América Latina

An analysis on Brazil is available below. Feature Chart I-1Poor Performance By EM Stocks, Currencies And Commodities I had the pleasure of meeting again with a long-term BCA client Ms. Mea last week during my trip to Europe. Ms. Mea and I meet on a semi-annual basis, where she has the opportunity to query my analysis and view. In our latest meeting, she was more perplexed than usual by the global macro developments and financial market dynamics. Ms. Mea: All the seemingly positive news on the trade front is pushing up global share prices. In fact, a substantial portion -if not all -of the global equity price gains have occurred on days when there has been positive news surrounding the US-China trade negotiations. Given EM financial markets were the most damaged by the trade war, one would have thought that EM markets would outperform in a rally stemming from progress in negotiations. Yet this has not occurred. EM currencies have failed to advance (a number of currencies are in fact breaking down), EM sovereign credit spreads are widening and the relative performance of EM vs. DM share prices has relapsed (Chart I-1). What is causing this disconnect? Answer: The disconnect is due to a somewhat false narrative that the global trade and manufacturing recession as well as the EM/China slowdown were primarily caused by the US-China trade confrontation. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The latter can only partially be attributed to the US-China trade tariffs and tensions. Chart I-2 illustrates that mainland exports are not contracting while imports excluding processing trade1 are down 5% from a year ago. This implies that China’s growth slump has not been due to a contraction in its exports but rather due to weakness in its domestic demand. The principal reason behind the global manufacturing and trade recession has been a deceleration in Chinese domestic demand. The basis as to why mainland exports have held up so well is because Chinese exporters have been re-routing their shipments to the US via other countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. Critically, the key force driving EM currencies and risk assets has been Chinese imports (Chart I-3). Mainland imports continue to shrink, with no recovery in sight. This is the reason why EM risk assets and currencies have performed so poorly, even amid the global risk-on environment. Chart I-2Chinese Imports Are Worse Than Exports Chart I-3China Imports Drive EM Currencies   Ms. Mea: Are you implying that a ceasefire in the trade war will not help Chinese growth rebound, and in turn support EM economies? The “Phase One” agreement and possible reductions in US tariffs on imports from China may help the Middle Kingdom’s exports, but not its imports. Crucially, the Chinese authorities will likely be reluctant to augment their credit and fiscal stimulus if there is a “Phase One” deal with the US. Absent greater stimulus, China’s domestic demand is unlikely to stage a swift recovery. In the case of a “Phase One” agreement, a mild improvement in business confidence in China and worldwide is likely, but a major upswing is doubtful. The basis is that business people around the world have witnessed the struggles faced by the US and China in their negotiations. They will likely doubt the ability of both nations to reach a structural resolution – and rightly so. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. Importantly, global investors are miscalculating China’s negotiating strategy and tactics. We put much greater odds than many other investors on the possibility that China will continue to drag out the negotiations without signing the “Phase One” agreement. This could easily derail the global equity rally. Investors should realize that the Chinese economy does not depend on exports to the US nearly as much as is commonly believed. China’s shipments to the US have been around 3.3% of GDP, even before the trade war began. The value-added to the economy/income generated from China’s exports to the US is less than 3% of its GDP. In contrast, capital spending accounts for the largest share (42%) of China’s GDP. In turn, investment outlays are driven by the credit cycle and fiscal spending, rather than by exports. Chart I-4China: Stimulus And Business Cycle Ms. Mea: Turning to stimulus in China, the authorities have been easing for about a year. By now, the cumulative effect of this stimulus should have begun to revive the mainland’s domestic demand. Why do you still think China’s business cycle has not reached a bottom? Answer: Indeed, our credit and fiscal spending impulse has been rising since January. Based on its historical relationship with business cycle variables – it leads those variables by roughly nine months – China’s growth should have troughed in August or September (Chart I-4). However, the time lags between the credit and fiscal spending impulse and economic cycle are not constant as can be seen in Chart I-4. On average, the lag has been nine months but has also varied from zero (at the trough in early 2009) to 18 months (at the peak in 2016-‘17). Relationships in economics – as opposed to those in hard sciences – are not constant and stable. Rather, correlations and time lags between variables vary substantially over time. In addition, the magnitude of stimulus is not the only variable that should be taken into account. The potential multiplier effect is also significant. One way to proxy the multiplier effect is via the marginal propensity to spend by households and companies. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Our proxies for Chinese marginal propensity to spend by companies and households have been falling (Chart I-5). This entails that households and businesses in China remain downbeat, which caps their expenditures, in turn offsetting the positive impact of stimulus. In our opinion, the prime cause behind households’ and businesses’ reluctance to spend is the weak property market. Without rapidly rising property prices and construction volumes, boosting sentiment and growth will prove challenging. We discussed the current conditions and outlook of China’s property market in last week’s report. Construction is the single largest sector of the mainland economy, and it is in recession: floor area started and under construction are all shrinking (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: A Weak Multiplier Effect Chart I-6China Construction Is In Recession   It is difficult to envision an improvement in manufacturing and a rebound in demand for commodities/materials and industrial goods without a recovery in construction. Notably, Chart I-6 displays the most comprehensive data on construction, as it encompasses all residential and non-residential construction by property developers and all other entities. Ms. Mea: Why are some global business cycle indicators turning up if, as you argue, the global manufacturing slowdown originated from Chinese domestic demand and the latter has not yet turned around? Answer: At any point of the business cycle, it is possible to find data that point both up and down. Our ongoing comprehensive review of global business cycle data leads us to conclude that the improvement is evident only in a few circumstances, and is not broad-based. In particular: In China and the rest of EM, there is no domestic demand recovery at the moment. China and EM ex-China capital goods imports are shrinking (Chart I-7). Chinese consumer spending is also sluggish (Chart I-8). The rise in China’s manufacturing Caixin PMI over the past several months is an aberration. Chart I-7EM/China Capex Is Very Weak Chart I-8No Recovery For Chinese Consumers     In EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan, narrow and broad money growth are underwhelming (Chart I-9). These developments signify that EM policy rate cuts have not yet boosted money/credit and domestic demand. We elaborated on this in more detail in our recent report. The basis for such poor transmission is banking-system health in many developing countries. Banks remain saddled with non-performing loans (NPLs). The need to boost provisions and fears of more NPLs continues to make banks reluctant to lend. Besides, real (inflation-adjusted) lending rates are high, discouraging credit demand. In the US and euro area, consumption – outside of autos – as well as money and credit growth have never slowed in this cycle. The slowdown has largely been due to exports and the auto sector. The latter may be bottoming in the euro area (Chart I-10). This might be behind the improvement in some business surveys in Europe. Chart I-9EM Ex-China: Money Growth Is At Record Low Chart I-10Euro Area’s Auto Sales: Is The Worst Over?   European business survey data are mixed, but the weakest segment - manufacturing – remains lackluster. In particular, Germany’s IFO index for business expectations and current conditions in manufacturing have not improved (Chart I-11, top panel). Similarly, the Swiss KOF economic barometer remains downbeat (Chart I-11, top panel). The only improvement is in Belgian business confidence, and a mild pickup in the euro area manufacturing PMI (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Chart I-11European Manufacturing And Business Confidence   In the US, shipping and carload data are rather grim. They are not corroborating the marginal improvement in the US manufacturing PMI. Overall, at this point there are no signs that domestic demand is recovering in China and the rest of EM, which have been the epicenter of the slowdown. The improvement is limited to some data in the US and Europe. Consistently, US and European share prices have been surging, while EM equities have dramatically underperformed. Ms. Mea: What about lower interest rates driving multiples expansion in both DM and EM equities? Answer: Concerning multiples expansion, our general framework is as follows: So long as corporate profits do not contract, lower interest rates will likely lead to equity multiples expansion. However, when corporate earnings shrink, the latter overwhelms the positive effect of a lower discount rate on multiples, and share prices drop along with lower interest rates. DM corporate profits are flirting with contraction, but are not yet contracting meaningfully. Hence, it is sensible that US and European stocks have experienced multiples expansion. In contrast, EM corporate earnings are shrinking at a rate of 10% from a year ago as illustrated in Chart I-12. The basis for an EM profit recession is the downturn in Chinese domestic demand and consequently imports. EM per-share earnings correlate much better with Chinese imports (Chart I-13, top panel) than US ones (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12EM Profits And Share Prices Chart I-13EM EPS Is Driven By China Not The US   In fact, we have documented numerous times in our reports that EM currencies and share prices correlate well with China’s business cycle/global trade/commodities prices, more so than with US bond yields. This does not mean that EM share prices are insensitive to interest rates. They are indeed sensitive to their own borrowing costs, but not to US Treasury yields. Chart I-14 demonstrates that EM share prices move in tandem with inverted EM sovereign US dollar bond yields and EM local currency bond yields. Similarly, emerging Asian share prices correlate with inverted high-yield Asian US dollar corporate bond yields (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-14EM Share Prices And EM Bond Yields Chart I-15Chinese Bond Yields Herald Relapse In EM Stocks And Currencies In short, EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Looking forward, exchange rates hold the key. A relapse in EM currencies will push up both the US dollar and local currency bond yields in many EMs. That will in turn warrant a setback in EM share prices. Ms. Mea: What about the correlation between EM performance and Chinese local rates? Answer: This is an essential relationship. Chart I-15 demonstrates that EM share prices and currencies have a strong positive correlation with local interest rates in China. The rationale is that all of them are driven by China’s business cycle. Relapsing interest rates in China are presently sending a bearish signal for EM risk assets and currencies. Ms. Mea: What does all this mean for investment strategy? A few weeks ago, you wrote that if the MSCI EM equity US dollar index breaks above 1075, you would reverse your recommended strategy. How does this square with your fundamental analysis that is still downbeat? Answer: My fundamental analysis on EM/China has not changed: I do not believe in the sustainability of this EM rebound in general, and EM outperformance versus DM in particular. The key risk to my strategy on EM stems from the US and Europe. It is possible that US and European share prices continue to rally. EM share prices typically sell off when EM borrowing costs rise – regardless if it is driven by mounting US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Notably, the high-beta segments of the US equity market and the overall Euro Stoxx 600 index are flirting with major breakouts (Chart I-16A and I-16B). If these breakouts transpire, the up-leg in US and European share prices will be long-lasting. This will also drag EM share prices higher in absolute terms. This is why I have placed a buy stop on the EM equity index. Chart I-16AUS High-Beta Stocks Chart I-16BEuropean Equities: At A Critical Juncture   That said, I have a strong conviction that EM will continue to underperform DM, even in such a scenario. Hence, I continue to recommend underweighting EM versus DM in both global equity and credit portfolios. As we have recently written in detail, the global macro backdrop and financial market dynamics in such a scenario will resemble 2012-2014, when EM currencies depreciated, commodities prices fell and EM share prices massively underperformed DM ones (Chart I-17). Further, I am not arguing that the current global trade and manufacturing downtrends will persist indefinitely. The odds are that the global business cycle, including China’s, will bottom sometime next year. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January. The point is that EM share prices have decoupled from fundamentals – namely corporate earnings growth – since January (please refer to Chart I-12 on page 8). This is an unprecedented historical gap, making EM stocks, currencies and credit markets vulnerable to continued disappointments in EM corporate profitability. Ms. Mea: What market signals give you confidence in poor EM performance going forward? Answer: Even though the S&P 500 has broken to new highs, multiple segments of EM financial markets have posted extremely disappointing performance. These include: Small-cap stocks in EM overall and emerging Asia as well as the EM equal-weighted equity index have struggled to rally (Chart I-18). Chart I-17EM Underperformed During 2012-14 Bull Market Chart I-18Various EM Equity Indexes: Failure To Rally Is A Bad Omen   Various Chinese equity indexes – onshore and offshore, small and large – have failed to advance and continue to underperform the global equity index. EM ex-China currencies and industrial commodities prices have remained subdued (please refer to Chart I-1 on page 1). Ms. Mea: Would you mind reminding me of your country allocation across various EM asset classes such as equities, credit, currencies and fixed-income? Answer: Within an EM equity portfolio, our overweights are Mexico, Russia, central Europe, Korea and Thailand. Our equity underweights are Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, South Africa and Colombia. We continue recommending to short an EM currency basket including ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Today, we add the BRL to our short list (please refer to the section below on Brazil). As to the country allocation within EM local currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios, investors can refer to our asset allocation tables below that are published at the end of each week’s report and are available on our web site. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Brazil: Deflationary Pressures Warrant A Weaker BRL The Brazilian real is breaking below its previous support. We recommend shorting the BRL against the US dollar. The primary macro risk in Brazil is not inflation but rather mounting deflationary pressures. Inflation has fallen to very low levels, to the bottom of the central bank’s target range (Chart II-1). Deflation or low inflation is dangerous when there are high debt levels. The Brazilian government is heavily indebted. With nominal GDP growth still below government borrowing costs and a primary budget balance at -1.3% of GDP, the public debt trajectory remains unsustainable as we discussed in previous reports (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Brazil: Undershooting Inflation Target Chart II-2Public Debt Dynamics Are Still Not Sustainable   The cyclical profile of the economy is very weak as shown in Chart II-3. Tight fiscal policy and a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves have caused money growth to slow. That in turn entails a poor outlook for the economy, which will reinforce the deflationary trend. Accordingly, Brazil needs to reflate its economy to boost nominal GDP, which is the only scenario where the nation escapes a public debt trap. Yet, fiscal policy is straightjacketed by the spending cap rule, which stipulates that government spending can only grow at the previous year’s IPCA inflation rate. Federal government spending is set to grow only at the low nominal rate of 3.4% in 2020. Hence, monetary policy is the sole tool available for policymakers to reflate. Both bond yields and bank lending rates remain elevated in real terms. This hampers any recovery in the business cycle. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend by companies and consumers is declining, foreshadowing weaker economic activity ahead (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Brazil: The Economy Is Weak Chart II-4Brazil: Propensity To Spend Is Declining   The central bank is determined to reduce interest rates further. As such, they cannot control the exchange rate. Indeed, the Impossible Trinity thesis states that in an economy with an open capital account (like in Brazil), the authorities cannot control both interest and exchange rates simultaneously. Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes stated in recent days that tight fiscal and easy monetary policies are consistent with a lower currency value. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. In fact, currency depreciation is another option to boost nominal growth that the nation desperately needs. Brazilian policymakers are open to the idea of a weaker exchange rate and will not defend the real. Their currency market interventions are intended to smooth volatility in the exchange rate but not preclude depreciation. Commodities prices remain an important driver of the Brazilian real (Chart II-5). These have failed to rebound amid the risk-on regime in global financial markets. This suggests that the path of least resistance for commodities prices is down, which is bad news for the real. Brazil’s current account deficit is widening and has reached 3% of GDP (Chart II-6). Notably, not only are export prices deflating but export volumes are also shrinking (Chart II-6, bottom panel). Chart II-5BRL And Commodities Prices Chart II-6Widening Current Account Deficit   Chart II-7The BRL Is Not Cheap Meanwhile, the nation’s foreign debt obligations – the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months – are at $190 billion, all-time highs. As the real depreciates, foreign currency debtors (companies and banks) will rush to acquire dollars or hedge their dollar liabilities. This will reinforce the weakening trend in the currency. Finally, the Brazilian real is not cheap - it is close to fair value (Chart II-7). Hence, valuation will not prevent currency depreciation. Bottom Line: We are initiating a short BRL / long US dollar trade. Investors should remain neutral on Brazil within EM equity, local bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Investors with long-term horizon should consider the following strategy: long the Bovespa, short the real. This is a bet that Brazil will succeed in reflating the economy at the detriment of the currency. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    Processing trade includes imports of goods that undergo further processing before being re-exported.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Analysis on Mexico and Central Europe is available on pages 6 and 10, respectively. Highlights Deflationary pressures have been intensifying in Malaysia and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. In Mexico, pieces are falling into place for stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. We are also keeping an overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and local currency bonds. In Central Europe (CE), inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies promote strong domestic demand. We are downgrading our allocation of CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral. Malaysia: Besieged By Deflationary Pressures Malaysian interest rates appear elevated given the state of its economy. Deflationary pressures have been intensifying and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. We are also upgrading our recommended allocation to Malaysian local currency and U.S. dollar government bonds for dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios from neutral to overweight. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures, requiring significant rate cuts by the central bank: Chart I-1 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation, and nominal GDP growth has slowed to the level of commercial banks’ average lending rates. Falling nominal growth amid elevated corporate and household debt levels is an extremely toxic mix (Chart I-2, top panel). Notably, debt-servicing costs for the private sector – both businesses and households – are high at 13.5% of GDP and are also rising (Chart I-2, bottom panel).  Chart I-1The Malaysian Economy Is Flirting With Deflation Chart I-2High Leverage & Debt Servicing Costs Among Businesses & Households Crucially, real borrowing costs are elevated. In real terms, the prime lending rate stands at 5% when deflated by the GDP deflator, and at 3% when deflated by headline CPI. Notably, private credit growth (outstanding business and household loans) has plunged to a 15-year low (Chart I-3), underscoring that real borrowing costs are excessive. Chart I-3Malaysia: Credit Growth Is In Freefall Chart I-4Malaysia's Corporate Sector Is Struggling Malaysia’s corporate sector is struggling. The manufacturing PMI is below the critical 50 threshold and is showing no signs of recovery. Listed companies’ profits are shrinking (Chart I-4, top panel). Poor corporate profitability is prompting cutbacks in capex spending (Chart I-4, middle and bottom panels) and weighing on employment and wages. The household sector has been retrenching; retail sales have been contracting and personal vehicle sales have been shrinking (Chart I-5). The property market – in particular the residential sub-sector – is still in recession. Property sales and starts are falling, and property prices are flirting with deflation (Chart I-6).   Critically, monetary policy easing and exchange rate depreciation are the only levers available to policymakers to reflate the economy. Fiscal policy is constrained as the budget deficit is already large at 3.4% of GDP, and public debt is elevated. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is in fact aiming to reduce the total national debt (including off-balance-sheet debt) back to the government’s ceiling of 54% of GDP (from 80% currently). Chart I-5Malaysian Households Are Retrenching Chart I-6Malaysia's Property Sector Is In A Downturn   Bottom Line: The Malaysian economy is besieged by deflationary pressures and requires lower borrowing costs. The central bank will deliver rate cuts in the coming months. Investment Recommendations A new trade idea: receive 2-year swap rates as a bet on rate cuts by the central bank. Consistently, for dedicated EM bond portfolios, we are upgrading local currency and U.S. dollar-denominated government bonds from neutral to overweight. Chart I-7Overweight Malaysian Local Currency And U.S. Dollar Government Bonds While we are downbeat on the ringgit versus the U.S. dollar, Malaysian domestic bonds will likely outperform the EM GBI index in common currency terms on a total return basis (Chart I-7, top panel). The same is true for excess returns on the country’s sovereign credit (Chart I-7, bottom panel).     The basis for the ringgit’s more moderate depreciation, especially in comparison with other EM currencies, is as follows: First, foreigners have reduced their holdings of local currency bonds. The share of foreign ownership has declined from 36% in 2015 to 22% now of total outstanding local domestic bonds in the past 4 years (Chart I-8). Hence, currency depreciation will not trigger large foreign capital outflows. Second, the trade balance is in surplus and improving. This will provide a cushion for the ringgit. Finally, the ringgit is cheap in real effective terms which also limits the potential downside (Chart I-9).   Dedicated EM equity portfolios should keep a neutral allocation on Malaysian stocks. We are taking profits on our long Malaysian small-cap stocks relative to the EM small-cap index position. This recommendation has generated a 6.6% gain since its initiation on December 14, 2018. Chart I-8Foreigners' Share Of Local Currency Bonds Has Dropped Chart I-9The Ringgit Is Cheap   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Raising Our Conviction On Equity Outperformance Mexican local currency bonds, as well as sovereign and corporate credit, have been one of our highest conviction overweights for some time. These positions have played out very well (Chart II-1). Presently, pieces are falling into place for Mexican stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. First, long-lasting outperformance by Mexican local currency bonds and corporate credit will lead to the stock market’s outperformance relative to the EM benchmark. Chart II-2 shows that when Mexican local currency bond and corporate dollar bond yields fall relative to their EM peers, the Bolsa tends to outperform. In brief, a relative decline in the cost of capital will eventually translate into relative equity outperformance. Chart II-1Mexico Vs. EM: Domestic Bonds And Credit Markets Chart II-2Mexico: Relative Stock Prices Are Correlated With Relative Cost Of Capital Second – as discussed in detail in our previous Special Report – market worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, especially relative to other developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa. Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, as well as low public debt, warrant a lower risk premium in Mexico, both in absolute terms and relative to other EM countries. Moreover, market participants and credit agencies have overstated the precariousness of Pemex’s debt and financing requirements. Pemex U.S. dollar bond yields have been falling steadily compared to EM aggregate corporate bond yields since the announcements of policies aimed at supporting the company’s debt sustainability. We have discussed Pemex’s financial sustainability and its effect on public finances in past reports.1  Third, having cut rates twice since September, the Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) has embarked on a rate cutting cycle. This is positive for stock prices, as it implies higher equity valuations and will eventually put a floor under the economy.  Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. Banxico members have been vocal about their desire to cut rates further, which is being foreshadowed by the swap market (Chart II-3, top panel). Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. The slowdown in the domestic economy and Andrés Manuel López Obrador’ (AMLO) administration’s tight fiscal policy will enable and encourage Banxico to further ease monetary policy (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Fourth, another positive market catalyst for Mexican equities is the ongoing outperformance of EM consumer staples versus the overall EM index. Consumer staples have a large 35% share of the overall Mexico MSCI stock index, while this sector in the EM MSCI benchmark accounts for only 7%. Therefore, durable outperformance by consumer staples often hints at a relative cyclical outperformance for the Mexican bourse (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Mexico: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Chart II-4Mexican Equities Are A Play On Consumer Staples Chart II-5Mexican Stocks Offer Reasonable Value Finally, Mexican equities are not expensive. Chart II-5 illustrates that according to our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratios, Mexican stocks offer good value in both absolute terms and relative to EM overall. We continue to believe AMLO’s administration is proving to be a pragmatic government with the aim of reducing rent-seeking activities and addressing structural issues such as poverty, corruption and crime. These policies will be positive for the economy over the long run and share prices will move higher in anticipation. Bottom Line: We are reiterating our overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and domestic local currency bonds within their respective EM benchmarks. With further rate cuts on the horizon, yet upside risks to EM local currency bond yields, we continue to recommend a curve steepening trade in Mexico: receiving 2-year and paying 10-year swap rates.  We now have high conviction that Mexican share prices will stage a cyclical outperformance relative to their EM peers. The bottom panel of Chart II-4 on page 8 illustrates that Mexican stocks seem to have formed a major bottom and are about to begin outperforming the EM equity benchmark. Dedicated EM equity managers should have a large overweight allocation to Mexican stocks. Our recommendation of favoring small-caps over large-cap companies in Mexico has been very profitable since we argued for this trade last November. We are taking a 12.9% profit on this position and recommend keeping an overweight allocation to both Mexican large- and small-caps within an EM equity portfolio.   Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Central Europe: An Inflationary Enclave In Deflationary Europe Our macroeconomic theme for Central European (CE) economies – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, elaborated in the linked report, has been as follows: Inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary as well as fiscal policies in CE promote strong domestic demand. CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Notably, CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Going forward, inflation will continue to rise across this region, despite the ongoing contraction in European manufacturing. First, Hungary’s and Poland’s central banks are behind the curve – they remain reluctant to hike rates amid rampantly rising inflation within overheating economies (Chart III-1). In turn, real policy rates across CE are becoming more negative and will promote robust money and credit growth (Chart III-2).      Chart III-1CE Central Banks Are Behind The Curve Chart III-2Low Real Rates Promote Rampant Credit Growth Policymakers are justifying stimulative policies by stressing ongoing woes in the Europe-wide manufacturing downturn. Yet, they are paying little attention to genuine inflationary pressures in their own economies. Most notably in Hungary, the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has been aggressively suppressing its policy rate and engaging in a corporate QE program, despite rising inflation and an overheating economy. Similarly, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) seems inclined to cut rates sooner rather than later. On the other end of the spectrum though, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is the only CE central bank to have embarked on a rate hiking cycle over the past 18 months. Going forward, the CNB looks most likely to normalize rates by continuing its hiking cycle. This development will favor rate differentials between it and the rest of CE. As such, we remain long the CZK versus both the HUF and PLN (Chart III-3). Chart III-3Favor CZK Versus PLN & HUF Chart III-4Germany's Manufacturing Cycles And CE Inflation Second, European manufacturing cycles have historically defined CE inflation trends, with time lags of around 12 to 18 months. However, this time around, the euro area manufacturing recession will not translate into slower CE inflation and growth dynamics (Chart III-4). Above all, booming credit induced by real negative borrowing costs has incentivized robust domestic demand in general and construction activity in particular in CE. In addition, employment growth remains strong and double-digit wage growth has supported strong consumer spending (Chart III-5). As a result, manufacturing production volumes have remained relatively resilient in Hungary and Poland, even as manufacturing output volumes in both Germany and the broader euro area have been contracting (Chart III-6). Chart III-5Strong Domestic Demand In CE… Chart III-6...Entails Divergences In Manufacturing With Euro Area Third, inflationary pressures in CE are both acute and genuine. Wage growth has been rising faster than productivity growth across the region, leading to surging unit labor costs (Chart III-7). Mounting wage pressures reflect widespread labor shortages. Further, output gaps in these economies have turned positive, which has historically been a precursor of inflationary pressures. Finally, fiscal policy in CE will remain very expansionary, supporting strong business and consumer demand. Bottom Line: Super-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies have led to a classic case of overheating within CE, particularly in Hungary and Poland, and less so in the Czech Republic. Chart III-7Genuine Inflationary Pressures In Central Europe Chart III-8A Widening Current Account Deficit Is A Symptom Of Overheating Investment Implications Deteriorating current accounts (Chart III-8), rising inflation and behind-the-curve central banks warrant further currency depreciation in both Hungary and Poland. This is why we continue to recommend a short position on both the HUF and PLN versus the CZK. We are closing our Hungarian/euro area relative three-year swap rate trade with a loss of 87 basis points. Our expectation that the market would price in rate hikes in Hungary despite the central bank’s dovishness has not materialized. Investors should remain overweight CE equities within an EM portfolio due to strong domestic demand in these economies and no direct economic exposure to China. As we expect EM equities to underperform DM stocks, we continue to recommend underweighting CE versus the core European markets. We are downgrading our allocation to CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral within an EM domestic bond portfolio. The primary reason is a risk of a selloff in core European rates.   Anddrija Vesic Research Analyst andrija@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1. Please see Emerging Markets Strategy, "Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income," dated April 23, 2019 and "Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing," dated September 5, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The U.S. and China are moving toward formalizing a trade ceasefire that reduces geopolitical risk in the near term. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is finished – removing a major downside to European assets. Spanish elections reinforce our narrative of general European political stability. Go long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Geopolitical risks will remain elevated in Turkey, rise in Russia, but remain subdued in Brazil. A post-mortem of Canada’s election suggests upside to fiscal spending but further downside to energy sector investment over the short to medium term. Feature After a brief spike in trade war-related geopolitical risk just prior to the resumption of U.S.-China negotiations, President Trump staged a tactical retreat in the trade war. Chart 1Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Negotiating in Washington, President Trump personally visited the top Chinese negotiator Liu He and the two sides announced an informal “phase one deal” to reverse the summer’s escalation in tensions: China will buy $40-$50 billion in U.S. agricultural goods while the U.S. will delay the October 15 tariff hike. More difficult issues – forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies – were punted to later. The RMB is up 0.7% and our own measures of trade war-related risk have dropped off sharply (Chart 1). We think these indicators will be confirmed and Trump’s retreat will continue – as long as he has a chance to save the 2020 economic outlook and his reelection campaign. Odds are low that Trump will be removed from office by a Republican-controlled senate – the looming election provides the republic with an obvious recourse for Trump’s alleged misdeeds. However, Trump’s approval rating is headed south. While it is around the same level as President Obama’s at this point in his first term, Obama’s started a steep and steady rise around now and ended above 50% for the election, a level that is difficult to foresee for Trump (Chart 2). So Trump desperately needs an economic boost and a policy victory to push up his numbers. Short of passing the USMCA, which is in the hands of the House Democrats, a deal with China is the only way to get a major economic and political win at the same time. Hence the odds of Presidents Trump and Xi actually signing some kind of agreement are the highest they have been since April (when we had them pegged at 50/50). Trump will have to delay the December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some of the tariffs over next year as continuing talks “make progress,” though we doubt he will remove restrictions on tech companies like Huawei. Still, we strongly believe that what is coming is a détente rather than the conclusion of the Sino-American rivalry crowned with a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Strategic tensions are rising on a secular basis between the two countries. These tensions could still nix Trump’s flagrantly short-term deal-making, and they virtually ensure that some form of trade war will resume in 2021 or 2022, if indeed a ceasefire is maintained in 2020. Both sides are willing to reduce immediate economic pain but neither side wants to lose face politically. Trump will not forge a “grand compromise.” Our highest conviction view all along has been – and remains – that Trump will not forge a “grand compromise” ushering in a new period of U.S.-China economic reengagement in the medium or long term. China’s compliance, its implementation of structural changes, will be slow or lacking and difficult to verify at least until the 2020 verdict is in. This means policy uncertainty will linger and business confidence and capex intentions will only improve on the margin, not skyrocket upward (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump Needs A Policy Win And Economic Boost Chart 3Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat The problem for bullish investors is that even if global trade uncertainty falls, and the dollar’s strength eases, fear will shift from geopolitics to politics, and from international equities to American equities (Chart 4). Trump, hit by impeachment and an explosive reaction to his Syria policy, is entering into dangerous territory for the 2020 race. Trump’s domestic weakness threatens imminent equity volatility for two reasons. Chart 4American Outperformance Falls With Trade Tensions Chart 5Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative First, if Trump’s approval rating falls below today’s 42%, investors will begin pricing a Democratic victory in 2020, i.e. higher domestic policy uncertainty, higher taxes, and the re-regulation of the American economy (Chart 5). This re-rating may be temporarily delayed or mitigated by the fact that former Vice President Joe Biden is still leading the Democratic Party’s primary election race. Biden is a known quantity whose policies would simply restore the Obama-era status quo, which is only marginally market-negative. Contrary to our expectations Biden's polling has not broken down due to accusations of foul play in Ukraine and China. Nevertheless, Senator Elizabeth Warren will gradually suck votes away from fellow progressive Senator Bernie Sanders and in doing so remain neck-and-neck with Biden (Chart 6). When and if she pulls ahead of Biden, markets face a much greater negative catalyst. (Yes, she is also capable of beating Trump, especially if his polling remains as weak as it is.) Chart 6Warren Will Rise To Front-Runner Status With Biden Second, if Trump becomes a “lame duck” he will eventually reverse the trade retreat above and turn into a loose cannon in his final months in office. Right now we see a decline in geopolitical risk, but if the economy fails to rebound or the China ceasefire offers little support, then Trump will at some point conclude that his only chance at reelection is to double down on his confrontation with America’s enemies and run as a “war president.” A cold war crisis with China, or a military confrontation with Iran (or North Korea, Venezuela, or some unexpected target) could occur. But since September we have been confirmed in believing that Trump is trying to be the dealmaker one last time before any shift to the war president. Bottom Line: The “phase one” trade deal is really just a short-term ceasefire. Assuming it is signed by Trump and Xi, it suggests no increase in tariffs and some tariff rollback next year. However, as recessionary fears fade, and if Trump’s reelection chances stabilize, U.S.-China tensions on a range of issues will revive – and there is no getting around the longer-term conflict between the two powers. For this and other reasons, we remain strategically short RMB-USD, as the flimsy ceasefire will only briefly see RMB appreciation. BoJo's Brexit Bluff Is Finished Our U.K. indicator captured a sharp decline in political risk in the past two weeks and our continental European indicators mirrored this move (Chart 7). The risk that the U.K. would fall out of the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed even further than in September, when parliament rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s no-deal gambit and we went long GBP-USD. We have since added a long GBP-JPY trade. Chart 7Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Chart 8Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This The risk of “no deal” is the only reason to care about Brexit from a macro point of view, as the difference between “soft Brexit” and “no Brexit” is not globally relevant. What matters is the threat of a supply-side shock to Europe when it is already on the verge of recession. With this risk removed, sentiment can begin to recover (and Trump’s trade retreat also confirms our base case that he will not impose tariffs on European cars on November 14). Since Brexit was the only major remaining European political risk, European policy uncertainty will continue to fall. The Halloween deadline was averted because the EU, on the brink of recession, offered a surprising concession to Johnson, enabling him to agree to a deal and put it up for a vote in parliament. The deal consists of keeping Northern Ireland in the European Customs Union but not the whole of the U.K., effectively drawing a new soft border at the Irish Sea. The bill passed the second reading but parliament paused before finalizing it, rejecting Johnson’s rapid three-day time table. The takeaway is that even if an impending election returns Johnson to power, he will seek to pass his deal rather than pull the U.K. out without a deal. This further lowers the odds of a no-deal Brexit as it illuminates Johnson's preferences, which are normally hidden from objective analysis. True, there is a chance that the no-deal option will reemerge if Johnson’s deal totally collapses due to parliamentary amendments, or if the U.K. and EU have failed to agree to a future relationship by the end of the transition period on December 31, 2020 (which can be extended until the end of 2022). However, the chance is well below the 30% which we deemed as the peak risk of no-deal back in August. Johnson created the most credible threat of a no-deal exit that we are likely to see in our lifetimes – a government with authority over foreign policy determined to execute the outcome of a popular referendum – and yet parliament stopped it dead in its tracks. Johnson does not want a no-deal recession and his successors will not want one either. After all, the support for Brexit and for the Tories has generally declined since the referendum, and the Tories are making a comeback on the prospect of an orderly Brexit (Chart 8). All eyes will now turn toward the impending election. Opinion polls still show that Johnson is likely to be returned to power (Chart 9). The Tories have a prospect of engrossing the pro-Brexit vote while the anti-Brexit opposition stands divided. No-deal risk only reemerges if the Conservatives are returned to power with another weak coalition that paralyzes parliament. Chart 9Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Chart 10Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Whatever the election result, we maintain our long-held position that Brexit portends greater fiscal largesse (Chart 10). The agitated swath of England that drove the referendum result will not be assuaged by leaving the European Union – the rewards of Brexit are not material but philosophical, so material grievances will return. Voter frustration will rotate from the EU to domestic political elites. Voters will demand more government support for social concerns. Johnson’s own government confirms this point through its budget proposals. A Labour-led government would oversee an even more dramatic fiscal shift. Our GeoRisk indicator will fall on Brexit improvements but the question of the election and next government will ensure it does not fall too far. Our long GBP trades are tactical and we expect volatility to remain elevated. But the greatest risk, of no deal, is finished, so it does make sense for investors with a long time horizon to go strategically long the pound. The greatest risk, of a no deal Brexit, is finished. Bottom Line: Brexit posed a risk to the global economy only insofar as it proved disorderly. A withdrawal agreement by definition smooths the process. Continental Europe will not suffer a further shock to net exports. The Brexit contribution to global policy uncertainty will abate. The pound will rise against the euro and yen and even against the dollar as long as Trump’s trade retreat continues. Spain: Further Evidence Of European Stability We have long argued that the majority of Catalans do not want independence, but rather a renegotiation of the region's relationship with Spain (Chart 11). This month’s protests in Barcelona following the Catalan independence leaders’ sentencing are at the lower historical range in terms of size – protest participation peaked in 2015 along with support for independence (Table 1). Table 1October Catalan Protests Unimpressive Our Spanish risk indicator is showing a decline in political risk (Chart 12). However, we believe that this fall is slightly overstated. While the Catalan independence movement is losing its momentum, the ongoing protests are having an impact on seat projections for the upcoming election.  Chart 11Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Chart 12Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Since the April election, the right-wing bloc of the People’s Party, Ciudadanos, and Vox has been gaining in the seat projections at the expense of the Socialist Party and Podemos. Over the course of the protests, the left-wing parties’ lead over the right-wing parties has narrowed from seven seats to one (Chart 13). If this momentum continues, a change of government from left-wing to right-wing becomes likely. However, a right-wing government is not a market-negative outcome, and any increase in risk on this sort of election surprise would be short-lived. The People’s Party has moderated its message and focused on the economy. Besides pledging to limit the personal tax rate to 40% and corporate tax rate to 20%, the People’s Party platform supports innovation, R&D spending, and startups. The party is promising tax breaks and easier immigration rules to firms and employees pursuing these objectives. Chart 13Spanish Right-Wing Parties Narrow Gap With Left Another outcome of the election would be a governing deal between PSOE and Podemos, along with case-by-case support from Ciudadanos. After a shift to the right lost Ciudadanos 5% in support since the April election, leader Albert Rivera announced in early October that he would be lifting the “veto” on working with the Socialist Party. If the right-wing parties fall short of a majority, then Rivera would be open to talks with Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez. A governing deal between PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos would have 175 seats, as of the latest projections, which is just one seat short of a majority. As we go to press, this is the only outcome that would end Spain’s current political gridlock, and would therefore be the most market-positive outcome. Bottom Line: Despite having a fourth election in as many years, Spanish political risk is contained. This is reinforced by a relatively politically stable backdrop in continental Europe, and marginally positive developments in the U.K. and on the trade front. We remain long European versus U.S. technology, and long EU versus Chinese equities. We will also be looking to go long EUR/USD when and if the global hard data turn. Following our European Investment Strategy, we recommend going long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Turkey, Brazil, And Russia Chart 14Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkey’s political risk skyrocketed upward after we issued our warning in September (Chart 14). We maintain that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship is not a basis for optimism regarding Turkey’s evading U.S. sanctions. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress are preparing a more stringent set of sanctions, focusing on the Turkish military, in the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from northeast Syria. At a time when Trump needs allies in the senate to defend him against eventual impeachment articles, he is not likely to veto and risk an override. Moreover, Turkey’s military incursion into Syria, which may wax and wane, stems from economic and political weakness at home and will eventually exacerbate that weakness by fueling the growing opposition to Erdogan’s administration and requiring more unorthodox monetary and fiscal accommodation. It reinforces our bearish outlook on Turkish lira and assets. Chart 15Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazil’s political risk has rebounded (Chart 15). The Senate has virtually passed the pension reform bill, as expected, which raises the official retirement age for men and women to 65 and 63 respectively. This will generate upwards of 800 billion Brazilian real in savings to improve the public debt profile. Of course, the country will still run primary deficits and thus the public debt-to-GDP ratio will still rise. Now the question shifts to President Jair Bolsonaro and his governing coalition. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has ticked up as we expected (Chart 16). If this continues then it is bullish for Brazil because it suggests that he will be able to keep his coalition together. But investors should not get ahead of themselves. Bolsonaro is not an inherently pro-market leader, there is no guarantee that he will remain disciplined in pursuing pro-productivity reforms, and there is a substantial risk that his coalition will fray without pension reform as a shared goal (at least until markets riot and push the coalition back together). Therefore we expect political risk to abate only temporarily, if at all, before new trouble emerges. Furthermore, if reform momentum wanes next year, then Brazil’s reform story as a whole will falter, since electoral considerations emerge in 2021-22. Hence it will be important to verify that policymakers make progress on reforms to tax and trade policy early next year. Our Russian geopolitical risk indicator is also lifting off of its bottom (see Appendix). This makes sense given Russia’s expanding strategic role (particularly in the Middle East), its domestic political troubles, and the risks of the U.S. election. The latter is especially significant given the risk (not our base case, however) that a Democratic administration could take a significantly more aggressive posture toward Russia. Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Bottom Line: Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Russia is a candidate for a “black swan” event, given the eerie quiet that has prevailed as Putin devotes his fourth term to reducing domestic political instability. Brazil, on the other hand, has a 12-month window in which reform momentum can be reinforced, reducing whatever spike in risk occurs in the aftermath of the ruling coalition’s completion of pension reform. Canada: Election Post-Mortem Prime Minister Justin Trudeau returned to power at the head of a minority government in Canada’s federal election (Chart 17). The New Democratic Party (NDP) lost 15 seats from the last election, but will have a greater role in parliament as the Liberals will need its support to pass key agenda items (and a formal governing coalition is possible). The NDP’s result would have been even worse if not for its last-minute surge in the polls after the election debates and Trudeau’s “blackface” scandal. Chart 17Liberals Need The New Democrats Now The Conservative Party won the popular vote but only 121 seats in parliament, leaving the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan aggrieved. The Bloc Québécois, the Quebec nationalist party, gained 22 seats to become the third-largest party in the House. Energy investment faces headwinds in the near-term. The Liberal Party will face resistance from the Left over the Trans Mountain pipeline. Trudeau will not necessarily have to sacrifice the pipeline to appease the NDP. He may be able to work with Conservatives to advance the pipeline while working with the NDP on the rest of his agenda. But on the whole the election result is the worst-case scenario for the oil sector and political questions will have to be resolved before Canada can take advantage of its position as a heavy crude producer near the U.S. Gulf refineries in an era in which Venezuela is collapsing and Saudi Arabia is exposed to geopolitical risk and attacks. More broadly, the Liberals will continue to endorse a more expansive fiscal policy than expected, given Canada’s low budget deficits and the need to prevent minor parties from eating away at the Liberal Party’s seat count in future. Bottom Line: The Liberal Party failed to maintain its single-party majority. Trudeau’s reliance on left-wing parties in parliament may prove market-negative for the Canadian energy sector, though that is not a forgone conclusion. Over the longer term the sector has a brighter future.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Appendix GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Analysis on Chile is available below. EM local bond yields have decoupled from their traditional macro drivers. This could be a sign that EM domestic bonds are entering a New Normal. We refer to a New Normal for EM local bonds when their yields drop during a global growth slowdown even as their currencies depreciate. Only time will tell whether the recent decoupling between EM local bond yields and their currencies is due to investor complacency or represents a sustainable paradigm shift. We are instituting a buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075. If and when the EM stock index in dollar terms breaks decisively above this level, we will become cyclically bullish and recommend playing the rally. Feature EM local currency bond yields have fallen below their 2013 lows (Chart I-1) – levels not reached since before the Federal Reserve-induced “Taper Tantrum” in the spring of 2013, when EM domestic bond yields spiked and currencies plunged. Crucially, in a major departure from their historical relationship, the aggregate EM GBI index of local bond yields has decoupled from EM currencies (Chart I-1), commodities prices, EM U.S dollar-denominated sovereign bond yields and the global business cycle (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM Local Bond Yields Have Decoupled From EM Currencies Chart I-2EM Domestic Bond Yields Have Diverged From Their Traditional Macro Drivers   Will this decoupling persist, or will the past relationship be re-established? In other words, have EM local currency bonds entered a New Normal – a paradigm where their yields behave like DM yields – falling during deflationary periods and rising during business cycle recoveries? What We Got Right And Wrong We had not been anticipating such a large drop in EM domestic bond yields this year. Our analysis has been based on the following pillars: That the global trade and manufacturing recession would persist until late 2019, and that such an outcome would herald lower commodities prices and weaker EM currencies. Falling resource prices and EM currency deprecation, consistent with the history shown in Chart I-1 and I-2, would lead to a foreign investor exodus from EM local bonds, reinforcing currency depreciation and somewhat higher yields.   Our theme that the global trade and manufacturing recession has been driven by weak domestic demand in China and the rest of the EM has played out quite well; commodities prices have been weak and EM currencies have depreciated. In addition, the broad trade-weighted dollar has been strong and DM bond yields have plunged in the past 12 months, in line with our theme of a global growth slump. In a major departure from their historical relationship, the aggregate EM GBI index of local bond yields has decoupled from EM currencies commodities prices, EM U.S dollar-denominated sovereign bond yields and the global business cycle. Nevertheless, our view of a selloff in EM domestic bonds has not panned out. In other words, our spot-on macro analysis has not translated into a successful investment call on the direction of EM local yields. The reason has been a change in the relationship between EM bond yields and their typical global macro drivers, specifically EM currencies. A potential counter-argument could be that falling DM bond yields have pushed EM local yields lower. However, contrary to the widespread consensus view, both EM local bond yields and currencies have illustrated a relatively weak correlation with U.S. bond yields (Chart I-3). All in all, even though our macro view has been on the ball, we have been flat-footed by the shifting relationship between EM domestic bond yields and their traditional macro drivers as illustrated in Chart I-1 and I-2.  Finally, even though EM bond yields have plunged, their total returns in U.S. dollar terms have not been spectacular (Chart I-4, top panel). Crucially, the EM GBI total return index in dollar terms has not outperformed that of duration-matched U.S. Treasurys (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-3No Stable Correlation Between EM Markets And U.S. Bond Yields Chart I-4EM Local Bonds Have Rallied But Have Not Outperformed U.S. Treasurys   Our macro views and themes have been positive for DM bonds. Fixed-income investors who favored U.S. Treasurys over EM local bonds have not underperformed by much in the past 12 months and have actually dramatically outperformed in 2018. Complacency Or A New Normal? There are two possible scenarios for EM domestic bonds going forward: Bullish Scenario: EM Local Bonds Have Entered A New Normal We refer to a New Normal for EM local bonds when their yields drop during a global growth slowdown even as EM currencies depreciate. This implies the past relationships between EM domestic yields on the one hand, and EM currencies and global macro variables on the other hand have permanently reversed. If EM domestic bonds have entered a New Normal, central banks in high-yielding EMs should cut interest rates during global growth slowdowns even if their exchange rate depreciates. Besides, their local bond yields should move lower despite currency weakness. If these two conditions are satisfied, one can argue that a major regime shift in EM interest rates has taken place. Ongoing rate cuts by a few of EM central banks - despite lingering weakness in their currencies - could be an indication that we are entering such a regime shift (Chart I-5). We refer to a New Normal for EM local bonds when their yields drop during a global growth slowdown even as EM currencies depreciate. We are open to accept this idea of a New Normal. Central banks in any economy where growth is slowing and inflation is low or falling should reduce interest rates even if their exchange rate depreciates. This will be a positive development for these countries, as it will make their monetary policy counter-cyclical - as it should be. One pre-condition for EM domestic bonds entering a New Normal is for the share of foreign investors holding of local currency bonds to decline. It is occurring at the margin in some countries. In Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia and Poland, the share of foreign investors in domestic bonds has fallen (Chart I-6). Yet, this phenomenon is not occurring in Indonesia, Russia, Colombia and Mexico. Chart I-5Rare Examples Of Rate Cuts Amid Currency Weakness Chart I-6Falling Share Of Foreign Investors   Negative Scenario: Investor Complacency Ends Chart I-7EM Currencies Correlate With Global Business Cycle And Commodities Prices Another potential explanation for the resilience of EM domestic yields to local currency depreciation is investor complacency: extremely low and negative bond yields in DM is inducing an unrelenting search for yields. As a result, investors are looking through EM currency depreciation, hoping it will be fleeting. Conditional on our view that EM currencies remain at risk of further depreciation panning out, EM local bonds are unlikely to avoid foreign outflows and higher yields under this scenario. This is especially true for the EM countries with high foreign ownership of local bonds. In theory, various macro forces such as expectations of domestic monetary policy, fiscal policy, inflation prospects, domestic business cycles, individual countries’ exchange rates as well as global interest rates should influence EM local bond yields. In reality, however, EM local yields have historically risen during periods of global business cycle downturns and falling commodities prices. The channel was via EM currencies, which depreciated during these periods (Chart I-7). Thereby, the primary driver for local bond yields has historically been swings in domestic exchange rates. In turn, the basis for this high sensitivity of EM domestic bond yields to their exchange rates has been due to the large share of foreign ownership. Table I-1 illustrates that the share of local currency government bonds held by foreign investors is high in the majority of EM countries. The exceptions are China, India, Korea, the Philippines and Chile. The data for Brazil are suspect. It is difficult to believe that foreigners own a mere 12% and declining share of Brazilian local currency bonds. Another potential explanation for the resilience of EM domestic yields to local currency depreciation is investor complacency: extremely low and negative bond yields in DM is inducing an unrelenting search for yields. As a result, investors are looking through EM currency depreciation, hoping it will be fleeting. What is critical, is that international investors care about the returns on their investments in U.S. dollars, euros or Japanese yen. Hence, they are very sensitive to exchange rates. Historically, foreign investors flee EM local bond markets when EM currencies depreciate, and vice versa. Chart I-8 illustrates the wide gap between total returns on EM domestic bonds in local currency and U.S. dollar terms. Table I-1Share Of Domestic Bonds Held By Foreign Investors Chart I-8EM Currencies Are Key To EM Local Bonds Volatility   In short, most investment return volatility in EM local bonds can be attributed to exchange rates – i.e., investments in EM local bonds have in practical terms constituted a bet on their exchange rates. If EM currencies experience another downleg, foreign investors’ patience might run out, causing a spike in EM local yields. Bottom Line: It is still early to conclude if a New Normal in EM domestic bonds has already taken hold. Only time will tell whether the recent decoupling between EM local bond yields and their currencies is due to an unrelenting search for yield or represents a paradigm shift. Reasons Why Local EM Yields Could Rise There are two macro risks to EM local bonds: 1.  A deepening/persisting growth slump in China Deteriorating Chinese domestic growth or a weaker RMB remain the key risks to the rest of the world. In brief, odds are high that China will continue exporting deflation to the rest of the world. Shrinking Chinese imports imply that the rest of the world’s export revenues emanating from their shipments to China are contracting (Chart I-9). A negative growth shock in EM economies that are exposed to China heralds both weaker currencies and lower interest rates. Given that high-yielding EM local bonds yields have risen historically during negative growth shocks, we are reluctant to chase these EM yields lower. This has been, and remains, our main thesis for high-yielding EM bond markets. 2.  Rising inflation in the U.S. Despite commentators’ preoccupation with global deflation and recession, U.S. core inflation is moving up. The equal-weighted average of various core measures presently stands at 2.2% and is drifting higher (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Chinese Imports Are Shrinking Chart I-10U.S. Core Inflation Is Above 2% And Rising   Besides, BCA Research’s U.S. wage tracker and unit labor costs have been accelerating (Chart I-11). The tight labor market in the U.S. suggest that risks to wages and unit labor costs and, ultimately, inflation are skewed to the upside. Chart I-11U.S. Wages And Unit Labor Costs Are Accelerating Unless U.S. growth slows much further, America’s fixed-income markets will at some point wake up to the reality of rising inflation. This will produce a shift up in the entire yield curve. Such a spike in U.S. Treasury yields will lead to a period of dollar strength and a selloff in overbought EM local bonds. Bottom Line: EM local bonds are discounting a goldilocks scenario. The two most likely risks that investors should monitor are a deepening growth slump in China and upside surprises in U.S. consumer price inflation.  Investment Strategy: Instituting A Buy Stop on EM Equities Given our negative stance on EM exchange rates, we have been receiving rates in EM countries where interest rates historically dropped amid currency deprecation. These include Korea, Chile and Mexico (the latter due to the value in local rates). For a dedicated EM local bond portfolio, our recommended overweights have been: Mexico, Russia, Central Europe, Chile, Korea and Thailand. Our underweights have been South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines and Argentina. Clients can always find our country allocation and trades for the EM local bond universe at the end of our weekly reports - please refer to page 14 - or on our website.  Also, gauging the direction of EM local bond yields is critical not only to fixed-income portfolio managers but to equity managers as well. Chart I-12 illustrates that EM equities rally when their domestic bond yields are falling. The failure of EM share prices to rally in recent months amid plunging EM local bond yields has been due to shrinking corporate profits. We are instituting a buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075. Any pick-up in EM domestic bond yields without recovery in EM corporate earnings will cause a major drop in EM equities. As to our EM equity strategy, our negative view is currently being challenged by the reaction of global share prices to negative profits and growth data releases. Despite very weak global trade and manufacturing data as well as downbeat profits from cyclical sectors, U.S. high-beta stocks and global cyclicals – an equal-weighted average of global industrials, materials and semiconductor stocks - have held up well (Chart I-13). Chart I-12EM Stocks Struggled Despite Falling Local Yields Chart I-13Global Cyclicals And U.S. High-Beta Stocks Are Holding Up   This could reflect investor complacency or it could be that the equity market is sensing an imminent recovery in global growth that we do not see in data. In particular, DM equities are at a critical juncture – not only the S&P 500 but also euro area stock prices are flirting with their previous highs (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Euro Area Stocks Are At Their Major Resistance If they relapse from here, it will signify a bear market. On the other hand, if these equity markets break out, it would suggest that a major upleg is in the making. Even though EM share prices are well below their previous highs, they are also at a make or break juncture. Therefore, we are instituting a buy stop on the MSCI EM equity index at 1075 (Chart I-15). If and when the EM stock index in dollar terms breaks decisively above this level, we will become cyclically bullish and recommend playing the rally. Chart I-15We Are Instituting A Buy Stop at 1075 on MSCI EM Index   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Chile: Structural Equity De-Rating The latest violent protests in Chile have raised doubts about its socio-political and economic stability. As a result, Chilean share prices could be facing both absolute and relative (versus other EM bourses) de-ratings. We are downgrading this bourse from overweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio, reiterating our short position in the peso versus the dollar, and continue to bet on lower rates and falling inflation cyclically, as discussed in great length in our recent report. Chilean stocks have always been among the most expensive within the EM universe due to the nation’s economic and socio-political stability. The violent protests now warrant a structural de-rating of equity valuations (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Chilean Share Prices: A Long-Term Perspective First, the government will be forced to adopt much more populist policies, such as the recently announced raise in minimum wages, pension payments and healthcare benefits. Unit labor costs for businesses are set to rise substantially, eating into corporate profit margins. Second, in line with more populist policies, larger budget deficits and structurally higher inflation will cause the long-end of the yield curve to rise. Higher interest rates will put downward pressure on equity multiples. Finally, equity investors will require a higher risk premium to invest in this bourse. Chile’s equity valuation premium versus EM overall will shrink. Bottom Line: The central bank will have to cut rates by a larger margin: continue receiving 3-year swap rates. A recession is unavoidable as business confidence will plunge and derail hiring and investments. Inflation will fall much further cyclically: bet on lower inflation by going long 3-year local currency bonds and shorting their inflation-linked counterparts. Continue shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar. Downgrade the allocation to Chilean stocks from overweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Análisis sobre Chile está disponible a continuación. Aspectos destacados Las grandes rotaciones en el liderazgo de acciones suelen ocurrir en torno a mercados bajistas o correcciones. Por tanto, una venta masiva amplia probablemente será una condición previa para que los mercados emergentes (EM), las materias primas, los cíclicos globales y las acciones de valor comiencen a tener un rendimiento superior. Las probabilidades de que las acciones de mercados emergentes (EM) tengan un rendimiento inferior al S&P 500 o a los precios de las acciones de mercados desarrollados (DM) en una caída de las acciones son del 65-70%. Un dólar más débil es esencial para el mejor desempeño de los EM. Seguimos alcistas en el dólar y estamos infraponderados/cortos en EM. Artículo principal La década actual se ha caracterizado por el rendimiento sustancialmente superior de las acciones de crecimiento frente a las de valor, y del S&P 500 frente a los mercados emergentes y otros mercados internacionales. BCA celebró su conferencia anual en Nueva York la semana pasada. Uno de los temas clave que los inversores querían entender fue el potencial de una rotación de liderazgo en los mercados de renta variable globales. La década actual se ha caracterizado por el rendimiento sustancialmente superior de las acciones de crecimiento frente a las de valor, y del S&P 500 frente a los mercados emergentes y otros mercados internacionales, los precios de las acciones FAANG frente a las materias primas y las acciones de la “vieja economía”. ¿Está a punto de invertirse esta tendencia? Las opiniones entre los ponentes de nuestra conferencia ciertamente diferían. Algunos todavía mostraron una inclinación por las acciones de crecimiento y las acciones estadounidenses, mientras que otros recomendaron valor global y acciones de EM. Nuestros temas para la década Nuestros temas clave a largo plazo – presentados en nuestro informe especial del 8 de junio de 2010 Special Report titulado How To Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade1 – que han dado forma a nuestra estrategia de inversión durante la última década han sido: Los sectores de renta variable de materias primas, materiales y energía, así como las acciones de maquinaria, estarán en un mercado bajista porque la inversión de capital de China ha alcanzado su punto máximo. Por tanto, los inversores deberían evitar los mercados emergentes que son muy sensibles a los precios de los recursos. Favorecer apuestas de consumo en EM/China, es decir, tecnología así como acciones de salud en general y de equipos sanitarios en particular, es la forma de aprovechar el crecimiento de China/EM en esta década. Dado que la tecnología y la salud representan un menor peso en los índices bursátiles de EM que en los de mercados desarrollados (DM), hemos estado recomendando que los inversores infraponderen EM frente a las acciones de DM. No hace falta decir que estos temas han resultado extremadamente bien, con los sectores de renta variable de EM, recursos, relacionados con materias primas y maquinaria subper- formando masivamente (Gráfico I-1), y las acciones de tecnología, consumo y salud superando (Gráfico I-2). Estos temas han guiado nuestra estrategia durante los últimos nueve años, llevándonos a estar infraponderados en acciones de EM en favor del S&P 500, que está fuertemente dominado por empresas de tecnología, consumo y salud. Gráfico I-1 Las apuestas de gasto de capital en China han tenido un rendimiento inferior esta década Las inversiones en Capex en China han quedado rezagadas esta década Las inversiones en Capex en China han quedado rezagadas esta década Gráfico I-2 Nuestros favoritos de esta década han tenido un rendimiento superior Nuestros favoritos de esta década han tenido un rendimiento superior Nuestros favoritos de esta década han tenido un rendimiento superior Cualquier tendencia de inversión tiene un principio y un final. Es esencial no permanecer en exceso en estrategias ganadoras. Críticamente, Gráfico I-3 muestra que la magnitud del aumento en las acciones FAANG durante los últimos 10 años es comparable a las burbujas de décadas anteriores. Este gráfico compara precios de activos en términos reales (ajustados por inflación) en dólares estadounidenses. Gráfico I-3 FAANG y burbujas previas en perspectiva FAANG y las burbujas anteriores en perspectiva FAANG y las burbujas anteriores en perspectiva Solo la historia dirá si las FAANG están actualmente en una burbuja o no. Por el momento, no tenemos una opinión de alta convicción sobre este asunto. Sin embargo, incluso si no están en una burbuja, están extremadamente sobrecompradas y caras. Su incapacidad para superar sus máximos de 2018 es una señal técnica negativa. En conjunto, esto justifica una postura cautelosa sobre el rendimiento absoluto de las FAANG. Conclusión: Independientemente de la dirección de las acciones FAANG, lo más probable es que los precios de las acciones de EM retrocedan en términos absolutos antes de que surja un suelo sostenible. Para una discusión detallada sobre esto, consulte las páginas 6-9. En tal escenario, es difícil imaginar un repunte de las acciones FAANG. Pueden seguir superando en términos relativos, pero aun así se desinflarán en términos absolutos. Las rotaciones de renta variable se producen en torno a mercados bajistas El rendimiento relativo de las acciones de crecimiento frente a las de valor a nivel global a menudo experimenta reversiones de tendencia durante o después de las ventas masivas. Con respecto a la rotación del liderazgo en renta variable, es crucial señalar que las rotaciones de liderazgo en renta variable normalmente ocurren durante o después de mercados bajistas y/o correcciones en los precios globales de las acciones. Gráfico I-4 ilustra los precios relativos de las acciones de EM frente a DM junto con el índice de renta variable global. En los últimos 25 años, ha habido varios cambios importantes de liderazgo entre EM y DM, y todos ellos coincidieron con, o fueron precedidos por, un mercado bajista o una corrección en los precios globales de las acciones. De manera similar, el rendimiento relativo de las acciones de crecimiento frente a las de valor a nivel global a menudo experimenta reversiones de tendencia durante o después de ventas masivas (Gráfico I-5). Gráfico I-4 EM versus DM: Rotaciones de renta variable EM Frente a DM: Rotaciones de Renta Variable EM Frente a DM: Rotaciones de Renta Variable Gráfico I-5 Crecimiento global versus valor: rotaciones de liderazgo Crecimiento global frente al valor: rotaciones de liderazgo Crecimiento global frente al valor: rotaciones de liderazgo Finalmente, los cambios estructurales en la tendencia del rendimiento relativo del sector tecnológico global, las acciones de energía y los materiales también han ocurrido durante o después de caídas en los precios globales de las acciones (Gráfico I-6). Gráfico I-6 Tecnología, energía y materiales globales: rotaciones de liderazgo Tecnología, Energía y Materiales Globales: Rotaciones de Liderazgo Tecnología, Energía y Materiales Globales: Rotaciones de Liderazgo Conclusión: Las grandes rotaciones de liderazgo en renta variable normalmente ocurren en torno a mercados bajistas o correcciones. Por tanto, probablemente habrá una venta masiva importante antes de que los EM, las materias primas, los cíclicos globales y las acciones de valor empiecen a obtener un rendimiento superior. Consideraremos cambiar nuestra estrategia relativa de renta variable si se produce una venta masiva generalizada. En una caída de las acciones de este tipo, existe una probabilidad del 30-35% de que los EM puedan superar al S&P 500, como ocurrió durante el colapso de las acciones globales en el cuarto trimestre del año pasado. En resumen, la probabilidad de que los precios de las acciones de EM tengan un rendimiento inferior al S&P 500 y a los mercados desarrollados (DM) es del 65-70%. Un dólar más débil es esencial para que los EM obtengan un mejor desempeño. El servicio Emerging Markets Strategy de BCA sigue siendo alcista respecto al dólar y está infraponderado/corto en EM. ¿Un colapso en EM y los cíclicos globales? Con el PMI manufacturero de China nuevamente en alza, es crucial cuestionar nuestra visión sobre el ciclo empresarial chino, así como la fabricación y el comercio globales. En nuestra opinión, el último aumento en el PMI manufacturero del continente es una aberración más que una nueva tendencia: Los precios de las acciones chinas a lo largo de los años han sido coincidentes o líderes respecto al PMI manufacturero del continente. Actualmente, las acciones apuntan a una recaída en este último (Gráfico I-7). El mensaje de los precios de las acciones chinas es que la última mejora en el PMI manufacturero del país debe desestimarse. Gráfico I-7 Precios de las acciones chinas y PMI manufacturero Precios de las Acciones Chinas y PMI Manufacturero Precios de las Acciones Chinas y PMI Manufacturero La recesión manufacturera global sigue extendiéndose. La recesión manufacturera global sigue extendiéndose. Esto aún no se ha descontado en los sectores de renta variable cíclica global. Estos últimos se han movido lateralmente durante el último año y medio, a pesar de la contracción en la actividad manufacturera global (Gráfico I-8). La paciencia de los inversores en acciones puede estar agotándose, ya que la recuperación manufacturera global esperada hasta ahora no se ha materializado. Gráfico I-8 Acciones cíclicas globales y PMI manufacturero bca.ems_wr_2019_10_03_s1_c8 bca.ems_wr_2019_10_03_s1_c8 Gráfico I-9 EPS de EM y exportaciones coreanas: moviéndose al unísono EM EPS y las exportaciones coreanas: avanzando al unísono EM EPS y las exportaciones coreanas: avanzando al unísono Las exportaciones coreanas en septiembre se contrajeron a una tasa cercana al 10% interanual (Gráfico I-9, panel superior). Curiosamente, el nivel de ganancias por acción (EPS) corporativas de EM en términos de dólares estadounidenses muestra un patrón similar al de las exportaciones coreanas (Gráfico I-9, panel inferior). Ambos están en el mismo nivel que en 2010. Por tanto, durante esta década las EPS de EM y las exportaciones coreanas en términos de dólares no se han expandido en absoluto. Las acciones estadounidenses de alta beta en conjunto, así como los precios de las acciones de industriales y tecnológicas de alta beta, están cerca de romper por debajo de sus líneas de soporte técnico (Gráfico I-10). Podrían ser canarios en la mina para el S&P 500. Gráfico I-10 Las acciones estadounidenses de alta beta se están deteriorando Las acciones de alta beta de EE. UU. se están desplomando Las acciones de alta beta de EE. UU. se están desplomando Gráfico I-11 Una señal bajista para EM y materias primas bca.ems_wr_2019_10_03_s1_c11 bca.ems_wr_2019_10_03_s1_c11 A pesar de un PMI manufacturero estadounidense muy débil, el dólar sigue estando bien demandado. Esto indica que la recesión manufacturera global emana del resto del mundo, no de EE. UU. De hecho, el sector manufacturero de EE. UU. ha sido el último dominó en caer. La fortaleza persistente del dólar es un síntoma del debilitamiento del crecimiento global. Nuestra ratio Risk-On / Safe-Haven Currency2 – que es agnóstica respecto a las tendencias del dólar – se está desplomando, corroborando la perspectiva negativa para el crecimiento global en general y los precios de las materias primas en particular (Gráfico I-11). Por último, los diferenciales de crédito corporativo de alto rendimiento en EM y Asia en conjunto se están ampliando frente a los de grado de inversión. Esto es una señal de aumento de la aversión al riesgo.  Los mercados de crédito de EM y los bonos en moneda local han sido hasta ahora razonablemente resistentes, a pesar de la venta masiva en los precios de las acciones y las monedas de EM (Gráfico I-12). La base de tal desacoplamiento ha sido la búsqueda indiscriminada de rendimiento más que una mejora en la dinámica de crecimiento de los EM. Gráfico I-12 Los mercados de crédito de EM volverán a acoplarse a la baja con acciones y monedas Los mercados de crédito de EM volverán a correlacionarse a la baja con las acciones y las divisas Los mercados de crédito de EM volverán a correlacionarse a la baja con las acciones y las divisas El deterioro del crecimiento eventualmente provocará una ampliación de los diferenciales de crédito de EM. Además, la depreciación persistente de las monedas de EM probablemente conducirá a salidas de los mercados de bonos locales de alto rendimiento de EM. Conclusión: Las acciones de EM, los mercados de crédito y los bonos en moneda local de alto rendimiento corren el riesgo de sufrir una venta masiva importante. Nuestra lista de asignaciones por país en las distintas clases de activos de EM, así como nuestras operaciones, siempre se puede encontrar al final de nuestros informes, consulte las páginas 14-15. Seguimos recomendando vender en corto la siguiente cesta de monedas emergentes frente al dólar: ZAR, CLP, COP, IDR, MYR, PHP y KRW.   Arthur Budaghyan Estratega jefe de mercados emergentes arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Chile: Seguir favoreciendo bonos sobre acciones; apostar por una inflación más baja Hemos estado apostando por un crecimiento lento, tasas de interés más bajas y una moneda debilitada en Chile. Estas posiciones han resultado bien ya que la economía se ha desacelerado considerablemente, los rendimientos de los bonos locales han caído y la moneda se ha depreciado significativamente (Gráfico II-1, panel superior y medio). Sin embargo, nuestra posición en sobreponderación en acciones chilenas dentro de una cartera dedicada de acciones de EM ha tenido un desempeño pobre (Gráfico II-1, panel inferior). ¿Es hora de reconsiderar nuestra posición? Gráfico II-1 Nuestra estrategia para Chile Nuestra estrategia para Chile Nuestra estrategia para Chile Tras reexaminar la dinámica cíclica de esta economía y situarla en el contexto del panorama global, reiteramos nuestras recomendaciones de inversión. También vemos una nueva oportunidad de inversión en los mercados de renta fija chilenos: los inversores deberían considerar apostar por expectativas de inflación más bajas, es decir, posicionarse largos en bonos domésticos y vender en corto bonos ligados a la inflación. Creemos que las expectativas de inflación a medio y largo plazo que refleja el mercado de bonos están sobrevaloradas y caerán en los próximos meses. Es probable que la economía chilena se debilite aún más y la inflación se reduzca considerablemente más allá del corto plazo. Aunque el banco central ya ha recortado las tasas en 100 puntos básicos, se necesitarán más flexibilizaciones y tiempo antes de que el impulso crediticio se vuelva positivo y eleve la demanda interna. El impulso crediticio para las empresas apunta a una recaída en la inversión de capital (Gráfico II-2). El estímulo fiscal adoptado ha sido insignificante, 0,21% del PIB para 2019 y 2020. Aunque el crecimiento del gasto público está tocando fondo, el gasto fiscal total representa el 20% del PIB. En resumen, son demasiado pequeños para marcar una diferencia importante en la economía. Gráfico II-2 Chile: Impulso del crédito en caída = Capex débil Chile: Caída del impulso crediticio = Capex débil Chile: Caída del impulso crediticio = Capex débil Con las exportaciones no mineras contrayéndose y los precios de las materias primas desplomándose, los sectores exportadores continuarán lastrando el crecimiento. Los beneficios corporativos se están reduciendo y esto afectará la inversión de capital y la contratación. De manera crítica, el aumento de los costes laborales por unidad está deprimendo los márgenes de beneficios corporativos (Gráfico II-3). Estos han subido porque la desaceleración de la producción aún no se ha visto acompañada por despidos o por un menor crecimiento salarial. A su vez, los próximos despidos en medio de la ya creciente tasa de desempleo llevarán sin duda a una considerable desinflación salarial (Gráfico II-4). Chile ha visto entradas masivas de inmigrantes desde Venezuela en los últimos años, lo que demostrará ser una fuerza desinflacionaria importante para esta economía a medio plazo. Por último, la inflación de los precios de los bienes – que ha surgido de la depreciación de la moneda – podría impedir que la inflación de los consumidores caiga en el corto plazo. Sin embargo, este fenómeno no será sostenible más allá del corto plazo. Gráfico II-3 La reducción de beneficios llevará a las empresas a bajar los costes laborales por unidad La reducción de las ganancias llevará a las empresas a disminuir los costos laborales unitarios. La reducción de las ganancias llevará a las empresas a disminuir los costos laborales unitarios. Gráfico II-4 El crecimiento salarial es insosteniblemente alto El crecimiento de los salarios es insosteniblemente alto El crecimiento de los salarios es insosteniblemente alto En conjunto, el mercado de renta fija pasará por alto la inflación de los precios de bienes inducida por la depreciación de la moneda y empezará a descontar expectativas de inflación mucho más bajas. Recomendamos apostar a que las expectativas de inflación a 3 años caerán del 2,5% al 1,5% en los próximos 12 meses (Gráfico II-5). Hemos estado recibiendo tasas swap a 3 años desde el 31st de mayo de 2018 y esta posición sigue intacta. El peso seguirá depreciándose a medida que los precios del cobre caigan más. Cabe destacar que la tasa de cambio efectiva real basada en los costes laborales por unidad – calculada por la OCDE – sugiere que el peso sigue estando caro (Gráfico II-6). El último punto de datos corresponde a septiembre de 2019. Esto probablemente se deba a la depreciación de otras monedas de América Latina. Gráfico II-5 Chile: expectativas de inflación en caída Chile: Expectativas de inflación se desplomarán Chile: Expectativas de inflación se desplomarán Gráfico II-6 El CLP no es barato El CLP no es barato El CLP no es barato Por último, nos mostramos reacios a rebajar la bolsa chilena dentro de una cartera de renta variable de EM. La relajación de la política y la gran subrendimiento, así como las perspectivas estructurales positivas, deberían producir un periodo de mejor desempeño de este mercado de acciones en medio de la venta masiva en el universo general de acciones de EM. Los asignadores de activos locales deberían seguir favoreciendo los bonos frente a las acciones. Conclusión: Como nueva operación para inversores de renta fija: recomendamos posicionarse largos en bonos domésticos a 3 años y vender en corto bonos ligados a la inflación a 3 años.   Juan Egaña, Asociado de investigación juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Estratega jefe de mercados emergentes arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Notas al pie 1      Consulte el Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “How To Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade”, fechado el 8 de junio de 2010, disponible en ems.bcaresearch.com 2      Promedio de los índices de rentabilidad total de CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP y ZAR en relación con el promedio de las rentabilidades totales de JPY y CHF (incluido el carry). Recomendaciones de acciones Recomendaciones de divisas, crédito y renta fija

Informe especial

Aspectos Destacados La reforma de pensiones en Brasil está avanzando. Los próximos 12-18 meses ofrecen una ventana de oportunidad, sobre todo en materia de privatizaciones y reforma tributaria. Los esfuerzos en curso deberían sostener una mejora en los “animal spirits” a corto plazo y crear algún potencial para mejoras estructurales a largo plazo. No obstante, la lenta y constante recuperación económica de Brasil sigue siendo vulnerable a un choque externo o interno negativo que podría hacer que entre en “velocidad de pérdida”. Si las reformas estructurales o el ciclo económico llegan a la velocidad de pérdida, los mercados financieros se venderán. Sopesando los pros y los contras, estamos elevando la calificación de Brasil de infraponderado a neutral. Resumen La reforma de pensiones (eventualmente) pasará, ¿pero qué sigue? El progreso reciente en la agenda de reformas económicas de Brasil es positivo para los mercados, pero está claramente en riesgo de “velocidad de pérdida”1 si el impulso reformista no se mantiene después de la probable aprobación de los recortes al sistema de seguridad social. Habiendo superado la Cámara de Diputados, es ahora probable que el proyecto de reforma de pensiones pase en el senado. Se espera la primera ronda de votación en cualquier momento y el líder del gobierno en el senado, Fernando Bezerra, espera que el proyecto pase la segunda ronda a mediados de octubre (Diagrama I-1). Diagrama I-1 Brasil: Cronograma de la Reforma de Pensiones Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Gráfico I-1 El proyecto de pensiones verá la luz Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida La reforma tiene casi garantizada su aprobación por el congreso, otorgando a la administración de Bolsonaro su primera gran victoria legislativa. Los diputados de la cámara baja votaron en gran medida en línea con las alianzas partidarias; si esto continúa en el senado, el proyecto debería reunir el apoyo de al menos 56 de los 81 senadores – superando los 49 votos necesarios para su aprobación (Gráfico I-1). No nos sorprendería que el proyecto enfrentara obstáculos repentinos en el senado, como demoras o diluciones. El proyecto de la Cámara se presentó en febrero y, después de cierto retraso, fue aprobado en agosto. Rodrigo Maia, presidente de la Cámara de Diputados, fue fundamental para asegurar el tránsito sin problemas del proyecto. Si bien el presidente del Senado, Davi Alcolumbre, tiene un interés similar en asegurar su aprobación, no hay garantía de que sea sencillo. La fragmentación en el senado, por ejemplo, está en su nivel más alto de la historia, a diferencia de la cámara baja. El proyecto requiere dos rondas de votación. La expectativa de Bezerra de votar el 24 de septiembre y el 15 de octubre ya es un retraso respecto a la proyección inicial del 18 de septiembre y el 2 de octubre. Conclusión: Es muy probable que la reforma de pensiones sea aprobada, aunque no tan rápidamente como afirman sus promotores, y el congreso brasileño pronto tendrá que pasar al siguiente tema importante de la agenda de reformas económicas. Rastreando el capital político de Bolsonaro para la agenda posterior a la reforma de pensiones ¿Tiene Bolsonaro suficiente capital político para aprobar otras reformas estructurales? ¿O será víctima de la velocidad de pérdida cuando su enfoque de política cambie a áreas menos amigas de los mercados, su relación con el legislativo se rompa y su apoyo popular continúe cayendo? Con vientos en contra macroeconómicos y una coalición de gobierno frágil, la respuesta es un sí con reservas: Bolsonaro dispone de suficiente capital político para gastarlo en reformas adicionales. Pero, dado que es imposible saber con precisión qué ocurrirá después de que pase la reforma de pensiones, destacamos los indicios clave que utilizaremos para monitorear el progreso de Bolsonaro. Una premisa fundamental es que ni Bolsonaro ni su partido son instintiva ni ideológicamente pro-mercado. Ganó las elecciones de 2018 debido a un conjunto específico de circunstancias y políticas populares. Estas forman los cuatro pilares de su apoyo político: El colapso de la izquierda: Las elecciones de 2016 y 2018 arrasaron con el Partido de los Trabajadores, que había gobernado Brasil desde 2003, y llevaron a Bolsonaro al poder en una ola de profunda desilusión. El éxito del Partido Social Liberal (PSL) de derecha de Bolsonaro, un partido decididamente minoritario, sobre el PT de izquierda de Fernando Haddad, uno de los partidos más grandes del país, destacó el desencanto de los brasileños después de la peor recesión en un siglo y un amplio escándalo de corrupción que implicó a gran parte de la élite política. Gráfico I-2 La izquierda sigue herida Brasil: Apenas por encima de la «velocidad de pérdida» Brasil: Apenas por encima de la «velocidad de pérdida» Aunque el “período de luna de miel” de Bolsonaro tras la elección ha terminado, el PT no se ha recuperado de su pérdida de legitimidad durante la última década. Una encuesta realizada a fines de agosto revela que si las elecciones de 2022 se celebraran hoy, Bolsonaro obtendría una ventaja significativa no solo sobre el PT sino también sobre la oposición combinada (Gráfico I-2). Reforma de pensiones: Todas las élites políticas de Brasil reconocen que el hinchado sistema de pensiones debe reducirse para mejorar el perfil fiscal del país y la sostenibilidad de la deuda. Tras el fracaso del gobierno anterior en hacerlo, esto se convirtió en una promesa central de la campaña de Bolsonaro. El consenso sobre la reforma de pensiones le ha permitido formar una coalición mayoritaria; es uno de los puntos más populares de la agenda del gobierno, no porque la gente adore que le recorten las pensiones, sino por la percepción generalizada de que es necesario y mejorará las circunstancias económicas generales de Brasil (Gráfico I-3). Gráfico I-3 Los brasileños ven valor en la reforma de pensiones Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Irónicamente, sin embargo, la aprobación de esta reforma también eliminará este pilar del capital político de la administración. A Bolsonaro le quedará menos capital político para gastar en otras reformas y enfrentará menos unidad dentro de su coalición habiendo logrado su objetivo compartido más importante. Por lo tanto, si el proyecto pasa pero no logra aumentar su índice de aprobación, o de inmediato lo impulsa a perseguir políticas menos favorables al mercado o a perder partidos importantes de su coalición, entonces es una señal de alarma que sugiere que es un líder de un solo truco y no logrará otras reformas importantes en su mandato. Ley y orden: Bolsonaro fue elegido con la promesa de restaurar el orden. La tasa de criminalidad ha caído desde comienzos de año y los votantes estarán atentos a que esta tendencia se sostenga (Gráfico I-4). La caída de la delincuencia y la aprobación neta del entorno de seguridad en Brasil son positivas para la credibilidad de Bolsonaro. Sin embargo, no está claro que sus políticas sean directamente responsables de esta mejora, lo que significa que la tendencia podría cambiar. Si la delincuencia aumenta, pierde capital político para hacer otras cosas. Además, es posible que el público no apruebe su enfoque. Como indica el Gráfico I-3 arriba, mientras la población está dividida sobre el derecho a poseer armas en el hogar, hay una clara desaprobación del derecho a poseer armas en la calle. La persecución de una solución impopular podría disminuir su apoyo en materia de ley y orden. Gráfico I-4 Un aumento del crimen dañaría a Bolsonaro Brasil: justo por encima de la 'velocidad de pérdida Brasil: justo por encima de la 'velocidad de pérdida Gráfico I-5 Moro, clave para la lucha anticorrupción de Bolsonaro Brasil: justo por encima de la 'velocidad de pérdida Brasil: justo por encima de la 'velocidad de pérdida Corrupción: El tercer panel del Gráfico I-4 también revela que combatir la corrupción es un área clave de éxito percibido por la administración de Bolsonaro hasta la fecha. Bolsonaro ganó el cargo en parte porque se le veía como un líder limpio en una época de corrupción generalizada. Su administración también está reforzada por la presencia del ministro de Justicia Sergio Moro, quien desempeñó un papel principal en el enjuiciamiento de figuras corruptas en la operación Lava Jato. Moro es con diferencia el ministro más popular del gabinete hoy (Gráfico I-5). Una caída en la popularidad de Moro sería un indicio de que los brasileños no están satisfechos con el progreso de la administración en el frente anticorrupción. Como tal, marcaría un descenso del capital político. Si Moro abandona la administración por cualquier motivo, eso también dañaría la credibilidad de Bolsonaro en este asunto crítico. La calificación de aprobación de Bolsonaro hasta la fecha es muy baja en relación con presidentes anteriores y está en caída (Gráfico I-6). La única forma en que esto puede cambiar es si recibe crédito por la reforma de pensiones y luego prioriza políticas que sean ampliamente populares en lugar de ideológicas. Como se mencionó, el cambio tras la reforma de pensiones será crítico de observar: las encuestas muestran que el público da al gobierno federal y al presidente Bolsonaro personalmente el mayor crédito por las mejoras en Brasil (Gráfico I-7), pero no está claro que sea muy recompensado por recortar las pensiones. Gráfico I-6 ¿Salvará la aprobación la aprobación de la reforma de pensiones a Bolsonaro? Brasil: Justo por encima de "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de "velocidad de pérdida Gráfico I-7 Todo el crédito va a la administración Bolsonaro Brasil: Apenas por encima de la 'velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Apenas por encima de la 'velocidad de pérdida   El esfuerzo legislativo ha tenido éxito en gran parte gracias al presidente de la Cámara, Rodrigo Maia, una pieza clave en el congreso. Maia, liberal en lo económico, ha dejado de lado diferencias personales con el liderazgo para guiar las reformas económicas a través del congreso. Esto ha implicado un enfoque pragmático que deja de lado las polémicas políticas sociales del presidente y se centra en aprobar proyectos pro-mercado. Gráfico I-8 Un punto de partida débil para el PSL Brasil: Justo por encima de "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de "velocidad de pérdida El flujo de noticias políticas de Brasil este año ha estado preocupado por la ruptura entre los poderes legislativo y ejecutivo. A primera vista, el congreso parece imposible de navegar. Como es típico en Brasil, el congreso está extremadamente fragmentado. El PSL de Bolsonaro solo posee el 10% de los escaños que pertenecen a los 25 partidos en la cámara baja, y solo el 5% de los escaños que pertenecen a los 17 partidos en la cámara alta (Gráfico I-8). Esto es comparable a la primera administración de Cardoso – por lo que no es imposible hacer crecer esta base legislativa – pero es un punto de partida débil. Además de eso, Bolsonaro ha mantenido su promesa de campaña de rechazar la llamada “política antigua” – la concesión de puestos en el gabinete o “clientelismo” basada en el patrocinio congresional. Esto refuerza su pilar anticorrupción pero dificulta engrasar las ruedas de la legislación. La aprobación de la propuesta de reforma de pensiones en la Cámara de Diputados de Brasil muestra que el congreso puede navegarse, pero destaca el papel crítico de Maia. Esta relación podría romperse después de la reforma de pensiones, lo que reduciría la capacidad del gobierno para lograr reformas adicionales que requieran aprobación legislativa. El tercer mandato de dos años de Maia expirará a fines del próximo año. Técnicamente no puede ser elegido para un mandato sucesivo (aunque esta regla ya se ha roto). Esto plantea la amenaza de que su sucesor no sea tan pro-mercado o tan exitoso en gestionar la cámara baja. De hecho, los próximos 12 a 18 meses crean una ventana de oportunidad para que la administración y la legislatura aprueben proyectos antes de que las elecciones locales de 2020 y las generales de 2022 comiencen a interferir. Dado que los recortes de pensiones serán diferidos —aplazados hasta años posteriores—, los votantes no sentirán inmediatamente el dolor de los cambios en la seguridad social, lo que reducirá las probabilidades de una reacción popular importante durante esta ventana. Siempre que prevalezca el pragmatismo de Maia, el gobierno puede usar la reforma de pensiones para lanzarse a otra gran iniciativa de reforma. El ministro de Economía, Paulo Guedes, otro actor clave pro-mercado, ha destacado la privatización y la reforma tributaria como los próximos grandes temas en su agenda. Los próximos 12-18 meses ofrecen una ventana de oportunidad para más reformas. Conclusión: Las tensiones entre los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo no han impedido que pasen las reformas de pensiones porque Bolsonaro tenía un mandato fresco, pleno capital político y un amplio consenso sobre la política en sí. De cara al futuro, se habrá gastado gran parte del capital político mientras que será necesario construir consenso para la próxima prioridad política. El presidente de la Cámara, Rodrigo Maia, es una pieza clave que, de forma pragmática, facilita la aprobación de proyectos en el congreso, por lo que su cooperación es esencial. Los próximos 12-18 meses ofrecen una ventana de oportunidad para más reformas, sobre todo privatizaciones y reforma tributaria. Un camino ejecutivo hacia la privatización El plan de privatizaciones de la administración es demasiado ambicioso, pero existe una vía ejecutiva a seguir mientras el gobierno entra en una larga lucha en la legislatura. Guedes ha indicado que quiere vender todas las empresas estatales de Brasil al sector privado. En términos de valor, el gobierno espera recaudar 1,3 billones de reales (US$323 mil millones) en el proceso, aproximadamente el 20% de la deuda pública total. Brasil tiene 418 empresas estatales controladas directa o indirectamente por el estado, tanto a nivel estatal como municipal. De las 134 empresas federales, 46 están bajo control directo, mientras que las 88 restantes están bajo control indirecto – subsidiarias de grandes empresas estatales como Petrobras, Eletrobras, Banco do Brasil, Caixa y BNDES. Con la deuda pública de Brasil en el 86% del PIB, las ganancias de estas ventas se destinarían a pagar la deuda y con suerte también a aumentar el PIB mediante ganancias de mayor competencia y eficiencia. El programa también reduciría los pagos de intereses del gobierno – que representan el 25% del gasto gubernamental y el 5% del PIB. Salim Mattar – Secretario Especial de Privatización, Desinversión y Mercado — sostiene que los intereses ahorrados permitirán al gobierno desviar fondos a educación y salud, fortaleciendo el capital humano de Brasil a largo plazo. La privatización de empresas estatales ineficientes y generadoras de pérdidas es positiva tanto para el panorama a corto como a largo plazo, pero el plan del gobierno es completamente irrealista. Incluso las ganancias proyectadas significativamente más bajas por Mattar —hasta 800.000 millones de reales (US$214 mil millones)— probablemente sean inalcanzables. Aunque el gobierno cumplirá fácilmente su objetivo de recaudar US$20.000 millones este año,2 estas ventas representan los frutos más fáciles —son las ventas de activos que enfrentan poca o nula resistencia del público y del congreso. El 21 de agosto, el gobierno de Bolsonaro publicó una lista de 17 empresas estatales que tiene la intención de privatizar (Tabla I-1). De entre las mayores empresas estatales – Petrobras, Eletrobras, BNDES, Banco do Brasil y Caixa Econômica Federal – solo Eletrobras está en la lista. El resto de las grandes empresas estatales afrontará mayores obstáculos ya que han sido identificadas como “estratégicas” y enfrentan mayor resistencia pública (Gráfico I-9). De hecho, aunque los funcionarios del gobierno expresaron confianza en que Eletrobras será privatizada en 2020, el presidente del Senado, Davi Alcolumbre, indicó que el proceso enfrenta una resistencia significativa en el senado. Por tanto, esperaríamos que la legislatura aborde empresas que no sean tan controvertidas. Tabla I-1 Lista de privatizaciones del gobierno Brasil: Justo por encima de "Stall Speed Brasil: Justo por encima de "Stall Speed Además, aunque la aprobación del congreso es necesaria para la venta de empresas estatales, una decisión del tribunal supremo a principios de este año permite al gobierno vender subsidiarias de sus compañías sin aprobación del congreso. Por lo tanto, si bien es improbable que se privatizen empresas estatales mayores como Petrobras o Eletrobras (ciertamente no por completo), el gobierno intentará avanzar vendiendo activos no esenciales de empresas no estratégicas y tomando otras medidas para mejorar la eficiencia operativa. Gráfico I-9 Estas empresas estatales "estratégicas" afrontan resistencia a la privatización Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Gráfico I-10 La privatización reducirá la carga de la deuda La privatización reducirá la carga de la deuda La privatización reducirá la carga de la deuda Dejando de lado el plan de la administración para acelerar el programa el próximo año, si proyectamos US$20.000 millones en privatizaciones por año durante el resto del mandato de Bolsonaro, la suma total de US$80.000 millones en ventas reducirá la ratio deuda/PIB de Brasil al 81% desde el 85% (Gráfico I-10). Conclusión: Aunque la venta de las mayores empresas estatales “estratégicas” no ocurrirá, el programa de privatizaciones de la administración puede tener éxito desviando los esfuerzos del congreso hacia empresas no estratégicas. La administración también puede actuar por su cuenta sobre activos no esenciales. Esto es un positivo neto para la productividad general, la competitividad y la sostenibilidad fiscal aunque su magnitud no sea enorme. Menos optimismo sobre la reforma tributaria y arancelaria Además del papel económico desmesurado del estado, Brasil ha estado sufriendo ineficiencias debido a la relativamente elevada carga impositiva y a un sistema excesivamente complicado (Gráfico I-11). Esto ha reducido su posición en el ranking Doing Business del Banco Mundial, que lo sitúa en el séptimo lugar peor en el pago de impuestos (Gráfico I-12). Las casi seis mil leyes que rigen los impuestos en Brasil probablemente limitan el potencial de IED del país y fomentan la evasión fiscal. Gráfico I-11 Los brasileños sufren una carga tributaria desmesurada … Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: Justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Gráfico I-12 … contribuyendo a un entorno empresarial poco atractivo Brasil: justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Brasil: justo por encima de la "velocidad de pérdida Dada la mala situación fiscal de Brasil y su gran carga de deuda, no hay margen para reducir impuestos. Más bien, los esfuerzos de reforma se centran en simplificar el código tributario para mejorar el entorno de inversión. Una revisión completa requiere la aprobación de tres quintos del congreso. La reforma de pensiones demuestra que esto es teóricamente posible, pero el proceso será largo y es poco probable que ocurra antes de la segunda mitad del próximo año. Actualmente se están considerando cuatro propuestas principales. Todas apuntan a simplificar el sistema tributario al combinar todos los impuestos vigentes sobre el consumo en un único impuesto. La propuesta más avanzada en el proceso legislativo cuenta con el apoyo de Maia y ya ha sido declarada constitucional por una comisión de la cámara baja. Recomienda aplicar la tasa única de impuesto de forma uniforme en todos los estados. La administración de Bolsonaro también está diseñando sus propias propuestas de reforma, pero aún no ha divulgado detalles. Como lo reveló el despido del secretario especial de la Receita Federal, Marcos Cintra, el 11 de septiembre, el gabinete está en conflicto sobre la reintroducción de un impuesto a las transacciones financieras, como la CPMF que expiró en 2007. El Gráfico I-3 arriba ilustra que el impuesto es generalmente impopular, lo que hace que Bolsonaro esté firmemente en contra del impuesto, mientras que Guedes ha indicado que debería ser parte de la reforma. Se espera que la propuesta se someta a los legisladores en una comisión del congreso responsable de redactar el proyecto antes del 8 de octubre, antes de ser presentada a la cámara baja. Sin embargo, dado que el impuesto a las transacciones financieras es impopular y un punto de conflicto en la administración, la cronología probablemente se retrasará. Además, el proceso de aprobación legislativa será largo. Si bien Bezerra Coelho no espera que la reforma tributaria se apruebe hasta la segunda mitad de 2020, esta es una evaluación optimista. Dada la complejidad de reformar el sistema tributario, esperamos un proceso de al menos un año y, por tanto, dudamos que la aprobación llegue en 2020. En su lugar, las modificaciones al sistema actual pueden ser más fáciles de promulgar e implementar. Guedes también ha señalado la necesidad de reducir los aranceles de importación extremadamente elevados de Brasil, erigidos en el marco de una política de sustitución de importaciones (Gráfico I-13). Con la mayoría de los aranceles en el rango del 10% al 35%, Guedes ha afirmado que el gobierno planea reducir los aranceles en 10 puntos porcentuales durante el mandato de cuatro años de Bolsonaro, reduciendo la tasa en un punto porcentual en el primer año, dos en el segundo, tres en el tercero y cuatro en el cuarto. Esto puede hacerse por acción ejecutiva y no requiere legislación. ¿Y el empuje de Bolsonaro por la liberalización comercial? En la campaña, Bolsonaro expresó su intención de distanciarse del Mercosur y priorizar en su lugar el comercio bilateral con países ricos como Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, dada la importancia del bloque para el comercio brasileño, la realidad es que Bolsonaro no puede permitirse descuidar estos países (Gráfico I-14). El acuerdo comercial UE-Mercosur recientemente acordado, 20 años en preparación, podría crear oportunidades para Brasil a largo plazo, pero está siendo retenido por países europeos ya que el apetito por acuerdos de libre comercio se vuelve políticamente problemático en todo el mundo. Gráfico I-13 La elevada tasa arancelaria perjudica la competitividad de Brasil La elevada tasa arancelaria perjudica la competitividad de Brasil La elevada tasa arancelaria perjudica la competitividad de Brasil Gráfico I-14 El superávit comercial con Mercosur es confiable El superávit comercial con Mercosur es fiable El superávit comercial con Mercosur es fiable Si bien una mayor integración con el comercio global aumentará el acceso al mercado de Brasil –algo positivo para las exportaciones– también resulta en mayor competencia y una amenaza para las empresas existentes que no pueden competir a nivel internacional en el corto plazo. Por lo tanto, no está inmediatamente claro si la liberalización comercial generará ganancias netas para la economía brasileña en el corto plazo. Si Bolsonaro y Guedes no actúan de inmediato, tendrán que pausar estos esfuerzos en 2021 en el período previo a las elecciones de 2022. Además, el acuerdo del Mercosur, así como el comercio bilateral general de Brasil con Argentina, están en riesgo si el líder opositor Alberto Fernández gana las elecciones presidenciales el 27 de octubre. Un regreso a políticas proteccionistas por parte de Argentina podría perjudicar las exportaciones brasileñas y amenazar el progreso en el bloque comercial del Mercosur. Hay más motivos para ser optimistas respecto a la privatización que sobre la reforma tributaria o la liberalización comercial. Conclusión: Hay más motivos para ser optimistas sobre los esfuerzos de privatización que sobre la aprobación de una revisión mayor del sistema tributario de Brasil o la integración de Brasil con los mercados globales. No obstante, los esfuerzos en curso deberían sostener una mejora en los “animal spirits” a corto plazo y crear cierto potencial para mejoras estructurales a largo plazo. La economía: riesgo de velocidad de pérdida Gráfico I-15 Una recuperación lenta y constante Una recuperación lenta y desgastante Una recuperación lenta y desgastante La economía brasileña está en vías de recuperación, aunque lenta. El nivel de actividad económica sigue muy por debajo de su nivel pre-recesión, pero se recupera lentamente (Gráfico I-15). El principal riesgo económico es la velocidad de pérdida. Como en una aeronave, si el ritmo de crecimiento cae por debajo de la velocidad de pérdida, las fuerzas de la gravedad prevalecerán y la economía descenderá hacia una recesión. En el caso de Brasil, las fuerzas de la gravedad se refieren al endeudamiento – deuda pública, costos de servicio de la deuda de los hogares y deuda corporativa en moneda extranjera. La senda de menor resistencia para el ciclo económico es al alza y el optimismo sobre Brasil es generalizado en la comunidad inversora global. No obstante, la economía sigue siendo muy frágil. En el momento actual, reconociendo que las probabilidades de que prospere el escenario positivo son razonablemente altas, nos gustaría enfatizar que las fuerzas de la gravedad siguen siendo agudas en Brasil. Aunque las probabilidades de que prospere el escenario positivo son altas, las fuerzas de la gravedad siguen siendo bastante agudas. El debilitamiento del crecimiento de la base monetaria anticipa un ritmo más débil de actividad económica nominal y real (Gráfico I-16). Los hogares brasileños han dependido cada vez más de tarjetas de crédito y líneas de crédito revolventes para financiar su consumo en los últimos años. Estos tipos de crédito tienen tasas de interés altas. En consecuencia, con un 21% de la renta disponible, el servicio de la deuda de los hogares sigue siendo muy elevado a pesar de una gran reducción en los rendimientos de los bonos y en las tasas de política (Gráfico I-17). Gráfico I-16 ¿Está a punto de estancarse el crecimiento? ¿Está el crecimiento a punto de estancarse? ¿Está el crecimiento a punto de estancarse? Gráfico I-17 Los costos de servicio de los hogares siguen elevados Los costes de servicio de los hogares siguen siendo elevados Los costes de servicio de los hogares siguen siendo elevados Los bancos privados han experimentado un ligero aumento en los préstamos en mora (NPLs) (Gráfico I-18). Esto puede incentivar a los bancos privados a moderar el crecimiento del crédito. Con los bancos públicos desapalancándose o reduciendo sus balances, cualquier moderación en los préstamos de bancos privados podría frenar el ritmo de crecimiento de la economía. Curiosamente, los rendimientos de los bonos y la tasa Selic en mínimos históricos aún no se han traducido en una recuperación significativa de los precios inmobiliarios y los nuevos lanzamientos de construcción permanecen anémicos (Gráfico I-19). Gráfico I-18 NPLs de bancos privados y crecimiento del crédito Bancos Privados: Préstamos Morosos y Crecimiento del Crédito Bancos Privados: Préstamos Morosos y Crecimiento del Crédito Gráfico I-19 Mercado inmobiliario débil a pesar de las bajas tasas Mercado inmobiliario débil a pesar de las bajas tasas de interés Mercado inmobiliario débil a pesar de las bajas tasas de interés   La política fiscal está constreñida por la regla del techo del gasto, que indexa el gasto gubernamental a la tasa de inflación del año anterior. El gasto fiscal nominal crecerá solo un 4,3% este año y se expandirá un mero 3,4% en 2020. Las obligaciones de deuda externa (FDO) – la suma de las reclamaciones a corto plazo, pagos de intereses y amortizaciones en los próximos 12 meses – ascienden a US$180.000 millones, equivalentes al 78% de las exportaciones anuales de Brasil (Gráfico I-20).  El déficit por cuenta corriente seguirá ampliándose si la demanda interna y, en consecuencia, las importaciones se recuperan. Los requisitos de financiamiento externo – FDO más el saldo de la cuenta corriente – son sustanciales, situándose en US$250.000 millones (Gráfico I-21). Si los flujos de cartera hacia mercados emergentes se ven perturbados, Brasil lo sentirá. Gráfico I-20 Las obligaciones de deuda externa están elevadas Las obligaciones de la deuda externa están elevadas Las obligaciones de la deuda externa están elevadas Gráfico I-21 Brasil tiene una gran brecha de financiamiento... Brasil tiene una gran brecha de financiación... Brasil tiene una gran brecha de financiación... Gráfico I-22 ...con las exportaciones contrayéndose ...Con Exports Contracting ...Con Exports Contracting Con el crecimiento de las exportaciones contrayéndose en dos dígitos tanto en valor como en volumen (Gráfico I-22), la demanda frente a la oferta de dólares en Brasil probablemente mantendrá al billete verde bien demandado frente al real brasileño. La factura de pensiones de la nación es un paso muy positivo y muy necesario en el proceso de reforma estructural. Sin embargo, en su forma actual, es insuficiente para hacer sostenibles las dinámicas de la deuda pública – es decir, detener el aumento de la ratio deuda/PIB del gobierno. Conclusión: La senda de menor resistencia para el ciclo económico es alcista. Sin embargo, la economía sigue siendo muy frágil. Un choque externo o interno negativo podría hacer que la economía brasileña entre en velocidad de pérdida. A menos que ocurran tales choques negativos, la economía continuará su recuperación. ¿Han alcanzado los mercados financieros la velocidad de escape? Los mercados financieros son vulnerables al riesgo de velocidad de pérdida tanto en el frente de las reformas estructurales como en el del crecimiento económico. Esto es especialmente cierto ahora que los precios de las acciones y los bonos han subido sustancialmente. Si el ritmo de las reformas estructurales o de la economía sucumben a la velocidad de pérdida, los mercados financieros se desplomarán. Por el contrario, si la agenda de reformas progresa y el crecimiento económico se acelera, los mercados financieros alcanzarán la velocidad de escape y sostendrán sus mercados alcistas. Aparte de las perspectivas para las reformas estructurales y el ciclo económico, los mayores riesgos para los mercados financieros de Brasil son los siguientes: El equipo de Emerging Markets Strategy de BCA espera que los precios de los metales básicos y la energía se reduzcan aún más, presionando a las monedas de mercados emergentes. El principal culpable es la debilitación de la demanda china. Este escenario implica probabilidades no despreciables de depreciación del real brasileño porque este ha estado históricamente positivamente correlacionado con los precios de las materias primas (Gráfico I-23). Brasil se ha convertido en un exportador neto de petróleo, por lo que los precios más bajos del crudo son negativos para la moneda. Es importante señalar que el real no está barato según la tasa de cambio efectiva real (Gráfico I-24). Gráfico I-23 Los precios de las materias primas tienen la llave Los precios de las materias primas son la clave Los precios de las materias primas son la clave Gráfico I-24 Las valoraciones del real aún no son atractivas Las valoraciones reales todavía no son atractivas. Las valoraciones reales todavía no son atractivas. La brecha entre los rendimientos de los bonos en moneda local y en dólares estadounidenses se ha reducido hasta un mínimo histórico. Esto, junto con la gran carga de deuda corporativa en moneda extranjera mencionada más arriba, ya está animando a hacer canjes de deuda: las empresas piden préstamo en reales para pagar su deuda en moneda extranjera. Estas salidas de capital de residentes seguirán presionando la tasa de cambio. Un déficit por cuenta corriente en expansión históricamente ha anticipado precios de acciones más bajos en términos de dólares estadounidenses (Gráfico I-25). Finalmente, los rendimientos locales de los bonos y los diferenciales soberanos y corporativos han caído a pesar de la depreciación de la moneda. Tal resistencia de los mercados de renta fija frente a la depreciación de la moneda es históricamente sin precedentes. Está por verse si los rendimientos y los diferenciales de crédito pueden mantenerse bajos si la moneda se deteriora. Conclusión: A menos que haya velocidad de pérdida en las reformas estructurales y en el crecimiento económico, la caída en los precios de los activos brasileños es limitada. Sin embargo, es probable que haya volatilidad a corto plazo ya que los mercados financieros de la nación están sobrecomprados y el sentimiento inversor es muy alcista. Además, los precios de las acciones en términos de dólares no han superado niveles técnicos de resistencia importantes, como se muestra en el Gráfico I-26. Por lo tanto, podemos decir que el mercado alcista del Bovespa en términos de dólares aún no ha alcanzado la velocidad de escape. Gráfico I-25 La cuenta corriente es un riesgo para los precios de las acciones La cuenta corriente supone un riesgo para los precios de las acciones La cuenta corriente supone un riesgo para los precios de las acciones Gráfico I-26 El Bovespa en términos de dólares no ha alcanzado la velocidad de escape La Bovespa en términos de dólares no ha alcanzado la velocidad de escape La Bovespa en términos de dólares no ha alcanzado la velocidad de escape Recomendaciones de inversión Sopesando los pros y los contras, recomendamos elevar la posición sobre Brasil de infraponderado a neutral para carteras dedicadas a renta variable de mercados emergentes, crédito y bonos domésticos. Dado los riesgos potenciales discutidos arriba, buscamos un mejor punto de entrada para elevar a Brasil a sobreponderado. Elevamos a Brasil a sobreponderado el 9 de octubre de 2018 tras la primera ronda de las elecciones presidenciales, pero lo rebajamos el 4 de abril de 2019 cuando la volatilidad comenzó a aumentar. En retrospectiva, fue la decisión equivocada. La volatilidad podría aumentar pero existe una base para dar el beneficio de la duda a la administración mientras permanezca comprometida con reformas pro-mercado. Gráfico I-27 Las acciones inmobiliarias ofrecen una oportunidad bca.ems_sr_2019_09_27_s1_c27 bca.ems_sr_2019_09_27_s1_c27 Para los inversores de retorno absoluto a largo plazo, el principal riesgo es el tipo de cambio. Por tanto, estos inversores deberían adoptar una inclinación positiva hacia los rendimientos en moneda local a largo plazo pero cubrir el riesgo cambiario de forma periódica. Actualmente, los mercados financieros globales están en un punto en el que el dólar probablemente se moverá al alza y el real brasileño se depreciará. Por ello, los inversores ya invertidos en Brasil deberían cubrir el riesgo cambiario. Dentro del universo accionario brasileño, el servicio Emerging Markets Strategy de BCA favorece el sector inmobiliario porque las bajas tasas nominales y reales son alcistas para el sector de la propiedad. Este sector fue devastado durante la recesión y aún no se ha recuperado (Gráfico I-27). En consecuencia, para inversores a largo plazo, seguimos recomendando apuestas/activos inmobiliarios brasileños en las caídas. Notas al pie   1      "Velocidad de pérdida" es la velocidad por debajo de la cual una aeronave descenderá, o 'entrará en pérdida', independientemente de su ángulo de ataque. Si la velocidad del aire de una aeronave es mayor que la velocidad de pérdida, entonces el piloto puede aumentar el ángulo de ataque de la aeronave para lograr sustentación adicional. 2      Hasta ahora en 2019 el gobierno ya ha vendido activos por valor de US$12.300 millones de Petrobras, US$4.900 millones en acciones mantenidas en varias empresas, y ha obtenido US$1.900 millones de arrendamientos de aeropuertos, ferrocarriles y puertos.

Highlights The lingering global manufacturing recession and the substantial drop in U.S. bond yields have been behind the decoupling between both EM stocks and the S&P 500, and cyclical and defensive equities. Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to indicate either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. We review some of our long-standing themes and associated recommendations. Feature Global financial markets have become bifurcated. On one hand, numerous segments of global financial markets leveraged to global growth, including EM stocks, have already sold off (Chart I-1). On the other hand, share prices of growth companies, defensive stocks and global credit markets have remained resilient. Chart I-2 shows that a similar divergence has taken place within EM asset classes: EM share prices have plummeted while EM corporate credit excess returns have not dropped much. Chart I-1Bifurcated Equity Markets Chart I-2Bifurcated Markets In EM   How to explain this market bifurcation? Financial markets sensitive to global trade and manufacturing cycles have been mirroring worsening conditions in global trade and manufacturing. Some of the affected segments include: Global cyclical equity sectors. Emerging Asia manufacturing-related currencies (KRW, TWD and SGD) versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). EM and DM commodity currencies (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Total Return (Including Carry): KRW, TWD And SGD Vs. USD Chart I-4EM And DM Commodity Currencies   Industrial and energy commodities prices. U.S. high-beta stocks as well as U.S. small caps (Chart I-5). Chart I-5U.S. High-Beta Stocks DM bond yields.  Crucially, the current global trade and manufacturing downturns have taken place despite robust U.S. consumer spending. In fact, our theme for the past several years has been that a global business cycle downturn would occur despite ongoing strength in American household spending. The rationale has been that China and the rest of EM combined are large enough on their own to bring down global trade and manufacturing, irrespective of strength in U.S. consumer spending. At the current juncture, one wonders whether such a market bifurcation is justified. It is not irrational. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Corporate bonds have also done well, given the background of a falling risk-free rate. Will the current market bifurcation continue? Or will these segments in global financial markets recouple and in which direction? What To Watch China rather than the U.S. has been the epicenter of this slowdown, as we have argued repeatedly in the past. Hence, a major rally in global cyclical equities and EM risk assets all hinge on a recovery in the Chinese business cycle. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Even though Caixin’s PMI for China was slightly up in August, many other economic indicators remain downbeat: The latest hard economic data out of Asia suggest that global trade/manufacturing continues to contract. Korea’s total exports in August contracted by 12.5% from a year ago, and its shipments to China plunged by 20% (Chart I-6). The import sub-component of China’s manufacturing PMI is not showing signs of amelioration (Chart I-7). The mainland’s import recovery is very critical to a revival in global trade and manufacturing. Chart I-6Korean Exports: No Recovery Chart I-7Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chart I-8German Manufacturing Confidence German manufacturing IFO business expectations and current conditions both suggest that it is still early to bet on a global trade recovery (Chart I-8). Newly released August data points reveal that U.S., Taiwanese, and Swedish manufacturing new export orders continue to tumble. To gauge whether bifurcated markets will recouple and whether it will occur to the downside or the upside, investors should watch the relative performance of China-exposed markets, global cyclicals and high-beta plays – the ones that have already sold off substantially. The notion is as follows: These markets’ relative performance will likely bottom before their absolute performance recovers. If so, their relative performance will likely foretell the outlook for their absolute performance. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. In other words, they could sell off even if a global recession is avoided. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. To assess the outlook for global cyclicals and China-related plays, we are monitoring the following financial market indicators: The Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio is the average of high-beta commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP and ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to the average of JPY and CHF total returns (including carry). This ratio is dollar-agnostic. This ratio is making a new cyclical low (Chart I-9). Hence, it presently warrants a negative view on global growth, China’s industrial sector and commodities. Global cyclical equity sectors seem to be on the edge of breaking down versus defensives (Chart I-10). This ratio does not signal ameliorating global growth conditions. Chart I-9The Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio Chart I-10Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Chart I-11U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 Finally, U.S. high-beta stocks continue to underperform the S&P 500 (Chart I-11). This is consistent with overall U.S. growth deceleration. Bottom Line: Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to foreshadow either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. Continue trading EM stocks and currencies on the short side, and underweighting EM risk assets versus DM. Our Investment Themes And Positions Some of our open positions often run for years because they reflect our long-standing themes. Our core theme has for some time been that a global trade/manufacturing recession will be generated by a growth relapse in China. To capitalize on this theme, we have been recommending a short EM stocks / long 30-year U.S. Treasurys strategy since April 2017. This recommendation has produced a 25% gain since its initiation (Chart I-12). Continue betting on lower local interest rates in emerging economies where the central bank can cut rates despite currency depreciation. To implement this theme, we have been recommending receiving swap rates in Korea and Chile for the past several years. Our reluctance to recommend an outright buy on local bonds stems from our bearish view on both currencies – the Korean won and Chilean peso. In fact, we have been shorting both the KRW and the CLP against the U.S. dollar. Chart I-13 shows that swap rates in Korea and Chile have dropped substantially since our recommendations to receive rates in these countries. More rate cuts are forthcoming in these economies, and we are maintaining these positions. Chart I-12EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds Chart I-13Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile   We have been bearish on EM banks in general and Chinese banks in particular. We have expressed these themes in a number of ways: Short EM and Chinese / long U.S. bank stocks. Short EM banks / long EM consumer staples (Chart I-14). Within Chinese banks, we have been short Chinese medium and small banks / long large ones. All these strategies remain valid. In credit markets, we have been favoring U.S. corporate credit versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Ability to service debt is better among U.S. debtors than EM/Chinese borrowers. We have been playing this theme in the following ways: Underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit / overweight U.S. investment-grade corporates (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Chart I-15Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates   Underweight Asian high-yield corporate credit / overweight emerging Asian investment-grade corporates. As a bet on a deteriorating political and business climate in Hong Kong, in our Special Report on Hong Kong SAR from June 27, we reiterated the following positions: Short Hong Kong property stocks / long Singapore equities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing The Mexican economy is heading into a full-blown recession. Most segments of the economy are in contraction, and leading indicators point to further downside. Both manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs are well below 50 (Chart II-1). Monetary policy remains too restrictive: Nominal and real interest rates are both very high and plunging narrow money (M1) growth is signaling  further downside in economic activity (Chart II-2). Chart II-1The Economy Is Deteriorating Chart II-2Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth   An inverted yield curve signifies that the central bank is behind the curve and foreshadows growth contraction (Chart II-3). Fiscal policy has tightened as the government has remained committed to achieving a primary fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP in 2019 (Chart II-4, top panel). Consequently, nominal government expenditures have been curbed (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The government’s fiscal stimulus has not been large and has been implemented too late. Chart II-3A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve Chart II-4Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot   Finally, business confidence is extremely low due to uncertainty over President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) policies towards the private sector. The president is attempting to revive business confidence, but it will take time. Chart II-5Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Our major theme for Mexico has been that both monetary and fiscal policies are very tight. Consequently, we have been recommending overweight positions in Mexican domestic bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. (Chart II-5). Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Meanwhile, we have been favoring the Mexican peso relative to other EM currencies due to the fact that AMLO is not as negative for the country as was initially perceived by markets. With inflation falling and the Federal Reserve cutting rates, Banxico will ease further. Yet, it will likely cut rates slower than warranted by the economy. The longer the central bank takes to ease, the lower domestic bond yields will drop. Concerning sovereign credit, investors should remain overweight Mexico within an EM credit portfolio. Mexico’s fiscal position is healthier, and macroeconomic policies will be more prudent relative to what the market is currently pricing. We continue to believe concerns about Pemex’s financing and its impact on government debt are overblown, as we discussed in detail in our previous Special Report. In July, the government released an action plan for Pemex financing. We view this plan as marginally positive. To supplement this plan, the government can use the $14.5 billion federal budget stabilization fund to fill in financing shortfalls in the coming years. Importantly, the starting point of Mexican public debt is quite low, which will allow the government to finance Pemex in the years to come by borrowing more from markets. Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Lastly, our overweight recommendation in Mexican stocks has not played out. However, we are maintaining it for the following reasons: Chart II-6 illustrates that when Mexican domestic bond yields decline relative to EM ones (shown inverted on Chart II-6), Mexican share prices usually outperform their EM counterparts in common currency terms. Consistent with our view that Mexican local currency bonds will outperform their EM peers, we expect Mexican stocks to outpace the EM equity benchmark. The Mexican bourse’s relative performance against EM often swings with the relative performance of EM consumer staples versus the EM equity benchmark. This is due to the large share of consumer staples stocks in Mexico (34.5%) compared to that in the EM benchmark (7%). Consumer staples stocks are beginning to outpace the EM equity index, raising the odds of Mexican equity outperformance versus its EM peers (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Chart II-7Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse   We do not expect a major rally in this nation’s stock market given the negative growth outlook. Our bet is that Mexican share prices - having already deflated considerably - will drop less in dollar terms than the overall EM equity index. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Mexican sovereign credit, domestic bonds and equities relative to their respective EM benchmarks. The main risk to the Mexican peso stems from persisting selloff in EM currencies. Traders’ net long positions in the MXN are elevated posing non-trivial risk (Chart II-8). We have been long MXN versus ZAR but are taking profit today. This trade has generated a 9.7% gain since March 29, 2018. A plunging oil-gold ratio warrants a caution on this cross rate in the near term (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Investors Are Long MXN Chart II-9Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade   Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations