China & EM Asia

Highlights Our top five geopolitical “Black Swans” are risks that the market is seriously underpricing. With the “phase one” trade deal signed, Chinese policy could become less accommodative, resulting in a negative economic surprise. The trade deal may fall victim to domestic politics, raising the risk of a US-China military skirmish. A Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention or a Democratic takeover of the White House could trigger social unrest and violence in the US. A pickup in the flow of migrants to Europe would fundamentally undermine political stability there. Russia’s weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest, risking an escalation beyond the point of containment. Feature Over the past four years, we have started off the year with our top five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s perennial list of market surprises, we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.” We offer risks that the market is seriously underpricing by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when we think the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Some of our risks below are so obscure that it is not clear how exactly to price them. We exclude issues that are fairly probable, such as flare-ups in Indo-Pakistani conflict. The two major risks of the year – discussed in our annual outlook – are that either US President Donald Trump or Chinese President Xi Jinping overreaches in a major way. But what would truly surprise the market would be a policy-induced relapse in Chinese growth or a direct military clash between the two great powers. That is how we begin. Other risks stem from domestic affairs in the US, Europe, and Russia. Black Swan 1: China’s Financial Crisis Begins The risk of Xi Jinping’s concentration of power in his own person is that individuals can easily make mistakes, especially if unchecked by advisors or institutions. Lower officials will fear correcting or admonishing an all-powerful leader. Inconvenient information may not be relayed up the hierarchy. Such behavior was rampant in Chairman Mao Zedong’s time, leading to famine among other ills. Insofar as President Xi’s cult of personality successfully imitates Mao’s, it will be subject to similar errors. If President Xi overreaches and makes a policy mistake this year, it could occur in economic policy or other policies. We begin with economic policy, as we have charted the risks of Xi’s crackdown on the financial system since early 2017 (Chart 1). Chart 1A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail Chart 2Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy This year is supposed to be the third and final year of Xi Jinping’s “three battles” against systemic risk, pollution, and poverty. The first battle actually focuses on financial risk, i.e. China’s money and credit bubble. The regime has compromised on this goal since mid-2018, allowing monetary easing to stabilize the economy amid the trade war. But with a “phase one” trade deal having been signed, there is an underrated risk that economic policy will return to its prior setting, i.e. become less accommodative (Chart 2). When Xi launched the “deleveraging campaign” in 2017, we posited that the authorities would be willing to tolerate an annual GDP growth rate below 6%. This would not only cull excesses in the economy but also demonstrate that the administration means business when it says that China must prioritize quality rather than quantity of growth. While Chinese authorities are most likely targeting “around 6%” in 2020, it is entirely possible that the authorities will allow an undershoot in the 5.5%-5.9% range. They will argue that the GDP target for 2020 has already been met on a compound growth rate basis (Chart 3), as astute clients have pointed out. They may see less need for stimulus than the market expects. Chart 3Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Similarly, while urban disposable income is ostensibly lagging its target of doubling 2010 levels by 2020, China’s 13th Five Year Plan, which concludes in 2020, conspicuously avoided treating urban and rural income targets separately. Chart 4Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Chart 5Has China's Stimulus Peaked? If the authorities focus only on general disposable income, then they are on track to meet their target (Chart 4). This would reduce the impetus for greater economic support. There are already tentative signs that Chinese authorities are “satisfied” with the amount of stimulus they have injected: some indicators of money and credit have already peaked (Chart 5). The crackdown on shadow banking has eased, but informal lending is still contracting. The regime is still pushing reforms that shake up state-owned enterprises. The Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. An added headwind for the Chinese economy stems from the currency. The currency should track interest rate differentials. Beijing’s incremental monetary stimulus, in the form of cuts to bank reserve requirement ratios (RRRs), should also push the renminbi down over time (Chart 6). However, an essential aspect of any trade deal with the Trump administration is the need to demonstrate that China is not competitively devaluing. Hence the CNY-USD could overshoot in the first half of the year. This is positive for global exports to China, but it tightens Chinese financial conditions at home. A stronger than otherwise justified renminbi would add to any negative economic surprises from less accommodative monetary and fiscal policy. Conventional wisdom says China will stimulate the economy ahead of two major political events: the centenary of the Communist Party in 2021 and the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. The former is a highly symbolic anniversary, as Xi has reasserted the supremacy of the party in all things, while the latter is more significant for policy, as it is a leadership reshuffle that will usher in the sixth generation of China’s political elite. But conventional wisdom may be wrong – the Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. It would make sense to save dry powder for the next US or global recession. The obvious implication is that China’s economic rebound may lose steam as early as H2 – but the black swan risk is that negative surprises could cause a vicious spiral inside of China. This is a country with massive financial and economic imbalances, a declining potential growth profile, and persistent political obstacles to growth both at home and abroad. Corporate defaults have spiked sharply. While the default rate is lower than elsewhere, the market may be sniffing out a bigger problem as it charges a much higher premium for onshore Chinese bonds (Chart 7). Chart 6CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions Chart 7Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Bottom Line: Our view is that China’s authorities will remain accommodative in 2020 in order to ensure that growth bottoms and the labor market continues to improve. But Beijing has compromised its domestic economic discipline since 2018 in order to fight trade war. The risk now, with a “phase one” deal in hand, is that Xi Jinping returns to his three-year battle plan and underestimates the downward pressures on the economy. The result would be a huge negative surprise for the Chinese and global economy in 2020. Black Swan 2: The US And China Go To War In 2013, we predicted that US-China conflict was “more likely than you think.” This was not just an argument for trade conflict or general enmity that raises the temperature in the Asia-Pacific region – we included military conflict. Chart 8Americans' Attitudes Toward China Plunged … At the time, the notion that a Sino-American armed conflict was the world’s greatest geopolitical threat seemed ludicrous to many of our clients. We published this analysis in October of that year, months after the Islamic State “Soldier’s Harvest” offensive into Iraq. Trying to direct investors to the budding rivalry between American and Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea amidst the Islamic State hysteria was challenging, to say the least. The suggestion that an accidental skirmish between the US and China could descend into a full-blown conflict involved a stretch of the imagination because China was not yet perceived by the American public as a major threat. In 2014, only 19%of the US public saw China as the “greatest threat to the US in the future.” This came between Russia, at 23%, and Iran, at 16%. Today, China and Russia share the top spot with 24%. Furthermore, the share of Americans with an unfavorable view of China has increased from 52% to 60% in the six intervening years (Chart 8). The level of enmity expressed by the US public toward China is still lower than that toward the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s (Chart 9). However, the trajectory of distrust is clearly mounting. We expect this trend to continue: anti-China sentiment is one of the few sources of bipartisan agreement remaining in Washington, DC (Chart 10). Chinese sentiment toward the United States has also darkened dramatically. The geopolitical rivalry is deepening for structural reasons: as China advances in size and sophistication, it seeks to alter the regional status quo in its favor, while the US grows fearful and seeks to contain China. Chart 9… But Not Yet To War-Inducing Levels Chart 10Distrust Of China Is Bipartisan Chart 11Newfound American Concern For China’s Repression One example of rising enmity is the US public’s newfound concern for China’s domestic policies and human rights, specifically Beijing’s treatment of its Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. A Google Trends analysis of the term “Uyghur” or “Uyghur camps” shows a dramatic rise in mentions since Q2 of 2018, around the same time the trade war ramped up in a major way (Chart 11). While startling revelations of re-education camps in Xinjiang emerged in recent years, the reality is that Beijing has used heavy-handed tactics against both militant groups and the wider Uyghur minority since at least 2008 – and much earlier than that. As such, the surge of interest by the general American public and legislators – culminating in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019 – is a product of the renewed strategic tension between the two countries. The “phase one” trade deal risks falling victim to domestic politics due to greater public engagement in foreign policy. The same can be said for Hong Kong: the US did not pass a Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2014, during the first round of mass protests, which prompted Beijing to take heavy-handed legal, legislative, and censorship actions. It passed the bill in 2019, after the climate in Washington had changed. Why does this matter for investors? There are two general risks that come with a greater public engagement in foreign policy. First, the “phase one” trade deal between China and the US could fall victim to domestic politics. This deal envisions a large step up in Sino-American economic cooperation. But if China is to import around $200 billion of additional US goods and services over the next two years – an almost inconceivable figure – the US and China will have to tamp down on public vitriol. This is notably the case if the Democratic Party takes over the White House, given its likely greater focus on liberal concerns such as human rights. And yet the latest bills became law under President Trump and a Republican Senate, and we fully expect a second Trump term to involve a re-escalation of trade tensions to ensure compliance with phase one and to try to gain greater structural concessions in phase two. Second, mounting nationalist sentiment will make it more difficult for US and Chinese policymakers to reduce tensions following a potential future military skirmish, accidental or otherwise. While our scenario of a military conflict in 2013 was cogent, the public backlash in the United States was probably manageable.1 Today we can no longer guarantee that this is the case. China has greater control over the domestic narrative and public discourse, but the rise of the middle class and the government’s efforts to rebuild support for the single-party regime have combined to create an increase in nationalism. Thus it is also more difficult for Chinese policymakers to contain the popular backlash if conflict erupts. In short, the probability of a quick tamping down of public enmity is actively being reduced as American public vilification of China is closing the gap with China’s burgeoning nationalism at an alarming pace. Chart 12Tsai Ing-Wen Enjoys A Greater Mandate On Higher Turnout … Another of our black swan risks – Taiwan island – is inextricably bound up in this dangerous US-China dynamic. To be clear, Washington will tread carefully, as a conflict over Taiwan could become a major war. Nevertheless Taiwan’s election, as we expected, has injected new vitality into this already underrated geopolitical risk. It is not only that a high-turnout election (Chart 12) gave President Tsai Ing-wen a greater mandate (Chart 13), or that her Democratic Progressive Party retained its legislative majority (Chart 14). It is not only that the trigger for this resounding victory was the revolt in Hong Kong and the Taiwanese people’s rejection of the “one country, two systems” formula for Taiwan. It is also that Tsai followed up with a repudiation of the mainland by declaring, “We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.” Chart 13… Popular Support … Chart 14… And A Legislative Majority This statement is not a minor rhetorical flourish but will be received as a major provocation in Beijing: the crystallization of a long-brewing clash between Beijing and Taipei. Additional punitive economic measures against Taiwan are now guaranteed. Saber-rattling could easily ignite in the coming year and beyond. Taiwan is the epicenter of the US-China strategic conflict. First, Beijing cannot compromise on its security or its political legitimacy and considers the “one China principle” to be inviolable. Second, the US maintains defense relations with Taiwan (and is in the process of delivering on a relatively large new package of arms). Third, the US’s true willingness to fight a war on Taiwan’s behalf is in doubt, which means that deterrence has eroded and there is greater room for miscalculation. Bottom Line: A US-China military skirmish has been our biggest black swan risk since we began writing the BCA Geopolitical Strategy. The difference between then and now, however, is that the American public is actually paying attention. Political ideology – the question of democracy and human rights – is clearly merging with trade, security, and other differences to provoke Americans of all stripes. This makes any skirmish more than just a temporary risk-off event, as it could lead to a string of incidents or even protracted military conflict. Black Swan 3: Social Unrest Erupts In America There are numerous lessons that one can learn from the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, but perhaps the most cogent one is that Millennials and Generation Z are not as docile and feckless as their elders think. Images of university students and even teenagers throwing flying kicks and Molotov cocktails while clad in black body armor have shocked the world. Perhaps all those violent video games did have a lasting impact on the youth! What is surprising is that so few commentators have made the cognitive leap from the ultra-first world streets of Hong Kong to other developed economies. Perhaps what is clouding analysts’ minds is the idiosyncratic nature of the dispute in Hong Kong, the “one China” angle. However, Hong Kong youth are confronted with similar socio-economic challenges that their peers in other advanced economies face: overpriced real estate and a bifurcated service-sector labor market with few mid-tier jobs that pay a decent wage. In the US, Millennials and Gen Z are also facing challenges unique to the US. First, their debt burden is much more toxic than that of the older cohorts, given that it is made up of student loans and credit card debt (Chart 15). Second, they find themselves at odds – demographically and ideologically – with the older cohorts (Chart 16). Chart 15Younger American Cohorts Plagued By Toxic Debt Chart 16Younger And Older Cohorts At Odds Demographically The adage that the youth are apolitical and do not turn out to vote may have ended thanks to President Trump. The 2018 midterm election, which the Democratic Party successfully turned into a referendum on the president, saw the youth (18-29) turnout nearly double from 20% to 36% (the 30-44 year-old cohort also saw a jump in turnout from 35.6% to 48.8%). The election saw one of the highest turnouts in recent memory, with a 53.4% figure, just two points off the 2016 general election figure (Chart 17). Chart 17Massive Turnout To The 2016 Referendum On Trump Despite the high turnout in 2018, the-most-definitely-not-Millennial Vice President Joe Biden continues to lead the Democratic Party in the polls. Chart 18Biden Unpopular Among Young American Voters Chart 19Bookies Pulled Down "Uncle Joe's" Odds, Capturing Democratic Party Zeitgeist His probability of winning the nomination is not overwhelming, but it is the highest of any contender. In recent polls, Biden comes third place in Millennial/Gen-Z vote preferences (Chart 18). Yet he is hardly out of contention, especially for the 30-44 year-old cohort. The view that “Uncle Joe” does not fit the Democratic Party zeitgeist has become so entrenched in the Democratic Party narrative that it became conventional wisdom last year, pulling oddsmakers and betting markets away from the clear frontrunner (Chart 19). As such, a Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16 may come as an affront to the left-wing activists who will surely descend on the convention. This will particularly be the case if Biden wins despite the progressive candidates amassing a majority of overall delegates, which is possible judging by the combined progressive vote share in current polling (Chart 20). He would arrive in Milwaukee without clearing the 1990 delegate count required to win on the first ballot. On the second ballot, his presidency would then receive a boost from “superdelegates” and those progressives who are unwilling to “rock the boat,” i.e. unify against an establishment candidate with the largest share of votes. This is also how Mayor Michael Bloomberg could pull off a surprise win. Chart 20Progressives Come Closest To Victory Such a “brokered” – or contested – convention has not occurred since 1952. However, several Democratic Party conventions came close, including 1968, 1972, and 1984. The 1968 one in Chicago was notable for considerable violence and unrest. Even if the Milwaukee Democratic Party convention does not produce unrest, it could sow the seeds for unrest later in the year. First, a breakout Biden performance in the primaries is unlikely. As such, he will likely need to pledge a shift to the left at the convention, including by accepting a progressive vice-presidential candidate. Second, an actual progressive may win the primary. Chart 21Zealots In Both Parties Perceive Each Other As A National Threat It is likely that either of the two options would be seen as an existential threat to many of Trump’s loyal supporters across the United States. President Trump’s rhetoric often paints the scenario of a Democratic takeover of the White House in apocalyptic terms. And data suggests that the zealots in both parties perceive each other as a “threat to the nation’s wellbeing” (Chart 21). The American Civil War in the nineteenth century began with the election of a president. This is not just because Abraham Lincoln was a particularly reviled figure in the South, but because the states that ultimately formed the Confederacy saw in his election the demographic writing-on-the-wall. The election was an expression of a general will that, from that point onwards, was irreversible. Given demographic trends in the US today, it is possible that many would see in Trump’s loss a similar fait accompli. If one perceives progressive Democrats as an existential threat to the US constitution, rebellion is the obvious and rational response. There is a risk of rebellion from Trump’s most ardent supporters if he loses the White House. Bottom Line: Year 2020 may be a particularly violent one for the US. First, left wing activists may be shocked and angered to learn that Joe Biden (or Bloomberg) is the nominee of the Democratic Party come July. With so much hype behind the progressive candidates throughout the campaign, Biden’s nomination could be seen as an affront to what was supposed to be “the big year” for left-wing candidates. Second, investors have to start thinking about what happens if Biden – or a progressive candidate – goes on to defeat President Trump in the general election. While liberal America took Trump’s election badly, it has demographics – and thus time – on its side. Trump’s most ardent supporters may conclude that his defeat means the end of America as they know it. Black Swan 4: Europe’s Migration Crisis Restarts Chart 22Decline In Illegal Immigration Dampened European Populism It is a testament to Europe’s resilience that we do not have a Black Swan scenario based on an election or a political crisis set on the continent in 2020. Support for the common currency and the EU as a whole has rebounded to its highest since 2013. Even early elections in Germany and Italy are unlikely to produce geopolitical risk. The populists in the former are in no danger of outperforming whereas the populists in the latter barely deserve the designation. But what if one of the reasons for the surge in populism – unchecked illegal immigration – were to return in 2020? The data suggests that the risk of migrant flows has massively subsided. From its peak of over a million arrivals in 2015, the data shows that only 125,472 migrants crossed into Europe via land and sea routes in the Mediterranean last year (Chart 22). Why? There are five reasons that we believe have checked the flow of migrants: Supply: The civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have largely subsided. Heterogenous regions, cities, and neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed and internal boundaries have largely ossified. It is unlikely that any future conflict will produce massive outflows of refugees as the displacement has already taken place. These countries are now largely divided into armed, ethnically homogenous, camps. Enforcement: The EU has stepped up border enforcement since 2015, pouring resources into the land border with Turkey and naval patrols across the Mediterranean. Individual member states – particularly Italy and Hungary – have also stepped up border enforcement policy. While most EU member states have publicly chided both for “draconian” policies, there is no impetus to force Rome and Budapest to change policy. Libyan Imbroglio: Conflict in Libya has flared up in 2019 with military warlord Khalifa Haftar looking to wrest control from the UN-backed Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Serraj. The Islamic State has regrouped in the country as well. Ironically, the conflict is helping stem the flow of migrants as African migrants from sub-Saharan countries dare not cross into Libya as they did in 2015 when there was a brief lull in fighting. Turkish benevolence: Ankara is quick to point out that it is the only thing standing between Europe and a massive deluge of migrants. Turkey is said to host somewhere between two and four million refugees from various conflicts in the Middle East. Fear of the crossing: If crossing the Mediterranean was easy, Europe would have experienced a massive influx of migrants throughout the twentieth century. Not only is it not easy, it is costly and quite deadly, with thousands lost each year. Furthermore, most migrants are not welcomed when they arrive to Europe, many are held in terrible conditions in holding camps in Italy and Greece. Over time, migrants who made it into Europe have reported these dangers and conditions, reducing the overall demand for illegal migration. We do not foresee these five factors changing, at least not all at once. However, there are several reasons to worry about the flow of migrants in 2020. US-Iran tensions have sparked outright military action, while unrest is flaring up across Iran’s sphere of influence. Going forward, Iran could destabilize Iraq or fuel Shia unrest against US-backed regimes. Second, Afghanistan has been the source of most migrants to Europe via sea and land Mediterranean routes – 19.2%. The conflict in the country continues and may flare up with President Trump’s decision to formally withdraw most US troops from the country in 2020. Third, a break in fighting in Libya may encourage sub-Saharan migrants to revisit routes to Europe. Migrants from Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo make up over 10% of migrants to Europe. Finally, Turkish relationship with the West could break up further in 2020, causing Ankara to ship migrants northward. We highly doubt that President Erdogan will risk such a break, given that 50% of Turkish exports go to Europe. A European embargo on Turkish exports – which would be a highly likely response to such an act – would crush the already decimated Turkish economy. Bottom Line: While we do not see a return to the 2015 level of migration in 2020, we flag this risk because it would fundamentally undermine political stability in Europe. Black Swan 5: Russia Faces A “Peasant Revolt” Our fifth and final black swan risk for the year stems from Russia. This risk may seem obvious, since the US election creates a dynamic that revives the inherent conflict in US-Russian relations. Russia could seek to accomplish foreign policy objectives – interfering in US elections, punishing regional adversaries. The Trump administration may be friendly toward Russia but Trump is unlikely to veto any sanctions passed by the House and Senate in an election year, should an occasion for new sanctions arise. Conversely Russia could anticipate greater US pressure if the Democrats win in November. Yet it is Russia’s domestic affairs that represent the real underrated risk. Putin’s fourth term as president has been characterized by increased focus on domestic political control and stability as opposed to foreign adventurism. The creation of a special National Guard in 2016, reporting directly to Putin and responsible for quelling domestic unrest, symbolizes the shift in focus. So too does Russia’s adherence to the OPEC 2.0 regime of production control to keep oil prices above their budget breakeven level. Meanwhile Putin’s courting of Europe for the Nordstream II pipeline, and his slight peacemaking efforts with Ukraine, has suggested a slightly more restrained international posture. Chart 23Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Strategically it makes little sense for Russia to court negative attention at a time when the US and Europe are at odds over trade and the Middle East, the US is preoccupied with China and Iran, and Russia itself faces mounting domestic problems. The domestic problems are long in coming. The central bank has maintained a stringent monetary policy for the better part of the decade. Despite cutting interest rates recently, monetary and credit conditions are still tight, hurting domestic demand. Moscow has also imposed fiscal austerity, namely by cutting back on state pensions and hiking the value added tax. Real wage growth is weak (Chart 23), retail sales are falling, and domestic demand looks to weaken further, as Andrija Vesic of BCA Emerging Markets Strategy observes in a recent Special Report. The effect of Russia’s policy austerity has been a drop in public approval of the administration (Chart 24). Protests erupted in 2019 but were largely drowned out by the larger and more globally significant protests in Hong Kong. These were met by police suppression that has not removed their underlying cause. Putin’s first major decision of the new year was to reshuffle the government, entailing Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s transfer to a new post and the appointment of a new cabinet. This move reveals the need to show some accountability to reduce popular pressure. While Moscow now has room to cut interest rates and ease fiscal policy, it is behind the curve and the weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest. Meanwhile Putin’s efforts to alter the Russian constitution so he can stay in power beyond current term limits, effectively becoming emperor for life, like Xi Jinping, should not be dismissed merely because they are expected. They reflect a need to take advantage of Putin’s popular standing to consolidate domestic political power at a time when the ruling United Russia party and the federal government face discontent. They also ensure that strategic conflict with the United States will take on an ideological dimension. Chart 24Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Chart 25Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russia's recent cabinet shakeup is positive from the point of view of economic reform. And the country's monetary and fiscal room provide a basis for remaining overweight equities within EM, as our Emerging Markets Strategy recommends. However, Russian equities have rallied hard and the political risk is understated. Bottom Line: It is never easy predicting Putin’s next international move. Our market-based indicators of Russian political risk have hit multi-year lows, but both the domestic and international context suggest that these lows will not be sustained (Chart 25). A new bout of risk can emanate from Putin, or from changes in Washington, or from the Russian people themselves. What would take the world by surprise would be domestic unrest on a larger scale than Russia can easily suppress through the police force. Housekeeping We are closing our long European Union / short Chinese equities strategic trade with a 1.61% loss since inception on May 10, 2019. Dhaval Joshi of BCA’s European Investment Strategy downgraded the Eurostoxx 50 to underweight versus the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225 this week. He makes the point that the Euro Area bond yield 6-month impulse hit 100 bps – a critical technical level – and will be a strong headwind to growth. We will look to reopen this trade at a later date when the euphoria over the “phase one” trade deal subsides, as we still favor European equities and DM bourses over EM. We will reinstitute our long Brent crude H2 2020 versus H2 2021 tactical position, which was stopped out on January 9, 2020. We remain bullish on oil fundamentals and expect Middle East instability to add a political risk premium. China's stimulus and the oil view also give reason for us to reinitiate our long Malaysian equities relative to EM as a tactical position. The Malaysian ringgit will benefit as oil prices move higher, helping Malaysian companies make payments on their large pile of dollar-denominated debt and improving household purchasing power. Higher oil prices also correlate with higher equity prices, while China's stimulus and the US trade ceasefire will push the US dollar lower and help trade revive in the region. Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Observe how little attention the public paid to US-China saber-rattling around China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that year.

Highlights The Fed is the usual culprit for killing business cycles — but the Fed is on hold. This makes geopolitics the likeliest candidate to kill the cycle. The key geopolitical risks are US political turmoil, China’s economic policy, and the US-Iran confrontation. Nevertheless, policymakers are adjusting to the threat of recession, which points to a continuation of this long-in-the-tooth expansion. The US-China talks will be driven by Trump’s need for an economic boost ahead of the US election. If the economy or Trump’s approval rating fails anyway, then all bets are off. Go long gold as a strategic hedge. Feature Great power struggle, or “multipolarity,” continues to be our mega-theme in 2020. The world does not operate like a normal society, with a single government that possesses a monopoly on the use of force and ensures stability. Nations are individualistic, armed, and dangerous, creating what scholar Hedley Bull once called “The Anarchical Society.” This is not pure chaos, but rather a community of nations that lacks a clear and undisputed leader. Hence, quarrels break out often. Updating our geopolitical power index shows that the rise of China remains the most disruptive trend in global politics (Chart 1). The gap between the US and China has closed until recently, with China’s downshift in growth rates, but American fear is just being awakened (Chart 2). Given that Beijing threatens the US’s military and technological dominance over the long run, Washington will continue to develop a containment policy. Chart 1China's Geopolitical Rise Is Disruptive Chart 2China-US Power Gap Is Narrowing China is too big to quarantine, especially for a relatively unpopular first-term American president who eschews international coalition-building. The European Union’s decline in relative power is more marked than that of the United States, but China does not pose as much of a security threat to Europe. This trend exacerbates the already serious divergence in the trans-Atlantic alliance – which will worsen if Trump wins on November 3, 2020. Hence, globalization faces persistent challenges, as indicated by the falling import share of global output (Chart 3). This multi-decade process has peaked, creating a headwind for trade-exposed firms over the long run. What about the next 12 months? Will geopolitics kill the bull market? Not necessarily. Just as central bankers have cut interest rates to guard against deflationary risks (Chart 4), so the key governments are adjusting policies to avoid recessionary risks, especially with the memory of 2008 still fresh. Simply put: The Fed is on pause, Trump wants to be reelected, and China cannot afford a hard landing. Chart 3Globalization Faces Challenges Chart 4Policymakers Are Reacting To Deflationary Risks Clearly the risks to this view are elevated. The chief ones: (1) President Trump becomes a lame duck, cannot run on an economic platform, and thus makes a desperate attempt to win as a “war president” (2) Xi Jinping overestimates his advantage, in domestic or foreign policy, and makes a policy mistake (3) the US-Iran conflict spirals out of control due to Iran’s economic vulnerability. Other risks, such as Brexit, pale by comparison. Fear And Loathing On The Campaign Trail It is too soon to declare that Trump’s presidency is finished. On the contrary he is slightly favored to win reelection: • The Senate is unlikely to remove him from office. Republican support for the president is well above average despite evidence that Trump tried to get Ukrainian officials to investigate his political rival (Chart 5). The implication is that a year from now Democrats will have suffered a policy failure while Trump will have been cleared of charges. Chart 5Trump Still Popular Among Republicans • The odds of recession in the coming year are low. The US voter is buffered by rising real incomes and wages and high net wealth (Chart 6). To unseat a sitting president requires a recessionary backdrop that fundamentally discredits him and his party – not just slowing growth. Chart 6Pocketbook Voter Theory To The Test • Trump’s low approval rating does not prohibit him from reelection. While historically low, it is also historically stable. Our quantitative election model – which predicts Trump will win the Electoral College with 279 votes by clinging onto Pennsylvania – shows that Trump’s victory margin would increase if we looked not at the average level of his approval but at its change, momentum, or low range (i.e. stability). Table 1 shows the results of all four variations of his approval rating, with ascending chances of winning key swing states. Table 1All Measures Of Trump’s Approval Rating Get Him 270 Electoral College Votes Trump’s odds of winning will affect the US equity market throughout the year. As long as he remains competitive, i.e. neither scandal nor the economy cause his approval rating to break down, he will have reason to temper his policies to cater to US financial markets. Foreign and trade policies are Trump’s only ways to improve the economy and voter support. Trump’s only remaining way to boost the economy and improve voter support lies in foreign policy and trade policy. Specifically, he will stop increasing tariffs on China – and maybe even roll back tariffs to August 2019 or even April 2019 levels (Chart 7) – at least as long as the manufacturing recession persists. Chart 7Some Tariff Rollback Is Possible China is unlikely to implement painful structural changes when Trump could be gone in 12 months’ time. Strategic tensions outside of trade will undermine any ceasefire. Hence economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated even though it will drop off from recent peaks. Assuming the electoral constraint prevents Trump from levying sweeping tariffs on China or Europe, he will be limited to other foreign and trade policies to try to boost his approval rating or fire up his base: • We expect a third summit with Kim Jong Un of North Korea. Trump is rumored to be considering some troop reduction in exchange for progress on denuclearization (neither of which would be irreversible). • Otherwise Trump could turn to saber-rattling, since Pyongyang is threatening to resume long-range tests and the economic consequences of another round of “fire and fury” would be limited. • Trump could also rattle the saber against Iran, Venezuela, or other rogue states. If Trump becomes uncompetitive in the election, then the market will sell off. The market will have to price not only policy discontinuity (e.g. higher taxes), but also the chance of a progressive-populist taking the White House. Moreover, if a Democrat is able to unseat an incumbent president, the Democrats will take the Senate as well. Trump is a known unknown; this scenario would be an unknown unknown. The Democratic Party’s primary election will consume the first half of the year. It culminates in the Democratic National Convention, strategically chosen to take place in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16. Wisconsin is one of three critical swing states. Will former Vice President Joe Biden win the nomination? A high conviction is not warranted. Biden is clearly the frontrunner, but we think a progressive can pull it off. A simulation of the Democratic Convention “pledged delegates,” based on November polling in the first four primary elections, shows Biden far short of a majority (Chart 8). He needs to outperform his polls, but this will be difficult given that he is well-known, has not performed well in debates, and will have Mayors Pete Buttigieg and Michael Bloomberg nipping at his heels in the Midwest and Northeast, respectively. Chart 8Do Not Discount A Progressive Win Over time, candidates will drop out, so it is more informative to look at the “centrist” candidates as a whole compared to the “progressives.” Here the early primary polling suggests that the progressives will come closest to victory (Chart 9). Chart 9Progressives Come Closest To Victory The trend within the party is to move to the left. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders are tied as voters’ second choice – even Buttigieg supporters are split between Biden and Warren (Chart 10). What is unknown is whether Warren (or Sanders) can consolidate the progressive vote faster than Biden (or Buttigieg) consolidates the centrist vote. Chart 10If Biden Falters, Progressives Are Next In Line Chart 11Structural Imbalances Give Rise To Populism Trends pointing toward a progressive victory may not at first trouble the market, but any signs that a progressive is pulling ahead decisively will force investors to sharply upgrade the probability that he or she will win the White House. This will cause equity volatility, which could become self-reinforcing. A progressive nominee would force investors to recognize that populism and political risk are here to stay – which is our expectation given that they are motivated by polarization, inequality, and other structural imbalances in the United States (Chart 11). Left-wing or progressive populism is far more negative for corporate earnings than Trump’s right-wing or “pluto-populism.” Sanders or Warren present the worst case for investors because they favor trade protectionism in addition to higher taxes and minimum wages. Most presidents achieve their chief legislative priority in their first term and there is no reason to assume a progressive presidency would be any different. The implication is higher corporate taxes as well as individual taxes to pay for a sweeping expansion of the social safety net – positive for the economy perhaps but negative for corporate earnings. Chart 12A Progressive Win Threatens Key Sectors An extensive re-regulation of the US economy would occur regardless, since it falls under executive authority. It would affect the key equity sectors in the US bourse, technology and health (Chart 12), as well as energy and financials. The choice of a centrist Democrat like Biden (or Buttigieg) would be the least negative outcome for US equities of all the Democrats. The market would probably cheer a Trump versus Biden matchup for this reason. Biden favors higher taxes and regulation but is an establishment politician and known quantity. However, even Biden will be pulled to the left by the current within his party once in office; and Buttigieg will govern to the left of Biden. Trump’s reelection would spur a relief rally in US equities, but it would be short-lived. He would solidify low taxes and deregulation and would have a real chance of passing an infrastructure package. But he would also curtail labor force growth with his border wall and double down on trade protectionism – likely against Europe as well as China this time. His unpredictable and aggressive tendencies would be turbo-charged by a new popular mandate. We expect to cut back on risk exposure upon Trump’s reelection, assuming the bull market has survived to return him to office. A Democratic victory would mark another reversal in US policy orientation. Given our view that the White House call is also the Senate call, this would be the third time since 2008 that the country has witnessed a total reversal. Domestic American political risk will not end with the election: a legitimacy crisis could follow a narrow election, and institutional erosion continues regardless. It is too soon to call peak polarization, as the election will result in either a left-wing government bent on redistributing wealth or a right-wing Trump administration that exacerbates inequality. A centrist "return to normalcy" is possible with a Biden or Buttigieg victory. This reinforces our constructive cyclical view. Bottom Line: The chief risk from US politics in 2020 is Trump becoming a lame duck and resorting to belligerent foreign policy to try to win back voters through a rally around the flag. The chief risk of the Democratic nomination, and the general election, is a left-wing populist winning the White House. Any Democratic victory would likely bring the Senate, removing a key constraint. Over time the median voter is moving to the left. The Man Who Changed China Chart 13Xi Is Purging Misallocated Capital Xi Jinping undoubtedly represents a “new era” in China – a reassertion of Communist Party rule. The party faced a crisis of legitimacy amid the Great Recession and Arab Spring and was determined to regain political, economic, and social control. Xi had previously been anointed but was all too happy to take on the role of neo-Maoist strongman. Yet Xi’s playbook is close to that of President Jiang Zemin’s: centralize the party, repress dissent, modernize the military, restructure banks and the economy, upgrade the country’s science and technology, and expand China’s global influence. The difference is that while Jiang rode the high tide of globalization, Xi is riding the receding tide. Jiang culled two-thirds of the country’s state-owned enterprises, laying off over 40 million people, confident that a surge of new growth would ensue. Xi is also cracking down – allowing bankruptcies to purge misallocated capital (Chart 13) – but with a large debt load and shrinking labor force, he needs the state sector to put a floor under growth rates. The takeaway is that Xi will act pragmatically to boost growth when China’s stability is threatened, as he did in 2015-16. The trade war has already forced him to backtrack on the 2017-18 deleveraging campaign and stimulate the economy. The combined fiscal and credit impulse amounts to 6.6% of GDP from trough to now, and it hasn’t peaked. The implication is that Chinese growth – and global growth – will pick up from here (Chart 14). Chinese authorities are still trying to contain the growth in leverage, which has kept this year’s stimulus in check. But the chief banking regulator has also stated that as long as the macro-leverage ratio is not growing faster than 10%, this goal is met (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Growth Will Pick Up Chart 15China Says Leverage Already Contained The economy has not yet durably bottomed, so the state will continue adding support. The coming year is the third and final year of the “Three Battles” – against poverty, pollution, and systemic risk – as well as the final year of the thirteenth five-year plan. Beijing is falling short on its targets for real urban per capita income (Chart 16) and poverty elimination (Chart 17). A last-minute rush to meet these targets is likely and will require more fiscal stimulus. Chart 16Beijing Falls Short Of Urban Income Target... Chart 17...And Poverty Target This is not an argument for a blowout credit splurge. China is saving dry powder for a further escalation in the US containment strategy and a worse economic downturn. Do not expect a blowout Chinese credit splurge. The core constraint on policy is unemployment. Stimulus efforts have created a bottom in the employment component of the manufacturing PMI as well as a notable uptick in the demand for urban labor (Chart 18). To withdraw stimulus now – or tighten policy – would be to trigger a relapse in an economy that is ultimately at risk of a debt-deflation trap. Chart 18Chinese Stimulus Shows Up In Employment Chart 19A Banking Crisis Is A Risk To The Chinese Economy Tougher controls on credit and shadow banking have seen an uptick in corporate defaults and bank failures. With the government deliberately imposing pain on bloated sectors of the economy, financial turmoil could spread. Newspaper mentions of defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies have only slightly subsided since stimulus efforts began (Chart 19). If bank failures spiral out of control, the economy will tank. The state will have to fight fires. Tariffs have accelerated the trend of firms relocating out of China, which began because of rising wages and a darkening business environment (Chart 20). A questionable trade ceasefire will not reverse the process as American and Asian companies are seeking a lasting solution, which requires them to set up shop elsewhere. China will want to mitigate the process, first by stabilizing domestic growth, and second by accepting Trump’s tactical trade retreat. Xi is also trying to avoid diplomatic isolation by courting trade partners other than the US, since the ceasefire is unreliable and the US containment strategy is presumed to continue. This involves outreach to the rest of Asia, Russia, and Europe, and even to distrustful neighbors like Japan and India. Europe is the swing player. China’s Asian neighbors, and Australia and New Zealand, have reason to fear Beijing’s growing clout and seek the US’s security umbrella. Russia and China are informal allies. But the European public is not interested in the new cold war – China does not threaten Europe from next door, like Russia does, and the Trump administration is threatening Europe with both trade war and Middle Eastern instability. European leaders are happy to take the market share that the US is leaving, as is clear from direct investment (Chart 21). Only a concentrated US diplomatic effort can address this divergence, which is not forthcoming in 2020. Chart 20Firms Are Relocating Out Of China Chart 21Europe Exploits US-China Rift A new Democratic administration, or a change in Trump strategy in the second term, could eventually produce a multilateral western coalition demanding that China open up and liberalize parts of its economy. But Europe will need to be convinced of the underlying reality that China is doubling down on the state-led industrial policies that provoked the Americans to begin with. Beijing is after economic self-sufficiency, indigenous innovation, and leadership in high-tech production and new frontiers. Its official research and development budget is not its only means for achieving this end (Chart 22) – it also has state-backed acquisitions and cyber campaigns. Germany and Europe have begun scrutinizing Chinese investment, separately from the United States. Chart 22Beijing Is After Economic Self-Sufficiency The danger to China – and the world – is that Xi Jinping might overplay his hand. He could overtighten money, credit, or property regulations and spoil the economy when global growth is vulnerable. His anti-corruption campaign is a telling reminder of his heavy hand in domestic affairs (Chart 23). Chart 23Xi Jinping Risks Overplaying His Hand Chart 24China Needs To Calm Things Down He could also suppress protesters in Hong Kong and rattle sabers over Taiwan or the South China Sea in a way that undermines the trade ceasefire. Or he could fail to bring the North Koreans to heel. These strategic tensions are significant only insofar as they undermine the trade ceasefire or provoke US-China saber-rattling. Failing to act as an honest broker in the Iran crisis would also irk Europeans and give them an excuse to side with the US. Bottom Line: China will continue modestly stimulating the economy next year to achieve a durable stabilization in growth. The risk of debt-deflation and rising unemployment ultimately necessitates this policy. Beijing can accept Trump’s tariff rollback for the sake of stability – China’s policy uncertainty relative to the rest of the world is off the charts and Beijing has an interest in calming things down (Chart 24). Yet Beijing will double down on indigenous innovation, while courting the rest of the world so as to preempt criticism and isolate the Americans. The risk is that Xi proves too heavy-handed when it comes to domestic leverage, the tech grab, strategic disputes, or trade talks with Washington. The Strait Of Hormuz Risk Chart 25US-Iran Conflict Still Unresolved In a special report earlier this year entitled “The Polybius Solution” we argued that while the US-China conflict is the major long-term geopolitical conflict, the US-Iran showdown could supersede it in the short term. This remains a risk for 2020, as the Trump administration’s confrontation with Iran is fundamentally unresolved (Chart 25). The Trump administration is still enforcing “maximum pressure” sanctions, which have reduced Iranian oil exports from 1.8 million barrels per day at their recent peak to 100,000 barrels per day in November (Chart 26). These are crippling sanctions that have sent Iran’s economy reeling. Chart 26Iran Remains Under Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled out negotiations with Trump. They would be unpopular at home without a major reversal on sanctions from Trump (Chart 27). Chart 27Major US Reversal Prerequisite For Iran Talks Trump presumably aims to avoid an oil shock ahead of the election. The US and its allies have visibly shied away from conflict in the wake of Iran’s provocations, including the spectacular attack on eastern Saudi Arabia that knocked 5.7 million barrels of oil per day offline in September. However, this does not mean the odds of war are zero. The Americans or the Iranians could miscalculate. Both sides might think they can improve their standing at home by flexing their muscles abroad. Iran is a rational actor and would not normally court American airstrikes or antagonize a potentially lame duck president. Yet it is under extreme pressure due to the sanctions. It faces significant unrest both at home and in its sphere of influence (Iraq and Lebanon). Opinion polls show that the public primarily blames the government for the collapsing economy, and yet that American sanctions are siphoning off some of this anger (Chart 28). This could tempt the leaders to continue staging provocations in the Strait of Hormuz or elsewhere in the region. Chart 28Iranians Blame Tehran, Tehran Blames America Hardline military leaders and politicians currently receive the most favor in polling, while the reformist President Rouhani – undercut by the American withdrawal from the 2015 deal – is among the least popular (Chart 29). The Majlis (parliament) elections in February will likely reverse the reformist turn in Iranian politics that began in 2012. The regime stalwarts are gearing up for the supreme leader’s succession in the coming years. While a Democratic White House could restore the 2015 deal, that ship may have sailed. Chart 29Rouhani And Reformists In Trouble A historic oil supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize. Chart 30The Iranians May Take Excessive Risk Trump, under impeachment, could seek to distract the public. This was Bill Clinton’s tactic with Operations Infinite Reach, Desert Fox, and Allied Force in 1998-99. These operations were minor and not comparable to a conflict with Iran. However, Trump may be emboldened. On paper the US strategic petroleum reserve (along with OPEC and other petroleum reserves) could cover most major oil shock scenarios. According to Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy, a supply outage the size of the Abqaiq attack in September would have to persist for four months to cause enough price pressure to harm the US economy and decrease Trump’s chances of winning reelection. The simulations in Chart 30 overstate the gasoline price impact by assuming that global oil reserves remain untapped. Thus while the Iranians may take excessive risks, the Trump administration may not refrain this time from airstrikes. Bottom Line: While the Middle East is always full of risks to oil supply, Iran’s vulnerability and Trump’s status at home make the situation unusually precarious. A historic oil supply disruption is a fatter tail risk than investors realize. Europe Is A Price Taker, Not A Price Maker Just as the US and China have a shared incentive to avoid tariff-induced recession, so the UK and EU have a shared incentive to prevent a shock reversion to basic WTO tariffs. The December 31, 2020 deadline for the UK-EU trade deal, like the various deadlines for Brexit itself, can be delayed. Even Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proved unwilling to exit without a deal and even a hung parliament has proved capable of preventing him from doing so. The negotiation of a trade deal – which is never easy and always drags on – will be a lower-order risk in the wake of the past two years’ Brexit-induced volatility. Johnson will not be held hostage by hardline Brexiters given that Brexit itself will be complete. If our view on Chinese growth is correct, then Europe’s economy can recover and European political risk will be a “red herring” in 2020, as it was in 2019. Instead the EU presents an opportunity. Chart 31Euro Area Breakup Risk Has Subsided Euro Area break-up risk has subsided after a series of challenges in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis (Chart 31). There is not a basis for a reversal of this trend, at least not until a full-blown recession afflicts the continent. The rise in anti-establishment parties coincided with a one-off surge in migration that is finished – and successful populists from Greece to Italy have moderated on euro membership once in power. Germany is entering a profound transition driven by de-globalization and tensions with the United States. It is more likely to have an early election than the consensus holds. But it is fundamentally stable and supportive of European integration. In fact the great debate about fiscal policy poses an upside risk over the long run both for European equities and the European project. We remain optimistic on French structural reforms even though President Emmanuel Macron must overcome significant public opposition. An eerie quiet hangs over Russia, making it one of our “Black Swan” risks for 2020. Oil prices are not very high, which discourages foreign adventures, and President Vladimir Putin has spent his fourth term trying to consolidate international gains and improve domestic stability. But approval of the government is weak, the job market is deteriorating, and social unrest is cropping up. There is plenty of room to ease monetary and fiscal policy, but a sharp downturn could provide the basis for an aggressive foreign policy action to shore up regime support. The US election also presents the risk of renewed US-Russian tensions, whether over election interference or a Democratic victory. Investment Conclusions Geopolitics is the likeliest candidate to derail the global bull market in 2020. Nevertheless, policymakers are adjusting to their constraints. Trump and Xi are negotiating a ceasefire and a disorderly Brexit is off the table. Even Trump’s impeachment shows that the US system of checks and balances remains intact. After all, there is nothing to prevent removal from office if Trump further antagonizes public opinion and the Republican Senate. This means that policy uncertainty will decline on the margin in 2020, even as it remains elevated due to the danger of the underlying events. The nature of US economic imbalances suggests that the policy discontinuity of a Democratic victory on November 3, 2020 would be better for the economy (via household consumption) than it would be for corporate earnings. Policy continuity with the Trump administration suggests the opposite. On a sectoral basis we recommend going long US energy large cap stocks and short info-tech and communications. Energy has limited downside even if a progressive wins whereas tech has limited upside even if Trump wins. The BCA Research House View expects the US dollar to weaken as global growth rebounds, stocks to outperform bonds and cash, and developed market equities to outperform those of the United States. But a Republican victory in November would push against these trends as it is more bullish for the greenback and for US equities relative to global. As a play on the global growth rebound we expect, we recommend going long industrial metals. Like our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy, we are initiating this as a tactical trade but it may become strategic. We are reinitiating a tactical long Korea / short Taiwan equity trade. Taiwanese political risk is understated ahead of January’s election and the island is the epicenter of the US-China cold war. We are restoring our long gold trade as a strategic hedge. Populism and de-globalization are potentially inflationary, but they are also linked with great power competition which will increase the frequency of geopolitical crises. In either case, gold is the right safe haven to own.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The US-China trade talks will continue despite Hong Kong. The UK election will not reintroduce no-deal Brexit risk – either in the short run or the long run. European political risk is set to rise from low levels, but Euro Area break-up risk will not. There is no single thread uniting emerging market social unrest. We remain constructive on Brazil. Feature Chart 1Taiwan Indicator To Rise Despite Ceasefire President Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act into law on November 27. The signing was by now expected – Trump was not going to veto the bill and invite the Senate to override him with a 67-vote at a time when he is being impeached. He does not want to familiarize the Senate with voting against him in supermajorities. The Hong Kong bill will not wreck the US-China trade talks, but it is a clear example of our argument that strategic tensions will persist and cast doubt on the durability of the “phase one trade deal” being negotiated. It is better to think of it as a ceasefire, as Trump’s electoral constraint is the clear motivation. Trump is embattled at home and will contend an election in 11 months. He will not impose the tariff rate hike scheduled for December 15. A relapse into trade war would kill the green shoots in US and global growth, which partly stem from the perception of easing trade risk. Only if Trump’s approval rating collapses, or China stops cooperating, will he become insensitive to his electoral constraint. Will China abandon the talks and leave Trump in the lurch? This is not our base case but it is a major global risk. So far China is reciprocating. Xi Jinping’s political and financial crackdown at home, combined with the trade war abroad, has led to an economic slowdown and an explosion in China’s policy uncertainty relative to America’s. A trade ceasefire – on top of fiscal easing – is a way to improve the economy without engaging in another credit splurge. The US and China will continue moving toward a trade ceasefire, despite the Hong Kong bill. The move toward a trade ceasefire will probably keep our China GeoRisk Indicator from rising sharply over the next few months. However, our Taiwan indicator, which we have used as a trade war proxy at times, may diverge as it starts pricing in the heightened political risk surrounding Taiwan’s presidential election on January 11, 2020 (Chart 1). Sanctions, tech controls, Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, Iran, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang are all strategic tensions that can flare up. Yes, uncertainty will fall and sentiment will improve on a ceasefire, but only up to a point. China’s domestic policy decisions are ultimately more important than its handling of the trade war. At the upcoming Central Economic Work Conference authorities are expected to stay focused on “deepening supply-side structural reform” and avoiding the use of “irrigation-style” stimulus (blowout credit growth). But this does not mean they will not add more stimulus. Since the third quarter, a more broad-based easing of financial controls and industry regulations is apparent, leading our China Investment Strategy to expect a turning point in the Chinese economy in early 2020. This “China view” – on stimulus and trade – is critical to the outlook for the two regions on which we focus for the rest of this report: Europe and emerging markets. Assuming that China stabilizes, these are the regions where risk assets stand to benefit the most. Europe is a political opportunity; the picture in emerging markets is, as always, mixed. United Kingdom: Will Santa Bring A Lump Of Coal? The Brits will hold their first winter election since 1974 on December 12. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party has seen a tremendous rally in opinion polls, although it has stalled at a level comparable to its peak ahead of the last election in June 2017 (Chart 2). Another hung parliament or weak Tory coalition is possible. Yet the Tories are better positioned this time given that the opposition Labour Party is less popular than two years ago, while the Liberal Democrats are more capable of stealing Labour votes. The Tories stand to lose in Scotland, but the Brexit Party of Nigel Farage is not contesting seats with them and is thus undercutting Labour in certain Brexit-leaning constituencies. Markets would enjoy a brief relief rally on a single-party Tory majority. This would enable Johnson to get his withdrawal deal over the line and take the UK out of the EU in an orderly manner by January 31. The question would then shift to whether Johnson feels overconfident in negotiating the post-Brexit trade agreement with the EU, which is supposed to be done by December 31, 2020. This date will become the new deadline for tariff increases, but it can be extended. Johnson is as unlikely to fly off the cliff edge next year as he was this year, and this year he demurred. Negotiating a trade agreement is easier when the two economies are already integrated, have a clear (yet flexible) deadline, and face exogenous economic risks. Our political risk indicator will rise but it will not revisit the highs of 2018-19 (Chart 3). The pound’s floor is higher than it was prior to September 2019. Chart 2Tories Look To Be Better Positioned For A Single Party Majority Chart 3UK Risk Will Rise, But Not To Previous Highs Bottom Line: A hung parliament is the only situation where a no-deal Brexit risk reemerges in advance of the new Brexit day of January 31. The market is underestimating this outcome based on our risk indicator. But Johnson himself prefers the deal he negotiated and wishes to avoid the recession that would likely ensue from crashing out of the EU. And a headless parliament can prevent Johnson from forcing a no-deal exit, as investors witnessed this fall. We remain long GBP-JPY. Germany: The Risk Of An Early Election Germany is wading deeper into a period of political risk surrounding Chancellor Angela Merkel’s “lame duck” phase, doubts over her chosen successor, and uncertainty about Germany’s future in the world. The federal election of 2021 already looms large. Our indicator is only beginning to price this trend which can last for the next two years (Chart 4). On October 27 Germany’s main centrist parties suffered a crushing defeat in the state election of Thuringia. For the first time, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) not only lost its leadership position, but also secured less vote share than both the Left Party and the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 4Germany Is Heading Toward A Period Of Greater Political Risk The AfD successfully positioned itself with the right wing of the electorate and managed to capture more undecided voters than any other party (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5The Right-Wing AfD Outperformed In Thuringia … While the rise of the AfD (and its outperformance over its national polling) may seem alarming, Germany is not being taken over by Euroskeptics. Both support for the euro and German feeling of being “European” is near all-time highs (Chart 6). The question is how the centrist parties respond. Merkel’s approval rating is at its lower range. Support for Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), Merkel’s chosen successor, is plummeting (Chart 7). Since AKK was confirmed as party chief, the CDU suffered big losses in the European Parliament election and in state elections. Several of her foreign policy initiatives were not well received in the party.1 In October 2019, the CDU youth wing openly rejected her nomination as Merkel’s successor. At the annual CDU party conference on November 22-23, she only narrowly managed to avoid rebellion. She is walking on thin ice and will need to recover her approval ratings if she wants to secure the chancellorship. Meanwhile the CDU will lose its united front, increasing Germany’s policy uncertainty. Chart 6... But Euroskeptics Will Not Take Over Germany Germany’s other major party – the Social Democratic Party (SPD) – is also going through a leadership struggle. Chart 7The CDU Party Leader Is Walking On Thin Ice Chart 8A Return To The Polls Would Result In A CDU-Green Coalition In the first round of the leadership vote, Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and Klara Geywitz (member of the Brandenburg Landtag) secured a small plurality of votes with 22.7%, just 1.6% more than Bundestag member Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans (finance minister of North Rhine-Westphalia from 2010-17). The latest polling, and Scholz’s backing by the establishment, implies that he will win but this is uncertain. The results of the second round will be published on November 30, after we go to press. What does the SPD’s leadership contest mean for the CDU-SPD coalition? More likely than not, the status quo will continue. Scholz is an establishment candidate and supports remaining in the ruling coalition until 2021. Esken is calling for the SPD to leave the coalition, but Walter-Borjans has not explicitly supported this. An SPD exit from the Grand Coalition would likely lead to a snap election, not a favorable outcome for stability-loving Germans. A return to the polls would benefit the Greens and AfD at the expense of the mainstream parties, and would likely see a CDU-Green coalition emerge (Chart 8). Given that a majority of voters want the SPD to remain in government (Chart 9), and that new elections would damage the SPD’s prospects, we believe that the SPD is likely to stay in government until 2021, even if the less established Esken and Walter-Borjans win. The risk is the uncertainty around Merkel’s exit. October 2021 is a long time for Merkel to drag the coalition along, so the odds of an early election are probably higher than expected. Chart 9Germans Prefer The SPD Remains In Government Chart 10Climate Spending Closest Germany Gets To Fiscal Stimulus (For Now) Chart 11There Is Room For More Fiscal Stimulus In Germany, If Needed What would a Scholz win mean for the great debate over whether Germany will step up its fiscal policy? If the establishment duo wins the SPD leadership, the Grand Coalition remains in place, and the economy does not relapse, we are unlikely to see additional fiscal stimulus in the near future. Scholz argues that additional stimulus would not be productive, as the slowdown is due to external factors (i.e. trade war).2 The recently released Climate Action Program 2030 is the closest to fiscal stimulus that we will see. This package will deliver additional spending worth 9bn euro in 2020 and 54bn euro until 2023 (Chart 10). We are unlikely to see additional fiscal stimulus from Germany in the near future. Bottom Line: Germany is wading into a period of rising political uncertainty. In the event of a downward surprise in growth, there is room to add more fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). But there is no change in fiscal policy in the meantime, e.g. no positive surprise. France: Macron Takes Center Stage While Merkel exits, President Emmanuel Macron continues to position himself as Europe’s leader – with a vision for European integration, reform, and political centrism. But in the near term he will remain tied down with his ambitious domestic agenda. France is trudging down the path of fiscal consolidation. After exiting the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2018, and decreasing real government expenditures by 0.3% of GDP, France’s budget deficit is forecasted to decline further (Chart 12). Macron’s government is moving towards balancing its budget primarily by reducing government expenditures to finance tax cuts and decrease the deficit. Macron’s reform efforts following the Great National Debate – tax cuts for the middle class, bonus exemptions from income tax and social security contributions, and adjustment of pensions for inflation – have paid off.3 His approval rating is beginning to recover from the lows hit during the Yellow Vest protests (Chart 13). These reforms will be financed by lower government expenditures and reduced debt burden as a result of accommodative monetary policy. Chart 12Fiscal Consolidation In France Chart 13Macron's Reform Efforts Have Paid Off Overall, France has proven to a very resilient country in light of a general economic slowdown (Chart 14, top panel). Business investment and foreign direct investment, propped up by gradual cuts in the corporate income tax rate, have remained steady, and confidence remains strong (Chart 14, bottom panels). France is consumer driven and hence somewhat protected from storms in global trade. Chart 14French Economy Resilient Despite Global Slowdown Chart 15Ongoing Strikes Will Register In French Risk Indicator Bottom Line: France stands out for remaining generally stable despite pursuing structural reforms. Strikes and opposition to reforms will continue, and will register in our risk indicator (Chart 15), but it is Germany where global trends threaten the growth model and political trends threaten greater uncertainty. On the fiscal front France is consolidating rather than stimulating.   Italy: Muddling Through This fall’s budget talks caused very little political trouble, as expected. The new Finance Minister Roberto Gualtieri is an establishment Democratic Party figure and will not seek excessive conflict with Brussels over fiscal policy. Italy’s budget deficit is projected to stay flat over 2019 and 2020. The key development since the mid-year budget revision was the repeal of the Value Added Tax hike scheduled for 2020, a repeal financed primarily by lower interest spending.4 Equity markets have celebrated Italy’s avoidance of political crisis this year with a 5.6% increase. Our own measure of geopolitical risk has dropped off sharply (Chart 16). But of course we expect it to rise next year given that Italy remains the weakest link in the Euro Area over the long run. The left-leaning alliance between the established Democratic Party and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement hurt both parties’ approval ratings. In fact, the only parties that have seen an increase in approval in the last month are the League, the far-right Brothers of Italy, and the new centrist party of former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Italia Viva (Chart 17). We expect to see cracks form next year, particularly over immigration, but mutual fear of a new election can motivate cooperation for a time. Chart 16Decline In Italian Risk Will Be Short Lived Chart 17The M5S-PD Alliance Damaged Their Approval Bottom Line: Italy’s new government is running orthodox fiscal policy, which means no boost to growth, but no clashing with Brussels either. Spain: Election Post Mortem Chart 18A Gridlocked Parliament In Spain The Spanish election produced another gridlocked parliament, as expected, with no party gaining a majority and no clear coalition options. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) emerged as the clear leader but still lost three seats. The People’s Party recovered somewhat from its April 2019 defeat, gaining 23 seats. The biggest loser of the election was Ciudadanos, which lost 47 seats after its highly criticized shift to the right, forcing its leader Alberto Rivera to resign. The party’s seats were largely captured by the far-right Vox party, which won 15.1% of the popular vote and more than doubled its seats (Chart 18). Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez has arranged a preliminary governing agreement with Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, but it is unstable. Even with Podemos, Sanchez falls far short of the 176 seats he needs to govern. In fact, there are only three possible scenarios in which the Socialists can reach the required 176 seats and none of these scenarios are easy to negotiate (Chart 19). The first – a coalition with the People’s Party – can already be ruled out. The other two require the support of the smaller pro-independence party, which will be difficult for Sanchez to secure, given that he hardened his stance on Catalonia in the days leading up to the election. Chart 19No Simple Way To A Majority Government The next step for Sanchez is to be confirmed as prime minister in an “investiture” vote, likely on December 16.5 He would need 176 votes in the first round (or a simple majority in the second round) to gain the confidence of Congress. He looks to fall short (Chart 20).6 If he fails to be confirmed, Sanchez will have another two months to form a government or face the possibility of yet another election. Chart 20Sanchez Set To Fall Short In Investiture Vote Spain’s indecision is leading to small conflicts with Brussels. Last week, the European Commission placed Spain under the preventative arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, stating that the country had not done enough to reach its medium-term budget objective.7 The European Commission’s outlook on Spain is slightly more pessimistic than that of the Spanish government (Chart 21). Deficit projections could worsen if a left-wing government takes power that includes the anti-austerity Podemos – which means that Spain is the only candidate for a substantial fiscal policy surprise. Chart 21A Fiscal Policy Surprise In Spain? Chart 22Spanish Risk Will Keep Rising We expect our Spanish risk indicator to keep rising (Chart 22). The silver lining is that Spain’s turmoil – like Germany’s – poses no systemic risk to the Euro Area. Spain could also see an increase in fiscal thrust. Stay long Italian government bonds and short Spanish bonos. Bottom Line: We remain tactically long Italian government bonds and short Spanish bonos. Italian bonds will sell off less in a risk-on phase and rally more in a risk-off phase, and relative political trends reinforce this trade. Emerging Markets: Global Unrest Civil unrest is unfolding across the world, grabbing the attention of the global news media (Chart 23). The proximate causes vary – ranging from corruption, inequality, governance, and austerity – but the fear of contagion is gaining ground. Chart 23Pickup In Civil Unrest Raising Fear Of Contagion A country’s vulnerability to unrest can be gauged by two main factors: political voice and underlying economic conditions. • Political Voice: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, specifically voice and accountability, corruption, and rule of law, provide proxies for political participation (Chart 24). The aim is to assess whether there is a legitimate channel for discontent to lead to change. Countries with low rankings are especially at risk of experiencing unrest when the economy is unable to deliver. Chart 24Greater Risk Of Unrest Where Political Voice Is Absent • Economic Conditions: Last year’s tightening monetary conditions, the manufacturing and trade slowdown, the US-China trade war, and a strong US dollar have weighed on global growth this year. This is challenging, especially for economies struggling to pick up the pace of growth (Chart 25). It translates to increased job insecurity, in some cases where insecurity is already rife (Chart 26). The likelihood that economic deterioration spurs widespread unrest depends on both the level and change in these variables. The former political factor is a structural condition that becomes more relevant when economic conditions deteriorate. Chart 25The Global Slowdown Weighed On Growth In Regions Already Struggling … Chart 26… And Raise Job Insecurity Chart 27Brazilian Risk Unlikely To Reach Previous Highs BCA Research is optimistic on global growth as we enter the end game of this business cycle. Nevertheless risks to this view are elevated and emerging market economies are still reeling from the past year’s slowdown. This makes them especially sensitive to failures on the part of policymakers. As a result, policymakers will be more inclined to ease monetary and fiscal policy and less inclined to execute structural reforms. Brazil is a case in point. Our indicator is flagging a sharp rise in political risk (Chart 27). This reflects the recent breakdown in the real – which can go further as the finance ministry has signaled it is willing to depreciate to revive growth. Meanwhile the administration has postponed its proposals to overhaul the country’s public sector, including measures to freeze wages and reduce public sectors jobs. On the political front, President Jair Bolsonaro’s recent break from the Social Liberal Party and launch of a new party, the Alliance for Brazil, threatens to reduce his ability to get things done. This move comes at a time when Brazil’s political landscape is being shaken up by former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s release from jail, pending an appeal against his corruption conviction. The former leader of the Worker’s Party lost no time in vowing to revive Brazil’s left. Our risk indicator might overshoot due to currency policy, but we doubt that underlying domestic political instability will reach late-2015 and mid-2018 levels. Brazil has emerged from a deep recession, an epic corruption scandal, and an impeachment that led to the removal of former president Dilma Rousseff. It is not likely to see a crisis of similar stature so soon. Bolsonaro’s approval rating is the lowest of Brazil’s recent leaders, save Michel Temer, but it has not yet collapsed (Chart 28). An opinion poll held in October – prior to Lula’s release – indicates that Bolsonaro is favored to win in a scenario in which he goes head to head against Lula (Chart 29). Justice Minister Sergio Moro, who oversaw the corruption investigation, is the only candidate that would gain more votes when pitted against Bolsonaro. He is working with Bolsonaro at present and is an important pillar of the administration. So it is premature to pronounce Bolsonaro’s presidency finished. Chart 28Bolsonaro’s Approval, While Relatively Low, Has Not Collapsed Chart 29Bolsonaro Not Yet Finished The problem, as illustrated in Charts 25 and 26, is that Brazil still suffers from slow growth and an uninspiring job market – longstanding economic grievances. This will induce the administration to take a precautionary stance and slow the reform process. The result should be reflationary in the short run but negative for Brazil’s sustainability over the long run. There is still a positive path forward. Unlike the recently passed pension cuts and the public sector cuts that were just postponed – both of which zap entitlements from Brazilians – the other items on the reform agenda are less controversial. Privatization and tax reform are less politically onerous and will keep the government and economy on a positive trajectory. Meanwhile the pension cuts are unlikely to be a source of discontent as they will be phased in over 12-14 years. Thus, while the recent political events justify a higher level of risk, speculation regarding the likelihood of mass unrest in Brazil – apart from the mobilization of Worker’s Party supporters ahead of the municipal elections next fall – is overdone. Bottom Line: The growth environment in emerging markets is set to improve in 2020. US-China trade risk is falling and China will do at least enough stimulus to be stable. Moreover emerging markets will use monetary and fiscal tools to mitigate social unrest. This will not prevent unrest from continuing to flare. But not every country that has unrest is globally significant. Brazil is a major market that has recently emerged from extreme political turmoil, so a relapse is not our base case. Otherwise one should monitor Hong Kong’s impact on the trade deal, Russia’s internal stability, and the danger that Iranian and Iraqi unrest could cause oil supply disruptions. In the event that the global growth rebound does not materialize we expect Mexico and Thailand – which have better fundamentals – to outperform. Our long Thai equity relative trade is a strategic defensive trade.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Merkel’s Successor Splits German Coalition With Rogue Syria Plan,” dated October 22, 2019 and “Merkel's Own Party Wants Outright Huawei Ban From 5G Networks,” dated November 15, 2019, available at bloomberg.com. 2 Please see “Scholz Says No Need for German Stimulus After Dodging Recession,” dated November 14, 2019, available at bloomberg.com. 3 Please see “France: Draft Budgetary Plan For 2020,” dated October 15, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. 4 Please see “Analysis of the Draft Budgetary Plan of Italy,” dated November 20, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. 5 Please see “Investiture calendar | Can a government be formed before Christmas?” dated November 14, 2019, available at elpais.com. 6 If Sanchez convinces PNV, BNG, and Teruel Exists to vote in his favor for both rounds of the vote, he would need ERC and Eh Bildu to abstain in order to win. However, given that the PSOE has stated that it will not even negotiate with Eh Bildu, it is likely that this party will vote against Sanchez, giving the opposition 168 votes. In this case, Sanchez would not only need PNV, BNG, and Teruel in his favor, but also the support of either CC or ERC, both unlikely scenarios. 7 Please see “Commission Opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Spain,” dated November 20, 2019, available at ec.europa.eu. Appendix Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator  Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

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In lieu of our regular weekly report, we are sending you a special report by our colleagues Bob Ryan, Chief Commodity and Energy Strategist, and Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst, from BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy. The report highlights how global economic policy uncertainty over the past year has enabled gold and the USD unusually to rise together. In the near term, the combination of global economic stimulus and a US-China trade ceasefire should reduce policy uncertainty and encourage global demand for commodities. On a cyclical basis this should allow the dollar to fall back, inflation expectations to revive, and gold to appreciate. We trust you will find this research useful and insightful. All very best, Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategy Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD was indefinitely suspended beginning in 4Q18 by the pervasive economic uncertainty we identified last week as the culprit holding back global oil demand growth via a super-charged dollar.1 This uncertainty is most pronounced in the US and Europe vis-à-vis gold, and partly explains the performance of safe havens, particularly the USD, which has soared to new heights on a trade-weighted goods basis, and gold (Chart of the Week). So far, gold has held its ground after breaking above $1,500/oz from the low $1,200s in mid-2018, indicating investors are much more concerned about economic risks arising from economic policy uncertainty than inflation and other diversifiable risks gold typically hedges (Chart 2). Cyclically we remain positive on gold prices on the back of a lower dollar and rising inflation pressure in the US. Chart of the WeekDemand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Economic policy uncertainty in Europe and the US supports gold prices. Chart 2AUS, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Chart 2BUS, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Even so, we are putting a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long gold portfolio hedge to cover tactical risks showing up in our technical indicators. In addition, as is the case with oil demand, if the ceasefire we are expecting in the Sino-US trade war materializes in 1H20 and limited trade – mostly in ags and energy – is forthcoming, demand for safe-haven assets could weaken gold prices at the margin. Fiscal and monetary stimulus globally also could revive economic growth and commodity demand, pushing global yields higher, which would put negative pressure on gold at the margin, as well, given the high correlation between real rates and gold prices. Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term tactical horizon – 3 to 6 months – as economic policy uncertainty continues to stoke global demand for safe havens.2 This can be seen in the elevated correlations between the USD’s broad trade-weighted goods index with the Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes for the US and Europe (Chart 3).3 Rising economic uncertainty – particularly since 4Q18 – has created a rare environment in which both the USD and gold trended up simultaneously and continue to move in the same direction. The implication of this is that gold’s correlation with both the USD and EPU is weaker than before because economic policy uncertainty now is positively correlated with the dollar. Chart 3Strong USD, EPU Correlation Chart 4Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher   There is a possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the US and China can agree on a trade ceasefire... The typically negative correlation between daily returns of gold and the USD also is weakening, moving toward positive territory (Chart 4), as both the USD and gold trend higher simultaneously (Chart 5). Chart 5Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher ...If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. Our short-term technical indicator is signaling an overbought gold market (Chart 6), and our fair-value model indicates gold should be trading ~ $1,450/oz (Chart 7). The latter signal off our fair-value model is less concerning, given the demand for safe-haven assets like the USD and gold now dominates gold’s typical drivers. Chart 6Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Chart 7High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model However, to be on the safe side, we are placing a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long-term gold position, which as of Tuesday’s close was up 21% since inception on May 14, 2017. This is a precautionary measure, which recognizes the possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the US and China can agree on a trade ceasefire, and global fiscal and monetary policy are successful in reviving EM income growth, which would revive commodity demand generally, pushing up global bond yields. If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. During that period, the monetary and fiscal aggregates we track as explanatory variables for gold prices will reassert themselves as the dominant drivers of gold prices (see below). This could produce tension between a falling USD and rising real rates as growth picks up, which would send us to a risk-neutral setting re gold, given the current high correlation between gold and real rates, which should remain strong until the Fed starts hiking rates again, most likely in 2020 (Chart 8). This is part of the reason we are including the stop-loss at $1,450/oz for our existing gold position: During this risky period going into 1H20 economic uncertainty could dissipate, and real rates could rise. Although the USD depreciation would mute these effects, rising real rates would be a risk to gold prices. Chart 8Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Economic Uncertainty Dominates Gold’s Fundamentals At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. In Table 1, we collect the variables we consider when assessing gold’s fair value. At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. This variable broadly falls in the geopolitical risk we regularly account for in our analysis of gold markets. Table 1Fundamental And Technical Gold-Price Drivers If the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Checking off each of these groups, we see: · Demand for inflation hedges remaining muted over the short-term, as inflationary pressures remain weak. In line with our House view, however, we do expect inflation could move higher toward the end of next year and overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for the US. This would support gold prices. · Monetary and financial aggregates are working less well as explanatory variables for gold prices in a market dominated by economic policy uncertainty. The USD-gold correlation continues to be disrupted by strong demand for safe-haven assets. As inflation picks up next year, we expect nominal bond yields to rise. Real rates, however, could remain subdued, as long as the Fed is not aggressively raising rates to get out ahead of a possible revival of inflation (Chart 9). Later in 2020, the correlation between rates and gold should be supportive for gold prices – the correlation fades when the Fed tightens, which creates a demand for safe-haven assets like gold. All the same, an increase in real rates would be a risk to gold prices in 1H20. · At present, demand for portfolio-diversification assets via safe-haven assets is a powerful force in gold’s price evolution. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that if global economic uncertainty is resolved and global growth does rebound, recession fears will diminish, thus reducing the marginal impact of geopolitical shocks. On the other hand, if the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Should that happen, short-term volatility in gold will rise (Chart 10). Chart 9Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Chart 10Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investment Implications Over a tactical horizon – i.e., 3 to 6 months – we expect global economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated. Going into 2020 – and particularly in 2H20 – we expect the USD to weaken on the back of global monetary accommodation policies and increased fiscal stimulus. We also are expecting a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, which will revive trade somewhat and support EM income growth and commodity demand. These assumptions, which we’ve laid out in previous research, will be bullish cyclical factors supporting commodities generally. Bottom Line: A ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, coupled with global fiscal and monetary stimulus, will reduce some of the economic uncertainty dogging aggregate demand. This should be apparent in the data in 1H20. As a result, we continue to expect rising EM income growth to be cyclically bullish for commodities generally. This will allow inflation to revive – again, assuming the Fed does not become aggressive in raising rates. Net, this will be bullish for gold: As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries (Chart 11) Chart 11EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1               Please see “Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth,” published October 17, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2              We expect a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war to be announced in 1H20, which will defuse – but not eliminate – an important risk for global growth in our analytical framework.  We expect this will allow the relationship between the USD and gold to move back to its previous equilibrium in 1Q20 or 2Q20. 3              For more info on the Baker-Bloom-Davis index, please see policyuncertainty.com

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Highlights China’s trade strategy toward the U.S. is not greatly affected by the early U.S. Democratic Party primary election. The sea change in American policy toward China began before Donald Trump and is grounded in U.S. grand strategy. Yet Trump is staging a tactical retreat in his trade war and China is reciprocating, suggesting that Beijing would rather avoid a “lame duck” Trump on the warpath. Beijing will not implement structural changes that would vindicate Trump’s negotiating strategy and set a precedent that is harmful to China’s national interests in the long run. Feature A U.S.-China trade ceasefire is in the works, based on the outcome of the latest high-level talks in Washington. President Trump, paying a surprise visit to the top Chinese negotiator, Vice Premier Liu He, agreed to pause the October 15 tariff hike in exchange for assurances that China would buy $40-$50 billion worth of agricultural goods to ease the economic pressure on Trump’s political base. Trump is now confirmed to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Santiago, Chile on November 16-17, where he hopes to cement this “phase one deal” with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Chart 1Global Policy Uncertainty To Fall Our market-based GeoRisk Indicator for Taiwan island – which calculates Taiwanese political risk based on any excessive deviation of the Taiwanese dollar from economic fundamentals – is a good proxy for Sino-American trade tensions due to Taiwan’s high level of exposure to China and the United States. At the moment it is signaling a sharp drop in tensions. We expect global uncertainty to follow over the coming month as Trump and Xi agree to some kind of ceasefire (Chart 1). Our Taiwan risk measure tracks closely with the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, which measures risk via the word count of key terms in influential global newspapers, because Taiwan is highly exposed to the world economy and trade. Taiwan is also uniquely vulnerable to the biggest source of global policy uncertainty today: the Sino-American trade war. Not only are U.S.-China relations slightly thawing, but also the risk of the U.K. leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed. This will reinforce Europe’s underlying political stability despite the manufacturing recession and help create a drop in global uncertainty (Chart 2). Chart 2American Policy Uncertainty To Buck The Trend Uncertainty will remain elevated beyond the fourth quarter, however, for two main reasons. First, U.S. uncertainty will rise, not fall, as a result of the impending 2020 election. Second, the trade ceasefire is highly unlikely to resolve the slate of disagreements and underlying strategic distrust plaguing U.S.-China relations. This will cap the rebound we expect in global business sentiment. How can we be so sure that the U.S. and China will not strike a historic deal? We answer this question in this report, with particular reference to an important corollary question that has emerged in numerous client meetings: wouldn’t China rather deal with the “transactional” Trump than an “ideological” President Elizabeth Warren?   Trump Is Not A “Lame Duck” Yet, Hence The Ceasefire President Trump is a uniquely commercial president. He did not become president through experience in military or government, but because he was a bold businessman who claimed he could negotiate better deals for the United States, including on immigration and trade. So he is even more vulnerable to an economic downturn than the average U.S. president. Industrial production, manufacturing, and core capital goods new orders are contracting, and sentiment is souring among both business leaders and average consumers (Chart 3). Trump faces a distinct risk that the manufacturing slowdown and psychological effects will morph into a general slowdown. Even if not outrightly recessionary, a generalized slowdown in the U.S. economy could easily lead to rising unemployment during the election year, which would all but ensure Trump’s loss of the White House. The degree of correlation between presidential approval and the unemployment rate fluctuates over time, but our survey of post-World War II presidents shows that the unemployment rate is the best indicator of the direction the approval rating will ultimately go by the end of the term in office. While Trump’s approval is highly correlated with unemployment, it is also very low – resembling President Obama’s at this point in his first term. Yet that was in the aftermath of the Great Recession, and Trump’s approval is declining as a result of the impeachment inquiry into his alleged attempt to convince Ukraine to interfere in the 2020 election in his favor. And his approval is low despite an incredibly low rate of unemployment, at 3.5%, that can hardly get better (Chart 4). Chart 3Trump Needs A Sentiment Boost For 2020 Chart 4Rising Unemployment Would Doom Trump 2020 In short, Trump has very little wiggle room. To be reelected he must not only keep unemployment from rising much, but also achieve some other policy wins in order to draw closer to the average approval rate among post-World War II presidents (top panel, Chart 5). Even the Republican-friendly pollster Rasmussen shows that Trump’s general approval is dangerously eroding (bottom panel, Chart 5). One way Trump can achieve a political and economic victory would be to agree to a trade deal with China. One clear way to achieve a policy victory and a boost to the economy would be to agree to a trade deal with China. Passing the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement through Congress is out of his control. Policy toward China, by contrast, is entirely within his control. Just as he raised the tariffs unilaterally, so he can roll them back unilaterally to encourage the financial markets and CEO confidence – as long as talks are making progress. The downside of this argument is that if Trump becomes a “lame duck,” with a falling economy and/or approval rating virtually ensuring that he cannot get reelected, he is no longer constrained by financial markets or the economy. He would have an incentive to initiate “Cold War 2.0” with China right here and now – or some other foreign conflict – and encourage Americans to rally around the flag amid a historic confrontation with a foreign enemy. This is a huge risk to the 2020 outlook, but it runs afoul of the economic constraint, so we expect Trump to try the “Art of the Deal” one last time.     What about impeachment? When the House of Representatives brings formal impeachment articles against Trump, the Senate will hold the trial. Republicans have a 53-47 majority in the Senate, requiring 20 to defect against the president to generate the 67 votes needed to make him the first president in U.S. history to be removed from office in this way. A total of 16 senators hail from states that Trump won by less than 10% in the 2016 election – so 20 defectors is a strong political constraint. Unless, of course, grassroots Republican support for Trump collapses. Right now it is falling but in line with the average (top panel, Chart 6). Republicans are not warming to the idea of impeachment and removal from office (middle panel, Chart 6). We will reassess the risk of removal if Trump’s intra-party approval heads further south and begins to look like Richard Nixon’s (bottom panel, Chart 6). Bear in mind that the election is one year away – it is easier for Republicans to kick the decision over to voters than to remove one of their own from the Oval Office. A scandal big enough to prompt an exodus of Republican support will doom any chances of Republicans retaining the White House through Vice President Mike Pence or other candidates. Bottom Line: Trump’s approval rating is in dangerously low territory but he is not yet a “lame duck” freed from the shackles of political and economic constraints. He still has a shot at extending the business cycle and saving his election campaign. This is driving him to retreat from tariffs and pursue a trade ceasefire with China. The result should be a decline in global policy uncertainty in Q4. However, this decline will not last long, as American uncertainty will skyrocket during the election year and U.S.-China tensions will reemerge once the economic constraint has been reduced. China Will Accept A Ceasefire In a special report in these pages in August, we raised a critical question: if Trump is forced to retreat from his trade war, will President Xi Jinping reciprocate? Or will he refuse to bargain, leaving Trump overextended to suffer the negative economic repercussions of the trade war without the political benefit of striking a new deal? We now have our answer, at least for the near term. China resumed negotiations in October and has confirmed that progress was made. Beijing is continuing to offer some accommodation of U.S. demands in both domestic and foreign policy (e.g. financial sector opening, enforcement of sanctions on Iran). In Hong Kong SAR, not only has Beijing avoided a violent intervention and suppression of civilian protesters, but there are rumors that Chief Executive Carrie Lam is on the way out by March (which we find highly plausible). There are still plenty of risks across the broad range of U.S.-China disputes, but from the past month’s developments we can infer that President Xi is not going on the offensive in order to destroy Trump’s latest “deal-making” bid. How far will Xi go to accommodate Trump? Not so far as to implement major structural concessions. And this will limit the positive impact of the deal. Xi does not face an electoral constraint, or the loss of office (having removed term limits), nor does he face a domestic political constraint on a 12-month time frame (the twentieth national party congress is not until 2022). Economically China is much more vulnerable – this is a valid constraint. But tariffs do not force Beijing to make major structural concessions and implement them rapidly, certainly not on Trump’s time frame. The economy is slowing but not plummeting (Chart 7). China does not face conditions like 2015-16 and policymakers have decided it is best to save ammunition in case they need to use “bazooka” stimulus later. Chart 7China's Economy Holding Up Chart 8China Not Reflating Property Bubble (Yet) The fact that Beijing has maintained restrictions on the property sector and not allowed reflation to fuel the property bubble (Chart 8) underscores the current policy disposition: some parts of the economy need to be shored up but there is no need to panic. When it comes to tariffs, China ultimately has the option of depreciating the currency to offset the impact. The fact that the CNY-USD exchange rate has not fallen as far as the headline tariff numbers suggest it should fall indicates that Beijing is still maintaining a negotiation rather than letting the currency absorb the full impact (Chart 9). Chart 9China Can Depreciate To Offset Tariffs Since China is still capable of “irrigation-style” fiscal stimulus, the economic constraint can be mitigated further. Beijing can continue to fight if Trump returns to the offensive. Hence we do not expect major new trade concessions beyond what is already on the table – and many of the current offerings consist of promises more so than concrete actions (Table 1). Chart 10Beijing Throws Trump A Bone We do expect China to try to avoid the worst-case scenario, since it would be destabilizing for China’s medium and long-term economy and single-party rule. Stimulus will increase as necessary to ensure that growth rebounds as Beijing seeks to improve the job market and manufacturing sector. And this also supports the logic for agreeing to a ceasefire with Trump. That China is reciprocating is apparent from the U.S.’s rebounding market share in China’s agricultural imports (Chart 10). The relevant constraint for China is that Trump could be rendered a “lame duck” and go ballistic on China, activating the full slate of threats – from high-tech export controls, to banking sanctions, to capital controls. The U.S. is still the more powerful nation in absolute terms, with enormous financial, economic, military, and technological leverage over China. Beijing also sees the danger in deliberately thwarting Trump only to have him somehow win reelection. He would then have a renewed passion for punitive measures, yet he would lack the first term’s electoral constraints. Hence there is a clear basis for President Xi to accept Trump’s tactical trade retreat. Bottom Line: President Xi does not face an imminent domestic political constraint, which gives him greater leverage than President Trump. Nevertheless he does face short term economic pressures, and enough of a geopolitical and economic constraint from a full-blown escalation of tensions to accept Trump’s offer of a ceasefire. Wouldn’t China Rather Deal With Trump Than Warren? What about the upside risk? What are the chances that Xi offers additional concessions – structural concessions – in order to achieve a groundbreaking deal with the American president? A grand compromise will not occur. Republicans and Communist Party leaders have a history of such deals, which pave the way for a new multi-year stint of deepening bilateral economic engagement. We have a high conviction view that such a grand compromise will not occur. But could the U.S. 2020 election change China’s calculus? In particular, wouldn’t China prefer to deal with Trump than Senator Elizabeth Warren? More and more investors are asking this last question as the early U.S. Democratic Party primary election heats up. Warren is a democratic progressive who aims to revolutionize U.S. trade policy to promote human rights, organized labor, and strict environmental standards. She is seen as more “ideological,” whereas Trump is more “transactional” – i.e. willing to make business tradeoffs while staying away from sensitive issues affecting China’s internal affairs. Moreover Trump is a known quantity, whereas Warren would represent an unknown – a progressive populist as president and another revolution in U.S. policy, reducing predictability for Beijing.  Our assessment is that the U.S. election process is too early and too uncertain to serve as a driver of Beijing’s trade negotiating strategy over the fourth quarter. Moreover there is not a clear basis for China to favor Trump to Warren. Chart 11Trade Dispute Precedes Trump There are three major trends to bear in mind: The sea change in U.S. policy toward China began under the Obama administration. President Obama entered office by slapping tire tariffs on Beijing. He endorsed Congress’s “Buy American” provisions in the fiscal stimulus package to fight the Great Recession. Under his administration, the U.S. effectively capped steel imports from China (Chart 11). The Obama administration orchestrated the “Pivot to Asia,” a diplomatic and military initiative to rebalance U.S. strategic commitment to focus on China and the western Pacific more than the Middle East. This included the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an advanced trade deal that deliberately excluded China. It eventually also included a robust reassertion of U.S. maritime supremacy via bulked up Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, a critical global sea lane where Beijing had become increasingly assertive (Diagram 1). Chart 12U.S.-China THAAD Dispute Under Obama The Obama administration’s attempt to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea caused a strategic showdown with China, emblematized by Chinese sanctions against the Korean economy (Chart 12). Obama’s one major policy handover to President Trump was to focus attention on North Korea’s advancing nuclear weaponization and missile capabilities – another source of friction with China. There can be little doubt that if the Democrats win the 2020 election, they will return to some or all of these policies. But this says more about U.S. national policy than it does about which political party China should favor in 2020, because … 2. The Trump administration is unpredictable and disruptive to both the global status quo and China’s economy. President Trump’s significance is that he shifted the Republican Party from its traditional pro-corporate, pro-free trade, pro-China orientation to a more populist, protectionist, and China-bashing approach. He stole the thunder of protectionist Democrats in the manufacturing heartland. He continued the pivot to Asia, albeit by another name (a “free and open Indo-Pacific”). This approach emphasized coercive unilateral “hard power” rather than multilateral “soft power” and resulted in a negative impact on China’s economy. This change, while it has pros and cons, demonstrates that a harder line on China has policy consensus across administrations. Few doubt that this is the new bipartisan consensus in Washington. Trump has executed this policy shift in a way that is fundamentally unsettling and unpredictable for China: sweeping unilateral tariffs against China on national security grounds (Chart 13); sanctions on tech companies critical for China’s economic future (Chart 14); and tightening relations with Taiwan. This policy eschews traditional diplomacy, which is where China thrives, and it unsettles global supply chains, where China once enjoyed centrality. To some extent Trump is even prisoner to his own logic: as he softens policy to get a trade ceasefire, he faces challenges from Congress on everything from tech export controls to Hong Kong human rights to Chinese corporate listings on U.S. stock exchanges. The Democrats will accuse him of caving to China if he agrees to a deal. Still, if China were to grant Trump deep trade concessions, it would effectively vindicate Trump’s approach. Future American presidents could always threaten across-the-board tariffs whenever they want to extract rapid structural changes from China’s policymakers. This is an intolerable precedent to set. A hard line on China has policy consensus across U.S. administrations. Chart 13Trump's Trade Policy Highly Disruptive Chart 14China's Tech Sector Under Threat   3. China cannot predict the outcome of U.S. primary or general elections. No one knows who will win the Democratic Party’s primary election. Joe Biden is the frontrunner and has clear advantages in terms of electability versus Trump. But Elizabeth Warren is gaining on him and her chief progressive rival, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, is likely to continue flagging in the polls and feeding her rise due to his ill health. It is highly unlikely that Xi Jinping will make decisions regarding a ceasefire with Trump, as early as next month, based on up-and-down developments in a primary election that has not technically even begun (the first vote is in February). Once Biden or Warren have clinched the nomination, it is not clear who will win in November 2020. President Trump narrowly seized the electoral college in 2016 and the risks to his reelection are extreme, as outlined above. Yet he is the incumbent and BCA Research does not expect a recession next year, which should create a baseline case of reelection. Meanwhile Biden’s debate performances and polling are lackluster, despite being the establishment pick and front runner. Warren’s far-left ideology is a liability, although she is at least capable of beating Trump. Chinese policymakers will assess the developments, but Beijing will conduct strategy to be prepared for any outcome. Summing up the above, all that China knows for certain is that Trump is the current standard-bearer of a broader sea change in the Republican Party and Washington. The new consensus is broadly antagonistic toward China’s growing global influence. Hence China is preparing for “protracted struggle” regardless of whether Trump or a Democrat sits in the Oval Office after 2020. The logical conclusion is to continue negotiating with Trump, and offer some concessions to maintain credibility, but not to capitulate to his gunboat diplomacy. Finally, there are a two key arguments that work against the argument that China prefers Warren to Trump: Democrats will need time to build a multilateral anti-China coalition: Trump’s greatest mistake in the trade war is arguably his failure to form a “coalition of the willing” among western nations to take on China’s mercantilist trade practices together. Chart 15Trump Missed Chance To Build Grand Coalition Such a coalition would have represented a much greater economic constraint for Chinese leaders (Chart 15), making structural concessions more likely. A future Democratic president would have better luck in galvanizing such a coalition. Thus, by favoring Trump, Beijing could perpetuate the division between “America First” and “the liberal Western order.” Yet western nations will still be reluctant to confront China and it will take years of diplomacy to build such a concerted effort. These are years in which China can improve its economic self-sufficiency and use diplomacy to undermine western cohesion. By contrast, a second-term Trump could pursue punitive measures immediately (beyond tariffs) and could also pursue more western alignment, for instance on tech sanctions. A Chinese policy focused on overall stability would not clearly prefer the latter. As for a Warren presidency, her trade policy has more in common with Trump’s than with Biden’s or the status quo. It is not at all clear that she would be able to unify the West against China on the issue of trade. Hence there is no clear advantage to China of preferring Trump. Biden is probably a greater threat to China on this front, since he would “renegotiate” (i.e. rejoin) the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and court the Europeans, while likely maintaining Obama’s line on China. Yet Biden is viewed as the most pro-China candidate of all.  In short, trade policy is a wash from China’s point of view. The U.S. has already taken a more protectionist turn. From China’s view, the U.S. as a whole has taken a protectionist turn. Democrats will not prioritize China: Trump will be unshackled from concerns about bear markets and recessions if he is reelected to a second term due to the two-term limit. Warren would enter as a first-term president and would therefore face the reelection constraint that has hindered Trump’s own trade policy. If Trump loses, Warren faces an implicit threat should she clash with China. Chart 16Market Sees Warren As Health Care Risk Warren will also, like President Obama, spend the majority of her first term engrossed in an ambitious domestic policy agenda. Her policy priority is a universal single-payer health care system, which is a much more dramatic undertaking than Biden’s proposal of restoring and enhancing Obamacare, which is why health sector equities are sensitive to Warren’s election chances (Chart 16). Obama did not devote his full attention to Iran and China until his second term, and it is normal for the second term to be the “foreign policy term” due to the absence of electoral constraints. Several of Warren’s policy priorities would also be more favorable to China. In particular, Warren’s desire to impose tougher restrictions on U.S. financials, energy companies, and tech companies is broadly beneficial to China’s efforts to create globally competitive champions. At the same time, Trump is more likely to continue the buildup in U.S. military spending, which, combined with the unlikelihood that Trump will ultimately abandon U.S. allies in Asia, poses a strategic threat for China (Chart 17). China cannot calculate its trade negotiations according to the ups and downs of volatile U.S. politics. Instead it has an incentive to play both sides: to give Trump promises while hesitating to implement them, so as not to render him a dangerous “lame duck” (Chart 18) but also not to gift-wrap the election for him. Chart 17Trump's Military Buildup The one thing that can be expected over the next two years is that China will try to maintain economic stability to attract Europe and Asia deeper into its orbit. This means incrementally more stimulus, as mentioned above. China cannot allow itself to risk debt-deflation while encouraging other economies to become less reliant on Chinese demand. Bottom Line: China cannot predict the future. Its best play is to try to undermine the emerging U.S. policy consensus to be tough on China. This means agreeing to a ceasefire to pacify Trump without giving him major structural concessions that improve his chances of reelection. If he loses, future presidents will be afraid of tackling China aggressively. If he wins, yes, China can try to exploit his “America First” policy to keep the U.S. divided within itself and with the rest of the West. If a Democrat wins, China will have set a precedent that gunboat diplomacy fails. It can try to bind the Democrat to the Trump ceasefire terms. If the Democrats tear up the deal then China will have a basis to begin negotiations as an aggrieved party. Investment Conclusions The problem for President Trump is that a weak, short-term ceasefire – in which China does not verifiably implement structural concessions and the threat of “tech war” continues to loom – will not have as positive of an impact on global and American economic sentiment as Trump hopes. Moreover it could collapse under the weight of Sino-American strategic distrust in areas outside trade. Thus while we expect global policy uncertainty to drop off – as we outlined at the beginning of this report – we expect the reduction to be moderate rather than dramatic and not to last all the way to the U.S. election.  Our colleagues Bob Ryan and Hugo Belanger have demonstrated that a rise in global policy uncertainty is correlated with a rise in the trade weighted dollar (Chart 19). If uncertainty falls, it will help the dollar ease, which improves global financial conditions and cultivates a rebound in global growth and trade. Chart 19Policy Uncertainty Boosts The Dollar Chart 20Falling Uncertainty Hurts US Outperformance This is corroborated by the U.S. trade policy uncertainty index, which reinforces not only the point about the dollar but also the implication that global equities can begin to outperform U.S. equities (Chart 20). With trade sentiment recovering, and U.S. domestic political risk rising due to the election, there is a basis for equity rotation. This assumes that China’s growth does incrementally improve, as we expect.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The U.S. and China are moving toward formalizing a trade ceasefire that reduces geopolitical risk in the near term. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is finished – removing a major downside to European assets. Spanish elections reinforce our narrative of general European political stability. Go long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Geopolitical risks will remain elevated in Turkey, rise in Russia, but remain subdued in Brazil. A post-mortem of Canada’s election suggests upside to fiscal spending but further downside to energy sector investment over the short to medium term. Feature After a brief spike in trade war-related geopolitical risk just prior to the resumption of U.S.-China negotiations, President Trump staged a tactical retreat in the trade war. Chart 1Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Negotiating in Washington, President Trump personally visited the top Chinese negotiator Liu He and the two sides announced an informal “phase one deal” to reverse the summer’s escalation in tensions: China will buy $40-$50 billion in U.S. agricultural goods while the U.S. will delay the October 15 tariff hike. More difficult issues – forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies – were punted to later. The RMB is up 0.7% and our own measures of trade war-related risk have dropped off sharply (Chart 1). We think these indicators will be confirmed and Trump’s retreat will continue – as long as he has a chance to save the 2020 economic outlook and his reelection campaign. Odds are low that Trump will be removed from office by a Republican-controlled senate – the looming election provides the republic with an obvious recourse for Trump’s alleged misdeeds. However, Trump’s approval rating is headed south. While it is around the same level as President Obama’s at this point in his first term, Obama’s started a steep and steady rise around now and ended above 50% for the election, a level that is difficult to foresee for Trump (Chart 2). So Trump desperately needs an economic boost and a policy victory to push up his numbers. Short of passing the USMCA, which is in the hands of the House Democrats, a deal with China is the only way to get a major economic and political win at the same time. Hence the odds of Presidents Trump and Xi actually signing some kind of agreement are the highest they have been since April (when we had them pegged at 50/50). Trump will have to delay the December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some of the tariffs over next year as continuing talks “make progress,” though we doubt he will remove restrictions on tech companies like Huawei. Still, we strongly believe that what is coming is a détente rather than the conclusion of the Sino-American rivalry crowned with a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Strategic tensions are rising on a secular basis between the two countries. These tensions could still nix Trump’s flagrantly short-term deal-making, and they virtually ensure that some form of trade war will resume in 2021 or 2022, if indeed a ceasefire is maintained in 2020. Both sides are willing to reduce immediate economic pain but neither side wants to lose face politically. Trump will not forge a “grand compromise.” Our highest conviction view all along has been – and remains – that Trump will not forge a “grand compromise” ushering in a new period of U.S.-China economic reengagement in the medium or long term. China’s compliance, its implementation of structural changes, will be slow or lacking and difficult to verify at least until the 2020 verdict is in. This means policy uncertainty will linger and business confidence and capex intentions will only improve on the margin, not skyrocket upward (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump Needs A Policy Win And Economic Boost Chart 3Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat The problem for bullish investors is that even if global trade uncertainty falls, and the dollar’s strength eases, fear will shift from geopolitics to politics, and from international equities to American equities (Chart 4). Trump, hit by impeachment and an explosive reaction to his Syria policy, is entering into dangerous territory for the 2020 race. Trump’s domestic weakness threatens imminent equity volatility for two reasons. Chart 4American Outperformance Falls With Trade Tensions Chart 5Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative First, if Trump’s approval rating falls below today’s 42%, investors will begin pricing a Democratic victory in 2020, i.e. higher domestic policy uncertainty, higher taxes, and the re-regulation of the American economy (Chart 5). This re-rating may be temporarily delayed or mitigated by the fact that former Vice President Joe Biden is still leading the Democratic Party’s primary election race. Biden is a known quantity whose policies would simply restore the Obama-era status quo, which is only marginally market-negative. Contrary to our expectations Biden's polling has not broken down due to accusations of foul play in Ukraine and China. Nevertheless, Senator Elizabeth Warren will gradually suck votes away from fellow progressive Senator Bernie Sanders and in doing so remain neck-and-neck with Biden (Chart 6). When and if she pulls ahead of Biden, markets face a much greater negative catalyst. (Yes, she is also capable of beating Trump, especially if his polling remains as weak as it is.) Chart 6Warren Will Rise To Front-Runner Status With Biden Second, if Trump becomes a “lame duck” he will eventually reverse the trade retreat above and turn into a loose cannon in his final months in office. Right now we see a decline in geopolitical risk, but if the economy fails to rebound or the China ceasefire offers little support, then Trump will at some point conclude that his only chance at reelection is to double down on his confrontation with America’s enemies and run as a “war president.” A cold war crisis with China, or a military confrontation with Iran (or North Korea, Venezuela, or some unexpected target) could occur. But since September we have been confirmed in believing that Trump is trying to be the dealmaker one last time before any shift to the war president. Bottom Line: The “phase one” trade deal is really just a short-term ceasefire. Assuming it is signed by Trump and Xi, it suggests no increase in tariffs and some tariff rollback next year. However, as recessionary fears fade, and if Trump’s reelection chances stabilize, U.S.-China tensions on a range of issues will revive – and there is no getting around the longer-term conflict between the two powers. For this and other reasons, we remain strategically short RMB-USD, as the flimsy ceasefire will only briefly see RMB appreciation. BoJo's Brexit Bluff Is Finished Our U.K. indicator captured a sharp decline in political risk in the past two weeks and our continental European indicators mirrored this move (Chart 7). The risk that the U.K. would fall out of the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed even further than in September, when parliament rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s no-deal gambit and we went long GBP-USD. We have since added a long GBP-JPY trade. Chart 7Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Chart 8Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This The risk of “no deal” is the only reason to care about Brexit from a macro point of view, as the difference between “soft Brexit” and “no Brexit” is not globally relevant. What matters is the threat of a supply-side shock to Europe when it is already on the verge of recession. With this risk removed, sentiment can begin to recover (and Trump’s trade retreat also confirms our base case that he will not impose tariffs on European cars on November 14). Since Brexit was the only major remaining European political risk, European policy uncertainty will continue to fall. The Halloween deadline was averted because the EU, on the brink of recession, offered a surprising concession to Johnson, enabling him to agree to a deal and put it up for a vote in parliament. The deal consists of keeping Northern Ireland in the European Customs Union but not the whole of the U.K., effectively drawing a new soft border at the Irish Sea. The bill passed the second reading but parliament paused before finalizing it, rejecting Johnson’s rapid three-day time table. The takeaway is that even if an impending election returns Johnson to power, he will seek to pass his deal rather than pull the U.K. out without a deal. This further lowers the odds of a no-deal Brexit as it illuminates Johnson's preferences, which are normally hidden from objective analysis. True, there is a chance that the no-deal option will reemerge if Johnson’s deal totally collapses due to parliamentary amendments, or if the U.K. and EU have failed to agree to a future relationship by the end of the transition period on December 31, 2020 (which can be extended until the end of 2022). However, the chance is well below the 30% which we deemed as the peak risk of no-deal back in August. Johnson created the most credible threat of a no-deal exit that we are likely to see in our lifetimes – a government with authority over foreign policy determined to execute the outcome of a popular referendum – and yet parliament stopped it dead in its tracks. Johnson does not want a no-deal recession and his successors will not want one either. After all, the support for Brexit and for the Tories has generally declined since the referendum, and the Tories are making a comeback on the prospect of an orderly Brexit (Chart 8). All eyes will now turn toward the impending election. Opinion polls still show that Johnson is likely to be returned to power (Chart 9). The Tories have a prospect of engrossing the pro-Brexit vote while the anti-Brexit opposition stands divided. No-deal risk only reemerges if the Conservatives are returned to power with another weak coalition that paralyzes parliament. Chart 9Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Chart 10Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Whatever the election result, we maintain our long-held position that Brexit portends greater fiscal largesse (Chart 10). The agitated swath of England that drove the referendum result will not be assuaged by leaving the European Union – the rewards of Brexit are not material but philosophical, so material grievances will return. Voter frustration will rotate from the EU to domestic political elites. Voters will demand more government support for social concerns. Johnson’s own government confirms this point through its budget proposals. A Labour-led government would oversee an even more dramatic fiscal shift. Our GeoRisk indicator will fall on Brexit improvements but the question of the election and next government will ensure it does not fall too far. Our long GBP trades are tactical and we expect volatility to remain elevated. But the greatest risk, of no deal, is finished, so it does make sense for investors with a long time horizon to go strategically long the pound. The greatest risk, of a no deal Brexit, is finished. Bottom Line: Brexit posed a risk to the global economy only insofar as it proved disorderly. A withdrawal agreement by definition smooths the process. Continental Europe will not suffer a further shock to net exports. The Brexit contribution to global policy uncertainty will abate. The pound will rise against the euro and yen and even against the dollar as long as Trump’s trade retreat continues. Spain: Further Evidence Of European Stability We have long argued that the majority of Catalans do not want independence, but rather a renegotiation of the region's relationship with Spain (Chart 11). This month’s protests in Barcelona following the Catalan independence leaders’ sentencing are at the lower historical range in terms of size – protest participation peaked in 2015 along with support for independence (Table 1). Table 1October Catalan Protests Unimpressive Our Spanish risk indicator is showing a decline in political risk (Chart 12). However, we believe that this fall is slightly overstated. While the Catalan independence movement is losing its momentum, the ongoing protests are having an impact on seat projections for the upcoming election.  Chart 11Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Chart 12Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Since the April election, the right-wing bloc of the People’s Party, Ciudadanos, and Vox has been gaining in the seat projections at the expense of the Socialist Party and Podemos. Over the course of the protests, the left-wing parties’ lead over the right-wing parties has narrowed from seven seats to one (Chart 13). If this momentum continues, a change of government from left-wing to right-wing becomes likely. However, a right-wing government is not a market-negative outcome, and any increase in risk on this sort of election surprise would be short-lived. The People’s Party has moderated its message and focused on the economy. Besides pledging to limit the personal tax rate to 40% and corporate tax rate to 20%, the People’s Party platform supports innovation, R&D spending, and startups. The party is promising tax breaks and easier immigration rules to firms and employees pursuing these objectives. Chart 13Spanish Right-Wing Parties Narrow Gap With Left Another outcome of the election would be a governing deal between PSOE and Podemos, along with case-by-case support from Ciudadanos. After a shift to the right lost Ciudadanos 5% in support since the April election, leader Albert Rivera announced in early October that he would be lifting the “veto” on working with the Socialist Party. If the right-wing parties fall short of a majority, then Rivera would be open to talks with Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez. A governing deal between PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos would have 175 seats, as of the latest projections, which is just one seat short of a majority. As we go to press, this is the only outcome that would end Spain’s current political gridlock, and would therefore be the most market-positive outcome. Bottom Line: Despite having a fourth election in as many years, Spanish political risk is contained. This is reinforced by a relatively politically stable backdrop in continental Europe, and marginally positive developments in the U.K. and on the trade front. We remain long European versus U.S. technology, and long EU versus Chinese equities. We will also be looking to go long EUR/USD when and if the global hard data turn. Following our European Investment Strategy, we recommend going long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Turkey, Brazil, And Russia Chart 14Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkey’s political risk skyrocketed upward after we issued our warning in September (Chart 14). We maintain that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship is not a basis for optimism regarding Turkey’s evading U.S. sanctions. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress are preparing a more stringent set of sanctions, focusing on the Turkish military, in the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from northeast Syria. At a time when Trump needs allies in the senate to defend him against eventual impeachment articles, he is not likely to veto and risk an override. Moreover, Turkey’s military incursion into Syria, which may wax and wane, stems from economic and political weakness at home and will eventually exacerbate that weakness by fueling the growing opposition to Erdogan’s administration and requiring more unorthodox monetary and fiscal accommodation. It reinforces our bearish outlook on Turkish lira and assets. Chart 15Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazil’s political risk has rebounded (Chart 15). The Senate has virtually passed the pension reform bill, as expected, which raises the official retirement age for men and women to 65 and 63 respectively. This will generate upwards of 800 billion Brazilian real in savings to improve the public debt profile. Of course, the country will still run primary deficits and thus the public debt-to-GDP ratio will still rise. Now the question shifts to President Jair Bolsonaro and his governing coalition. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has ticked up as we expected (Chart 16). If this continues then it is bullish for Brazil because it suggests that he will be able to keep his coalition together. But investors should not get ahead of themselves. Bolsonaro is not an inherently pro-market leader, there is no guarantee that he will remain disciplined in pursuing pro-productivity reforms, and there is a substantial risk that his coalition will fray without pension reform as a shared goal (at least until markets riot and push the coalition back together). Therefore we expect political risk to abate only temporarily, if at all, before new trouble emerges. Furthermore, if reform momentum wanes next year, then Brazil’s reform story as a whole will falter, since electoral considerations emerge in 2021-22. Hence it will be important to verify that policymakers make progress on reforms to tax and trade policy early next year. Our Russian geopolitical risk indicator is also lifting off of its bottom (see Appendix). This makes sense given Russia’s expanding strategic role (particularly in the Middle East), its domestic political troubles, and the risks of the U.S. election. The latter is especially significant given the risk (not our base case, however) that a Democratic administration could take a significantly more aggressive posture toward Russia. Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Bottom Line: Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Russia is a candidate for a “black swan” event, given the eerie quiet that has prevailed as Putin devotes his fourth term to reducing domestic political instability. Brazil, on the other hand, has a 12-month window in which reform momentum can be reinforced, reducing whatever spike in risk occurs in the aftermath of the ruling coalition’s completion of pension reform. Canada: Election Post-Mortem Prime Minister Justin Trudeau returned to power at the head of a minority government in Canada’s federal election (Chart 17). The New Democratic Party (NDP) lost 15 seats from the last election, but will have a greater role in parliament as the Liberals will need its support to pass key agenda items (and a formal governing coalition is possible). The NDP’s result would have been even worse if not for its last-minute surge in the polls after the election debates and Trudeau’s “blackface” scandal. Chart 17Liberals Need The New Democrats Now The Conservative Party won the popular vote but only 121 seats in parliament, leaving the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan aggrieved. The Bloc Québécois, the Quebec nationalist party, gained 22 seats to become the third-largest party in the House. Energy investment faces headwinds in the near-term. The Liberal Party will face resistance from the Left over the Trans Mountain pipeline. Trudeau will not necessarily have to sacrifice the pipeline to appease the NDP. He may be able to work with Conservatives to advance the pipeline while working with the NDP on the rest of his agenda. But on the whole the election result is the worst-case scenario for the oil sector and political questions will have to be resolved before Canada can take advantage of its position as a heavy crude producer near the U.S. Gulf refineries in an era in which Venezuela is collapsing and Saudi Arabia is exposed to geopolitical risk and attacks. More broadly, the Liberals will continue to endorse a more expansive fiscal policy than expected, given Canada’s low budget deficits and the need to prevent minor parties from eating away at the Liberal Party’s seat count in future. Bottom Line: The Liberal Party failed to maintain its single-party majority. Trudeau’s reliance on left-wing parties in parliament may prove market-negative for the Canadian energy sector, though that is not a forgone conclusion. Over the longer term the sector has a brighter future.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Appendix GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Geopolitical risks are starting to abate as a result of material constraints influencing policymakers. China needs to ensure its economy bottoms and a debt-deflationary tendency does not take hold. President Trump needs to avoid further economic deterioration arising from the trade war. The U.K. is looking to prevent a recession induced by leaving the EU without an agreement. Iran and the risk of an oil price shock is the outstanding geopolitical tail risk. Feature Readers of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy know that what defines our research is our analytical framework – specifically the theory of constraints. Chart 1The Electoral College – An Overlooked Constraint The theory holds that policymakers are trapped by the pressures of their office, their nation’s global position, and the stream of events. These pressures emerge from the material world that we inhabit and as such are measurable. If a leader lacks popular approval, cannot command a majority in the legislature, rides atop a sinking economy, or suffers under stronger or smarter foreign enemies, then his policy preferences will be compromised. He will have to change his preferences to accommodate the constraints, rather than the other way around. Case in point is the U.S. electoral college: it proved an insurmountable political constraint on the Democratic Party in 2016. The college is intended to restrain direct democracy or popular passions; it also restrains the concentration of regional power. In 2012, Barack Obama won a larger share of the electoral college than the popular vote, while in 2016 Hillary Clinton won a smaller share (Chart 1). Clinton’s lack of appeal in the industrial Midwest turned the college and deprived her of the prize. The rest is history. In this report we highlight five key constraints that will shape the direction of the major geopolitical risks in the fourth quarter. We recommend investors remain tactically cautious on risk assets, although we have not yet extended this recommendation to the cyclical, 12-month time frame. China’s Policy: The Debt-Deflation Constraint We have a solid record of pessimism regarding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s willingness and ability to stimulate the economy – but even we were surprised by his tenacity this year. His administration’s effort to contain leverage, while still stimulating the economy, has prevented a quick rebound in the global manufacturing cycle. The constraint limiting this approach is the need to avoid a debt-deflation spiral. This is a condition in which households and firms become pessimistic about the future and cut back their spending and borrowing. The general price level falls and drives up real debt burdens, which motivates further cutbacks. A classic example is Japan, which saw a property bubble burst, destroying corporate balance sheets and forcing the country into a long phase of paying down debt amid falling prices. China has not seen its property bubble burst yet. Prices have continued to rise despite the recent pause in the non-financial debt build-up (Chart 2). Looser monetary and fiscal policy have sustained this precarious balance. But the result is a tug-of-war between the government and the private sector. If the government miscalculates, and the asset bubble bursts, then it will be extremely difficult for the government to change the mindset of households and companies bent on paying down debt. It will be too late to avoid the vicious spiral that Japan experienced – with the critical proviso that Chinese people are less wealthy than the Japanese in 1990 and the country’s political system is less flexible. A Japan-sized economic problem would lead to a China-sized political problem. This is why the recent drop in Chinese producer prices below zero is a worrisome sign (Chart 3). Policymakers have loosened monetary and fiscal policy incrementally since July 2018 and they are signaling that they will continue to do so. This is particularly likely in an environment in which trade tensions are reduced but remain fundamentally unresolved – which is our base case. Chart 2China's Property Bubble Intact Chart 3China's Constraint Is Debt-Deflation Are policymakers aware of this constraint? Absolutely. If the trade talks collapse, or the global economy slumps regardless, then China will have to stimulate more aggressively. Xi Jinping is not truly a Chairman Mao, willing to impose extreme austerity. He oversaw the 2015-16 stimulus and would do it again if he came face to face with the debt-deflation constraint. Is China still capable of stimulating? High debt levels, the reassertion of centralized state power, and the trade war have all rendered traditional stimulus levers less effective by dampening animal spirits. Yet policymakers are visibly “riding the brake,” so they can remove restraints and increase reflation if necessary. Most obviously, authorities can inject larger fiscal stimulus. They have insisted that they will prevent easy monetary and credit policies from feeding into property prices – and this could change. They could also pick up the pace when it comes to reducing average bank lending rates for small and medium-sized businesses.1 In short, stimulus is less effective, but the government is also preferring to save dry powder. This preference will be thrown by the wayside if it hits the critical constraint. The implication is that Chinese stimulus will continue to pick up over a cyclical, 12-month horizon. There is impetus to reduce trade tensions with the U.S., discussed below, but a lack of final resolution will ensure that policy tightening is not called for. Bottom Line: China’s chief economic constraint is a debt-deflation trap. This would engender long-term economic difficulties that would eventually translate into political difficulties for Communist Party rule. If a trade deal is reached, it is unlikely alone to require a shift to tighter policy. If the trade talks collapse, stimulus will overshoot to the upside. Trade War: The Electoral Constraint The U.S. and China are holding the thirteenth round of trade negotiations this week after a summer replete with punitive measures, threats, and failed restarts. Tensions spiked just ahead of the talks, as expected. Immediately thereafter President Trump declared he will meet with Chinese negotiators to give a boost to the process and reassure the markets.2 Trump’s major constraint in waging the trade war is economic, not political. Americans are generally sympathetic to his pressure campaign against China. Public opinion polls show that a strong majority believes it is necessary to confront China even though the bulk of the economic pain will be borne by consumers themselves (Chart 4). Yet Americans could lose faith in Trump’s approach once the economic pain fully materializes. Critically, the decline in wage growth that is occurring as a result of the global and manufacturing slowdown is concentrated in the states that are most likely to swing the 2020 election, e.g. the “purple” or battleground states (Chart 5). Chart 4Americans To Confront China Despite The Costs? Chart 5Trump Faces Pressure To Stage A Tactical Trade Retreat Furthermore, a rise in unemployment, which is implied by the recent decline in the University of Michigan’s survey of consumer confidence regarding the purchase of large household goods, would devastate voters’ willingness to give Trump’s tariff strategy the benefit of the doubt (Chart 6). Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, two critical states, have seen a net loss of manufacturing jobs on the year. The fear of an uptick in U.S. unemployment will prevent Trump from escalating the trade war. An uptick in unemployment would be a major constraint on Trump’s trade war – he cannot escalate further until the economy has stabilized. And that may very well require tariff rollback while trade talks “make progress.” We expect that Trump is willing to do this in the interest of staying in power. As highlighted above, the Xi administration is not without its own constraints. Our proxies for China’s marginal propensity to consume show that Chinese animal spirits are still vulnerable, particularly on the household side, which has not responded to stimulus thus far (Chart 7). Since this constraint is less immediate than Trump’s election date, Xi cannot be expected to capitulate to Trump’s biggest demands. Hence a ceasefire or détente is more likely than a full bilateral trade agreement. Chart 6Waning Consumer Confidence On Big Ticket Items Foreshadows Rise In Unemployment Trump’s electoral constraint also suggests that he needs to remove trade risks such as car tariffs on Europe and Japan (which we expect he will do). We have been optimistic on the passage of the USMCA trade deal but impeachment puts this forecast in jeopardy. Chart 7China's Trade War Constraint? Animal Spirits   Bottom Line: Trump will stage a tactical retreat on trade in order to soften the negative impact on the economy and reduce the chances of a recession prior to the November 3, 2020 election. China’s economic constraints are less immediate and it is unlikely to make major structural concessions. Hence we expect a ceasefire that temporarily reduces tensions and boosts sentiment rather than a bilateral trade agreement that initiates a fundamental deepening of U.S.-China economic engagement. U.S. Policy: The Economic Constraint The 2020 U.S. election is a critical political risk both because of the volatility it will engender and because of what we see as a 45% chance that it will lead to a change in the ruling party governing the world’s largest economy. Will Trump be the candidate? Yes. If Trump’s approval among Republicans breaks beneath the lows plumbed during the Charlottesville incident in 2017 (Chart 8A), then Trump has an impeachment problem, but otherwise he is safe from removal. Judging by the Republican-leaning pollster Rasmussen, which should reflect the party’s mood, Trump’s approval rating has not broken beneath its floor and may already be bouncing back from the initial hit of the impeachment inquiry (Chart 8B). The rise in support for impeachment and removal in opinion polls is notable, but it is also along party lines and will fade if the Democrats are seen as dragging on the process or trying to circumvent an election that is just around the corner. Chart 8ARepublican Opinion Precludes Trump’s Removal Chart 8BRepublican-Leaning Pollster Shows Support Holding Thus Far How will all of this bear on the 2020 election? Turnout will be high so everything depends on which side will be more passionate. A critical factor will be the Democratic nominee. Former Vice President Joe Biden, the establishment pick, has broken beneath his floor in the polling. His rambling debate performances have reinforced the narrative that he is too old, while the impeachment of Trump will fuel counteraccusations of corruption that will detract from Biden’s greatest asset: his electability. According to a Harvard-Harris poll from late September, 61% of voters believe it was inappropriate for Biden to withhold aid from Ukraine to encourage the firing of a Ukrainian prosecutor even when the polling question makes no mention of any connection with Biden’s son’s business interest there. Moreover, 77% believe it is inappropriate that Biden’s son Hunter traveled with his father to China while soliciting investments there. With Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s candidacy now defunct as a result of his heart attack and old age, Elizabeth Warren, the progressive senator from Massachusetts, will become the indisputable front runner (which she is not yet). In the fourth primary debate on October 15, she will face attacks from all sides reflecting this new status. Given her debate performances thus far, she will sustain the heightened scrutiny and come out stronger. This is not to say that Warren is already the Democratic candidate. Biden is still polling like a traditional Democratic primary front runner (Chart 9), while Warren has some clear weaknesses in electability, as reflected in her smaller lead over Trump in head-to-head polls in swing states. Nevertheless Warren is likely to become the front runner. Chart 9Biden Polling About Average Relative To Previous Democratic Primary Front Runners The recession call remains the U.S. election call. Two further considerations: Impeachment and removal of President Trump ensure a Democratic victory. There are hopes in some quarters that President Trump could be impeached and removed and yet his Vice President Mike Pence could go on to win the 2020 election, preserving the pro-business policy status quo. The problem with this logic is that Trump cannot be removed unless Republican opinion shifts. This will require an earthquake as a result of some wrongdoing by Trump. Such an earthquake will blacken Pence’s and the GOP’s name and render them toxic in the general election. Not to mention that Pence’s only act as president in the brief interim would likely be to pardon Trump and his accomplices. He would suffer Gerald Ford’s fate in 1976. Which means that a significant slide in Trump’s approval among Republicans will translate to higher odds of a Democratic win in 2020 and hence higher taxes and regulation, i.e. a hit to corporate earnings expectations. We expect this approval to hold up, but the market can sell off anyway because … The market is overrating the Senate as a check on Warren in the event she wins the White House. It is true that relative to Biden, Warren is less likely to carry the Senate. Democrats need to retain their Senate seat in Alabama, while capturing Maine, Colorado, and Arizona (or Georgia) in addition to the White House in order to control the Senate. Biden is more competitive in Arizona and Georgia than Warren. But this is a flimsy basis to feel reassured that a Warren presidency will be constrained. In fact, it is very difficult to unseat a sitting president. If the Democrats can muster enough votes to kick out an incumbent and elect an outspoken left-wing progressive from the northeast, they most likely will have mustered enough votes to take the Senate as well. For instance, unemployment could be rising or Trump’s risky foreign policy could have backfired. Chart 10Business Sentiment Threatens Trump Re-Election In our estimation the Democrats have about a 45% chance of winning the presidency, and Warren does not significantly reduce this chance. The resilient U.S. economy is Trump’s base case for success. But Trump’s trade policy and the global slowdown are rapidly eating away at the prospect that voters see improvement (Chart 10). This speaks to the constraint driving a ceasefire with China above, but it also speaks to the broader probability of policy continuity in the U.S. As Warren’s path to the White House widens, there is a clear basis for equities to sell off in the near term. Bottom Line: Trump’s approval among Republicans is a constraint on his removal via impeachment. But the status of the economy is the greater constraint. The recession call remains the election call. While we expect downside in the near term, we are still constructive on U.S. equities on a cyclical basis. War With Iran: The Oil Price Constraint The Senate will remain President Trump’s bulwark amid impeachment, notwithstanding the controversial news that Trump is moving forward with the withdrawal of troops from Syria, specifically from the so-called “safe zone” agreed with Turkey, giving Ankara license to stage a larger military offensive in Syria. This abandonment of the U.S.’s Kurdish allies at the behest of Turkey (which is a NATO ally but has been at odds with Washington) has provoked flak from Republican senators. However, it is well supported in U.S. public opinion (Chart 11). Trump is threatening to impose economic sanctions on Turkey if it engages in ethnic cleansing. The Turkish lira is the marginal loser, Trump’s approval rating is the marginal winner. The withdrawal sends a signal to the world that the U.S. is continuing to deleverage from the Middle East – a corollary with the return of focus on Asia Pacific. While the Iranians are key beneficiaries of this pivot, the Trump administration is maintaining maximum sanctions pressure on the Iranians. The firing of hawkish National Security Adviser John Bolton did not lead to a détente, as President Rouhani has too much to risk from negotiating with Trump. Instead the Iranians smelled U.S. weakness and went on the attack in Saudi Arabia, briefly shuttering 6 million barrels of oil per day. The response to the attack – from both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. – revealed an extreme aversion to military conflict and escalation. Instead the U.S. has tightened its sanctions regime – China is reportedly withdrawing from its interest in the South Pars natural gas project, a potentially serious blow to Iran, which had been hyping its strategic partnership with China. This reinforces the prospect for a U.S.-China ceasefire even as it redoubles the economic pressure on Iran. As long as the U.S. maintains the crippling sanctions on Iran, there is no guarantee that Tehran will not strike out again in an effort to weaken President Trump’s resolve. The fact that about 18% of global oil supply flows through the critical chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s ace in the hole (Chart 12). It is the chief constraint on Trump’s foreign policy, as greater oil supply disruptions could shock the U.S. economy ahead of the election. Trump can benefit from minor or ephemeral disruptions but he is likely to get into trouble if a serious shock weakens the economy at this juncture. Chart 11U.S. Opinion Constrains Foreign Policy Chart 12Oil Price Constrains U.S. Policy Toward Iran An oil shock does not have to originate in Hormuz shipping or sneak attacks on regional oil infrastructure. Iran is uniquely capable of fomenting the anti-government protests that have erupted in southern Iraq. The restoration of stability in Iraq has resulted in around 2 million barrels of oil per day coming onto international markets (Chart 13). If this process is reversed through political instability or sabotage, it will rapidly push up against global spare oil capacity and exert an upward pressure on oil prices that would come at an awkward time for a global economy experiencing a manufacturing recession (Chart 14). Chart 13Iran's Leverage Over Iraq Chart 14Global Oil Spare Capacity Constrains Response To Crisis Bottom Line: Iran’s power over regional oil production is the biggest constraint on Trump’s foreign policy in the region, yet Trump is apparently tightening rather than easing the sanctions regime. The failure of the Abqaiq attack to generate a lasting impact on oil prices amid weak global demand suggests that Iran could feel emboldened. The U.S. preference to withdraw from Middle Eastern conflicts could also encourage Iran, while the tightening of the sanctions regime could make it desperate. An oil shock emanating from the conflict with Iran is still a significant risk to the global bull market. Brexit: The No-Deal Constraint The fifth and final constraint to discuss in this report pertains to the U.K. and Brexit. We do not consider the October 31 deadline a no-deal exit risk. Parliament will prevail over a prime minister who lacks a majority. Nevertheless the expected election can revive no-deal risk, especially if Boris Johnson is returned to power with a weak minority government. Chart 15U.K.: Public Opinion Constrains Parliament And No-Deal Brexit While parliament is the constraint on the prime minister, the public is the constraint on parliament. From this point of view, support for Brexit has weakened and the Conservative Party is less popular than in the lead up to the 2015 and 2017 general elections. The public is aware that no-deal exit is likely to cause significant economic pain and that is why a majority rejects no-deal, as opposed to a soft Brexit. Unless the Tory rally in opinion polling produces another coalition with the Northern Irish, albeit with Boris Johnson at the helm, these points make it likely that a no-deal Brexit will become untenable when all is said and done (Chart 15). If Johnson achieves a single party majority the EU will be more likely to grant concessions enabling him to get a withdrawal deal over the line. We remain long GBP-USD but will turn sellers at the $1.30 mark. Investment Implications The path of least resistance is for China’s stimulus efforts to increase – incrementally if trade tensions are contained, and sharply if not. This should help put a floor beneath growth, but the Q1 timing of this floor means that global risk assets face additional downside in the near term. We continue to recommend going long our “China Play” index. U.S.-China trade tensions should decline as President Trump looks to prevent higher unemployment ahead of his election. China has reason to follow through on small concessions to encourage Trump’s tactical trade retreat, but it does not face pressure to make new structural concessions. We expect a ceasefire – with some tariff rollback likely – but not a big bang agreement that removes all tariffs or deepens the overall bilateral economic engagement. Stay long our “China Play” index. We remain short CNY-USD on a strategic basis but recognize that a ceasefire presents a short term (maximum 12-month) risk to this view, so clients with a shorter-term horizon should close that trade. We are long European equities relative to Chinese equities as a result of the view that China will stimulate but that a trade ceasefire will leave lingering uncertainties over Chinese corporates. U.S. politics are highly unpredictable but constraint-based analysis indicates that while the House may impeach, the Senate will not remove. This, combined with Warren’s likely ascent to the head of the pack in the Democratic primary race, means that Trump remains favored to win reelection, albeit with low conviction (55% chance) due to a weak general approval rating and economic risks. The risk to U.S. equities is immediate, but should dissipate. The U.S. is rotating its strategic focus from the Middle East to Asia Pacific, which entails a continued rotation of geopolitical risk. However, recent developments reinforce our argument in July that Iranian geopolitical risk is frontloaded relative to the China risk. This is true as long as Trump maintains crippling sanctions. Iran may be emboldened by its successes so far and has various mechanisms – including Iraqi instability – by which it can threaten oil supply to pressure Trump. This is a tail risk, but it does support our position of being long EM energy producers.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research, China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Mild Deflation Means Timid Easing,” October 9, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 China knows that Trump wants to seal a deal prior to November 2020 to aid his reelection campaign, while Trump needs to try to convince China that he does not care about election, the stock market, or anything other than structural concessions from China. Hence the U.S. blacklisted several artificial intelligence companies and sanctioned Chinese officials in advance of the talks. The U.S. opened a new front in the conflict by invoking China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which is also an implicit warning not to create a humanitarian incident in Hong Kong where protests continue to rage. These are pressure tactics but have not yet derailed the attempt to seal a deal in Q4.

特別レポート

ハイライト 冷戦は米中対立の限定的な類推に過ぎない; 多極化する世界では、貿易の完全な二分化は困難、いや不可能に近い; 歴史は、ライバル同士の貿易は最小限の障害しかなく継続すると示唆している; 長期的には、防衛株、欧州、キャップエックス、非同盟国を買う。 特集 中国と米国が冷戦へ突き進んでいるという見方が強まっている。BCA Researchは、少なくとも投資コミュニティに関しては、この合意形成に一役買った — 2012年9月に「Power and Politics in East Asia: Cold War 2.0?」を掲載したことである。1 この10年の大部分において、ジオポリティカル・ストラテジーは地政学リスクがますます無関係になりつつある中東から、ますます重要性を増すであろう東アジアへと回帰しているという説に焦点を当ててきた。 この仮説はなお示唆に富むが、それが必ずしも「シリコン・カーテン」が世界を二つの分断された資本主義圏に分けることを意味するわけではない。貿易、資本フロー、人の交流は中国と米国の間で継続し、場合によっては拡大するだろう。しかし、軍事的なものを含む紛争のリスクは低下しない。 本報告では、まず米中緊張の背後にある地政学的論理を概観する。次に、貿易および経済関係の観点から両国の関係がどのように展開するかに関する手がかりを得るために学術文献を精査する。政治理論からの証拠は意外であり、投資に極めて関連性が高い。その後、投資家にとって意味するところを探るために歴史を遡る。 結論として、米国と中国が地政学的ライバルであり続ける可能性が高いと考える。ただし、多極化という地政学的文脈のために、結果として「分断された資本主義」が生じるとは考えにくい。むしろ、地政学が評価、モメンタム、ファンダメンタルズ、マクロ経済と並んで投資機会とリスクを決定する要因群の歴史的な位置を占める、刺激的で変動の大きい環境が投資家を待ち受けると予想する。 トゥキディデスの罠は現実である … 1897年にライヒスタークで演説したドイツの外相ベルンハルト・フォン・ビューローは、ドイツが「太陽の下での自らの場所」を要求すべき時であると宣言した。2 これは東アジアに対するドイツの政策を巡る討議の場であった。ビューローは間もなくカイザー・ヴィルヘルム2世の下で首相に就き、ドイツ外交政策をリアルポリティークからヴェルトポリティークへと進化させる過程を監督した。リアルポリティークがビスマルク首相下で慎重に列強の均衡を保つ姿勢を特徴としたのに対し、ヴェルトポリティークはビューローとヴィルヘルム2世が攻撃的な外交・貿易政策を通じて現状を書き換えようとした。 帝政ドイツは、アテネから現代の中華人民共和国に至るまでの敵対者の長いリストに加わり、人類史の悲劇的な劇とも呼べる「トゥキディデスの罠」に名を連ねた。3 Chart 1 帝国の過剰拡張 帝国の過剰拡張 帝国の過剰拡張 この基本概念は世界史を学ぶ者にはよく知られている。その名はギリシャの歴史家トゥキディデスと彼の代表作History of the Peloponnesian Warに由来する。トゥキディデスはなぜスパルタとアテネが戦争に至ったのかを説明するが、同時代の他者のように道徳化したり神々を非難したりはしない。むしろ、改革を志向するアテネと既存勢力であるスパルタの対立が不信の連鎖によって不可避になったことを冷静に描写している。 米国の国際関係論を代表する学者の一人、グラハム・アリソンは、現状勢力と挑戦者の相互作用はほとんど常に紛争を導いたと主張している。彼が調査した16例のうち12例で実際の軍事衝突が発生した。戦争に至らなかった4例のうち3例は、深い文化的親和性と既存の制度への尊重を共有する国間の移行を伴っていた。4 これらのケースでは、移行は新しい経営陣がほぼ同じ組織構造を運営するようなものだった。そして、戦争に至らなかった4例のうちの一つはまさにソ連と米国の冷戦であった。 現状勢力にとって根本的な問題は、その帝国または「勢力圏」が最盛期と同じ大きさのままである点にある。しかし、相対的な衰退は古典的な「帝国の過剰拡張」の問題を引き起こす。覇権的または帝国的な勢力は、もはや維持できない現状を誤って固持しようとする（Chart 1）。 挑戦者側も責めを免れない。挑戦者は覇権国の弱さを感じ取り、地域的な勢力圏を形成し始める。問題は、地域覇権が世界的覇権への跳躍台になり得る点だ。挑戦者の意図が限定的で抑制的であったとしても（しばしば野心的で横柄であるが）、現状勢力は意図ではなく能力に反応せざるを得ない。能力は物質的かつ実在のものであるのに対し、意図は認知された一時的なものである。 挑戦者には常にその野心を正当化する内的論理がある。中国の場合、今日のエリートの間には国家が長い歴史の多くの世紀にわたってあったあり方へ単に平均回帰しているにすぎないという感覚がある（Chart 2）。言い換えれば、中国は過去300年を現状と定義するならば「挑戦者」だが、もっと昔に遡れば「既存」の強国である。したがって、中国の合意形成では、現代の状況は西洋の帝国主義による既存の中国および地域秩序への「挑戦」の結果に過ぎないため、現状に対して従属すべきではないとされる。 Chart 2 中国の平均回帰的な物語 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 加えて、中国は少なくとも米国と同等に世界経済にとって重要であり、したがって国際ガバナンスにおいてより大きな発言権に値するという正当な主張を持っている。米国がなお世界経済のより大きなシェアを占めている一方で、中国は過去20年で世界の増分GDPに対して23％を寄与しており、米国の13％と比べて大きい（Chart 3）。 Chart 3 北京コンセンサス 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 結論： 中国と米国の間で顕在化している緊張は、トゥキディデスの罠の理論的かつ実証的な枠組みにきれいに当てはまる。我々は、両国が世俗的または予測可能な範囲で闘争と対立を回避する方法はないと見ている。 では、投資家にとって何を意味するか。ひとつには、防衛株の背後にある長期的な追い風は持続するだろう。しかしそれ以外は？ 世界経済は完全に二分化され、シリコン・カーテンで隔てられた二つの軍事陣営に分かれる運命にあるのか？ アリババとアマゾンの協定は、冷戦時代のNATOとワルシャワ条約機構のように互いに疑いのまなざしを向け合うのか？ 答えは、慎重に言えば、否である。 …しかし経済の二分化には至らない トランプ大統領の強硬な通商政策も、ある程度までは政治理論に整合する。 政治学におけるリアリズムは、貿易を含むすべての関係において絶対利得より相対利得に焦点を当てる。なぜなら、貿易は経済的繁栄をもたらし、繁栄は経済剰余の蓄積へ、経済剰余は軍事費、研究開発へとつながるからである。競争を重視し相対利得のみを気にする国家同士はゼロサムゲームを生み出し、協力の余地はなくなる。これは協力を選ばないことで両側が非最適な経済結果を招く「囚人のジレンマ」である。 米中対立は世界経済の完全な二分化をもたらさないだろう。 図表1は、国家の貿易行動に対する相対利得計算の影響を示している。地政学が存在しない場合、需要（Q3）は国内生産（Q0）がそれを満たせないため、貿易（Q3-Q0）によって満たされる。 Diagram 1 双極世界における貿易戦争 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る しかし、地政学的外部性—すなわち他国とのライバル関係—は輸入の限界的社会コストを引き上げる。すなわち貿易はライバルにより多くの利得を与え、地政学的能力の面で「追いつかせる」。したがって、貿易する国家はこの外部性を関税（t）で除去し、国内生産をQ1へ引き上げ、需要をQ2へ縮小させ、輸入を（Q2-Q1）のみに削減する。これは地政学が問題とならない世界での水準の一部にすぎない。 相対利得の力学は、弱まって再考を迫られる覇権国にも強く作用する。政治学者ダンカン・スナイダルは1991年の論文で次のように論じた。 世界システムが初めて構築されるとき、覇権国は小国と取引を行う。覇権国は絶対利得をより重視し、小国は相対利得をより重視するため交渉は厳しくなる。小国を有利にする協力体制は相対的な覇権の衰退に寄与する。利益の不均等配分が小国の追いつきを助けると同時に、小国が覇権国に対して相対利得の重みを下げることになる。同時に相対的優越の低下は覇権国の他国、特に台頭する挑戦者に対する相対利得への関心を高める。結果として最大の行為者から既存システムを変えて協力利益のより大きなシェアを得ようとする圧力が増す。5 小国が当初相対利得をより気にする理由は、覇権国よりも国の安全保障に対してはるかに敏感だからだ。覇権国は力の優位性を持ち、安全保障に対して比較的余裕がある。これが、ジョージ・ブッシュ（父）、ビル・クリントン、ジョージ・ブッシュ（子）がいずれも「誤った取引」を中国と行った理由を説明する。 スナイダルは30年近く前に、この米中貿易戦争を的確に描写した。彼は来たる無秩序の十年を記述していると思っていた。しかし彼と同時代の政治学者たちは米国の力を過小評価していた。アメリカの覇権の「一極の瞬間」は終わったのではなく、始まっていただけだった！ したがって、スナイダルが描いた力学は実を結ぶまでに30年を要した。 米国の覇権からの移行を考えるとき、多くの投資家は冷戦にアンカーを置く。冷戦は彼らが知る非一極的世界の唯一の例であり、単純な双極の力配分はゲーム理論で容易にモデル化できるからだ。もし我々がこれから住む世界が米国と中国が米ソのように地球全体を勢力圏に分ける世界ならば、スナイダルの論文から抜き出した段落が結末になるだろう。アメリカはグローバリゼーションを完全に放棄し、中国の周囲に厳しいシリコン・カーテンを敷き、同盟国にそれに従うことを強制するだろう。 しかし、近代史の大部分は双極ではなく多極の勢力配分によって定義されてきた。用語としての「冷戦」は、軍事力の比較的均衡が全面的な「熱戦」を防ぐ可能性があるという意味で米中に適用できる。しかし最終的に、米ソ冷戦は今日の世界に対する貧弱な類推に過ぎない。スナイダルは結論として、「協力しない国家は、互いに協力する他の相対利得最大化者に遅れをとる。これは、ライバルが多国間で協力している場合、協力こそが最良の防御（および最良の攻撃）となる」と述べている。彼はプレイヤー数が2から増えるにつれて相対利得感受性が急速に低下することを形式的モデルで示している。6 米中関係は真空中で起きているわけではなく、世界的文脈によって緩和される。今日の世界的文脈は多極化である。多極化とは、地政学的な力の配分がもはや一つか二つの大国に支配されていないことを指す（Chart 4）。例えば欧州や日本は強力な経済力と軍事能力を有している。ロシアは依然として強力な軍事大国であり、一方でインドは総合的な地政学的力の面でロシアを上回りつつある。 Chart 4 世界はもはや二極ではない 世界はもはや二極化していない 世界はもはや二極化していない 多極化した世界は最も「秩序だっていない」そして最も不安定な世界システムである（Chart 5）。理由は三つである： Chart 5 多極化は混沌としている 多極化は混沌としている 多極化は混沌としている 数学的観点: 多極化は紛争につながり得る潜在的な「紛争ダイアド」をより多く生む。単極の世界では規範と行動規則を決める国は一つだけである。紛争は可能だが、それは覇権国が望む場合に限られる。双極世界では紛争は可能だが、それは二つの支配的勢力の軸に沿わなければならない。多極世界では同盟は常に移り変わり、新たな紛争ダイアドを生む。 調整の欠如: 多極化の時期には「拒否権プレイヤー」が増えるため、世界的な調整が損なわれる。これは攻勢的な改革勢力が武力を使う場合や世界が経済危機に直面する場合など、ストレスの高い時期に特に問題となる。チャールズ・キンドルバーガーは、覇権の不安定性がまさに大恐慌を第二次世界大戦へと陥らせたと指摘している。7 誤算: 単極・双極世界では同時に振られるサイコロの数が非常に限られているため、悲劇的な誤算の確率は低く、複雑な正式関係（例えばゲーム理論に基づく米ソの相互確証破壊）があれば軽減できる。しかし多極世界では、要人の暗殺のようなランダムな出来事が世界大戦の引き金になることがある。多極システムははるかに動的であり、したがって予測不可能である。 多極化した世界では、米国は中国を国際システムから排除することはできない。 図表2は多極化した世界に合わせて修正したものだ。すべては同じだが、我々は他の大国に失われる貿易を強調している。ライバルとの貿易に関する限界的社会コストを下げるために関税を用いることを検討する国家は、この「失われた貿易」を考慮しなければならない。今日の中国との貿易戦争の文脈では、これは欧州のすべてのエアバスやブラジル産大豆が米国の輸出の代わりに中国に販売される分の総和となる。中国にとっては、アジアの残りから生産され米国に出荷されるすべての機械、電子機器、資本財の総和である。 Diagram 2 多極世界における貿易戦争 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る ワシントンは、欧州、日本、韓国、台湾などの同盟国に対して、中国との貿易で失われる（Q3-Q0)-(Q2-Q1)という潤沢な貿易を利用しないよう要請できるだろうか？ もちろんだ。しかし実証研究は、彼らがそのような結束の訴えを無視する可能性が高いことを示している。同盟が双極システムで生まれると二国間貿易フローに統計的に有意で大きな影響を与える一方で、その関係は多極化の文脈では弱まる。これはジョアン・ゴーワとエドワード・D・マンフィールドが1993年に示した結論である。8 著者らは1905年から始まる80年間の期間を用いて結論を導いており、これは数十年にわたる世界の多極性を含んでいる。 米国が同盟関係を徹底的に締め付け、貿易制裁を強制するという全力の外交努力を行わない限り—現政権下ではほとんど想定しがたい—、米国の同盟国は自らの利害に基づき中国との貿易を継続するだろう。米国は中国を国際システムから排除することはできないし、中国が習近平氏の誇る「自給自足」を達成することもできないだろう。 我々の見方へのリスクは、1990年代初頭の政治学者たちが世界システムを誤判断したのと同様に、我々も世界システムを誤判断している可能性があるという点だ。その点を踏まえ、Chart 1とChart 4が世界が均衡した多極状態にあるという見解を真に支持しているわけではないことを認める。米国は明らかに世界で最も強力な国であり続けている。しかし問題は、相対的な衰退が進んでいること、そしてその勢力圏がグローバルであるため非常に費用がかかる一方で、ライバルは当面地域的な野心しか持っていないということである。したがって、我々はアメリカの覇権が比較的速やかに再主張される可能性は認めるが、それは他の極のどれかで重大な大災害が発生することを必要とするだろう。例えば、中国の国内安定が崩壊し、同時に米国の政治的安定が回復するような場合だ。 結論： 米中間の貿易戦争は地政学的に持続不能である。それが継続し得る唯一の状況は、残りの国家が両超大国の背後に厳密に結集するような双極世界である。我々は現時点で世界が—当面のところ—多極化しているとの確信度が高い見解を持っている。アメリカの同盟国はワシントンの「中国孤立」要求を逃れ、抜け道を探すだろう。これは、米国が1990年代末から2000年代初頭に享受したような圧倒的な力の優位をもはや持っていないからである。 ここまでの洞察は政治学の形式理論に由来する。では歴史は何を教えてくれるか？ 敵と貿易する 1896年、英国でベストセラーとなったパンフレット『Made in Germany』は不吉な絵を描いた: 「巨大な商業国家が台頭して我々の繁栄を脅かし、世界の貿易を巡って我々と争うだろう。」9 著者E.E.ウィリアムズは読者に自宅を見渡すよう促した。「あなたの子供が遊んでいるおもちゃや人形、童話の本はドイツ製だ：いや、あなたのお気に入りの（愛国的な）新聞の紙だって、同じ出生地を持つかもしれない。」ウィリアムズは後に関税が解決策であり、それが「ドイツをひざまずかせ、我々の寛容を乞わせるだろう」と書いた。10 1890年代後半には、ドイツが英国にとって最大の国防上の脅威であることは明らかだった。1898年と1900年のドイツ海軍法は、地理的制約であるユトランド半島からドイツ帝国を解放することを単一の目的として大規模な海軍建造を開始した。1902年までに王立海軍のファースト・ロードは「新しく大きくなったドイツ海軍は我々との戦争の観点から注意深く築かれている」と指摘した。11 ドイツが英国にとって最も深刻な国防上の脅威であったことは疑いようがない。その結果、ロンドンは1904年4月にフランスと一連の協定を締結し、それはエントント・コルディアルとして知られるようになった。このアンタントは1905年の第一次モロッコ危機でドイツにより即座に試され、同盟はむしろ強化された。ロシアは1907年にこの協定に組み込まれ、三国協商が成立した。 振り返れば、この同盟構造は1871年の統一からのドイツの急速な台頭を考えれば明白だった。しかし、英国とフランスが数世紀にわたる対立を解消し、1904年に同盟を正式化したことの規模を過小評価してはならない。それは歴史、根深い敵意、イデオロギーの流れに逆らって行われた地殻変動的なシフトであった。12 歴史は、ライバル間や戦時中でも貿易は行われると教えてくれる。 政治学者と歴史家は、地政学的敵対が冷戦で見られたような経済関係の二分化を生むことは稀であると指摘してきた。実証研究と形式的モデリングの両方が、ライバル同士や戦時中でも貿易は行われることを示している。13 これは英国とドイツの間では確かに当てはまり、両国の貿易は第一次世界大戦勃発直前まで着実に増加した（Chart 6）。これは英国のレッセフェール経済へのイデオロギー的なコミットメントで説明できるのか？ あるいはロンドンは保護主義に転じれば軽装備の植民地に対する動きが起きることを恐れたのか？ これらはもっともな議論だ。しかし、それだけではロシアとフランスが同期間にドイツ帝国との総貿易を伸ばし続けた理由を説明しない（Chart 7）。三国ともに戦争の到来を見抜けなかった無能な政策立案者に率いられていた—というのはありそうにない—か、あるいは互いにドイツとの貿易の利得を奪われる余裕がなかったのだ。 Chart 6 同盟国はドイツと貿易していた… 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る Chart 7 …第一次世界大戦直前まで 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る Chart 8 日本と米国は貿易を落とさなかった 19世紀に戻る 19世紀に戻る 第二次世界大戦前も同様の力学が働いていた。1930年代に米国と日本の関係は悪化し、1931年の満州事変が起きた。1935年、日本は1922年のワシントン海軍条約を離脱し、太平洋の勢力均衡の基盤を崩して大規模な海軍建造を開始した。1937年、日本は中国へ侵攻した。明らかな差し迫った危険があったにもかかわらず、米国は1941年7月26日まで日本との貿易を続けた — これは日本がインドシナ南部に侵攻した数日後のことである（Chart 8）。12月7日、日本は米国を攻撃した。 懐疑論者は主張するかもしれない。第一次・第二次世界大戦で政策担当者が戦争に向かって無自覚に進んだのは事実であり、今回は同じ誤りを犯さない（あるいは犯すべきではない）だろう、と。 第一に、我々は政策提言を行う立場ではなく、したがって「あるべき」ことに関心はない。第二に、20世紀前半の政策立案者が現代の啓蒙された指導者と比べて欠陥があったと考える見方には強く懐疑的である。我々の制約に基づくフレームワークは、指導者の行動に対して制度的な理由を求めることを促す。 政治学は、ロンドンやワシントンが明白な脅威にもかかわらず敵と貿易を続けた理由を明確に説明する。答えは制約の制度的性質にある：多極世界は、同盟関係の変化と同盟国の行動を統制する難しさにより集団行動の問題を導入し、政策立案者の相対利得への感受性を低下させる。 米中の場合、これはトランプ大統領が多国間外交を回避し、（貿易赤字への執着のような）重商主義的な力の測定に強く焦点を当てる戦略を採っていることでさらに顕著になっている。もし反中国通商政策が同盟国との寛大な貿易関係を伴っていれば、北京に対する「志願者の連合」を生むことができただろう。しかし、関税とEU、日、カナダへの脅しの2年間を経て、トランプ政権は世界に対して古い同盟と協調の道筋が見直しの対象であることを既に示している。 次の10年の間に現れると我々が見ている結果は二つある。 第一に、米国の指導部は自らが動いている制度的制約を認識し、対中国貿易は制限や変動を伴いながらも継続する。しかし、そのような貿易は地政学的緊張を減少させることはなく、軍事衝突を阻止もしない。実際、貿易が維持される一方で軍事衝突の確率は増す可能性すらある。 第二に、米国の指導部が自らが多極化した世界で行動していることを正しく評価できず、図表2で示した貿易利得を欧州や日本といった経済ライバルに譲り渡すことになる。 我々は制約に基づく予測法を採用しているため、後者のシナリオが起こる可能性は低いと強く考えている。 結論： 米中対立は冷戦の再演ではない。世界的多極性からの制度的圧力は、米国に中国との貿易を続けさせる。とはいえ、中国が他の技術的に先進した国から依然として入手する新興の二重用途技術に関しては交換が制限されるだろう。これは、地政学が投資に対して外生的なものと見なされなくなる複雑で興味深い世界を生み出す。 楽観的な結論に対するリスクは、歴史的記録は今日に適用できるが、時間が遅くなっている可能性があるという点だ。すでに1941年7月26日、すなわち米国が日本とのすべての貿易を破棄した時点に近い — 1930年代の初めではない。したがって、米中間のもう10年の貿易が残されているわけではなく、我々はサイクルの終わりにいるのかもしれない。 これはリスクだが、起こりにくい。米国の政策立案者は、日本に対して行ったのと同等のレベルで貿易戦争を中国に対して拡大するために軍事衝突のリスクを取ることを受け入れる必要があるだろうという点だ。客観的事実として、中国は地域における攻撃的な外交を明確に強化してきた。しかし1941年の日本とは異なり、中国は過去10年で他国を明確に侵略してはいない。したがって、そのような衝突を支持する大衆の意欲は不透明であり、米国民のうち中国を米国にとって最大の脅威と考える者はわずか21％に過ぎない。 投資への示唆 本分析は楽観的であることを意図しているわけではない。第一に、米国と中国は経済関係が世界的な二分化につながらないとしてもライバルであり続ける。ひとつには、中国は20世紀初頭のドイツのように外部市場へのアクセスを懸念しており、その経済の19.5％が依然として外需に依存している。したがって中国は近隣圏を支配しようとして現代的な海軍と軍隊を整備しており、これは世界を支配したいからではなく、むしろ近隣を支配したいからである。これはモンロー主義を始めとする米国の欲求に類似する。このことは南シナ海や東シナ海での中国の攻撃性を引き起こし、米海軍との衝突の確率を高める。 トゥキディデスの罠の物語がなお妥当であることを踏まえ、投資家はグローバル株式市場に対してS&P 500の航空宇宙・防衛株をオーバーウエイトすることを検討すべきである。本仮説を別の方法で活用するならば、グローバルの防衛株のバスケットを構築することだ。多極化は貿易保護主義への制約を生むかもしれないが、地政学的変動性を助長し、防衛支出を支えるだろう。 第二に、グローバリゼーションが再び上昇することは期待しない。多極化は国がライバルとの貿易を完全に閉ざすことを難しくするかもしれないが、グローバリゼーションは単にライバル間の貿易だけで成り立つわけではない。グローバリゼーションは大国間の高度な調整を必要とし、それは覇権的条件下でのみ可能である。Chart 9は、英国とその後のアメリカの覇権が過去200年にわたり貿易に強力な追い風を与えたことを示している。 Chart 9 グローバリゼーションの頂点は過ぎ去った グローバリゼーションの頂点はすでに過ぎている グローバリゼーションの頂点はすでに過ぎている 「Apex of Globalization」は既に過ぎ去った—ここからは下り坂である。しかしこれは二分法的な見方ではない。外国貿易がゼロになることはない。米国と中国が互いの勢力圏をシリコン・カーテンで完全に封鎖することはないだろう。 代わりに、我々は多極化、米中地政学的対立、グローバリゼーションの頂点という三つの潮流によって特徴づけられる世界から派生する五つの投資テーマに注目する。 欧州が利益を得る: 米中の敵対関係が深まるにつれて、いくつかの欧州企業が恩恵を受けると予想する。投資コミュニティはすでにこのトレンドを察知しており、貿易緊張が2019年に高まるたびに欧州株が米国株をややアウトパフォームした証拠がある（Chart 10）。しかし我々の仮説からすると、米国が中国市場で欧州に完全に市場シェアを奪われる可能性は低い。したがって我々は特にテクノロジーに注目している。ここでは、システム上の圧力があっても米中は非関税障壁を強化すると予想するからだ。したがって、欧州のテクノロジー企業を米国の同業と比較して戦略的にロングすることは理にかなっているかもしれない（Chart 11）。 Chart 10 欧州：貿易戦争の避難所 欧州：貿易戦争のセーフヘイブン 欧州：貿易戦争のセーフヘイブン Chart 11 欧州は本当にこれほど無能なのか？ ヨーロッパは本当にここまで無能なのか？ ヨーロッパは本当にここまで無能なのか？ 米ドルの強気相場は終焉する: 貿易戦争は貿易関係を調整する非常に破壊的な手段であり、報復を招き相対的損失を被る可能性がある。したがって我々は、米国が2018年の引き締めを積極的に反転させるか、貿易ライバルに自国通貨を強化させることを強制することで、最終的に米ドルを減価させると予想する。そのような動きは米ドル離れの追い風となり、ユーロに利益をもたらすだろう。 キャップエックスの強気相場: グローバルな製造チェーンの再配線は引き続き行われる。悪いニュースは、多国籍企業が利益率を切り崩してサプライチェーンを移転する必要があることだ。良いニュースは、それを達成するために製造キャップエックスに投資する必要があることである。このテーマの一つの表現は、半導体向け資本財企業の指数を買うことだ（AMAT、LRCX、KLAC、MKSI、AEIS、BRIKS、TERなど）。資本財企業は景気循環性が高いため、エントリーポイントは貿易緊張が緩和し世界成長の芽が見え始めたときに検討することを勧める。 「非同盟」市場が恩恵を受ける: 世界が最後に多極だったとき、大国は帝国主義を通じて競争した。今回は同様のダイナミクスが発展し、中国の「一帯一路」構想を模倣しようとする国々が現れるだろう。これはフロンティア市場にとって好材料である。輸出とサービスを提供するためのラッシュは供給を増やしコストを下げるため、これまで忘れられていた市場に投資のブームをもたらすだろう。インドや中国を除くアジアは、グローバル製造チェーンの再配線を利用するために積極的な改革を行っている現在の政権下で、魅力的な中国の代替先として立っている。 資本市場はグローバル化を維持する: 先進国の多くで金利がゼロ近傍にあり、人口動態上の負担が年金により高いリターンを強く求めさせているため、利回り探索は資本市場をグローバルに保ち続ける強力な動機となるだろう。制限は増える可能性が高く、特に二重用途技術への越境プライベート投資に関してはそうだ。しかし資本市場の完全な二分化はありそうにない。 我々が描写する世界は、地政学がグローバル投資家にとってますます重要な役割を果たす世界である。世界が単純に二つの交戦陣営に分かれ、投資家が地政学を無視できるようなきれいに分かれた区分けができるというのは都合が良いが、それは起こりそうにない。むしろ世界は19世紀末の動的な時代に似ており、粗野で混沌とした時代であって、投資には学際的なアプローチが求められるだろう。   Marko Papic, コンサルティング編集者、BCAリサーチ チーフ・ストラテジスト、Clocktower Group Marko@clocktowergroup.com 脚注 1 BCAリサーチ ジオポリティカル・ストラテジー、「Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?」（2012年9月25日）、「Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think」（2013年10月4日）、「The Great Risk Rotation」（2013年12月11日）、および「Strategic Outlook 2014 – Stay The Course: EM Risk – DM Reward」（2014年1月23日）、「Underestimating Sino-American Tensions」（2015年11月6日）、「The Geopolitics Of Trump」（2016年12月2日）、「How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia」（2017年3月1日）など。これらはgps.bcaresearch.comで入手可能、またはリクエストに応じて提供。 2 German Historical Institute、「Bernhard von Bulow on Germany’s ‘Place in the Sun’」（1897年）参照。http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/ 3 Graham Allison、Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?（New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017）参照。 4 戦争とならなかった三例は、16世紀のポルトガルからスペインへの移行、20世紀の英から米への移行、そして21世紀におけるドイツの地域覇権への台頭である。 5 Duncan Snidal、「Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation」、The American Political Science Review, 85:3（1991年9月）、pp. 701-726。 6 本稿ではスナイダルの優れたゲーム理論による形式モデルを詳細に再検討しないが、興味のある読者には原著を推奨する。 7 Charles P. Kindleberger、The World In Depression, 1929-1939（Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013）参照。 8 Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield、「Power Politics and International Trade」、The American Political Science Review, 87:2（1993年6月）、pp. 408-420。 9 Ernest Edwin Williams、Made in Germany（再版、Ithaca: Cornell University Press）参照。https://archive.org/details/cu31924031247830。 10 Margaret MacMillan、The War That Ended Peace（Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014）に引用。 11 Peter Liberman、「Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains」、International Security, 21:1（1996年夏）、pp. 147-175。 12 フランスとロシアは、共和制と暴力的蜂起に基づく共和国—フランス—と貴族的権威主義体制—ロシア—というイデオロギー的差異を乗り越えた点でさらに大きな溝を克服した。 13 James Morrow、「When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?」、The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1（1997年2月）、pp. 12-37；および Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri、「Trading With the Enemy During Wartime」、Security Studies, 13:3（2004年12月）、pp. 1-47 を参照。

ハイライト トランプ大統領が共和党内で支持され、決定的な証拠がないことは罷免を阻むだろう。 弾劾手続きでトランプ氏の支持率が恩恵を受け、米国経済が底堅ければ、貿易リスクは高まるだろう。 欧州本土の政治リスクは低下している。しかしロシアとトルコには注意が必要で、英国の10年物対2年物ギルトをショートせよ。 スペインの新選挙は政治的膠着を解消しない可能性がある。 香港ハンセンのショートで利益を確定する。 特集 米国のドナルド・トランプ大統領に対する弾劾手続き、露骨なイランによるサウジ攻撃、貿易戦争リスクの残存、そして中国と欧州からの追加の弱いデータは、投資家は当面リスク回避の姿勢を維持すべきであることを示唆している。具体的には、トランプ氏の弾劾は彼を国外での気晴らしに駆り立てる可能性があり、始まったばかりの積極的な対外・貿易政策からの戦術的撤退を放棄することになり得る。 ホットスポット以外の地政学リスクは低下しており、特に欧州で目立つ。ノーディール・ブレグジットのリスクは当社の予想に沿って急落した。イタリアとドイツは市場を安心させるためにポピュリズムなき財政刺激を提示し、市場を喜ばせた。フランスではエマニュエル・マクロン大統領の人気が回復している。そして本レポートで論じるように、スペインの選挙は重大な懸念材料を追加しないだろう。 以下では新しいGeoRisk指標を紹介し、過去1か月にわたる当社のすべての指標からのシグナルを概観し、その後スペインに焦点を当てる。 恐れるべきは米国政治であって弾劾自体ではない 下院民主党によるトランプ氏の弾劾決定は、投資家がリスク資産に対して慎重であり続けるもう一つの理由を与える。なぜ強気になれないのか？確かに、弾劾が決定的な証拠なしに行われれば、トランプ氏の再選確率は高まりうる。これは民主党の勝利に比べれば市場にとってプラスである。トランプ大統領は、共和党が引き続き91%の支持率で支える限り、事実上民主党の弾劾手続きに対して無敵である（チャート1）。このような状況では上院議員が離反することはなく、トランプ氏は職を追われることはないだろう。 共和党の支持が高い限り、トランプ氏は弾劾手続きに対して無敵である。 さらに、ウクライナ大統領ヴォロディミル・ゼレンスキーとの電話会話の議事録は決定的な一撃にはならなかった。トランプ大統領が軍事支援を差し止める代わりにジョー・バイデン前副大統領やその息子ハンターに関する捜査を要求するという明確な「見返り」は示されていない。従って不正行為があったかどうかは、さらなる証拠を待つまでは議論の余地がある。これは「内部告発者の申し立て」を超える証拠を含み得るもので、同申し立てはトランプ陣営が前述の電話議事録の情報を抑えようとした可能性を示唆している。重要なのは、草の根の共和党と上院がこの議論の最終的な裁定者であるという点である。 問題は、スキャンダルと弾劾が株式市場のボラティリティに供給されることが依然として考えられることである（チャート2）。下院民主党は弾劾に全面的に注力し、情報機関の内部告発者からの証言を聴取する過程で新たな証拠を掘り起こす可能性がある。 チャート1 共和党はまだトランプを弾劾する用意がない 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの短期滞在 – GeoRisk Update: 2019年9月27日 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの短期滞在 – GeoRisk Update: 2019年9月27日 弾劾はまた、民主党の大統領予備選を通じて市場にネガティブな影響を与える。エリザベス・ウォーレンはまだ初期の民主党予備選でバイデンを押しのけていない。 チャート2 弾劾手続きはボラティリティを高める可能性 弾劾手続きはボラティリティを高める可能性が高い 弾劾手続きはボラティリティを高める可能性が高い もし彼女（ウォーレン）がバイデンを追い落とせば、市場には大きなネガティブ・インパクトが生じるだろう。トランプ大統領は依然として再選で僅かに有利であるに過ぎない。いかなる場合でもこの選挙は極めて接戦であり、財政政策と規制に対して重大な影響を持ち、従って2020年11月まで多くの不確実性を生むだろう。内部告発者を巡る一連の出来事は、この不確実性をむしろ悪化させている。 レポート冒頭でも述べたように、もし弾劾手続きが何らかの勢いを得れば、それはトランプ氏を国外での気晴らしに駆り立てる可能性があり、始まったばかりの積極的な対外・貿易政策からの戦術的撤退を放棄させることになり得る。 最後に、トランプ氏の再選は代替案より市場に優しいため安心ラリーを引き起こす可能性が高いが、一見したほど強気ではない。第2期のトランプ政策は第1期ほど企業に有利ではないだろう。選挙上の懸念から解放されつつも下院が民主党であるという状況では、減税は実現困難だが、対外・貿易政策をさらに攻撃的に進める可能性が高い。これは米国の長期的利益に資するか否かに関わらず、市場にとってプラスの見通しではない。 結論：トランプ大統領の共和党有権者間での支持率が重要な指標である。彼らが信頼を捨てない限り上院は反転せず、トランプ氏の支持はむしろ上がる可能性がある。しかしそれは強気転換の理由にはならない。今後1年は米国の政治的機能不全の恐怖劇が不可避であり、ボラティリティと潜在的に海外での紛争エスカレーションを引き起こすだろう。 発表…当社の米中貿易リスク指標 今週、米中貿易戦争のための新しいGeoRisk指標を導入する（チャート3）。この指標は、全体の先進国株式が中国エクスポージャーの高い銘柄群に対してどの程度アウトパフォームしているか、および中国の民間クレジット成長（「社会総融資」）に基づいている。チャートの説明が示すように、この指標は貿易戦争を通じた事象の推移と整合している。また、報道記事中の重要語のカウントなど別の貿易リスクの測度ともかなり相関している。 チャート3 ここから貿易リスクは上昇するだろう 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの短期滞在 — GeoRiskアップデート：2019年9月27日 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの短期滞在 — GeoRiskアップデート：2019年9月27日 執筆時点で当社の指標は貿易戦争関連のリスクが増加していることを示唆している。過去1か月、トランプ氏は選挙前の経済リスクを抑えるために対外・貿易政策で戦術的撤退を行ってきたが（経済リスク管理のため）、当社の指標はこれが既に織り込まれていることを示している。 問題は、トランプ再選のリスクが中国にとって一層厳しい交渉を可能にすることであり、これはFedExの従業員拘束（米企業を困らせ得るシグナル）やモンタナ、ネブラスカでの農場視察のキャンセルにより暫定的に確認されている。これらは大事件ではないが、中国がトランプの躊躇を嗅ぎ取り、交渉で攻勢に出ていることを示唆している。 主要交渉担当者は10月上旬に極めて重要な協議ラウンドで会合する予定である。これが実質的な進展の公表や、4月にほぼ完成しているドラフト文書が仕上がることを示せば、11月のAPECサミット（チリ・サンティアゴ）で習近平国家主席とドナルド・トランプ大統領の首脳会談が設定される可能性がある。この時点で、我々は2020年11月までに合意が成立する確率を上方修正する必要があるだろう（当社は40%と見積もっている）。 もし協議が前向きな公的成果で終わらなければ、投資家はそれを軽視すべきではない。第4四半期の交渉は米国選挙前の最後の合意の試みである可能性があり、トランプ＝習の首脳会談の話がない場合、我々のエンドゲームに対する悲観的見通しが裏付けられることになる。 米中貿易協議が決定的で持続的な合意を生む可能性は低い。 最終的に我々は、米中貿易協議が貿易戦争リスクと不確実性を実質的に取り除くような決定的かつ持続的な合意を生むとは考えていない。特に世界的な金融緩和の中で金融市場・経済圧力が十分に強くなく、政策決定者を妥協に駆り立てない場合にはその可能性は低い。しかし、弾劾手続きがトランプの戦術的撤退を持続させ、中国からの相互措置を引き出している兆候があれば、見通しはより楽観的になるだろう。 結論：大統領の支持率が民主党の弾劾手続きから恩恵を受け、かつ我々が予想するように米国経済が底堅ければ、トランプ氏は中国との浅い合意に屈することを回避できる。ここから貿易リスクは上昇し得る。 同様に、弾劾手続きは最終的にトランプ氏に再び戦術を変えさせ、対外政策でより攻撃的な姿勢を取らせる可能性がある。弾劾に勢いがつくか、ベアマーケットが発生すれば、彼は大統領就任以降で最も攻撃的になることがあり得る—その攻撃は中国（あるいはイラン、北朝鮮、ベネズエラ、その他の国）に向けられるかもしれない。 我々の見方に対するリスクは、中国が自国経済の猶予を得るためにトランプの貿易姿勢を受け入れ、両者がAPECサミットで合意に達することである。 欧州のリスクは低下、ロシアとトルコのリスクはこれ以上ほとんど下がらない その他の地域では、当社の地政学リスクの測定は多数の先進国および新興国で緊張の低下を示している（付録参照）。ドイツではリスクは現状からやや上昇し得るが概ね抑制されている—これは短期を除けば英国では当てはまらない。ロシアとトルコでは、これ以上リスクが下がる余地はほとんどない。 まずドイツだが、メルケル首相の与党連立が気候変動対策として500億ユーロの財政支出パッケージで合意したことで政治リスクは低下した。この合意は、ドイツ政治が基本的に安定している一方で、行政は刺激策を先取りして打つというよりは反応的に行動するだろうという当社の評価を裏付けるものだ。 欧州がドイツの財政政策における真の「ゲームチェンジャー」を待つには、世界的な危機、あるいは新たなドイツ政府が必要だろう。世論調査で急伸している緑の党が、メルケルを気候支出へ駆り立てたため、そのような展開を可能にするかもしれないが、まだ早すぎる。 一方で、メルケルの退任間際の状態と外部要因が政治リスクを完全には収束させないだろう。我々は、米国車の関税が現状より高まる確率を30%以下と見ている—少なくとも米中の緊張が続く限りは。 対照的に、英国の政治リスクは今月大きく改善したにもかかわらず、抑制されているとは言えない。9月25日の最高裁判所による首相ボリス・ジョンソンの議会休会（プログ）無効判決は、合意なきEU離脱で国を引き裂くという彼の脅しの棺にもう一打を加えた。これはEUから譲歩を引き出すための賭けだったが、完全に失敗した。1 これが、最も説得力のあるノーディール離脱の脅威であったため、その失敗は英国と近隣国の政治リスク低下の一歩を意味するはずだ。 しかし逆説的に、我々のGeoRisk指標は夏を通じておよび現在のポンドの急落を裏付けられなかった。理由は、夏の間ポンドの減価率は比較的横ばいであった一方、当該指標の説明変数の一つである英国製造業PMIは世界的な製造業の急落に伴いもっと速く低下したためである。その結果、当社の指標は政治リスクの低下としてこれを記録した。世界はノーディールよりも景気後退を恐れており、市場の判断は正しかった。しかし状況は逆転し得る：世界成長が改善し、新たな英国選挙が予定されれば、後者はノーディールのリスクを再燃させる可能性がある（特にトーリー党が薄い過半数で連立政権として戻った場合はなおさらだ）。 真実は、ブレグジットの物語は終わっておらず、英国は選挙、左派政権の可能性、そして最終的には離脱も残留も中間層の不安を解決しないことが明らかになればポピュリズムの粘り強さに直面するだろう。我々のGBP-USDのロング推奨は必然的にタクティカルであり、1.30ドルで売りに転じる予定である。 新興市場では、ロシアとトルコの政治リスクは非常に低下しており、何らかの政治展開が起こらない限りこれ以上低下するのは難しい。最新の評価に基づけば、トルコは近い将来リスクが急上昇する可能性が高い。これはエルドアン大統領に対する国内政治的連携の形成や、脆弱な米国とトルコのシリア協定を巡る外的リスクの高まりによって生じ得る。イランとの緊張はオイルショックを引き起こし、経済を弱体化させ野党を勢いづける可能性もある。 ロシアについては、我々のベースケースはロシアが対外目的を軽視して国内問題に注力し続けることであり、これが地政学リスクを低位に保つのに寄与するというものだ。米国の政治が混乱し、対イランの紛争が視野に入る中で、モスクワが自ら敵対的注目を浴びる理由はない。しかしながら、プーチン時代を通じてモスクワは予測不可能で攻撃的であり、トランプに対する忠誠心は本物ではなく民主党の怒りの標的となり得るし、中東やアジア太平洋で火種を煽る誘因も持つ。したがって地政学リスクがこれ以上大幅に下がることを期待するのは運を天に任せることになる。 結論： 欧州の政治リスクは低下している が、メルケルの退任間際の状態と貿易戦争により、政権基盤が安定しているにもかかわらずドイツのリスクはここから上昇し得る。 英国は今夏のノーディール・リスクの回避という幸運な結論にもかかわらず、世代的に高まった政治リスクに直面している。英国の10年物対2年物ギルトをショートしなさい。 ロシアは当面静かであり続けるべきだが、トルコはほぼ確実に政治リスクの上昇を経験するだろう。 スペイン：選挙は驚きをもたらすかもしれないがリスクは低い 政党幹部が恒久的な政府樹立で合意できなかったため、スペインの有権者は11月10日に4年で4度目の投票に向かうことになる。 スペイン社会労働党（PSOE）は4月の解散総選挙で350議席中123議席を獲得して以降、暫定政権を務めている。 新たなスペインの選挙は現在の政治的膠着を解消しないだろう。 首相でありPSOE党首のペドロ・サンチェスは7月に承認を得られず、それ以来左派の反体制政党ポデモスと政権協定を模索してきた。ただしPSOEは完全な連立を求めているわけではなく、単に少数与党として引き続き統治するための外部支持を求めているに過ぎない。したがって交渉でPSOEはポデモスに閣僚ポストではなく非閣僚の機関を提供する程度にとどめ、ポデモスや他党は選挙の準備を整えている。 今後の選挙の結果は4月の選挙と大きくは変わらないかもしれない。スペインの有権者は変化を求めていない。失業と不完全雇用は減少しており、賃金上昇は2014年以降プラスで推移している（チャート4）。世論調査では各党への支持は大きく変動していない（チャート5、上段）。PSOEは依然としてかなりの差でリードしている。 チャート4 スペイン有権者は変化を求めていない スペインの有権者は変化を求めていない スペインの有権者は変化を求めていない とはいえ選挙は不都合な時期に不確実性を高め、驚きを生む可能性がある。PSOEの支持は7月下旬以降わずかに低下しており、これはポデモスとの交渉がこじれ始めた時期に一致する。 チャート5 世論調査に大きな変化はない… 世論調査に大きな変化なし... 世論調査に大きな変化なし... たとえPSOEとポデモスが統治協定を結んだとしても、両者の合計支持は主要な保守系3党の合計支持を大きく上回るわけではない。保守系は国民党（Partido Popular）、シウダダノス（Ciudadanos）、Voxであり（チャート5下段）、彼らはマドリードの地域政府を共同で支配することで協力できることを最近示した。 チャート6 …しかし投票率低下は左派に打撃を与える可能性 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの滞在 – GeoRiskアップデート：2019年9月27日 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの滞在 – GeoRiskアップデート：2019年9月27日 社会党はシウダダノスから際どい有権者を取り込むことを望んでおり、特にシウダダノスの右派ポピュリズムへの転向やカタルーニャ問題に対する強硬姿勢に懐疑的な有権者を狙っている。しかしシウダダノスの有権者の半分を取り込めたとしても、PSOEの支持は約37%にとどまり、単独過半数政権を形成するには程遠い。 PSOEに打撃を与え得るもう一つの要素は投票率である。スペインの有権者は4月選挙以降、いずれの党も支持することへの関心が薄れている。投票率の低下は左派にとって最も打撃になり得る。なぜなら有権者は政府形成失敗をポデモスとPSOEの責任と見なす割合が、PPやシウダダノスよりも高いからである（チャート6）。 最も可能性の高い結果は現状維持か、あるいはPSOE–ポデモス連合だ。しかし保守派の勝利を排除することはできない。前者2ケースでは短期的にはやや拡張的な財政が実施されやすくなるが、長期的には改革の勢いを失うリスクがある。 文脈を示すと、スペインの政治は国内志向であり、欧州統合への脅威とはなっていない。スペインの有権者は通貨やEU加盟に関して大陸で最も親欧的な層の一つである（チャート7）。スペインはイタリアとともにEU予算配分の主要な受益国である。極右のVoxですら「強硬なユーロ懐疑主義者」と見なされてはいない。 ただし国内に目を向けると政治的分断が問題である。不平等や社会的流動性の欠如はイタリア、英国、米国ほど極端ではないにせよ懸念材料だ。さらにカタルーニャ独立問題は対立を生む。新たなカタルーニャ州議会選は2022年まで予定されていないが、共和主義左派（Republican Left of Catalonia）とカタルーニャ・シーの親独立連合は世論調査で勢いを増しており、シウダダノスの支持は今年初めに同党がカタルーニャに対する姿勢を強硬化して以来急落している（チャート8）。カタルーニャが独立するという状況では全くない—独立支持は2013年にピークに達している—が、それでもスペイン政治の原動力であり続けている。 チャート7 スペイン人は欧州を好む スペイン人はヨーロッパを愛している スペイン人はヨーロッパを愛している チャート8 カタルーニャは分裂を招く問題 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの滞在 — GeoRiskアップデート：2019年9月27日 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの滞在 — GeoRiskアップデート：2019年9月27日 ごく短期的には、選挙の麻痺は財政政策にクロスウインドを生む。一方では地方政府は支出削減を強いられる可能性がある。地域は昨年より50億ユーロ多く受け取ると期待しており、その一部は医療や教育に使われる予定だった。安定（あるいは少なくとも暫定）政権が2019年予算を承認できるまでは、地域は2019年予算を昨年の数値に基づいて作成するため、予定されていた支出増加を削らざるを得ない。 しかし他方で、税収が回収できないため予算赤字は拡大するだろう。2018年末にスペインは年金、公務員給与、最低賃金の引き上げを法令で実施したが、2019年予算で実施されるはずだった対応する歳入増加は政権が確立するまで実現しないため、赤字は上方圧力を受ける。 選挙を越えれば、大陸の景気減速を受けてやや大きめの財政的押し上げが期待される。スペインには多少の財政余力があり、2019年に財政赤字は2%、2020年に1.1%へ低下すると見込まれている。2 欧州委員会のより保守的な見積もりでも2019年と2020年の赤字はそれぞれ2.3%と2%と予想されている（チャート9）。これは、スペインが過去10年の緊縮の後に歓迎される変化として、2020年に過度の赤字手続きを起動させることなく追加で約100～150億ユーロ分の刺激を提供できることを意味する。 リスクは、スペインの構造改革の勢いが失われ、長期的に悪影響を及ぼす可能性があることだ。2012年、スペインは痛みを伴う労働市場と年金改革を実行し、それが印象的な経済回復を支えた。我々の報告が示す通り、経済は同業国平均より速く成長し続け、失業は過去6年で12%低下し、輸出競争力は2008年以降ヨーロッパで最も急速に回復した国の一つである（チャート10）。この回復は現在減速し始めており、現時点の政治的膠着は改革が市場の望むより深く巻き戻されるリスクを生んでいる。 チャート9 スペインにはある程度の財政余地がある スペインにはいくらかの財政余地がある スペインにはいくらかの財政余地がある 保守派が政権に戻るという驚きが起これば、これは回避される可能性が高いが、その場合は短期的に緩和的な政策は少なくなるだろう。 チャート10 回復は減速し始めている 回復が鈍化し始めている 回復が鈍化し始めている 結論：当社の地政学リスク指標はスペインに関して抑制されたリスク水準を示している。これは、選挙が大きな変化をもたらさない可能性があり、いずれにせよ同国は不安定な均衡状態にとどまるだろうという点に適合している。政治は米国、英国、イタリアのようなポピュリズムに侵された国々よりも基本的に安定している。しかし、左派政権が生じれば短期的にはより大きな財政的緩和が行われ、その代償としてスペインが最近達成した構造改革の進展が損なわれるというリスクがある。 事務連絡 香港ハンセンのショートで利益を確定している。混乱はまだ終わっていないが、10月1日の中華人民共和国建国記念日が近づくにつれてピークに達し、北京は強硬な介入を避けようとするだろう。   エカテリーナ・シュトレヴェンスキー、リサーチ・アナリスト ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com マット・ガートケン、副社長 地政学ストラテジスト mattg@bcaresearch.com 脚注 1 最高裁はジョンソン政権による議会休会が、正当な理由なく議会の主権的立法者としての役割および政府監視の役割を不当に骨抜きにする違法な手段であると判断した。通常より大規模な11人の裁判官が全会一致で休会の無効を判決した。歴史的に見て休会の使用例や、議会が10月31日のブレグジット日までに行動する時間がまだあったこと、そして首相の対外関係や条約に関する歴史的権限を考えれば、我々は少なくとも判決は接戦になると予想していた。しかし最高裁はブレグジットの混乱の中で議会の麻痺によって生じた権力の真空を埋める役割を果たし、首相が重要な局面で議会の役割を縮小できるという新たな前例になり得るものを「打ち砕いた」。実務的な短期的帰結はノーディール退出の政治的・経済的リスクの低下であるが、長期的帰結は英国の絶えず進化する憲法制度における司法の重要性の高まりかもしれない。 2 「Stability Programme Update 2019-2022, Kingdom of Spain」を参照、入手先は www.ec.europa.eu。 英国：GeoRisk指標 英国：GEORISK 指標 英国：GEORISK 指標 フランス：GeoRisk指標 フランス：GEORISK指標 フランス：GEORISK指標 ドイツ：GeoRisk指標 ドイツ：GEORISK指標 ドイツ：GEORISK指標 スペイン：GeoRisk指標 スペイン：GEORISK指標 スペイン：GEORISK指標 イタリア：GeoRisk指標 イタリア：ジオリスク・インジケーター イタリア：ジオリスク・インジケーター ロシア：GeoRisk指標 ロシア：ジオリスク・インディケーター ロシア：ジオリスク・インディケーター トルコ：GeoRisk指標 トルコ：GEORISKインジケーター トルコ：GEORISKインジケーター ブラジル：GeoRisk指標 ブラジル：ジオリスク・インディケーター ブラジル：ジオリスク・インディケーター 台湾：GeoRisk指標 台湾：GEORISK指標 台湾：GEORISK指標 韓国：GeoRisk指標 韓国：GEORISKインジケーター 韓国：GEORISKインジケーター 地政学的レーダー上の注目点は？ 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの短期滞在 — GeoRisk アップデート：2019年9月27日 弾劾、貿易戦争、そしてスペインへの短期滞在 — GeoRisk アップデート：2019年9月27日 第III部：地政学カレンダー