資本流動
Executive Summary The RMB And Real Interest Rates The RMB has overshot and will likely consolidate gains in the coming months. The said, the yuan remains underpinned by a current account surplus, positive real rates, and a valuation cushion. This will support modest appreciation over the next 12-18 months (Feature Chart). The dollar is likely to enter a period of weakness beyond the Russo-Ukrainian crisis, underpinning a firm RMB. Yield spreads between China and the US will narrow across the bond curve, slowing the pace of any RMB appreciation. In its quest to dominate Asian trade flows, China will also seek a stable yuan which can be an anchor for regional currencies. Low volatility in the Chinese bond and currency market will increasingly make it an attractive hedge for global portfolio managers. This will encourage RMB inflows. The financial sanctions on Russia from the ongoing Ukrainian conflict will accelerate Chinese diversification from US assets. It will also boost the use of RMB in global trade, lifting its share in global FX reserves. Bottom Line: In the near term, USD/CNY is due for a bounce and could retrace to 6.5. It is also the case that a lot of the gains in the Chinese RMB have been frontloaded, suggesting a flattish path ahead. Beyond the near term, we expect the DXY to hit 90 in the next 12-18 months, which will boost the RMB towards 6.0. Feature The RMB has been strong across the board versus most major currencies (Chart 1). Year-to-date, the DXY dollar index is up 2% while the CFETS basket is up 3%. This places the Chinese yuan as one of the best performing major currencies this year. Such a configuration where USD/CNY diverges from the broad dollar trend has been very rare in recent history (Chart 2). More importantly, this has occurred amidst very low volatility. Chart 1A Bull Market In Yuans Chart 2USD/CNY And The Dollar Diverge In this Special Report, we try to understand the driving forces behind a rising RMB, to gauge its likely path going forward. In our view, while the yuan is vulnerable tactically, it is underpinned by strong structural forces that support modest appreciation over the next 12-18 months. The Chinese Economy, Interest Rates, And The RMB An exchange rate is simply a mechanism to equalize rates of returns across countries. For most currencies, the key determinants of this arbitrage window are real interest rate differentials. In China, while nominal interest rates vis-à-vis the US have been collapsing, real interest rate differentials are near a record high. This has been the key driver of a rising RMB (Chart 3). Real interest rates tend to matter because high and rising inflation destroys the purchasing power of any currency. Our bias is that higher real rates in China versus the US will persist and keep the RMB firm. Five key reasons underpin this view: The Chinese economy is expected to accelerate this year relative to the US. The IMF expects 4.8% GDP growth in China, versus 4% in the US. Bloomberg consensus estimates corroborate this view – 5.2% growth is expected for China this year, versus 3.6% for the US. Even the Chinese government’s GDP growth target this year is 5.5%, much higher than street estimates. US interest rates are likely to rise over the medium term, but so will those in China. The Chinese credit impulse has bottomed, and it is usually a good precursor to both stronger economic activity and higher relative government bond yields (Chart 4). Chart 3The RMB And Real Versus Nominal Rates Chart 4Interest Rate Differentials And The Credit Impulse While Chinese productivity growth is slowing, it remains structurally higher compared to that in the US or Europe. Stronger productivity growth suggests the neutral rate of interest in China will remain higher than in Western economies for years to come. This will continue to attract further fixed-income inflows. The RMB is a procyclical currency and tends to benefit when flows into emerging market assets in general, and Chinese stocks in particular, are fervent. While the Chinese authorities have cracked down on the property and information technology/communication service sectors, they have done so without causing widespread capital flight and hurting the RMB (Chart 5). Going forward, odds are that the interest from foreign bargain hunters will rise as these sectors reset from lower and much cheaper levels. It is well known that the Chinese economy has excess capacity, which is inherently deflationary (and positive for real rates). Like Japan, China has excess savings and deficient demand (Chart 6). However, in an inflationary world, this excess capacity can easily be exported, especially to the US, which is on the verge of overheating. A healthy trade balance in China suggests there is little reason for the RMB to depreciate meaningfully. Chart 6Excess Savings In China And Low Inflation Chart 5The RMB And Chinese Equities It is remarkable that despite being the largest commodity importer in the world, terms of trade in China is picking up. Rising terms of trade is usually synonymous with a stronger currency. On the flip side, a stronger currency will also temper inflationary pressures in China (Chart 7). Chart 7The RMB, Terms Of Trade And Inflation The bottom line is that real interest rates will remain relatively high in China, even as the US begins to tighten monetary policy while China eases. The reason is that the US economy is much more inflationary, and Chinese bond yields tend to rise when the PBoC stimulates growth. Market Liberalization And Portfolio Flows With attractive real yields, Chinese bonds have been gaining widespread investor appeal. Their inclusion in the world’s three major bond indices has been a seminal milestone in the process of liberalizing the Chinese fixed-income market. Chinese bonds have also acted as perfect portfolio hedges, moving inversely to US and global equities (Chart 8). The result has been significant portfolio inflows into Chinese bonds. As a reminder, Chinese bonds were initially included in the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index (BBGA) in April 2019. Following that, they were added to the JP Morgan Government Bond - Emerging Market Index (GBI-EM) in February 2020. Finally, FTSE Russell announced their inclusion of in the FTSE World Government Bond Index (WGBI) as of October 2021. Since their inclusion, a net US$350 billion has flowed into Chinese bonds. We estimate that about 35% of that has been due to index inclusion. The amount of Chinese onshore bonds held by overseas investors has breached US$600 billion, a record high (Chart 9). Chart 9A Healthy Appetite From Foreign Investors Chart 8RMB Bonds As A Portfolio Hedge In a nutshell, the path of the RMB in the short term will follow relative growth dynamics between China and the rest of the world, but structural factors such the inclusion of RMB bonds in global portfolios will underpin strong inflows into the Chinese fixed-income market. The Dollar, Trade, And Lessons From The Ukrainian Conflict Chart 10China Is Destocking USDs Another factor to consider vis-à-vis the RMB is the dollar’s reserve status, and the overreach that it commands. Quite simply, transactions conducted in US dollars anywhere fall under US law. This means that if a company in any country buys energy from Iran and the transaction is done in US dollars, the Treasury has powers to sanction the parties involved. Russian holdings of US Treasurys peaked during the Georgian war and have since fallen to near 0% of total reserves. Even so, the world has witnessed how vulnerable the Russian economy has been to a cut-off from the Society For Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging system. China is the largest holder of US Treasurys and what it decides to do with this war chest of savings is of critical importance. At a minimum, a few trends that have been underway in recent years are likely to accelerate. China will continue to destock its holding of Treasurys into gold and other currencies (Chart 10). This will put downward pressure on the dollar and boost the RMB. In fact, ever since China started destocking Treasurys in earnest in 2015, the DXY has been unable to sustainably punch through the 100 level. Trade flows in Asia remain rather buoyant, even as globalization has peaked (Chart 11A and 11B). With most Asian countries having China as a large trading partner, the logical step will be more and more invoicing in RMB. Most global trade hubs in history (such as Hong Kong for example) have always sought a stable currency with low volatility to instill confidence in trade. China is likely to also favor a stable RMB. Chart 11AChina Could Dominate Asian Trade Chart 11BAsian Trade Is Booming As Asian trade continues to expand, the PBoC can step in as the regional central bank and lender of last resort. It is notable that China is already engaging in this role. Since the global financial crisis, the number of bilateral swap lines offered to foreign central banks by the PBoC has ballooned (Chart 12). According to the most recent data (from the PBoC), the Chinese central bank had bilateral local currency swap agreements with central banks or monetary authorities in 40 countries and regions, with a total amount of around 4 trillion yuan. The People’s Bank of China has massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.2 trillion. This means it can provide swap agreements that will almost cover the totality of EM foreign dollar debt. The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) already allows the transfer and clearing of yuan-denominated payments. In 2021, the system processed US$12.7 trillion, a 75% increase in turnover from the previous year.1 While the system still largely relies on SWIFT messaging for most cross-border transactions, progress towards independence is moving fast. The key point is that as China continues to rise as an economic power and increases the share of RMB trade within its sphere of influence, the yuan will naturally become the de facto Asian currency. This will allow the RMB to continue to gain international appeal (Chart 13). Chart 12The People's Bank Of Asia? Chart 13The RMB And International Appeal Valuation Concerns Most of the discussion above has focused on the cyclical outlook for the Chinese economy and bond yields, as well as the geopolitical ramifications from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. While the macro environment is by far the most important driver of currencies, valuation and sentiment tend to matter as well. On this note: Our productivity model suggests the RMB is at fair value. Productivity in China remains higher than among its western trading partners, but the gap has been closing. This has flattened the slope of the fair-value model (Chart 14). That said, the US and Europe are generating much higher inflation than China, suggesting there is higher pressure for unit labor costs to rise in these countries. This will improve the competitive profile of the RMB. Our PPP model for the RMB, using an apples-to-apples consumer basket vis-à-vis the US suggests the RMB is undervalued by 11% (Chart 15). Historically, such levels of undervaluation have seen the RMB appreciate by 2% per year over the next 4 years (Chart 16). Chart 14The RMB Is At Fair Value Based On Productivity Trends Chart 15The RMB Is Cheap Based On Relative Prices Chart 16Potential RMB Returns For Foreign Investors Valuation tends to be important because it is usually the trigger for imbalances to manifest themselves. Back in 2015-20162 when Chinese capital outflows (especially illicit flows) were rampant amongst global and Chinese concerns, the RMB also happened to be very overvalued. Today, such a risk is much limited. Concluding Thoughts The RMB and the dollar tend to move in harmony, and so a discussion of one entails talking about the other. We have characterized the dollar this year as caught in a tug of war. Specifically, aggressive rate hikes by the Federal Reserve will boost interest rate differentials in favor of the US but undermine the equity market via a derating in stocks. This will tighten financial conditions, nudging the Fed to pivot. On the other hand, less accommodation by the Fed will significantly unwind the rate-driven rally that has nudged the DXY close to 100. On the other hand, the Chinese credit impulse has bottomed meaning bond investors will benefit from rising bond yields in China. Equity investors will also benefit from a cheaper market, as well as exposure to sectors that are primed to benefit as the global economy reopens. This combination could sustain the pace of foreign capital inflows. In the near term, USD/CNY is due for a bounce and could retrace to 6.5. It is also the case that a lot of the gains in the Chinese RMB have been front loaded, suggesting a flattish path ahead. Beyond the near term, we expect the DXY to hit 90 in the next 12-18 months, which will boost the RMB towards 6.0. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/what-is-chinas-onshore-yuan-clearing-settlement-system-cips-2022-02-28/ 2 Please see Chinese Investment Strategy Special Report, titled “Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows,” dated March 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
Dear client, In addition to this weekly report, we sent you a Special Report from our Geopolitical Strategy service, highlighting the risk from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Kind regards, Chester Executive Summary The Ukraine crisis will lead to a period of strength for the DXY. Countries requiring foreign capital will be most at risk from an escalation in tensions. Portfolio flows have reaccelerated into the US, on the back of a rise in Treasury yields. This will be sustained in the near term. The euro area on the other hand has already witnessed significant portfolio outflows, on the back of Russo-Ukrainian tensions and an energy crisis. Countries with balance of payment surpluses like Switzerland and Australia are good havens amidst the carnage. Oil-producing countries such as Norway and Canada have also seen an improvement in their balance of payments, on the back of a strong terms-of-trade tailwind. This will be sustained in the near term. Balance Of Payments Across The G10 Bottom Line: The dollar is king in a risk-off environment. That said, the US and the UK sport the worst balance of payments backdrops, while Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden have the best. This underpins our long-term preference for Scandinavian currencies in an FX portfolio. In the near term, we think the DXY will peak near 98-100, but volatility will swamp fundamental biases. Feature Chart 1The US Runs A Sizeable Deficit The Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to dictate near-term FX movements. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the risk of escalation and/or a miscalculation has risen. FX volatility is increasing sharply, and with it, the risk of a further selloff in currencies dependent on foreign capital inflows. As a reserve currency, the dollar has also been strong. It is difficult to ascertain how this imbroglio will end. However, in this week’s report, we look at which currencies are most vulnerable (and likely to stay vulnerable) from a balance of payments standpoint. Chart 1 plots the basic balance – the sum of the current account balance and foreign investment – across G10 countries. It shows that at first blush, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and Australia are the most resilient from a funding standpoint, while New Zealand, the UK, and the US are the most vulnerable. In Chart 2, we rank G10 currencies on eight different criteria: The basic balance, which we highlighted above. Real interest rate differentials, using the 10-year tenor and headline inflation. Relative growth fundamentals, as measured by the Markit manufacturing PMI. Three fair value models which we use in-house. The first is our Purchasing Power Parity model, which adjusts consumption basket weights across the G10 to reflect a more apples-to-apples comparison. The second is our long-term fair value model (LTFV), which adjusts for productivity differentials between countries; and the final is our intermediate-term timing model (ITTM), which separates procyclical from safe-haven currencies by including a risk factor such as corporate spreads. All three models are equally weighted in our rankings. The net international investment position (NIIP), which highlights currencies that are most likely to witness either repatriation flows or a positive income balance in the current account. Finally, net speculative positioning, which tells us which currencies have crowded long positions, and which ones sport a consensus sell. Chart 2The Scandinavian Currencies Are Attractive The conclusions from this chart are similar to our basic balance scenario – NOK, SEK, AUD, CHF, and JPY stand out as winners while GBP, NZD, and USD are the least attractive. The US dollar is a special case given its reserve currency status, with a persistent balance of payments deficit. The rise in the greenback amidst market volatility is a case in point. However, portfolio flows into the dollar also tend to be cyclical, so a resolution in the Ukraine/Russia conflict will put a cap on inflows. Equity portfolio flows had dominated financing of the US current account deficit but are relapsing (Chart 3). Bond portfolio flows have rebounded on the back of rising US yields, but US TIPS yields remain very low by historical standards (Chart 4). If they do not improve much further, specifically relative to other developed markets, it will be tough to justify further inflows into US Treasurys. Chart 3Equity Portfolio Flows Into The US Are Relapsing Chart 4Bond Portfolio Flows Into The US Are Strong In this week’s report, we look at the key drivers of balance of payments dynamics across the G10, starting with the US, especially amidst a scenario where the forfeit of foreign capital could come to the fore. United States Chart 5US Balance Of Payments The US trade deficit continues to hit record lows at -$80.7 billion for the month of December. Over the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to fund this widening trade deficit via foreign purchases of US Treasurys. A positive net income balance has allowed a slower deterioration in the US current account balance, though at -$214.8 billion for Q3, it remains close to record lows. The overall picture for both the trade and current account balance is more benign as a share of GDP, given robust GDP growth (Chart 5). That said, as a share of GDP, the trade balance stands at -3.5%, the worst in over a decade. Foreign direct investment into the US has been improving of late. This probably reflects an onshoring of manufacturing, triggered by the Covid-19 crisis. That said, despite this improvement, the US still sports a negative net FDI backdrop. In a nutshell, the basic balance in the US (the sum of the current account and foreign direct investment) is still deteriorating. The dollar tends to decline on a multi-year basis when the basic balance peaks and starts worsening. Euro Area Chart 6Euro Area Balance Of Payments The trade balance in the euro area has significantly deteriorated in recent quarters, on the back of an escalating energy crisis. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the cherry on top. On a rolling 12-month basis, the trade surplus has fallen to 1% of GDP (Chart 6). This is particularly telling since for the month of December, the trade balance came in at €-4.6 billion, the worst since the euro area debt crisis. The current account continues to post a surplus of 2.6% of GDP, on the back of a positive income balance. However, FDI inflows are relapsing. After about two decades of underinvestment in the euro area, FDI inflows were at their highest level, to the tune of about 2% of GDP in 2021. Those have now completely reversed on the back of uncertainty. The combination of an energy crisis and dwindling FDI is crushing the euro area’s basic balance surplus. A rising basic balance surplus has been one of the key pillars underpinning a bullish euro thesis. Should the deterioration continue, it will undermine our longer-term bullish stance on the euro. It is encouraging that portfolio investments have turned less negative in recent quarters, as bond yields in the euro area are rising. Should this continue, it will be a good offset to the deterioration in FDI. Japan Chart 7Japan Balance Of Payments Like the euro area, the trade balance in Japan continues to be severely hampered by rising energy imports. The trade deficit in January deteriorated to a near record of ¥2.2 trillion, even though export growth remained very robust. Income receipts from Japan’s large investment positions abroad continue to buffer the current account, but a resolution to the energy crisis will be necessary to stem Japan’s basic balance from deteriorating (Chart 7). The process of offshoring has sharply reversed since the Covid-19 crisis. While FDI is still deteriorating, it now stands at -2.4% of GDP, compared to -4.3% just before the pandemic. Net portfolio investments are also accelerating, especially given the rise in long-term interest rates in Japan, positive real rates, and the value bias of Japanese equities. We are buyers of the yen over the long term, but a further rise in global yields and energy prices are key risks to our view. United Kingdom Chart 8UK Balance Of Payments The UK has the worst trade balance in the G10, and the picture has not improved much since the pandemic (currently at -6.7% of GDP). Similar to both the euro area and Japan, much of the drag on the trade balance has been due to rising import costs from energy and fuels. This puts the UK at risk of an escalation in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, the improvement in the income balance over the last few years has started to deteriorate, as transfer payments under the Brexit withdrawal agreement kick in. As a result, the current account balance is deteriorating anew (Chart 8). Both portfolio and direct investment in the UK were robust in the post-Brexit environment but have started to deteriorate. This is critical since significant foreign investment is necessary to boost productivity in the UK and prevent the pound from adjusting much lower. With bond yields in the UK rising, and the FTSE heavy in cyclical stocks, this should limit further deterioration in the UK’s financial account. A significant drop in the estimated path of settlement payments for Brexit will also boost the income balance. The key for the pound over the coming years remains how fast the UK can improve productivity, which will convince foreign investors that the return on capital for UK assets will increase. Canada Chart 9Canada Balance Of Payments Canada’s domestic economy has been relatively insulated from the geopolitical shock in Europe, but its export sector is benefiting tremendously from it. Rising oil prices are boosting Canadian terms of trade. As a result, the current account has turned into a surplus for the first time since 2009, in part driven by an improving trade balance (Chart 9). Outside of trade, part of the improvement in the Canadian current account balance is specifically driven by income receipts from Canada’s positive net international investment position. At C$1.5 trillion, income receipts are becoming an important component of the current account balance. Foreign direct investment into Canada continues to remain robust, given strong commodity prices. This is boosting our basic balance measure, which today sits at a surplus of 2.4% of GDP and should continue to improve. Finally, because of Canada’s improving balance-of-payments backdrop, it is no longer reliant on foreign capital as it had been in the past, which supports the loonie. Australia Chart 10Australia Balance Of Payments Australia continues to sport the best improvement in both its trade and current account balances over the last few years. As a result, the basic balance has eclipsed 4% of GDP for the first time since we have been measuring this series (Chart 10). The story for Australia remains improving terms of trade, specifically in the most desirable commodities – copper, high-grade iron ore, liquefied natural gas, and to a certain extent, high-grade coal. Foreign direct investment in Australia has eased significantly. Investment in projects in the resource space are now bearing fruit, easing the external funding constraint. Meanwhile, domestic savings can now be easily recycled for sustaining capital investment. In fact, foreign direct investment turned negative in Q4 2021. This also explains the drop in net portfolio investment since Australians now need to build a positive net international investment position. We have a limit buy on the Aussie dollar at 70 cents, as we are bullish the currency over a medium-term horizon. New Zealand Chart 11New Zealand Balance Of Payments For the third quarter of 2021, New Zealand’s current account balance hit record lows, despite robust commodity (agricultural) prices. Imports of fertilizers, crude oil, and vaccines have led to a widening trade deficit. A drop in the exports of wood also affected the balance. With a negative net international investment position of about 48% of GDP, the income balance also subtracted from the current account total (Chart 11). From a bigger-picture perspective, New Zealand’s basic balance has been negative for many years, as coupon and dividend payments to foreign investors, as well as valuation adjustments from net foreign liabilities, have kept the current account in structural deficit. However, as the prices of key agricultural goods head higher, New Zealand can begin to benefit from a terms-of-trade boom that will limit its external funding requirement. In that respect, portfolio investments are also improving. New Zealand has the highest bond yield in the G10, on the back of the highest policy rate so far (the RBNZ raised interest rates again this week). New Zealand’s defensive equity market has also corrected sharply amidst the general market riot. As such, foreign investors could begin to favor this market again based on high yields and a reset in valuations. Going forward, New Zealand should continue to see further improvement in its basic balance relative to the US, supporting the kiwi. Switzerland Chart 12Switzerland Balance Of Payments The Swiss trade balance remains in a structural surplus, with a post Covid-19 boom that has led a new high as a share of GDP (Chart 12). Global trade has been rather resilient due to high demand for goods. While Switzerland has a large net international investment position, income flows this quarter were hampered by servicing costs for foreign direct investments. The net international investment position did improve by CHF27 billion on a quarter-over-quarter basis in Q3, on the back of a net increase in foreign asset purchases. Currency movements also had little impact on the portfolio in Q3, which is atypical. The SNB will always have to contend with a structural trade surplus that puts upward pressure on the currency. This will keep the Swiss franc well bid, especially in times of crisis when the positive balance-of-payments backdrop makes the CHF a safe haven. Norway Chart 13Norway Balance Of Payments Q3 2021 saw a strong recovery in Norway’s trade account that is likely to carry over to this year. A recovery in crude oil and natural gas prices was a welcome boon. The lack of tourism also boosted the services account (Norwegians travel and spend less abroad than foreigners visiting Norway). The ongoing electricity crisis in Europe was also an opportune export channel for Norway, which for the first time, opened its 450-mile-long, 1400-megawatt North Sea cable link to the UK. Positive income flows also benefit the current account and the krone (Chart 13). With one of the largest NIIPs in the world heavily skewed towards equity dividends, the NOK benefits when yields rise, even though the domestic fixed-income market is highly illiquid. While a resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis could sap the geopolitical risk premium from oil, the reopening of the global economy will benefit Norwegian exports of oil and gas. Tepid investment in global oil and gas exploration will also ensure Norway’s terms of trade remain robust. Sweden Chart 14Sweden Balance Of Payments The Swedish current account balance has deteriorated slightly in the last few quarters, on the back of supply-side bottlenecks. Particularly, exports of cars have been hampered amidst a semiconductor shortage. That said, the primary income surplus remains a key pillar of the current account, keeping the basic balance at a healthy surplus of about 6% of GDP (Chart 14). Portfolio inflows into Sweden have dwindled, like most other European economies. If this has been due to geopolitical tensions in Europe, it will eventually prove to be fleeting. That said, the Riksbank remains one of the most dovish in the G10 and the OMX is also one of the most cyclical stock markets, which may have spooked short-term foreign investments. The Swedish krona has been the weakest G10 currency year-to-date. Given that we expect most of the headwinds to be temporary, and the basic balance backdrop remains solid, we will go long SEK versus both the euro and the US dollar. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary
お客様各位、 来週のウィークリーブリテンの代わりに、1月28日金曜日午前11時（EST）に最近のドル動向についてのウェブキャストを開催します。ぜひご参加ください。 敬具、 Chester Ntonifor
ハイライト
頻繁には議論されないが、ドルが割高であることはよく知られている。
評価は、転換点を迎えるまでは重要性が低くなる傾向があるのは事実だ。そうした転換は通常、特に過大評価された為替レートによって生じる大きな対外不均衡と同時に発生する。
米ドルはそのようなパラダイムに突入しつつある可能性がある — DXYは公正価値から1.5標準偏差上にあり、同時に物品貿易赤字は過去最大級となり、実質金利は深くマイナスになっている。
もっと重要なのは、このようなドルの構成には前例がほとんどないということだ。歴史的には、そのような高い評価を正当化するには、はるかに高い実質金利か、または国際収支の改善が必要だった。
当社のトレーディングモデルは、通貨が割高なときに売り、割安なときに買うことで時間を通じて超過リターンが得られることを示している。
当社の評価ランキングでは、最も割安なのはJPY、SEK、NOKである。貿易条件ベースではAUDが際立つ勝者だ。
特集
チャート 1
ドルの高評価と極端に低い実質金利は前例がない
ドルが高く評価され、実質金利が極端に低い状況は前例がない
ドルが高く評価され、実質金利が極端に低い状況は前例がない
評価は中期的な為替変動に関して通常あまり重視されないことが多い。特にここ数年は、マクロ経済環境が米ドルを動かす最大の要因であった。2011年から2020年のドルの強気相場は、米国の実質金利が他の先進国より高かった時期と一致している。実際、2008年以降、米連邦準備制度理事会（FRB）を除いて、200bps以上利上げできた先進国の中央銀行はほとんど存在しなかった。
先週の当社レポートは、FRBの積極的な利上げが短期的には米ドルにとって強気になり得るが、最終的には減価の前段階を作る可能性がある理由に焦点を当てた。本レポートでは、評価が今後1〜2年で通貨ストラテジーにとってより重要な要因になると主張する（チャート 1）。
ドルと対外収支
通貨と対外収支を理解する枠組みは単純だ — 貿易赤字（輸入 > 輸出）が拡大する場合、製造業の競争力を高めるために為替レートを下げるか、貿易赤字を減らすために支出を削減する必要がある。多くの先進国では、需要の押し下げや支出削減は、需要の蓄積や緩和的な財政政策があるため起こりにくい。したがって、広い貿易赤字を抱える国にとって自然な調整メカニズムは為替レートになるだろう。
先進国および新興国通貨の広範なスペクトルの中で、米ドルは実質実効為替レートベースで割高に見える（チャート 2Aおよびチャート 2B）。評価は転換点を引き起こすまでは重要性が低くなる傾向があるのは事実だが、そうした転換は通常、景気センチメントの変化とともに大きな対外不均衡が生じる時に起こる。
図表2
チャート2
米国では、これらの不均衡がすでに変化を引き起こし始めている。米国の貿易赤字は悪化しており、物品の貿易赤字は11月に過去最大の赤字である-980億ドルを記録した。ここ数年、拡大する貿易赤字を米国債の外国人購入で賄うことはますます難しくなっている（チャート 3）。一方、先週強調したように、ここ数年の大規模な株式流入は減速し始めている。
要するに、米国の基本収支（経常収支と対外直接投資の合計）は加速的に悪化している（チャート 4）。第3四半期の米国の経常収支は-2,148億ドルで、10年以上で最大の赤字となった。これは世界金融危機以降に改善した基礎的な収支の多くを巻き戻すものだ。基本収支がピークに達して悪化し始めると、ドルは複数年にわたって下落する傾向がある。
チャート 4
国際収支の状況悪化：米国の国際収支
国際収支の悪化動向
米国の国際収支
国際収支の悪化動向
米国の国際収支
チャート 3
拡大する赤字を資金調達することがますます困難になっている
拡大する赤字の資金調達がますます困難になっている
拡大する赤字の資金調達がますます困難になっている
財政政策は今後数年で引き締まる可能性が高く、為替レートに対する国内支出の制約を緩和するだろう。それでも、財政政策はパンデミック前の水準や雇用状況に比べれば緩和的なままである。歴史的に見ても、これは対外収支の悪化につながり、ドルの実質実効為替レートを押し下げてきた（チャート 5）。
チャート 5
ドルと財政赤字
ドルと財政赤字
ドルと財政赤字
実質金利とドル
米国で実質金利が最もマイナスに振れている一方で、単純な購買力平価（PPP）モデルではドルが数十年ぶりの割高水準にあるというのは注目に値する。これは、2010年に始まったドルの強気相場の初期の構成の完全な逆像であり、その時はドルは割安で実質金利はより支援的だった（チャート 1）。
経済理論によれば、通貨は国間でのリターンを均等化するように調整されるべきだ。これは裁定機会の不存在の条件である。1980年代初頭には、割高なドルは非常に高い実質金利に支えられていた。その後のドル下落も実質金利の低下と同時に起こった。事実、過去10年では相対的な実質金利がこれほどマイナスであるにもかかわらずドルが強いというのは異常事態だった（チャート 6）。
当社の見解は、米国の終端金利（ターミナル金利）は現在10年物米国債利回りに織り込まれている水準よりも高いべきだということだ。オーバーナイト・インデックス・スワップ（OIS）カーブによれば、FRBは金利を1.75％を超えて引き上げない見込みだ。これは過去のサイクルよりかなり低く、実質金利を低位に保つ。これは割高なグリーンバックを正当化しない。当社の短期金利モデルも、短期金利が過去1年でドルに有利に動いたにもかかわらず、DXYをやや割高と示している（チャート 7）。
チャート 6
相対的実質利回りの水準も重要
相対的な実質利回りの水準も重要である
相対的な実質利回りの水準も重要である
チャート 7
当社のタイミングモデルは##br##反落を示唆している
当社のタイミングモデルは調整を示唆しています
当社のタイミングモデルは調整を示唆しています
その他の考慮点
実質実効為替レートや購買力平価モデルは当社のお気に入りの評価指標の一つだが、万能ではない。構造的に高いインフレ率（それゆえ高い実質実効為替レート）を持つ国は、より高い生産性を有している可能性もある。バラッサ＝サミュエルソン仮説によれば、貿易可能財セクターの競争力は経済のすべてのセクターの賃金を押し上げ、結果的に物価を引き上げる。
この議論は、米国が成長の速い経済であり、そのために経常赤字を抱える傾向があると示唆する支持者に特に響くだろう。これは2000年代初頭のコモディティブーム期のオーストラリアに似た状況だという見方だ。一方で、米国は海外資産から得る収入が負債に対する支出を上回っており、資金ギャップは最終的に縮小するだろうという見方もある。
残念ながら、ドルの過大評価は米国の相対的な生産性の高さによるものではない。特に他国と比較するとそうだ。先進国および新興国の幅広いスペクトルにわたって、当社の生産性モデルによればドルは割高であると見える（当社の生産性モデルによれば）。購買力平価ベースで大きく割高に見える中国人民元（RMB）は、生産性を考慮に入れると公正価値に近くなる（チャート 8）。
チャート8
一方で、米国の大きな赤字はそのプラスの投資収支によって完全に相殺されているわけではない（チャート 9）。これは、中国のような成長の速い多くの国が経常黒字を生み出している時期に発生している（チャート 10Aおよびチャート 10B）。要するに、相対的な物価水準、相対的な生産性動向、あるいは政府資産の相対的な実質リターンのいずれを見ても、ドルは割高である。
チャート 9
プラスの所得収支は米国の投資状況の改善に寄与していない
プラスの所得収支は米国の投資ポジションの改善に寄与していない。
プラスの所得収支は米国の投資ポジションの改善に寄与していない。
チャート10
チャート10
結論
昨夏、FX評価に関心のある方向けに通貨評価のためのトレーディングモデルを紹介した。社内の購買力平価モデル（PPP）と当社の中期タイミングモデルの両方を評価ツールとして使用したところ、2000年代以降、両方の評価モデルはバイ・アンド・ホールドの通貨戦略を大きく上回り、ボラティリティもはるかに低かった（チャート 11）。
通貨の評価は長期的には重要になりやすく、一方でマクロ環境は短期の通貨取引を支配する傾向がある。ドルがここ3〜5年にわたって割高であったことを踏まえると、上記の分析は、評価が今後より重要になり始める「長期的な」転換点に入ろうとしている可能性を示唆している。
当社の評価ランキングでは、最も割安なのはJPY、SEK、NOKである。貿易条件および生産性の観点ではAUDが勝者として際立っている。これは記録的な基本収支の黒字にも反映されている（チャート 12）。当社のトレード表ではAUDを70セントでロングしており、通貨ボラティリティが弱まる兆しが出れば高い確信度の賭けへと格上げする予定だ。
チャート 11
評価のみに基づくトレーディングルール
バリュエーションのみに基づく取引ルール
バリュエーションのみに基づく取引ルール
チャート 12
AUDと国際収支
AUDと国際収支
AUDと国際収支
Chester Ntonifor 外国為替ストラテジスト chestern@bcaresearch.com
売買と予測
戦略的見解
タクティカル・ホールディング（0〜6か月）
予測サマリー
New orders for US durable goods grew 1.8% month-on-month to a record $263.5 billion in August. The increase follows an upwardly revised 0.5% and is more than double expectations of a 0.7% rise. However, a 5.5% month-on-month surge in transportation equipment…
Highlights China’s new plan for “common prosperity” is a long-term strategic plan to bulk up the middle class that will strengthen China – if it is implemented successfully. The record on implementing reforms is mixed. Large budget deficits to provide subsidies for households and key industries are inevitable. But fiscal reforms will be more difficult. Implementation will proceed gradually and some provinces will move faster than others. Cyclically, the common prosperity plan will not be allowed to interfere with the post-pandemic economic recovery. Beijing will have to ease monetary and fiscal policy to secure the recovery. But large debt levels create a limit on the ability to push through key reforms. Macro policy easing is beneficial for the rest of the world but Chinese investors must deal with a rise in uncertainty and an anti-business turn in the policy environment. Beijing has centralized political power to move rapidly on reforms. However, centralization creates new structural problems while antagonizing foreign nations. Feature Chinese President Xi Jinping laid out a plan on August 18 for “common prosperity” in China that will help guide national policy over the coming decades. The plan seeks to reduce social and economic imbalances and hence strengthen China and reinforce the Communist Party’s rule. The plan confirms our top key view for the year – China’s confluence of internal and external risks – as well as our long-running theme that Chinese domestic political risk is greater than it looks because of underlying problems like inequality and weak governance. The market has woken up to these views and themes (Chart 1). Now Beijing is turning to address these problems, which is positive if it follows through. But investors will have to cope with new policies and laws that reverse the pro-business context of recent decades. In this report we review the new plan and its implications in the context of overall Chinese economic policy. The chief investment takeaway is that while China will push forward various reforms, Beijing cannot afford to self-inflict an economic collapse. Monetary and fiscal policy will ease over the coming 12 months. As such China policy tightening will not short-circuit the global recovery. However, Chinese corporate earnings and the renminbi will not benefit from the country’s anti-business turn. Chart 1Market Wakes Up To China's Political Risk What Is In The Common Prosperity Plan? The first thing to understand about Beijing’s new plan for “common prosperity” is that it is aspirational: it contains few specific targets or concrete policies. It builds on existing policy goals set for 2049, the hundredth anniversary of the People’s Republic. Implementation will be gradual. The plan is consistent with the Xi administration’s previous emphasis on improving the country’s quality of life and tackling systemic risks. It takes aim at social immobility, income and wealth inequality, poor public services, a weak social safety net, and other problems that did not receive enough attention during China’s rapid growth phase over the past forty years. Left unattended, China’s socioeconomic imbalances could fester and eventually destabilize the regime. From the beginning, the Xi administration has tackled the most pressing popular concerns to try to rebuild the party’s legitimacy, increase public support, and avoid crises. Crackdowns on pollution and excessive debt are prime examples. China does indeed suffer from high income inequality and low social mobility, as we have highlighted in key reports. It is comparable to the United States as well as Italy, Argentina, and Chile, all of which have suffered from significant social and political upheaval in recent memory (Chart 2). By contrast, Japan, Germany, and Australia have been relatively politically stable. Chart 2China Risks Social Unrest Like The Americas Table 1 summarizes the common prosperity plan. The key takeaways are the long 2049 deadline, the emphasis on “mixed ownership” in the corporate sphere (retaining a big role for state control and state-owned enterprises but attracting private capital), the redistribution of household income (reform the tax code), the establishment of property rights, the censorship of media/discourse, and the need to reduce rural disparity. The most important point of all is that Beijing intends to grow the size and wellbeing of the middle class – the foundation of a country’s strength. Table 1China’s “Common Prosperity” Plan For 2049 Coastal China today has reached Taiwanese and Korean levels of per capita income and has slightly exceeded their levels of wealth inequality (Chart 3). These countries witnessed social unrest and regime change in the 1980s due to such problems. The urban-rural gap is even more problematic in China due to its large rural population and territory. The Chinese public is expected to become more demanding as it evolves. Hence Beijing is pledging to redistribute wealth, grow the middle class, speed up income growth among the poorest, reduce rural disparities, expand access to elderly care, medicine, and housing, and establish a better legal framework for business. These goals are positive in principle, especially for household sentiment, social stability, and political support for the administration. But they also entail a higher tax/wage/regulation environment for business and corporate earnings. The question for investors centers on implementation. Chart 3China's Wealth Disparities Outstrip Comparable Neighbors What About Vested Interests? Table 1 above shows that the super-committee that issued the common prosperity plan also addressed China’s ongoing battle against financial risk. The financial policy statement was neither new nor surprising but it highlights something important: “preventing risks” will have to be balanced with “ensuring stable growth.” This balancing of reform and growth is essential to Chinese government and will guide the implementation of the common prosperity plan just as it has guided President Xi’s crackdown on shadow banking. This is an especially pertinent point today, as Beijing runs the risk of overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. While Beijing’s vision of a better regulated, more heavily taxed, and higher-wage society should not be underrated, reform initiatives will be delayed if they threaten to derail the post-pandemic recovery. Time and again the Xi administration has ruled against a rapid, resolute, and disruptive approach to reform, such as the “assault phase of reform” spearheaded by Premier Zhu Rongji in the late 1990s. In the plan’s own words: “achieving common prosperity will be a long-term, arduous, and complicated task and it should be achieved in a gradual and progressive manner.” Having said that, the pattern of reform has been a vigorous launch, a market riot, and then backtracking or delay. This means markets face more volatility first before things settle down. An initial volley of policy actions should be expected between now and spring of 2023, when the National People’s Congress solidifies the plans of the twentieth National Party Congress in fall 2022. As with the ongoing regulatory crackdown on Big Tech, the market may experience a technical rebound but the political assessment suggests government pressure will be sustained for at least the next 12 months. We do not recommend bottom feeding in Chinese equities. Will the reforms be effective over time? When the Xi administration took power in 2012-13, it issued a visionary policy document calling for wide-ranging reforms to China’s economy (“Decision on Several Major Questions About Deepening Reform”).1 Over the past decade these reforms have had mixed success. Rhodium Group maintains a reform tracker to monitor progress – the results are lackluster (Table 2). Some core principles, such as the claim that China would make market forces “decisive” in allocating resources, have been totally reversed. Table 2China’s Progress On Reforms Over Past Decade While China’s government model is absolutist, there are still social and economic limits on what the government can achieve. Beijing cannot raise a nationwide property tax, estate tax, and capital gains tax overnight just to reduce inequality. In fact, the long saga of the property tax tells a very different story. Beijing is limited in how it can tax the bubbling property sector because Chinese households store their wealth in houses and because any sustained price deflation would lead to a national debt crisis. Officials have pledged to advance a nationwide property tax in the past three five-year plans with little progress. A serious effort to impose the tax in 2014 was only implemented in two provinces, notably Shanghai’s tax on second or third homes owned by the same household.2 The common prosperity plan entails that the government will revive the property tax but the rollout will still be gradual and step-by-step reform. The tax will focus on major urban areas, not minor ones where population decline could weigh on prices. The government work report in early 2023 will be a key watchpoint for where and when the property tax will be levied but there can be little doubt that it will gradually be levied for top-tier cities. Other aspects of the common prosperity plan will be implemented with provincial trial runs. It all begins with a “demonstration zone,” namely Zhejiang province, a wealthy coastal state where President Xi Jinping once served as party secretary and first army secretary. Zhejiang is expected to make some progress by 2025 and achieve most the goals by 2035 (in keeping with Xi’s 2035 strategic vision). The Zhejiang plan includes concrete numerical targets and as such sheds light on the broader national plan and how other provinces will implement it. The most important target is the desire to have 80% of the population earn an annual disposable income of CNY 100,000-500,000 ($15,400-77,000). The labor share of output should be greater than 50%, compared to a national average of 35%-40%. The urbanization rate should hit 75%, up from 72%. Urban incomes should be capped at just short of twice that of rural income. Enrollment rates in higher education will go up, life expectancy should reach above 80 years, pollution should be further controlled, and the unemployment rate should stay below 5.5%. A host of other goals, ranging from technology to fertility and the social safety net, are shown in Table 3. Table 3China: Zhejiang Province As Bellwether For “Common Prosperity” Plan Some of the plan’s intentions will be undermined by Chinese governance. It is difficult to improve social fairness and property rights in the context of autocracy because the central and local governments create distortions and cannot be held to account for their own mistakes and abuses. The immediate political context of the common prosperity plan should not be missed: the president is outlining a bright future to justify the fact that he will not step down from power as earlier term limits required in fall 2022. The president’s 2035 vision implies an important strategic window in which to accomplish ambitious goals but the lack of checks and balances suggests that the next 14 years could be very similar to the last 10 years, in which arbitrary and absolutist decisions govern policy. The problem is highlighted by China’s recent 10-point plan on government under rule of law, which is undercut by the arbitrary actions of regulators in the tech crackdown (see Appendix). In other words, while social stability may improve in many ways, the shift away from consensus rule, toward rule of a single person, will increase policy uncertainty and create new governance problems at the same time that could produce greater instability over the long run. Having said all that, it is essential to acknowledge that a comprehensive plan to grow the middle class and expand the social safety net could be very positive for China if implemented. A Global Social Justice Race? If investors are thinking that the Xi administration’s calls for “social fairness and justice” and big new investments in “elderly care, medical security, and housing supply” resemble those of US President Joe Biden in his American Families Plan, then they are right. But while the US is already at historic levels of social division after failing to deal with inequality, China is attempting to learn from the US’s problems and rebalance society before polarization, factionalization, and social unrest occur. The Communist Party tends to take major action in response to American crises. Beijing’s crackdown on extremism and domestic terrorism in the early 2000s followed from the September 11 attacks. Its crackdown on local government debt and shadow banking stemmed from the 2008 financial crisis. And its crackdown on Big Tech, social media, and inequality today responds to the rise of populism in the US and Europe. The fact that deindustrialization has led to political crises in the developed world, and that social media companies can both exacerbate social unrest and silence a sitting president, is not lost on the Chinese administration. Unfortunately, China’s approach will probably escalate conflict with the West. First, Beijing is coupling its new social agenda with an aggressive campaign of military modernization and technological acquisition. It is doubling down on advanced manufacturing as its future economic model. The liberal democracies will not only be forced to defend their own political systems and governance models but will also be pressured into more hawkish stances on foreign, trade, and defense policy toward China. So far China is still attractive to foreign investors but the combination of socialist policy, import substitution, and foreign protectionism should put a cap on investment flows over time (Chart 4). What is the net effect of social largesse at home and great power competition abroad? Larger budget deficits. Fiscal expansionism is the key mechanism for the US and China to reboot their economies, reduce social pressures, secure supply chains, and compete with other each other. And expansionary fiscal policies will boost inflation expectations on the margin. One thing is clear: China’s regime will be imperiled if instead of common prosperity and “national rejuvenation” it gets economic collapse. Beijing is already seeing capital outflows reminiscent of the crisis period in 2014-15 when aggressive reforms triggered a collapse in risk appetite and a stock market crash (Chart 5). The implication is that monetary and fiscal easing will accompany the reform agenda. Chart 4China's New Policies Will Deter Foreign Investment Chart 5Capital Flight And Capital Controls A Risk If Implementation Aggressive That would be marginally positive for global growth and EM countries that export to China. Investors in China, however, will have to deal with greater policy uncertainty as China attempts to redistribute wealth while waging a cold war abroad. Investment Takeaways None of Beijing’s social goals can be met if overall growth and job creation slow too much. Reforms are constantly subject to the ultimate constraint of maintaining overall stability. Already in 2021 Beijing is verging on excessive monetary and fiscal policy tightening (Chart 6). The Politburo signaled in July that it would take its foot off the brakes but policy uncertainty is still wreaking havoc in the equity market and overall animal spirits are downbeat. We expect policy to ease over the coming year to ensure stability ahead of the twentieth national party congress. This would be marginally good news for global growth, contingent on the effects of the global pandemic. Of course we cannot deny that more bad news for global risk assets may be necessary in the very near term to prompt the policy easing that we expect. Policymakers will backtrack on various policies when the market revolts or when the risk of debt-deflation rears its ugly head. Corporate and even household debt have expanded so much in recent years that Chinese policymakers have their hands tied when they try to push reforms too aggressively (Chart 7). A Japanese-style combination of a shrinking and graying population could create a feedback loop with debt deleveraging in the event of a sharp drop in asset prices. On the whole we maintain a pessimistic outlook on Chinese currency and assets. Chart 6China Runs Risk Of Overtightening Policy Chart 7Debt Trap Must Be Avoided - Monetary/ Fiscal Policy Will Stay Accommodative Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Table A1China: 10-Point Guidelines On Government Under Rule Of Law (2021-25) Footnotes 1 See Arthur R. Kroeber, “Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China,” Brookings, November 17, 2013, brookings.edu. 2 Chongqing’s property tax only affects luxury houses. Shenzhen and Hainan are the next pilot projects.
Highlights President Biden has called for the US intelligence community to investigate the origins of COVID-19 and one of Biden’s top diplomats has stated the obvious: the era of “engagement” with China is over. This clinches our long-held view that any Democratic president would be a hawk like President Trump. The US-China conflict – and global geopolitical risk – will revive and undermine global risk appetite. China faces a confluence of geopolitical and macroeconomic challenges, suggesting that its equity underperformance will continue. Domestic Chinese investors should stay long government bonds. Foreign investors should sell into the bond rally to reduce exposure to any future sanctions. The impending agreement of a global minimum corporate tax rate has limited concrete implications that are not already known but it symbolizes the return of Big Government in the western world. Our updated GeoRisk Indicators are available in the Appendix, as well as our monthly geopolitical calendar. Feature In our quarterly webcast, “Geopolitics And Bull Markets,” we argued that geopolitical themes matter to investors when they have a demonstrable relationship with the macroeconomic backdrop. When geopolitics and macro are synchronized, a simple yet powerful investment thesis can be discerned. The US war on terror, Russia’s resurgence, the EU debt crisis, and Brexit each provided cases in which a geopolitically informed macro view was both accessible and actionable at an early stage. Investors generally did well if they sold the relevant country’s currency and disfavored its equities on a relative basis. Chart 1China's Decade Of Troubles Of course, the market takeaway is not always so clear. When geopolitics and macroeconomics are desynchronized, the trick is to determine which framework will prevail over the financial markets and for how long. Sometimes the market moves to its own rhythm. The goal is not to trade on geopolitics but rather to invest with geopolitics. One of our key views for this year – headwinds for China – is an example of synchronization. Two weeks ago we discussed China’s macroeconomic challenge. In this report we discuss China’s foreign policy challenge: geopolitical pressure from the US and its allies. In particular we address President Biden’s call for a deeper intelligence dive into the origins of COVID-19. The takeaway is negative for China’s currency and risk assets. The Great Recession dealt a painful blow to the Chinese version of the East Asian economic miracle. By 2015, China’s financial turmoil and currency devaluation should have convinced even bullish investors to keep their distance from Chinese stocks and the renminbi. If investors stuck with this bearish view despite the post-2016 rally, on fear of trade war, they were rewarded in 2018-19. Only with China’s containment of COVID-19 and large economic stimulus in 2020 has CNY-USD threatened to break out (Chart 1). We expect the renminbi to weaken anew, especially once the Fed begins to taper asset purchases. Our cyclical view is still bullish but US-China relations are unstable so we remain tactically defensive. Forget Biden’s China Review, He’s A Hawk Chinese financial markets face a host of challenges this year, despite the positive factors for China’s manufacturing sector amid the global recovery. At home these challenges consist of a structural economic slowdown, a withdrawal of policy stimulus, bearish sentiment among households, and an ongoing government crackdown on systemic risk. Abroad the Democratic Party’s return to power in Washington means that the US will bring more allies to bear in its attempt to curb China’s rise. This combination of factors presents a headwind for Chinese equities and a tailwind for government bonds (Chart 2). This is true at least until the government should hit its pain threshold and re-stimulate. Chart 2Global Investors Still Wary New stimulus may not occur in 2022. The Communist Party’s leadership rotation merely requires economic stability, not rapid growth. While the central government has a record of stimulating when its pain threshold is hit, even under the economically hawkish President Xi Jinping, a financial market riot is usually part of this threshold. This implies near-term downside, particularly for global commodities and metals, which are also facing a Chinese regulatory backlash to deter speculation. In this context, President Biden’s call for a deeper US intelligence investigation into the origin of COVID-19 is an important confirming signal of the US’s hawkish turn toward China. Biden gave 90 days for the intelligence community to report back to him. We will not enter into the debate about COVID-19’s origins. From a geopolitical point of view it is a moot point. The facts of the virus origin may never be established. According to Biden’s statement, at least one US intelligence agency believes the “lab leak theory” is the most likely source of the virus (while two other agencies decided in favor of animal-to-human transmission). Meanwhile Chinese government spokespeople continue to push the theory that the virus originated at the US’s Fort Detrick in Maryland or at a US-affiliated global research center. What is certain is that the first major outbreak of a highly contagious disease occurred in Wuhan. Both sides are demanding greater transparency and will reject each other’s claims based on a lack of transparency. If the US intelligence report concludes that COVID originated from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Chinese government and media will reject the report. If the report exonerates the Wuhan laboratory, at least half of the US public will disbelieve it and it will not deter Biden from drawing a hard line on more macro-relevant policy disputes with China. The US’s hawkish bipartisan consensus on China took shape before COVID. Biden’s decision to order the fresh report introduces skepticism regarding the World Health Organization’s narrative, which was until now the mainstream media’s narrative. Previously this skepticism was ghettoized in US public discourse: indeed, until Biden’s announcement on May 26, the social media company Facebook suppressed claims that the virus came from a lab accident or human failure. Thus Biden’s action will ensure that a large swathe of the American public will always tend to support this theory regardless of the next report’s findings. At the same time Biden discontinued a State Department effort to prove the lab leak theory, which shows that it is not a foregone conclusion what his administration will decide. The good news is that even if the report concluded in favor of the lab leak, the Biden administration would remain highly unlikely to demand that China pay “reparations,” like the Trump administration demanded in 2020. This demand, if actualized, would be explosive. The bad news is that a future nationalist administration could conceivably use the investigation as a basis to demand reparations. Nationalism is a force to be reckoned with in both countries and the dispute over COVID’s origin will exacerbate it. Traditionally the presidents of both countries would tamp down nationalism or attempt to keep it harnessed. But in the post-Xi, post-Trump era it is harder to control. The death toll of COVID-19 will be a permanent source of popular grievance around the world and a wedge between the US and China (Chart 3). China’s international image suffered dramatically in 2020. So far in 2021 China has not regained any diplomatic ground. Chart 3Death Toll Of COVID-19 The US is repairing its image via a return to multilateralism while the Europeans have put their Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China on hold due to a spat over sanctions arising from western accusations of genocide (a subject on which China pointedly answered that it did not need to be lectured by Europeans). Notably Biden’s Department of State also endorsed its predecessor’s accusation of genocide in Xinjiang. Any authoritative US intelligence review that solidifies doubts about the WHO’s initial investigation – even if it should not affirm the lab leak theory – would give Biden more ammunition in global opinion to form a democratic alliance to pressure China (for example, in Europe). An important factor that enables the US to remain hawkish on China is fiscal stimulus. While stimulus helps bring about economic recovery, it also lowers the bar to political confrontation (Chart 4). Countries with supercharged domestic demand do not have as much to fear from punitive trade measures. The Biden administration has not taken new punitive measures against China but it is clearly not worried about Chinese retaliation. Chart 4Large Fiscal Stimulus Lowers The Bar To Geopolitical Conflict China’s stimulus is underrated in this chart (which excludes non-fiscal measures) but it is still true that China’s policy has been somewhat restrained and it will need to stimulate its economy again in response to any new punitive measures or any global loss of confidence. At least China is limited in its ability to tighten policy due to the threat of US pressure and western trade protectionism. Simultaneous with Biden’s announcement on COVID-19, his administration’s coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, proclaimed in a speech that the era of “engagement” with China is officially over and the new paradigm is one of “competition.” By now Campbell is stating the obvious. But this tone is a change both from his tone while serving in President Obama’s Department of State and from his article in Foreign Affairs last year (when he was basically auditioning for his current role in the Biden administration).1 Campbell even said in his latest remarks that the Trump administration was right about the “direction” of China policy (though not the “execution”), which is candid. Campbell was speaking at Stanford University but his comments were obviously aimed for broader consumption. Investors no longer need to wait for the outcome of the Biden administration’s comprehensive review of policy toward China. The answer is known: the Biden administration’s hawkishness is confirmed. The Department of Defense report on China policy, due in June, is very unlikely to strike a more dovish posture than the president’s health policy. Now investors must worry about how rapidly tensions will escalate and put a drag on global sentiment. Bottom Line: US-China relations are unstable and pose an immediate threat to global risk appetite. The fundamental geopolitical assessment of US-China relations has been confirmed yet again. The US is seeking to constrain China’s rise because China is the only country capable of rivaling the US for supremacy in Asia and the world. Meanwhile China is rejecting liberalization in favor of economic self-sufficiency and maintaining an offensive foreign policy as it is wary of US containment and interference. Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are still capable of stabilizing relations in the medium term but they are unlikely to substantially de-escalate tensions. And at the moment tensions are escalating. China’s Reaction: The Example Of Australia How will China respond to Biden’s new inquiry into COVID’s origins? Obviously Beijing will react negatively but we would not expect anything concrete to occur until the result of the inquiry is released in 90 days. China will be more constrained in its response to the US than it has been with Australia, which called for an international inquiry early last year, as the US is a superior power. Australia was the first to ban Chinese telecom company Huawei from its 5G network (back in 2018) and it was the first to call for a COVID probe. Relations between China and Australia have deteriorated steadily since then, but macro trends have clearly driven the Aussie dollar. The AUD-JPY exchange rate is a good measure for global risk appetite and it is wavering in recent weeks (Chart 5). Chart 5Australian Dollar Follows Macro Trends, Rallies Amid China Trade Spat Tensions have also escalated due to China’s dependency on Australian commodity exports at a time of spiking commodity prices. This is a recurring theme going back to the Stern Hu affair. The COVID spat led China to impose a series of sanctions against Australian beef, barley, wine, and coal. But because China cannot replace Australian resources (at least, not in the short term), its punitive measures are limited. It faces rising producer prices as a result of its trade restrictions (Chart 6). This dependency is a bigger problem for China today than it was in previous cycles so China will try to diversify. Chart 6Constraints On China's Tarrifs On Australia By contrast, China is not likely to impose sanctions on the US in response to Biden’s investigation, unless Biden attacks first. China’s imports from the US are booming and its currency is appreciating sharply. Despite Beijing’s efforts to keep the Phase One trade deal from collapsing, Biden is maintaining Trump’s tariffs and the US-China trade divorce is proceeding (Chart 7). Bilateral tariff rates are still 16-17 percentage points higher than they were in 2018, with US tariffs on China at 19% (versus 3% on the rest of the world) while Chinese tariffs on the US stand at 21% (versus 6% on the rest of the world). The Biden administration timed this week’s hawkish statements to coincide with the first meeting of US trade negotiators with China, which was a more civil affair. Both countries acknowledged that the relationship is important and trade needs to be continued. However, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s comments were not overly optimistic (she told Reuters that the relationship is “very, very challenging”). She has also been explicit about maintaining policy continuity with the Trump administration. We highly doubt that China’s share of US imports will ever surpass its pre-Trump peaks. The Biden administration has also refrained so far from loosening export controls on high-tech trade with China. This has caused a bull market in Taiwan while causing problems for Chinese semiconductor stocks’ relative performance (Chart 8). If Biden’s policy review does not lead to any relaxation of export controls on commercial items then it will mark a further escalation in tensions. Chart 7US Tarrifs Reduce China In Trade Deficit Bottom Line: Until Presidents Biden and Xi stabilize relations at the top, the trade negotiations over implementing the Phase One trade deal – and any new Phase Two talks – cannot bring major positive surprises for financial markets. Chart 8US Export Controls Amid Chip Shortage Congress Is More Hawkish Than Biden Biden’s ability to reduce frictions with China, should he seek to, will also be limited by Congress and public opinion. With the US deeply politically divided, and polarization at historically high levels, China has emerged as one of the few areas of agreement. The hawkish consensus is symbolized by new legislation such as the Strategic Competition Act, which is making its way through the Senate rapidly. Congress is also trying to boost US competitiveness through bills such as the Endless Frontier Act. These bills would subject China to scrutiny and potential punitive measures over a broad range of issues but most of all they would ignite US industrial policy , STEM education, and R&D, and diversify the US’s supply chains. We would highlight three key points with regard to the global impact of this legislation: Global supply chains are shifting regardless: This trend is fairly well established in tech, defense, and pharmaceuticals. It will continue unless we see a major policy reversal from China to try to court western powers and reduce frictions. The EU and India are less enthusiastic than the US and Australia about removing China from supply chains but they are not opposed. The EU Commission has recommended new defensive economic measures that cover supply chains in batteries, cloud services, hydrogen energy, pharmaceuticals, materials, and semiconductors. As mentioned, the EU is also hesitating to ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China. Hence the EU is moving in the US’s direction independently of proposed US laws. After all, China’s rise up the tech value chain (and its decision to stop cutting back the size of its manufacturing sector) ultimately threatens the EU’s comparative advantage. The EU is also aligned with the US on democratic values and network security. India has taken a harder stance on China than usual, which marks an important break with the past. India’s decision to exclude Huawei from its 5G network is not final but it is likely to be at least partially implemented. A working group of democracies is forming regardless. The Strategic Competition Act calls for the creation of a working group of democracies but the truth is that this is already happening through more effective forums like the G7 and bilateral summits. Just as the implementation of the act would will ultimately depend on President Biden, so the willingness of other countries to adopt the recommendations of the working group would depend on their own executives. Allies have leeway as Biden will not use punitive measures against them: Any policy change from the EU, UK, India, and Australia will be independent of the US Congress passing the Strategic Competition Act. These countries will be self-directed. The US would have to devote diplomatic energy to maintaining a sustained effort by these states to counter China in the face of economic costs. This will be limited by the fact that the Biden administration will be very reluctant to impose punitive measures on allies to insist on their cooperation. The allies will set the pace of pressure on China rather than the United States. This gives the EU an important position, particularly Germany. And yet the trends in Germany suggest that the government will be more hawkish on China after the federal elections in September. Bottom Line: The Biden administration is unlikely to use punitive measures against allies so new US laws are less important than overall US diplomacy with each of the allies. Some allies will be less compliant with US policies given their need for trade with China. But so far there appears to be a common position taking shape even with the EU that is prejudicial to China’s involvement in key sectors of emerging technologies. If China does not respond by reducing its foreign policy assertiveness, then China’s economic growth will suffer. That drag would have to be offset by new supply chain construction in Southeast Asia and other countries. Investment Takeaways The foregoing highlights the international risks facing China even at a time when its trend growth is slowing (Chart 9) and its ongoing struggle with domestic financial imbalances is intensifying. China’s debt-service costs have risen sharply and Beijing is putting pressure on corporations and local governments to straighten out their finances (Chart 10), resulting in a wave of defaults. This backdrop is worrisome for investors until policymakers reassure them that government support will continue. Chart 9China's Growth Potential Slowing Chart 10China's Leaders Struggle With Debt China’s domestic stability is a key indicator of whether geopolitical risks could spiral out of control. In particular we think aggressive action in the Taiwan Strait is likely to be delayed as long as the Chinese economy and regime are stable. China has rattled sabers over the strait this year in a warning to the United States not to cross its red line (Chart 11). It is not yet clear how Biden’s policy continuity with the Trump administration will affect cross-strait stability. We see no basis yet for changing our view that there is a 60% chance of a market-negative geopolitical incident in 2021-22 and a 5% chance of full-scale war in the short run. Chart 11China PLA Flights Over Taiwan Strait Putting all of the above together, we see substantial support for two key market-relevant geopolitical risks: Chinese domestic politics (including policy tightening) and persistent US-China tensions (including but not limited to the Taiwan Strait). We remain tactically defensive, a stance supported by several recent turns in global markets: The global stock-to-bond ratio has rolled over. China is a negative factor for global risk appetite (Chart 12). Global cyclical equities are no longer outperforming defensives. There is a stark divergence between Chinese cyclicals and global cyclicals stemming from the painful transition in China’s bloated industrial economy (Chart 13). Global large caps are catching a bid relative to small caps (Chart 14). Chart 12Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio Rolled Over Chart 13Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Pause Chart 14Global Large Caps Catch A Bid Versus Small Caps Cyclically the global economic recovery should continue as the pandemic wanes. China will eventually relax policy to prevent too abrupt of a slowdown. Therefore our strategic portfolio reflects our high-conviction view that the current global economic expansion will continue even as it faces hurdles from the secular rise in geopolitical risk, especially US-China cold war. Measurable geopolitical risk and policy uncertainty are likely to rebound sooner rather than later, with a negative impact on high-beta risk assets. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Coda: Global Minimum Tax Symbolizes Return Of Big Government On Thursday, the US Treasury Department released a proposal to set the global minimum corporate tax rate at 15%. The plan is to stop what Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has referred to as a global “race to the bottom” and create the basis for a rehabilitation of government budgets damaged by pandemic-era stimulus. Although the newly proposed 15% rate is significantly below President Biden’s bid to raise the US Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) rate to 21% from 10.5%, it is the same rate as his proposed minimum tax on corporate book income. Biden is also raising the headline corporate tax rate from 21% to around 25% (or at highest 28%). Negotiators at the OECD were initially discussing a 12.5% global minimum rate. The finance ministers of both France and Germany – where the corporate income tax rates are 32.0% and 29.9%, respectively – both responded positively to the announcement. However, Ireland, which uses low corporate taxes as an economic development strategy, is obviously more comfortable with a minimum closer to its own 12.5% rate. Discussions are likely to occur when G7 finance ministers meet on June 4-5. Countries are hoping to establish a broad outline for the proposal by the G20 meeting in early July. It is highly likely that the OECD will come to an agreement. However, it is not a truly “global” minimum as there will still be tax havens. Compliance and enforcement will vary across countries. A close look at the domestic political capital of the relevant countries shows that while many countries have the raw parliamentary majorities necessary to raise taxes, most countries have substantial conservative contingents capable of preventing stiff corporate tax hikes (Table 1, in the Appendix). Our Geopolitical strategists highlight that the Biden administration’s compromise on the minimum rate reflects its pragmatism as well as emphasis on multilateralism. Any global deal will be non-binding but the two most important low-tax players are already committed to raising corporate rates well above this level: Biden’s plan is noted above, while the UK’s budget for March includes a jump in the business rate to 25% in April 2023 from the current 19%. Ireland and Hungary are the only outliers but they may eventually be forced to yield to such a large coalition of bigger economies (Chart 15). Chart 15Global Minimum Corporate Tax Impact Is Symbolic Rather Than Concrete Thus a nominal minimum corporate tax rate is likely to be forged but it will not be truly global and it will not change the corporate rate for most countries. The reality of what companies pay will also depend on loopholes, tax havens, and the effective tax rate. Bottom Line: On a structural horizon, the global minimum corporate tax is significant for showing a paradigm shift in global macro policy: western governments are starting to raise taxes and revenue after decades of cutting taxes. The experiment with limited government has ended and Big Government is making a comeback. On a cyclical horizon, the US concession on global minimum tax is that the Biden administration aims to be pragmatic and “get things done.” Biden is also working with Republicans to pass bills covering some bipartisan aspects of his domestic agenda, such as trade, manufacturing, and China. The takeaway from a global point of view is that Biden may prove to be a compromiser rather than an ideologue, unlike his predecessors. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Vice President Daily Insights RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, "Competition Without Catastrophe," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019, foreignaffairs.com. Section II: Appendix Table 1OECD: Which Countries Are Willing And Able To Raise Corporate Tax Rates? GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
ハイライト
米国の成長アウトパフォーマンスが弱まりつつある暫定的な兆候が見られる。
海外の製造業セクターの回復が既に米国から主導権を奪っている。このトレンドは間もなくサービスセクターへと回転するだろう。
したがって、長期投資家はユーロの下落時に買い増しを始めるべきである。
カナダ経済は2月時点の評価よりも速いペースで改善している。
これはCADが早期にアウトパフォームする可能性を示唆している。
特集
チャート I-1
ユーロがDXYを牽引する
相対的成長、ユーロ、そしてルーニー
相対的成長、ユーロ、そしてルーニー
米国経済は今年、成長のアウトパフォーマーとなっている。そのため米国では利回りの上昇がより速く進み、ドルが買われている。今年初め以降、DXY指数は先進国通貨に対する年間下落分の2.5%を反転させた。一方で、このラリーは広範囲に及んでおり、ユーロ、円、スウェーデンクローナが下落の大きな被害を受けている（チャート I-1）。
我々のバイアスは、成長のアウトパフォーマンスが今年後半に米国から世界の他地域へと回転するという点にある。これはドルにとってマイナスであり、景気循環に敏感な通貨に有利に働くだろう。今週は、このシフトから恩恵を受けるはずのユーロとルーニー（カナダドル）を取り上げる。
EUR/USD と製造業サイクル
債券利回りと経済の関係は循環的である。長期債の利回りは経済の成長見通しに関する重要なシグナル機能と見なすことができる。同時に、利回りは特に急速に上昇すると金融環境に直接影響を与える。短期の通貨予測の観点からは、利回りの上昇がどの時点で制約的になるかを見極めることが、相対的な経済成長を予測するうえで非常に有益になり得る。
チャート I-2 は、米国とユーロ圏の相対利回りが1%上昇するたびに、約12か月のラグを経て短期の相対成長が後者（ユーロ圏）に有利に転じることを示している。これは重要であり、EUR/USD と相対成長の相関は短期ではかなり強い（チャート I-3）。したがって、米国とユーロ圏の利回り差の上昇は短期的にはEUR/USD を傷つける可能性があるが、長期的にはユーロ／米国成長にとって有利に働き始めるだろう。
チャート I-2
相対債券利回りと製造業サイクル
相対的な債券利回りと製造業サイクル
相対的な債券利回りと製造業サイクル
チャート I-3
ユーロ圏の経済指標は上振れしている
ユーロ圏の経済指標が上方サプライズとなっている
ユーロ圏の経済指標が上方サプライズとなっている
債券フローとその他の市場シグナル
米国債利回りの上昇にもかかわらず、今年は欧州から米国債の買い増しが増えていない（チャート I-4）。2011年から2020年のドルブル相場では、米利回りの上昇と米国債の購入増加に直接的な相関があった。今回の違いの一つは、カナダ、オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、さらには英国などの他の安全資産債券市場が今日では魅力的な利回りを示している点だ。米利回りはG10他国と比較して全体としてあまり上昇していない。これはユーロが下落できる程度を引き続き抑制するだろう。
他方で、ユーロの上振れ余地はかなり大きい。購買力平価（PPP）の観点から見ると、ユーロは米国に対する割引をリセットするために15%上昇し得る。PPP調整は数年を要する傾向があるが、もし米国が引き続きインフレ誘導的な政策を追求するならば、定義上ユーロのフェアバリューも上昇するだろう（チャート I-5）。
チャート I-4
欧州勢は米国債保有を増やしていない
欧州勢は米国債の保有を増やしていない
欧州勢は米国債の保有を増やしていない
チャート I-5
ユーロは依然やや ##br## 割安である
ユーロは依然としてやや割安である
ユーロは依然としてやや割安である
その他の景気循環的要因もユーロにバネのような反発が起こり得ることを示唆している。銅価格は今年急騰しており、ユーロとの伝統的な関係が乖離している（チャート I-6）。銅は炭素からクリーンな電力への移行から恩恵を受けているが、ユーロも恩恵を受け得る。欧州経済は再生可能技術において長年の経験を有しており、投資資本が投入されればこれらのセクターへの意味のある資金流入が始まる可能性がある。これにより、ブルームバーグの2022年末のEUR/USD 1.23という予想は悲観的すぎると考えられる（チャート I-7）。
チャート I-6
ユーロは近くバネのような反発をする可能性がある
ユーロはまもなくコイルばねのように反発する可能性がある
ユーロはまもなくコイルばねのように反発する可能性がある
チャート I-7
ユーロに対するセンチメントはややリセットされた
ユーロに対するセンチメントがわずかにリセットされた
ユーロに対するセンチメントがわずかにリセットされた
最後に、我々は戦術的ヘッジとしてEUR/JPYをショートしており、ストップは131に厳格に置いている。また、EUR/USD の指値買いを1.15から1.16に引き上げている。
カナダの回復は加速している
チャート I-8
カナダの企業景況感調査の見通しは励みになる内容だった
カナダの企業景況感調査の見通しは好材料だった
カナダの企業景況感調査の見通しは好材料だった
カナダの回復は2月時点の評価よりも早く形になりつつあり、最新のBusiness Outlook Surveyがこれを裏付けている。投資意向と将来の売上成長の双方が非常に強く、前者は数十年ぶりの高水準に達した（チャート I-8）。注目すべき点は以下の通り：
企業の3分の2が売上がパンデミック前の水準を上回ると見ている;
多くの企業は第2波が第1波と比べて売上への影響が小さいか無いと述べている;
一部産業ではまだ供給制約が高いが、全体としてインフレ懸念は比較的抑制されている。
感染第2波が猛威を振るい、国の大部分がロックダウン下にあることを考えると、調査の堅調さは我々にとって驚きであった。とはいえ、投資支出の強さはグローバルな文脈で重要なテーマになりつつあり、カナダは今後数年で対外直接投資（FDI）の大きな流入を受ける可能性がある。
市場はカナダでの利上げペースの速まりを織り込み始めている（チャート I-9）。これは過去10年間では稀な事象であり、グローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジーの同僚と共に、我々はカナダが利上げサイクルの先導をする可能性は低いと引き続き考えている。しかし、経済の勢いが米国の成長を上回ることを許せば、この見方は変わり得る。
チャート I-9
市場はカナダでの速い利上げを織り込んでいる
市場はカナダの利上げの加速を織り込んでいる
市場はカナダの利上げの加速を織り込んでいる
IMFはカナダの実質GDP成長率を今年5%、来年4.7%と見積もっている。Bloomberg Nanos Confidence Indexによれば成長はこれらを大きく上回る可能性がある（チャート I-10）。
チャート I-10
カナダのGDPは回復基調にある
カナダのGDP、回復基調
カナダのGDP、回復基調
雇用レポートは我々の2月時点の評価以降、著しく改善している（チャート I-11）。BoCモニターのサブコンポーネントを見ると、弱さは経済変数に集中していた。これは変わりつつあり、カナダの失業率は米国の失業率より速く低下している（チャート I-12）。これはCADにとって強気の材料である。
チャート I-11
カナダの雇用回復は堅調
チャート I-12
カナダの雇用は米国に追いつきつつある
カナダの雇用が米国に追いつきつつある
カナダの雇用が米国に追いつきつつある
カナダの住宅市場は加熱している。全体として住宅価格は10%上昇し、多くの都市でそれを大きく上回っている（チャート I-13）。カナダの住宅価格の軌跡は次の通りである：政府の支援とマクロプルーデンシャル措置により低価格都市と高価格都市の価格が収束した。具体的には、バンクーバー（およびある程度トロント）は価格上昇がやや緩やかである一方、他の都市は回復している。しかし、低価格都市で名目所得から逸脱し始めると、より広範なマクロプルーデンシャル措置のリスクが大きく高まる。
第二の点は重要であり、カナダの住宅価格上昇はオーストラリアや米国など他国よりも顕著であった。これは債務増加と購買力低下がカナダ経済にとって重要なマクロリスクとなる可能性が高いことを意味する。住宅建設はカナダ経済において無視できない割合を占めている（チャート I-14）。
チャート I-13
カナダの住宅市場は加熱している
カナダの住宅市場が過熱している
カナダの住宅市場が過熱している
チャート I-14
住宅建設は活況を呈している
住宅建設が活況を呈している
住宅建設が活況を呈している
結論：最近の動きはカナダ銀行が利上げを早める可能性を高めている。これがCADのさらなる上昇を可能にするだろう。
CAD と原油
原油価格はCADにとってもう一つの非常に重要なドライバーである。実際、今年の大半において金利はあまり重要な要因でなく、BoCはカナダの見通しの短期的改善を織り込まない姿勢を示してきた。Covid-19危機とワクチン接種の進展の遅さも回復を損ない、ルーニーの上昇にブレーキをかけた（チャート I-15）。
我々のコモディティ・ストラテジストは、ブレント原油が2023年に75ドルに達すると予測している。これはフォワード市場の価格より高い。フォワード価格の上昇は、CAD高と同義になるだろう。
ただし、カナダは歴史的にブレントやWTIに対して大きな割引で取引されてきたウェスタン・カナディアン・セレクト（WCS）ブレンドを販売している（チャート I-16）。環境基準の強化はカナダに不利に働く。WCSは硫黄含有量が高いためである。パイプライン容量も米国の製油所へカナダ原油を輸送する上で依然として大きなボトルネックである。
チャート I-15
ルーニーは出遅れている
ルーニーは出遅れている
ルーニーは出遅れている
チャート I-16
カナダの原油価格は回復に遅れをとる可能性がある
カナダの原油価格は回復に乗り遅れる可能性がある
カナダの原油価格は回復に乗り遅れる可能性がある
今回の救いとなる点は、米国が大規模なインフラプロジェクトに着手し始めるにつれて、CAD/USD と原油価格の相関が他通貨よりも速く上昇していることだ（チャート I-17）。米国の石油輸入の約50%はカナダから供給されている。Covid-19危機は米国の石油生産をカナダより遅らせ、これが原油価格と通貨の相関上昇を助けた。ポートフォリオの資金流入は今年カナダに加速しており、これが石油株とルーニーに恩恵を与えている。
チャート I-17
USD/CAD の原油感応度は高まっている
USD/CADの原油に対する感度が高まった
USD/CADの原油に対する感度が高まった
投資結論
チャート I-18
CADは割安である
カナダドルは割安だ
カナダドルは割安だ
CADは依然として割安である。実効実質為替レートベースで長期平均より1標準偏差下で取引されている（チャート I-18）。平均回帰に戻れば約10%の上昇余地がある。我々のPPPモデルはより慎重で、ルーニーは約5%割安であることを示唆している。これはなおも84〜85セント圏が射程内にあることを意味する。新たなカナダの回復が本格的な加速に転じれば、CADはさらに上昇する可能性がある。
Chester Ntonifor 外国為替ストラテジスト chestern@bcaresearch.com
通貨
米ドル
チャート II-1
USD テクニカルズ 1
USD テクニカル分析 1
USD テクニカル分析 1
チャート II-2
USD テクニカルズ 2
USDテクニカル 2
USDテクニカル 2
今週の米国の経済指標は堅調であった：
3月のCPIは前年同月比2.6%、前月比0.6%と、いずれも予想を上回った。
3月のPPIは前年同月比4.2%、前月比1%で、予想を上回った。
Empire Manufacturingの調査は4月に17.4から26.3へと大幅に反発した。
小売売上高は特に強く、3月は前月比9.8%であった。
NAHB住宅市場指数は4月に83と引き続き高水準であった。
DXY指数は今週0.5%下落した。堅調なデータを受けての利回りの下落は驚きである。これは債券ショートポジションが混雑したトレードになりつつあるシグナルである可能性が高い。DXY指数は4月にロールオーバーしており、これは季節パターンをサポートする動きである。
レポートリンク：
Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - 2021年3月19日
The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - 2021年3月5日
Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - 2021年2月19日
ユーロ
チャート II-3
EUR テクニカルズ 1
ユーロ・テクニカル 1
ユーロ・テクニカル 1
チャート II-4
EUR テクニカルズ 2
EUR テクニカル 2
EUR テクニカル 2
ユーロ圏の最近のデータはやや良好であった：
2月の小売売上高は前月比3%増加し、予想の1.7%を上回った。
4月のドイツおよびEUのZEW景況感は予想を下回った。
2月の鉱工業生産は前月比1%減少した。
ドイツのCPIは前月比0.5%で、予想と一致した。
ユーロは今週ドルに対して0.5%上昇し、これで2週連続の上昇となった。新たなCovid-19の波は短期的にEUR/USDの重しになる可能性があるが、これによりセンチメントとポジショニング指標がリセットされた。我々の中期指標は大きくロールオーバーしており、これは逆張りの観点からは強気材料である。
レポートリンク：
Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日
On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - 2021年1月29日
The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日
日本円
チャート II-5
JPY テクニカルズ 1
JPY テクニカル 1
JPY テクニカル 1
チャート II-6
JPY テクニカルズ 2
JPY テクニカル分析 2
JPY テクニカル分析 2
日本のデータは混在している：
機械受注は2月に再び減少し、前月比で8.5%低下し、予想の2.8%増を下回った。
しかしより好材料として、工作機械受注は3月に前年同月比65%増加した。
2月のPPIは前月比0.8%で、予想を上回った。
日本円は今週対米ドルで0.4%上昇し、4月におけるG10通貨の中で最も強い通貨の一つである。我々の中期指標は崩壊しており、投機筋はネットで円ショートのポジションを持っている。ポートフォリオヘッジとしてEUR/JPYのショートを継続している。
レポートリンク：
The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - 2021年3月5日
On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - 2021年1月29日
The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日
英ポンド
チャート II-7
GBP テクニカルズ 1
GBP テクニカル分析 1
GBP テクニカル分析 1
チャート II-8
GBP テクニカルズ 2
GBP テクニカル指標 2
GBP テクニカル指標 2
英国の最近のデータはやや良好である：
2月のGDPは前月比0.4%増加し、予想の0.6%増をやや下回った。
2月の鉱工業・製造生産および建設生産はいずれも予想を上回り、それぞれ前月比1%、1.3%、1.6%であった。
2月の対EU貿易赤字は164億となった。
英ポンドは今週対米ドルで0.3%上昇し、G10通貨の中では中位に位置し、ユーロに対しては横ばいであった。英国のワクチン接種の成功と他国の追いつき局面を受け、我々は先週EUR/GBPのショートを利確のために決済した。ポンドに対する投機的なネットポジションが高水準にあることから、中立姿勢を取っている。
レポートリンク：
Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日
The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日
Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - 2020年9月11日
豪ドル
チャート II-9
AUD テクニカルズ 1
AUD テクニカルズ 1
AUD テクニカルズ 1
チャート II-10
AUD テクニカルズ 2
AUDのテクニカル分析 2
AUDのテクニカル分析 2
豪州の最近のデータは強かった：
NABのビジネス・コンディションは3月に25となり、2月の17から改善した。
4月のWestpac消費者信頼感指数は前月比6.2%上昇し118.8となり、2010年8月以来の高水準となった。
雇用回復は堅調に推移している。3月には71Kの新規雇用が創出され、予想の35Kを上回った。失業率も5.8%から5.6%に低下した。
豪ドルは今週対米ドルで横ばいであった。しかし、最近の堅調なデータ、貿易条件の急上昇、および高い債券利回りはAUD/USDを回復トレードに適したものにしている。ただし、最近の経済指標が堅調な米国に近いメキシコの存在を考慮し、我々はAUD/MXNをショートしている。
レポートリンク：
The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - 2021年3月5日
Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日
Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - 2021年1月20日
ニュージーランドドル
チャート II-11
NZD テクニカルズ 1
NZDのテクニカル分析 1
NZDのテクニカル分析 1
チャート II-12
NZD テクニカルズ 2
NZD テクニカル 2
NZD テクニカル 2
今週のニュージーランドのデータは乏しかった：
RBNZは公式キャッシュレートを0.25%に据え置き、資産購入プログラムも維持した。住宅市場は熱を帯びており、成長見通しの不確実性が引用された。
NZIERBのビジネス・コンフィデンスは第1四半期で-13%となり、第4四半期の-6%から低下し、4四半期ぶりの下落となった。
NZDは今週対米ドルで横ばいであった。利上げ発表の日にはNZDが上昇し一方でOISカーブがフラット化したが、これはやや不可解な展開である。我々はOISカーブの反応が適切だと考えている。短期的なNZDの上振れリスクはオーストラリアとの計画されているトラベルバブルである。現在、我々はAUD/NZDをロングしている。
レポートリンク：
Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日
Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - 2020年7月10日
Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - 2019年11月29日
カナダドル
チャート II-13
CAD テクニカルズ 1
CAD テクニカル 1
CAD テクニカル 1
チャート II-14
CAD テクニカルズ 2
CAD テクニカル 2
CAD テクニカル 2
カナダの最近のデータは強かった：
カナダ銀行のBusiness Outlook Surveyは堅調であった。センチメント指標は第1四半期に2.87となり、第4四半期の1.3から上昇し、2018年以降の高水準となった。
3月の雇用レポートは特筆に値する。新規雇用は303Kで予想の100Kを大きく上回った。パートタイムとフルタイムの内訳も健全で、それぞれ175Kと128Kであった。これにより3月の失業率は7.5%に低下し、予想および2月の8.2%を下回った。
カナダドルは今週対米ドルで0.3%上昇した。本文前半でカナダドルについて時間を割いて解説したが、短期的にはやや脆弱かもしれない一方で、今後12か月で84セントに達する可能性がある。
レポートリンク：
Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - 2021年2月12日
Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - 2020年7月10日
More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - 2020年5月1日
スイスフラン
チャート II-15
CHF テクニカルズ 1
CHF テクニカル分析 1
CHF テクニカル分析 1
チャート II-16
CHF テクニカルズ 2
CHF テクニカル 2
CHF テクニカル 2
今週のスイスのデータは乏しかった：
3月の失業率は3.3%で、予想および前月を下回った。
スイスフランは今週対米ドルで横ばいであり、4月のG10通貨の中で上位のパフォーマーであり続けている。先週のレポートで示したように、フランは今年の最初の3か月での出遅れの反動で反発する局面にあるかもしれない。CHFは米ドルに対して引き続き上昇する可能性があるが、評価面の懸念から我々はEUR/CHFをロングしており、ストップは1.095に厳格に置いている。我々のUSD/CHFの中期指標も反転が見込まれる。
レポートリンク：
Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日
The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - 2020年11月6日
On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - 2020年2月21日
ノルウェークローネ
チャート II-17
NOK テクニカルズ 1
NOKのテクニカル指標 1
NOKのテクニカル指標 1
チャート II-18
NOK テクニカルズ 2
NOK テクニカル指標 2
NOK テクニカル指標 2
ノルウェーの最近のデータは混在している：
2月のGDPは前月比0.5%減少した。
第1四半期の住宅価格は前期比3.4%上昇した。
3月のCPIは前年同月比3.1%で、予想の3.4%増を下回った。
CPIの失望は主に消費財価格の前月比0.6%の下落によるものであった。
ノルウェークローネは今週対米ドルで横ばいであった。Norges Bankが今年利上げを見込まれておりG10で最も早い可能性があるにもかかわらず、今月の弱いインフレデータや世界的な再ロックダウンに伴う原油価格の下落により短期的な下振れリスクがあるかもしれない。戦略的には、我々はドルの最終的な下落に備えてNOKとSEKをロングのまま維持している。
レポートリンク：
Portfolio And Model Review - 2021年2月5日
Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - 2020年9月11日
A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - 2020年4月10日
スウェーデンクローナ
チャート II-19
SEK テクニカルズ 1
SEK テクニカル 1
SEK テクニカル 1
チャート II-20
SEK テクニカルズ 2
SEK テクニカル指標 2
SEK テクニカル指標 2
スウェーデンの最近のインフレデータは強い：
リクスバンクが重視するCPIFは前年同月比1.9%上昇し、2月の1.5%増を上回った。
エネルギーを除いた数値は1.4%の上昇にとどまったが、ほとんどのインフレ指標は2020年の底から力強く反発している。
スウェーデンクローナは今週対米ドルで1.4%上昇し、今週および4月を通じてG10で最も好調な通貨の一つだった。5年物および10年物のインフレスワップは2%水準を上回って堅調に固定されており、市場はスウェーデンのインフレ上昇を一時的なものとは見なしていない可能性がある。これにより利上げ期待が前倒しされることがある。米国より高い2年実質利回りもSEKを支えるだろう。ただし、新規のCovid-19感染者は依然として懸念材料である。
レポートリンク：
Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - 2020年9月11日
Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - 2019年11月29日
Where To Next For The US Dollar? - 2019年6月7日
トレードと予想
フォーキャスト要約
コアポートフォリオ
戦術トレード
指値注文
クローズドトレード
Dear client, Next week, in lieu of our weekly report, I will be hosting a webcast on Thursday, March 25 at 10:00 am EDT and Friday March 26 at 9:00 am HKT. I look forward to your comments and questions during the webcast. Best regards, Chester Highlights During bear markets, counter-trend rallies in the dollar are capped around 4%. This time should be no different. Meanwhile, unless the Fed tightens policy to stem the increase in aggregate demand, inflation will rise and real short rates will drop. The relative equity performance of the US is critical for the dollar. Reserve diversification out of dollars has also started to place a natural ceiling against other developed market currencies. An attractive opportunity is emerging to short the AUD/CAD cross. Feature The 1.7% rise in the US dollar this year is reinvigorating the bull case. When presenting our key views last year, we highlighted that the DXY index was at risk of a 2-4% bounce.1 We reaffirmed this view in our January report: Sizing A Potential Dollar Bounce. At the time, the DXY index was at the 90 level, suggesting the rally should fizzle around 94. Therefore, the key question is whether the nascent rise in the DXY will punch through this level, or fade as we originally expected. The short-term case for the dollar remains bullish. The currency is much oversold. Meanwhile, real interest rates are moving in favor of the US, vis-à-vis a few countries. Third and interrelated, economic momentum in the US is quite strong, compared to other G10 countries. With the rising specter of a market correction, the dollar could also benefit from safe haven flows towards the US. The Federal Reserve’s meeting yesterday certainly reaffirmed that short-term rates will remain anchored near zero, at least until 2023. The Fed does not see inflation much above 2% a couple of years out. Nevertheless, a lot can change in the coming months. Cycles, Positioning And Interest Rates The dollar tends to move in long cycles, with the latest bull and bear markets lasting about a decade or so. In other words, the dollar is a momentum currency. As such, determining which regime you are in is critical to assessing the magnitude of any rally. This is certainly the case when sentiment remains overly dollar bearish, as now. During bear markets, counter-trend rallies in the dollar are capped around 4-6%. This was what happened in the early 2000s. In bull markets, such as after the financial crisis, the dollar achieves escape velocity, with more durable rallies well into the teens (Chart I-1). So far, the current rise still fits within the narrative of a healthy reset in a longer-term bear market. Chart I-1The Dollar Rally Is Still Benign Long interest rates have also been moving in favor of the dollar, especially relative to the euro area, Japan, and even Sweden. Currencies are driven by real interest rate differentials, and higher US yields are bullish. With the Fed giving no indication it will prevent the curve from steepening further, US interest rates could keep gaping higher. However, currencies are about relative rate differentials, and the rise in US interest rates has not been in isolation. Rates in the UK, Australia and New Zealand, countries that have managed the COVID-19 crisis pretty well, are beginning to rise faster than in the US (Chart I-2). Chart I-2A Synchronized Rise In Global Yields US Versus World Growth The rise in US interest rates has been justified by better economic performance. Whether looking at purchasing managers’ indices, economic surprise indices, or even GDP growth expectations, the US has had the upper hand (Chart I-3). The Fed expects US growth to hit 6.5% this year. This is well above what other central banks expect for their domestic economies. The ECB expects 4%, the BoJ expects 3.9%, and the BoC expects 4.6% (Table I-1). Chart I-3AThe US Leads In Growth This Year Chart I-3BThe US Leads In Growth This Year Table I-1The US Leads In Growth And Inflation This Year However, economic dominance can be transient, especially in a world of flexible exchange rates. For one, a higher dollar will sap US growth via the export channel. This is especially the case since the starting point is an expensive currency. On a real effective exchange rate basis, the dollar is above its long-term mean (Chart I-4). Meanwhile, we expect the rest of the world to perform better as economies reopen. The services PMI in the US is already close to a cyclical high, similar to Sweden (Chart I-5). These are among the countries with the least stringent COVID-19 measures in the western hemisphere. This suggests that other economies, even manufacturing-centric ones, could see a coiled-spring rebound in growth as we put this pandemic behind us. Chart I-4The Dollar Is Expensive Chart I-5The US Service PMI Is At A Cyclical High The sweet spot for most economies is when growth is rising but inflation is low, allowing the resident central bank to keep policy dovish. However, it is an open question if the US can continue to boost spending, without a commensurate rise in inflation. The OECD estimates that the US output gap will close by 2022, with the $1.9-trillion fiscal package. This will put the US well ahead of any G10 country (Chart I-6). Unless the Fed tightens policy to stem the increase in aggregate demand, inflation will rise and real rates will drop (Chart I-7). Rising nominal rates and falling real yields will be anathema to the dollar. Chart I-6The US Output Gap Will Soon Close Chart I-7Wages And Inflation Should Inch Higher Equity Rotation And The Dollar A currency manager once noted that the most important variable to pay attention to when making FX allocations is relative equity performance. This might seem bizarre at first blush, but stands at the center of what an exchange rate is – a mechanism that equalizes rates of return across countries. As such while bond flows are important for exchange rates, equity flows matter as well. The relative equity performance of the US is critical for two reasons. First, the US equity market tends to do relatively better during bear markets. This was the case last year and during the 2008 crisis. Second, the outperformance of the US over the last decade has dovetailed with a dollar bull market (Chart I-8). It is rare to find a currency that has performed well both during equity bull and bear markets. If past is prologue, the near-term risks for the dollar are to the upside, especially if the market rally encounters turbulence as yields rise. The put/call ratio in the US is at a 5-year nadir. A move towards parity could violently pull up the DXY index (Chart I-9). However, a garden-variety 5-10% correction in the SPX should correspond to a shallow bounce in the DXY. This will also fit the pattern of bear market USD rallies, as we already highlighted in Chart I-1. Chart I-8US Equity Relative Performance And The Dollar Chart I-9The Dollar Could Rise In ##br##A Market Reset At the same time, any correction could usher in a violent rotation from cyclicals to defensives, especially if underpinned by higher interest rates. The performance of energy and financials are a leap ahead of other sectors in the S&P 500 this year. Importantly, they also massively outperformed during the February drawdown. Meanwhile, valuations are heavily elevated in the US compared to the rest of the world. This is true for growth sectors compared to value, and cyclicals compared to defensives. Throughout history, both exchange rates and valuations have tended to mean revert. Long-Term Dollar Outlook The 2020 pandemic was a one-in-a-hundred-year event. Coordinated fiscal and monetary stimuli have ushered in a new economic cycle. As a counter-cyclical currency, the dollar tends to do poorly (Chart I-10). This is because monetary stimulus provides more torque to economies levered to the global cycle. Once growth achieves escape velocity, the currencies of these more pro-cyclical economies benefit. The IMF projects that non-US growth should outpace US growth after 2021. Meanwhile, it is an open question that any rally in the dollar will be durable. The key driver behind the dollar increase in 2020 was a global shortage. Not only has the Fed extended its liquidity provisions to foreign central banks until September this year, the share of offshore US dollar debt issuance has fallen by a full 9 percentage points (Chart I-11). Simply put, the Fed is flooding the system with dollar liquidity at the same time that foreign entities are weaning themselves off it Chart I-10The IMF Expects Faster Growth Outside The US After 2021 Chart I-11Share Of US Dollar Debt ##br##Rolling Over The reason behind this is balance-of-payment dynamics. The market has realized that ballooning twin deficits in the US come at a cost. For foreign issuers, it is the prospect of rolling over US-denominated debt at a much higher coupon rate. For bond investors, it is currency depreciation, especially if fiscal largesse becomes too “sticky,” and stokes inflation. As such, bond investors continue to avoid the US, despite rising rates (Chart I-12). Finally, reserve diversification out of dollars has started to place a natural ceiling on the US dollar, especially against other developed market currencies. Ever since the trend began to accelerate in 2015, the DXY has been unable to sustainably punch through the 100 level (Chart I-13). This will place a durable floor under developed market currencies in general and gold in particular. The Chinese RMB has also been gaining traction in global FX reserves. Chart I-12Little Appetite For US ##br##Treasurys Chart I-13Reserve Diversification Has Been A Headwind For The Dollar More specifically, the role of the USD/CNY exchange rate as a key anchor for emerging market currencies will rise, especially if the RMB remains structurally strong.2 The People’s Bank of China has massive foreign exchange reserves, worth about US$3.2 trillion. This means it can provide swap agreements that will almost cover the totality of EM foreign dollar debt. Swap agreements entail no exchange of currency, but are about confidence. The PBoC can instill this confidence in countries that have low and/or falling foreign exchange reserves. The dollar will remain the global reserve currency for years to come. However, a slow pivot towards reserve diversification will act as a structural headwind for the dollar. Housekeeping Chart I-14AUD/CAD Is Correlated To The VIX We were stopped out of our CAD/NOK trade for a profit of 3.1%. The resilience of the US economy is benefiting the CAD more than the NOK for now. However, the Norges Bank confirmed it might be one of the first central banks to lift rates, as early as this year. We are both short USD/NOK and EUR/NOK and recommend sticking with these positions. Second, the growing spat between the EU and the UK could lead to more volatility in our short EUR/GBP position. Our target remains 0.8, but we are tightening stops to 0.865 to protect profits. The BoE left interest rates unchanged, but struck a constructive tone. This will bode well for cable, beyond near-term volatility. Third, our short USD/JPY position was stopped out amid the dollar rally. We are standing aside for now, but will reopen this trade later. Finally, a rise in volatility will boost the dollar, but also benefit short AUD/CAD positions. We are already short the AUD/MXN, but short AUD/CAD could be more profitable should market turmoil persist (Chart I-14). Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “2021 Key Views: Tradeable Themes,” dated December 4, 2020. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Currency In-Depth Report, titled “Will The RMB Continue To Appreciate?,” dated February 26, 2021. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Most data out of the US has been robust: Both PPI, import and export prices were in line with expectations for February. The PPI ex food and energy came in at 2.5% year-on-year. Empire manufacturing was robust at 17.4 in March, versus 12.1 last month. Housing starts and building permits came in a nudge below expectations in February, at 1421K and 1682K. The one disappointment was retail sales, which fell 3.3% year-on-year in February. The DXY index rose slightly this week. The FOMC remained dovish, without any revision to its median path of interest rate hikes. The markets disliked its reticence on rising long-bond yields. As such, equities are rolling over as yields continue to creep higher. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area are mending: The ZEW expectations survey rose to 74 in March, from 69.6. For Germany, the improvement was better at 76.6 from 71.2. The trade balance remained at a healthy €24.2bn euro surplus in January. The euro fell by 0.6% amidst broad dollar strength. With the ECB committed to cap the rise in yields and rise in peripheral spreads, relative interest rates will move against the euro. Sentiment remains elevated, and so a healthy reset is necessary to wash out stale longs. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan has been mixed: Core machinery orders grew 1.5% year-on-year in January. Exports fell by 4.5% in January, while imports rose by 11.8%. This has shifted the adjusted trade balance to a deficit of ¥38.7bn yen. The Japanese yen fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week, and remains the weakest G10 currency this year. Rising yields have seen Japanese investors stampede into overseas markets such as the UK, while pushing down the yen. We remain yen bulls, but will stand aside for now since it could still go lower in the short term. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data out of the UK have been weak: Industrial production and construction output fell by 4.9% and 3% year-on-year in January. Monthly GDP growth fell by 2.9% in January. Rightmove house prices rose 2.7% year-on-year in March. The pound fell by 0.4% against the dollar this week. It however remains the best performing currency this year. The BoE kept monetary policy on hold, but struck a hawkish tone as vaccination progresses, giving way to higher mobility in the summer. We remain long sterling via the euro. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia was robust: Home prices rose by 3.6% in the fourth quarter. Modest home appreciation is welcome news by the RBA, given high-flying prices in its antipodean neighbor. The employment report was solid. There were 88.7K new jobs in February, all full-time. This pushed down the unemployment rate to 5.8% from 6.4%. The Aussie fell by 0.4% this week. The Australian recovery is fast approaching escape velocity, forcing the RBA to contain a more pronounced rise in long-bond yields. We remain long AUD/NZD. In the very near term, a market shakeout could pull the Aussie lower, favoring short AUD/CAD positions. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data out of New Zealand was weak: Credit card spending fell by 10.6% year-on-year in January. Q4 GDP contracted by 1% both year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter. The current account remains in deficit at NZ$-2.7bn for Q4. The New Zealand dollar fell by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The new rule to include house prices in setting monetary policy will be a logistical nightmare for the RBNZ. In trying to achieve financial stability, the RBNZ will have to forego some economic stability, especially if the country still requires accommodative settings. Confused messaging could also introduce currency volatility. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 There was a data dump in Canada this week: The economy added 259.2K jobs in February. This pushed down the unemployment rate from 9.4% to 8.2%. Wages also increased by 4.3% in February. The Nanos confidence index rose from 60.5 to 62.7 in the week of March 12. Housing starts rose by 246K in February, as expected. The BoC’s preferred measures of CPI came in close to the 2% target. Headline CPI was weaker at 1.1% in February. The Canadian dollar rose by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The correction in oil prices could set the tone for the near-term performance of the loonie, despite robust domestic conditions. However, at the crosses, CAD should have upside. We took profits on our short CAD/NOK position this week. Report Links: Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: Producer and import prices fell by 1.1% year-on-year in February. February CPI releases also suggest the economy remains in deflation. The Swiss franc fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Safe-haven currencies continue to be sold as yields rise, making the Swiss franc the worst performing currency this year after the yen. This is welcome news for the SNB. We have been long EUR/CHF on this expectation, and recommend investors to stick with this trade. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week: The trade balance remained in surplus of NOK 25.1bn in February. The Norges bank kept interest rates on hold at 0%. The NOK fell by 1.2% against the dollar this week. The trigger was the selloff in oil prices. However, with the Norges bank signaling a rate hike later this year, placing it ahead of its G10 peers, there is little scope for the NOK to fall durably. Inflation in Norway is above target, and higher mobility later this year will benefit oil-rich Norway. We are long the Norwegian krone as a high-conviction bet against both the dollar and the euro. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data releases were a slight miss: Headline CPI came in at 1.4% in February. Core CPI came in at 1.2%. The unemployment rate remained at 8.9% in February. The Swedish krona fell by 0.8% against US dollar this week. Sweden is struggling to contain another wave of the pandemic and this has weighed on the currency this year. The saving grace for the economy has been a global manufacturing cycle that continues humming. Until Sweden is able to get past the pandemic, the currency will continue trading in a stop-and-go pattern. We remain long the SEK on cheap valuations and as a play on the global industrial cycle. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights EM domestic fundamentals, global trade and commodities prices, as well as global financial market themes are the main drivers of EM financial assets and currencies. The positive effect of improving global growth and rising commodity prices on EM currencies (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has been offset by these countries’ inferior domestic fundamentals. The odds of a near-term US dollar rebound are rising. This will likely produce a setback in EM currencies, fixed-income markets and equities. However, such a setback will likely prove to be a buying opportunity. Increased central bank intervention in asset markets may diminish the importance of fundamentals in determining the asset prices. Feature Chart I-1Unusual Divergences EM risk assets have done well in absolute terms but have underperformed their DM counterparts. This is unusual given the substantial weakness in the US dollar and the rally in commodities prices since April (Chart I-1). Until early this year, many commentators had argued that monetary policies of DM central banks were the principal drivers of EM financial markets. Given the zero interest rates and money printing that is prevalent in DM, the underperformance of EM equities and currencies is especially intriguing. Is this underperformance an aberration or is it fundamentally justified? What really drives EM performance? Back To Basics As we have argued over the years, EM risk assets and currencies are primarily driven by their domestic fundamentals, rather than by the actions and policies of the US Federal Reserve or the ECB. The critical determinant of EM stocks’ absolute as well as relative performance versus DM equities has been corporate profits. Chart I-2 illustrates that relative equity performance and relative EPS between EM and the US move in tandem, both in common and, critically, local currency terms. Similarly, the main reason why EM share prices in absolute terms have failed to deliver positive returns over the past 10 years is that their profits have been stagnant over the same period, even prior to the pandemic (Chart I-3). Interestingly, fluctuations in EM EPS resemble those of Korea’s exports. This reflects the importance of global growth in shaping EM profit trends. Chart I-2Corporate Profits Drive EM Absolute And Relative Performance Chart I-3EM EPS Has Been Flat For 10 Years The key drivers of EM risk assets and currencies have been and remain: 1. EM domestic fundamentals that can be encapsulated by a potential risk-adjusted return on capital. The latter is impacted by both cyclical and structural growth trajectories, as well as by the quality and composition of growth. Risks to growth can be gauged based on factors such as (but not limited to): productivity, wages, inflation, fiscal and balance of payment positions, the global economic and financial environment, and the health of the banking system. In EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan), the fundamentals remain challenging: The business cycle recovery is slower in these economies than it is in China and advanced economies. Fiscal stimulus has not been as large as in many advanced countries, while the pandemic situation has been worse. Their banking systems were already fragile before the pandemic, and have lately been hit by defaults stemming from the unprecedented recession. These governments have less room than in DM and China, to stimulate fiscally and bail out debtors and banks. Banks in EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) will continue struggling for some time, and their ability to finance a new expansion cycle will, for now, remain constrained (Chart I-4). A restructuring of non-performing loans and a recapitalization of banks will be required to kick-start a new credit cycle in many of these economies. 2. Global growth, especially relating to China’s business cycle and commodities. The recovery in China since April, along with rising commodities prices have been positive for EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan). Given the substantial stimulus injected into the Chinese economy, its recovery will continue well into next year (Chart I-5). As a result, higher commodities prices will benefit resource producing economies by supporting their balance of payments and enhancing income growth. Chart I-4EM ex-China: Limited Bank Support For Growth Chart I-5China's Stimulus Entails More Upside In Commodity Prices 3. Global financial market themes: a search for yield and leadership of new economy stocks. Global investment themes have an important bearing on EM financial markets. For example, in recent years, the increased market cap of new economy and semiconductor stocks – due to an exponential rise in their share prices – has amplified their importance for the aggregate EM equity index. The largest six mega cap stocks in the EM benchmark are new economy and semiconductor companies, and make up about 25% of the EM MSCI market cap. The six FAANGM stocks presently account for about 25% of the S&P 500. Hence, the concentration risk in EM is as high as it is in the US. Consequently, the trajectory of new economy and semiconductor stocks globally will be essential to the performance of the EM equity index. On August 20, we published an in-depth Special Report assessing near-term and structural outlooks for global semiconductor stocks. With new economy and semiconductor share prices going parabolic worldwide, we are witnessing a full-fledged mania, as we discussed in our July 16 report. The equal-weighted US FAANGM stock index has risen by 24-fold in nominal and 20-fold in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, since January 1, 2010 (Chart I-6). Chart I-6History Of Manias Of Past Decades In brief, with respect to magnitude and duration, the bull market in FAANGM is on par with the bubbles of previous decades (Chart I-6). Those bubbles culminated in bear markets, where prices fell by at least 50% after topping out. Chart I-7EM ex-TMT Stocks: Absolute And Relative Performance We do not know when the FAANGM rally will end. Timing a reversal in a powerful bull market is impossible. Also, we are not certain about the magnitude of such a potential drawdown. Nevertheless, our message is that the risk-reward tradeoff of chasing FAANGM at this stage is very unattractive. Excluding technology, media and telecommunication (TMT) – as most growth stocks are a part of TMT– EM equities remain in a bear market (Chart I-7, top panel). In relative terms, EM ex-TMT stocks have massively underperformed their global peers (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Even with a larger weighting of mega-cap growth TMT stocks than the overall DM equity index, the aggregate EM equity index has underperformed the overall DM index. Bottom Line: EM domestic fundamentals, global trade and commodities prices, and global financial market themes are the main drivers of EM financial assets and currencies. What About The Dollar? The high correlation of the trade-weighted US dollar and EM equities is due to the following: (1) the greenback has been a countercyclical currency; and (2) the US dollar’s exchange rate against EM currencies reflects relative fundamentals in the US versus EM economies. When a global business cycle accelerates, the broad trade-weighted US dollar weakens. If this growth acceleration is led by China and other emerging economies, the greenback depreciates considerably versus EM currencies. The opposite is also true. In other words, the US dollar exchange rate’s strong negative correlation to EM equities is primarily due to the fact that the greenback’s exchange rates against EM currencies reflect both the global business cycle as well as EM growth and fundamentals. Chart I-8Divergence Between DM And EM Currencies In recent months, the greenback has: (1) depreciated due to the global economic recovery; (2) tumbled versus DM currencies due to the still raging pandemic and the socio-political instability in the US as well as the Fed’s commitment to staying behind the inflation curve in the years to come; and (3) not fallen much against EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) currencies because their fundamentals have been poor, as discussed above. Bottom Line: Exchange rates in EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) have failed to appreciate versus the dollar despite the latter’s plunge versus other DM currencies (Chart I-8). The positive effect of improving global growth and rising commodities prices on EM currencies (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has been offset by these countries’ inferior domestic fundamentals. Flows And Cash On The Sidelines Chart I-9Cash On The Sidelines Has Been Produced By The Fed's Debt Monetization What about capital flows? Aren’t they essential in driving EM financial markets? Of course, they are important. However, we view flows as resulting from and determined by fundamentals. Over the medium and long term, we assume that capital flows to regions where the return on capital is high or rising. Thus, we see ourselves as responsible for directing investors to those areas that we have identified as providing a high or rising return on capital (and cautioning investors when the opposite is true). The presumption is that beyond short-term volatility, investment flows will gravitate to countries/sectors/asset classes with high or rising returns on capital, just as they will abandon areas of low or falling returns on capital. In brief, fundamentals drive flows and flows determine asset price performance. Isn’t sizable cash on the sidelines a reason to be bullish? Yes, there is substantial cash on the sidelines. Along with zero short-term rates, this has been the potent force leading investors to purchase equities, credit and other risk assets since late March. Below we examine the case of the US, but this has also been true in many markets around the world. The top panel of Chart I-9 demonstrates that US institutional and retail money market funds – a measure of cash on the sidelines - presently stand at $4.2 trillion, having increased by $900 billion since March. Yet, the Fed and US commercial banks have increased their debt securities holdings by $2.9 trillion since March. Furthermore, the Fed and US commercial banks hold $10.6 trillion of debt securities (Chart I-9, middle panel) – amounting to 18% of the aggregate equity and US dollar fixed-income market value (Chart I-9, bottom panel). These securities, held by the Fed and US commercial banks, are not available to non-bank investors. Chart I-10Investors' Cash Holdings Ratio Is Still Elevated Excluding debt securities owned by the Fed and commercial banks, we reckon that cash on the sidelines is equal to 8.4% of the value of equities and US dollar debt securities available to non-bank investors (Chart I-10). This is a relatively high cash ratio. Unprecedented purchases by the Fed and US commercial banks have not only removed a considerable chuck of debt securities from the market; they have also created money “out of thin air”. When central or commercial banks acquire a security from, or lend to, a non-bank entity, they are creating new money “out of thin air”. No one needs to save for the central bank and commercial banks to lend to or purchase a security from a non-bank. In short, savings versus spending decisions by economic agents (non-banks) do not affect the stock of money supply. We have deliberated on these topics at length in past reports. In sum, the Fed’s large purchases of debt securities amount to a de facto monetization of public and private debt. These operations have both reduced the amount of securities available to investors and boosted the latter’s cash balances. Hence, the Fed has boosted asset prices not only indirectly, by lowering short-term interest rates, but also directly, by printing new money and shrinking the amount of securities available to investors. We have in recent months argued that global risk assets are overpriced relative to fundamentals. However, investors have continued to deploy cash in asset markets, pushing prices higher. Given the zero money market interest rates and the still elevated cash balances, one can envision a scenario in which cash continues to be deployed in asset markets, pushing valuations to bubble levels across all risk assets. Pressure on investors to deploy their cash amid rising asset prices implies that only a major negative shock might be able to reverse this rally. There have been plenty of reasons to be cautious, including escalating US-China geopolitical tensions, the increasing odds of a contested US presidential election and, hence, elevated political uncertainty, the possibility of a US fiscal cliff, and a potential second wave of the pandemic. However, investors have so far shrugged off all of these and continue to allocate capital to risk assets. Bottom Line: Increased central bank intervention in asset markets may diminish the importance of fundamentals in determining the price of risk assets. This would also mean that the role of momentum investing and psychology may increase. Investment Strategy Currencies: The US dollar has become oversold and could stage a rebound in the near term. The euro has risen to its technical resistance (Chart I-11). The EM currency index (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has failed to break above its 200-day moving average (Chart I-12, top panel). The emerging Asian trade-weighted currency index (ADXY) has rebounded to the upper boundary of its falling channel (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Chart I-11A Short-Term Resistance For Euro/USD Chart I-12EM Currencies Have Not Entered A Bull Market Such technical profiles suggest that EM currencies have not yet entered a bull market despite the greenback’s considerable depreciation against DM currencies. This is a reflection of the poor fundamentals of EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan). In short, the odds of a US dollar rebound are rising. This could dent commodities prices and weigh on EM currencies. We continue recommending shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the euro, CHF and JPY. The downside in these DM currencies versus the greenback is limited. The euro could drop to 1.15, but not much below that level. Our basket of EM currencies to short includes: BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, PHP, KRW and IDR. Chart I-13EM Local Currency Bonds: Looking For A Better Entry Point Fixed-Income Markets: We have been neutral on EM local currency bonds and EM credit markets (USD bonds) since April 23 and June 4, respectively. The strategy is to wait for a correction in these markets before going long. The rebound in the US dollar and correction in commodities will provide a better entry point for these fixed-income markets (Chart I-13). Equities: On July 30, we recommended shifting the EM equity allocation within a global equity portfolio from underweight to neutral. In the near term, EM share prices will likely continue underperforming their DM counterparts. A bounce in the US dollar, rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, as well as the continuation of a FAANGM-driven mania in US equities will result in EM equity underperformance versus DM. However, in the medium- to long-term, the balance of risks no longer justifies an underweight allocation. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations