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Neutral The recently released National Restaurant Association's Restaurant Performance Index turned up solidly in November, building on momentum earned in the early parts of 2017 (second panel). Further, the Expectations Index, a reflection of restaurant operators' six-month outlook, rose to its highest level since 2014 (third panel). We are much less sanguine. Consumers have been spending fewer of their dollars in restaurants for the last two years and the trend is now accelerating to the downside at the fastest rate since the GFC (bottom panel). With this deflationary backdrop, rapid sales growth seems overly optimistic. We continue to remain on the fence and reiterate our neutral recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5REST - MCD, SBUX, YUM, DRI, CMG.

Underweight Presenters at this week's Detroit Auto Show have reason to celebrate; December light vehicle sales numbers showed the industry had sold more than 17 million vehicles for a third consecutive year, marking the best winning streak ever for auto makers. Even better, falling pricing appears to be staging a much needed comeback (third panel). The picture is somewhat murkier beneath the surface. J.D. Power reported that average manufacturer incentive spending per unit set a new record in December, exceeding 10% of MSRP for the 17th time in 18 months. At the same time, lenders have continued to clamp down sharply on auto lending (bottom panel), implying that ongoing incentives are required to maintain even the status quo. This is negative to component makers from both a pricing and potentially volume basis. Better growth can be found elsewhere; stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P auto components index are: BLBG: S5AUTC - DLPH, BWA, GT.

Highlights Slower global demand growth, coupled with surging production from the U.S. shales and higher OPEC 2.0 production, risks reversing the progress made in draining global commercial oil storage and tanking prices in 2019.1 Our updated balances modelling is in agreement with the backwardation in forward Brent and WTI curves, but, if anything, indicates the backwardation should be more pronounced: We are forecasting Brent and WTI prices next year will average $55 and $53/bbl, respectively, vs. $62.80/bbl and $57.40/bbl average prices for 2019's forward curves. For 2018, we are maintaining our $67 and $63/bbl expectation for Brent and WTI, although our modelling indicates higher prices are a distinct possibility, given our fundamental assumptions of falling supply and rising demand this year (Chart of the Week). Energy: Overweight. We liquidated our May and July Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads last week with gains of 110.1% and 129.0%. We will be liquidating our Dec/18 Brent and WTI $55 vs. $60/bbl call spreads at tonight's close; they were up 62.3% and 82.1% as of Tuesday. We remain long Jul/18 vs. Dec/18 WTI (up 47.4%), and long the S&P GSCI (up 8.5%), expecting backwardation. We will get long $55 Brent Puts vs. short $50 Brent Puts in 4Q19 at tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. We continue to expect base metals to remain well supported in 1H18 by environmental reforms in China, and supply uncertainty around contract renegotiations at the copper mines. The global expansion underpinning demand will compensate for slower Chinese growth in 2H18. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 8.5% since inception in May/17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Soybean markets rallied following last week's USDA WASDE report, but grains fell amid data indicating these markets will remain oversupplied. Feature If there is one truth in commodity markets it is this: The best cure for high prices is high prices, and vice versa. This is being dramatically demonstrated by OPEC 2.0 in its collective action to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market following disastrously low prices in 2015 - 16. Higher prices in 4Q17 and 1H18 oil futures are incentivizing a surge in U.S. shale output, and will give OPEC 2.0 comfort in slowly feeding output taken offline at the beginning of 2017 back into the market in 2H18 and 2019 (Chart 2). Higher prices and tightening monetary conditions globally will slow the rate of growth in demand next year (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekFundamentals##BR##Support Oil In 2018 Chart 2Non-OPEC Production##BR##Will Surge Chart 3Strong Consumption Growth In 2018,##BR##Tempered By Higher Prices In 2019 Given these fundamental inputs, we expect to see Brent averaging $55/bbl next year, and WTI averaging $53/bbl next year. Our forecast is highly uncertain, given the actual evolution of prices will, once again, depend on actions taken by OPEC 2.0 and the forward guidance provided by its leadership, KSA and Russia. Our forecast for 2018 - $67/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - remains unchanged. If anything, our unconstrained models (Chart of the Week) have more upside risk than our forecast suggests, largely from falling production and surging demand - not to mention unplanned production outages. Looking to the end of 2019 from today, the backwardation we expect is greater than what is being priced into the Brent and WTI forward curves presently. Growth In U.S. Shales Dominates Non-OPEC Gains We are expecting U.S. crude oil production growth will dominate the increase in non-OPEC output in 2018 and 2019 (Chart 2, top panel). U.S. shale-oil output rises by 970k b/d and another 1.18mm b/d, respectively, this year and in 2019. By our reckoning, this will lift total U.S. crude oil production to 10.22mm b/d this year, a record level of output, and to 11.44mm b/d on average next year. Total U.S. crude and liquids output therefore rises from just under 17mm b/d in 2018 to 18.5mm b/d by the end of 2019. If our estimates are correct, the U.S. will join Russia in producing more than 11mm b/d of crude oil next year, and may even exceed it. Russia is expected to raise production slightly. As one of the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, we expect Russia to maintain its 300k b/d production cut in 1H18, which will keep its overall liquids production steady at ~ 11.17mm b/d through June. In 2H18, Russia will gradually restore production to an average of 11.24mm b/d, reaching 11.4mm b/d by December. For 2019, we expect total Russian liquids production to average 11.35mm b/d, up ~ 140k b/d yoy. OPEC's return will be led by the Cartel's Gulf producers, which are expected to raise crude production 450k b/d this year and 350k b/d next year (Chart 2, bottom panel). Total production in Gulf OPEC states will reach 25.25mm b/d on average in 2019. This will, of course, be dominated by KSA, which we expect will lift crude production to ~ 10.36mm b/d in 2H18 after holding crude output steady at ~ 10mm b/d in 1H18 over-delivering vs. its quota under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement. For 2019, we expect KSA to maintain production above 10.1mm b/d.2 Non-Gulf OPEC producers, on the other hand, will see their production fall 140k b/d this year, and another 240k b/d next year, leaving it at 7.49mm b/d on average in 2019, in our estimation. The contribution of these states to the OPEC 2.0 production cuts has been "managing" their respective decline curves. It is highly unlikely they will see production surge following the expiration of the OPEC 2.0 agreement at the end of this year. Overall, we expect global crude and liquids production to reach 100mm b/d this year, and 102.2mm b/d next year (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Oil Demand Surges This Year, But Slows In 2019 The global economic expansion will lift oil demand above 100mm b/d this year to 100.3mm b/d. This will be led, as always, by non-OECD growth, which we expect to increase 1.24mm b/d this year to 52.8mm b/d (Chart 3, top panel). DM demand - i.e., OECD consumption - will increase 440k b/d this year, to 47.5mm b/d, based on our estimates. Overall global demand rises 1.68mm b/d this year, by our reckoning (Chart 3). We expect tighter financial conditions this year and next will, with the lags typical of monetary policy, slow the rate of growth in oil demand next year. This will be delivered by tightening monetary policy, led by the U.S. Fed, and a mild recession next year, most likely in 2H19. We expect global demand to grow 1.57mm b/d next year, rising to just under 102mm b/d. EM demand will grow 1.21mm b/d, while DM demand will be up 360k b/d next year. Tightening Balances Will Reverse In 2H18 The yeoman effort put forth by OPEC 2.0 in reducing output and draining commercial inventories globally will reach its apotheosis by the end of 1H18 (Charts 4). Thereafter, as production grows and demand begins to slow, our balances indicate inventories will start to grow again (Chart 5). Chart 4Supply-Demand Balances##BR##No Longer Tightening In 2019 ... Chart 5... Leading To##BR##Inventory Accumulation Markets likely will start focusing on the implications of OPEC 2.0 returning production to the market and the surge in shale in 2H18 and during 2019. Non-forecastable events notwithstanding - e.g., a breakdown in Venezuela's production and exports - markets will be looking to OPEC 2.0 leadership for guidance on how the coalition will manage member-state production from 2H18 forward. If the OPEC 2.0 coalition is allowed to dissolve - something we do not expect - and a production free-for-all resumes similar to that of 2015 - 16, another round of supply destruction, brought about by lower prices, likely will ensue. This would greatly restrict E&P and services companies' access to capital, should it occur, and would, once again, imperil the economies of OPEC 2.0. In addition, because such volatility would discourage investment once again, it would set up a powerful price rally in the early 2020s following the attendant collapse in capex and E&P spending, as occurred in the previous down-cycle. We doubt this is the desired outcome of the OPEC 2.0 leadership, particularly KSA, as the Kingdom will be looking to IPO Saudi Aramco later this year to fund its Vision 2030 diversification efforts. We also doubt this is the desired outcome of Russia, given the economic pain it endured in the 2015 - 16 episode. More Frequent OPEC 2.0 Guidance Expected Given these considerations, we expect KSA and Russia to increase the frequency of forward guidance, directing market participants toward a preferred price band. Right now, this looks like a $50 to $60/bbl range - the 2018 forecast given by Russia's Energy Minister Alexander Novak earlier this week.3 It would be incumbent on OPEC 2.0 leadership to guide markets to expect production and inventory responses consistent with such guidance. We think the combination of OPEC 2.0 production restraint and the powerful synchronized global growth already in place puts Energy Minister Novak's guidance out of range for this year, and we are sticking with our forecasts for Brent and WTI. However, beginning in 2H18, a 2019 Brent forecast in Novak's range appears reasonable, based on the fundamentals discussed above. And, our WTI forecast of $53/bbl also is reasonable, given the average marginal cost of producing in the most prolific fields in the U.S. are at or below $50/bbl, according to the Dallas Fed's periodic Energy Survey.4 We believe the massive drawdown in global oil inventories to be the first step in a longer-term strategy by OPEC 2.0 countries. Lower OECD commercial inventory levels will diminish their shock-absorbing capacity, leading to a higher responsiveness of oil prices to supply-demand shocks. This will allow the coalition to exert greater control over oil prices via rapid, flexible storage adjustments and spare capacity management. Therefore, this year's out-of-range prices will be tolerated by Russia and KSA to achieve their optimal level of global inventories. A $50-to-$60/bbl Brent range for OPEC 2.0 would be consistent with a longer-term strategy to maximize the period of time hydrocarbons are the primary transportation fuel in the world. This is the only way to achieve the development goals set out by leaders of various oil-exporting states seeking to diversify the economic underpinnings of these economies. To do so, they have to keep oil-based transportation competitive for decades. Too much volatility - i.e., frequent excursions between very high and very low prices - will severely limit the access to capital these societies need to pull off this diversification. Managing production in a way that limits this volatility and keeps oil competitive in transport markets therefore is critical. Bottom Line: High prices will cause crude oil production to surge this year and next, particularly in the U.S. shales, and demand growth to slow. We expect Brent prices to average $67/bbl this year and $55/bbl next year. WTI prices will average $63/bbl this year and $53/bbl next year. We expect OPEC 2.0 to increase the frequency of its forward guidance - and to follow through on production and inventory adjustment in a manner that supports a desired price range for Brent prices in 2019 and into the 2020s. Right now, that range looks like $50 to $60/bbl. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined to describe the oil-producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which was formed at the end of 2016 to rein in out-of-control global oil production by cutting production some 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d last year (vs. a target of 1.8mm b/d). The coalition has been remarkably successful in maintaining production discipline in 2017 and extending their deal to the end of 2018 with an option to review quotas in June. We expect OPEC 2.0 to gradually return production taken off the market over the course of 2H18, which will, by next year, most likely reverse the draws seen in global inventories. 2 KSA's production should lift next year as pipeline repairs at its giant Manifa field are completed. Corrosion problems took some 300k of 900k b/d total production offline. In addition, there is another 500k b/d of capacity offline in the Neutral Zone shared with Kuwait. KSA's capacity likely will remain ~ 11.7mm b/d, versus its historical 12.5mm level, but as Energy Intelligence notes, it will have to balance actual production with spare capacity for the next year or so. Please see "A Headache for Aramco," published July 2017 by Energy Intelligence on its website. 3 Please see "CORRECTED-UPDATE 5-Brent oil falls by $1 but demand underpins near $70/barrel," published by uk.reuters.com on January 16, 2018. 4 In its December 2017 Dallas Fed Energy Survey, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas reported the WTI price shale operators needed to profitably drill a new well in Texas and Oklahoma averaged $49/bbl (simple, unweighted survey average). The lowest cost was in the Permian Midland formation ($46/bbl) and the highest costs was in so-called Other U.S. (shale) at $55/bbl. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017

America's banks appear to have finished off 2017 with stellar core earnings as some of the largest lenders, including JPM, WFC and C, have all reported strengthening net interest income and loan growth while delivering EPS ahead of estimates. These earnings reports serve as early validation of our high-conviction investment thesis for banks, namely that bank profits should exceed expectations as the price of credit, loan growth and credit quality move steadily higher in the year to come. Rising inflation expectations (second panel) should keep a tailwind behind the 10-year yield, driving improving net interest margins (third panel). Combined with record low unemployment and the associated low default rates, margins should widen; EPS should soar as a result. We reiterate our high conviction overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT.

Highlights Controversial gaffes aside, President Trump has started 2018 by moving to the middle; This comes at a time when animal spirits are reawakening thanks to tax cuts; And the path of least resistance for fiscal policy points towards more profligacy; Meanwhile, Chinese growth is imperiled by structural reform efforts; With money growth and import data showing signs of stress; The combination of upside growth risks in the U.S. and downside growth risks in the rest of the world should revive the U.S. dollar and threaten EM performance in 2018. Feature In just the first two weeks of 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump has: Hosted a meeting on immigration policy with Republican and Democratic leaders during which he said that the upcoming legislation should be a "bill of love," while encouraging congressional leaders to think big and pursue comprehensive immigration reform; Claimed that he has a "very good relationship" with Kim Jong-Un, while refusing to deny that he has already spoken privately with the North Korean leader; Supported bringing back "earmarks" in order to grease the wheels of bipartisanship in Congress - i.e., new spending that allocates funds to specific projects; Extended sanction relief to Iran, albeit with the caveat that it would be the last time he does so without demanding modifications to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal); Broken with his former chief political strategist Steve Bannon - dubbing him "Sloppy Steve" in the process - while disparaging Bannon's penchant for scorched-earth tactics.1 On the whole, Trump's actions in January suggest a move towards the political center. Meanwhile, the media and political opponents continue to dwell on Trump's alleged comments where he disparaged immigrants from certain countries, obscuring the subtle shift in political strategy. What would be the reason for a Trump shift to the middle? As we wrote last week, the Pocketbook Voter Theory in political science suggests that Trump's Republican Party should be benefiting from a surge in popular support amid strong economic data and record-setting market performance.2 However, the 2018 generic congressional ballot still points to a very challenging midterm election for the Republican Party (Chart 1). Trump has two choices. First, he can ignore the poor GOP polling, as well as his own (Chart 2) in the face of stellar economic performance, and plow into an electoral disaster. This would make him the earliest "lame duck" president in recent U.S. history. As we wrote in December, this choice is a serious market risk for investors.3 Lame duck presidents have often sought relevancy abroad, given the lack of constitutional constraints to executive action in the foreign policy realm. In the case of Trump, we could think of three avenues by which he might increase geopolitical risk premiums: Protectionist policies towards China, the abrogation of NAFTA, or military tensions with Iran. Chart 1History Favors The Opposition Chart 2Trump Is Extraordinarily Unpopular The second option for President Trump is to move to the middle ahead of the midterms. This would be unexpected in every way other than that Trump is the master of the unexpected. We happen to agree with his supporters that he is a political genius. Unless, that is, he continues to waste an extraordinary bull market, strong economy, and soaring consumer/business confidence by refusing to woo the median voter. What would a shift towards the center mean for the equity market? First, the already low probability that domestic political intrigue will upend the ongoing rally would get even lower in a world where Trump moves to the center. Second, the risk of market-moving geopolitical risks prompted by White House policy would decline as Trump would presumably seek and follow the advice of his establishment advisers. In other words, it would be pure nectar for the already buoyant markets. This is not to say that there would not still be reason for a pullback in U.S. equities. The bull-bear ratio is dangerously high (Chart 3), and consumer confidence is ominously stretched (Chart 4). Chart 3Investor Bullishness Is At Record High... Chart 4...And So Is Consumer Confidence U.S.: Business Owners Are Republican While some of our clients in the financial community may fret about Trump's unorthodoxy, our clients in the corporate world clearly do not. This is not merely an offhand observation, it is an empirical fact (Chart 5). America's business leaders have given President Trump the benefit of the doubt since he was elected. Bill Dunkelberg, the Chief Economist of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), which publishes the Small Business Optimism survey, went on to comment this month: "we've been doing this research for nearly half a century ... and I've never seen anything like 2017 ... The 2016 election was like a dam breaking."4 It is dangerous, therefore, to be overly mathematical about U.S. growth prospects in 2017. While we agree with our colleague Peter Berezin that, on face value, the strict growth impact of the tax cuts may merely add 0.3% of GDP growth in 2018, the qualitative impact of unleashing animal spirits is incalculable.5 The risk to growth in the U.S. is therefore very much tilted to the upside. First, as we discussed in a Special Report published with our U.S. Equity Strategy colleague Chris Bowes, a crucial, yet under-reported change in the corporate tax bill allows the immediate expensing of capital investment.6 Most market observers have overlooked this part of the legislation as it is simply a shift in the "time value of money." The IRS already allows significantly accelerated depreciation of capex; this reform merely brings it forward. Our analysis, however, suggests that the impact of bringing it forward could, at the margin, change spending behavior for firms and drive the next upleg in capex. This comes at a time when the prospects for business investment are already positive (Chart 6).7 Chart 5Business Owners Are Depressed When##br## Democrats Control The White House Chart 6Animal Spirits Will ##br##Spur CAPEX Second, investors are underestimating the probability that the current budget impasse - which could lead to a government shutdown in late January - gets resolved through more, not less, federal spending. Trump surprised legislators during a meeting on immigration when he offered his support for "earmarks" - i.e., legislative tags that direct funding to special interests in representatives' home districts. Earmarks were done away with in 2011 by the GOP following the Tea Party-inspired 2010 midterm victory, but they have crept back into the discussion through different guises (Chart 7). Chart 7Pork-Barrel Prohibition Is Ending The timing of Trump's statement on earmarks is interesting as the House Rules Committee is holding public hearings on the originally GOP-instituted earmark ban. In fact, the 115th Congress (the current one) almost reinstated earmarks at the beginning of 2017, only to be held back by House Speaker Paul Ryan and the newly elected White House. In January 2017, Ryan and the White House agreed that it would be unseemly to approve "pork barreling" so quickly after the election of a man who promised to "drain the swamp." Apparently, a year later, the appropriate amount of time has passed to make the move okay! What about the fears that the budget deficit is unsustainable? Investors may be fretting about a problem that does not exist (at least not yet). Chart 8 shows that budget deficits have decreased in almost every case ahead of a recession by 1.16% on average in the eight quarters before a downturn. This is because revenues are very important in determining deficit dynamics. Only just before the recession hits, as growth slows, does the deficit start to flatline or expand. If the risk to the U.S. economy is to the upside, as we believe it is, then deficits will come down regardless of tax or spending policy. Chart 8The Deficit Is Not A Problem... Yet Fiscal policy rhetoric may alone be far more important to the equity, bond, and currency markets than the market is currently pricing. Talk of draconian spending cuts - remember the May 2017 White House budget? Anyone? - could very quickly be replaced with an appropriation bill in late January that combines higher defense spending with higher discretionary spending. Given the current low levels of discretionary spending (Chart 9), the move towards greater spending could be sizeable and surprising. And if earmarks make a comeback, look out! Chart 9Government Spending Is Bottoming Chart 10Global Economy Is Firing On All Cylinders This fiscal fuel is coming when the fire of the U.S. economy is already well lit. Yes, global growth is strong (Chart 10), but U.S. growth is likely to beat it in 2018 (Chart 11). The global and U.S. economy may diverge just as the BCA's two-factor 10-year Treasury yield model is showing that U.S. long-dated bonds are expensive (Chart 12), while dollar bearishness is overcrowded (Chart 13). Chart 11U.S. May Outperform Global Growth Chart 12More Room For Yields To Rise Chart 13The Dollar Will Be Great Again Bottom Line: Tax cuts will unleash animal spirits in the U.S. in 2018. Meanwhile, the political path of least resistance on fiscal policy is towards profligacy. Fade any talk of austerity or entitlement reform, earmarks are back! A combination of easy fiscal policy and tax cuts should be good for equity markets, bad for Treasuries, and good for the greenback in 2018. Technical indicators flag some near-term risks to the dollar, but over the course of the year, our assessment is that it will hold at current levels or rally. China: Reform Reboot Is Growth-Constraining Unlike the U.S. economy, where risks lie to the upside, China is our top candidate for growth disappointments in 2018. Premier Li Keqiang has announced that China's GDP grew by 6.9% in 2017, slightly above expectations at the beginning of the year. However, growth momentum is already slowing due to cyclical factors, the waning of fiscal and credit stimulus, and the government's financial tightening measures that were implemented over the past year (Chart 14). Chinese imports are what really matter from a global macro perspective, and the latest import data suggest that the domestic economy is slowing more abruptly than expected. Import growth fell sharply to 5% year-on-year in December and 0.46% month-on-month. Import volume growth fell from 27.1% in early 2017 to 9.3% in December (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Economy: Weakness Ahead Chart 15What Happens In China, Does Not Stay In China Policy changes are highly likely to add to this slowdown. There can no longer be much doubt about the reformist turn in government policy that we highlighted last year.8 All of the policy announcements that came out of the nineteenth National Party Congress in October so far have had a reformist bent. The market agrees, as the sectors of the equity market most likely to benefit from reforms - health care, IT, energy and consumer staples - have outperformed the broad market significantly since President Xi's five-year policy speech on October 18, 2017 (Chart 16). Two separate news items that caused market jitters over the past week reflect the reformist turn. First came unconfirmed rumors that China would make its exchange rate more flexible by abandoning a "counter-cyclical factor" in its daily fixing rate; second came a "fake news" report that China planned to diversify its foreign exchange reserves away from U.S. Treasuries (Chart 17). The rumors were not significant in themselves, at least not without more information, but they were significant in suggesting that debates on major macro policies are intensifying.9 The question is how much resolve will China's central government have in executing its renewed reform agenda? President Xi obviously does not want to self-impose a recession, yet meaningful reform will constrain credit, investment, and growth. For instance, the current financial regulatory crackdown has caused a precipitous drop in the growth of wealth management products (WMPs), which are investment products that make up about 60% of the burgeoning non-bank credit flows; non-bank credit, for its part, makes up 28% of total credit (total social financing). And regulators have gone on to tackle entrusted loans, corporate bonds, and other innovative financial products as well (Chart 18). The impact could be material over the course of this year. Chart 16Markets Believe In China Reforms Chart 17Chinese Treasury Reserves Can Be Weaponized Chart 18China's Dodd-Frank Moment We strongly urge clients to fade the narrative that China is already "easing up" on reforms. In the three months since China's party congress we have seen a handful of false media narratives about how the government is backtracking on its policy agenda. For instance, both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times declared that the outcome of the major annual economic policymaking meeting - the Central Economic Work Conference - included a turn away from deleveraging. This was not only a misreading of the high-level policy priorities but also a mistranslation of the Economic Work Conference documents, which argued that deleveraging remains a key policy focus.10 It would be humiliating for President Xi - who, not incidentally, has achieved Mao-like authority within the Communist Party - to backtrack on his second-term economic agenda before he has even officially been elected to his second term. Xi will be re-elected in March and he is looking at 2020-21 deadlines for progress on key reforms according to the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2015-20) and his own three-year plan to fight the "Three Battles" of systemic financial risk, poverty, and pollution. The only way to meet these deadlines while ensuring that the country is strong and stable for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021 is to frontload the reform push in 2018-19.11 In Table 1 we update our "Reform Reboot Checklist" to reflect the reality that the Central Economic Work Conference produced a strikingly reform-oriented outcome. This is significant because it was billed as the first major statement of economic policy under "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era." Table 1How Do We Know China Is Reforming? The money growth (M2) target for 2018, for instance, is rumored to be the lowest in China's history after that meeting (supposedly it will be 9%, down from the low- to mid-teens seen in previous years). Now all we need to confirm that serious reforms are afoot is slower bank loan growth (which will likely be tipped in January numbers due in early February), or substantially tighter interbank rates, plus the announcement of significant reform initiatives at the annual "Two Sessions" in early March. It is very common in China for central government decrees to be too draconian initially and then to be modified after an outcry from industry. This year, however, we would advise clients to avoid confusing the inevitable back-and-forth between the central and local governments for a lack of resolve from the central government.12 China's bark will have bite this time around because the political and macroeconomic constraints to the core leadership are lower than they have been at any point in the past ten years. Table 2 shows the issues that we are watching to gauge the reform process and its impact on growth. In light of the above initiatives, we give a 30% subjective probability that China's policymakers will overtighten this year, which could lead to a global risk-off move in financial assets. Table 2China Is Rebooting Economic Reforms Even in our baseline case - China slows abruptly but remains stable - we believe financial markets have yet to understand the shift in Chinese policymaker thinking, which means that China is the prime candidate for negative surprises in a year in which markets are priced for perfection. Chart 19China's Trade Surplus Is A Geopolitical Risk Finally, China is still a major geopolitical risk this year. It scored the largest trade surplus ever with the U.S. in 2017 (Chart 19) and several key U.S. trade rulings are looming that could trigger a tit-for-tat conflict. This was, of course, the real reason behind the rumors about halting U.S. Treasury purchases. We will discuss the trade and geopolitical tensions in a forthcoming report. Bottom Line: China's reform reboot is gaining steam. It will threaten to constrain growth via the anti-corruption campaign, financial and regulatory tightening, corporate and industrial restructuring, and local government scrutiny. In combination with a stronger U.S. economy, China's downward-sloping business cycle and reform-capable political cycle spell disappointments for global markets this year. Investment Implications A faster growing U.S. economy and a slower growing China is beneficial for DM versus EM, the USD versus the RMB and other EM and commodity-linked currencies, U.S. stocks relative to DM stocks (because China's slower growth will weigh on Japanese and European earnings), and Chinese stocks relative to EM. It is bearish for China/EM corporate bonds. It will have varying impacts on commodity prices, depending on the role of Chinese supply-side reforms, but in the long term - as overcapacity cuts are priced in - it should be marginally bearish base metals as a result of China's desired switch of the growth model to a less investment-intensive model.13 Could stronger U.S. growth compensate for slower Chinese growth? We doubt it very much. China is alone expected to make up a third of all global economic growth in 2018, with China-leveraged EM making up the other 45%, according to the latest IMF World Economic Outlook (Chart 20). It is unfathomable to see how the U.S., which is expected to contribute just 10% of all growth, can compensate for slower growth in developing nations. Even if U.S. growth massively surprised to the upside, the U.S. economy is far too domestically driven to make a genuine difference through higher imports. Chart 20Chinese Growth Outweighs U.S. Globally As for the U.S. economy and markets, a global slowdown may be precisely what the doctor ordered. With stretched valuations, a foreign-induced correction may be healthy from a valuation perspective while having no impact on domestic economic fundamentals. Meanwhile, a dollar rally combined with some market volatility later in the year may be enough to give the Fed just enough pause to slow down the pace of hikes. Technical indicators are flagging some near-term risks to the dollar, but over the course of the year our assessment is that it will hold at current levels or rally. While this is not our base case, it would be the type of event that could prolong the current economic cycle. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jim Mylonas, Vice President Client Advisory & BCA Academy jim@bcaresearch.com 1 In his official statement on the break with Mr. Bannon, President Trump concluded with an important paragraph: "We have many great Republican members of Congress and candidates who are very supportive of the Make America Great Again agenda. Like me, they love the United States of America and are helping to finally take our country back and build it up, rather than simply seeking to burn it all down." The statement was important as it aligned President Trump firmly with Congressional Republicans in their opposition to the Bannon/Breitbart Clique. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The American Pocketbook Voter," dated January 10, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see NFIB, "December 2017 Report: Small Business Optimism Index," dated December 12, 2017, available at www.nfib.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Four Key Questions On The 2018 Global Growth Outlook," dated January 5, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here - Equity Sector Implications," dated December 11, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 The biggest pushback against our view comes from the oft-repeated anecdote of a meeting between Gary Cohn, the Director of the National Economic Council, and American business leaders. Apparently, when Cohn asked the attendees how many would invest if their corporate taxes were cut, only one executive raised their hand. We have now heard this anecdote repeated to us so many times by clients that it has become clear that it is essentially the only evidence that U.S. corporations have no intention of increasing capex. Needless to say, we do not base our analysis on a single anecdote! 8 For this theme, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "China Down, India Up?" dated March 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 The change to the RMB fixing method is not confirmed, while the rumor of a change in the forex reserve portfolio management came from an unreliable media report that was denied by China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). China's purchases of U.S. Treasuries peaked in 2011; China would harm itself if it sold its Treasuries rapidly. However, it may want to highlight this threat in response to U.S. President Donald Trump's threats of broad tariffs on Chinese imports. 10 The official communique from the 2017 Central Economic Work Conference did not specifically use the term "deleveraging," as in the 2015 and 2016 statements. This omission triggered U.S. news reports claiming that Beijing was backing off its deleveraging goal. However, the 2017 communique clearly emphasized preventing financial risk, including the first of the administration's "three battles" for the next three years. It also indirectly referred to "deleveraging" by citing the "Three De's, One Lower, and One Make Up," which is shorthand for the policy phrase "De-capacity, de-stocking, deleveraging, lowering costs and making up for weaknesses," which has been a fixture in rhetoric on China's supply-side reforms. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 For instance, the central government is facing pushback on new asset management regulations that are set to be fully in force by June 2019. While there may be some compromise, we do not expect the regulations themselves to be watered down too much. 13 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "China's Environmental Reforms Drive Steel & Iron Ore," dated January 11, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in U.S. bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & U.S. Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Feature Chart of the WeekHigher Yields, Driven By Inflation There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart of the Week). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016, its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal U.S. 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's U.S. CPI report provided further evidence that U.S. core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning##BR##For Oil And Bonds Chart 5Net Speculative Positions &##BR##10-Year Treasury Yield (2010 - Present) Chart 6Net Speculative Positions &##BR##WTI Oil Price (2010 - Present) Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And U.S. Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields. The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection. Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When##BR##Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to ease policy is constrained while its ability to tighten is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation: Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation & Commodities Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the U.S. TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year. Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal U.S. bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of U.S. bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of U.S. bond yields. Australia: Too Soon To Expect A Hike Chart 11Australia: A Solid Rebound In Growth... Over the last quarter much of the economic data from Australia have improved. Real GDP growth rebounded sharply to 2.8% YoY in Q3 from 1.9% the previous quarter (Chart 11). Iron ore prices have been rising since mid-October. Employment growth is robust and the unemployment rate is well below its estimated natural level. This begs the question - with so much going right is it time for the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to lift rates? Our answer is an emphatic "no." First, most data improvements have been relatively minor and the overall economic picture remains mixed. As we mentioned in our recent Special Report,2 the RBA is stuck between conflicting forces. Booming house prices and rising household indebtedness on the one hand, and an economy still working off excess capacity on the other. Nevertheless, our expectation is that the RBA will allow the economy to recover further for the following reasons: Consumer health is fragile. Policymakers left cash rates unchanged at the last monetary policy meeting in December, and Governor Philip Lowe expressed concerns about household consumption. Consumption is a significant driver of economic growth and the combination of declining savings, elevated debt levels and weak income growth is worrisome (Chart 12). Since then, real income growth has dipped back into positive territory, but only barely so. Meanwhile, house prices are still surging, despite macro-prudential measures aimed at tightening lending standards, thereby supporting consumer spending through the wealth effect. Given an extreme household debt to income ratio, consumption would be very vulnerable if the RBA were to curb house price gains by raising rates. Labors markets have plenty of slack. The unemployment rate has fallen to a four year low and other labor market statistics show a broad-based improvement over the last quarter. However, the unemployment rate is still significantly higher than it was in the previous cycle and other improvements in the labor market have also occurred from extremely weak levels. In 2017Q1, the underemployment rate and part-time workers as a percentage of total workers both reached all-time highs. Those numbers have dipped slightly in Q3, with underemployment falling to 8.3% and part-time workers as a percentage of total declining to 31.7%, but those elevated levels suggest there still needs to be significant improvement before spare capacity is worked off and real wage growth starts to move higher (Chart 13). Chart 12...But Consumers Can't Afford A Rate Hike Chart 13Still Plenty Of Slack In Australian Labor Markets Inflation is still too low. Headline and core inflation readings came in at 1.8% and 1.9% respectively in Q3 (Chart 14). While headline slowed, core inflation recovered over the last quarter. Tradeable goods inflation collapsed into negative territory at -0.9%, as a result of currency strength and increased competition among retailers. Going forward, we expect consumer price growth to be muted given the lack of inflationary pressures. The output gap is wide, despite rebounding growth, and the IMF forecasts that it will be years before the Australian economy reaches capacity. The trade-weighted Aussie dollar index has risen almost 5% since it bottomed in early December, while the AUD/USD has broken above its 40-week moving average. Continued currency strength would exert even further deflationary pressure. As stated above, the labor market also requires significant improvement to work off excess capacity. All of these factors caused the RBA to dial back its inflation forecast in the November statement. It now expects that inflation will remain quite flat for the next two years, only touching the lower-end of its 2%-3% target range at the end of 2019. Consequently, inflation will not be forcing the RBA's hand in the foreseeable future. One of our key themes for 2018 is that global growth will be less synchronized. Central banks will therefore employ diverging monetary policies, presenting cross-country bond market investment opportunities. As such, we recently shifted to a slight overweight position in Australian debt within our model portfolio, arguing that it would outperform global government bond benchmarks during a year expected to be driven by Fed tightening and ECB/BoJ tapering concerns. Historically, relative yield moves have closely tracked relative shifts in monetary policy (Chart 15). In the U.S., above-trend growth, a tight labor market and the continued recovery in inflation will force the Fed to become more aggressive. If the RBA stays inactive as we expect, then this gap should continue to move in favor of Australian debt. Additionally, there is still a modest yield pickup in Australian debt relative to the global index and as we expect global bond yields to rise, low-beta Australian government bonds should offer considerable protection. Chart 14Australia: Lacking Inflationary Pressures Chart 15Australian Relative Yields Track Relative Policy This also leads us to continue holding our tactical Long Dec 2018 Australian Bank Bill futures trade from last October. We initially entered into this trade as a more focused way of expressing that the RBA will stay on hold. The trade is currently 6 bps in the money and with markets still pricing about 30 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, there is plenty of room for further profit as market expectations are revised down. Bottom Line: Maintain an overweight position in Australian government debt. Economic data are still mixed and the RBA will stay on hold for the foreseeable future. Against a backdrop of Fed rate hikes, Australian debt should outperform. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Australia: Stuck Between A Rock And A Hard Place", dated July 25, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Informe especial

Equities have melted up in recent weeks, celebrating the tax bill passage, synchronized upswing in global economic data, still quiescent inflation and near vanishing tail risk. On July 10th when we penned the "SPX 3,000?" report, the S&P 500 was close to 2400.1 Over the past six months stocks have been in an uninterrupted upleg, moving to within 10% of our SPX 3,000 target. Table 1 Stocks have run "too far too fast" for our liking and there are increasing odds of a healthy pullback, especially now that no pundits are talking of a correction. In addition, were the selloff in the bond markets to accelerate in a short time frame, at some point it will cause equity market consternation. But, bonds still remain extremely overvalued versus stocks (Chart 1). Late last year, we began to modestly de-risk the portfolio via booking impressive gains in tactical market-neutral trades, as our upbeat cyclical view remains intact.2 Our cyclical strategy is to "buy the dip", as we do not foresee a recession in the coming 9-12 months. Importantly, profits will dictate the S&P 500's direction and the cyclical path of least resistance is higher still. Our SPX profit model continues to forecast healthy EPS growth in 2018 (Chart 2) and as we posited in the last report of 2017, earnings will do the heavy lifting at the current juncture with the forward P/E multiple likely moving laterally (Chart 3). Chart 1Simple Bond Valuation Metric Says:##br## Bonds Are Overvalued Vs. Stocks Chart 2All ##br##Clear Chart 3EPS Will Do The##br## Heavy Lifting In 2018 A simple decomposition shows that equity returns could reasonably reach a low-to-mid double digit level this year. Our assumptions are the following: nominal GDP can grow near 5% (3% real plus 2% inflation) and thus we estimate organic EPS growth that typically mimics GDP at this stage of the cycle of ~5%, ~2% dividend yield, ~2% buyback yield, ~5% tax related boost to EPS and no multiple expansion. The above assumptions are based on four key drivers: energy and financials will command a larger slice of the earnings pie,3 synchronized global capex upcycle will boost EPS,4 delayed positive translation effects from the U.S. dollar will lift profits5 and easy fiscal policy will also act as a tonic to EPS.6 On this note, this White Paper officially introduces the U.S. Equity Strategy earnings models for the eleven GICS1 equity sectors. We have identified key macro earnings drivers for each sector and incorporated them into individual sector models. The objective is to forecast the direction of earnings growth. Beyond introducing our EPS models, the purpose of this White Paper is to also compare and contrast the cyclical readings of our equity sector models with sell-side analysts' profit growth (Charts 4 & 5) and margin expectations and help clients position portfolios for the rest of 2018. The earnings models carry the most weight in determining our sector positioning, with our macro overlay and our valuation and technical indicators rounding out our methodology. Currently, our earnings models are consistent with maintaining a mostly cyclically biased portfolio structure (top panel, Chart 6), and thus participating in the broad market's overshoot. Chart 4What EPS Are Priced In... Chart 5...Per Sector For 2018 Chart 6Continue To Prefer Cyclicals Over Defensives Encouragingly, an equal weight of the 10 GICS1 sector model outputs (we are excluding real estate due to lack of history), accurately forecasts the S&P 500's profit growth (bottom panel, Chart 6), and currently also confirms the broad market's upbeat four factor macro EPS model (Chart 2). Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Financials (Overweight) Our financials earnings growth model comprises bank credit growth, the U.S. dollar index and net earnings revisions. The U.S. credit impulse is gaining traction, indicating that the market has digested the almost doubling in long-term rates over the past 18 months. Bankers are willing extenders of C&I credit and, with the economy humming north of 3% in real GDP terms, the outlook for loan growth is excellent. Loosening U.S. banking regulatory requirements, and pent up demand for shareholder friendly activities are all welcome news for financials profitability. Tack on BCA's higher interest rate view in 2018 and net interest margins will also get a bump, further adding to the sector's EPS euphoria. Credit quality is the third key profit driver for bank profitability and pristine credit quality is a harbinger of increased profits. The unemployment rate is plumbing generational lows and suggests that non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans will remain on a downward trajectory. Our profit model is expanding at twice the current profit growth rate (second panel, Chart 7) and 10 percentage points above the Street's 12-month forward estimates (top panel, Chart 5). In fact, the latter have gone vertical of late playing catch up to our model's estimates. The S&P financials sector remains a core portfolio overweight and we reiterate our high-conviction overweight status in the heavyweight S&P banks index. Chart 7Financials (Overweight) Energy (Overweight) The three drivers behind the S&P energy sector EPS growth model are oil-related currencies, the U.S. oil & gas rig count and WTI crude oil prices. A depreciating greenback, whittling down OECD oil stocks and rising global oil demand are all boosting energy profitability. OPEC 2.0 cutbacks have not only helped stabilize oil markets, but also paved the way for a breakout in oil prices above the $62.50/bbl stiff resistance level. Sustained OPEC output restraint will counterbalance U.S. shale oil production increases and coupled with rising global demand likely continue to underpin oil prices. Our synchronized global capex upcycle theme included the basic resources following a multi-year drubbing in outlays. Energy capex cannot contract at double digit rates indefinitely. Already a V-shaped capex momentum recovery is in store, as 2018 capital spending budgets are on track to at least match 2017. Our EPS growth model (second panel, Chart 8) matches sell-side analyst optimism (third panel, Chart 5). Keep in mind that only recently did the energy space become profit positive, making a solid recovery from an extremely low base. Margins are only now renormalizing above the zero line and breakneck pace EPS growth should continue in 2018. Following a negative 2017 return, the S&P energy sector is the best performing sector year-to-date, and we reiterate the high-conviction overweight stance. Chart 8Energy (Overweight) Industrials (Overweight) Our S&P industrials EPS model comprises the ISM manufacturing survey, raw industrials commodity prices and interest rates. It has an excellent track record in forecasting industrials EPS momentum, and sports one of the highest explanatory powers amongst all sector EPS models. While industrials EPS growth has been bouncing off the zero line for the better part of the past five years, our profit model has spoken: forecast EPS are in a V-shaped recovery since the end of the recent manufacturing recession (second panel, Chart 9). Commodity prices are recovering and increasing final demand, coupled with a soft U.S. dollar suggest that more gains are in store. Tack on the global virtuous capex upcycle, and the stars are aligned for this deep cyclical sector to break out of its multi-year trading range funk on the back of a surge in profits. China is a wild card, but signs of stability are enough to sustain the upward trajectory in the commodity-levered complex, including industrials stocks. Our industrials sector EPS model suggests that industrials profits will easily surpass the low (and below the overall market) analysts' EPS growth hurdle (third panel, Chart 4). The late-cyclical S&P industrials sector remains an overweight. Chart 9Industrials (Overweight) Consumer Staples (Overweight) The S&P consumer staples EPS growth model key drivers are: food exports, non-discretionary retail sales and analysts' net earnings revision ratio. Overall industry exports are expanding at a healthy clip as a consequence of a softening U.S. dollar and robust European and rebounding emerging markets demand. Deflating raw food commodity prices are offsetting rising energy and labor input costs, heralding a sideways move to margins. Sell side analysts are also currently penciling in a lateral profit margin move (middle panel, Chart 10). Our model is expanding at a near double digit rate, and is in line with 12-month forward EPS growth estimates (second panel, Chart 4). Investors have been vehemently avoiding staples stocks during the board market's uninterrupted run up, and have put out positioning offside. However, in the context of our cyclical over defensive portfolio bent we refrain from putting all our eggs in one basket, and prefer to keep consumer staples as our sole defensive sector overweight. This small hedge will serve our portfolio well if we do indeed get a healthy Q1/2018 pullback, as we expect. Chart 10Consumer Staples (Overweight) Consumer Discretionary (Neutral - Downgrade Alert) Measures of consumer confidence, consumer discretionary exports and the net earnings revisions ratio comprise BCA's global consumer discretionary EPS growth model, which has an excellent track record in forecasting the path of consumer discretionary profits. Consumer confidence is rolling over, albeit from a nose-bleed level, signaling that, at the margin, discretionary consumer outlays will remain tame. Worrisomely, rising interest rates coupled with a breakout in crude oil prices are net negatives for consumer spending. Our consumer drag indicator captures these consumer headwinds and warns that the sector is not out of the woods yet (bottom panel, Chart 11). The Fed is on track to raise rate three more times in 2018 and continue to mop up liquidity via renormalizing its balance sheet. This dual tightening backdrop bodes ill for early cyclical discretionary stocks as we highlighted in the September 25th Weekly Report. Our consumer discretionary EPS growth model is making an effort to bounce, signaling that contracting earnings will likely reverse course and come out of their recent funk (second panel). But, analysts are overly optimistic penciling in a near double-digit profit growth backdrop for the consumer discretionary sector (fourth panel, Chart 5). Netting it all out, the anemic message from our profit model along with the ongoing Fed tightening cycle and spiking energy prices warrant a downgrade alert. Stay tuned. Chart 11Consumer Discretionary (Neutral-Downgrade Alert) Telecom Services (Neutral) Telecom pricing power and capital expenditures expectations comprise our S&P telecom services EPS growth model. Telecom capital expenditures have bounced off the zero line and are growing at 4% per annum while sector sales growth has been nil. This capital-intensive industry must continually invest to stay relevant. A push by telecom carriers into TV offerings as part of a quad-play (internet, wireline, wireless and TV) has rekindled an M&A boom, and capex is slated to increase. However, margins will suffer if increased investment fails to translate into new sales (bottom panel, Chart 12). Steeply contracting pricing power is a bad omen both for top and bottom line growth prospects (fourth panel). Hopefully, industry consolidation will lead to a better pricing backdrop, but the jury is still out. Our EPS model has sunk into the contraction zone (second panel). Analysts are a little bit more sanguine, penciling in low single-digit profit growth (bottom panel, Chart 4). Industry deflation is not alone as a headwind as the bond market selloff is weighing on the high dividend yielding telecom services stocks. Despite all the bearish news, near all-time lows in relative valuation and washed out technicals are keeping us on the sidelines. Chart 12Telecom Services (Neutral) Materials (Neutral) Materials EPS growth is a far cry from the near 100% year-over-year mark hit during the commodity super-cycle the mid-2000s and the reflex rebound following the Great Recession (second panel, Chart 13). Our S&P materials EPS model inputs include the U.S. currency, metals commodity prices and a measure of borrowing costs. The model has been steadily decelerating recently, and moving in the opposite direction compared with sell-side analysts' optimistic estimates (bottom panel, Chart 5). Consequently, there is scope for downward revisions. Materials stocks are reflationary beneficiaries and also high fixed cost high operating leverage deep cyclicals that benefit most during the later stages of the business cycle when a virtuous capex/EPS upcycle takes root. A number of both developed and developing central banks have recently embarked on tightening monetary policy following in the Fed's footsteps. Global liquidity is on the verge of getting mopped up as even the ECB and the BoJ have started to hint that they would remove some of their ultra-accommodative and unconventional policy measures. These opposing forces keep us at bay and we continue to recommend a benchmark allocation in the S&P materials index. Chart 13Materials (Neutral) Real Estate (Neutral) Commercial real estate loan demand, a labor market measure and the EUR/USD comprise our S&P real estate profit growth model (second panel, Chart 14). The 10-year Treasury yield and real estate relative performance have been nearly perfectly inversely correlated since the GFC as REITs sport a hefty dividend yield and thus are considered a fixed income proxy. BCA's higher interest rate 2018 theme suggests that more downside looms for this rate-sensitive sector. Similarly, a firming EUR/USD reflecting the nearly 100% domestic exposure of the sector weighs on real estate relative performance. Our EPS model has recently sunk into the contraction zone and is in sync with sell-side analysts' negative profit growth figures for calendar 2018 (second panel, Chart 5). While all this signals that an underweight stance is appropriate, we would rather stay on the sidelines for three reasons: First, sector pricing power (mostly rents) has not eroded yet, despite the surge in multi-family housing construction. Second, most of the bad news is likely already discounted in sinking valuations and extremely oversold technicals. Finally, we would rather concentrate our interest rate related underweight in the pure play fixed income proxy, the utilities sector (please see page 15). Stick with a benchmark allocation in the S&P real estate index. Chart 14Real Estate (Neutral) Health Care (Underweight) Our S&P health care EPS growth model consists of health care pricing power, labor costs and a measure of health care outlays. Health care demand is fairly inelastic, signaling that health care spending prospects remain upbeat, especially given the aging population. However, the industry's up-to-recently structurally robust pricing power backdrop is under intense scrutiny. Medical commodity cost inflation is melting and drug pricing power has nearly halved since early 2016. Democrats and Republicans alike, despise the pharmaceutical/biotech industry's pricing tactics and drug price containment is on nearly every legislator's agenda. Add on the generic drug inroads, and Big Pharma/biotech resilient profits appear vulnerable, weighing heavily on the sector's relative performance. From a secular perspective, there is scope for health care sector profit gains. Developing countries are only just starting to institute social "safety nets" that the developed world already has in place. Our profit model is decelerating (second panel, Chart 15) and forecasting single digit EPS growth, in line with the Street's 12-month forward profit estimates (fourth panel, Chart 4). The S&P health care sector is a core underweight portfolio holding and we reiterate the high-conviction underweight status in the heavy weight S&P pharma sub index. Chart 15Health Care (Underweight) Utilities (Underweight) Utilities pricing power, the yield curve and analysts' net earnings revisions are the key inputs in our S&P utilities EPS growth model (second panel, Chart 16). While natgas prices, the industry's marginal price setter, have been stuck in a trading range between $2.6 and $3.4/mmbtu over the past 18 months, they are currently contracting and weighing heavily on industry pricing power. The U.S. economy is firing on all cylinders (bottom panel, Chart 16) and a selloff in the 10-year Treasury market near 3% is BCA's base-case scenario for 2018. Under such a backdrop, fixed income proxied defensive equities lose their luster, and thus utilities stocks will likely remain under intense downward pressure, Our S&P utilities EPS growth model is expanding at a mid-single digit growth rate, broadly in line with sell-side analysts' forecasts (fifth panel, Chart 4) and roughly 700bps below the broad market. The S&P utilities sector is a high-conviction underweight. Chart 16Utilities (Underweight) Technology (Underweight - Upgrade Alert) Our three-factor global technology EPS growth model includes capex intentions, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar and sell-side analysts' net earnings revision ratio. While the tech sector is still largely considered a deep cyclical, we view it as more defensive. The majority of large capitalization tech companies are mature, cash rich, cash flow generating, dividend paying and high margin. Tech firms thrive in a deflationary backdrop as business models have been built to withstand the inherently disinflationary "creative destruction" process. BCA's interest rate view calls for an inflationary driven sell off in bonds for 2018, suggesting that investors avoid high-flying tech stocks. Weakness in basic resources explains most of the delta in cyclical capital outlays. Encouragingly, technology's share of the U.S. capex pie is making inroads rising to roughly 10% (bottom panel, Chart 17). Tech investment has been so abysmal for so long that it is hard to get any worse. In fact, it has started to improve both on an absolute and relative basis, as pent-up tech demand is being unleashed. Our synchronized global capex upcycle theme is gaining traction and the tech sector will continue to make gains at the expense of resource-related spending. Our global tech EPS model is forecasting modest double-digit growth in the coming quarters (second panel, Chart 17), largely aligned with sell-side analysts' profit growth expectations (fifth panel, Chart 5). On balance, we are putting the S&P tech sector on upgrade alert reflecting the capex tailwind offsetting the rising interest rate backdrop, and reiterate our capex-related high-conviction overweight in the S&P software sub-index. Chart 17Technology (Underweight-Upgrade Alert) 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "SPX 3,000?," dated July 10, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "EPS And "Nothing Else Matters"," dated December 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Dissecting Profit Composition," dated July 24, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Invincible," dated November 6, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar The Great Reflator," dated September 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?," dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Duration: Economic fundamentals indicate that TIPS breakeven inflation rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher on a 6-12 month horizon. In the near term, however, positioning data suggest that the uptrend in bond yields is due for a pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance. Oil & Bonds: The cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. This will continue to be true until long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. At that point the oil price will become a less important driver of yields. Fed: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Feature There was certainly no shortage of possible catalysts for last week's bond rout (Chart 1). The Bank of Japan (BoJ) reduced its buying of long-dated JGBs, there was a rumor that China plans to slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt, and U.S. inflation expectations started to ramp back up - driven by a combination of higher oil prices and a strong December core CPI print. But of all these factors we think it is only the third that merits much attention. Once the BoJ started targeting the level of the yield curve in September 2016 its quantity targets became irrelevant. A reduction in the pace of BoJ buying only matters if it foreshadows a shift to a higher yield curve target. Our foreign exchange strategists don't think such a move is likely in the next 12-18 months.1 China, for its part, still has a highly managed currency and now that capital is no longer flowing out of the country it will start to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States (Chart 2). Chart 1Higher Yields, Driven By Inflation Chart 2China's Forex Reserves Are Rising The compensation for 10-year U.S. inflation protection broke above 2% last week, after having been as low as 1.66% as recently as last June. This 34 basis point increase in inflation compensation coincided with a 36 basis point increase in the nominal 10-year yield and a Brent crude oil price that rose from $45 per barrel last June to $70 per barrel as of last Friday. We think these correlations will continue to be the most important factors driving bond yields during the next 6-12 months, and the bulk of this report is dedicated to disentangling the linkages between oil prices, inflation, inflation expectations and nominal bond yields. But first we reiterate our cyclical investment stance. Last week's CPI report provided further evidence that core inflation is in the process of bottoming-out (Chart 3). The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5% by the time that core inflation returns to the Fed's target. By that time the nominal 10-year yield will be in a range between 2.8% and 3.25%. Likewise, our energy strategists anticipate that an ongoing steady decline in commercial inventories will keep crude prices well supported on a 6-12 month horizon. Chart 3U.S. Inflation Turns The Corner Chart 4Net Speculative Positioning For Oil And Bonds However, on a shorter time horizon (3 months or less), recent shifts in speculative positioning signal that the uptrends in bond yields and the oil price might be due for a pause (Chart 4). After having been solidly "net long" since the middle of last year, net speculative positions in the 10-year U.S. Treasury futures contract have just dipped into "net short" territory. Historically, net speculative positions have been a decent indicator of 3-month changes in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield, and at current levels they signal that the 10-year yield could decline modestly during the next three months (Chart 5). Similarly, speculators in the oil futures market are now more "net long" than at any time since last February. While this positioning indicator does not work quite as well for the oil market as for the Treasury market, net longs at more than 20% of open interest (most recent reading is 26%) have more often than not been met with 3-month price declines since 2010 (Chart 6). Chart 5Net Speculative Positions & 10-Year Treasury Yield Chart 6Net Speculative Positions & WTI Oil Price Bottom Line: The outlook for U.S. inflation suggests that TIPS breakeven rates have further cyclical upside and this will drive nominal bond yields higher. However, positioning data in both bond and oil markets suggest that the recent run-up in yields might be due for a near-term pause. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance on a 6-12 month horizon. Oil, TIPS, Inflation And Bond Yields: Sorting Out The Mess During the post-financial crisis period two relationships have been both (i) incredibly robust and (ii) unlike relationships observed in prior periods. They are: The cost of inflation protection has been an unusually important determinant of nominal U.S. bond yields The oil price has shown a very strong correlation with the cost of inflation protection Both relationships can be explained by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric ability to control inflation. We consider each relationship in turn. The Importance Of Inflation Chart 7TIPS Beta Declines When ##br##Breakevens Are Low A common rule of thumb is to estimate the TIPS beta - the proportion of movement in U.S. nominal bond yields that is explained by movement in TIPS (real) yields - at around 0.8. In other words, this assumes that 80% of the movement in nominal bond yields is explained by the real component. However, we observe that since the financial crisis the 10-year TIPS beta has been a much lower 0.68, and at times it has been closer to 0.5 on a 12-month rolling basis (Chart 7). We also observe that the TIPS beta tends to be lower when TIPS breakeven inflation rates are un-anchored to the downside. There is a very good reason for this. The reason is that the Fed's ability to influence inflation is asymmetric. The Fed has a strong track record of successfully tightening to bring inflation down, but has been less successful at easing to drive it up. This asymmetric ability to influence prices is due in no small part to the zero-lower bound on interest rates. Because the Fed's ability to cut rates is constrained by the zero-bound while its ability to lift rates is not, bond market participants may at times question the Fed's ability to ease and revise their inflation expectations lower. It is also during these periods that inflation expectations become more volatile and a more important determinant of nominal bond yields. This is because they are increasingly driven by the swings in the economic data and less by the Fed's policy bias. The Importance Of Oil This is where the oil price comes in. Oil and other commodities are crucial inputs to the production process. As such, not only do these prices rise in response to stronger aggregate demand, but higher prices also signal mounting cost-push inflationary pressures. But despite this obvious truth, there is not always a strong correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is because the Fed's reaction function influences the relationship. Consider the pre-crisis (2004-2008) period. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates stayed range-bound between 2.4% and 2.5% even as the oil price increased dramatically (Chart 8). Since investors perceived that the Fed would simply tighten policy to tamp out any inflationary pressures that might arise, there was no desire to demand greater compensation for inflation. However, this logic does not work in reverse. When commodity prices fell in 2014, inflation expectations declined alongside. In fact we observe that the correlations between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and both oil and commodity prices have been much stronger in the post-crisis period, when inflation expectations have been un-anchored (Table 1). Chart 8The Unstable Correlation Breakevens & Oil Table 1Correlations Between TIPS Breakeven Inflation And Commodities Investment Conclusions The Fed's asymmetric reaction function leads to two crucial investment conclusions. First, long-maturity inflation expectations (as measured by the TIPS breakeven inflation rate) can fall when deflationary pressures mount, but their upside is capped in the 2.4% to 2.5% range. This is because the market has no reason to question the Fed's ability to lower inflation by lifting rates. The upside limit of 2.4% to 2.5% will remain in place unless the Fed changes its inflation target. A change to the inflation target that allows for higher inflation is an idea that is quickly gaining traction among policymakers, but is unlikely to be implemented this year (see section titled "The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change" below). Second, when long-maturity inflation expectations are below their 2.4% to 2.5% upper-bound they become both (i) a more important driver of nominal yields - as evidenced by the lower TIPS beta - and (ii) more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. For this reason, the oil price will continue to be an important driver of inflation expectations and nominal bond yields for the next few months, but will decrease in importance as TIPS breakevens move back to their 2.4% to 2.5% range. Once inflation expectations are re-anchored, nominal bond yields will once again be predominantly driven by the real component and swings in the price of oil will be less important for bond markets. The dynamics described above are not merely theoretical. Consider the evidence from five developed countries presented in Charts 9 & 10. Chart 9 shows that the oil price is tightly correlated with inflation expectations in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan, but also that inflation expectations in the U.K. and Australia did not respond to the recent increase in oil prices. The reason is that core inflation in the U.K. and Australia is already relatively close to the central bank's target (Chart 10). It is only where core inflation is far below target (in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan) that the oil price remains an important driver of bond yields. Chart 9Oil & Inflation Expectations Highly Correlated... Chart 10...But Only When Inflation Is Low The U.K. in particular presents an interesting case study. U.K. core inflation was quite far below target throughout 2015 and 2016, and during this time period U.K. inflation expectations were tightly linked with the oil price. It is only in the past few months that U.K. core inflation has moved back above target, and not surprisingly the correlation between the U.K. 10-year CPI swap rate and the price of oil has started to break down. Bottom Line: At present, the cost of inflation compensation is an important driver of bond yields and the oil price is an important driver of the cost of inflation compensation. Both of these dynamics will continue to be true for the next few months, but will decline in importance as TIPS breakeven inflation rates rise. When long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates settle into a range between 2.4% and 2.5%, then the oil price will become a less important driver of bond yields. The Fed In 2018: Contemplating A Major Change? As was alluded to in the prior section, the biggest potential change for bond markets in 2018 would be if the Fed changed its monetary policy framework to one that tolerated higher levels of inflation. For example, let's imagine that the Fed suddenly lifted its inflation target from 2% to 3%. This would likewise shift the upper-bound range for long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to approximately 3.4% to 3.5%. It would mean that nominal bond yields have further upside over the course of the cycle, and also that oil and commodity prices would play an important role in bond markets for much longer. It would also lengthen the period where spread product can outperform Treasuries since the Fed would not be so quick to choke off the recovery. We still think it is unlikely that such a change will be implemented this year, but recent weeks have seen a marked increase in the number of Fed policymakers either advocating for a different policy framework or saying that the Fed should start researching alternative frameworks. What's crucial to remember is that the reason policymakers are unsatisfied with the current 2% inflation target is that it brings the zero-lower bound on interest rates into play too often. So any potential change in policy framework would be to one that tolerates higher inflation rates. Bernanke's Idea Chart 11The Implications Of A Price Level Target One potential new policy approach was put forward by ex-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in a recent blog post.2 Bernanke made the case for "Temporary Price Level Targeting", a policy where the Fed continues to use a 2% inflation target when the fed funds rate is sufficiently far from zero, but then switches to a price-level target when the fed funds rate is close to the zero bound. In his own words, the strategy would be communicated as follows: The Committee therefore agrees that, in future situations in which the funds rate is at or near zero, a necessary condition for raising the funds rate will be that average inflation since the date at which the federal funds rate first hit zero be at least 2 percent. Chart 11 provides an illustration of this example. Under the current framework the Fed targets 2% PCE inflation and forecasts that it will achieve this target sometime in 2019. In Bernanke's proposed framework the Fed would not target 2% inflation, but rather a price level that is consistent with 2% trend growth in prices since the zero-lower bound was hit in December 2008. In order to achieve this goal by the end of 2019 the Fed would need to tolerate a significant overshoot of inflation during the next two years (bottom panel). Who's On Board? The Appendix to this report is a list of all Fed Governors and Regional Fed Presidents. It also shows our own assessment of each committee member's policy bias. We noted from the most recent Summary of Economic Projections that 6 FOMC participants expect three rate hikes in 2018, 6 expect fewer than three rate hikes and 4 expect more than three hikes. From recent speeches we attempted to discern which member owns which forecast and then we attributed a "dovish" policy bias to those with a forecast for fewer than three hikes, a "neutral" bias to those expecting three hikes, and a "hawkish" bias to those expecting more than three hikes. We also show which FOMC participants are voters in 2018, although we do not think that distinction carries much practical importance. The Committee tends to arrive at decisions by consensus anyways, and all participants voice their opinions at every meeting whether or not it is their turn to vote. But it is the "notes" column of the Appendix that is most striking. There we highlighted all the FOMC participants who have recently made comments regarding the exploration of alternative policy frameworks. A general consensus seems to be forming that alternative frameworks should be studied this year, and a few policymakers (San Francisco Fed President John Williams, in particular) have strongly made the case that the Fed should switch to some sort of price level targeting regime. The Appendix also identifies the biggest source of uncertainty for the Fed this year. Namely that there are four vacant Governor positions that need to be filled. The New York Fed will also need a new President when William Dudley retires later this year. Who is nominated to fill those vacant positions will go a long way toward determining how aggressively the Fed pursues alternative policy frameworks. Bottom Line: The Fed will start actively discussing alternative monetary policy frameworks in 2018. While we think the Fed will eventually adopt a policy framework that tolerates higher inflation, this shift probably won't occur this year. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!", dated January 12, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/10/12/temporary-price-level-targeting-an-alternative-framework-for-monetary-policy/ Appendix Table 2Composition Of The FOMC Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Aspectos destacados La economía japonesa está en auge. Esto permite al BoJ alejarse de su programa QQE (Flexibilización Cuantitativa y Cualitativa). Sin embargo, el programa YCC (Control de la Curva de Rendimientos) se mantendrá vigente en el futuro previsible, ya que la inflación sigue siendo una función directa de las condiciones financieras. Debido a que la posición y la valoración del yen están tan sesgadas, esto podría provocar un repunte del yen, especialmente frente al euro. Corto en EUR/JPY. Al igual que la Fed, el BoC aumentará las tasas tres veces este año. Sin embargo, el mercado ya descuenta más subidas en Canadá que en EE. UU. Mantenemos una postura neutral en USD/CAD. No obstante, el CAD registrará pérdidas frente a la NOK. Corto en CAD/NOK. Artículo principal Gráfico I-1 JPY Vs. Bonds: The Divorce JPY Vs. Bonos: El Divorcio JPY Vs. Bonos: El Divorcio Algo fascinante le sucedió al USD/JPY en los últimos meses: comenzó a desacoplarse de los rendimientos de los bonos estadounidenses (Gráfico I-1). En gran medida, esta ruptura en la relación reflejó la propia debilidad del dólar, ya que el índice del dólar cayó un 10% en 2017. Pero por débil que haya sido el dólar el año pasado, en realidad se ha mantenido plano desde el 7 de septiembre. Otro culpable detrás del desacople del yen respecto a los rendimientos de los bonos fue que, cuando el Banco Central Europeo anunció el fin de su programa de compra de activos, el Banco de Japón fue visto como el siguiente en la fila para reducir sus compras. El 8 de enero, el BoJ comenzó a moverse en esa dirección, ya que empezó a recortar su compra de JGBs a largo plazo. Desde ese día, no solo se han vendido bonos a nivel mundial, sino que el yen también ha recuperado vigor. Creemos que el mercado bajista del yen no ha terminado, pero es probable que surja un repunte aprovechable frente al euro. El sol está saliendo El BoJ está justificado al querer retirar cierto estímulo de la política. La economía japonesa está funcionando a pleno rendimiento y la mejora parece generalizada. La confianza del consumidor, impulsada por el aumento de los precios de los activos y una tasa de desempleo en mínimos de 23 años, está alcanzando máximos históricos (Gráfico I-2). Esto continuará apoyando el gasto real de los hogares, que ahora crece a un ritmo cercano al 2% después de contraerse de forma sostenida desde 2015 hasta principios de 2017. Otro apoyo al gasto de los hogares proviene del frente salarial. Los salarios contractuales ya están creciendo a su ritmo más rápido desde 2006, y los salarios excluyendo horas extra se expanden a tasas no vistas desde 1998 (Gráfico I-3). Además, la ratio de ofertas por solicitante se encuentra en su nivel más alto desde 1974. Esto aumenta la probabilidad de que el pulso del primer ministro Shinzo Abe con la empresa japonesa para aumentar los salarios dé frutos, y de que las próximas negociaciones salariales de primavera generen ganancias aceleradas. Gráfico I-2 Los hogares japoneses se sienten eufóricos ENCUESTA DE CONFIANZA DEL CONSUMIDOR Los hogares japoneses se sienten eufóricos ENCUESTA DE CONFIANZA DEL CONSUMIDOR Los hogares japoneses se sienten eufóricos Gráfico I-3 El crecimiento salarial se ha acelerado El crecimiento salarial se ha acelerado. El crecimiento salarial se ha acelerado. La confianza empresarial también está aumentando. El índice PMI manufacturero japonés está elevado según los estándares japoneses, actualmente en 54, y la confianza de las pequeñas empresas apunta a una aceleración de la producción industrial (Gráfico I-4). Los mercados financieros también validan este panorama. El repunte del Nikkei ha captado la imaginación de los inversores, pero aún más impresionante ha sido la fortaleza de las acciones de pequeña capitalización, que han superado a sus homólogas de gran capitalización en un 17% desde 2015 (Gráfico I-5). Este desarrollo ha coincidido con un repunte en el crecimiento del crédito y normalmente también se asocia con una perspectiva de crecimiento robusta. El modelo del PIB desarrollado por nuestra publicación hermana, The Bank Credit Analyst, encapsula estos diversos fenómenos y pronostica que el crecimiento real del PIB japonés podría alcanzar una tasa anual del 3% en la primera mitad de 2018 (Gráfico I-6). Por tanto, parece que la economía japonesa seguirá ganando impulso. Gráfico I-4 Las empresas japonesas también##br## sienten el buen ambiente Las empresas japonesas también están sintiendo buenas vibras Las empresas japonesas también están sintiendo buenas vibras Gráfico I-5 Las small caps apuntan a##br## un futuro prometedor Las empresas de pequeña capitalización apuntan a un futuro prometedor Las empresas de pequeña capitalización apuntan a un futuro prometedor Gráfico I-6 El crecimiento japonés ##br##tiene impulso El crecimiento japonés gana impulso El crecimiento japonés gana impulso ¿Pero qué sustenta estas mejoras? En primer lugar, el empuje fiscal en Japón ha cambiado. La política fiscal fue un lastre en Japón de 2012 a 2016, creando un freno promedio a la actividad económica de 0.6% del PIB por año. Sin embargo, en 2017, la política fiscal se relajó para añadir 0.2% al PIB. En segundo lugar, Japón se ha beneficiado en gran medida del repunte del crecimiento en los mercados emergentes. Según el FMI, un choque de crecimiento del 1% en los mercados emergentes (EM) afecta al crecimiento japonés en 50 puntos básicos —casi cinco veces más que el efecto del mismo choque en la economía de EE. UU. Esto se debe a que el 43% de las exportaciones japonesas se envían a economías emergentes. En tercer lugar, el impacto de la actividad de los mercados emergentes en Japón se amplifica por la naturaleza contracíclica del JPY. A medida que el crecimiento global y de los mercados emergentes se expande con mayor vigor, el yen se debilita, lo que relaja las condiciones financieras japonesas. Este fenómeno se manifestó plenamente el año pasado, cuando las condiciones financieras se aflojaron en una desviación estándar completa durante los últimos 16 meses. Estos desarrollos son los que han sentado las bases para un mejor crecimiento y el cambio de tono del BoJ. Conclusión: Japón está funcionando muy bien. Los consumidores y las empresas están optimistas, el gasto está en alza y se prevé que el PIB se acelere aún más. La relajación del ajuste fiscal, economías emergentes más fuertes y el ablandamiento de las condiciones financieras son los factores detrás de estas mejoras. El BoJ está tomando nota. ¿Hasta dónde puede llegar el BoJ? El BoJ llevaba meses deseando mover la política. En noviembre de 2017, el gobernador del BoJ, Haruhiko Kuroda, hablaba del concepto de la "tasa de reversión". La tasa de reversión es el tipo de interés por debajo del cual recortes adicionales de tipos se vuelven contractivos para la actividad económica. Esto se debe a que por debajo de ese nivel, los tipos más bajos dañan los márgenes de interés bancarios en tal medida que los bancos comerciales empiezan a recortar su concesión de crédito al sector privado. La razón por la que el BoJ se estaba volviendo más vocal sobre la tasa de reversión es porque esta tasa está inversamente relacionada con la cantidad de valores en los balances de los bancos comerciales. Si los bancos comerciales mantienen muchas obligaciones gubernamentales, al caer los tipos a niveles muy bajos, el valor de esos activos aumenta, contrarrestando el impacto negativo de márgenes de interés más estrechos. El problema en Japón es que, a medida que el BoJ absorbió más JGBs de los emitidos por el gobierno, las tenencias de bonos de los bancos disminuyeron a un ritmo alarmante (Gráfico I-7). Esto significaba que la tasa de reversión estaba subiendo, lo que implicaba que el BoJ tenía menos control sobre la política. Cuando la inflación sorprendió al alza en diciembre, los mercados financieros reaccionaron violentamente. Mientras que los rendimientos nominales japoneses no se movieron mucho, las expectativas de inflación japonesas se dispararon, lo que provocó un colapso en las tasas reales japonesas (Gráfico I-8). Esto produjo un ablandamiento de facto de las condiciones monetarias japonesas, creando la cobertura perfecta para que el BoJ ajustara sus compras de activos: cualquier impacto negativo de modificar las compras de bonos sería mitigado y el BoJ, según su criterio, no perdería control de las condiciones financieras debido a una caída de la tasa de reversión. A pesar de este cambio en la acción y la retórica de la política, aún no prevemos el fin del programa de Control de la Curva de Rendimientos. La inflación excluyendo alimentos y energía sólo se sitúa en un exiguo 0.3%, todavía muy por debajo del objetivo del 2% del BoJ o incluso del 1% —un nivel que probablemente conduciría a una retirada más real del estímulo. Además, el BoJ se encuentra en cierta tesitura. Es cierto que la economía está mucho mejor, pero eso no explica realmente la dinámica de la inflación. La utilización de la capacidad en Japón sólo explica el 3% de los movimientos en la inflación subyacente japonesa; la utilización global, sólo el 10%; y la inflación precede a la creación de crédito en Japón. En cambio, el mejor factor para explicar la inflación japonesa han sido las condiciones financieras (FCIs). En ningún otro país las FCIs explican tanto la dinámica de la inflación como en Japón. Los movimientos recientes en la inflación japonesa son totalmente consistentes con la evolución de las FCIs japonesas desde 2010. Basado en esta relación, el IPC excluyendo alimentos y energía probablemente alcanzará un pico del 0.7% en junio de 2018 (Gráfico I-9). Gráfico I-7 La tasa de reversión japonesa##br## cae debido al QQE La tasa de reversión de Japón está disminuyendo debido a QQE. La tasa de reversión de Japón está disminuyendo debido a QQE. Gráfico I-8 Aumento repentino de##br## las expectativas de inflación Aumento repentino de las expectativas de inflación Aumento repentino de las expectativas de inflación Gráfico I-9 La inflación está subiendo porque##br## las condiciones financieras se relajaron La inflación se acelera porque las condiciones financieras se relajaron La inflación se acelera porque las condiciones financieras se relajaron Sin embargo, si el BoJ elimina el estímulo demasiado rápido, el yen se apreciaría y las condiciones financieras se endurecerían con fuerza. Lo más probable es que la inflación se debilite sustancialmente, anulando la propia razón para endurecer la política en primer lugar. Estas dinámicas apuntan a una continuación del YCC durante al menos los próximos 12 a 18 meses. Conclusión: Japón pronto eliminará por completo su programa QQE. No obstante, esto no indica la supresión del control de la curva de rendimientos. Esto no solo se debe a que la inflación japonesa está extremadamente lejos del objetivo del BoJ, sino también a que la tasa de inflación de Japón es hipersensible a las condiciones financieras. Por lo tanto, cualquier endurecimiento de las condiciones financieras provocado por un yen más fuerte —la probable respuesta del mercado ante una política más restrictiva— provocará que la inflación colapse, anulando la propia necesidad de una política más restrictiva. Implicaciones para la inversión USD/JPY está caro, negociándose un 16% por encima del valor justo implícito por la paridad del poder adquisitivo. Además, el yen está respaldado por un generoso superávit por cuenta corriente del 4% del PIB. Asimismo, los inversores globales han estado infraponderados en duración. Este fenómeno tiende a ser negativo para el yen. Cuando los inversores están tan infraponderados en duración como en la actualidad, el yen tiene más probabilidades de repuntar (Gráfico I-10). Es cierto que en 2014 los inversores estaban tan negativos con respecto a los bonos como lo están hoy, pero el USD/JPY se vendió. Esto se debió a que en aquel entonces el BoJ anunció un aumento de su programa de compras de activos. Hoy, el BoJ se está moviendo hacia abandonar su programa QQE, lo que probablemente provoque un rally por cobertura de cortos. Ahora bien, la pregunta clave para los inversores es qué moneda debe venderse frente al yen. Sostenemos que el euro es una alternativa interesante al USD. EUR/JPY está excepcionalmente caro en la actualidad. A largo plazo, EUR/JPY se negocia muy fuera de su rango normal según la paridad del poder adquisitivo (Gráfico I-11). Además, mientras que USD/JPY está levemente caro según métricas que incorporan diferenciales de tipos y apetito por el riesgo, EUR/USD está muy apreciado basado en una comparación similar. La implicación es que EUR/JPY se negocia a un nivel excepcionalmente exigente en términos de valoraciones a corto plazo (Gráfico I-12). Por tanto, tácticamente, el momento es cada vez más propicio para vender este cruce. Gráfico I-10 La posición en duración apunta a riesgo alcista para el yen El posicionamiento en duración apunta a un riesgo al alza para el yen El posicionamiento en duración apunta a un riesgo al alza para el yen Gráfico I-11 EUR/JPY está caro EUR/JPY está caro EUR/JPY está caro Gráfico I-12 Riesgo táctico para EUR/JPY Riesgo táctico para EUR/JPY Riesgo táctico para EUR/JPY . Argumentando además a favor de vender EUR/JPY en lugar de USD/JPY están las condiciones financieras relativas. Las condiciones financieras de la zona euro se han endurecido mucho más que las condiciones financieras de EE. UU. en relación con las de Japón (Gráfico I-13). Como consecuencia, incluso ajustando por sesgos sectoriales, las acciones europeas están actualmente rindiendo por debajo de las japonesas en mayor medida que la infraperformance de las acciones estadounidenses. Esto destaca que la perspectiva económica relativa de Japón brilla más cuando se compara con la zona euro que cuando se compara con EE. UU. Esto también significa que el yen tiene más margen para apreciarse frente al euro que frente al USD. Finalmente, el posicionamiento relativo entre el euro y el yen también está excepcionalmente sesgado. Como ilustra el Gráfico I-14 , cuando los especuladores están simultáneamente largos en euro y cortos en yen, EUR/JPY tiende a experimentar correcciones posteriores. Gráfico I-13 Las FCIs de la zona euro se apretaron ##br##más que las de EE. UU. Los FCIs de la zona del euro se endurecieron más que los de EE. UU. Los FCIs de la zona del euro se endurecieron más que los de EE. UU. Gráfico I-14 Posicionamiento sesgado##br## en EUR Posicionamiento Sesgado en EUR Posicionamiento Sesgado en EUR Los factores mencionados apuntan a un posible repunte importante del yen, pero la durabilidad de ese repunte probablemente será limitada. El BoJ solo estará abandonando un programa QQE que ya había implementado solo a medias en los últimos meses, ya que las compras de bonos estaban muy por debajo de su objetivo de JPY80 billones. El BoJ sigue comprometido con su programa YCC en el futuro previsible. Solo una renuncia a este programa creará un apoyo duradero para el yen. Mientras tanto, dado que cualquier repunte del yen endurecerá las condiciones financieras y dañará la inflación, cualquier repunte del yen debe tomarse como una operación temporal y no como una posición de largo plazo, ya que las tasas de política terminales en Japón aún tienen poco margen para subir. Conclusión: Abandonar el QQE probablemente resultará en un repunte del yen. Dicho repunte será probablemente más pronunciado frente al euro, ya que las valoraciones, el posicionamiento y las condiciones financieras están especialmente exacerbados en comparación con la moneda europea. Para ser claros, el repunte del yen probablemente será un movimiento contra la tendencia, ya que un yen fuerte ejercerá serias presiones deflacionarias sobre Japón, lo que significa que el programa YCC del BoJ permanecerá firmemente en vigor. Estamos cortos en EUR/JPY en 133.79. CAD: Atrapado entre el BoC y el NAFTA Gráfico I-15 Canadá experimentará aumento salarial##br##Surgen condiciones inflacionarias Canadá experimentará un aumento de los salarios Canadá: surgen condiciones inflacionarias Canadá experimentará un aumento de los salarios Canadá: surgen condiciones inflacionarias El Banco de Canadá (BoC) se reúne la próxima semana y aumentan las probabilidades de que eleve las tasas de política este mes. La economía canadiense también es muy fuerte, liderada por el sector doméstico. El gasto real de los consumidores está creciendo a su ritmo más rápido en casi 10 años, la tasa de desempleo está en mínimos de 40 años y la inversión de capital (capex) se está recuperando tras haber sido diezmada por el colapso de los precios del petróleo entre 2014 y 2016. Gracias a este contexto, la economía canadiense está alcanzando sus propias restricciones de capacidad. El BoC estima que la brecha de producción canadiense se ha cerrado. Además, la reciente Encuesta de Perspectivas Empresariales confirma este mensaje: una proporción récord de empresas canadienses tiene dificultades para satisfacer la demanda debido a las restricciones de capacidad, y el número y la intensidad crecientes de la escasez de mano de obra apuntan a un mercado laboral ajustado (Gráfico I-15). La capacidad limitada y los salarios más altos respaldarán el repunte ya visible de la inflación subyacente, que ya ha alcanzado el 1.8%. Como resultado, esperamos que el BoC endurezca las tasas tanto como la Reserva Federal este año. Sin embargo, el impacto de este desarrollo en el CAD podría ser limitado. Los inversores ya están descontando más subidas en Canadá que en EE. UU. en los próximos 12 meses - 82 puntos básicos frente a 60 puntos básicos, respectivamente. Además, los especuladores vuelven a estar muy largos en el loonie, lo que implica un obstáculo elevado para que los datos económicos fuertes eleven aún más el CAD. Además, el NAFTA sigue siendo un riesgo importante para Canadá. Como escribió Marko Papic, nuestro estratega geopolítico jefe, en un Informe Especial de noviembre, el presidente Trump tiene poder sin restricciones cuando se trata de abrogar el NAFTA (Tabla I-1).1 Si el NAFTA colapsara, es muy probable que Canadá volviera en última instancia al todavía preferencial Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Canadá-EE. UU. Por tanto, el impacto en el comercio Canadá-EE. UU. probablemente sería temporal. Sin embargo, el mayor golpe se sentiría en la inversión de capital (capex) en Canadá. El alto grado de incertidumbre asociado con deshacer el NAFTA haría que las empresas abandonaran los planes de expansión en Canadá y las llevaría a expandir su capacidad norteamericana directamente en EE. UU., eludiendo así el riesgo regulatorio creado en la cadena de suministro. Esto amortiguaría el perfil de crecimiento futuro de Canadá. Tabla I-1 Trump afronta pocas limitaciones en materia comercial Yen: ¡QQE ha muerto! ¡Larga vida al YCC! Yen: ¡QQE ha muerto! ¡Larga vida al YCC! Es poco probable que el petróleo llene el vacío para el CAD. Con Brent cerca de US$70/bbl, ha alcanzado el objetivo de nuestros estrategas de Materias Primas y Energía. OPEC 2.0 no estará dispuesto a acomodar precios mucho más altos, ya que esto incentivaría a los productores de shale a ampliar la capacidad, recreando la dinámica de exceso de oferta que existía antes del colapso de 2014. Además, el referente West Canada Select, el precio del petróleo más relevante para Canadá, sigue con un descuento sustancial frente a WTI y Brent. Esto se debe a que no hay suficiente capacidad de oleoductos para transportar el crudo fuera de Alberta. Canadá se está ahogando en su propio petróleo. Esta situación no va a cambiar. Gráfico I-16 CAD/NOK está sobreextendido CAD/NOK está sobreextendido CAD/NOK está sobreextendido Basado en esta combinación, somos neutrales en USD/CAD en una base a 12 meses, aunque es probable un movimiento de vuelta a 1.29 en las próximas semanas. Sin embargo, mientras el petróleo canadiense se negocia con descuento, el CAD ha rendido mejor que el NOK, la otra petromoneda en el espacio del G10. Esto sugiere que vender CAD/NOK puede ser una forma más limpia de jugar los riesgos inherentes al dólar canadiense. En primer lugar, el dólar canadiense está muy caro en relación con la corona noruega en este momento, cotizándose un 11% por encima de su tasa de paridad del poder adquisitivo (Gráfico I-16). Incluso ajustando por otros factores como la productividad y los precios de las materias primas, el CAD cotiza con su mayor prima frente al NOK desde 1994. Esto representa un riesgo para CAD/NOK, ya que el loonie está expuesto a riesgos de política comercial, mientras que la corona noruega no. En segundo lugar, el panorama de la balanza de pagos sigue siendo muy favorable para el NOK. Noruega presenta un superávit por cuenta corriente del 5.5% mientras que Canadá registra un déficit del 2.8%. Además, Noruega ostenta una posición neta de inversión internacional (NIIP) del 210% del PIB, la mayor en el G10. Las NIIP sólidas se asocian con subidas en los tipos de cambio efectivos reales. En tercer lugar, aunque el impulso de la economía canadiense es ampliamente conocido por los inversores —esta es la razón por la que están tan largos en CAD y esperan tantas subidas del BoC— los aspectos positivos de Noruega están siendo ignorados. El indicador adelantado de Noruega sigue subiendo, y la producción industrial noruega y el crecimiento real del PIB se están acelerando. En cuarto lugar, el Norges Bank está respondiendo a la debilidad del NOK. En su reunión de diciembre, matizó su tono, ya que el NOK está relajando las condiciones monetarias demasiado a los ojos del banco central noruego. Esto sugiere que la subida de 25 puntos básicos actualmente esperada en Noruega podría ser demasiado baja. También destaca que la excepcional brecha de 60 puntos básicos entre Canadá y Noruega en términos de subidas esperadas a 12 meses también es probable que se normalice. Por último, CAD/NOK se está negociando hacia la parte alta tanto de su rango histórico a largo plazo como a corto plazo. Aunque el posicionamiento en CAD ahora está bastante extendido en el lado largo, según datos del Norges Bank los especuladores están cortos en NOK. Por tanto, con el NAFTA en cuestión, una visión del BoC ya totalmente descontada y la improbabilidad de que el descuento WCS-Brent se estreche, los riesgos están sesgados hacia un CAD/NOK más bajo en el futuro. Conclusión: La economía canadiense está en auge. Esto significa que el BoC seguirá el ritmo de la Fed y aumentará las tasas al menos tres veces este año. Sin embargo, los mercados ya están descontando más subidas en Canadá que en EE. UU. Además, los precios del petróleo tienen un alza limitada desde aquí, y el referente WCS continuará negociándose con un profundo descuento frente a Brent. Por tanto, aunque USD/CAD tiene un potencial alcista limitado, también tiene un potencial bajista limitado. Sin embargo, CAD/NOK enfrenta numerosos riesgos a la baja desde los niveles actuales. Esta semana estamos cortos en este cruce, con un punto de entrada en 6.398. Mathieu Savary, Vicepresidente Estrategia de divisas mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Consulte el informe especial de BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism" fechado el 10 de noviembre de 2017, disponible en gis.bcaresearch.com Monedas Dólar estadounidense Gráfico II-1 Técnicas del USD 1 Técnicos del USD 1 Técnicos del USD 1 Gráfico II-2 Técnicas del USD 2 Técnicos del USD 2 Técnicos del USD 2 Los datos recientes en EE. UU. han sido mixtos: Las nóminas no agrícolas sorprendieron a la baja, situándose en 148 mil. Además, la tasa de participación laboral sorprendió a la baja, situándose en 62.7%. El PMI no manufacturero ISM también estuvo por debajo de las expectativas, situándose en 55.9. Sin embargo, el cambio en el crédito al consumo superó las expectativas, situándose en 27.95 mil millones de dólares. El dólar comenzó la semana con fuerza, la cual finalmente se disipó, por unas minutas relativamente agresivas del BCE y ajustes de política en Japón. En general, esperamos que el mercado continúe descontando el diagrama de puntos de la Fed, ejerciendo presión al alza sobre el dólar. Enlaces del informe: Una ola de frío no hace un invierno - 5 de enero de 2018 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Canarios en la mina de carbón Alerta 2: más sobre carry trades en EM y crecimiento global - 15 de diciembre de 2017 El euro Gráfico II-3 Técnicas del EUR 1 EUR: Aspectos técnicos 1 EUR: Aspectos técnicos 1 Gráfico II-4 Técnicas del EUR 2 EUR Técnicos 2 Por favor, proporcione únicamente el texto traducido en su respuesta, sin comentarios ni formato adicional. EUR Técnicos 2 Por favor, proporcione únicamente el texto traducido en su respuesta, sin comentarios ni formato adicional. Los datos recientes en la zona euro han sido positivos: La inflación subyacente superó las expectativas, situándose en 1.1%. Además, el indicador de sentimiento económico también superó las expectativas, situándose en 116. El crecimiento anual de las ventas minoristas también sorprendió al alza, situándose en 2.8%. Finalmente, la tasa de desempleo descendió del 8.8% al 8.7% A pesar de los datos positivos, el euro ha caído esta semana. El euro comenzó la semana débil, pero se disparó tras las minutas agresivas del BCE. Esto ha ocurrido debido al repunte en las expectativas de tipos en EE. UU., ya que el mercado ha continuado descontando a la Fed. En general, esperamos ver descensos en EUR/JPY, ya que el BoJ tiene más margen para retirarse de su política ultraacomodaticia que el BCE. Enlaces del informe: Una ola de frío no hace un invierno - 5 de enero de 2018 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 El yen Gráfico II-5 Técnicas del JPY 1 Análisis técnico del JPY 1 Análisis técnico del JPY 1 Gráfico II-6 Técnicas del JPY 2 Análisis técnico del JPY 2 Análisis técnico del JPY 2 Los datos recientes en Japón han sido mixtos: El crecimiento anual de las remuneraciones en efectivo superó las expectativas, situándose en 0.9%. Además, aumentaron respecto a octubre. Sin embargo, la confianza del consumidor sorprendió a la baja, situándose en 44.7 y descendiendo respecto al mes anterior. El yen ha estado subiendo con fuerza esta semana, con el USD/JPY cayendo un 1.7%. Esto se debió a que el BoJ señaló que reduciría sus compras de bonos a largo plazo. El mercado interpreta esto como una señal de que el BoJ comenzará a salir de su política monetaria ultraacomodaticia. Estos desarrollos deberían seguir proporcionando apreciación al JPY, particularmente frente al euro. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - 8 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Libra esterlina Gráfico II-7 Técnicas de la GBP 1 GBP Análisis Técnicos 1 GBP Análisis Técnicos 1 Gráfico II-8 Técnicas de la GBP 2 Análisis técnico GBP 2 Análisis técnico GBP 2 Los datos recientes en el Reino Unido han sido mixtos: El crecimiento anual de la producción industrial superó las expectativas, situándose en 2.5%. Además, el crecimiento anual de la producción manufacturera también sorprendió al alza, situándose en 3.5%. Sin embargo, el crecimiento anual de los precios de la vivienda según Halifax no cumplió las expectativas, situándose en 2.7% mientras que la variación mensual se contrajo un 0.6%. La libra se ha mantenido plana esta semana frente al dólar, mientras que ha perdido aproximadamente un 1% frente al euro. En general, el BoE tiene limitada la capacidad de subir las tasas de manera significativa. Además, la inflación debería comenzar a ceder tras la subida de tipos y el aumento de la libra. Esto ejercerá presión a la baja sobre la moneda. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - 3 de noviembre de 2017 Dólar australiano Gráfico II-9 Técnicas del AUD 1 Indicadores técnicos del AUD 1 Indicadores técnicos del AUD 1 Gráfico II-10 Técnicas del AUD 2 Análisis técnico del AUD 2 Análisis técnico del AUD 2 Los datos recientes en Australia han sido mixtos: El crecimiento anual de permisos de construcción superó las expectativas, situándose en 17.2%. Sin embargo, la balanza comercial de noviembre sorprendió a la baja, situándose en -628 millones. Además, disminuyó desde -302 millones un mes antes. AUD/USD se ha mantenido plano esta semana; sin embargo, AUD/NZD ha caído aproximadamente un 1%. Si bien es cierto que el crecimiento global sigue siendo fuerte, indicadores clave como el crecimiento de las exportaciones de Corea y Taiwán han retrocedido. Además, el crecimiento de la oferta monetaria en China continúa disminuyendo. Todo esto apunta a una desaceleración temporal de la actividad industrial china, lo que conduciría a debilidad en AUD/USD. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Cobertura de divisas: ¿Dinámica o estática? - Una guía práctica para inversores globales - 29 de septiembre de 2017 Dólar neozelandés Gráfico II-11 Técnicas del NZD 1 Análisis técnico del NZD 1 Análisis técnico del NZD 1 Gráfico II-12 Técnicas del NZD 2 NZD Técnicos 2 NZD Técnicos 2 El kiwi se ha revalorizado casi un 5% desde el inicio del año, a medida que el crecimiento global sigue siendo robusto. En general, esperamos que el NZD continúe superando al AUD este año, ya que Nueva Zelanda es menos sensible a un endurecimiento de las condiciones financieras que Australia. Sin embargo, a más largo plazo, el potencial alcista del kiwi es limitado, ya que el nuevo gobierno populista no solo se ha comprometido a reducir la inmigración al país, sino también a que el RBNZ tenga un mandato dual. Ambas políticas deprimirán la tasa neutral en Nueva Zelanda y, en consecuencia, ejercerán presión a la baja sobre el kiwi. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - 3 de noviembre de 2017 Dólar canadiense Gráfico II-13 Técnicas del CAD 1 Técnicas de CAD 1 Técnicas de CAD 1 Gráfico II-14 Técnicas del CAD 2 Técnicas de CAD 2 Técnicas de CAD 2 Los datos recientes en Canadá han sido en su mayoría positivos: La tasa de desempleo sorprendió positivamente, al descender a 5.7% desde 5.9% Además, el cambio neto en el empleo también superó las expectativas, situándose en 78.6 mil. El crecimiento anual de las viviendas iniciadas también superó las expectativas, situándose en 217 mil. Sin embargo, el Ivey Purchasing Manager Index estuvo por debajo de las expectativas, situándose en 60.4. USD/CAD saltó el martes tras informes de que Trump saldrá del acuerdo NAFTA. En general, creemos que el dólar canadiense tendrá un potencial alcista limitado a partir de ahora, ya que el mercado está descontando más subidas en Canadá que en EE. UU. Esta debilidad podría aprovecharse vendiendo CAD/NOK, ya que este cruce está muy sobrevalorado según múltiples métricas. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Actualización del mercado - 27 de octubre de 2017 Franco suizo Gráfico II-15 Técnicas del CHF 1 Análisis técnicos del CHF 1 Análisis técnicos del CHF 1 Gráfico II-16 Técnicas del CHF 2 Análisis técnico CHF 2 Análisis técnico CHF 2 Los datos recientes en Suiza han sido positivos: La inflación general llegó en línea con las expectativas, en 0.8%; mientras tanto, la inflación mes a mes sorprendió al alza, situándose en 0%. La tasa de desempleo también estuvo en línea con las expectativas, en un nivel muy bajo, situándose en 3%. Finalmente, el crecimiento anual de las ventas minoristas sorprendió al alza sustancialmente, situándose en -0.2%, comparado con 2.6% el mes pasado. EUR/CHF se ha mantenido relativamente plano desde la semana pasada. En general, esperamos un alza limitada en el franco, ya que el SNB permanecerá activo en el mercado de divisas. Para que el SNB cambie su política, la inflación en Suiza deberá mantenerse en un nivel alto durante un período considerable. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Actualización de nuestros modelos de valor justo a largo plazo - 15 de septiembre de 2017 Corona noruega Gráfico II-17 Técnicas del NOK 1 Técnicos de NOK 1 Técnicos de NOK 1 Gráfico II-18 Técnicas del NOK 2 NOK Análisis técnico 2 NOK Análisis técnico 2 Los datos recientes en Noruega han sido mixtos: La inflación general superó las expectativas, situándose en 1.6%. Además, la inflación subyacente también sorprendió al alza, situándose en 1.4% Sin embargo, el crecimiento de la producción manufacturera estuvo por debajo de las expectativas, situándose en 0.3% USD/NOK baja aproximadamente un 0.7%, mientras los precios del petróleo continúan acercándose a la marca de 70 dólares. No obstante, creemos que el potencial alcista para USD/NOK es limitado desde aquí, ya que el mercado comenzará a descontar más subidas de tipos por parte de la Fed. Dicho esto, los inversores dispuestos a apostar por una mayor fortaleza del petróleo podrían vender EUR/NOK. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Canarios en la mina de carbón Alerta 2: más sobre carry trades en EM y crecimiento global - 15 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Corona sueca Gráfico II-19 Técnicas del SEK 1 SEK Indicadores Técnicos 1 SEK Indicadores Técnicos 1 Gráfico II-20 Técnicas del SEK 2 SEK Técnicos 2 SEK Técnicos 2 Tras caer precipitadamente a finales de 2017, USD/SEK se ha mantenido relativamente plano este año. En general, aunque Stefan Ingves sigue siendo muy dovish, en las últimas minutas reconoció que un cambio en la política monetaria se está acercando. Mientras tanto, el gobernador adjunto Jansson declaró que, aunque apoya continuar con las compras de activos, mantener la tasa repo sin cambios sería "difícil de digerir". Los inversores dispuestos a apostar por una desaceleración en la zona euro provocada por el endurecimiento de las condiciones financieras podrían vender EUR/SEK. Enlaces del informe: 10 gráficos para digerir con adornos navideños - 22 de diciembre de 2017 Canarios en la mina de carbón Alerta 2: más sobre carry trades en EM y crecimiento global - 15 de diciembre de 2017 Las equis y el mercado de divisas - 24 de noviembre de 2017 Operaciones & Pronósticos Resumen de pronósticos Cartera principal Operaciones tácticas Operaciones cerradas