Elections
Highlights Three distinct forces are likely to make South Asia’s geopolitical risks increasingly relevant to global investors. First, India’s tensions with China stem from China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness and India’s shift away from traditional neutrality toward aligning with the US and its allies. This creates a security dilemma in South Asia, just as in East Asia. Second, India’s economy is sputtering in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, adding fuel to nationalism and populism in advance of a series of important elections. India will stimulate the economy but it could also become more reactive on the international scene. Third, the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan and negotiating a deal with Iran in an effort to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East and South Asia. This will create a scramble for influence across both regions and a power vacuum in Afghanistan that is highly likely to yield negative surprises for India and its neighbors. Traditionally geopolitical risks in South Asia have a limited impact on markets. India’s growth slowdown and forthcoming fiscal stimulus are more relevant for investors. However, a sharp rise in geopolitical risk would undermine India’s structural advantages as the West diversifies away from China. Stay short Indian banks. Feature Geopolitical risks in South Asia are slowly but surely rising. India-Pakistan and China-India are well-known “conflict-dyads” or pairings. Historically, these two sets have been fighting each other over their fuzzy Himalayan border with limited global financial market consequences. But now fundamental changes are afoot that are altering the geopolitical setting in the region. Specifically, the coming together of three distinct forces could trigger a significant geopolitical event in South Asia. The three forces are as follow: Force #1: Sino-Indian Tensions Get Real About a year ago, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in Ladakh, a disputed territory in the Kashmir region. Following these clashes China reduced its military presence in the Pangong Tso area but its presence in some neighboring areas remains meaningful. Besides the troop build-up along India’s eastern border, China is building more air combat infrastructure in its India-facing western theatre. China’s major air bases have historically been concentrated in China’s eastern region, away from the Indian border (Map 1). Consequently, India has historically enjoyed an advantage in airpower. But China appears to be working to mitigate this disadvantage. Map 1Most Of China’s Major Aviation Units Are Located Away From India Owing to China’s increased military focus along the Sino-India border, India’s threat perception of China has undergone a fundamental change in recent years. Notably, India has diverted some of its key army units away from its western Indo-Pak border towards its eastern border with China. India could now have nearly 200,000 troops deployed along its border with China, which would mark a 40% increase from last year.1 Turning attention to the Indo-Pak border, India’s problems with Pakistan appear under control for now. This is owing to the ceasefire agreement that was renewed by the two countries in February 2021. However, this peace cannot possibly be expected to last. This is mainly because core problems between the two countries (like Pakistan’s support of militant proxies and India’s control over Kashmir) remain unaddressed. History too suggests that bouts of peace between the two warring neighbors rarely last long. These bouts usually end abruptly when a terrorist attack takes place in India. With both political turbulence and economic distress in Pakistan rising, the fragile ceasefire between India and Pakistan could be upended over the next six months. In fact, two events over the last week point to the fragility of the ceasefire: Two drones carrying explosives entered an Indian air force station located in Jammu and Kashmir (i.e. a northern territory that India recently reorganized, to Pakistan’s chagrin). Even as no casualties were reported, this attack marks a turning point for terrorist activity in India as this was the first-time terrorists used drones to enter an Indian military base. Hours later, another drone attack struck an Indian base at the Ratnuchak-Kaluchak army station, the site of a major terrorist attack in 2002. Chart 1China, Pakistan And India Cumulatively Added 41 Nuclear Warheads Over 2020 Given that the ceasefire was agreed recently, any further increase in terrorist activity in India over the next six months would suggest that a more substantial breakdown in relations is nigh. Distinct from these recent tensions, China’s troop deployment along India’s eastern arm and Pakistan’s presence along India’s western arm creates a strategic “pincer” that increasingly threatens India. India is naturally concerned. China and Pakistan are allies who have been working closely on projects including the strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a collection of infrastructure projects in Pakistan that includes the development of a port in Gwadar where a future presence of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is envisaged. Gwadar has the potential of providing China land-based access to the Indian Ocean. Trust in the South Asian region is clearly running low. Distinct from troop build-ups and drone-attacks, China, Pakistan, and India cumulatively added more than 40 nuclear warheads over the last year (Chart 1). China is reputed to be engaged in an even larger increase in its nuclear arsenal than the data show.2 From a structural perspective, too, geopolitical risks in the South Asian peninsula are bound to keep rising. When it comes to the conflicting Indo-Pak dyad, India’s geopolitical power has been rising relative to that of Pakistan in the 2000s. However, the geopolitical muscle of the Sino-Pak alliance is much greater than that of India on a standalone basis (Chart 2). Chart 2India Has Aligned With The QUAD To Counter The Sino-Pak Alliance China’s active involvement in South Asia is responsible for driving India’s increasing desire to abandon its historical foreign policy stance of non-alignment. India’s membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the QUAD, whose other members include the US, Japan, and Australia) bears testimony to India’s active effort to develop closer relations with the US and its allies (Chart 2). India’s alignment with the US is deepening China’s and Pakistan’s distrust of India. Conventional and nuclear military deterrence should prevent full-scale war. But the regional balance is increasingly fluid which means geopolitical risks will slowly but surely rise in South Asia over the coming year and years. Force #2: A Growth Slowdown Alongside India’s Loaded Election Calendar The pandemic has hit the economies of South Asia particularly hard. South Asia historically maintained higher real GDP growth rates relative to Emerging Markets (EMs). But in 2021, this region’s growth rate is set to be lower than that of EM peers (Chart 3). History is replete with examples of a rise in economic distress triggering geopolitical events. South Asia is characterized by unusually low per capita incomes (Chart 4) and the latest slowdown could exacerbate the risk of both social unrest and geopolitical incidents materialising. Chart 3South Asian Economies Have Been Hit Hard By The Pandemic Chart 4South Asia Is Characterized By Very Low Per Capita Incomes To complicate matters a busy state elections calendar is coming up in India. Elections will be due in seven Indian states in 2022. These states account for about 25% of India’s population. State elections due in 2022 will amount to a high-stakes political battle. During state elections in 2021, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the incumbent in only one of the five states. In 2022, the BJP is the incumbent party in most of the states that are due for elections, which means it has the advantage but also has a lot to lose, especially in a post-pandemic environment. Elections kick off in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh next February. Last time this state faced elections Prime Minister Narendra Modi was willing to go to great lengths to boost his popularity ahead of time. Specifically, he upset the nation with a large-scale and unprecedented de-monetization program. Given the busy state election calendar in 2022, we expect the BJP-led central government to focus on policy actions that can improve its support among Indian voters. Two policies in particular are likely to come through: Fiscal Stimulus Measures To Provide Economic Relief: India has refrained from administering a large post-pandemic stimulus thus far. As per budget estimates, the Indian central government’s total expenditure in FY22 is set to increase only by 1% on a year-on-year basis. But the expenditure-side restraint shown by India’s central government could change. With elections and a pandemic (which has now claimed over 400,000 lives in India), the central government could consider a meaningful increase in spending closer to February 2022. Map 2Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India India’s Finance Minister already announced a fiscal stimulus package of $85 billion (amounting to 2.8% of GDP) earlier this week. Whilst this stimulus entails limited fresh spending (amounting to about 0.6% of India’s GDP), we would not be surprised if the government follows it up with more spending closer to February 2022. Assertive Foreign Policy To Ward-Off Unfriendly Neighbors: India’s northern states are known to harbor unfavorable views of Pakistan (Map 2). The roots of this phenomenon can be traced to geography and the bloody civil strife of 1947 that was triggered by the partition of British-ruled India into the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan. Given the north’s unfavorable views of Pakistan and given looming elections, Indian policy makers may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response, to any terrorist strikes from Pakistan or territorial incursions by China. This kind of response was observed most recently ahead of the Indian General Elections in April-May 2019. An Indian military convoy was attacked by a suicide-bomber in early February 2019 and a Pakistan-based terrorist group claimed responsibility. A fortnight later the Indian air force launched unexpected airstrikes across the Line of Control which were then followed by the Pakistan air force conducting air strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. While the next round of Pakistani and Indian general elections is not due until 2023 and 2024, respectively, it is worth noting that of the seven state elections due in India in 2022, four are in the north (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, and Himachal Pradesh). Force #3: Power Vacuum In Afghanistan The final reason to be wary of the South Asian geopolitical dynamic is the change in US policy: both the Iran nuclear deal expected in August and the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan in September. The US public has now elected three presidents on the demand that foreign wars be reduced. In the wake of Trump and populism the political establishment is now responding. Therefore Biden will ultimately implement both the Iran deal and the Afghan withdrawal regardless of delays or hang-ups. But then he will have to do damage control. In the case of Iran, a last-minute flare-up of conflict in the region is likely this summer, as the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran underscore their red lines before the US and Iran settle down to a deal. Indeed it is already happening, with recent US attacks against Iran-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. A major incident would push up oil prices, which is negative for India. But the endgame, an Iranian economic opening, is positive for India, since it imports oil and has had close relations with Iran historically. In the case of Afghanistan, the US exit will activate latent terrorist forces. It will also create a scramble for influence over this landlocked country that could lead to negative surprises across the region. The first principle of the peace agreement between the US and Afghanistan states that the latter will make all efforts to ensure that Afghan soil is not used to further terrorist activity. However, the enforceability of such a guarantee is next to impossible. Notably, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will revive the Taliban’s influence in the region. This poses major risks for India, which has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. The Taliban played a critical role in the release of terrorists into Pakistan following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999. Furthermore, the Haqqani network, which has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, has attacked Indian assets in the past. Any attack on India deriving from the power vacuum in Afghanistan would upset the precarious regional balance. Whilst there are no immediate triggers for Afghani groups to launch a terrorist attack in India, the US withdrawal will trigger a tectonic shift in the region. Negative surprises emanating from Afghanistan should be expected. Investment Conclusions Chart 5Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives We reiterate the need to pare exposure to Indian assets on a tactical basis. India’s growth engine is likely to misfire over the second half of the Indian financial year. Macroeconomic headwinds pose the chief risk for investors, but major geopolitical changes could act as a negative catalyst in the current context. So we urge clients to stay short Indian Banks (Chart 5). Financials account for the lion’s share of India’s benchmark index (26% weight). India could opt for an unexpected expansion in its fiscal deficit soon. Whilst we continue to watch fiscal dynamics closely, we expect the fiscal expansion to materialize closer to February 2022 when India’s most populous state (i.e. Uttar Pradesh) will undergo elections. Over the long run, India’s sense of insecurity will escalate in the context of a more assertive China, stronger Sino-Pakistani ties, and a power vacuum in Afghanistan. For that reason, New Delhi will continue to shed its neutrality and improve relations with the US-led coalition of democratic countries, with an aim to balance China. This process will feed China’s insecurity of being surrounded and contained by a hegemonic American system. This security dilemma is a source of South Asian geopolitical risk that will become more globally relevant over time. China’s conflict with the US and western world should create incentives for India to attract trade and investment. However, its ability to do so will be contingent upon domestic political factors and regional geopolitical factors. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, ‘India Shifts 50,000 Troops to China Border in Historic Move’, Bloomberg, June 28, 2021, bloomberg.com. 2 Joby Warrick, “China is building more than 100 missile silos in its western desert, analysts say,” Washington Post, June 30, 2021, washingtonpost.com.
Highlights The US is withdrawing from the Middle East and South Asia and making a strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. The third quarter will see risks flare around Iran and the US rejoin the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. The result is briefly negative for oil prices but the rise of Iran is a new geopolitical trend that will increase Middle Eastern risk over the long run. The geopolitical outlook is dollar bullish, while the macroeconomic outlook is getting less dollar-bearish due to China’s risk of over-tightening policy. Stay neutral USD and be wary of commodities and emerging markets in the third quarter. European political risk is bottoming. The German and French elections are at best minor risks. However, the continent is ripe for negative black swans, especially due to Russian aggression. Go tactically long global large caps and defensives. Feature Chart 1Three Key Views On Track (So Far) We chose “No Return To Normalcy” as the theme of our 2021 outlook. While the COVID-19 vaccine promised economic recovery, we argued that normalization would create complacency regarding fundamental changes that have taken place in the geopolitical environment. A contradiction between an improving macroeconomic backdrop and a foreboding geopolitical backdrop would develop in 2021 and beyond. The “reflation trade” has begun to lose steam as we go to press. However, global recovery will still be the dominant story in the second half of the year as vaccination spreads. The question for the third quarter and the rest of the year is whether reflation will continue. As a matter of forecasting, we think it will. But as a matter of investment strategy, we are taking a more defensive stance until China relaxes economic policy. In our annual outlook we highlighted three key geopolitical views: (1) China’s headwinds, both at home and abroad (2) US détente with Iran and pivot to Asia (3) Europe’s opportunity. All three trends are broadly on track and can be illustrated by looking at equity performance in the relevant regions for the year so far: Chinese stocks sold off, UAE stocks rallied, and European stocks rallied (Chart 1). However, these trends are not exclusively tied to absolute equity performance. The most important question is what happens to global growth and the US dollar as these three key views continue. Stay Neutral On The Dollar It paid off for us to maintain a neutral stance on the dollar. True, the global recovery and exorbitant US trade and budget deficits are bearish for the dollar and bullish for other currencies. But the greenback’s “counter-trend bounce” is proving more formidable than many investors expected. The fundamentals of the American economy and global position remain strong. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the US has secured its recovery with fiscal policy, maintained rule of law amid a contested election, innovated and distributed vaccines, benefited from more flexible social restrictions, refurbished global alliances, and put pressure on its geopolitical rivals. In essence, the combined effect of President Trump’s and Biden’s policies has been to make America “great again” (Chart 2). From a geopolitical perspective, the dollar is appealing. Chart 2Trump-Biden Make America Great Again? In addition, the first two geopolitical views mentioned above – China’s headwinds and the US-Iran détente – imply a negative environment for China and the renminbi. The reason for the US to do a suboptimal deal with Iran, both in 2015 and 2021, is to reduce the risk of war and buy time to enable a strategic pivot to Asia Pacific. Three US presidents have been elected on the pledge to conclude the “forever wars” in the Middle East and South Asia. Biden is withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in September. There can be little doubt Biden is committed to an Iran deal, which is supposed to free up the US’s hands (Chart 3). Meanwhile the US public and Congress are unified in their desire to better defend US interests against China’s economic and military rise. There has not yet been a stabilization of US-China policies. Biden is not likely to hold a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping until late October at earliest – and that is a guess, not a confirmed summit. The Biden administration has completed its review of China policy and is maintaining the Trump administration’s hawkish posture, as predicted. The US and China may resume their strategic and economic dialogue at some point but it is impossible to go back to the status quo ante 2015. That was the year the US adopted a more confrontational stance toward China – a stance later supercharged by Trump’s election and trade tariffs. The hawkish consensus on China is one of the rare unifying factors in a deeply divided America. The Biden administration explicitly says the US-China relationship is now defined by “competition” instead of “engagement.”1 One exception to this neutral view on the dollar has been our decision to go long the Japanese yen and Swiss franc, which has not panned out so far. Our reasoning is that geopolitical risk will boost these currencies but otherwise the reduction of geopolitical risk will weigh on the dollar in the context of global growth recovery. So far geopolitical risk has remained subdued while the US dollar has outperformed. We are still sympathetic to these safe-haven currencies, however, as they are attractively valued as long as one expects geopolitical risks to materialize (Chart 4). Chart 3US Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran Our third key view, that EU was the real winner of the US election last year, remains on track. This is marginally positive for the euro at the expense of the dollar. Given the above points, we favor an equal-weighted basket of the euro and the dollar relative to the renminbi (Chart 5). Chart 4Safe-Haven Currencies Attractive Chart 5Favor Euro And Dollar Over Renminbi The geopolitical outlook is dollar-bullish. The macroeconomic outlook is dollar-bearish, except that China’s economy looks to slow down. We expect China to ease policy in the second half of the year but it may come late. We remain neutral dollar in the third quarter. Wait For China To Relax Policy July 1 marks the centenary of the Communist Party of China. The main thing investors should know is that the Communist Party predates China’s capitalist phase by sixty years. The party adopted capitalism to improve the economy – it never sacrificed its political or foreign policy goals. This poses a major geopolitical problem today because the Communist Party’s consolidation of power across Greater China, symbolized by Beijing’s revocation of Hong Kong’s special status in 2019, has convinced the western democracies that China is no longer compatible with the liberal world order. China launched a 13.8% of GDP monetary-and-fiscal stimulus over 2018-20 due to the trade war and COVID-19 pandemic. So the economy is stable for the hundredth anniversary celebration. The centenary goals are largely accomplished: GDP is larger, poverty is nearly extinguished, although urban incomes are still lagging (Chart 6). General Secretary Xi Jinping will mark the occasion with a speech. The speech will contribute to his governing philosophy, Xi Jinping Thought, a synthesis of communist Mao Zedong Thought and the pro-capitalist “socialism with Chinese characteristics” pioneered by General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s-90s. The effect is to reassert Communist Party and central government primacy after the long period of decentralization that enabled China’s rapid growth phase. It is also to endorse an inward economic turn after the four-decade export-manufacturing boom. The Xi administration’s re-centralization of policy has entailed mini-cycles of tightening and loosening control over the economy. The administration leans against the country’s tendency to gorge itself on debt and grow at any cost – until it must lean the other way for fear of triggering a destabilizing slowdown. For this reason Beijing tightened policy proactively last year, producing a sharp drop in money, credit, and fiscal expansion in 2021 that now threatens to undermine the global recovery. By our measures, any further tightening will result in undershooting the regime’s money and credit targets, i.e. overtightening, and hence threaten to drag on the global recovery (Chart 7). Chart 6China's Communist Party Centenary Goals Chart 7China Verges On Over-Tightening Policy Overtightening would be a policy mistake with potentially disastrous consequences. So the base case should be that the government will relax policy rather than undermine the post-COVID recovery. However, investors cannot be confident about the timing. The 2015 financial turmoil and renminbi devaluation occurred because policymakers reacted too slowly. One reason to believe policy will be eased is that after July 1 the government will turn its attention to the twentieth national party congress in 2022, the once-in-five-years rotation of the Central Committee and Politburo. The party congress begins at the local level at the beginning of next year and culminates in the fall of 2022 with the national rotation of top party leaders. Xi Jinping was originally slated to step down in 2022. So he needs to squash any last-minute push against him by opposing factions of the party. He may have himself named chairman of the Communist Party, like Mao before him. Most importantly he will put his stamp on the “seventh generation” of China’s leaders by promoting his followers into key positions. All of this suggests that the Xi administration cannot risk triggering a recession, even if its preferences remain hawkish on economic policy. Policy easing could come as early as the end of July. As a rule of thumb, we have noticed that the Politburo’s July meeting on economic policy is often an inflection point, as was the case in 2007, 2015, 2018, and 2020 (Table 1). Some observers claim the April Politburo meeting already signaled an easing in policy, although we do not see that. If July clearly signals relaxation, global investors will cheer and emerging market assets and commodities will rise. Table 1China’s Politburo Often Hits Inflection Point On Economic Policy In July Still we maintain a defensive posture going into the third quarter because we do not have a high level of confidence that policymakers will act preemptively. A market riot may precede and motivate the inflection point in policy. Also the negative impact of previous policy tightening will be felt in the third quarter. China plays and industrial metals are extremely vulnerable to further correction (Chart 8). Chart 8China Plays And Metals Vulnerable To Further Correction The earliest occasion for a Biden-Xi summit comes at the end of October, as mentioned. While US-China talks will occur at some level, relations will remain fundamentally unstable. While a Biden-Xi summit may improve the atmosphere and lead to a new round of strategic and economic dialogue, or Phase Two trade talks, the fact is that the US is seeking to contain China’s rise and China is seeking to break out of the strictures of the US-led world order. The global elite and mainstream media will put a lot of emphasis on the post-Trump return to diplomatic “normalcy” and summits. But this is to overemphasize style at the expense of substance. Note that the positive feelings of the Biden-Putin summit on June 16 fizzled in less than a week when Russia allegedly dropped bombs in the path of a British destroyer in the Black Sea. The US and UK were training Ukraine’s military. Britain denies any bombs were dropped but Russia says next time they will hit their target. (More on this below.) This episode is instructive for US-China relations: summitry is overrated. China is building a sphere of influence and the US no longer believes dialogue alone is the answer. Tit-for-tat punitive measures and proxy battles in China’s neighboring areas, from the Korean peninsula to the Taiwan Strait to the South and East China Seas, are the new normal. Bottom Line: Tactically, stay defensive on global risk assets, especially China plays. Strategically, maintain a constructive outlook on the cycle given the global recovery and China’s need eventually to relax monetary and fiscal policy. US-Iran Deal Likely – Then The Real Trouble Starts The US will likely rejoin the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) by August and pull out of its longest-ever war in Afghanistan in September. The US is wrapping up its “forever wars” to meet the demands of a war-weary public. Ironically, the long-term consequence is to create power vacuums that invite new geopolitical conflicts in the context of the US’s great power struggle with China and Russia. But for now a deal with Iran – once it is settled – reduces geopolitical risk by reducing the odds of military escalation in the region. The Iran talks are more significant than the Afghanistan pullout. We are confident in a deal because Biden can rejoin the 2015 deal unilaterally – it was never approved by the US Senate as a formal treaty. The Iranians will not support any militant action so aggressive as to scupper a deal that offers them the chance of reviving their economy at a critical time in the regime’s history. Reviving the deal poses a downside risk for oil prices in the third quarter though not over the long run. It is negative in the short run because investors will have to price not only Iran’s current and future production (Chart 9) but also any resulting loss of OPEC 2.0 discipline. Brent crude is trading at $76 per barrel as we go to press, above the $65-$70 per barrel average that our Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects to see over the coming five years (Chart 10). Chart 9Iran's Oil Production Will Return Chart 10Brent Price Faces Short-Term Downside Risk From Iranian Crude The oil price ceiling is enforced by the cartel of oil producers who fear that too high of prices will incentivize US shale oil production as well as the global shift to renewable energy. The Russians have always dragged their feet over oil production cuts and are now pushing for production hikes. The government needs an oil price of around $50-55 per barrel for the budget to break even. The Saudis need higher prices to break even, at $70-75 per barrel. Moscow must coordinate various oil producers, led by the country’s powerful oligarchs and their factions, which is inherently more difficult than the Saudi position of coordinating one producer, Aramco. The Russians and Saudis have maintained cartel discipline so far in 2021, as expected, because the wounds of the market-share war last year are still raw. They retreated from that showdown in less than a month. However, a major escalation in Saudi Arabia’s strategic conflict with Iran could push the Saudis to seek greater market share at Iran’s expense, as occurred before the original Iran deal in 2014-15. Hence our view that the risk to oil prices will shift from the upside to the downside in the second half of the year if the US-Iran deal is reconstituted. Over the long run, the deal is not negative for oil prices. The deal is a tradeoff for lower geopolitical risk today but higher risk in the future. The reason is that Iran’s economic recovery will strengthen its strategic hand and generate a backlash in the region. The global oil supply and demand balance will fluctuate according to circumstances but regional conflict will inject a risk premium over time. Biden’s likely decision to rejoin the 2015 deal should be seen as a delaying tactic. It is impossible to go back to 2015, when the US had mustered a coalition of nations to pressure Iran and when Iran’s “reformist” faction stood to receive a historic boost from the opening of the country’s economy. Now the US lacks a coalition and the reformists are leaving office in disgrace, with the hardliners (“principlists”) taking full power for the foreseeable future. Iran is happy to go back to complying with a deal that consists of sanctions relief in exchange for temporary limits on its nuclear program. The 2015 deal’s restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program begin expiring in 2023 and continue to expire through 2040. Biden has no chance of negotiating a newer and more expansive deal that extends these sunset clauses while also restricting Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional militant activities. He will say that easing sanctions is premised on a broader “follow on” deal to achieve these US goals. But the broader deal is unlikely to materialize anytime soon. The Iranians will commit to future talks but they will have no intention of agreeing to a more expansive deal unless forced. The country’s leaders will never abandon their nuclear program after witnessing the invasions of non-nuclear Libya and Ukraine – in stark contrast with nuclear-armed North Korea. Moreover Biden cannot possibly reassemble the P5+1 coalition with Russia and China anytime soon. The US is directly confronting these states. They could conceivably work with the US when Iran is on the brink of obtaining nuclear weapons but not before then. They did not prevent North Korea. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the soon-to-be-inaugurated President Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence, and other pillars of the regime are focused exclusively on strengthening the regime in advance of Khamenei’s impending succession sometime in the coming decade. The succession could easily lead to domestic unrest and a political crisis, which makes the 2020s a critical period for the Islamic Republic. With Tehran focused on a delicate succession, it is not a foregone conclusion that Iran will go on the offensive to expand its sphere of influence immediately after the US deal. But sooner or later a major new geopolitical trend will emerge: the rise of Iran. With sanctions removed, trade and investment increasing, and Chinese and Russian support, Iran will be capable of pursuing its strategic aims in the region more effectively. It will extend its influence across the “Shia Crescent,” including Iraq. The fear that this will inspire in Israel and the Gulf Arab states has already generated a slow-boiling war in the region. This war will intensify as the US will be reluctant to intervene. The purpose of the deal is to enable the war-weary US to reduce its active involvement in the region. The US foreign policy and defense establishment do not entirely see it this way – they emphasize that the US will remain engaged. But US allies in the Middle East will not be convinced. The region already has a taste for the way this works after the US’s precipitous withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which lead to the rise of the Islamic State terrorist group. Biden will try not to be so precipitous but the writing is on the wall: the US will reduce its focus and commitment. A scramble for power in the region will begin the moment the ink dries on Biden’s signature of the JCPA. Israel and the Arab states are forming a de facto alliance – based on last year’s Abraham Accords – to prepare for Iran’s push to dominate the region. Even if Iran is not overly aggressive (a big if), Israel and the Gulf Arabs will overreact as a result of their fear of abandonment. They will also seek to hedge their bets by improving ties with the Chinese and Russians, making the Middle East the scene of a major new proxy battle in the global great power struggle. As a risk to our view: if the Biden administration changes course this summer and refuses to lift sanctions or rejoin the Iran deal – low but not zero probability – then tensions with Iran will explode almost instantaneously. The Iranians will threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz and a crisis will erupt in the third or fourth quarter. Bottom Line: The US will most likely rejoin the Iranian nuclear deal by August to avoid an immediate crisis or war. The Biden administration will wager that it can lend enough support to regional allies to keep Iran contained. This might work, as the Iranians will focus on fortifying the regime ahead of its leadership succession. However, Iran’s hardline leadership will see an opportunity in America’s withdrawal from its “forever wars.” Iran will increasingly cooperate with Russia and China. Iran’s conflict with Israel and Saudi Arabia will be extremely difficult to manage and will escalate over time, quite possibly creating a revolution or war in Iraq. The Gulf Arabs are already under immense pressure from the green energy revolution. Thus while oil prices might temporarily fall on the return of Iranian exports, they will later see upward pressure from a new wave of Middle Eastern instability. European Political Risk Has (Probably) Bottomed By contrast with all the above we have viewed Europe as a negligible source of (geo)political risk in 2021. European policy uncertainty is falling in Europe relative to these other powers and the rest of the world (Chart 11). Chart 11Europe's Relative Policy Uncertainty Bottoming Chart 12EU Break-Up Risk Hits Floor (Again) The risk of a break-up of the European Union has wilted and remains at historic lows (Chart 12). There is no immediate threat of any European countries emulating the UK and attempting to exit. Even Italian support for the euro has surged. Immigration flows have plummeted. European solidarity is not on the ballot in the upcoming German and French elections. Germany is choosing between the status quo and a “green revolution” that would not really be a revolution due to the constraints of coalition politics. The Greens have lost some momentum relative to their polling earlier this year but underlying trends suggest they will surprise to the upside in the September 26 vote (Charts 13A and 13B). They embrace EU solidarity, robust government spending, weariness with the Merkel regime, and concerns about climate change, Russia, China, and social justice. Chart 13AGerman Greens Will Surprise To Upside Chart 13BGerman Greens Will Surprise To Upside We expect the Greens to surprise to the upside. But as they are forced into a coalition with the ruling Christian Democrats then they will be limited to raising spending rather raising taxes (Table 2). The market will cheer this result. Table 2German Greens’ Ambitious Tax Hike Proposals If the Greens disappoint then a right-leaning government and too early fiscal tightening could become a risk – but it is a minor risk because Merkel’s hand-picked successor, the CDU Chancellor Candidate Armin Laschet, will be pro-Europe and fiscally dovish, just like the mainstream of his party under Merkel. The only limitation on this dovishness is that it would take another global shock for there to be enough votes in the Bundestag to loosen the schuldenbremse or “debt brake.” In France, President Emmanuel Macron is likely to win re-election – the populist candidate Marine Le Pen remains an underdog who is unlikely to make it through France’s two-round electoral system. In Italy, Prime Minister Mario Draghi is overseeing a national unity coalition that will dole out EU recovery funds. An election cannot be held ahead of the presidential election in January, which will be secured by the establishment parties as a major check on any future populist ruling coalition. The risk in these countries, as in Spain and elsewhere, is that neoliberal structural reform and competitiveness are falling by the wayside. Fiscal largesse is positive for securing the recovery but long-term growth potential will remain depressed (Chart 14). Chart 14European And Global Fiscal Stimulus (Updated June 2021) Europe remains stuck in a liquidity trap over the long run. It depends on the rest of the world for growth. This is a problem given that China’s potential growth is slowing and there is no ready substitute that will prop up global growth. Europe is increasingly ripe for negative “black swan” events. The power vacuum in the Middle East described above will lead to instability and regime failures that will threaten European security. Russia will remain aggressive, a reflection of its crumbling structural foundations. The Putin administration has not changed its strategy of building a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and pushing back against the West, as signaled by the threat to bomb ships that sail in Crimean waters – a unilateral expansion of Russia’s territorial waters following the Crimean invasion. The Biden administration is not seeking anything comparable to the diplomatic “reset” with Russia from 2009-11, which ended in acrimony. In other words, European political risk may be bottoming as we speak. Investment Takeaways Chart 15Limited Equity Upside From Likely US Infrastructure Bill US Peak Fiscal Stimulus: The Biden administration is highly likely to pass an infrastructure package through Congress, either as a bipartisan deal with Republicans or as part of the American Jobs Plan. The result is another $1-$1.5 trillion fiscal stimulus, albeit over an eight-year period, with infrastructure funding taking until 2024-25 to ramp up. Biden’s other plans probably will not pass before the 2022 midterm election, which will likely bring gridlock. Investors are well aware of these proposals and the policy setting will probably be frozen after this year. Hence there is limited remaining upside for global materials sector and US infrastructure plays (Chart 15). The extravagant US fiscal thrust of 2020-21 will turn into a huge fiscal drag in 2022 (Chart 16). The Federal Reserve, however, will remain ultra-dovish as long as labor market slack persists – regardless of who is at the helm. Chart 16US Fiscal Drag Very Large In 2022 Chart 17Go Long Large Caps And Defensives China’s Headwinds Persist: China may or may not ease policy in time to prevent a market riot. China plays and industrial metals are highly exposed to a correction and we recommend steering clear. US-Iran Deal Weighs On Oil Price: Tactically we are neutral on oil and oil plays. An Iran deal could depress oil prices temporarily – and potentially in a major way if the Saudis agree with the Russians on increasing production. Fundamentals are positive but depend on the OPEC 2.0 cartel. The cartel faces the risk that higher prices will incentivize both alternative oil providers and the green revolution. Europe’s Opportunity: We continue to see the euro and European stocks offering value. Given the troubles with Russia we favor developed Europe plays over emerging Europe. The German election would be a bullish catalyst for European assets but headwinds from China will prevail, which is negative for cyclical European stocks. The Russian Duma election, also in September, creates high potential for Russia to clash with the West between now and then. Tactically, go long global large caps and defensives (Chart 17). Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Independent Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders recently felt it was necessary to warn against a second cold war. Sanders, a democratic socialist, is a reliable indicator of the left wing of the Democratic Party and a dissenter who puts pressure on the center-left Biden administration. His fears underscore the dominance of the new hawkish consensus. Appendix China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia
Highlights Geopolitical risk is trickling back into financial markets. China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse collapsed again. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is ticking back up after the sharp drop from 2020. All of our proprietary GeoRisk Indicators are elevated or rising. Geopolitical risk often rises during bull markets – the Geopolitical Risk Index can even spike without triggering a bear market or recession. Nevertheless a rise in geopolitical risk is positive for the US dollar, which happens to stand at a critical technical point. The macroeconomic backdrop for the dollar is becoming less bearish given China’s impending slowdown. President Biden’s trip to Europe and summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin will underscore a foreign policy of forming a democratic alliance to confront Russia and China, confirming the secular trend of rising geopolitical risk. Shift to a defensive tactical position. Feature Back in March 2017 we wrote a report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” in which we reaffirmed our 2016 view that President Trump would succeed in steering the US in the direction of fiscal largesse and trade protectionism. Now it is time for us to do the same with President Biden. Our forecast for Biden rested on the same points: the US would pursue fiscal profligacy and mercantilist trade policy. The recognition of a consistent national policy despite extreme partisan divisions is a testament to the usefulness of macro analysis and the geopolitical method. Trump stole the Democrats’ thunder with his anti-austerity and anti-free trade message. Biden stole it back. It was the median voter in the Rust Belt who was calling the shots all along (after all, Biden would still have won the election without Arizona and Georgia). We did make some qualifications, of course. Biden would maintain a hawkish line on China and Russia but he would reject Trump’s aggressive foreign and trade policy when it came to US allies.1 Biden would restore President Obama’s policy on Iran and immigration but not Russia, where there would be no “diplomatic reset.” And Biden’s fiscal profligacy, unlike Trump’s, would come with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy … even though they would fall far short of offsetting the new spending. This is what brings us to this week’s report: New developments are confirming this view of the Biden administration. Geopolitical Risk And Bull Markets Chart 1Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar In recent weeks Biden has adopted a hawkish policy on China, lowered tensions with Europe, and sought to restore President Obama’s policy of détente with Iran. The jury is still out on relations with Russia – Biden will meet with Putin on June 16 – but we do not expect a 2009-style “reset” that increases engagement. Still, it is too soon to declare a “Biden doctrine” of foreign policy because Biden has not yet faced a major foreign crisis. A major test is coming soon. Biden’s decision to double down on hawkish policy toward China will bring ramifications. His possible deal with Iran faces a range of enemies, including within Iran. His reduction in tensions with Russia is not settled yet. While the specific source and timing of his first major foreign policy crisis is impossible predict, structural tensions are rebuilding. An aggregate of our 13 market-based GeoRisk indicators suggests that global political risk is skyrocketing once again. A sharp spike in the indicator, which is happening now, usually correlates with a dollar rally (Chart 1). This indicator is mean-reverting since it measures the deviation of emerging market currencies, or developed market equity markets, from underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The implication is positive for the dollar, although the correlation is not always positive. Looking at both the DXY’s level and its rate of change shows periods when the global risk indicator fell yet the dollar stayed strong – and vice versa. The big increase in the indicator over the past week stems mostly from Germany, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia, though all 13 of the indicators are now either elevated or rising, including the China/Taiwan indicators. Some of the increase is due to base effects. As global exports recover, currencies and equities that we monitor are staying weaker than one would expect. This causes the relevant BCA GeoRisk indicator to rise. Base effects from the weak economy in June 2020 will fall out in coming weeks. But the aggregate shows that all of the indicators are either high or rising and, on a country by country level, they are now in established uptrends even aside from base effects. Chart 2Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Meanwhile the global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is recovering across the world after the drop in uncertainty following the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 2). Policy uncertainty is also linked to the dollar and this indicator shows that it is rising on a secular basis. The Geopolitical Risk Index, maintained by Matteo Iacoviello and a group of academics affiliated with the Policy Uncertainty Index, is also in a secular uptrend, although cyclically it has not recovered from the post-COVID drop-off. It is sensitive to traditional, war-linked geopolitical risk as reported in newspapers. By contrast our proprietary indicators are sensitive to market perceptions of any kind of risk, not just political, both domestic and international. A comparison of the Geopolitical Risk Index with the S&P 500 over the past century shows that a geopolitical crisis may occur at the beginning of a business cycle but it may not be linked with a recession or bear market. Risk can rise, even extravagantly, during economic expansions without causing major pullbacks. But a crisis event certainly can trigger a recession or bear market, particularly if it is tied to the global oil supply, as in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Chart 3). Chart 3Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself While geopolitical risk is normally positive for the dollar, the macroeconomic backdrop is negative. The dollar’s attempt to recover earlier this year faltered. This underlying cyclical bearish dollar trend is due to global economic recovery – which will continue – and extravagant American monetary expansion and budget deficits. This is why we have preferred gold – it is a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation expectations. Tactically this year we have refrained from betting against the dollar except when building up some safe-haven positions like Japanese yen. Over the medium and long term we expect geopolitical risk to put a floor under the greenback. The bottom line is that the US dollar is at a critical technical crossroads where it could break out or break down. Macro factors suggest a breakdown but the recovery of global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk suggests the opposite. We remain neutral. A final quantitative indicator of the recovery of geopolitical risk is the performance of global aerospace and defense stocks (Chart 4). Defense shares are rising in absolute and relative terms. Chart 4Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Can The WWII Peace Be Prolonged? Qualitative assessments of geopolitical risk are necessary to explain why risk is on a secular upswing – why drops in the quantitative indicators are temporary and the troughs keep getting higher. Great nations are returning to aggressive competition after a period of relative peace and prosperity. Over the past two decades Russia and China took advantage of America’s preoccupations with the Middle East, the financial crisis, and domestic partisanship in order to build up their global influence. The result is a world in which authority is contested. The current crisis is not merely about the end of the post-Cold War international order. It is much scarier than that. It is about the decay of the post-WWII international order and the return of the centuries-long struggle for global supremacy among Great Powers. The US and European political establishments fear the collapse of the WWII settlement in the face of eroding legitimacy at home and rising challenges from abroad. The 1945 peace settlement gave rise to both a Cold War and a diplomatic system, including the United Nations Security Council, for resolving differences among the great powers. It also gave rise to European integration and various institutions of American “liberal hegemony.” It is this system of managing great power struggle, and not the post-Cold War system of American domination, that lies in danger of unraveling. This is evident from the following points: American preeminence only lasted fifteen years, or at best until the 2008 Georgia war and global financial crisis. The US has been an incoherent wild card for at least 13 years now, almost as long as it was said to be the global empire. Russian antagonism with the West never really ended. In retrospect the 1990s were a hiatus rather than a conclusion of this conflict. China’s geopolitical rise has thawed the frozen conflicts in Asia from the 1940s-50s – i.e. the Chinese civil war, the Hong Kong and Taiwan Strait predicaments, the Korean conflict, Japanese pacifism, and regional battles for political influence and territory. Europe’s inward focus and difficulty projecting power have been a constant, as has its tendency to act as a constraint on America. Only now is Europe getting closer to full independence (which helped trigger Brexit). Geopolitical pressures will remain historically elevated for the foreseeable future because the underlying problem is whether great power struggle can be contained and major wars can be prevented. Specifically the question is whether the US can accommodate China’s rise – and whether China can continue to channel its domestic ambitions into productive uses (i.e. not attempts to create a Greater Chinese and then East Asian empire). The Great Recession killed off the “East Asia miracle” phase of China’s growth. Potential GDP is declining, which undermines social stability and threatens the Communist Party’s legitimacy. The renminbi is on a downtrend that began with the Xi Jinping era. The sharp rally during the COVID crisis is over, as both domestic and international pressures are rising again (Chart 5). Chart 5Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing While the data for China’s domestic labor protests is limited in extent, we can use it as a proxy for domestic instability in lieu of official statistics that were tellingly discontinued back in 2005. The slowdown in credit growth and the cyclical sectors of the economy suggest that domestic political risk is underrated in the lead up to the 2022 leadership rotation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise Chart 7Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait The increasing focus on China’s access to key industrial and technological inputs, the tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the formation of a Russo-Chinese bloc that is excluded from the West all suggest that the risk to global stability is grave and historic. It is reminiscent of the global power struggles of the seventeenth through early twentieth centuries. The outperformance of Taiwanese equities from 2019-20 reflects strong global demand for advanced semiconductors but the global response to this geopolitical bottleneck is to boost production at home and replace Taiwan. Therefore Taiwan’s comparative advantage will erode even as geopolitical risk rises (Chart 7). The drop in geopolitical tensions during COVID-19 is over, as highlighted above. With the US, EU, and other countries launching probes into whether the virus emerged from a laboratory leak in China – contrary to what their publics were told last year – it is likely that a period of national recriminations has begun. There is a substantial risk of nationalism, xenophobia, and jingoism emerging along with new sources of instability. An Alliance Of Democracies The Biden administration’s attempt to restore liberal hegemony across the world requires a period of alliance refurbishment with the Europeans. That is the purpose of his current trip to the UK, Belgium, and Switzerland. But diplomacy only goes so far. The structural factor that has changed is the willingness of the West to utilize government in the economic sphere, i.e. fiscal proactivity. Infrastructure spending and industrial policy, at the service of national security as well as demand-side stimulus, are the order of the day. This revolution in economic policy – a return to Big Government in the West – poses a threat to the authoritarian powers, which have benefited in recent decades by using central strategic planning to take advantage of the West’s democratic and laissez-faire governance. If the West restores a degree of central government – and central coordination via NATO and other institutions – then Beijing and Moscow will face greater pressure on their economies and fewer strategic options. About 16 American allies fall short of the 2% of GDP target for annual defense spending – ranging from Italy to Canada to Germany to Japan. However, recent trends show that defense spending did indeed increase during the Trump administration (Chart 8). Chart 8NATO Boosts Defense Spending The European Union as a whole has added $50 billion to the annual total over the past five years. A discernible rise in defense spending is taking place even in Germany (Chart 9). The same point could be made for Japan, which is significantly boosting defense spending (as a share of output) after decades of saying it would do so without following through. A major reason for the American political establishment’s rejection of President Trump was the risk he posed to the trans-Atlantic alliance. A decline in NATO and US-EU ties would dramatically undermine European security and ultimately American security. Hence Biden is adopting the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade with China but winding down the trade war with Europe (Chart 10). Chart 9Europe Spending More On Guns Chart 10US Ends Trade War With Europe? A multilateral deal aimed at setting a floor in global corporate taxes rates is intended to prevent the US and Europe from undercutting each other – and to ensure governments have sufficient funding to maintain social spending and reduce income inequality (Chart 11). Inequality is seen as having vitiated sociopolitical stability and trust in government in the democracies. Chart 11‘Global’ Corporate Tax Deal Shows Return Of Big Government, Attempt To Reduce Inequality In The West Risks To Biden’s Diplomacy It is possible that Biden’s attempt to restore US alliances will go nowhere over the course of his four-year term in office. The Europeans may well remain risk averse despite their initial signals of willingness to work with Biden to tackle China’s and Russia’s challenges to the western system. The Germans flatly rejected both Biden and Trump on the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline linkage with Russia, which is virtually complete and which strengthens the foundation of Russo-German engagement (more on this below). The US’s lack of international reliability – given the potential of another partisan reversal in four years – makes it very hard for countries to make any sacrifices on behalf of US initiatives. The US’s profound domestic divisions have only slightly abated since the crises of 2020 and could easily flare up again. A major outbreak of domestic instability could distract Biden from the foreign policy game.2 However, American incapacity is a risk, not our base case, over the coming years. We expect the US economic stimulus to stabilize the country enough that the internal political crisis will be contained and the US will continue to play a global role. The “Civil War Lite” has mostly concluded, excepting one or two aftershocks, and the US is entering into a “Reconstruction Lite” era. The implication is negative for China and Russia, as they will now have to confront an America that, if not wholly unified, is at least recovering. Congress’s impending passage of the Innovation and Competition Act – notably through regular legislative order and bipartisan compromise – is case in point. The Senate has already passed this approximately $250 billion smorgasbord of industrial policy, supply chain resilience, and alliance refurbishment. It will allot around $50 billion to the domestic semiconductor industry almost immediately as well as $17 billion to DARPA, $81 billion for federal research and development through the National Science Foundation, which includes $29 billion for education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and other initiatives (Table 1). Table 1Peak Polarization: US Congress Passes Bipartisan ‘Innovation And Competition Act’ To Counter China With the combination of foreign competition, the political establishment’s need to distract from domestic divisions, and the benefit of debt monetization courtesy of the Federal Reserve, the US is likely to achieve some notable successes in pushing back against China and Russia. On the diplomatic front, the US will meet with some success because the European and Asian allies do not wish to see the US embrace nationalism and isolationism. They have their own interests in deterring Russia and China. Lack Of Engagement With Russia Russian leadership has dealt with the country’s structural weaknesses by adopting aggressive foreign policy. At some point either the weaknesses or the foreign policy will create a crisis that will undermine the current regime – after all, Russia has greatly lagged the West in economic development and quality of life (Chart 12). But President Putin has been successful at improving the country’s wealth and status from its miserably low base in the 1990s and this has preserved sociopolitical stability so far. Chart 12Russia's Domestic Political Risk It is debatable whether US policy toward Russia ever really changed under President Trump, but there has certainly not been a change in strategy from Russia. Thus investors should expect US-Russia antagonism to continue after Biden’s summit with Putin even if there is an ostensible improvement. The fundamental purpose of Putin’s strategy has been to salvage the Russian empire after the Soviet collapse, ensure that all world powers recognize Russia’s veto power over major global policies and initiatives, and establish a strong strategic position for the coming decades as Russia’s demographic decline takes its toll. A key component of the strategy has been to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce exposure to US sanctions. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Putin has rapidly increased Russia’s foreign exchange reserves so as to buffer against shocks (Chart 13). Chart 13Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Putin has also reduced Russia’s reliance on the US dollar to about 22% (Chart 14), primarily by substituting the euro and gold. Russia will not be willing or able to purge US dollars from its system entirely but it has been able to limit America’s ability to hurt Russia by constricting access to dollars and the dollar-based global financial architecture. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov highlighted this process ahead of the Biden-Putin summit by declaring that the National Wealth Fund will divest of its remaining $40 billion of its US dollar holdings. Chart 14Russia Diversifies From USD In general this year, Russia is highlighting its various advantages: its resilience against US sanctions, its ability to re-invade Ukraine, its ability to escalate its military presence in Belarus and the Black Sea, and its ability to conduct or condone cyberattacks on vital American food and fuel supplies (Chart 15). Meanwhile the US is suffering from deep political divisions at home and strategic incoherence abroad and these are only starting to be mended by domestic economic stimulus and alliance refurbishment. Chart 15Cyber Security Stocks Recover Europe’s risk-aversion when it comes to strategic confrontation with Russia, and the lack of stability in US-Russia relations, means that investors should not chase Russian currency or financial assets amid the cyclical commodity rally. Investors should also expect risk premiums to remain high in developing European economies relative to their developed counterparts. This is true despite the fact that developed market Europe’s outperformance relative to emerging Europe recently peaked and rolled over. From a technical perspective this outperformance looks to subside but geopolitical tensions can easily escalate in the near term, particularly in advance of the Russian and German elections in September (Chart 16). Chart 16Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Europe trades in line with EUR-RUB and these pair trades all correspond closely to geopolitical tensions with Russia (Chart 17). A notable exception is the UK, whose stock market looks attractive relative to eastern Europe and is much more secure from any geopolitical crisis in this region (Chart 17, bottom panel). The pound is particularly attractive against the Czech koruna, as Russo-Czech tensions have heated up in advance of October’s legislative election there (Chart 18). Chart 17Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Chart 18Long GBP Versus CZK Meanwhile Russia and China have grown closer together out of strategic necessity. Germany’s Election And Stance Toward Russia Germany’s position on Russia is now critical. The decision to complete the Nord Stream II pipeline against American wishes either means that the Biden administration can be safely ignored – since it prizes multilateralism and alliances above all things and is therefore toothless when opposed – or it means that German will aim to compensate the Americans in some other area of strategic concern. Washington is clearly attempting to rally the Germans to its side with regard to putting pressure on China over its trade practices and human rights. This could be the avenue for the US and Germany to tighten their bond despite the new milestone in German-Russia relations. The US may call on Germany to stand up for eastern Europe against Russian aggression but on that front Berlin will continue to disappoint. It has no desire to be drawn into a new Cold War given that the last one resulted in the partition of Germany. The implication is negative for China on one hand and eastern Europe on the other. Germany’s federal election on September 26 will be important because it will determine who will succeed Chancellor Angela Merkel, both in Germany and on the European and global stage. The ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is hoping to ride Merkel’s coattails to another term in charge of the government. But they are likely to rule alongside the Greens, who have surged in opinion polls in recent years. The state election in Saxony-Anhalt over the weekend saw the CDU win 37% of the popular vote, better than any recent result, while Germany’s second major party, the Social Democrats, continued their decline (Table 2). The far-right Alternative for Germany won 21% of the vote, a downshift from 2016, while the Greens won 6% of the vote, a slight improvement from 2016. All parties underperformed opinion polling except the CDU (Chart 19). Table 2Saxony-Anhalt Election Results Chart 19Germany: Conservatives Outperform In Final State Election Before Federal Vote, But Face Challenges Chart 20Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote The implication is still not excellent for the CDU. Saxony-Anhalt is a middling German state, a CDU stronghold, and a state with a popular CDU leader. So it is not representative of the national campaign ahead of September. The latest nationwide opinion polling puts the CDU at around 25% support. They are neck-and-neck with the Greens. The country’s left- and right-leaning ideological blocs are also evenly balanced in opinion polls (Chart 20). A potential concern for the CDU is that the Free Democratic Party is ticking up in national polls, which gives them the potential to steal conservative votes. Betting markets are manifestly underrating the chance that Annalena Baerbock and the Greens take over the chancellorship (Charts 21A and 21B). We still give a subjective 35% chance that the Greens will lead the next German government without the CDU, a 30% that the Greens will lead with the CDU, and a 25% chance that the CDU retains power but forms a coalition with the Greens. A coalition government would moderate the Greens’ ambitious agenda of raising taxes on carbon emissions, wealth, the financial sector, and Big Tech. The CDU has already shifted in a pro-environmental, fiscally proactive direction. Chart 21AGerman Greens Will Recover Chart 21BGerman Greens Still Underrated No matter what the German election will support fiscal spending and European solidarity, which is positive for the euro and regional equities over the next 12 to 24 months. However, the Greens would pursue a more confrontational stance toward Russia, a petro-state whose special relations with the German establishment have impeded the transition to carbon neutrality. Latin America’s Troubles A final aspect of Biden’s agenda deserves some attention: immigration and the Mexican border. Obviously this one of the areas where Biden starkly differs from Trump, unlike on Europe and China, as mentioned above. Vice President Kamala Harris recently came back from a trip to Guatemala and Mexico that received negative media attention. Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, the surge in immigrant arrivals over 2020-21, both to give her some foreign policy experience and to manage the public outcry. Despite telling immigrants explicitly “Do not come,” Harris has no power to deter the influx at a time when the US economy is fired up on historic economic stimulus and the Democratic Party has cut back on all manner of border and immigration enforcement. From a macro perspective the real story is the collapse of political and geopolitical risk in Mexico. From 2016-20 Mexico faced a protectionist onslaught from the Trump administration and then a left-wing supermajority in Congress. But these structural risks have dissipated with the USMCA trade deal and the inability of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to follow through with anti-market reforms, as we highlighted in reports in October and April. The midterm election deprived the ruling MORENA party of its single-party majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the legislature (Chart 22). AMLO is now politically constrained – he will not be able to revive state control over the energy and power sectors. Chart 22Mexican Midterm Election Constrained Left-Wing Populism, Political Risk Chart 23Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus American monetary and fiscal stimulus, and the supply-chain shift away from China, also provide tailwinds for Mexico. In short, the Mexican election adds the final piece to one of our key themes stemming from the Biden administration, US populism, and US-China tensions: favor Mexico and Canada (Chart 23). A further implication is that Mexico should outperform Brazil in the equity space. Brazil is closely linked to China’s credit cycle and metals prices, which are slated to turn down as a result of Chinese policy tightening. Mexico is linked to the US economy and oil prices (Chart 24). While our trade stopped out at -5% last week we still favor the underlying view. Brazilian political risk and unsustainable debt dynamics will continue to weigh on the currency and equities until political change is cemented in the 2022 election and the new government is then forced by financial market riots into undertaking structural reforms. Chart 24Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Elsewhere in Latin America, the rise of a militant left-wing populist to the presidency in a contested election in Peru, and the ongoing social unrest in Colombia and Chile, are less significant than the abrupt slowdown in China’s credit growth (Charts 25A and 25B). According to our COVID-19 Social Stability Index, investors should favor Mexico. Turkey, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Brazil are the most likely to see substantial social instability according to this ranking system (Table 3). Chart 25AMexico To Outperform Latin America Chart 25BChina’s Slowdown Will Hit South America Table 3Post-COVID Emerging Market Social Unrest Only Just Beginning Investment Takeaways Close long emerging markets relative to developed markets for a loss of 6.8% – this is a strategic trade that we will revisit but it faces challenges in the near term due to China’s slowdown (Chart 26). Go long Mexican equities relative to emerging markets on a strategic time frame. Our long Mexico / short Brazil trade hit the stop loss at 5% but the technical profile and investment thesis are still sound over the short and medium term. Chart 26China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets Chart 27Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens China’s sharp fiscal-and-credit slowdown suggests that investors should reduce risk exposure, take a defensive tactical positioning, and wait for China’s policy tightening to be priced before buying risky assets. Our geopolitical method suggests the dollar will rise, while macro fundamentals are becoming less dollar-bearish due to China. We are neutral for now and will reassess for our third quarter forecast later this month. If US policy uncertainty falls relative to global uncertainty then the EUR-USD will also fall and safe-haven assets like Swiss bonds will gain a bid (Chart 27). Gold is an excellent haven amid medium-term geopolitical and inflation risks but we recommend closing our long silver trade for a gain of 4.5%. Disfavor emerging Europe relative to developed Europe, where heavy discounts can persist due to geopolitical risk premiums. We will reassess after the Russian Duma election in September. Go long GBP-CZK. Close the Euro “laggards” trade. Go long an equal-weighted basket of euros and US dollars relative to the Chinese renminbi. Short the TWD-USD on a strategic basis. Prefer South Korea to Taiwan – while the semiconductor splurge favors Taiwan, investors should diversify away from the island that lies at the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. Close long defense relative to cyber stocks for a gain of 9.8%. This was a geopolitical “back to work” trade but the cyber rebound is now significant enough to warrant closing this trade. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Trump’s policy toward Russia is an excellent example of geopolitical constraints. Despite any personal preferences in favor of closer ties with Russia, Trump and his administration ultimately reaffirmed Article 5 of NATO, authorized the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine, and deployed US troops to Poland and the Czech Republic. 2 As just one example, given the controversial and contested US election of 2020, it is possible that a major terrorist attack could occur. Neither wing of America’s ideological fringes has a monopoly on fanaticism and violence. Meanwhile foreign powers stand to benefit from US civil strife. A truly disruptive sequence of events in the US in the coming years could lead to greater political instability in the US and a period in which global powers would be able to do what they want without having to deal with Biden’s attempt to regroup with Europe and restore some semblance of a global police force. The US would fall behind in foreign affairs, leaving power vacuums in various regions that would see new sources of political and geopolitical risk crop up. Then the US would struggle to catch up, with another set of destabilizing consequences.
Highlights US labor-market disappointments notwithstanding, the global recovery being propelled by real GDP growth in the world's major economies is on track to be the strongest in 80 years. This growth will fuel commodity demand, which increasingly confronts tighter supply. Higher commodity prices will ensue, and feed through to realized and expected inflation. Manufacturers will continue to see higher input and output prices. Our modeling suggests the USD will weaken to end-2023; however, most of the move already has occurred. Real US rates will remain subdued, as the Fed looks through PCE inflation rates above its 2% target and continues to focus on its full-employment mandate (Chart of the Week). Given these supportive inflation fundamentals, we remain long gold with a price target of $2,000/oz for this year. We are upgrading silver to a strategic position, expecting a $30/oz price by year-end. We remain long the S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll Index ETF (COMT) and the S&P GSCI, expecting tight supply-demand balances to steepen backwardations in forward curves, and long the Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK). Global economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated until broader vaccine distributions reduce lockdown risks. Feature The recovery of the global economy catalyzed by massive monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus is on track to be the strongest in the past 80 years, according to the World Bank.1 The Bank revised its growth expectation for real GDP this year sharply higher – to 5.6% from its January estimate of 4.1%. For 2022, the rate of global real GDP growth is expected to slow to 4.3%, which is still significantly higher than the average 3% growth of 2018-19. DM economies are expected to grow at a 4% rate this year – double the average 2018-19 rate – while EM growth is expected to come in at 6% this year vs a 4.2% average for 2018-19. The big drivers of growth this year will be China, where the Bank expects an unleashing of pent-up demand to push real GDP up by 8.5%, and the US, where massive fiscal and monetary support will lift real GDP 6.8%. The Bank expects other DM economies will contribute to this growth, as well. Growth in EM economies will be supported by stronger demand and higher commodity prices, in the Bank's forecast. Commodity demand is recovering faster than commodity supply in the wake of this big-economy GDP recovery. As a result, manufacturers globally are seeing significant increases in input and output prices (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekUS Real Rates Continue To Languish Chart 2Global Manufacturers' Prices Moving Higher These price increases at the manufacturing level reflect the higher-price environment in global commodity markets, particularly in industrial commodities – i.e., bulks like iron ore and steel; base metals like copper and aluminum; and oil prices, which touch most processes involved in getting materials out of the ground and into factories before they make their way to consumers, who then drive to stores to pick up goods or have them delivered. Chart 3Commodity Price Increases Reflected in CPI Inflation Expectations These price pressures are being picked up in 5y5y CPI swaps markets, which are cointegrated with commodity prices (Chart 3). This also is showing up in shorter-tenor inflation gauges – monthly CPI and 2y CPI swaps. Oil prices, in particular, will be critical to the evolution of 5-year/5-year (5y5y) CPI swap rates, which are closely followed by fixed-income markets (Chart 4). Chart 4Oil Prices Are Key To 5Y5Y CPI Swap Rates Higher Gold Prices Expected CPI inflation expectations drive 5-year and 10-year real rates, which are important explanatory variables for gold prices (Chart 5).2 In addition, the massive monetary and fiscal policy out of the US also is driving expectations for a lower USD: Currency debasement fears are higher than they otherwise would be, given all the liquidity and stimulus sloshing around global markets, which also is bullish for gold (Chart 6). Chart 5Weaker Real Rates Bullish For Gold Chart 6Weaker USD Supports Gold All of these effects, particularly the inflationary impacts, are summarized in our fair-value gold model (Chart 7). At the beginning of 2021, our fair-value gold model indicated price would be closer to $2,005/oz, which was well above the actual gold price in January. Gold prices have remained below the fair value model since the beginning of 2021. The model explains gold prices using real rates, TWIB, US CPI and global economic policy uncertainty. Based on our modeling, we expect these variables to continue to be supportive of gold, bolstering our view the yellow metal will reach $2000/ oz this year. Unlike industrial commodities, gold prices are sensitive to speculative positioning and technical indicators. Our gold composite indicator shows that gold prices may be reflecting bullish sentiment. This sentiment likely reflects increasing inflation expectations, which we use as an explanatory variable for gold prices. The fact that gold is moving higher on sentiment is corroborated by the latest data point from Marketvane’s gold bullish consensus, which reported 72% of the traders expect prices to rise further (Chart 8). Chart 7BCAs Gold Fair-Value Model Supports 00/oz View Chart 8Sentiment Supports Oil Prices Investment Implications The massive monetary and fiscal stimulus that saw the global economy through the worst of the economic devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic is now bubbling through the real economy, and will, if the World Bank's assessment proves out, result in the strongest real GDP growth in 80 years. Liquidity remains abundant and interest rates – real and nominal – remain low. In its latest Global Economic Prospects, the Bank notes, " The literature generally suggests that monetary easing, both conventional and unconventional, typically boosts aggregate demand and inflation with a lag of 1-3 years …" The evidence for this is stronger for DM economies than EM; however, as the experience in China shows, scale matters. If the Bank's assessment is correct, the inflationary impulse from this stimulus should be apparent now – and it is – and will endure for another year or two. This stimulus has catalyzed organic growth and will continue to do so for years, particularly in economies pouring massive resources into renewable-energy generation and the infrastructure required to support it, a topic we have been writing about for some time.3 We remain long gold with a price target of $2,000/oz for this year. We are long silver on a tactical basis, but given our growth expectations, are upgrading this to a strategic position, expecting a $30/oz price by year-end. As we have noted in the past, silver is sensitive to all of the financial factors we consider when assessing gold markets, and it has a strong industrial component that accounts for more than half of its demand.4 Supportive fundamentals remain in place, with total supply (mine output and recycling) falling, demand rising and balances tightening (Chart 9). Worth noting is silver's supply is constrained because of underinvestment in copper production at the mine level, where silver is a by-product. On the demand side, continued recovery of industrial and consumer demand will keep silver prices well supported. In terms of broad commodity exposure, we remain long the S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll Index ETF (COMT) and the S&P GSCI, expecting tight supply-demand balances to continue to draw down inventories – particularly in energy and metals markets – which will lead to steeper backwardations in forward curves. Backwardation is the source of roll-yields for long commodity index investments. Investors initially have a long exposure in deferred commodity futures contracts, which are then liquidated and re-established when these contracts become more prompt (i.e., closer to delivery). If the futures' forward curves are backwardated, investors essentially are buying the deferred contracts at a lower price than the price at which the position likely is liquidated. We also remain long the Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK), an equity vehicle that spans miners and traders; the longer discounting horizon of equity markets suits our view on metals. Chart 9Upgrading Silver To Strategic Position Chart 10Wider Vaccine Distribution Will Support Gold Demand Global economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated until broader vaccine distributions reduce lockdown risks. We expect the wider distribution of vaccines will become increasingly apparent during 2H21 and in 2022. This will be bullish for physical gold demand – particularly in China and India – which will add support for our gold position (Chart 10). Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US EIA expects Brent crude oil prices to fall to $60/bbl next year, given its call higher production from OPEC 2.0 and the US shales will outpace demand growth. The EIA expects global oil demand will average just under 98mm this year, or 5.4mm b/d above 2020 levels. For next year, the EIA is forecasting demand will grow 3.6mm b/d, averaging 101.3mm b/d. This is slightly less than the demand growth we expect next year – 101.65mm b/d. We are expecting 2022 Brent prices to average $73/bbl, and $78/bbl in 2023. We will be updating our oil balances and price forecasts in next week's publication. Base Metals: Bullish Pedro Castillo, the socialist candidate in Peru's presidential election, held on to a razor-thin lead in balloting as we went to press. Markets have been focused on the outcome of this election, as Castillo has campaigned on increasing taxes and royalties for mining companies operating in Peru, which accounts for ~10% of global copper production. The election results are likely to be contested by opposition candidate rival Keiko Fujimori, who has made unsubstantiated claims of fraud, according to reuters.com. Copper prices traded on either side of $4.50/lb on the CME/COMEX market as the election drama was unfolding (Chart 11). Precious Metals: Bullish As economies around the world reopen and growth rebounds, car manufacturing will revive. Stricter emissions regulations mean the demand for autocatalysts – hence platinum and palladium – will rise with the recovery in automobile production. Platinum is also used in the production of green hydrogen, making it an important metal for the shift to renewable energy. On the supply side, most platinum shafts in South Africa are back to pre-COVID-19 levels, according to Johnson Matthey, the metals refiner. As a result, supply from the world’s largest platinum producer will rebound by 40%, resulting in a surplus. South Africa accounts for ~ 70% of global platinum supply. The fact that an overwhelming majority of platinum comes from a nation which has had periodic electricity outages – the most recent one occurring a little more than a week ago – could pose a supply-side risk to this metal. This could introduce upside volatility to prices (Chart 12). Ags/Softs: Neutral As of 6 June, 90% of the US corn crop had emerged vs a five-year average of 82%; 72% of the crop was reported to be in good to excellent condition vs 75% at this time last year. Chart 11 Chart 12 Footnotes 1 Please see World Bank's Global Economic Prospects update, published June 8, 2021. 2 In fact, US Treasury Inflation-Indexed securities include the CPI-U as a factor in yield determination. 3 For our latest installment of this epic evolution, please see A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, which we published last week. It is available at ces.bcareserch.com. 4 Please see Higher Inflation Expectations Battle Lower Risk Premia In Gold Markets, which we published February 4, 2021. It is available at ces.bcareserch.com. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
Aspectos destacados
Las acciones globales son muy vulnerables a una corrección. Pero cíclicamente la Fed está comprometida con un exceso de inflación y la economía global se está recuperando.
El impulso fiscal y de crédito de China cayó bruscamente, lo que deja a las acciones cíclicas globales y a las materias primas expuestas a una retirada.
Más allá del corto plazo, la necesidad de China de estabilidad política debería evitar un endurecimiento excesivo de la política. El riesgo está concentrado en el corto plazo.
El censo de población de China subraya uno de nuestros megatemas: la política interna de China es inestable y puede traer sorpresas negativas.
Las elecciones estatales de India, celebradas en medio de una enorme ola de COVID-19, sugieren que el partido gobernante sigue siendo favorito en 2024. Esto implica continuidad en las políticas.
Mantener un sesgo cíclico alcista pero estar preparado para cambiar si China comete un error de política.
Artículo principal
Gráfico 1
La inflación asoma la cabeza
La inflación asoma la cabeza
La inflación asoma la cabeza
Los mercados globales se estremecieron esta semana ante un dato fuerte de inflación subyacente en EE. UU. así como por temores más amplios al resurgimiento de la inflación tras un largo letargo (Gráfico 1).
Cíclicamente todavía esperamos que los inversores roten fuera de las acciones de EE. UU. hacia acciones internacionales y que el dólar estadounidense caiga a medida que la economía global se recupere (Gráfico 2). Sin embargo, esta visión también implica que las acciones de mercados emergentes deberían comenzar a superar a sus pares de mercados desarrollados, lo cual no se ha materializado hasta ahora este año. Los mercados emergentes no solo son intensivos en tecnología y vulnerables a la subida de los rendimientos de los bonos estadounidenses, sino que además se ven ahora desafiados por el hecho de que el estímulo de China ha alcanzado su pico.
Gráfico 2
El mercado de acciones tiembla
El mercado bursátil tiembla
El mercado bursátil tiembla
Gráfico 3
La economía global y el sentimiento se recuperan
La economía global y el sentimiento se recuperan
La economía global y el sentimiento se recuperan
Gráfico 4
Cíclicos globales frente a defensivos vacilando
Cíclicos globales frente a defensivos vacilan
Cíclicos globales frente a defensivos vacilan
Lo único en lo que podemos confiar es que el despliegue de la vacuna contra el COVID-19 continuará permitiendo una recuperación del crecimiento global (Gráfico 3). El dólar estadounidense está señalando algo similar. El billete verde rebotó en el primer trimestre por el mejor desempeño relativo del crecimiento de EE. UU., pero desde entonces ha retrocedido. Un dólar en caída es positivo para las acciones cíclicas frente a las defensivas, aunque las cíclicas indican que la operación de reflación está sobreextendida en el corto plazo (Gráfico 4).
El crecimiento de China se convierte ahora en el punto focal crítico. Un error de política en China trastocaría la visión alcista cíclica. El endurecimiento de la política monetaria y fiscal en China es un riesgo político global importante que hemos señalado este año y que ahora se está materializando. No obstante, también hemos señalado las limitaciones al endurecimiento. En la actualidad China se encuentra justo en el umbral del sobreendurecimiento según nuestros puntos de referencia. Si China endurece más, adoptaremos una postura fundamentalmente más defensiva.
También en este informe revisaremos los resultados del censo de población de China y las implicaciones de las recientes elecciones estatales de India frente a la última gran oleada de infecciones por COVID-19. Por ahora no haremos cambios a nuestra visión alcista sobre India, pero la ponemos bajo vigilancia.
China: El riesgo de sobreendurecimiento
Los problemas de China provienen del cambio en curso de su modelo económico, que pasa de depender del comercio exterior a depender de la demanda interna. Esta fue una decisión estratégica que el Partido Comunista tomó antes del ascenso del presidente Xi Jinping. Xi también ha llegado a encarnar y reforzar esta visión estratégica y la confrontación con Estados Unidos.
El objetivo de Pekín era gestionar una transición suave y estable. La turbulencia financiera de 2015 y la guerra comercial de 2018-19 pusieron en peligro ese objetivo, pero los responsables de la política finalmente prevalecieron. Luego estalló el COVID-19 y causó la primera contracción económica real desde la década de 1970. Aunque China contuvo el virus y rebotó con otra ronda masiva de estímulo (13,8% del PIB desde el inicio de la guerra comercial hasta el pico de 2021), ahora enfrenta una transición aún más difícil.
Gráfico 5
Aumento de la propensión al ahorro en China
La creciente propensión de China a ahorrar
La creciente propensión de China a ahorrar
La necesidad de mejorar la calidad de vida es más urgente dado que el PIB potencial se ha desacelerado. La necesidad de contener el riesgo financiero sistémico es más urgente dado el gran nuevo aumento de la deuda. Y la necesidad de diversificar la economía es más urgente dado que EE. UU. está ahora formando una coalición de democracias para confrontar a China en una serie de políticas. El aumento en la “propensión marginal al ahorro” entre personas y empresas chinas —medida por la proporción de depósitos a plazo largo frente a depósitos a corto plazo— es una indicación de que el país está aquejado de problemas y que los ánimos empresariales están deprimidos (Gráfico 5).
El impulso fiscal y de crédito de China está girando a la baja tras la gran expansión de 2018-21. Los responsables de la política han señalado desde el año pasado que retirarían el estímulo de emergencia y ahora el impacto es aparente en los datos reales. El dinero, el crédito y los impulsos combinados de crédito y fiscal de China se correlacionan con el crecimiento económico tras un rezago de seis a nueve meses. Esto es cierto independientemente de qué indicadores se usen para los ciclos de dinero y crédito y la actividad económica de China (Gráficos 6A y 6B). El impulso económico de China está en su punto máximo y se convertirá en un viento en contra para la economía global más adelante este año y en 2022, aunque el resto del mundo disfruta de los vientos favorables de la vacunación y la reapertura económica.
Gráfico 6A
El impulso fiscal y de crédito de China cae bruscamente …
El impulso fiscal y crediticio de China cae bruscamente...
El impulso fiscal y crediticio de China cae bruscamente...
Gráfico 6B
… al igual que los impulsos de dinero y crédito
... Al igual que los impulsos de dinero y crédito
... Al igual que los impulsos de dinero y crédito
La desaceleración del impulso fiscal y de crédito presagia una caída de la demanda de materias primas, materiales y otros bienes que China importa, especialmente para el consumo interno. (Las importaciones chinas de piezas e insumos que forman parte de sus exportaciones manufacturadas al resto del mundo se ven más saludables a medida que el resto del mundo se recupera). Este cambio dificultará que los elevados precios de los metales y otras apuestas vinculadas a China, como las acciones suecas, sigan subiendo sin una corrección (Gráfico 7). La posición especulativa favorece en gran medida a las materias primas en este momento. La divergencia entre China y los mercados de metales que domina parece insostenible a corto plazo (Gráfico 8).
Gráfico 7
Las operaciones de reflación de China cerca de los picos
Operaciones de reflación en China cerca de máximos
Operaciones de reflación en China cerca de máximos
Gráfico 8
Choque entre el ciclo del dinero y los precios de las materias primas
El ciclo monetario y los precios de las materias primas chocan
El ciclo monetario y los precios de las materias primas chocan
La transición global hacia sistemas de energía verdes o renovables (es decir, la descarbonización) es alcista para los metales, especialmente el cobre, pero no podrá compensar la caída de la demanda china en el corto plazo, como ha mostrado nuestra Estrategia de Mercados Emergentes. Los usos internos del cobre en China para la construcción y la industria representan aproximadamente el 56,5% de la demanda mundial de cobre, mientras que la carrera por la energía verde —es decir, la producción de paneles solares, aerogeneradores, coches eléctricos— representa solo alrededor del 3,5% de la demanda mundial.
Este número subestima algo el programa verde ya que también se prevé el reacondicionamiento y la adaptación de sistemas y estructuras existentes, como las redes eléctricas. Pero el punto es que una caída en el consumo de cobre de China actuará en contra del gran aumento del consumo en Estados Unidos y Europa, sobre todo dado que el programa de infraestructura de EE. UU. no empezará hasta 2022 como muy pronto. Por lo tanto, la demanda mundial de cobre se ralentizará en los próximos 12 meses en respuesta a China, aunque la demanda del resto del mundo esté subiendo.
Los responsables de la política chinos aún no han señalado que estén preocupados por un sobreendurecimiento de la política o que vayan a aflojar la política de nuevo. La reunión del Politburó a finales de abril no contenía un cambio de política importante respecto a la Conferencia Central de Trabajo Económico en diciembre o al Informe de Trabajo del Gobierno en marzo (Tabla 1). Pero si hubo una diferencia significativa, residió en reducir aún más el sentido de emergencia del año pasado al tiempo que se proyectaba algún tipo de esquema para responsabilizar a los funcionarios locales por la deuda oculta. La implicación es la continuación de una política estricta, y por ende el riesgo de sobreendurecimiento sigue siendo sustancial.
Tabla 1
Declaraciones macroeconómicas recientes de la política de China: eliminando el estímulo
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
Gráfico 9
Puntos de referencia para el endurecimiento de la política en China
Puntos de referencia para el endurecimiento de la política en China
Puntos de referencia para el endurecimiento de la política en China
Cierto es que las señales de la reunión de abril pueden leerse de varias maneras. La declaración de abril omitió frases sobre “mantener el apoyo de política necesario” en la orientación macroeconómica general, lo que implicaría menos apoyo para la economía. Pero también omitió el objetivo de mantener el crecimiento de la oferta monetaria (M2) y del crédito (financiación social total) en línea con el crecimiento del PIB nominal, lo que podría verse como permitir un repunte en el crecimiento del crédito. Sin embargo, el Banco Popular de China mantuvo este objetivo de crédito en su informe de política monetaria del primer trimestre, por lo que no se puede estar seguro. Observa que, según este criterio, China está justo en el umbral del “sobreendurecimiento” de la política que hemos utilizado para medir el riesgo (Gráfico 9).
Basándonos en la formulación de políticas china durante las últimas dos décadas, esperaríamos que cualquier punto de inflexión importante se anuncie en la reunión del Politburó de julio, no en la de abril. No consideramos que abril suponga un cambio importante respecto a las reuniones previas – ni lo considera nuestra Estrategia de Inversión en China. Por lo tanto, el endurecimiento excesivo de la política sigue siendo un riesgo real para la economía china y global durante los próximos 12 meses. Nuestra lista de verificación para el endurecimiento excesivo subraya este punto (Tabla 2).
Tabla 2
Lista de verificación para el endurecimiento de la política china
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
El descenso del impulso fiscal y de crédito de China está ocurriendo antes del vigésimo congreso nacional del partido, que tendrá lugar a lo largo de 2022 y culminará con la rotación del liderazgo superior (el Comité Permanente del Politburó) en otoño. La economía está suficientemente estimulada para el centenario del Partido Comunista el 1 de julio de este año, por lo que los responsables de la política están centrados en prevenir excesos. La prevención del riesgo financiero, la regulación antimonopolio y la contención de la burbuja inmobiliaria son las órdenes del día. El aumento de los impagos y quiebras de bonos corporativos y gubernamentales subraya la disposición del liderazgo a avanzar con la reestructuración económica y la reforma, lo cual está bien documentado en los últimos años (Gráfico 10).
Gráfico 10
Destrucción creativa en China
China al borde del endurecimiento excesivo
China al borde del endurecimiento excesivo
Los inversores no pueden asumir que el congreso del partido en 2022 sea una razón para que el liderazgo afloje la política. Ocurrió lo contrario en la antesala del congreso de 2017. Sin embargo, los inversores tampoco pueden asumir que China se sobreendurezca y hunda su propia economía antes de un evento tan importante. La estabilidad será el objetivo, como ocurrió en 2017 y en congresos anteriores, y esto significa que en algún momento habrá un alivio de la política si la ronda actual de endurecimiento se vuelve demasiado dolorosa financiera y económicamente. Los activos vinculados a China son vulnerables en el corto plazo hasta que los responsables de la política alcancen su punto de inflexión.
De paso, la aproximación del vigésimo congreso nacional del partido será un imán para la intriga política y eventos impactantes. El líder máximo normalmente destituye a un rival prominente antes de un congreso como muestra de fuerza en el proceso de promoción de su facción. El gobierno también endurece el control de los medios y reprime a los disidentes, que pueden alzar la voz o protestar en torno al evento. Pero en 2022 las apuestas son más altas.
Originalmente se esperaba que el presidente Xi dimitiera en 2022, pero ahora no lo hará, lo que suscitará al menos cierta oposición. Además, bajo Xi, China ha emprendido tres revoluciones políticas históricas: está adoptando un modelo de liderazgo autoritario, en detrimento del modelo de liderazgo colectivo bajo los dos presidentes anteriores; está enfatizando la autosuficiencia económica, en detrimento de la liberalización y la apertura; y está enfatizando el estatus de gran potencia, en detrimento de la cooperación con Estados Unidos y sus aliados.
Conclusión: Las acciones globales, las materias primas y las “apuestas vinculadas a China” están en riesgo de una corrección sustancial como resultado del endurecimiento de la política en China. Nuestro caso base es que China evitará el sobreendurecimiento, pero los últimos números de dinero y crédito rozan nuestro umbral para cambiar esa visión. Otra caída pronunciada en estos indicadores exigirá un cambio.
Fuerza laboral desaparecida de China
En última instancia, una de las limitaciones al sobreendurecimiento de la política es la caída del crecimiento potencial del PIB de China como resultado de su población en edad laboral en disminución. El séptimo censo de población de China se publicó esta semana y subrayó los profundos cambios estructurales que afectan al país y su economía.
El crecimiento de la población en los últimos diez años se desaceleró hasta el 5,4%, la tasa más baja desde el primer censo en 1953. La tasa de fecundidad cayó a 1,3 en 2020, por debajo de la tasa de reemplazo de 2,1 y del objetivo de 1,8 establecido cuando las autoridades chinas relajaron la política del hijo único en 2016. La tasa de fecundidad también es más baja que las estimaciones del Banco Mundial (1,7 en 2019) e incluso que la de Japón. La tasa de natalidad (nacimientos por 1.000 personas) también cayó, con el número de recién nacidos en 2020 en el punto más bajo desde 1961, el año de la Gran Hambruna. La tasa de natalidad se ha convergido con la de los países de ingresos altos, lo que implica que el desarrollo económico está teniendo el mismo efecto de desalentar la procreación en China, aunque China está menos desarrollada que esos países.
Gráfico 11
La población en edad laboral de China cae más rápido que la de Japón en los años 90
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
La cohorte más joven aumentó del 16,6% al 17,95% de la población, la cohorte más anciana aumentó del 8,9% en 2010 al 13,5% hoy, mientras que la cohorte en edad laboral cayó del 75,3% al 68,6%. La población en edad laboral alcanzó su pico en 2010 y cayó 6,79 puntos porcentuales en los últimos diez años. En contraste, la población en edad laboral de Japón alcanzó su pico en 1992 y cayó 2,18 puntos porcentuales en la década posterior (Gráfico 11).
En otras palabras, China está experimentando la transición demográfica que afectó a Japón a principios de los años 90, pero la población en edad laboral de China podría caer incluso más rápido. El país está experimentando este cambio tectónico socioeconómico en un nivel de riqueza per cápita más bajo del que Japón había alcanzado.
El desafío demográfico presionará el sistema socioeconómico y político de China. El milagro chino, como otros milagros asiáticos, se basó en el uso de la manufactura orientada a la exportación para generar grandes cantidades de ahorro que podían reorientarse para el desarrollo nacional. La caída de la población en edad laboral de China coincide con el desarrollo económico y una probable disminución de la tasa de ahorro a largo plazo. Esto se muestra en el Gráfico 12, que presenta dos imágenes diferentes de la población trabajadora de China junto con la tasa de ahorro nacional bruta. A medida que aumenta la ratio de dependencia, la tasa de ahorro caerá y habrá menos fondos disponibles para repropositar. El costo del capital aumentará y la reestructuración económica se acelerará.
En el caso de Japón, el cambio demográfico coincidió con la crisis financiera de 1990 y luego con un cambio nacional en el comportamiento económico. La tasa de ahorro cayó a medida que la economía evolucionó, pero los ahorros generados aún superaron la inversión debido a la falta de demanda privada y a la presión de grandes cargas de deuda. Las empresas se centraron en pagar la deuda en lugar de expandir la inversión y la producción (Gráfico 13). Todo esto ocurrió cuando el entorno externo era benigno, mientras que China enfrenta un desafío demográfico similar en el contexto de una creciente presión económica debido a tensiones geopolíticas.
Gráfico 12
Los trabajadores chinos son cada vez más escasos
Trabajadores chinos cada vez más escasos
Trabajadores chinos cada vez más escasos
Gráfico 13
Altos niveles de ahorro permiten derroches de deuda hasta que la deuda abruma
Los altos ahorros permiten un derroche de deuda hasta que esta se vuelve abrumadora.
Los altos ahorros permiten un derroche de deuda hasta que esta se vuelve abrumadora.
China hasta ahora ha evitado una crisis financiera debilitante y un colapso de los precios de la vivienda que condenaría al país a una trampa de liquidez traumática. Las autoridades chinas son dolorosamente conscientes del peligro de la burbuja inmobiliaria y por ello están ansiosas por prevenir excesos financieros y frenar la actividad con rasgos de burbuja. Esto es lo que hace que el riesgo de sobreendurecimiento sea significativo. Pero un error en cualquiera de las dos direcciones puede conducir a una caída hacia la deflación. La administración de Xi ha estimulado la economía cada vez que la actividad se ralentizaba excesivamente o la inestabilidad financiera amenazaba con salirse de control, como se ha señalado arriba, pero este es un acto de equilibrio difícil, razón por la cual vigilamos tan de cerca el riesgo de endurecimiento excesivo.
Algunos otros puntos notables del censo de población de China incluyen:
La política de dos hijos no está teniendo éxito hasta ahora.
COVID-19 podría haber tenido un efecto negativo en la fecundidad, pero no podría haber afectado mucho a los nacimientos debido al momento. Así que las tendencias no pueden estar demasiado distorsionadas por la pandemia.
La urbanización rápida continúa, con la tasa alcanzando el 64% de la población, 14 puntos porcentuales más que en 2010.
Las discusiones de política enfatizan elevar la edad de jubilación; ofrecer incentivos financieros para tener hijos; una serie de controles de precios para hacer más asequible tener hijos, destacando la supresión de la burbuja inmobiliaria; y medidas para asegurar que los precios de la vivienda no caigan demasiado rápido en las ciudades más pequeñas a medida que continúa la migración desde el campo.
La población de minorías étnicas de China, que constituye el 9% de la población total, creció mucho más rápido (tasa del 10%) durante la última década que la mayoría Han, que representa el 91% de la población (creciendo al 5%). Las minorías están exentas de la política del hijo único (y de la de dos hijos). Sin embargo, han surgido tensiones étnicas, particularmente en regiones autónomas como Xinjiang, lo que ha provocado un mayor escrutinio internacional de las políticas de China hacia las minorías.
El desafío demográfico de China es ampliamente conocido, pero el último censo refuerza la magnitud del reto. El crecimiento potencial de China está disminuyendo mientras que la ratio de dependencia creciente subraya cambios sociales que exigirán más al gobierno. Mayores necesidades de gasto fiscal y social requerirán difíciles compensaciones económicas y decisiones políticas impopulares. El cambio económico y el movimiento de personas también profundizarán las disparidades regionales y de riqueza.
Todos estos puntos subrayan uno de nuestros megatemas constantes de Estrategia Geopolítica: los riesgos políticos internos de China están subestimados.
Conclusión: El censo de 2020 de China refuerza el declive demográfico que está en la raíz de los crecientes desafíos socioeconómicos y políticos de China. Aunque China tiene un gobierno central fuerte con el poder consolidado bajo un solo partido gobernante y un historial de gestión exitosa de sus distintos desafíos en las últimas décadas, la magnitud de los cambios que están ocurriendo es abrumadora y traerá sorpresas económicas y políticas negativas.
India: las elecciones estatales no representan un punto de inflexión contra Modi
En el apogeo de la segunda ola de COVID-19 en India, se celebraron elecciones en cinco estados indios. Los resultados para el estado de Bengala Occidental fueron los más importantes. Bengala Occidental es un estado grande, que representa casi una décima parte de los legisladores en la asamblea nacional de India, y el gobernante Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) del primer ministro Narendra Modi había declarado que ganaría cerca del 70% de los 294 escaños allí.
Al final, Bengala Occidental entregó una victoria aplastante al All India Trinamool Congress (AITMC), un partido regional. A pesar de que el AITMC enfrentaba una anti-incumbencia de dos mandatos, el recuento de escaños del AITMC alcanzó un máximo histórico. Pocos lo habían previsto, como lo demuestra el hecho de que el desempeño del AITMC superó las previsiones hechas por la mayoría de encuestadores.
¿Qué deben hacer los inversores con la pérdida del BJP en este estado clave? ¿Fue una reacción contra la gestión de la pandemia por parte de Modi? ¿Presagia un cambio de gobierno y de política nacional en las elecciones generales de 2024? No realmente. Aquí destacamos tres conclusiones clave:
Conclusión n.º 1: El desempeño del BJP fue notable
Gráfico 14
India: el BJP consigue penetrar en Bengala Occidental
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
China al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
Si bien el BJP no alcanzó sus objetivos en Bengala Occidental, el estado no es un bastión del BJP. Se sabe que el BJP tiene tracción natural en las regiones de habla hindi de India y Bengala Occidental es un estado de habla no hindi donde tradicionalmente se veía al BJP como un forastero. Además, este estado es conocido por ser inusualmente renuente al cambio. Por ejemplo, antes del AITMC, la Izquierda estuvo en el poder durante un récord de 34 años en este estado. En ese contexto, el desempeño del BJP en 2021 en Bengala Occidental es notable: el partido aumentó su número de escaños a 77, en comparación con solo 3 escaños en 2016 (Gráfico 14).
Este desempeño catapulta ahora al BJP a convertirse en el principal partido de oposición en Bengala Occidental. También indica que el BJP puede tardar, pero tiene lo necesario para construir tracción en estados que no son bastiones tradicionales. Dado que logró esta hazaña en un estado donde tiene poca fuerza histórica, su actuación es significativa como señal de que el BJP sigue siendo una fuerza a tener en cuenta.
Conclusión n.º 2: La popularidad del BJP se resintió pero aún se le considera favorito para mantener el poder en 2024
Aunque el descontento contra el BJP está aumentando por su mala gestión del COVID-19 y la consiguiente angustia económica, no existe una alternativa viable al BJP a nivel nacional.
Las recientes elecciones estatales, no solo en Bengala Occidental, confirman que la oposición, el Indian National Congress (INC), aún no ha organizado su actuación. El partido del Congreso se hundió de 44 escaños en Bengala a 0 escaños. Más importante aún, el Congreso aún no ha resuelto dos cuestiones críticas, es decir, la necesidad de designar o elegir a un líder interno con atractivo masivo y la necesidad de desarrollar una agenda política identificable.
La debilidad del Congreso significa que, aunque el número de escaños del BJP podría disminuir respecto a su rendimiento máximo de 2019, nuestro escenario base para 2024 sigue siendo el de un gobierno liderado por el BJP que mantiene el poder en India. La continuidad de las políticas y la posibilidad de alguna reforma estructural siguen siendo el caso base.
Conclusión n.º 3: El auge constante de los partidos regionales de India
El ascenso del BJP en la última década ha coincidido con pérdidas de escaños tanto por parte del Congreso como de los partidos regionales de India. Sin embargo, la ronda más reciente de elecciones estatales indica que el BJP no puede comprimir drásticamente la cuota de escaños de los partidos regionales. Por ejemplo, en Bengala Occidental consiguió 77 escaños por sí solo, pero esto no fue a expensas del AITMC, que es el actor dominante en este estado. En otro estado grande donde se celebraron elecciones a principios de este mes, es decir, Tamil Nadu, el control continúa fluctuando entre dos partidos regionales bien afianzados.
Gráfico 15
India: el BJP alcanzó su pico en 2019 pero sigue siendo favorito para 2024
China, al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
China, al borde de un endurecimiento excesivo
Las elecciones generales de 2019 vieron que la cuota de los partidos regionales (definidos como todos los partidos excluyendo al BJP y al Congreso) cayó al 35% desde casi el 40% observado en las elecciones generales de 2014 (Gráfico 15). Las elecciones de 2024 podrían de hecho ver aumentar un punto la cuota de escaños de los partidos regionales, ya que el conteo máximo de escaños del BJP podría disminuir respecto a los máximos de 2019.
El próximo auge de los partidos regionales de India es una tendencia arraigada en una dinámica simple. Con el BJP como incumbente de dos mandatos en las elecciones de 2024, los votantes podrían optar por gratificar a los partidos regionales en el margen, en ausencia de cualquier alternativa al BJP a nivel nacional.
El BJP sigue en condiciones de ser el partido más grande de India en 2024 con un número de escaños superior a la marca de la mitad. ¿Podría surgir una situación en la que el partido gobernante incorpore a un partido regional para mantenerse por delante de la marca de la mitad con un amplio colchón? Absolutamente. Pero, por supuesto, 2024 aún está lejos. Gestionar el COVID-19 y sus secuelas económicas hará más difícil de lo habitual para el BJP superar su rendimiento de 2019. La siguiente tanda de elecciones estatales clave en India está prevista para febrero de 2022 y el estado más grande de India, Uttar Pradesh, celebrará elecciones. Con el BJP actualmente en el poder en este estado de habla hindi, las elecciones de febrero de 2022 arrojarán más luz sobre la capacidad del BJP para mitigar el efecto de anti-incumbencia de la pandemia y el shock económico.
Conclusión: La popularidad del BJP en India se ha sacudido pero no de forma dramática. El BJP sigue firmemente en una posición para ser el partido más grande en India con un número de escaños que debería superar la marca de la mitad en 2024. Así que la estabilidad gubernamental no es una preocupación en este mercado emergente por ahora.
A la luz de los riesgos políticos internos de China y de la continuidad política en India, mantendremos nuestras apuestas en India por el momento (Gráficos 16A y 16B). Sin embargo, estamos llevando a cabo una revisión de India en su conjunto y actualizaremos a los clientes con nuestras conclusiones en un próximo informe especial.
Gráfico 16A
Mantener posiciones largas en bonos indios frente a mercados emergentes
Mantener posiciones largas en bonos indios frente a los mercados emergentes (EM)
Mantener posiciones largas en bonos indios frente a los mercados emergentes (EM)
Gráfico 16B
Mantener largo en India / corto en China
Manténgase largo en India / corto en China
Manténgase largo en India / corto en China
Conclusiones de inversión
Mantener operaciones refugio a corto plazo. Cerrar posiciones largas en futuros de gas natural con una ganancia del 19.8%.
Mantener una posición alcista cíclica (12 meses) con preferencia por las acciones de valor sobre las de crecimiento. Mantener posiciones largas en materias primas, incluidos los metales de tierras raras, y en mercados emergentes. Pero estar preparado para recortar estas operaciones si China sobreendurece la política según nuestros puntos de referencia.
Por ahora, continuar sobreponderando bonos indios en moneda local respecto a pares de mercados emergentes y acciones indias respecto a acciones chinas. Pero estamos revisando nuestra postura alcista sobre India.
Gráfico 17
Las acciones de ciberseguridad se animan en medio de la caída tecnológica
Las acciones de ciberseguridad repuntan en medio del desplome del sector tecnológico
Las acciones de ciberseguridad repuntan en medio del desplome del sector tecnológico
Mantener posiciones largas en acciones de ciberseguridad, aunque seguir prefiriendo aeroespacial y defensa sobre ciberseguridad como una apuesta geopolítica de “vuelta al trabajo”. Las acciones de ciberseguridad se animaron respecto al sector tecnológico durante la venta general de tecnología en la última semana. El ataque masivo de ransomware a Colonial Pipeline en EE. UU. cerró temporalmente una red importante que suministra alrededor del 45% del combustible de la Costa Este (Gráfico 17). No obstante, el ataque a la infraestructura crítica destaca que la ciberseguridad es un tema secular y los inversores deberían mantener exposición. Las acciones de ciberseguridad han superado al sector tecnológico en general desde el descubrimiento de la vacuna (Gráfico 18).
Gráfico 18
La ciberseguridad es un tema secular
La Ciberseguridad Es Un Tema Secular
La Ciberseguridad Es Un Tema Secular
Matt Gertken Vicepresidente Estrategia Geopolítica mattg@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma Asociada de investigación yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Ritika Mankar, CFA Editora/Estratega Ritika.Mankar@bcaresearch.com