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特別レポート Highlights The US election cycle is an understated risk to US equities – and the risk of a left-wing populist outperforming in the Democratic primary election is frontloaded in February. The US-Iran conflict is unresolved and remains market-relevant. Iraq is at the center of the conflict and oil supply disruption there or elsewhere in the region is a substantial risk. Even if war does not erupt, Iran has the potential to give President Trump’s foreign policy a black eye and thus could marginally impact the election dynamic. Feature Stocks have rallied mightily since our August report on Trump’s “tactical trade retreat,” but new headwinds face the market. In this report we call attention to four hurdles arising from US election uncertainty. Then we focus on the status of Iran and Iraq in the wake of this month’s hostilities, which brought the US and Iran to the brink of outright war. We maintain that the Iran risk is unresolved and will remain market-relevant in advance of the US election. Primarily due to the US Democratic primary election, we urge caution on US equities in the near term, along with our Global Investment Strategy, despite our cyclically bullish House View. Four Hurdles In The US Election Cycle The US election cycle is the chief political risk to the bull market this year – and geopolitical risks largely radiate from it. There are four immediate hurdles that financial markets are underestimating: Risks to Trump's re-election: Global investors have come around to our view since 2018 that Trump is slightly favored to win re-election (Chart 1). Bets on the related question of which party will hold the White House have flipped from Democratic to Republican (Chart 2). Everyone now recognizes that Trump will not be removed from office through impeachment. Chart 1Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Chart 2Republicans Now Favored For White House Yet, anecdotally, investors may be becoming complacent about Trump’s chances. He is not a shoo-in. Subjectively we have argued that his odds of victory are 55%. Our quantitative election model shows that Wisconsin has shifted to the Republican camp since November, but it places the odds of winning that state (and Pennsylvania) at less than 52% (Chart 3). This gives Trump 289 electoral votes, only 19 more than necessary. If both of these states tipped in the opposite direction then investors would be facing a major policy reversal in the United States. Chart 3Our US 2020 Election Model Shows Trump Win With 289 Electoral College Votes Chart 4The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump Trump’s low approval rating remains a liability – and in this sense impeachment is still relevant, in that it can either help or hurt his approval, or prompt him to seek distractions abroad that could deliver negative surprises. Moreover the US manufacturing sector and labor market are not out of the woods yet (Chart 4). In short, the election is still ten months away and a lot can happen between now and then. We see Trump as only slightly favored. Moreover other hurdles are more immediate than the benefits of policy continuity upon a Trump win. 2. Risks to Biden's nomination: Throughout last year we maintained that former Vice President Joe Biden was the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, albeit with very low conviction. In particular, after Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s poor showing in the third debate and subsequent heart attack, we expected Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren to consolidate the progressive vote and trigger a policy-induced selloff in US equities. This never occurred because Biden held firm, Sanders recovered, and Warren fell. The risk to equities from a left-wing populist Democratic nominee is frontloaded in February and March. Now, however, the risk to equities is back. The Democratic Party faces a last-ditch effort from its left or “progressive” wing and anti-establishment voters to oppose Biden. With the primary election now upon us – the Iowa Caucus is February 3 – national opinion polls show that Sanders is pushing up against Biden (Chart 5). It is less clear if Sanders is breaking through in the primary polling state-by-state, where multiple candidates remain competitive (Chart 6). But online gamblers are reasserting Biden over Sanders at just the moment when progressives are set to launch their biggest push (Chart 7). Meanwhile New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg is finally gaining some traction – and he eats away at Biden’s support from centrist voters. Everything is in flux, which warrants caution. Chart 5Biden Is The Frontrunner, But Sanders Is Challenger Chart 6Biden Not A Shoo-In For Early Democratic Primary States Biden is still favored to win the nomination, but he has not clinched it. The market faces volatility during the period when Democrats get “cold feet” about nominating another establishment candidate. Moreover the fundamental knock against Sanders – that he is not as “electable” as Biden – is debatable, judging by head-to-head polls against Trump (Chart 8). This means that a shift in momentum – for instance, if Biden lurches from disappointments in early states to underperformance in his bulwark of South Carolina – would have legs. Ultimately a “contested convention” is not impossible. This would be a negative surprise to market participants currently assuming that the world faces the relatively benign choice of two known quantities: an establishment Democrat or a continuation of Trump policies. Chart 7Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Chart 8Electability Fears May Not Stop Sanders Rally Risks to the Republican Senate: Assuming Biden clinches the nomination, he has a 45% chance of winning the election – and in that case, his chance of bringing the Senate over to the Democrats is higher than investors realize. This is another risk that the market will awaken to later this year. Chart 9Democrats Underestimated In Senate The consensus holds that Republicans will hold the Senate, particularly with Republican senators in Maine and Iowa leading their Democratic challengers in polling. The problem is that for Democrats to unseat an incumbent president they will necessarily have generated strong turnout from key demographic groups: young people, suburbanites, women, and minorities. If that is the case, then the election will not be as tight as expected and Republicans will be less likely to hold the Senate. This would require rising unemployment or some other blow that fundamentally damages the Trump administration’s popular support in key swing states. At least until it becomes clear that the manufacturing sector is out of the woods, the Democrats should be seen as far more likely to take the Senate than the Republicans are to retake the House of Representatives – yet this goes against the consensus (Chart 9). Rising odds of a Senate victory would mean that even a “centrist” Democrat like Biden would have fewer political constraints in office – he would pose a greater threat of increasing taxes, minimum wages, and passing legislative regulation than the market currently expects. In short, Biden would be pulled to the left of the political spectrum by his party and expectations of an establishment Democrat posing a minimal threat to corporate profits would be greatly disappointed. Risks of Trump's second term: Finally, assuming the manufacturing sector rebounds and that Trump’s odds of re-election rise above 55%, market complacency becomes an even bigger concern for a long-term investor. For in his second term Trump would become virtually unshackled with regard to economic and financial constraints, since he cannot run for office again. He would still face the senate, the Supreme Court, and other constraints, but these would certainly not preclude a doubling down on trade war (or confrontations with nuclear-aspirants like Iran or North Korea). We have argued that Trump will not instigate a trade war with Europe, at least until the economy has clearly rebounded, and most likely not until his second term. But we fully expect chapter two of the trade war to begin in 2021 – and this could mean China, Europe, or even a two-front war. Re-election could go to Trump’s head and prompt him to overreach on the global stage. Hence we expect the relief rally on Trump’s re-election to be short-lived and would be looking to sell the news. But the S&P 500 faces more immediate hurdles anyway, and that is why we urge caution in the very near term. Iran is still a major geopolitical risk this year. Bottom Line: None of these hurdles are insurmountable, but the US election cycle is now an understated risk to the equity bull market. We agree with our Global Investment Strategy that it is prudent to shift to a neutral position tactically on US equities, especially for the February and March period when uncertainty rises over the Democratic Party primary. This does not change our view that the underlying global economy is improving, largely on China’s rebound, and that the cyclical outlook is positive. Don’t Bet On Regime Collapse In Iran (Yet) The January 8 Iranian attack on US bases in Iraq was intended to serve as a breather for Iranian leaders. It was meant to put on pause the rapid escalation in US-Iran tensions – allowing Iranian leaders to recover from the assassination of top military commander Qassem Suleimani – all the while appeasing the public through a public show of revenge. As fate would have it, however, the Iranian regime was granted no such respite. Days later, domestic unrest descended on the Islamic Republic as protesters returned to the streets across the country, criticizing the regime’s downing of a civilian airliner and re-stating their long-running complaints against the regime. Civil strife is not uncommon in Iran (Table 1). Economic inefficiencies, corruption, and discriminatory policies which serve to reward regime loyalists while suppressing the private sector are only some of the grievances faced by Iranians.1 Table 1Civil Strife Ongoing Problem In Iran Today’s strife is relevant, however, because it is fueled by US-imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions that have created an even bleaker economic reality. Iranian exports were down 37% in 2019 following an 18% decline the previous year. Oil exports fell to 129 thousand barrels per day in December 2019, down from an average 2.1 million barrels per day in 2017 (Chart 10). Households are facing the brunt, experiencing a 17% unemployment rate and a whopping 36% inflation rate (Chart 11). Chart 10US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports Chart 11Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock The 2020-21 budget, released in December and described as a weapon of “resistance against US sanctions,” intends to plug the deficit using state bonds and state property sales (Chart 12). However Iran’s fiscal condition is shaky. The International Monetary Fund estimates a fiscal breakeven oil price of $194.6 per barrel for Iran, more than 3 times higher than current oil prices. Chart 12Iran’s Fiscal Condition Is Shaky Chart 13Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Chart 14Iranians Also Blame Their Government For Malaise The solution of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the populist hawk who led the government during the US’s previous round of sanctions, was to devalue the official exchange rate. The weaker rial raised local currency revenues for each barrel of exported oil and encouraged import substitution in other industries. However devaluation came at a steep political cost and sparked riots and protests. So far President Hassan Rouhani has eschewed this strategy, instead maintaining a stable official exchange rate, used as the reference for subsidized basic goods and medicine (Chart 13). Nevertheless, the unofficial market rate has weakened 68% since the beginning of 2018. It is no surprise then that Iranians all over the country are taking to the streets. The latest bout of unrest is significant in size, geographic reach, and in that protesters are calling on Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to step down as supreme leader. Despite US sanctions, Iranian protesters are partially blaming Khamenei and the government for the country’s malaise (Chart 14). Even prior to the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), Iranians were angry about economic mismanagement. Nevertheless, according to our checklist for an Iranian revolution, the regime is not yet at risk of collapse (Table 2). Although the street movement is picking up pace, it is not organized or unified. There is no alternative being offered against the all-powerful supreme leader, and the political elite are mostly united in preserving the current system. Table 2Iran Regime Stability Checklist The regime has two main options going forward: seek immediate economic relief through negotiations with the United States, or hunker down and wait to see whether President Trump is reelected and able to sustain his campaign of maximum pressure, and go from there. We fully expect the latter. Domestic dissent can still be suppressed for the time being. The parliamentary – or Majlis – elections scheduled for February 21 could in theory offer Iranians an opportunity to voice their discontent through the ballot box. However this democratic exercise conceals the known political reality that the supreme leader holds supreme authority, even in the selection of parliament or the president (Diagram 1). Thus the election result will not drive major policy change. Diagram 1Supreme Leader Controls Iran A case in point was the regime’s 2016 strategy in the parliamentary election. At that time, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, responsible for screening potential candidates, rejected well-known reformist applicants (Chart 15). As a result, the reformists who were able to win seats were either lesser-known figures or unaligned with liberals in the reformist movement. Thus while the reformist presence in parliament nominally surged, these lawmakers were ineffective, reneging on campaign promises or collaborating with the conservative faction. The 2016 election serves as a blueprint for what to expect in the upcoming elections in February. The Guardian Council ruled that out of around 15,000 candidates, only 60 (relatively unknown) reformist candidates were qualified to run for the election.2 The elections will not change anything, but this means the grievances of the population will fester in the coming years, especially if the US does not change policies. This is where the medium-term risk to regime stability – namely through elite divisions – becomes apparent. The impending leadership succession is a major source of uncertainty. Supreme Leader Khamenei is the main barrier to political change. At 80 years old and reportedly suffering from poor health, a change in leadership is imminent. However, no one has been officially endorsed as his successor. This is an immense source of uncertainty in the coming years. There are several possibilities for the succession.3 A successor is appointed by the Assembly of Experts. Because we exclude Rouhani as a candidate for supreme leader, the potential candidates for Iran’s top position listed below ascribe to Khamanei’s hardline ideology: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahim Raisi, head of judiciary and of the Imam Reza shrine since March 2019. Raisi is reportedly Khamenei’s favorite for succession. He is a hardliner who lost the May 2017 presidential election to Rouhani.4 Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, the conservative former head of the judiciary and current chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is responsible for resolving disputes among government branches. Larijani is also a member of the Guardian Council.5 Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader and senior member of the Assembly of Experts. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a military force with immense influence in the regime – may choose to rule itself. We assign a low likelihood of this occurring. The IRGC is more likely to ensure that Khamenei’s successor is someone who supports its hardline ideology and vision for Iran. Some moderate clerics are advocating a change in structure, whereby the position of supreme leader is abolished. This school of thought argues that political leaders should be selected based on popular election rather than appointment.6 We do not assign high odds to this scenario. Until the Assembly of Experts selects the successor, a three-member council made up of the Iranian president, the head of judiciary, and a theologian of the Guardian Council, will assume the functions of supreme leader. Such a “triumvirate” could last longer than expected, or could even be formally decided as an alternative to a new supreme leader. In the context of such extreme uncertainty for the regime’s leadership in the coming decade, it is highly unlikely that the current political leaders will engage in negotiations with President Trump until they are sure of his staying power (Chart 16). First, the Iranians will continue to refuse talks prior to the US election. They will seek to undermine the Trump administration, yet without crossing red lines on the nuclear program (one year till nuclear breakout) or militant activities (killing American citizens). Chart 15Iran’s Guardians Vet Election Candidates Second, if Trump wins, then the shift to negotiations may or may not come, but the subsequent diplomatic process will be prolonged. Trump will have to gain the full cooperation of Europe, Russia, and China – and any new US-Iran deal is an open question and will involve tensions flaring up more than once. Chart 16Iranians Opposed To Talks With Trump Third, even if the Democrats win, the regime will play “hard to get” and will not immediately return to status quo ante Trump, although eventually there could be a restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or something like it. This process could also involve saber-rattling despite the Democrats’ more dovish disposition toward Iran. Bottom Line: The US maximum pressure campaign is not aimed at regime change in Iran, but if it brings any political change it will be a shift in a more hawkish direction as the regime faces immense internal and external pressures and an uncertain succession in the coming years. Iran’s leaders will continue to suppress unrest and can probably succeed in the near term. The confrontation with the US discredits any political actors who advocate negotiations. The path toward reform and improved relations with the West is closed until after the US election at minimum. Since Iran will seek to undermine both President Trump and the US presence in the Middle East in the meantime, US-Iran tensions remain a market-relevant source of risk in 2020. Iraq Still Poses An Oil Supply Risk Chart 17Iraqis Suffering From Poor Governance Iraq is ground zero for the US-Iran showdown, since the two powers have eschewed direct military confrontation. Iraqis have also been suffering the consequences of an ill-functioning political system (Chart 17). Corruption has prevented the trickle down of oil revenues, resulting in endemic poverty and inequality (Chart 18). Yet unlike its neighbor, Iraq is not ruled by a supreme leader who controls a powerful armed forces to which anger can be directed. Instead, protesters have been blaming the deep seated influence of the Iranian regime, which often results in what Iraqis’ argue to be a prioritization of foreign – i.e. Iranian – objectives over national ones. The demonstrations were successful in forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and the passing of a new electoral law. However Iraq remains in a state of chaos as Iraqis have vowed to remain on the street until all their conditions are met, including the appointment of an acceptable prime minister and early elections. Chart 18Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq This batch of reforms has been challenging for politicians to execute. For one, there is a lack of clarity as to which political group holds the majority of seats in Iraq’s Council of Representatives. Both the Iran-backed al-Binaa bloc as well as the al-Islah coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr claim this position (Chart 19). A list of candidates for the temporary position of prime minister until early elections are held, proposed by Binaa in December, was rejected by President Barham Salih on grounds that it did not include anyone who would possess the support of the demonstrators. Chart 19Iraqi Parliamentary Control Up For Grabs Iraqi protesters have consistently reiterated their desire for a sovereign state, free from both American and Iranian interference. However, this nationalistic call has been disrupted and overshadowed by the US-Iran conflict. Importantly, the protest movement has now lost its most influential backer within the Iraqi political system: Sadr of the Islah bloc. This year’s Iran tensions and the parliamentary resolution to eject US troops from Iraq have unified the warring Shia political blocs. Sadr has called on the Mahdi army – a notoriously anti-American force also known as the Peace Brigades – to re-assemble. On January 13, in what can only be interpreted as a rapprochement among the main Shia political factions, Sadr met with paramilitary leaders making up the Popular Mobilization Forces in the Iranian city of Qom. They discussed the creation of a “united resistance” and the need jointly to expel foreign troops. Sadr also called for a “million-man march” against US troops in Iraq.7 Sadr’s pivot to Iran has not gone down well in Iraq’s streets, where protesters are accusing him of putting aside national goals for his own personal aspirations. While the protest movement will keep going, it is now largely headless and competing with the unified priorities of the Shia parties. This state of affairs weakens the odds of a sovereign Iraq that curbs Iranian regional influence. The political class is more likely to turn a blind eye to the repression of protesters, which is likely to increase as the system notches up its crackdown on dissent. A return to the status quo ante in Iraq is also now more likely. A new government may be elected. It may include more technocratic politicians in a nod to the protestors, but the pro-Iranian faction has fortified its position as kingmaker. Meanwhile, Sadr has decided that reform should be postponed for a later day. Iraqis who have been camping out on the streets for nearly four months, risking their lives, are unlikely to be easily put down. Instead their frustrations will manifest in more aggressive forms, such as through violence and the sabotage of infrastructure. Saudi Arabia may or may not seek to interfere in Iraq to maintain the pressure on Iranian interests. If it does so, it risks escalating the situation and provoking retaliation from Iran. Iraqi efforts to force a US troop withdrawal will clash with US interests. President Trump wants to reduce commitments but does not want to risk anything remotely resembling a Saigon-style evacuation during an election year. As such, some form of sanctions against Iraq is possible. The US administration may pass up imposing sanctions on oil sales and instead target USD flows to Iraq’s central bank. Blocking or reducing access to Iraqi accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York – to which all revenues from Iraqi oil sales are directed – would debilitate the economy and amplify the risk to stability and hence oil flows. Washington’s decision whether to renew waivers allowing Iraq to import Iranian gas – set to expire mid-February – will signal whether the events earlier this year changed the US’s calculus. Iraq is extremely dependent on Iranian gas to generate power. A decision not to extend the waivers would cause greater friction between the Iraqi street and the ruling elite.8 Bottom Line: Baghdad is getting dragged deeper into chaos. Alignment with Iran, and delays in government formation and economic reform, will aggravate tensions between the street and the political class. Dissent may take on more violent forms going forward. Middle Eastern oil supply will remain vulnerable to instability and sabotage in Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf. Investment Conclusions In the very near term we expect US equities to encounter headwinds due to the over extension of the rally and immediate risks from the US election cycle. We also see global risk appetite suffering due to US uncertainty, as well as to fears about the new coronavirus. These may reach a crescendo in the wake of Chinese New Year travel season. However, China’s stimulative policy trajectory will ultimately be reinforced due to the economic threat from the outbreak. And China’s economy is showing signs of rebounding. This reinforces our constructive view on the global business cycle overall, on commodities, and on select emerging markets that produce oil or are undertaking structural reforms. The US-Iran conflict is ongoing and we expect it to continue injecting a risk premium into oil markets. The two sides are effectively playing Russian roulette.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The IRGC and bonyads – para-governmental organizations that provide funding for groups supporting the Islamic Republic – have access to subsidies, favorable contracts, and cheap loans. Together they run a considerable part of the economy. 2 Questions Loom In Iran As Reformist Factions Lose Hope In Elections," dated January 23, 2020, available at en.radiofarda.com. 3 In an interview with Fars news agency in June 2019, Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a prominent member of the Assembly of Experts, mentioned that a committee of three members from the Assembly of Experts were working on a list of prospective supreme leaders, which they will present to the full AE when necessary. Please see "Is Iran’s Next Supreme Leader Already Chosen?," dated June 18, 2019, available at en.radiofarda.com. 4 Please see "Ebrahim Raisi: The Cleric Who Could End Iranian Hopes For Change," dated January 5, 2019, available at aljazeera.com. 5 Please see “A Right-Wing Loyalist, Sadeq Larijani, Gains More Power in Iran,” dated January 8, 2019, available at atlanticcouncil.org. 6 Mohsen Kadivar, an unorthodox cleric who was forced to flee Iran due to his political views, and is now an instructor at Duke University is a critic of the system of Velayet-e Faqih, or clerical rule. He claims that since the death of Khomeini, a majority of Iran’s religious scholars hold a “secretive belief” that supreme clerical rule should be abolished as it only leads to despotism. 7 In response to Sadr’s call for a “million man march”, Ayatollah al-Sistani repeated his warning against “those who seek to exploit the protests that call for reforms to achieve certain goals that will hurt the primary interests of the Iraqi people and are not in line with their true values.” 8 The last time Iran reduced electricity exports to Iraq resulted in mass protests in Iraq in July 2018. Thus if the sanction waivers are not renewed the cutoff of gas risks a greater clash between the Iraqi street and government, especially during the hot summer months.
ハイライト 世界の成長は今年加速する態勢にあるが、コロナウイルスの感染拡大が短期的に支出を抑制する可能性がある。 歴史的に見て、失業率が非常に低い水準に低下したときに景気後退の確率が高まることが示唆されている。 この相関を説明するために3つの経路が提案されている:1) 失業率の低下により家計や企業が過度に拡張して経済が脆弱になること、2) 逼迫した労働市場に起因する賃金上昇が利益率を圧迫し、設備投資や採用を抑制すること、3) 潜在余力の縮小がインフレを促し中央銀行が利上げを迫られること。 第1の経路は、住宅バブルが形成され家計債務が非常に高水準に達している一部の小規模な先進国経済にとって非常に関連性が高い。しかし、米国、日本、およびユーロ圏の大半では差し迫った懸念ではない。 第2の経路の重要性は過小評価したい。というのも、賃金の加速は総需要を押し上げる可能性が高く、企業が省力化技術への設備投資を増やすインセンティブにもなるからである。 第3の経路が長期的には最大のリスクをもたらすが、今年の市場にとって直ちに重大となる可能性は低い。 投資家は今後12〜18か月間はグローバル株式に対して強気を維持すべきである。より慎重な姿勢は2021年後半から必要になるだろう。 グローバル株式:強気を維持 グローバル株式は8月の安値以降16%上昇しており、短期的な調整に脆弱である。しかし、年間を通じて世界の成長が勢いを増すと予想しているため、今後12か月の株式に対する見方は引き続きポジティブである。 最新の世界の製造業活動に関するデータは概ね当社の建設的な仮説を支持している。ニューヨーク連銀の製造業PMIは予想を上回り、フィラデルフィア連銀のPMIは約15ポイント跳ね上がり8か月ぶりの高水準となった。フィラデルフィア連銀指数の6か月先の企業見通し(ビジネスアウトルック)項目は2018年5月以来の好水準に上昇した。 欧州の製造業も今年改善するはずだ。ZEW指数のドイツ成長期待は1月に急騰し、2015年7月以来の高水準となった(チャート 1)。SentixやIFO指数も上昇している。励みになることに、ユーロ圏の自動車登録台数は12月に前年比22%増加した。 英国では、製造業者対象のCBI調査における企業信頼感が2019年Q3の-44からQ4で+23へと急上昇し、この調査の62年の歴史で最大の上昇幅となった。財政刺激策と混乱を伴うブレグジットのリスク低下も今年の成長を押し上げるだろう。 チャート 1 ユーロ圏に表れ始めた回復の兆し Some Green Shoots Emerging In The Euro Area Some Green Shoots Emerging In The Euro Area チャート 2 新興アジアは回復基調にある EM Asia Is Rebounding EM Asia Is Rebounding アジアの製造業および貿易データは改善している。先週の中国の貿易データ改善を受けて、韓国の輸出は変化率ベースで4か月連続の回復を示した。対中向けの日本の輸出は昨年2月以来初めて増加した。台湾では12月の鉱工業生産と輸出受注が予想を上回った。当社の新興アジア経済ディフュージョン指数は2018年10月以来の高水準に上昇している(チャート 2)。 コロナウイルス:侮れない存在か? コロナウイルスの感染拡大は、芽生えつつある世界経済の回復に対する短期的な脅威を表している。概念的には、流行は経済に2つの方法で影響を及ぼし得る。第一に、旅行、娯楽、レストラン、あるいは他者との近接を伴うあらゆる支出を抑制することで需要を減らす。第二に、人々が出勤を避けることで供給を減少させる。 実際には、第一の影響が通常第二を上回る。その結果、そのような流行はデフレ圧力をもたらす傾向がある。 ブルッキングス研究所は、2003年のSARS流行が中国の当該年の成長率を約1ポイント押し下げたと推定している。1 今回の流行が中国の旧正月期間中に発生しており、4億人を超える人々が移動する時期であることは、ウイルスの伝播を助長し、経済的被害を増幅させる可能性がある。 とはいえ、同じ動物由来ウイルスの一群に属するものの、初期の所見では今回の株はSARSほど致死的ではない可能性が示唆されている。加えて、中国当局はSARS流行時よりも速やかにリスク対応を行っている。感染源と見られる人口1100万人の武漢市を事実上隔離し、ウイルスの配列を解析して国際医療コミュニティと共有した。これにより米国疾病対策センター(CDC)はウイルス検査を開発でき、数週間以内に利用可能になる見込みである。 低失業率の負の側面 コロナウイルスの流行が封じ込められることを前提とすれば、より強い世界成長は残存する労働市場の余剰を吸収し続けるだろう。ここで問題になるのは、失業率が低下し続けると、ある時点でそれが逆効果になり得るかどうかである。 コロナウイルスの感染拡大は、芽生えつつある世界経済の回復に対する短期的な脅威を表している。 OECDの失業率は現在5.1%で、2007年の最安値5.5%を下回っている(チャート 3)。米国では失業率は50年ぶりの低水準に低下している。 チャート 3 ほとんどの経済で失業率は危機前の最安値を下回っている Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? 金融危機以降の失業率の低下は歓迎すべき動きであることは誰も否定しない。しかし、それには1つの主要なリスクが伴う。歴史的に、失業率が非常に低い水準に低下すると景気後退の可能性が高まることが示されている(チャート 4)。 チャート 4 労働市場が過熱し始めると景気後退の可能性が高まる Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? この正の相関を説明するために3つの経路が提案されている:1) 失業率の低下により家計や企業が過度に拡張して経済が脆弱になること、2) 逼迫した労働市場に起因する賃金上昇が利益率を圧迫し、設備投資や採用を抑制すること、3) 潜在余力の縮小がインフレを促し、これが中央銀行に利上げを強いることで成長を抑制すること。 それぞれを順に検討しよう。 失業率と非合理的な熱狂 チャート 5 一部の経済で拡大する住宅の不均衡 Growing Housing Imbalances In Some Economies Growing Housing Imbalances In Some Economies 強い経済はリスクテイクを促進する。ある程度のリスクテイクは資本主義にとって不可欠だが、過度のリスクテイクは不均衡の蓄積を招き、最終的な下振れの舞台を整える可能性がある。 オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、カナダ、北欧諸国では、低金利と強い経済成長の組み合わせが家計債務を伴う住宅バブルを煽っている(チャート 5、パネル3)。先週議論したとおり、それらの経済で金利が上昇すれば経済的な困窮の芽を生む可能性がある。2 その他ほとんどの国では、金融の不均衡は景気後退を引き起こすほど深刻ではない。チャート 6は、民間部門の金融バランス(民間部門の収入と支出の差)が先進国では依然としてGDPの3.4%の健全な黒字を保っていることを示している。2007年には先進国の民間部門金融バランスは0.4%に低下し、米国では2%の赤字に達していた。民間部門のバランスは2001年の景気後退前にも急速に悪化していた(チャート 7)。 チャート 6 ほとんどの経済で民間部門の支出は所得を下回っている Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? チャート 7 民間部門の黒字は前回の景気拡大終了前よりも大きい The Private-Sector Surplus Is Larger Than It Was Before The End Of Previous Expansions The Private-Sector Surplus Is Larger Than It Was Before The End Of Previous Expansions   米国では個人貯蓄率が約8%まで上昇しており、家計の純資産水準から予想される水準よりもはるかに高い(チャート 8)。2018/19年に実質個人消費は約2.5%で成長したが、消費者信頼感の水準から予想されるペースよりも遅かった。これは家計が比較的慎重な態度を維持していることを示唆している。これと整合的に、家計の負債対可処分所得比は2008年以降で32ポイント低下している。 チャート 8 家計は予想以上に貯蓄している Households Are Saving More Than One Would Expect Households Are Saving More Than One Would Expect 確かに、いくつかのクレジットカテゴリは大きく増加している(チャート 9)。学生ローンは可処分所得の9%に達している。自動車ローンはリセッション前の高水準に戻っている。 前者については大半の学生ローンが政府によって保証されているため、それほど心配していない。自動車ローンの方が懸念材料ではある。しかし、自動車ローン市場は住宅ローン市場の6分の1未満の規模であることを留意しておくべきだ。 さらに、2011年から2016年にかけて自動車ローンの与信基準を緩めた後、銀行はその基準を引き締めてきた。この調整はほぼ完了しているように見える。最新のシニアローン担当者調査では与信基準はこれ以上引き締まらず、自動車ローン需要は2年ぶりの速さで増加した。自動車ローンの延滞に陥る割合は低下傾向にあり、延滞率はピークに達していることを示唆している(チャート 10)。 チャート 9 学生ローンと自動車ローンの増加にもかかわらず米国の家計債務は低下している US Household Debt Levels Have Fallen, Despite Increases in Student And Auto Loans US Household Debt Levels Have Fallen, Despite Increases in Student And Auto Loans チャート 10 自動車ローン:与信基準と延滞率の動向をモニタリング Auto Loans: Monitoring Trends In Credit Standards And Delinquency Rates Auto Loans: Monitoring Trends In Credit Standards And Delinquency Rates 最後に、自動車市場の騒ぎにもかかわらず、自動車ローン担保証券は良好なパフォーマンスを示していることを指摘しておきたい(チャート 11)。デフォルト率は上昇しているが、貸し手は通常、発生する損失を吸収できるだけの利率を設定している。 チャート 11 証券化された自動車ローンは良好な実績を示している Securitized Auto Loans Have Performed Well Securitized Auto Loans Have Performed Well 利益率の低下は景気拡大を狂わせるか? 利益率は通常、景気後退の発生の数年前にピークに達することが多い(チャート 12、上段)。このため、利益率の低下が企業の採用意欲や新たな生産能力への投資意欲を削ぎ、景気後退をもたらすのではないかと推測する者もいる。 チャート 12 利益率のピーク:不吉な兆候か? A Peak In Profit Margins: An Ominous Sign? A Peak In Profit Margins: An Ominous Sign? 興味深い理論ではあるが、精査すると支持されにくい。企業景況感調査は明確に、設備投資の意図は賃上げ計画と正の相関があることを示している(チャート 13、左パネル)。賃金の上昇に応じて設備投資を削減するどころか、賃上げを計画している企業の方がむしろ設備投資を増やす傾向がある。 チャート 13A 賃金上昇、採用増、設備投資の増加は同時に進む(I) Faster Wage Growth, Increased Hiring, And More Capex Go Hand In Hand (I) Faster Wage Growth, Increased Hiring, And More Capex Go Hand In Hand (I) チャート 13B 賃金上昇、採用増、設備投資の増加は同時に進む(II) Faster Wage Growth, Increased Hiring, And More Capex Go Hand In Hand (II) Faster Wage Growth, Increased Hiring, And More Capex Go Hand In Hand (II) その一因は、賃金上昇が自動化をより魅力的にすることである。自動化は定義上、より多くの設備投資を必要とする。しかし、それだけが理由ではなく、賃金成長が高まっている期間には企業は同時により多くの労働者を雇用する傾向がある(チャート 13、右パネル)。 これは第三の要因―強い経済成長―が賃金と採用意図の両方を加速させていることを示唆している。実際、実質の企業売上は雇用成長と非住宅投資の双方と強く相関していることがこの主張の証拠である(チャート 12、下段)。 利益率低下:問題の症状に過ぎない 上記の議論は、賃金の加速が企業を採用や設備投資から思いとどまらせる可能性は低いことを示唆している。むしろその逆であろう。一般に、労働者は企業よりも所得の1ドル当たり多くを消費するため、国民所得に占める労働者の取り分が増えれば総需要は上向く。 では、なぜ利益率は通常景気後退前にピークを迎えるのか。その答えは、労働市場の余剰が縮小すると単位労働コストが上昇し、中央銀行が高まるインフレを抑えるために利上げを余儀なくされる傾向があることだ。したがって、利益率の低下は根本問題である経済の過熱の単なる症状にすぎない。景気後退の原因を利益率の低下に帰するべきではない。中央銀行を批判すべきなのである。 インフレはまだ脅威ではない 現時点では、主要経済の単位労働コストのインフレは比較的抑制されている(チャート 14)。しかし、労働市場の余剰と賃金上昇の歴史的関係が崩れたという証拠はほとんどない(チャート 15)。生産性の大幅な上振れがない限り、企業が上昇した労働コストを顧客に転嫁しようとするため、インフレは最終的に加速する可能性が高い。 チャート 14A 当面、単位労働コストは安定している(I) Unit Labor Costs Are Well Behaved For Now (I) Unit Labor Costs Are Well Behaved For Now (I) チャート 14B 当面、単位労働コストは安定している(II) Unit Labor Costs Are Well Behaved For Now (II) Unit Labor Costs Are Well Behaved For Now (II)       チャート 15 労働市場の余剰と賃金上昇の相関は維持されている Correlation Between Labor Market Slack And Wage Growth Remains Intact Correlation Between Labor Market Slack And Wage Growth Remains Intact いつそのような物価・賃金のらせんが出現するかを正確に知ることはできない。インフレは著しく遅行する指標である(チャート 16)。当社の最良の見立てでは、インフレは2021年末から2022年にかけて投資家にとって深刻なリスクになり得る。したがって、投資家は今後12〜18か月はグローバル株式の比重を高める(オーバーウェイト)べきだが、2021年後半にはより慎重になる準備をしておくべきである。 チャート 16 インフレは遅行指標である Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment?   Peter Berezin チーフ・グローバル・ストラテジスト peterb@bcaresearch.com   脚注 1   Jong-Wha Lee and Warwick J. McKibbin, “Globalization and Disease: The Case of SARS,” Brookings Institution, 2004年2月付。 2  詳細はグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー週次レポート、「Bond Yields: How High Is Too High?」2020年1月17日付を参照のこと。   グローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー ビュー・マトリクス Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? マクロクォント・モデルと現在の主観的スコア Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? Who’s Afraid Of Low Unemployment? 戦略的推奨 決済済み取引
ハイライト ほとんどの中央銀行は依然として経済リスクを下方リスクに偏ったものと見なしている。 これは、世界的な成長が本格的に回復したとしても、今後3〜6か月は政策が据え置かれる可能性が高いことを意味する。 結論としては、今後数か月の為替の値動きは中央銀行の政策というよりも相対的な成長ファンダメンタルズが主導する可能性が高い。 我々のバイアスは、今年前半は米国以外で成長の勢いが最も強くなるというものだ。DXY指数はショートで構える。 今週の日銀の不作為は、為替ボラティリティの上昇に対する円ロングを安価な保険にしている。USD/JPYはショートを維持し、CHF/JPYはショートを取る。 ポンドは押し目買いだが、今後数か月はユーロに対してやや劣後する公算が大きい。EUR/GBPは0.88に達するはずだ。 カナダ銀行は利率を据え置いたが、我々の期待通りタカ派寄りではなくハト派寄りの判断を示した。CAD/NOKはショート、AUD/CADはロングを維持する。 我々のロングNOK/SEKポジションは1.8%の利益でストップにかかって決済された。より低い水準でこのクロスを買い戻すことを検討する。 特集 チャート I-1 為替市場は穏やかな回復を織り込んでいる 為替市場は穏やかな回復を織り込んでいる 為替市場は穏やかな回復を織り込んでいる 8月の安値以降の世界株式市場の強い反発は、多くの株価指数を買われ過ぎ領域に押し上げた。チャート I-1 は、世界株の上昇が既にグローバル製造業の改善を2012年や2016年の局面と同程度の規模で織り込んでいることを示している。一方で為替市場ははるかに穏やかな結果を織り込んでいる(下段)。 為替と株式のパフォーマンスの乖離は、過去のサイクルで見られたものとは大きく異なる。例えば、ボトムからピークにかけて、為替市場における強欲と恐怖の重要なバロメーターであるAUD/JPYは2012年の局面で40%、2016〜2017年で25%上昇し、株価も上昇した。RUB/JPY、ZAR/JPY、BRL/JPYのようなよりハイオクタンな通貨ペアのパフォーマンスは爆発的だった。今回のように通貨の動きが抑制されていることは、この回復の持続性に疑問符を付ける。 株式は長期資産であるため、2019年の金利低下が相対的な魅力を高め名目価値を押し上げたというのはもっともらしい説明だ。しかし、多くの債券市場でもここ数か月で利回りが上昇しており、この説明だけでは不十分とも言える。別の可能性としては、貿易緊張の緩和やFRBの流動性注入が国内投資家の動物的精神を呼び起こしたのかもしれない。あるいは、世界的な同期化した回復がG10の成長差を縮め、通貨の動きを抑えつつ株価を押し上げたのかもしれない。 世界株の上昇は既にグローバル製造業の改善を織り込んでいる。しかし、為替市場ははるかに穏やかな結末を織り込んでいる。 いずれにせよ、この不協和音の解決は、今後数か月で世界の経済データが著しく改善してプロシクリカル通貨を支持するか、株式市場の消化不良期(ボラティリティ上昇)を迎えるか、あるいはその両方の組み合わせによってもたらされるだろう。少なくとも、これらのダイナミクスを見越して通貨ポートフォリオを調整することを示唆している。 ボラティリティとドルについて 為替市場は相対的なトレンドに関するものだということは誰もが理解している。したがって、世界成長が加速すればドルが弱くなるという暗黙の前提は、この回復の震源地が米国外にあるということを意味する。チャート I-2 は、米国外で経済指標がまだ上振れを示しているわけではないことを示しているが、変化率ベースでは著しい改善が見られる。表面下では、最も強いデータサプライズはユーロ圏、スイス、ニュージーランド、オーストラリアで見られ、カナダと英国は予想外の失望があった。振り返れば、このチャートはカナダドルが2019年にG10で最も好調だった理由、スウェーデンクローナが最も弱かった理由も浮き彫りにしている。 チャート I-2 成長のばらつきは縮小した グロースの分散が減少した グロースの分散が減少した 経済の分散の低下は通貨ボラティリティをほぼ史上最低水準に押し下げている(チャート I-3)。経験豊富な投資家は低ボラティリティに注目し、注目すべきだ。なぜなら、ポートフォリオを破壊するのは熱狂ではなく慢心だからである。これは自明の理に聞こえるかもしれないが、過去3回ボラティリティがこれほど低下した局面ではドルは急騰し、プロシクリカル通貨は大きな損失を被った。誰もが1997〜1998年、2007〜2008年、2014〜2015年を覚えている。今回は同じだろうか? 通常、ボラティリティの上昇はドル高と結びつくが、今回は3つの重要な相違点がある。 第一に、実質金利は2014年に米国がG10の同業国に対してプラスに転じた(チャート I-4)。これは、通常は資金調達通貨であった米ドル(準備通貨でもある)がキャリートレードの対象になったことを意味する。米国債に資金を振り向けたい資本は5年以上にわたり正の実質キャリーを享受してきたと言ってよい。現在米国の実質相対利回りが頭打ちになっている中で、資本はどちらに向かうだろうか? チャート I-3 ボラティリティは史上最低水準付近 ボラティリティが記録的低水準に近い ボラティリティが記録的低水準に近い チャート I-4 米国の実質金利は低下 米国で実質金利が低下 米国で実質金利が低下 ドルは2011年以降ブル相場にあり、評価は高い四分位にシフトしている。これは、ドルが前の低ボラティリティ局面でより早い段階でブル相場にあった時とは大きく異なる(チャート I-5)。ドルは長いサイクルで動く傾向があり、ボラティリティの急騰はサイクルの始まりか終わりのいずれかを示すことがある。 以前のレポートで繰り返し強調してきたように、米ドルロングはコンセンサストレードである。我々の主な根拠はCFTCのポジショニングデータだ。しかし、よりタイムリーな先行指標として注視すべきは金と債券の比率だ。通貨は信認に関するものであり、米ドルへの信認の重要な尺度は米10年国債の総リターンと金地金の比率であり、これは崩れている(チャート I-6)。米国の財政赤字はこれから急拡大する見込みであり、過去のドル高の局面では赤字は低く減少傾向にあった。 チャート I-5 ドルは割高である ドルは高い ドルは高い チャート I-6 米国債と金の綱引き 米国債と金の綱引き 米国債と金の綱引き より重要なのは、通貨市場は相対的なファンダメンタルズに合わせて変動する可能性が高いということだ。世界経済の減速は製造業が主因であったため、平均回帰が期待できるのはこの分野だと考えるのが妥当だ。歴史的に見て、多くの経済における景気循環の振幅はサービス(消費)よりも製造業や輸出に牽引される傾向がある。 より具体的には、製造業の減速で最も痛手を被った通貨が最も早いリバーサルを経験する論理的な候補となる。これは既に、対米国での債券利回りの急上昇として現れているvis-à-vis 米国の利回りに対してである。例えば、ノルウェー、スウェーデン、スイス、日本の利回りはボトム以降、対米で大幅に上昇している。世界的な成長の同期回復は米国の利回り優位をさらに削ぐだろう。 通貨は信認に関するものであり、米ドルへの信認の重要な尺度は米10年国債の総リターンと金地金の比較である。 結論: DXY指数はショートを維持、当面のターゲットを90、ストップロスを100に設定する。 ポートフォリオ保険としての円 もし我々の2020年のドルに対する下落トレンドという仮説が正しければ、それは一直線には進まないだろう。したがって、ポートフォリオ保険を持つことが理にかなっている。 今週の日銀の不作為は気を逸らすためのものだった可能性がある。なぜなら近月の資産市場で最も強力な動きの一つは日本の利回りに有利な+130ベーシスポイントの動きだったからだ(チャート I-7)。USD/JPYと実質金利のギャップは希少な裁定機会を生んでいる。世界的なリスク資産の売りが顕在化すれば円は強くなるだろう。一方で、世界成長が最終的に加速すれば円は通貨クロスで弱含む可能性があるが、対ドルでは強まる可能性がある。これによりUSD/JPYのショートは「勝てば大きく勝つ、負けてもそれほど失わない」という好ましい構図になる。 日本の利回り上昇は、次の3つの重要な転換点で駆動されている: 過去5年間の大半で、日銀は資産買入れの点で最も積極的な中央銀行の一つだった。これは貿易加重の円安の大きな要因だった(チャート I-8)。FRBのバランスシートの再拡大により、日本との相対的な金融政策は引き締まりつつある。日銀の年間総資産買入れは現在約20兆円、JGB買入れは約15兆円の水準で推移している。これは目標の80兆円という緩やかな目標からはほど遠く、当面変わる見込みはない。 チャート I-7 日本の国債利回りは急騰した 日本の債券利回りが急騰している 日本の債券利回りが急騰している チャート I-8 円と量的緩和(QE) 円と量的緩和 円と量的緩和 円の動きは日本の巨大小売輸出セクターを考慮すると、国内要因と同様に外部環境の影響も大きい。景気循環的なセクターのクレジット・デフォルト・スワップスプレッドは新たな安値へと収縮しており、収益見通しの改善を示唆している(チャート I-9)。これは成長要因が日本の利回りを押し上げていることを示唆する(日本のCPIスワップは実際には横ばい)。これはアジアの景気循環セクターが防御的セクターに対して最近アウトパフォームしている動きとも一致する。 安倍政権は昨年、大規模な財政パッケージを発表した。これは壊滅的だった台風被害と来たる五輪に部分的に起因する。これにより日銀は最新の政策分科会で成長見通しを上方修正した。建設・エンジニアリング株の相対パフォーマンスは、資金が経済に流入しているかどうかの重要なバロメーターである(チャート I-10)。 チャート I-9 日本のデフォルトリスク緩和 日本でデフォルト・リスクが緩和 日本でデフォルト・リスクが緩和 チャート I-10 財政刺激と建設株 財政刺激策と建設株 財政刺激策と建設株 防御通貨としての円は、グローバル成長が改善すると資金調達通貨として使われるため通常は弱含む傾向がある。とはいえ我々の主張は、円はクロスでは確かに弱まるだろうが、対ドルではなお強くなり得るということだ。前述したように、その触媒の一つは実質金利との従来の関係からの乖離である。 より重要なのは、USD/JPYとDXYは正の相関を持つ傾向があることで、なぜならドルが多くの場合円を動かすからだ。一方で、円に対するネットショートポジションは逆張りの観点から魅力的に見える(チャート I-11)。極めて低いボラティリティを考えると、USD/JPYのショートはボラティリティ上昇をプレイする魅力的な手段となる。 チャート I-11 投資家は円をショートしている 投資家は円をショートしている 投資家は円をショートしている より保守的な投資家はCHF/JPYをショートすることもできる。最近のスイスフラン高はインフレ回復の芽を脅かしており(チャート I-12)、一方で円安は国内でのトレード可能財の価格を押し上げるだろう。これにより日銀よりもスイス国立銀行に対するプレッシャーが強まる。また、セーフヘイブンとして円はフランよりも割安である。これは当社の多数の社内モデルでも確認されている。 簡単に言えば、過去数十年で米国に対する相対的インフレは日本の方が低かったが、フランの方が強かった。 簡単に言えば、過去数十年で米国に対する相対的インフレは日本の方が低かったが、フランの方が強かった(チャート I-13)。一方で、過去2年間ではボラティリティ上昇はフランよりも円に有利に働いている。 チャート I-12 強いフランはスイスのインフレにとって逆風である 強いスイスフランはスイスのインフレにとって逆風だ 強いスイスフランはスイスのインフレにとって逆風だ チャート I-13 円はより割安 ##br##保険 円はより安い保険 円はより安い保険 結論: 現時点では円が最も魅力的なセーフヘイブン通貨である。USD/JPYはショートを維持し、CHF/JPYを売る。 ハウスキーピング 我々のロングNOK/SEKポジションは1.8%の利益でストップにかかって決済された。より低い水準でこのクロスを買い戻すつもりだ。このトレードは主にキャリーに関するものであり、我々はNOKとSEKの両方に対してポジティブである。したがってマーケットタイミングが重要になる。NOK/SEKが1.04なら魅力的だ。今週の各中央銀行会合の文脈ではノルゲス銀行からの新たな示唆はなかった。 我々はポンドを押し目買いで仕込む機会も探るが、EURまたはGBPのボラティリティを買う方が良い賭けかもしれない。今のところ、堅調な雇用報告にもかかわらず英国の経済サプライズは依然としてマイナスである(チャート I-14)。続報を注目してほしい。 チャート I-14 GBPは脆弱である 英ポンドは弱含み 英ポンドは弱含み Chester Ntonifor 外国為替ストラテジスト chestern@bcaresearch.com 通貨 米ドル チャート II-1 USD テクニカル 1 米ドルのテクニカル(1) 米ドルのテクニカル(1) チャート II-2 USD テクニカル 2 米ドルのテクニカル分析 2 米ドルのテクニカル分析 2 最近の米国のデータは混在している: 鉱工業生産は12月に前年同月比で1%減少した。 ミシガン大学消費者信頼感の速報値は1月に99.1へやや低下した。 MBA住宅ローン申請件数は1月17日までの週で1.2%減少した。しかし既存住宅販売は12月に月次で3.6%増加し予想を上回った。 シカゴ地区連銀の全国活動指数は12月に0.41から-0.35へ低下した。 新規失業保険申請件数は1月17日までの週で211Kに増加し、予想より良かった。 DXY指数は今週0.4%上昇した。中国のコロナウイルスが世界成長を大幅に押し下げるのではないかという懸念が高まっている。これは短期的にはつまずきに過ぎないが、我々は依然としてポジティブで、金融条件の緩和と貿易戦争リスクの後退により今年は世界成長が加速すると考えている。 レポートリンク: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 ユーロ チャート II-3 EUR テクニカル 1 EURのテクニカル指標 1 EURのテクニカル指標 1 チャート II-4 EUR テクニカル 2 EURのテクニカル分析 2 EURのテクニカル分析 2 ユーロ圏の最近のデータは概ねポジティブである: 経常収支は11月に339億ユーロとなった。 ヘッドラインとコアのインフレ率はともに12月に前年比1.3%で横ばいだった。 ZEW景況感調査は1月に11.2から25.6へ急上昇した。 ユーロは今週対米ドルで0.8%下落した。木曜日にECBは政策金利を-0.5%で据え置いた。ECBの最大の示唆は、彼らが金融政策目標の見直しに取り組んでおり、それがより緩和的な姿勢の増加につながる可能性があるという点だ。明示的な2%インフレ目標への切り替えや量的緩和の判断に気候変動目標を組み入れることは、はるかにハト派的なECBの到来を告げる。長期のEUR/CADのストップを1.42へ引き締めている。 レポートリンク: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 日本円 チャート II-5 JPY テクニカル 1 JPYのテクニカル1 JPYのテクニカル1 チャート II-6 JPY テクニカル 2 JPY テクニカル分析 2 JPY テクニカル分析 2 日本の最近のデータは軟調である: 鉱工業生産は11月に前年同月比で8.2%減少した。 貿易収支は12月に1525億円の赤字に拡大した。輸出入はそれぞれ前年同月比で4.9%および6.3%減少した。 全産業活動指数は11月に前月比0.9%上昇した。 一致指数と先行指数は11月にそれぞれ94.7と90.8に低下した。 日本円は今週対米ドルで0.3%上昇した。日銀は予想通り政策金利を据え置いた。より重要なのは、見通し報告が2020会計年度の成長見通しを0.7%から0.9%に上方修正したことだ。さらに日銀は原油安を受けてインフレ見通しを10ベーシスポイント下方修正した。日本円に関する詳しい分析は本号の前半を参照されたい。 レポートリンク: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 英ポンド チャート II-7 GBP テクニカル 1 GBP テクニカル 1 GBP テクニカル 1 チャート II-8 GBP テクニカル 2 GBP テクニカル分析 2 GBP テクニカル分析 2 英国の最近のデータはポジティブである: 小売売上高は12月に前年同月比で0.9%増加した。 Rightmoveの住宅価格指数は1月に前年同月比で2.7%上昇した。 ILO方式の失業率は11月に3.8%で横ばいだった。 平均賃金は11月に前年同月比で3.2%増加した。これは2019年の大半で低迷していた雇用報告の後、3か月で就業者が20.8万人改善したことに続く。 英ポンドは今週対米ドルで0.7%上昇した。今後数週間で欧州通貨の最大のボラティリティはEUR/GBPクロスで生じる可能性が高い。欧州の経済データはベース効果もあってここ数週間で最も良いポジティブサプライズを示している。しかし今週のECB議事録は通貨の強さに対して牽制する姿勢を示唆している。英国では当面ポンドは政治の影響を部分的に受けるだろう。GBPおよびEURのボラティリティを買うのは良い賭けに見える。 レポートリンク: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 オーストラリアドル チャート II-9 AUD テクニカル 1 AUD テクニカル分析 1 AUD テクニカル分析 1 チャート II-10 AUD テクニカル 2 AUDのテクニカル分析 2 AUDのテクニカル分析 2 オーストラリアの最近のデータはポジティブである: Westpac消費者信頼感指数は1月に1.8%低下した。 消費者のインフレ期待は1月に4%から4.7%へ上昇した。 12月には28.9Kの雇用が創出され、コンセンサスを上回った。これは29.2Kのパートタイム雇用増だがフルタイムは0.3K減少した。 参加率は12月に66%で横ばい、失業率はさらに低下して5.1%となった。 オーストラリアドルは今週対米ドルで0.6%下落した。ポジティブな雇用報告はAUDを支えたが、コロナウイルスの懸念がヘッドラインを支配し始めるとすぐに薄れた。我々は先週AUDを詳述し、68セントで買い手だ。主な根拠は強力な逆張りの賭けであるためだ。 レポートリンク: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 ニュージーランドドル チャート II-11 NZD テクニカル 1 NZDテクニカル 1 NZDテクニカル 1 チャート II-12 NZD テクニカル 2 NZDテクニカル分析 2 NZDテクニカル分析 2 ニュージーランドの最近のデータは弱含みである: 訪問者数は11月に前年同月比で3.5%減少した。 純移民は11月に3400から2610へ減少した。 パフォーマンスサービス指数は12月に52.9から51.9へ低下した。 ニュージーランドドルは今週対米ドルで0.5%下落した。我々はキウイが世界成長の改善の中で今年は米ドルをアウトパフォームすると考えているが、純移民の減少など国内制約が上昇余地を制限する可能性がある。AUD/NZDとSEK/NZDはロングを維持する。 レポートリンク: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 カナダドル チャート II-13 CAD テクニカル 1 CADのテクニカル分析 1 CADのテクニカル分析 1 チャート II-14 CAD テクニカル 2 CADのテクニカル指標 2 CADのテクニカル指標 2 カナダの最近のデータは軟調である: 製造業売上高は11月に前月比で0.6%減少した。 ヘッドラインのインフレ率は12月に前年比2.2%で横ばいだった。コアインフレは12月に1.9%から1.7%へ低下した。 新築住宅価格は12月に前年同月比で0.1%上昇した。 カナダドルは今週対米ドルで0.8%下落した。水曜日にカナダ銀行は利率を据え置くことを決めたが、カナダのデータが失望すれば今年後半に利下げの可能性を開く余地を残した。要するに他の多くの中央銀行と同様に、カナダ銀行もデータ依存だ。我々のCADに関するストーリーは単純で、成長リバウンドの震源地が米国外にあるならCADは対極の通貨に対して下振れするということだ。AUD/CADはロングを維持する。 レポートリンク: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 スイスフラン チャート II-15 CHF テクニカル 1 CHF テクニカル 1 CHF テクニカル 1 チャート II-16 CHF テクニカル 2 CHF テクニカルズ 2 CHF テクニカルズ 2 今週スイスからのデータは乏しかった: 生産者物価は12月に前年同月比で1.7%下落し、前月の2.5%減から改善した。 マネーサプライ(M3)は12月に前年同月比で0.7%増加した。 スイスフランは今週対米ドルでほぼ横ばいだった。我々は世界的リスクが持続する限りスイスフランを支持し続ける、コロナウイルスへの懸念を含めて。しかし、本レポート前半で議論したように、現時点では円の方がフランよりも優れたヘッジである。 レポートリンク: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 ノルウェークローネ チャート II-17 NOK テクニカル 1 NOK テクニカル指標 1 NOK テクニカル指標 1 チャート II-18 NOK テクニカル 2 NOK テクニカルズ 2 NOK テクニカルズ 2 今週ノルウェーからのデータは乏しかった: 労働力調査は11月に失業率が4%に上昇したと記録した。 ノルウェークローネは今週エネルギー価格の下落を受けて対米ドルで1.3%下落した。木曜日にノルゲス銀行は政策金利を1.5%で据え置き、広く予想されていたとおりだった。さらにオイステイン・オルセン総裁は「委員会の現在の見通しとリスクのバランス評価は、政策金利が当面現在の水準のままである可能性が高いことを示している」と述べ、短期的な政策変更の可能性を示唆しなかった。これは今後は政策決定よりも相対的なファンダメンタルズがNOKの進路を決めることを示唆している。我々のバイアスはバリュエーションのクッションがロングNOKの安全マージンを提供しているというものだ。USD/NOKとCAD/NOKはショートを維持する。 レポートリンク: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 スウェーデンクローナ チャート II-19 SEK テクニカル 1 SEKのテクニカル1 SEKのテクニカル1 チャート II-20 SEK テクニカル 2 SEK テクニカル指標 2 SEK テクニカル指標 2 今週スウェーデンからのデータは乏しかった: 11月に6%から6.8%へ上昇した後、失業率は12月に6%へ戻った。 スウェーデンクローナは今週対米ドルで0.2%下落した。今後は世界成長の改善、貿易緊張の緩和、短期的な景気後退懸念の後退がスウェーデン経済とクローナを下支えする。SEKは世界的な製造業のリバウンドをプレイするための最も有力なG10クロスである。 レポートリンク: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 トレードと予想 予想サマリー コアポートフォリオ タクティカルトレード 指値注文 決済済みトレード
In recent decades, economic concentration and the regulatory environment have given capital owners the upper hand in labor relations. However, the immediate future seems poised to favor labor, as the legal and regulatory climate cannot get materially better…
Highlights The Wuhan coronavirus outbreak in China is now being priced into commodity markets, with comparisons to the 2003 SARS outbreak serving as an early benchmark.1 If it follows the SARS trajectory its impact likely will be limited, although oil demand could fall at the margin as global travel falls. The IMF expects growth in EM economies, the engine for commodity demand, to come in at 4.4% and 4.6% this year and next, respectively, down two-tenths of a percent from its previous forecast, but still up from 2019’s 3.7% rate. The Fund’s risk assessment tilts slightly to the upside, nonetheless, in the wake of global monetary and fiscal stimulus. We introduce our 2021 oil balances and price forecasts this week. We expect Brent crude oil to average $70/bbl next year, and for WTI to average $4/bbl below that. We are maintaining our $67/bbl Brent and $63/bbl WTI 2020 forecasts (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekCrude Oil Price Forecasts For 2020, 2021 Feature In its latest World Economic Outlook – Tentative Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery? – the IMF flags key risks to EM growth, which will continue to feed the economic policy uncertainty that dogs commodity demand.2 The Fund’s “downward revision primarily reflects negative surprises to economic activity in a few emerging market economies, notably India, which led to a reassessment of growth prospects over the next two years. In a few cases, this reassessment also reflects the impact of increased social unrest.” That said, the Fund sees the balance of risk slightly tilted to the upside versus its earlier assessment in October, in the wake of global monetary and fiscal stimulus. This is in line with our view that the effects of monetary stimulus – deployed over the better part of last year and still expected to remain accommodative this year – will boost growth this year. Our view remains tempered by risks we’ve been highlighting that keep political and economic policy uncertainty elevated – e.g., trade tensions, civil unrest, and the still-underappreciated risks to oil markets arising from US-Iran tensions and social unrest in Iraq, which remains high (Chart 2). The loss of 800k b/d from Libya is significant, but the world does not lack spare light-sweet crude oil production capacity – the US shales, in particular, abound in this type of crude oil. Chart 2Policy Uncertainty Will Trend Lower, But Continues To Dog Commodities Oil Fundamentals Improving As is typically the case, we expect global oil-demand growth this year will be led by EM economies. Crude oil fundamentals continue to favor higher prices: Production management and capital discipline will constrain the rate of growth of oil supplies, and, as discussed above, demand will benefit from policy stimulus globally (Chart 3). Oil demand growth will recover this year, following a lower-than-normal rate of just 830k b/d last year, based on the US EIA’s most recent estimates of historical consumption. We continue to expect demand to grow 1.4mm b/d this year.  For 2021, we expect growth of just under 1.5mm b/d, reaching 103.65mm b/d globally. For its part, the EIA’s estimating growth of 1.34mm and 1.37mm b/d for 2020 and 2021, respectively. As is typically the case, we expect global oil-demand growth this year will be led by EM economies, proxied by non-OECD oil consumption, of 1.26mm b/d. For next year, we expect EM demand growth to come in at 1.34mm b/d, or just over 90% of global oil consumption growth in 2021. On the supply side, we continue to expect OPEC 2.0 output to increase slightly in 2Q20 and return to levels consistent with its previous agreement to cut 1.2mm b/d of production. Our modeling also assumes this level of production remains flat for the rest of 2020. Chart 3Fundamental Supply-Demand Balances Support Higher Crude Oil Prices Next year, we assume the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to increase production by 350k b/d in 1H21. In addition, we gradually remove 300k b/d of KSA’s overcompliance of 400k b/d next year, which moves its crude oil output in 2021 to 9.94mm b/d vs 9.76mm b/d this year. For Russia, we anticipate an increase in its condensate production, which it lobbied for last year. This will put our estimate of Russia’s crude and condensate production at 11.4mm b/d in 2020 and 11.64mm b/d in 2021.3 Most of the production cuts realized by OPEC 2.0 – ~ 2mm b/d – come at the expense of Venezuela and Iran, both of which are under sanctions limiting their production imposed by the US. We are holding Venezuela’s production at ~ 700k b/d in 2021, and will be monitoring this closely for any indication it is significantly changing. For Iran, we are keeping its production at 2.10mm b/d this year and next, assuming US sanctions remain in place. Oil production in both countries could be impacted by the outcome of US elections in November, and right now this is a near-impossible call to make. US Shales: No Longer A Growth Story? We continue to see slower production growth in the US than the EIA, particularly in the shales, as we expect capital markets to continue to discipline shale producers by only funding those firms that are able to return capital to shareholders or to deliver steady and increasing dividends. In our modeling, total US onshore production this year and next is expected to rise 800k b/d, and 310k b/d for 2021. We also continue to expect drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells to continue to make significant contributions to overall shale-oil production in the US. Indeed, we expect DUCs to continue to offset part of the decline implied by lower rig counts, as they require less capex than drilling and completing new wells. We add ~ 500k b/d of production from DUCs completion over 2020 and 2021. Future production will depend heavily on the Majors and on productivity and lateral length. Our US crude and condensate production estimates for 2020 and 2021 reflect these constraints, and the slowing rate of growth being imposed by capital markets. For 2020, we expect total US crude and condensate production of 13.16mm b/d, of which 9.20mm b/d will come from the main shale basins led by the Permian.4 Tighter Fundamentals, Steeper Backwardations Our fundamental supply-demand balances are tighter than those assumed by the US EIA and the Paris-based IEA (Table 1). We expect US crude and liquids production to grow 1.6mm b/d this year, and only 500k b/d next year. We see global production growing 1.15mm b/d and 1.39mm b/d in 2020 and 2021, respectively. With demand growing 1.4mm b/d and close to 1.5mm b/d in 2020 and 2021, respectively, against this supply backdrop, our balances point to a deficit this year vs. the surplus expected by the IEA  (Table 2 and Chart 4). Table 1Fundamentals Comparison Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Chart 4BCA Research's Balances Estimates Point To Falling Inventories Chart 5Tighter Storage, Steeper Backwardation For this reason, we continue to anticipate a steepening in the Brent and WTI forward curves – i.e., more backwardation – which will support our long 2H20 Brent vs. short 2H21 Brent curve trade (Chart 5). As a result of the steeper backwardation, we expect higher volatility, and will be getting long 4Q20 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short 4Q20 Brent $70/bbl calls (Chart 6). Bottom Line: We continue to expect crude oil markets to tighten, given persistent production restraint by OPEC 2.0, capital-market-imposed restraint on US shale-oil producers, and revived global demand growth in 2020 and 2021. The IMF’s assessment re the balance of risk being tilted to the upside, in the wake of global monetary stimulus, is broadly consistent with our maintained view. While we expect global policy uncertainty to fall following the so-called phase-one US-China trade deal and a definitive Brexit vote in the UK, geopolitical tension remains high, particularly in the Persian Gulf. Chart 6Steeper Backwardation To Higher Implied Volatility We will be getting long 4Q20 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short 4Q20 Brent $70/bbl calls, in anticipation of higher volatility in the wake of lower inventories. As a result, we are keeping our 2020 Brent forecast at $67/bbl, and are expecting 2021 Brent to trade at $70/bbl; WTI is expected to trade $4/bbl below Brent this year and next, on average. At tonight’s close, we will be getting long 4Q20 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short 4Q20 Brent $70/bbl calls, in anticipation of higher volatility in the wake of lower inventories.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent prices traded sideways ~ $64/bbl since last Tuesday, dismissing the US and China phase-one agreement and disruptions to Libyan production and exports which could total as much as 800k b/d.  Over the weekend, concerns re the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak in China started being priced into commodities, particularly oil.  Separately, the US Treasury Department renewed Chevron’s waiver to operate in Venezuela for another three months.  The company is scheduled to export 1mm barrels of oil produced by PDVSA via a joint-venture, partially dodging US sanctions on Venezuelan oil.5  We expect the country’s output to stabilize close to its current level of 710 kb/d this year. Base Metals: Neutral On Tuesday Beijing reported more than 400 people had been infected with the Wuhan coronavirus, confirming person-to-person transmission of the virus. Concerns that a wider spread over the lunar New Year holidays starting this weekend will impact economic growth in the world’s top metal consumer brought copper prices down 1.8% on Tuesday.  Zinc reached two-month highs this week amidst concerns of low LME warehouses stocks, now close to their 20-year lows at 50,900 MT (Chart 7).  Supply concerns stemming from low iron ore stocked in China’s ports, along with good Chinese macro data, lifted iron-ore prices. Precious Metals: Neutral The US dollar is a key missing piece needed to propel gold prices higher from current levels. The 2.4% decline in the trade-weighted dollar index supported gold’s 5% increase since October 1, 2019 (Chart 8).  We expect the dollar to continue depreciating in 2020, as global growth rebounds and the Fed remains accommodative, keeping gold prices well bid.  Most precious metals have followed gold’s lead this year; palladium and platinum are up 17.63% and 3.15%, respectively. Chart 7 Chart 8 Ags/Softs:  Underweight CBOT Corn and soybeans futures traded lower on Tuesday as markets awaited evidence of China purchasing additional U.S. agricultural goods, fulfilling its commitment to buy $32 billion of agricultural goods over two years per the phase-one deal negotiated between China and the US earlier this month.  Corn traded lower, as US grain elevators have yet to confirm any Chinese buying.  Soybeans, further weakened by expectations of a massive harvest in rival exporter Brazil.  Wheat was the only ag posting gains early in the week on the back of strong Black Sea export demand.     Footnotes 1     Please see CDC SARS Response Timeline, published by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  The SARS outbreak was identified in February 2003 and lasted six months.  The CDC noted: “Globally, WHO received reports of SARS from 29 countries and regions; 8,096 persons with probable SARS resulting in 774 deaths. In the United States, eight SARS infections were documented by laboratory testing and an additional 19 probable SARS infections were reported.”  According to Chinese officials, there were 440 confirmed cases of the new coronavirus as of Wednesday; nine people were reported to have died thus far.  The World Health Organization met Wednesday to assess the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak.  The 2003 coronavirus outbreak was minor compared to the typical influenza outbreak: by way of comparison, every year there are an estimated one billion cases of influenza, resulting in 290,000 to 650,000 deaths, according to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations in Switzerland. 2               Economic policy uncertainty is a recurrent theme in our research.  It has been driving safe-haven demand for the USD and gold for months, as we recently discussed in Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3     We use World Bank growth estimates to drive our EM demand forecasts.  Earlier this month, the Bank forecast EM GDP growth of 4.1% for 2020 and 4.3% for next year.  This will outpace last year’s growth rate of 3.5%. 4     US production growth, particularly in the Permian and Bakken basins, could be constrained by environmental restrictions, if state regulators crack down on the massive flaring occurring in both states.  Please see Lingering Oil-Demand Weakness Will Fade, published November 21, 2019, where we discuss this risk in more depth. 5     Please see Exclusive: PDVSA's partners act as traders of Venezuelan oil amid sanctions - documents, published by reuters.com January 13, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Overweight US refiners enjoyed a solid run for the better part of 2019, but over the past three months have retraced roughly a third of those relative gains. Nevertheless, we remain overweight the S&P oil & gas refining & marketing (O&G R&M) index for three reasons. First, US gasoline inventories are on the cusp of contracting anew. Whittled down inventories have historically underpinned US refiners’ margins (gasoline inventories shown inverted, second panel). Second, historically rising crack spreads have been synonymous with expanding relative forward earnings growth. Thus, an inventory-led boost to refining margins should continue to underpin relative profit growth (third panel). Finally, the dollar is a key driver behind the entire commodity complex as well as commodity exposed equities. Since the 2015 manufacturing recession, US refiners have been tightly inversely correlated with the greenback and the current message is that the sell-off in the S&P O&G R&M index is near exhaustion (US dollar shown inverted, bottom line). Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P O&G R&M index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5OILR – MPC, VLO, PSX, HFC.
Today, the major development of the ECB’s policy meeting was the announcement of the new monetary strategy policy review. Following the press conference where the program was announced, the euro fell 0.6% and bunds outperformed Treasury Notes. The policy…
As expected, the BoC kept interest rates at 1.75%. While the BoC highlighted that the economy possesses more slack than originally estimated, it refrained from committing policy to any path this year. After all, while the Canadian economy continues to suffer…
Highlights The bank credit 6-month impulse is likely to drop sharply in Europe, drop modestly in the US, but remain positive in China. Hence, the momentum of first-half economic data is likely to be worse in Europe than in China – albeit the Wuhan coronavirus scare is an unknown risk to this view. Initiate long CNY/GBP on a 6-month horizon. Underweight banks and the cyclical-heavy Eurostoxx 50 versus other markets, again on a 6-month horizon. There will be a better time to enter these positions later in the year when 6-month impulses are improving. Long-term investors seeking value in Europe should focus on the main currencies and not on the main equity indexes. Fractal trade: long EUR/GBP. Europe And China Play A Role-Reversal In recent dispatches we have highlighted that the euro area bond yield 6-month impulse stands near +100 bps, posing the strongest headwind to growth for three years. To make matters worse, the impulse has flipped from a strong -100 bps tailwind last summer into the current strong headwind, equating to a marked deterioration in the weather. But in China, it is the opposite story. Last summer, the China bond yield 6-month impulse constituted a strong +80 bps headwind; today the headwind has disappeared. Indeed, it has morphed into a tailwind, albeit a very mild tailwind at just -10 bps. In this sense, Europe and China are now playing a role-reversal. The momentum of first-half economic data is likely to be worse in Europe than in China – albeit with the caveat that the Wuhan coronavirus scare is an unknown risk to this view (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekBond Yields In Europe And China Play A Role-Reversal For the sake of completeness, we should address the world’s other large economy, the United States. Just as in the euro area, the US bond yield 6-month impulse has flipped from a strong -100 bps tailwind last summer into a current headwind. But the headwind, at +50 bps, is not as strong as it is in the euro area (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Headwind Impulses In The Euro Area And The US, But Not In China The Four Impulse Framework For Short-Term Growth The bond yield 6-month impulse is the first component of our proprietary ‘four impulse framework’ for short-term growth. The bond yield 6-month impulse is important because it usually leads the framework’s second component, the bank credit 6-month impulse, by a few months. This relationship makes perfect sense as, at the margin, it is the price of credit that drives credit demand. Indeed, to the extent that monetary policy drives growth, this is the main mechanism by which it operates, albeit with a slight delay. The bond yield impulse usually leads the credit impulse. On this compelling theoretical and empirical evidence, the bank credit impulse is now likely to drop sharply in the euro area (Chart I-3), drop modestly in the US (Chart I-4), but remain positive in China (Chart I-5). Chart I-3The Credit 6-Month Impulse Is Likely To Drop Sharply In The Euro Area... Chart I-4...Drop Modestly In ##br##The US...   Chart I-5...But Remain Positive In China But we must also consider the other two impulses in our four impulse framework. In the case of the euro area, the third important impulse is the oil price 6-month impulse. This is because the euro area relies on oil imports whose volumes tend to be price inelastic. Hence, when the oil price falls it subtracts from imports, thereby adding to net exports and growth – and vice-versa when the oil price rises. In the middle of 2019, the oil price impulse constituted a very strong headwind which helps to explain the midyear sharp slowdown in Germany. Subsequently, the headwind eased, even reversing into a modest tailwind which facilitated a recovery. But the tailwind is now fading (Chart I-6).  Chart I-6A Fading Tailwind From The Oil Price 6-Month Impulse The fourth and final component of our four impulse framework is geopolitical risk. This is not an impulse in the strict mathematical sense, but it is the same broad idea applied to the flow of geopolitical tail-events, both negative and positive. Europe’s positive events came several months ago: first in early-August when Italy ousted the firebrand Matteo Salvini from government; then in early-October when the UK parliament legislated against a no-deal Halloween Brexit. The tailwind from these positive events has now likely faded. For China, a positive geopolitical event and potential mild tailwind has come more recently, with the signing of the phase one trade deal with the US. Against this, the Wuhan coronavirus scare is a new risk – though based on the latest information it is unlikely to impact a 6-month view. The tailwind from the oil price impulse is now fading. On the four impulse framework, the momentum of first-half economic data is likely to favour China over Europe. We have found that the best way of playing this is through the exchange rate (Chart I-7), though given recent moves our preferred expression is versus the pound rather than the euro. Hence, on a 6-month horizon, initiate long CNY/GBP. Chart I-7Play Relative Impulses Through Currencies More generally, can the mild tailwind in China counter the headwinds in the West? No. Despite the improvement in China, the aggregate global bond yield impulse still constitutes a +50 bps headwind, which is almost certain to weigh down the global credit impulse through the early months of 2020 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Global Credit 6-Month Impulse Will Weaken In Early 2020 Therefore, as discussed last week in Strong Headwind Warrants Caution In H1, we recommend an underweight stance to banks and to the cyclical-heavy Eurostoxx 50 versus other markets, again on a 6-month horizon. This is not to say that these positions cannot do better on a 12-month view, as per the BCA house view. But if so, any outperformance will be back-end loaded, and there will be a better time to enter these positions later in the year when 6-month impulses are improving. Where Is The Value In Europe? One of the most common questions we get is: are European equities cheaper than US equities? Usually, this question comes from our US clients who are aware that their own stock market is expensive and wish that Europe might be less so. Unfortunately, the wishful thinking won’t make it come true! Major stock market indexes comprise multinational companies with global footprints. For these multinationals, there is no such thing as a ‘European’ company or a ‘US’ company. They are simply global companies that could list their shares on any major stock market. Now ask yourself this: is it really plausible that such a multinational would be cheaper if its primary listing was in Frankfurt as opposed to New York? Of course not. The valuation depends on the industry and company specifics, but it is highly unlikely to depend on whether the company is listed in Frankfurt or New York. It is not European equities that are cheap, it is European currencies that are cheap. But then why do companies with dual listings in Europe and outside Europe trade at a valuation discount in their European listing? For example, Carnival Cruises trades around 8 percent dearer in New York than in London (Chart I-9); and BHP Billiton trades around 15 percent dearer in Sydney than in London (Chart I-10). The answer is that the London listing is quoted in pounds, the New York listing is quoted in US dollars, the Sydney listing is quoted in Australian dollars, but Carnival’s and BHP’s sales and profits are denominated in a mix of international currencies. Chart I-9Carnival Cruises Trades Dearer In New York Than In London Chart I-10BHP Trades Dearer In Sydney ##br##Than In London Hence, Carnival and BHP are trading dearer in New York and Sydney because the market is expecting their mixed currency earnings to appreciate more in US dollar and Australian dollar terms respectively than in pound terms. Put another way, the market is expecting the pound to appreciate structurally versus the major non-European currencies. Therein lies the important message. It is not European equities that are cheap, it is European currencies that are cheap. For those of you still in doubt, just visit the ECB website. The central bank’s own currency valuation indicator admits that the trade-weighted euro is 10 percent undervalued (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The ECB Admits That The Euro Is 10 Percent Undervalued Hence, investors seeking value in Europe should not focus on the main equity indexes. Instead, they should focus on the main currencies. That said, valuation based investing only works if you have a long enough time horizon, meaning at least two years. For shorter horizons, economic momentum and technical factors dominate. In this regard, the pound’s strong rally faces resistance once post-Brexit trade deal negotiations begin in earnest after January 31. As a tactical trade, go long EUR/GBP (see next section). Fractal Trading System* The Brexit deal unleashed a strong rally in the pound, but this is vulnerable to a countertrend setback once the trade deal negotiations begin in earnest. Accordingly, this week's recommendation is long EUR/GBP. Set a profit target at 2 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, long tin achieved its 5 percent profit target at which it was closed. The rolling 1-year win ratio stands at 62 percent. Chart I-12EUR/GBP When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
Overweight In our most recent Special Report we outline why we believe the S&P industrials index is set to outperform the market. Among other reasons, industrials forward earnings breadth – defined as the net number of sub-sectors with higher forward earnings revisions – has bounced off extreme lows signaling that the sell-off in relative share prices is reaching exhaustion. Historically, similar sharp bounces have marked previous price reversals (second panel). With regard to fundamentals, expanding profit margins since mid-2018 also reflect positive sector dynamics, despite the industry having borne the brunt of the US/China trade war. In fact, CEOs managed to compensate for the falling selling prices at the expense of labor (third & bottom panels). Bottom Line: Remain overweight the S&P industrials index. For more details please refer to the most recent Special Report.