure: likely intense pain up-front albeit with much better long-term prospects thereafter. Alternatively, without a crisis, the process to recognise and expunge NPLs would be largely up to the private sector and markets. But a long chain of events from the repossession of assets under bankruptcy law, to valuation, to full divestment from the banks' balance sheets could take years. Indeed, the Chart of the Week shows a striking parallel between Italian bank profits and Japan's 'zombie' bank profits, if we lag the Japanese experience by 17 years. Japan perfectly illustrates this alternative 'long-L' cure: no outright crisis, just a long and seemingly never-ending struggle back to normal health. Either way, absent any further information, we would lean against any knee-jerk rally in Italian banks that followed a yes vote on December 4. What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? Turning to the broader financial markets, a bigger concern is the impact that sharply higher bond yields will have on growth and/or on risk-asset valuations. Higher long-term borrowing costs depress credit growth as captured in the credit impulse (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). A depressed credit impulse then almost always drags down subsequent GDP growth. The recent spike in U.S. 15-year and 30-year mortgage rates has already caused mortgage refinancing applications to plunge by 40% since July (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Higher Bond Yields Depress##br## Credit Growth In Europe... Chart I-7...And In ##br##The U.S. Chart I-8Mortgage Applications##br## Have Plunged Prior to the current incidence, a 50bps rise in the JPM Global Government Bond Yield in just 3 months has occurred only eight times this century (Chart I-9). Table I-1 lists those eight occasions and the subsequent 3-month performance of the equity market. On three out of the eight occasions, the equity market rose modestly, but on the other five it fell. Chart I-9The Bond Yield Has Spiked Table I-1What Happens When Bond Yields Spike? But perhaps the most interesting finding is that on all eight occasions, the equity market's subsequent 3-month performance consistently deteriorated, on average by -7%, compared to the preceding 3-month performance. For reference, today's preceding 3-month performance is just 0.7%. Given this evidence, it is prudent to retain a cautious stance to risk-assets on a 3-month horizon. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The Italy versus France sovereign bond underperformance indicates excessive pessimistic groupthink. However, in this instance we would wait until after Italy's December 4 referendum on constitutional reform before initiating the countertrend trade. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
Recommended Allocation The Meaning Of Trump Sudden large shocks in markets are rare. But the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President is one such. After a shock of this magnitude, markets tend initially to overreact, then correct, before settling on a new course. Market action since November 9th has caused many asset prices to overshoot short term. It is likely that U.S. bond yields, inflation expectations, the performance of bank and materials stocks, and the U.S. dollar (Chart 1) will correct over the next month or so, perhaps triggered by the Fed's likely rate hike on December 14th or simply by shifting expectations for Trump's economic policies. But what is the likely long-term course, which should set our asset allocation for the next 6 to 12 months? We think investors should take Trump at least partly at his word when he says he will enact tax cuts and increase infrastructure investment. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service sees few constraints on Trump from Congress in the short term.1 The OECD in its latest Economic Outlook has given its imprimatur, arguing that "a stronger fiscal policy response is needed," and estimating that U.S. fiscal stimulus could add 0.1 percentage point to global growth next year and 0.3 points in 2018.2 If such a policy boosted growth and inflation, it would be negative for bonds. The only question, with 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yields having already risen by almost 100 bps since July, is how much of this is priced in. In the long run, government bond yields are broadly correlated with nominal GDP growth (Chart 2). In H1 2016, U.S. nominal GDP growth was 2.7%, and for 2016 as a whole probably about 3.2%. If it picks up to 4-5% in 2017 (2.5-3% real, plus inflation of 1.5-2%), an additional rise of 50-100 bps in the 10-year yield would not be surprising (though ECB and BoJ asset purchases might somewhat limit the rise in yields). Moreover, growth was already accelerating before Trump's victory. The effects of 2015's commodity shock and industrial and profits recessions have passed, with U.S. Q3 GDP growth revised up to 3.2% and the Fed's NowCasting models suggesting 2.5%-3.6% for Q4. The Citi Economic Surprise Index has surprised on the upside in recent weeks both in the U.S. and Europe - though not in emerging markets (Chart 3). And the Q3 earnings season in the U.S. was well above expectations, with EPS coming in at +3.3% YoY (compared to a consensus forecast pre-results of -2.2%). Analysts' forecasts for 2017 EPS growth are a comparatively modest 11%. Chart 1Some Short-Term Overshoots Chart 2Bond Yields Relate To Nominal Growth Chart 3Growth Was Already Surprising On The Upside But whether this new world will be positive for equities is harder to answer. Trump's unpredictability raises policy uncertainty: how much emphasis, for example, will he put on trade protectionism or confrontational foreign policy? This should raise the risk premium. The Fed's response will also be key. Futures have now priced in the rate hike in December and (almost) the two further rate hikes in the Fed's dots for 2017 (Chart 4). But the market still sees the long-term equilibrium rate (as expressed in five-year five-year forwards) as only just over 2%, compared to the Fed's 2.9%. And, although Janet Yellen has suggested that the Fed will act only after Trump's policies take effect ("We will be watching the decisions that Congress makes and updating our economic outlook as the policy landscape becomes clearer," she said), if core PCE inflation continues to pick up in 2017 beyond the current 1.7% and a strong stimulus package is implemented, the Fed might accelerate its rate hikes. More worryingly, Trump's fundamental views on monetary policy are unknown: does he, as a businessman, like low rates, or will he listen to his "hard money" advisers who believe the Fed has been too lax? Since he can appoint six FOMC governors in his first year in office, he will be able to influence monetary policy. Too fast a rise in Fed rates would be negative for equities. On balance, in this environment we see equities outperforming bonds over the next 12 months. It is unusual for the stock-to-bond ratio to decline outside of a global recession (Chart 5) - and, with the extra boost from fiscal policy (with Trump possibly joined by Japan, the U.K., China and others), a recession is unlikely over our forecast horizon. Chart 4Market Has Priced In 2017 Fed Hikes - ##br##But Not The Long-Term Chart 5Stocks Don't Often ##br##Underperform Outside Recession Accordingly, we are raising our recommendation for global equities to overweight, and lowering bonds to underweight. The problem is timing: we recognize that there may be a better entry point over the next couple of months. Some investors may, therefore, want to implement the change gradually. In addition, some recent market moves are not fundamentally justified: for example, we cannot see how the materials sector would be a significant beneficiary from a Trump fiscal stimulus. We plan to make further detailed adjustments to our equity country and sector recommendations and bond-class recommendations in the next Quarterly Portfolio Update, to be published on December 15th. Currencies: Stronger U.S. growth and tighter monetary policy suggest that the USD will continue to appreciate. The dollar looks somewhat expensive but is still well below the peak of overvaluation at the end of previous bouts of strength in 1985 and 2002. The Bank of Japan's policy of capping the 10-year JGB yield at 0% has worked well (pushing the yen down by 12% against the dollar in the past two months) and, as rates elsewhere rise, this implies further long-run yen weakness. The euro is likely to weaken less, with eurozone growth recently surprising on the upside and the ECB therefore likely to reconsider the amount of asset purchases at some point next year, though probably not at its meeting on December 8th. Emerging market currencies continue to look particularly vulnerable. Equities: In common currency terms, U.S. equities are more attractive than European ones. In local currency terms, however, the call is closer since the strong dollar will depress U.S. earnings relative to those in Europe, and an acceleration of global economic growth should help the more cyclical eurozone stock market. On the other hand, Europe faces structural issues, such as the chronically poor profitability of its banking system, and political risk from a series of upcoming elections (starting with the Italian referendum on December 4th). We continue to like Japan (on a currency hedged basis) and expect that the BoJ's policy will be bolstered by government fiscal and employment policies. We remain underweight on emerging markets. They have always been vulnerable during periods of dollar strength, and political side-effects from their bout of economic weakness in 2011-5 are starting to spread, recently to Turkey, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Korea and South Africa. Fixed Income: The risk of tighter Fed policy and higher yields suggest investors should remain underweight duration. We have liked U.S. TIPS over nominal bonds all year and, with 10-year breakeven inflation still only at 1.8%, they remain attractive in the current environment. We reduced high-yield bonds to neutral on September 30th, on the grounds that investors were no longer being sufficiently compensated for default risk: they have subsequently given -3% return, while equities rallied. We recommend investment grade credits for those investors who need to pick up yield (Chart 6). Commodities: After the OPEC agreement on production cuts, we expect the oil price to move towards $55 in the first few months of 2017 as inventories are drawn down. Over the longer run the risk is to the upside as a dearth of new projects, following cancellations last year, will tighten the supply/demand balance. Metals prices have strengthened since Trump's victory, with the CRB Raw Industrials Index up sharply (Chart 7). This makes little sense. Trump's stimulus will be centered on tax, not infrastructure. China remains a far more important factor: the U.S. represented only 7% of global steel consumption in 2015, for example, compared to 43% for China. And China's recent stimulus is running out of steam. Chart 6Yield On Investment Grade Credits ##br##Still Attractive Chart 7Trump Shouldn't Have ##br##This Much Effect On Metals Prices Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report,"U.S. Election: Outcomes and Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see OECD Global Economic Outlook, November 2016, available at http://www.oecd.org/economy/outlook/economicoutlook.htm. Recommended Asset Allocation