新興市場

Highlights Markets largely ignored the uproar at the US Capitol on January 6 because the transfer of power was not in question. Democratic control over the Senate, after two upsets in the Georgia runoff, is the bigger signal. US fiscal policy will become more expansive yet the Federal Reserve will not start hiking rates anytime soon. This is a powerful tailwind for risk assets over the short and medium run. Politics and geopolitics affect markets through the policy setting, rather than through discrete events, which tend to have fleeting market impacts. The current setting, in the US and abroad, is negative for the US dollar. The implication is positive for emerging market stocks and value plays. Go long global stocks ex-US, long emerging markets over developed markets, and long value over growth. Cut losses on short CNY-USD. Feature Chart 1Market's Muted Response To US Turmoil Scenes of mayhem unfolded in the US Capitol on January 6 as protesters and rioters flooded the building and temporarily interrupted the joint session of Congress convened to count the Electoral College votes. Congress reconvened later and finished the tally. President-elect Joe Biden will take office at noon on January 20. Financial markets were unperturbed, with stocks up and volatility down, though safe havens did perk up a bit (Chart 1). The incident supports our thesis that the US election cycle of 2020 was a sort of “Civil War Lite” and that the country is witnessing “Peak Polarization,” with polarization likely to fall over the coming five years. The incident was the culmination of the past year of pandemic-fueled unrest and President Trump’s refusal to concede to the Electoral College verdict. Trump made a show of force by rallying his supporters, and apparently refrained from cracking down on those that overran Congress, but then he backed down and promised an orderly transfer of power. The immediate political result was to isolate him. Fewer Republicans than expected contested the electoral votes in the ensuing joint session; one Republican is openly calling for Trump to be forced into resignation via the 25th amendment procedure for those unfit to serve. The electoral votes were promptly certified. Vice President Mike Pence and other actors performed their constitutional duties. Pence reportedly gave the order to bring out the National Guard to restore order – hence it is possible that Pence and Trump’s cabinet could activate the 25th amendment, but that is unlikely unless Trump foments rebellion going forward. Vandals and criminals will be prosecuted and there could also be legal ramifications for Trump and some government officials. Do Politics And Geopolitics Affect Markets? The market’s lack of concern raises the question of whether investors need trouble themselves with politics at all. Philosopher and market guru Nassim Nicholas Taleb tweeted the following: If someone, a year ago, described January 6, 2021 (and events attending it) & asked you to guess the stock market behavior, admit you would have gotten it wrong. Just so you understand that news do not help you understand markets.1 This is a valid point. Investors should not (and do not) invest based on the daily news. Of course, many observers foresaw social unrest surrounding the 2020 election, including Professor Peter Turchin.2 Social instability was rising in the data, as we have long shown. When you combined this likelihood with the Fed’s pause on rate hikes, and a measurable rise in geopolitical tensions between the US and other countries, the implication was that gold would appreciate. So if someone had told you a year ago that the US would have a pandemic, that governments would unleash a 10.2% of global GDP fiscal stimulus, that the Fed would start average inflation targeting, that a vaccine would be produced, and that the US would have a contested election on top of it all, would you have expected gold to rise? Absolutely – and it has done so, both in keeping with the fall in real interest rates plus some safe-haven bonus, which is observable (Chart 2). Chart 2Gold Price In Excess Of Fall In Real Rates Implies Geopolitical Risk The takeaway is that policy matters for markets while politics may only matter briefly at best. Which brings us back to the implications of the Trump rebellion. What Will Be The Impact Of The Trump Rebellion? We have highlighted that this election was a controversial rather than contested election – meaning that the outcome was not in question after late November when the court cases, vote counts, and recounts were certified. This was doubly true after the Electoral College voted on December 14. The protests and riots yesterday never seriously called this result into question. Whatever Trump’s intentions, there was no military coup or imposition of martial law, as some observers feared. In fact the scandal arose from the President’s hesitation to call out the National Guard rather than his use of security forces to prevent the transfer of power, as occurs during a coup. This partially explains why the market traded on the contested election in December 2000 but not in 2020 – the result was largely settled. The Biden administration now has more political capital than otherwise, which is market-positive because it implies more proactive fiscal policy to support the economic recovery. Trump’s refusal to concede gave Democrats both seats in the Georgia Senate runoffs, yielding control of Congress. Household and business sentiment will revive with the vaccine distribution and economic recovery, while the passage of larger fiscal stimulus is highly probable. US fiscal policy will almost certainly avoid the mistake of tightening fiscal policy too soon. Taken with the Fed’s aversion to raising rates, greater fiscal stimulus will create a powerful tailwind for risk assets over the next 12 months. The primary consequence of combined fiscal and monetary dovishness is a falling dollar. The greenback is a counter-cyclical and momentum-driven currency that broadly responds inversely to global growth trends. But policy decisions are clearly legible in the global growth path and the dollar’s path over the past two decades. Japanese and European QE, Chinese devaluation, the global oil crash, Trump’s tax cuts, the US-China trade war, and COVID-19 lockdowns all drove the dollar to fresh highs – all policy decisions (Chart 3). Policy decisions also ensured the euro’s survival, marking the dollar’s bottom against the euro in 2011, and ensuring that the euro could take over from the dollar once the dollar became overbought. Today, the US’s stimulus response to COVID-19 – combined with the Fed’s strategic review and the Democratic sweep of government – marked the peak and continued drop-off in the dollar. Chart 3Euro Survival, US Peak Polarization, Set Stage For Rotation From USD To EUR Chart 4China's Yuan Says Geopolitics Matters The Chinese renminbi is heavily manipulated by the People’s Bank and is not freely exchangeable. The massive stimulus cycle that began in 2015, in reaction to financial turmoil, combined with the central bank’s decision to defend the currency marked a bottom in the yuan’s path. China’s draconian response to the pandemic this year, and massive stimulus, made China the only major country to contribute positively to global growth in 2020 and ensured a surge in the currency. The combination of US and Chinese policy decisions has clearly favored the renminbi more than would be the case from the general economic backdrop (Chart 4). Getting the policy setting right is necessary for investors. This is true even though discrete political events – including major political and geopolitical crises – have fleeting impacts on markets. What About Biden’s Trade Policy? Trump was never going to control monetary or fiscal policy – that was up to the Fed and Congress. His impact lay mostly in trade and foreign policy. Specifically his defeat reduces the risk of sweeping unilateral tariffs. It makes sense that global economic policy uncertainty has plummeted, especially relative to the United States (Chart 5). If US policy facilitates a global economic and trade recovery, then it also makes sense that global equities would rise faster than American equities, which benefited from the previous period of a strong dollar and erratic or aggressive US fiscal and trade policy. Trump’s last 14 days could see a few executive orders that rattle stocks. There is a very near-term downside risk to European and especially Chinese stocks from punitive measures, or to Emirati stocks in the event of another military exchange with Iran (Chart 6). But Trump will be disobeyed if he orders any highly disruptive actions, especially if they contravene national interests. Beyond Trump’s term we are constructive on all these bourses, though we expect politics and geopolitics to remain a headwind for Chinese equities. Chart 5Big Drop In Global Policy Uncertainty US tensions with China will escalate again soon – and in a way that negatively impacts US and Chinese companies exposed to each other. Chart 6Geopolitical Implications Of Biden's Election The cold war between these two is an unavoidable geopolitical trend as China threatens to surpass the US in economic size and improves its technological prowess. Presidents Xi and Trump were merely catalysts. But there are two policy trends that will override this rivalry for at least the first half of the year. First, global trade is recovering– as shown here by the Shanghai freight index and South Korean exports and equity prices (Chart 7). The global recovery will boost Korean stocks but geopolitical tensions will continue to brood over more expensive Taiwanese stocks due to the US-China conflict. This has motivated our longstanding long Korea / short Taiwan recommendation. Chart 7Global Economy Speaks Louder Than North Korea Chart 8China Wary Of Over-Tightening Policy Chart 9Global Stock-Bond Ratio Registers Good News Second, China’s 2020 stimulus will have lingering effects and it is wary of over-tightening monetary and fiscal policy, lest it undo its domestic economic recovery. The tenor of China’s Central Economic Work Conference in December has reinforced this view. Chart 8 illustrates the expectations of our China Investment Strategy regarding China’s credit growth and local government bond issuance. They suggest that there will not be a sharp withdrawal of fiscal or quasi-fiscal support in 2021. Stability is especially important in the lead up to the critical leadership rotation in 2022.3 This policy backdrop will be positive for global/EM equities despite the political crackdown on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s opponents will occur despite this supportive policy backdrop. The global stock-to-bond ratio has surged in clear recognition of these positive policy trends (Chart 9). Government bonds were deeply overbought and it will take several years before central banks begin tightening policy. What About Biden’s Foreign Policy? Chart 10OPEC 2.0 Cartel Continues (For Now) Iran poses a genuine geopolitical risk this year – first in the form of an oil supply risk, should conflict emerge in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, or elsewhere in the region. This would inject a risk premium into the oil price. Later the risk is the opposite as a deal with the Biden administration would create the prospect for Iran to attract foreign investment and begin pumping oil, while putting pressure on the OPEC 2.0 coalition to abandon its current, tentative, production discipline in pursuit of market share (Chart 10). Biden has the executive authority to restore the 2015 nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). He is in favor of doing so in order to (1) prevent the Middle East from generating a crisis that consumes his foreign policy; (2) execute an American grand strategy of reviving its Asia Pacific influence; (3) cement the Obama administration’s legacy. The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also has a clear interest in returning to the deal before the country’s presidential election in June. This would salvage his legacy and support his “reformist” faction. The Supreme Leader also has a chance to pin the negative aspects of the deal on a lame duck president while benefiting from it economically as he prepares for his all-important succession. The problem is that extreme levels of distrust will require some brinkmanship early in Biden’s term. Iran is building up leverage ahead of negotiations, which will mean higher levels of uranium enrichment and demonstrating the range of its regional capabilities, including the Strait of Hormuz, and its ability to impose economic pain via oil prices. Biden will need to establish a credible threat if Iran misbehaves. Hence the geopolitical setting is positive for oil prices at the moment. Beyond Iran, there is a clear basis for policy uncertainty to decline for Europe and the UK while it remains elevated for China and Russia (Chart 11). Chart 11Relative Policy Uncertainty Favors Europe and UK Over Russia And China The US international image has suffered from the Trump era and the Biden administration’s main priorities will lie in solidifying alliances and partnerships and stabilizing the US role in the world, rather than pursuing showdown and confrontation. However, it will not be long before scrutiny returns to the authoritarian states, which have been able to focus on domestic recovery and expanding their spheres of influence amid the US’s tumultuous election year. Chart 12GeoRisk Indicators Say Risks Underrated For These Bourses The US will not seek a “diplomatic reset” with Russia, aside from renegotiating the New START treaty. The Democrats will seek to retaliate for Russia’s extensive cyberattack in 2021 as well as for election interference and psychological warfare in the United States. And while there probably will be a reset with China, it will be short-lived, as outlined above. This situation contrasts with that of the Atlantic sphere. The Biden administration is a crystal clear positive, relative to a second Trump term, for the European Union. The EU and the UK have just agreed to a trade deal, as expected, to conclude the Brexit process, which means that the US-UK “special relationship” will not be marred by disagreements over Ireland. European solidarity has also strengthened as a result of the pandemic, which highlighted the need for collective policy responses, including fiscal. Thus the geopolitical risks of the new administration are most relevant for China/Taiwan and Russia. Comparing our GeoRisk Indicators, which are market-based, with the relative equity performance of these bourses, Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable because markets are increasingly pricing the geopolitical risk yet the relative stock performance is toppy (Chart 12). The limited recovery in Russian equities is also at risk for the same reason. Only in China’s case has the market priced lower geopolitical risk, not least because of the positive change in US administration. We expect Biden and Xi Jinping to be friendly at first but for strategic distrust to reemerge by the second half of the year. This will be a rude awakening for Chinese stocks – or China-exposed US stocks, especially in the tech sector. Investment Takeaways Chart 13Global Policy Shifts Drive Big Investment Reversals The US is politically divided. Civil unrest and aftershocks of the controversial election will persist but markets will ignore it unless it has a systemic impact. The policy consequence is a more proactive fiscal policy, resulting in virtual fiscal-monetary coordination that is positive both for global demand and risk assets, while negative for the US dollar. The Biden administration will succeed in partially repealing the Trump tax cuts, but the impact on corporate profit margins will be discounted fairly mechanically and quickly by market participants, while the impact on economic growth will be more than offset by huge new spending. Sentiment will improve after the pandemic – and Biden has not yet shown an inclination to take an anti-business tone. The past decade has been marked by a dollar bull market and the outperformance of developed markets over emerging markets and growth stocks like technology over value stocks like financials. Cyclical sectors have traded in a range. Going forward, a secular rise in geopolitical Great Power competition is likely to persist but the macro backdrop has shifted with the decline of the dollar. Cyclical sectors are now poised to outperform while a bottom is forming in value stocks and emerging markets (Chart 13). We recommend investors go strategically long emerging markets relative to developed. We are also going long global value over growth stocks. We are not yet ready to close our gold trade given that the two supports, populist fiscal turn and great power struggle, will continue to be priced by markets in the near term. We are throwing in the towel on our short CNY-USD trade after the latest upleg in the renminbi, though our view continues to be that geopolitical fundamentals will catch yuan investors by surprise when they reassert themselves. We also recommend preferring global equities to US equities, given the above-mentioned global trends plus looming tax hikes.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 January 6, 2020, twitter.com. 2 See Turchin and Andrey Korotayev, "The 2010 Structural-Demographic Forecast for the 2010-2020 Decade: A Retrospective Assessment," PLoS ONE 15:8 (2020), journals.plos.org. 3 Not to mention that 2021 is the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary – not a time to make an unforced policy error with an already wobbly economy.

Highlights An uninterrupted advance in reflation trades will be possible if the FOMO (fear of missing out) evolves into a full-blown mania. This scenario cannot be ruled out especially with retail investors around the world continuing to flock into equity markets. EM equity valuations are neither cheap in absolute terms nor relative to Europe and Japan. EM is cheap only versus the S&P 500. US relative equity outperformance in common currency terms is breaking down. Go long EM stocks / short the S&P 500. The Blue Wave in the US is very bearish for the greenback and has reduced our expectations of the magnitude and duration of any near-term US dollar rebound. It has in fact reinforced our medium- to long-term negative US dollar view. Feature Financial markets are at a crossroad. On the one hand, the reflation trades have already rallied a great deal and might be at a point of exhaustion. On the other hand, gigantic monetary and fiscal support from authorities worldwide, and the US in particular, could push global share prices into a no gravity zone where major overshoots and manias are possible. The bullish view is well-known: DM central banks’ easy monetary and fiscal policies will endure. Moreover, the global economy will continue its recovery as vaccines are made accessible by mid-year to a large share of the population in advanced economies. Markets will ignore any growth disappointment stemming from the expansion and/or extension of lockdowns as they are forward-looking and expect widespread vaccine deployment to eventually allow for a reopening of the economies. We agree with these points. The negative view is also well-recognized: investor sentiment on global equities in general and EM in particular is very elevated and reflation trades have become overbought. These are valid and correct points as well. Chart I-1 illustrates that the Sentix investor sentiment1 on EM equities is at an all-time high. In the past, when sentiment reached these levels EM share prices experienced either a correction or a bear market. Chart I-1Investor Sentiment On EM Equities Is At A Record High Further, the December issue of the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch survey noted that investor overweights in EM stocks and commodities are the highest since November 2010 and February 2011, respectively. These proved to be the major (structural) tops in EM equities and commodities. Certainly, positioning in EM is even more crowded now than it was four weeks ago. Are EM equities at a point of exhaustion – where the rally runs out – or at a point of no gravity – where nothing will stop them from marching higher? In the near term, either is possible. It truly depends on investor behavior which is impossible to forecast with any high degree of certainty. Chart I-2Korean Stocks Have Benefited From Local Retail Mania For instance, retail mania has been happening not only in the US but also in many developing countries. In particular, the astonishing rally in Korean stocks has been propelled not by foreign investors but by local retail investors (Chart I-2). That is why traditional yardsticks of investment analysis have not been useful. In the medium and long term, the trend in global share prices, and thereby EM, will likely be shaped by issues where there is no consensus among investors. In our opinion, there are two subjects upon which investors disagree: (1) whether global and EM equity valuations are too expensive, and (2) whether US inflation will rise sufficiently so that the Federal Reserve abandons its super-easy monetary policy stance, and when markets will begin to price this in. EM equity valuations are not at all cheap. An uninterrupted advance will be possible if the FOMO (fear of missing out) evolves into a full-blown mania. This scenario cannot be ruled out especially with retail investors around the world continuing to flock into equity markets. Concerning US inflation, the odds are that it will rise sooner and faster than is expected by the market and the Fed. Although the Fed is unlikely to singlehandedly spoil the party, fixed-income markets could start pricing in rate hikes sooner rather than later with ramifications for share prices. We will discuss equity valuations in this report and devote a separate report in the coming weeks to the inflation outlook in the US and China. Market Implications Of The Blue Wave Chart I-3US Consumption Of Industrial Metals Is Too Small We expected US Republicans to maintain their majority in the Senate after Georgia’s Senate elections, thus dimming the likelihood of more large-scale fiscal stimulus. If realized, that would have triggered a rebound in the US dollar from very oversold levels. US Democrats effectively gaining control of the Senate has major implications for financial markets: America’s fiscal policy will be looser than otherwise. Swelling government spending will boost domestic demand and will produce a wider trade deficit and higher inflation. Yet, the Fed is unlikely to tighten policy anytime soon and real interest rates will remain negative. This is very bearish for the US dollar. Any rebound in the greenback, which is possible given its oversold conditions, should be faded. According to our Chief Geopolitical Strategist Matt Gertken, odds are that Democrats will partially repeal the corporate tax cuts enacted during Trump’s administration. This is negative for both the US dollar and for Wall Street. One of the main campaign promises of Democrats has been to address income inequality. Actions on this front are good for Main Street but these policies will weigh on corporate profitability. Big Tech faces a greater threat of taxes from a united Congress as opposed to a divided Congress, but Biden’s executive decrees will not be too harsh given that these companies are a major source of support for Democrats. US nominal interest rates will rise but so will nominal GDP growth. The negative impact of higher US bond yields on EM will be more than offset by two forces: a weaker US dollar and stronger exports to the US. Finally, the shift in US fiscal policy is clearly inflationary. However, the impact on commodities prices will be modest. The US accounts for only 8% of global industrial metals consumption compared to China’s 57% share (Chart I-3). So, a slowdown in China commencing in H2 2021 will more than offset the rise in US metals consumption. Concerning oil, the US is the world’s largest crude consumer. Hence, higher household income and spending are positive for oil prices. However, a forceful Democrat push toward green energy is structurally negative for US oil consumption. These two forces might offset each other leaving oil prices to be determined by other factors. Bottom Line: Democrat control of both houses of Congress is positive for US nominal GDP and, hence, for corporate revenues but is bearish for the US dollar and corporate profit margins. Net-net, this reinforces our view that US relative equity outperformance in common currency terms has already passed its secular top and is breaking down (Chart I-4, top panel). By contrast, this US policy shift is positive for EM financial markets (Chart I-4, bottom panel). We recommend a new trade/strategy: go long EM stocks / short the S&P 500. EM Equity Valuations In our opinion, global stocks, especially US ones, are expensive and EM equities are far from being cheap. Let’s begin with EM equity valuations: Chart I-5 shows our Composite Valuation Indicator (CVI) for the MSCI EM equity benchmark. It is an average of four individual valuation indicators: market cap-weighted, equal-weighted, trimmed mean, and median. Chart I-4US Equity Outperformance Is Over Chart I-5EM Equities: Good News Are Fully Priced In   In turn, each of these four indicators incorporates five multiples: forward P/E, trailing P/E, price-to-cash EPS, price-to-book value and price-to-dividend ratios. According to Chart I-5, EM equities are expensive. Not only are trailing P/E and price-to-cash EPS ratios extremely elevated but also the forward P/E ratio is the highest and the dividend yield is the lowest it has been in 18 years (Chart I-6). Even though EM stocks do not appear to be expensive based on a price-to-book value (PBV) ratio, a structural decline in EM return on equity (RoE) entails that the fair value range for the PBV ratio has downshifted over the past decade and the current reading should be taken with a grain of salt. Chart I-7 demonstrates that the RoEs for the entire MSCI EM universe, equal-weighted MSCI EM equity index and MSCI non-financial EM companies have deteriorated structurally. Hence, a decline in return on equity is widespread among EM-listed companies, i.e. it is not a feature unique to only large caps. Chart I-6EM Equity Multiples Chart I-7A Structural Drop In EM RoE Heralds Lower Multiples   In brief, the structural decline in EM RoE justifies a lower PBV ratio for EM equities (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Relative to DM, EM equities are not cheap. They are cheap versus their US peers but expensive versus European and Japanese stocks. Chart I-8 exhibits the relative Composite Valuation Indicator for EM relative to DM. For EM, it is the same as in Chart I-5 and for DM we use an identical measure. When discussing equity valuations, one should now distinguish between growth and value stocks. EM growth stocks are grossly overvalued as shown in the top panel of Chart I-9. EM value stocks are close to their fair value, i.e., they are not cheap (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Chart I-8EM Versus DM: Relative Equity Multiples Chart I-9Multiples For EM Growth And Value Stocks   A caveat is in order: all of these CVIs do not incorporate interest rates into valuation models. We look at equity multiples in the context of low interest rates in the sections that follow. Incorporating Interest Rates Into Equity Valuations Chart I-10EM Earnings Yields Adjusted For Local Bond Yields There are various ways to incorporate interest rates/the discount factor into equity valuations. One way is to calculate the difference between forward earnings yield (EY) and long-term bond yields. We use forward EY because trailing EPS is still depressed by the pandemic-induced economic crash, i.e., trailing P/Es do not provide a true valuation picture. Chart I-10 demonstrates the gap between EM forward EY and 10-year US bond yields (on the top panel) and the same forward EY and EM local bond yields (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Both measures are not far from their historical means. Hence, adjusted for bond yields, EM stocks are fairly valued. That said, there are two pertinent questions that follow from this: (1) how do EM equities compare to their DM peers; and (2) how well have these interest rate-adjusted valuation measures worked in markets where interest rates had dropped to zero. In other words, do near-zero interest rates warrant a secular bull market? We address this last topic in the section below. As to the first question, Chart I-11 presents the forward EY-local interest rate differential for major equity markets. A higher differential presage cheaper equity valuation relative to lower numbers. Chart I-11US And EM Equities Have Been Chronically Expensive Versus European And Japanese Ones According to this measure, Japanese and Euro Area equities have been and remain cheaper than US and EM equities. Chart I-12 ranks all individual EM equity benchmarks as well as major DM bourses based on the differential between forward EY and local nominal bond yields. Stocks in India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Mexico and Colombia are expensive, adjusted for local bond yields. Chart I-12Cross Country Valuation Ranking: Forward Earnings Yield Minus Local Bond Yields By contrast, equity markets in Central Europe, core Europe and Russia offer better value, relative to domestic bonds. The EM aggregate index, the Chinese investable benchmark and the S&P 500 fall in the middle of this valuation ranking. Bottom Line: Based on equity multiples, EM equities are expensive. However, when adjusted for interest rates, absolute valuation of EM equities is neutral. Relative to DM, the EM equity benchmark is not cheap. In fact, they are more expensive compared to European and Japanese stocks. Equity Valuation When Rates Are At Zero No doubt, equity prices should be re-rated as interest rates drop. However, what should the equilibrium P/E multiple be when interest rates are close to zero? Japan, the euro area and Switzerland offer a roadmap. Chart I-13Japanese And European Stocks Have Not Entered Structural Bull Markets Despite Negative Rates For some time now, these markets have had to process many of the same features that US and global markets are currently facing. Specifically: They have had negative policy rates and 10-year government bond yields for many years. Their central banks have been conducting some sort of QE programs. The Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank have been purchasing equities and the ECB has been buying corporate bonds. Finally, onward from 2012 until the eruption of the pandemic, economic growth in Japan, the euro area and Switzerland was decent. Despite negative interest rates, their broad equity markets have failed to break out into a structural bull market. Their stocks have re-rated, but the upside was capped (Chart I-13). Critically, the forward EY differential with their local government bond yields have stayed wide (Chart I-14). Chart I-14Japanese, Euro Area And Swiss Equities Have Not Re-Rated Despite Negative Bond Yields In sum, the experiences of Japanese, Swiss and other European markets show that zero or negative interest rates alone did not compel a secular bull market in share prices. Rather, equity re-rating in these bourses has been relatively moderate. Investment Considerations The Blue Wave is very bearish for the greenback as we argued above. This development has reduced our conviction regarding the magnitude and duration of any near-term US dollar rebound. It has in fact reinforced our medium- to long-term negative US dollar view. Potential EM currencies that investors should consider buying on a dip versus the US dollar are MXN, SGD, KRW, TWD, CNY, INR and CZK. For now, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to EM equities and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. However, we note that odds of EM outperformance have risen with the Blue Wave in the US and ensuing US dollar depreciation. Yet, Europe and Japan presently offer a better risk/reward profile than EM. However, to reflect our strong conviction of a breakdown in US relative performance and a more upbeat view on EM versus US stocks, we recommend the following trade/strategy: long EM stocks / short the S&P 500, currency unhedged. Concerning the absolute performance of EM and DM stocks, they are very overbought, reasonably expensive and sentiment is very bullish. In normal times, this would argue for a pullback. For example, Chart I-15 shows that a rollover in the inverted US equity put-call ratio typically heralds a setback in the S&P500. Chart I-15A Red Flag? Do Indicators No Longer Work? However, if global stocks are moving from a FOMO stage to a mania phase, many traditional relationships and indicators might not work. This and the fact the EM equity index is at a critical juncture entails its outlook is currently highly uncertain – odds of a breakout (FOMO evolving into a mania) and a potential setback are equal. Finally, some housekeeping, we are closing the long Chinese Investable stocks / short Korean stocks recommendation. This trade has generated a massive loss of 33.5% as the KOSPI has taken off in recent weeks. We continue to overweight both Chinese and Korean equities within an EM equity portfolio. We will likely make changes to our recommended country allocations within equity and fixed-income portfolios in the coming weeks. Stay tuned. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  The Sentix Asset Classes Sentiment Emerging Markets Equities Index is polled among 5,000 European individual and institutional investors. In the survey, investors are asked about their medium-term price expectations for the asset class. Source: SENTIX.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Feature Chart 1Stock Prices Are Struggling To Break Out Of Their Recent Highs Stock prices in China's onshore and offshore markets rallied into the New Year (Chart 1). Despite the strong performance in the last couple of days, as we pointed out in our 2021 Outlook Report, the biggest obstacle that Chinese stock prices face is their elevated valuations against tightening macro policy. Recent liquidity injections by the PBoC have prompted a sharp drop in the 7-day repo rate. However, slightly loosened liquidity conditions in the interbank system do not signify a shift in monetary policy, i.e. financial conditions will continue to tighten in 2021, albeit at a slower rate than in the second half of 2020. The Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) wrapped up its December meeting with a pledge to maintain continuity, stability and sustainability in macroeconomic policy without making any “sudden turns”.  The conference release also stated that China “must use the valuable time window to focus on reform and innovation — achieving a good start for the 14th five-year plan in terms of high-quality development.” The CEWC’s messages align with our baseline view that Chinese policymakers are not yet in a deleveraging mood. The country’s macro leverage level should be kept stable in 2021 and the growth of credit creation will decelerate gradually (Chart 2, Scenario 1). The pullback in this year’s fiscal support will also be gentle: we expect newly issued special purpose bonds (SPBs) to reach 3.2-3.5 trillion in 2021, about 10% less than the 3.75 trillion issued in 2020.  This will put the 2021 SPB quota in the same range as in 2016, but higher than in 2017, 2018 or 2019 (Chart 3).   Chart 2Credit Growth Will Decelerate In 2021 Chart 3Fiscal Cliff In 2021 Unlikely A credit or fiscal cliff is unlikely this year. Instead, we expect the authorities to accelerate key reforms such as a clampdown on market monopolies and housing speculation in large cities, heavier penalties on capital market violations and a reduction in carbon emissions. In the long run, these reforms may help to rebalance China’s economic structure, but in the near term, a more stringent policy backdrop will probably hinder investors’ appetites for Chinese risk assets. In early December, we downgraded Chinese equities from overweight to neutral for the next 0-3 months, in both absolute and relative terms. We will evaluate our cyclical call on Chinese stocks in the coming weeks. Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Below is a set of market relevant charts along with our comments: The PBoC has injected large amounts of liquidity into the interbank system since mid-November, helping to sharply lower the short-term interbank repo rate. We pointed out previously that policy rates had breached their pre-pandemic levels by November while the economy had barely expanded from the end of 2019. Thus, we expected the PBoC to slow the pace of interest rate normalization in Q4. Recent liquidity injections likely were related to preventing a year-end cash crunch in the financial system, not a change in the PBoC’s planned pace of policy tightening. While the 7-day interbank repo rate is back to its June 2020 level, the 3-month SHIBOR (the de facto policy rate) has only slightly moderated. The divergence between the 7-day and the 3-month interbank rates was also apparent during the monetary tightening cycle in 2017-2018. During that cycle, the jump in the 3-month SHIBOR pushed up government bond yields and bank lending rates, while the 7-day repo rate remained stable. As shown in a previous report, the 3-month SHIBOR more tightly correlates with bond yields and is a better measure of China’s monetary policy stance.  Chart 4The Short-Term Interbank Repo Rate Dropped Sharply Since Mid-November … Chart 5… But The Declines In The 3-Month SHIBOR And Bond Yields Have Been Much Milder Chinese onshore stock prices trended sideways for most of December, even as the PBoC loosened interbank liquidity conditions in mid-November. Chinese offshore stocks have also failed to break out from highs reached in November, as tech giants such as Alibaba and Tencent have come under tough scrutiny from regulators. Chinese stocks will continue to experience a tug-of-war between tailwinds and headwinds in the next three months. The relatively well-contained domestic pandemic and improving economic growth will support investors’ sentiments towards Chinese risk assets. At the same time, stock prices will face headwinds such as elevated valuations, a more restrictive policy environment and wider corporate credit spreads. For now, the downside risks to Chinese stocks prevail.  Chart 6ADomestic Stocks Are No Longer Cheap Chart 6BElevated Valuations In Investable Stocks Tailwinds Supporting Chinese Stocks: Economic Recovery To Continue In 1H21 Chart 7China’s EPS Recovery To Continue In 1H21 China’s business cycle will remain resilient in the first half of 2021 while existing stimulus measures continue to work their way into the real economy. In the next six months, some laggards in the economic recovery, such as the service sector and household consumption, will likely pick up momentum, while the manufacturing and export sectors remain robust.  China’s export sector should maintain strong growth momentum in the first half of the year. A rising RMB exchange rate may eventually impede the price competitiveness of some labor-intensive export goods , but Chinese manufacturers will continue to fill the gap between global demand and supply before the COVID-19 vaccines are widely distributed and the global supply chains are fully recovered. Moreover, China’s global share of exports gradually rose in both 2018 and 2019 despite the Sino-US trade war. Data from Q4 show that Chinese exports have been robust beyond pandemic-related goods. As the global economy and demand growth pick up next year, Chinese exports should also benefit from the trade recovery.   Chart 8The Strength In Chinese Exports Has Expanded Beyond Pandemic-Related Goods … Chart 9… And Will Benefit From Recovering Global Demand In 2021 Chart 10The Acceleration In Completed Housing Will Support Construction In 1H21 An acceleration in completing existing projects should support the construction sector in the first half of 2021, despite a slower expansion rate in new development projects.  Floor space completed has significantly lagged floor space started and sold during the past two years, while real estate developers rushed to acquire new projects, land and down payments to expand their market share. Property developers will need to speed up the completion process of existing projects to bring leverage in line with the “three red lines” imposed since August 2020 (housing presales need to be excluded from the liability-to-asset ratio calculation). Hence, we expect the growth in real estate investment and construction activities to remain stable through the first half.    Chart 11Smaller Cities Face Less Upward Price Pressure on Housing Prices Than Big Cities Chart 12Housing Restrictions Will Be Most Stringent In Top-Tier Cities Chart 13The Laggards In The Economy Are Firming Up The laggards in the economy are firming up. Recent economic data show that growth momentum is shifting from leaders in the economic recovery, especially old-economy sectors such as infrastructure and real estate, to the coincident and lagging sectors such as manufacturing and consumer sectors. While an increase in these sectors is positive for the economy and the growth of corporate profits, it also implies that the economic recovery has entered a late phase and a peak in the business cycle is near. Therefore, the improvements do not necessarily provide enough impetus for stock prices to trend higher, and prices may be at risk from a policy overkill.   Chart 14Household Consumption Still Has Room To Improve Chart 15Sales Of Discretionary Goods Have Surged   Downside Risks To Chinese Equity Prices China’s domestic policy environment has turned less favorable for risk assets.  A new round of policy tightening is well underway as suggested by a slew of events, ranging from the recent SOE bond payment defaults to regulators suspending the Ant Group IPO and cracking down on market monopolies. Investors will likely be risk averse in the near term.   Chart 16Stringent Scrutiny On Tech Companies Hammered Their Stock Performance … Chart 17… Bringing Down Their Sector Performance   Rising corporate bond yields in China’s onshore bond market are not an impediment to increasing Chinese share prices as long as forward EPS net revisions are also climbing. Not only have onshore corporate bond yields recently risen, but forward EPS net revisions have rolled over. Such a combination does not bode well for Chinese equities.  Chart 18Red Flag For Chinese Equities The impact from stricter lending regulations in the real estate sector may start impeding home sales and new real estate investment into the second half of the year. Effective January 1, 2021, China imposed caps on bank loans to real estate developers. Loans will be capped at 40% for the largest state-owned lenders, while banks’ mortgage lending should be no more than 32.5% of their outstanding credit. The regulations are even more rigorous for smaller banks.1 The new rules highlight the authorities’ determination to curb financial risks derived from the housing market and are a step up from the existing deleveraging pressures faced by property developers. Bank loan quotas under the new rules are in line with ones used in 2020.2 However, based on our projections that overall credit growth will decelerate by at least 2 percentage points in 2021 compared with 2020, there will be a corresponding decrease in real estate sector’s borrowing from banks. Bank loans account for roughly 14% of real estate developers’ total funding sources and household mortgages accounted for 16% in 2020. When deleveraging pressures are on and financing resources are capped from both the supply and demand sides, real estate investment growth will likely peak no later than mid-2021.  Chart 19The New Rules May Exacerbate The Downward Trend In Bank Loans To The Real Estate Sector This Year Deflationary pressures may resurface in the second half, which would be a downside risk to China’s corporate profit growth. The producer prices contraction will continue to narrow and even turn mildly positive in the next six months, supported by the uptrend in the business cycle and a low base factor in 1H20. However, both consumer and producer prices may face renewed downward pressures in the second half of 2021 when the business cycle is expected to peak and the effects of stimulus gradually fade. Moreover, the RMB appreciation will add to headwinds faced by producer prices in 2021.  Chart 20While The Ongoing Economic Recovery Will Support Prices In 1H21 … Chart 21… Lower Money Growth And Higher RMB Value May Start To Hurt Prices In 2H21 Chart 22Resurfaced Deflationary Pressure Will Create Downside Risk To China’s Corporate Profit Growth In 2H21 Chart 23The Outperformance In Cyclical Stocks Versus Defensives Has Rolled Over The outperformance in cyclical stocks relative to defensives in the investable stocks recently rolled over. Historically, there is a strong link between forward earnings and stock price performance of cyclical sectors, while defensives have a low equity return beta and are market neutral. A switch in outperformance from cyclicals to defensives usually corresponds with the economy shifting from an expansionary to contractionary phase. Therefore, the recent rollover in the outperformance of cyclical stocks versus defensives may be an early sign that Chinese stock performance has lost its momentum in the current cycle. In relative terms, as breakthroughs in vaccines make the pandemic less threatening to the global economy, cyclical stocks outside of China will start to benefit from improvements in business activities. This will make Chinese risk assets relative to global ones less appealing.  Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary   Footnotes 1For second-tier banks, including state-owned Agricultural Development Bank of China and Exim Bank of China, and 12 joint-stock holding commercial banks, caps on loans to developers and mortgage loans are 27.5% and 20% respectively. Meanwhile, the ratios are capped at 22.5% and 17.5% respectively for smaller city and rural commercial banks, rural cooperative banks and credit cooperatives. The strictest limits apply to small village banks, which can lend only 12.5% of their portfolios to real estate developers and 7.5% to homeowners. 2Currently, outstanding loans to the real estate sector (including household mortgage loans) account for about 29% of total loans from China’s financial institutions, while the ratio of housing mortgage loans is 22%. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The ongoing pandemic underscores the need for fiscal and monetary policymakers to continue to provide a reflationary “bridge” until vaccination ends the threat to the health care system. The pending deal being discussed between US congressional negotiators is not perfect, but it is likely to be a credible extension of the US fiscal bridge and it clarifies the path from the near-term growth outlook (which is negative), to the cyclical outlook (which is positive). The surprisingly strong euro area flash services PMI in December likely reflects the quick removal of restrictions that may soon need to be reimposed. European leaders will either need to provide additional fiscal support to their economies if the strain on the health care system does not soon relent, or economic activity will have to become increasingly dependent on external demand. China’s credit impulse has likely peaked, but economic activity will continue to accelerate in the first half of 2021 and will positively contribute to global growth. Our baseline view is that credit tightening in China will not lead to a meaningful drag on global growth in the second half of next year, but the history of policy “oversteering” in China means that the risks of a policy overkill cannot be ruled out. A likely extension of the reflationary bridge in the US coupled with strengthening Chinese demand has meaningfully reduced the odds of a deflationary outcome over the next year. Extreme technical conditions suggest that a moderate correction in stocks is possible in the first quarter, but the next significant episode of risk-off sentiment should be bought rather than sold. Investors should position in favor of risky assets over a 6-12 month horizon. Feature Our recently published 2021 Outlook report laid out the main macroeconomic themes that we see driving markets next year, as well as our cyclical investment recommendations. In this month’s report we briefly discuss the nearer-term outlook for growth through the lens of fiscal policy. Still Some Way To Go Chart I-1Slowing Economic Activity In Developed Economies Over the very near term, growth will remain unavoidably linked to the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic. The second/third wave of infections that began in September has forced the re-imposition of restrictions in most European countries, as well as in some US states. High-frequency economic indicators clearly show that the European economy contracted in Q4 (Chart I-1), whereas in the US the slowdown has so far been less pronounced. The US economy continued to expand in the fourth quarter with the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model projecting 11% annualized growth, driven heavily by a sizeable change in private inventories (Chart I-2).   Chart I-2US Q4 Growth Is Set To Be Large, But Driven Mostly By Inventories The relationship between the pandemic and the economy has shifted since the spring. Back then, the rapid spread of the disease and the mostly unknown nature of the virus triggered a forceful response from policymakers. Widespread restrictions on movement and economic activity were imposed to stem the spread. However, those measures came at a high economic and social cost. With economic activity still running far below pre-pandemic levels and an increasingly weary and resistant public, policymakers have become highly reluctant to re-impose aggressive measures. As a driver of policy, the key consideration is the extent of pressure on medical systems. Chart I-3 highlights the situation in Europe. Daily ICU occupancy exploded in several European countries in October, which led to the new restrictions at the end of that month. In the US, COVID-19 hospitalizations are now nearly twice as high as they were in April and July, and for now many new state-level restrictions are not mandatory. But New York City’s mayor noted earlier this week that a “full shutdown” was likely following Christmas, highlighting that many parts of the US may be facing meaningfully tighter restrictions in the weeks ahead if the pace of new infections does not level off. Chart I-4 presents an estimate of the COVID-19 reproduction value (“R-naught”) in the US and in advanced economies outside the US, which highlights that it is too soon to confidently project a peak. Even outside the US, where restrictions have recently been tighter and progress has been made at reducing the number of intensive care patients, the reproduction number has crept back above one after some restrictions were loosened. Chart I-3Europe Reintroduced Lockdowns Because Of Pressure On The Medical System Chart I-4Too Soon To Project A Peak In Cases   A Credible Extension Of The US Reflationary Bridge The ongoing pandemic underscores the need for fiscal and monetary policymakers to continue to provide a reflationary “bridge” until vaccination ends the threat to the health care system. Currently, health experts project that this is unlikely to occur before late spring or mid-year. Earlier this year, fiscal authorities around the world built a massive reflationary bridge to support household income while stay-at-home orders were in place. However, the effect of that stimulus has waned – at least for some income groups. In the US, Chart I-5 highlights that unemployment insurance payments have fallen by more than suggested by the decline in continuing jobless claims. Post-election surveys have suggested that a vast majority of Americans felt another economic assistance package was needed, with most reporting that it should occur before inauguration.1 Overall income remains higher than its pre-pandemic baseline (Chart I-6), but aggregate figures mask white collar/blue collar divergences. Many white-collar employees saw a substantial increase in their savings this year as their spending declined and income held up (due to their ability to work from home), whereas blue-collar and low-wage service workers found themselves dependent on government assistance. While the deployment of white-collar savings is likely to eventually support blue-collar and low-wage worker income, it is unlikely that this will occur while significant pandemic restrictions remain in place. Chart I-5The Stimulative Effect Of The CARES Act Has Waned Chart I-6Overall Income Is ''Normal'', But This Masks Large Differences Across The Income Spectrum   That reality motivated the COVID relief deal that is reportedly under discussion between US congressional negotiators. The deal – as described in the financial media as we go to press – likely excludes state & local support, but it also likely includes a new round of stimulus checks, some funding for unemployment insurance recipients, and cash for small businesses, health-care providers, and schools. The deal, which we expect to be passed over the course of the next week, is not perfect but it is a credible extension of the US fiscal bridge and it clarifies the path from the near-term growth outlook (which is negative), to the cyclical outlook (which is positive). Chart I-7State & Local Government Support Is Needed In The New Year The issue of state & local funding will be important to return to in the new year following Joe Biden’s inauguration. Persistent state & local government austerity following the global financial crisis acted as a significant drag on US economic growth (Chart I-7). Nonetheless, one-month delay to state & local government fiscal assistance is less problematic than a delay in extending unemployment insurance payments, given the pending expiry of the remaining CARES act unemployment programs on Dec. 26. Europe’s Bridge Is Shakier In Europe, the need for additional fiscal support is higher than in the US, given that activity contracted this quarter. While the December flash euro area services PMI showed surprising strength, this likely reflects the quick removal of restrictions that we noted may soon need to be reimposed. European economies responded very forcefully this year to the pandemic when all response measures are considered, but less so in many important economies when focusing only above-the-line measures – i.e., new spending and foregone government revenue – to the exclusion of equity injections, loans, and guarantees. Based on this metric, Chart I-8 shows that the UK and Germany have provided a response that is in line with the advanced economy average, whereas most other European countries have lagged. Chart I-9 highlights that this year’s economic rebound in Spain and Italy has been aided by Germany’s stronger fiscal response, as evidenced by intra-euro area trade balances. Chart I-8The Fiscal Response Of Many European Countries Has Lagged Chart I-9Germany's Fiscal Stimulus Supported The Euro Area's Recovery Funds from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility (“RRF”) have yet to be deployed and they will eventually act to support euro area economic activity. However, outlays from the fund next year are expected to be small. Given that this month’s ECB actions were aimed at simply maintaining easy financial conditions,2 European leaders will either need to provide additional fiscal support to their economies if the strain on the health care system does not soon relent, or economic activity will have to become increasingly dependent on external demand. China: Adding To Global Growth, For Now Chart I-10China Will Boost Euro Area Economic Activity Next Year Fortunately for Europe (and advanced economies more generally), the external demand outlook is bright – for now. Euro area exports to China are strongly predicted by China’s credit impulse lagged by 9 months, and are set to rise materially (Chart I-10). China’s aggressive – and comparatively early – response to the pandemic will thus contribute meaningfully to global growth in the first half of 2021, and could obviate the need for further European fiscal stimulus if restrictions there are not reinstituted. China is likely to provide a significantly smaller boost to global growth in the second half of next year, as policymakers have already begun to mop up excess liquidity. Chart I-11 highlights that China’s credit impulse has consistently followed a 3½-year cycle since 2010, and this year has been no different. This cycle is not exogenous or mystical; it has been caused by the repeated “oversteering” of activity by Chinese policymakers who frequently oscillate between the need to fight deflation and the strong desire to curb additional private-sector leveraging. The chart suggests that an inflection point in this cycle’s upswing has been reached, which is consistent with the view of BCA’s China strategists that the credit cycle has peaked. A peak in China’s credit impulse does not mean that China’s contribution to global growth is about to slow. Global industrial production continued to accelerate following a peak in China’s credit impulse for at least six months in the lead-up to the last two global economic slowdowns (Chart I-12). But the chart also shows that a slowdown in global activity did occur following China’s impulse peak in both cases, especially when the impulse fell below its average of 28½% of GDP. Chart I-11China's Credit Cycle Has Peaked, Right On Schedule Chart I-12DM Economies Continue To Grow Following A Peak In China's Credit Cycle   Our baseline view is that credit tightening in China will bring the impulse down to approximately 30% of GDP in 2021, which is still above its average of the past decade. This suggests that China will not contribute as much to global demand in the second half of the year, but will not be an actual drag. Still, the history of policy “oversteering” in China means that the risk of a policy overkill cannot be ruled out. Investors should closely watch for signs of increased hawkishness emanating from China’s National People’s Congress in March. Conclusions And Portfolio Recommendations Cyclically, as we highlighted in our 2021 Outlook, developed market (DM) economies are likely to experience above-trend growth, low inflation, and accommodative monetary policy next year. China’s economic cycle is running ahead of the DM world and Chinese growth will eventually moderate, but is still set to accelerate in the first half of the year. A likely extension of the reflationary bridge in the US coupled with strengthening Chinese demand meaningfully reduces the odds of a deflationary outcome over the next year, in the sense that consumers, businesses, and investors are much more likely to view any near-term lockdown-driven impacts on growth as necessarily temporary. This de-risks the path to a post-pandemic economy and increases our conviction in a cyclically-bullish stance towards risk assets. We continue to recommend that in 2021 global investors should: Favor stocks versus bonds; Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration; Position for corporate bond spread tightening; Favor commodities; and Expect a continued decline in the US dollar. Chart I-13US Equities Are Vulnerable To A Moderate Correction Over the very near-term, Chart I-13 shows that US equities are potentially vulnerable to a moderate tactical correction. US stocks are very richly valued, and investors may use signs of modest delays in the immunization campaign, a failure of the US Congress to provide support for state & local governments, or inadequate fiscal support in Europe as an excuse to sell. A moderate correction, on the order of 5-7%, is possible in the first quarter. The question for investors is whether the next significant episode of risk-off sentiment should be bought or sold. Given the ongoing impact of very easy monetary policy on equity multiples and the high likelihood of a significant earnings recovery, we are strongly inclined towards the former, barring any substantial shift in the timeline to mass vaccination. Equity returns will be lower in 2021 than in 2020, but are very likely to be positive and beat those offered by government securities. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 18, 2020 Next Report: January 28, 2021   II. The Modern-Day Phillips Curve, Future Inflation, And What To Do About It Many investors feel that the Phillips Curve has failed to predict weak inflation over the past decade. But this perception is due to a singular focus on the economic slack component of the modern-day version of the curve to the exclusion of inflation expectations, and a failure to fully consider the lasting impact of sustained periods of a negative output gap on those expectations. In addition, many investors tend to downplay the long-term balance sheet impact of two episodes of excesses and savings/capital misallocations on the relationship between the stance of monetary policy and the output gap, via a persistently negative shock to aggregate demand and a reduced sensitivity of economic activity to interest rates. The COVID-19 pandemic was certainly a major economic shock. But for now, it seems like this was a sharp income statement recession, not a balance-sheet recession. This fact, along with lower odds of negative supply-side shocks and several structural factors, suggest that inflation will be higher over the next ten years than it has over the past decade. Investors looking to protect against potentially higher inflation should look primarily to commodities, cyclical stocks, and US farmland. Gold is likely to remain well supported over the coming few years, but rich valuation suggests the long-term outlook for the yellow metal is poor. A hybrid TIPS/currency portfolio has historically been strongly correlated with the price of gold, and may provide investors with long-term protection against inflation – at a better price. Introduction Chart II-1A Surge In Long-Dated Inflation Expectations The pandemic, and the corresponding fiscal and monetary response is challenging the low-inflation outlook of many market participants. Chart II-1 highlights that long-dated market-based inflation expectations have surged past their pre-COVID levels after collapsing to the lowest-ever level in March. The shift in thinking about inflation has partly been a response to an extraordinary rise in government spending in many countries. But Chart II-1 shows that long-dated expectations in the US were mostly trendless from April to June as Federal support was distributed, and instead rose sharply in July and August in the lead-up to the Fed’s official shift to an average inflation targeting regime. This new dawn for US monetary policy has been prompted not just by the pandemic, but also by the extended period of below-target inflation over the past decade. In this report, we review how the past ten-year episode of low inflation can be successfully explained through the lens of the expectations-augmented (i.e. “modern-day”) Phillips Curve. Many investors fail to fully appreciate the impact that inflation expectations have on driving actual inflation, as well as the cumulative impact of two major capital and savings misallocations over the past 25 years on the responsiveness of demand to interest rates and on the level of inflation expectations. Using the modern-day Phillips Curve as a guide, we present several reasons in favor of the view that inflation will be higher over the next decade than over the past ten years. Finally, we conclude with an assessment of several ways for investors to protect their portfolios from rising inflation. Revisiting The “Modern-Day” Phillips Curve The original Phillips Curve, as formulated by New Zealand economist William Phillips in the late 1950s, described a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the pace of wage growth. Given the close correlation between wage and overall price growth at the time, the Phillips Curve was soon extended and generalized to describe an inverse relationship between labor market slack and overall price inflation. Chart II-2Rising Unemployment And Inflation Challenged The Original Phillips Curve However, the experience of rising inflation alongside high unemployment from the late 1960s to the late 1970s underscored that prices are also importantly determined by inflation expectations and shocks to the supply-side of the economy (Chart II-2). In the 1980s and 1990s, the Federal Reserve’s success at reigning in inflation was achieved not only by raising interest rates to punishingly high levels, but also by sharply altering consumer, business, and investor expectations about future prices. The experience of the late 1960s and 1970s led to a revised form of the Phillips Curve, dubbed the “expectations-augmented” or “modern” version. As an equation, the modern Phillips Curve is described today by Fed officials, in terms of core inflation, as follows: πct = β1πet + β2πct-1 + β3πct-2 - β4SLACKt + β5IMPt + εt where: πct = Core inflation today πet = Expectations of inflation πct-n = Lagged core inflation SLACKt = Slack in the economy IMPt = Imported goods prices εt = Other shocks to prices Described verbally, this framework suggests that “economic slack, changes in imported goods prices, and idiosyncratic shocks all cause core inflation to deviate from its longer-term trend that is ultimately determined by long-run inflation expectations.3” This framework can easily be extended to headline inflation by adding changes in food and energy prices. In most formal models of the economy in use today, the modern Phillips Curve is combined with the New Keynesian demand function to describe business cycles: Yt = Y*t – β(r-r*) + εt where: Yt = Real GDP Y*t = Real potential GDP r = The real interest rate r* = The neutral rate of interest εt = Other shocks to output This equation posits that differences in the real interest rate from its neutral level, along with idiosyncratic shocks to demand, cause real GDP to deviate from potential output. Abstracting from import prices and idiosyncratic shocks, these two equations tell a simple and intuitive story of how the economy generally works: The stance of monetary policy determines the output gap and, The output gap, along with inflation expectations, determine inflation. The Modern-Day Phillips Curve: The Pre-2000 Experience This above view of inflation and demand was strongly accepted by investors before the 2008 global financial crisis, but the decade-long period of generally below-target inflation has caused a crisis of faith in the idea of the Phillips Curve. Charts II-3 and II-4 show the historical record of the New Keynesian demand function and the modern-day Phillips Curve, using five-year averages of the data in question to smooth out the impact of short-term and idiosyncratic effects. We use nominal GDP growth as our long-run proxy for the neutral rate of interest,4 the US Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) estimate of potential GDP to determine the output gap, and a proprietary measure of inflation expectations based on an adaptive expectations framework5 (Chart II-5). Chart II-3With Just Two Exceptions, Monetary Policy Strongly Explained Demand Before 2000 Chart II-4Similarly, Pre-2000 The Output Gap Generally Explained Unexpected Inflation Chart II-3 shows that until 1999, the stance of monetary policy was highly predictive of the output gap over a five-year period, with just two exceptions where major structural forces were at play: the late 1970s, and the second half of the 1990s. In the case of the former, the disruptive effect of persistently high inflation negatively impacted output growth despite easy monetary policy, and in the latter case, economic activity was modestly stronger than what interest rates would have implied due to the beneficial impact of the technologically-driven productivity boom of that decade. Similarly, Chart II-4 shows that until 1999 there was a good relationship between the output gap and the deviation in inflation from expectations, again with the late 1970s and late 1990s as exceptions. Along with the beneficial supply-side effects of the disinflationary tech boom, persistent import price weakness (via dollar strength) seems to have also played a role in suppressing inflation in the late 1990s (Chart II-6). Chart II-5The Expectations Component Of The Modern Phillips Curve, Visualized Chart II-6A Strong Dollar Also Played A Role In Suppressing Inflation During The 1990s   The Modern-Day Phillips Curve Post-2000 Following 2000, deviations between the monetary policy stance, the output gap, and inflation become more prominent, particularly after 2008. As we will illustrate below, these deviations are more apparent on the demand side. In the case of inflation, the question should be why inflation was not even lower in the years immediately following the global financial crisis. On both the demand and inflation side, these deviations are explainable, and in a way that helps us determine future inflation. Charts II-7 and II-8 show the same series as in Charts II-3 and II-4, but focused on the post-2000 period. From 2000-2007, Chart II-8 shows that the relationship between the output gap and the deviation in inflation from expectations was not particularly anomalous. The output gap was negative from the end of the 2001 recession until the beginning of 2006, and inflation was correspondingly below expectations on average for the cycle. Chart II-7Post-2000, The Output Gap Decoupled From The Monetary Policy Stance Chart II-8Since The GFC, The Real Mystery Is Why Inflation Has Been So Strong   Chart II-7 shows that the anomaly during that cycle was in the relationship between the output gap and the stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy was the easiest it had been in two decades, yet the output gap was negative for several years following the recession. Larry Summers pointedly cited this divergence in his revival of the secular stagnation theory in November 2013, arguing that it was strong evidence that excess savings were depressing aggregate demand via a lower neutral rate of interest and that this effect pre-dated the financial crisis. Why was demand so weak during that period? Chart II-9 compares the annualized per capita growth in the expenditure components of GDP during the 2001-2007 expansion to the 1991-2001 period. The chart shows that all components of GDP were lower than during the 1991-2001 period, with investment – the most interest rate sensitive component of GDP – showing up as particularly weak. On the surface, this supports the idea of structural factors weighing heavily on the neutral rate, rendering monetary policy less easy than investors would otherwise expect. But Chart II-9 treats the 2001-2007 years as one period, ignoring what happened over the course of the expansion. Chart II-10 repeats the exercise shown in Chart II-9 from Q1 2001 to Q3 2005, and highlights that the annualized growth in per capita residential investment was much stronger than it was during the 1991-2001 period – and nonresidential fixed investment was much weaker. Spending on goods was roughly the same, which is impressive considering that the late 1990s experienced a productivity boom and robust wage growth. All the negative contribution to growth from residential investment during the 2001-2007 expansion came after Q3 2005, as the housing market bubble burst in response to rising interest rates. In short, Chart II-10 highlights that there was a strong relationship between easy monetary policy and the demand for housing, but that this was not true for the corporate sector. Chart II-9Looking At The Whole 2001-2007 Period, Investment Was Extremely Weak Chart II-10Housing Absolutely Responded To Easy Monetary Policy   Explaining Weak CAPEX Growth In The Early 2000s This leads us to ask why CAPEX was so weak during the 2001-2007 period. In addition to changes in interest rates, business investment is strongly influenced by expectations of consumer demand and corporate profitability. Chart II-11 shows that real nonresidential fixed investment and as-reported earnings moved in lockstep during the period, and that this delayed corporate-sector recovery also impacted the pace of hiring. Weak expectations for consumer spending do not appear to be the culprit. Chart II-12 highlights that while real personal consumption expenditure growth fell during the recession, spending did not contract (as it had done during the previous recession) and capital expenditures fell much more than what real PCE would have implied. Chart II-11Post-2001, Persistently Weak Profits Led To Weak Investment And Jobs Growth Chart II-12CAPEX Was Much Weaker In 2002 Than Justified By Consumer Spending   Instead, persistently weak CAPEX in the early 2000s appears to be best explained by the damaging impact of corporate excesses that built up during the dot-com bubble. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in response to a series of corporate accounting frauds that came to light in the wake of the bubble, but in many cases had been occurring for several years. Chart II-13 highlights that widespread write-offs badly impacted earnings quality and the growth in the asset value of equipment and intellectual property products (IPP), both of which only began to improve again in early 2003. This occurred alongside an outright contraction in real investment in IPP as investors lost faith in company financial statements and heavily scrutinized corporate spending. Chart II-14highlights that a contraction in IP spending was a huge change from the double-digit pace of growth that occurred in the late 1990s. Chart II-13The Damaging Impact Of Corporate Excesses Chart II-14A Near-Unprecedented Collapse In IPP Investment Followed The Tech Bubble   In addition, corporate sector indebtedness also appears to have played a role in driving weak investment in the early 2000s. While the interest burden of nonfinancial corporate debt was not as high in 2000 as it was in the early 1990s, Chart II-15 highlights that debt to operating income surged in the late 1990s – which likely caused investors already skeptical about company financial statements to impose a period of elevated capital discipline on corporate managers following the recession. Chart II-16 shows that while the peak in the 12-month trailing corporate bond default rate in January 2002 was similar to that of the early 90s, it was meaningfully higher on average in the lead-up to and following the recession. Chart II-15The Late-1990s Saw A Major Increase In Corporate Debt Chart II-16Above-Average Corporate Defaults Before And After The 2001 Recession   To summarize, Charts II-10-16 underscore that management excesses, governance failures, and elevated debt in the corporate sector in the 1990s were the root cause of the seeming divergence between monetary policy and the output gap from 2001 to 2007. This was, unfortunately, the first of two major savings/capital misallocations that have occurred in the US over the past 25 years. Explaining The Post-GFC Experience In the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve was faced with a decision between two monetary policy paths: one that was appropriate for the corporate sector, and one that was appropriate for the household sector. The Fed chose the former, and it inadvertently contributed to the second major savings/capital misallocation to occur over the past 25 years: the enormous debt-driven bubble in US housing that culminated into the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. Chart II-17It Is No Mystery Why Demand And Inflation Were Weak Last Cycle As a result, 2007 to 2013/2014 was a mirror image of the early 2000s. Unlike previous post-war downturns, the GFC precipitated a balance-sheet recession that deeply affected homeowners and the financial system. This lasting damage led to a multi-year household deleveraging process, which substantially lowered the responsiveness of the economy to stimulative monetary policy. On a year-over-year basis, Chart II-17 shows that total nominal household mortgage credit growth was continuously negative for six and a half years, from Q4 2008 until Q2 2015, underscoring that the large divergence during this period between the stance of monetary policy and the output gap should not, in any way, be surprising to investors. And this is even before accounting for the negative impact of the euro area sovereign debt crisis and double-dip recession, or the persistent fiscal drag in nearly every advanced economy last cycle. What is surprising about the post-GFC experience is that inflation was not substantially weaker than it was, which is ironic considering that the secular stagnation narrative was revived to help explain below-target inflation. Chart II-8 showed that actual inflation steadily improved versus expected inflation alongside the closing of the output gap and the decline in the unemployment rate, but that it was much stronger than the output gap would have implied – particularly during the early phase of the economic recovery. It is still an open question as to why this occurred. A weak dollar and a strong recovery in oil prices likely helped support consumer prices, but we doubt that these two factors alone explain the discrepancy. A more credible answer is that expectations stayed very well anchored due to the Fed’s strong record of maintaining low and stable inflation (thus preventing a disinflationary spiral). In addition, the fact that the Fed actively communicated to the public during the early recovery years that a large part of its objective was to prevent deflation may have helped support prices. For example, in a CBS interview following the Fed’s November 2010 decision to engage in a second round of quantitative easing (“QE2”), then-Chair Bernanke prominently tied the decision to the fact that “inflation is very, very low.” When asked whether additional rounds of easing might be required, Bernanke responded that it was “certainly possible” and again cited inflation as a core consideration. Chart II-18Rising US Oil Production Caused The Massive 2014 Oil Price Shock While inflation did not ultimately fall relative to expectations post-GFC as much as the output gap would have implied, the long-lasting weakness in demand left expectations vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In 2014, such a shock occurred: oil prices collapsed almost exactly at the point that US tight oil production crossed the four-million-barrels-per-day mark (Chart II-18), a level of output that many experts had previously believed would not be attainable (or would roughly mark the peak in production). We view this event as a truly exogenous shock to prices, given that research & development of shale technology had been ongoing since the late 1970s and only happened to finally gain traction around 2010. Chart II-19 shows that the 2014 oil price collapse caused a clear break lower in our measure of inflation expectations, to the lowest value recorded since the 1940s. This break also occurred in market-based expectations of inflation, such as long-dated CPI swap rates and TIPS breakeven inflation rates, and surveys of consumer inflation expectations (Chart II-20). This decline in inflation expectations meant that the output gap needed to be above zero in order for the Fed to hit its 2% target (absent any upwards shock to prices), and that the meaningful acceleration of inflation from 2016 to 2018 should actually be viewed as inflation “outperformance” because its long-term trend had been lowered by the earlier downward shift in expectations. Chart II-19The 2014 Oil Price Shock Collapsed Inflation Expectations... Chart II-20...No Matter What Inflation Expectations Measure Is Used   The Modern-Day Phillips Curve: Key Takeaways Based on the evidence presented above, we see the perceived “failure” of the Phillips Curve to predict weak inflation over the past decade as being due to: A singular focus on the output gap/slack component of the modern Phillips Curve, to the exclusion of expectations A failure to fully consider the lasting impact of sustained periods of a negative output gap on expectations Downplaying the long-term balance-sheet impact of two episodes of excesses and savings/capital misallocations on the relationship between the stance of monetary policy and the output gap, via a persistently negative shock to aggregate demand and a reduced sensitivity of economic activity to interest rates. One crucial takeaway from the modern-day Phillips Curve equation presented above is that if inflation expectations are largely formed based on the experience of past inflation, then inflation is ultimately determined by three dimensions of the output gap: whether it is rising or falling, whether it is above or below zero, and how long it has been above or below zero. The extended period of below-potential output over the past two decades, accelerated recently by a major negative shock to energy prices, has now lowered inflation expectations to a point that merely reaching the Fed’s target constitutes inflation “outperformance.” This realization, made even more urgent by the COVID-19 pandemic, has strongly motivated the Fed’s official shift to an average inflation targeting regime. That shift does not suggest that the Fed is moving away from the modern-day Phillips Curve framework; rather, the Fed’s new policy is aimed at closing the output gap as quickly as possible in order to prevent a renewed decline in inflation expectations (and thus inflation itself) from another long period of activity running below its potential. The Outlook For Inflation While the Fed has shifted its policy to prefer higher inflation, that does not necessarily mean it will get it. Why is it likely to happen this time, if the last economic cycle featured such a large divergence between monetary policy and the output gap? Chart II-21Above-Target Inflation Is Not Imminent First, to clarify, we do not believe that above-target inflation is imminent. The COVID-19 pandemic was an extreme event, and even given the very substantial recovery in the labor market, the unemployment rate remains almost 2½ percentage points above the Congressional Budget long-run estimate of NAIRU (Chart II-21). But based on our analysis of the modern-day Phillips Curve presented above, there are at least four main reasons to expect that inflation may be higher on average over the next ten years than over the past decade. Reason #1: This Appears To Be A Sharp Income Statement Recession, Not A Balance-Sheet Recession We highlighted above the importance of savings/capital misallocations in driving a gap between monetary policy and the output gap over the past two decades, but this recession was obviously not sparked by such an event. The onset of the pandemic came following a long period of US household sector deleveraging which, while painful, helped restore consumer balance sheets. Chart II-22 highlights that household debt to disposable income had fallen back to 2001 levels at the onset of the pandemic, and the interest burden of debt servicing had fallen to a 40-year low. From a wealth perspective, Chart II-23 highlights that total household liabilities to net worth have fallen below where they were at the peak of the housing market boom in 2005 for almost all income groups, and that a decline in leverage has been particularly noteworthy for the lowest income group since mid-2016. Chart II-22Households Have Repaired Their Balance Sheets... Chart II-23...Across Almost All Income Brackets   Total credit to the nonfinancial corporate sector rose significantly relative to GDP over the course of the last cycle, but subpar growth in real nonresidential fixed investment and a rise in share buybacks highlight that this debt went largely to fund changes in capital structure rather than increased productive capacity. Chart II-24 highlights that corporate sector interest payments as a percentage of operating income are low relative to history, and they do not seem to be necessarily dependent on extremely low government bond yields.6 Finally, the corporate bond default rate may have already peaked (Chart II-25) and the percentage of jobs permanently lost looks more like 2001 than 2007 (Chart II-26), signaling that a prolonged balance-sheet recession is unlikely. Chart II-24Corporate Sector Debt Is Currently High, But Affordable Chart II-25Corporate Defaults Have Already Peaked Chart II-26So Far, Permanent Job Losses Look Like The 2001 Recession, Not 2007/2008 The bottom line is that while the pandemic has not yet been resolved and that major and permanent economic damage cannot be ruled out, the absence of “balance-sheet dynamics” is likely to eventually lead to a stronger responsiveness of demand for goods and services to what is set to be an extraordinarily easy monetary policy stance for at least another two years. Reason #2: The Fed May Be Able To Jawbone Inflation Higher The Fed’s public commitment to set interest rates in a way that will generate moderately above-target inflation is highly reminiscent of its defense of quantitative easing in the early phase of the last economic expansion, and (in the opposite fashion) of Paul Volker’s campaign in the 1980s against the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of inflation. From 2008-2014, the Fed explicitly linked the odds of future bond buying to the pace of actual inflation in its public statements. On its own, this was not enough to cause inflation to rise, but we highlighted above that it may have contributed to the fact that inflation expectations did not collapse. Chart II-1 on page 12 showed that long-dated market-based expectations for inflation have already been impacted by the Fed’s regime shift, suggesting decent odds that Fed policy will contribute to self-fulfilling price increases if the US economy does indeed avoid “balance-sheet dynamics” as a result of the pandemic. Reason #3: The Odds Of Negative Supply Shocks Are Lower Than In The Past We noted above the impact that energy price shocks and large typically exchange-rate driven changes in import prices can have on inflation, with the 2014 oil price collapse serving as the most vivid recent example. On both fronts, a value perspective suggests that the odds of negative shocks to inflation over the coming few years from oil and the dollar are lower than they have been in the past. Chart II-27 shows that the cost of global energy consumption as a share of GDP has fallen below its median since 1970, and Chart II-28 highlights that the US dollar is comparatively expensive relative to other currencies – which raises the bar for further gains. Stable-to-higher oil prices alongside a flat-to-weak dollar implies reflationary rather than disinflationary pressure. Chart II-27Massive, Downward Shocks To Oil Prices Are Now Less Likely Chart II-28Valuation Favors A Declining Dollar, Which Is Inflationary   Reason #4: Structural Factors In addition to the cyclical arguments noted above, my colleague Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, has also highlighted several structural arguments in favor of higher inflation. Chart II-29 highlights that the world support ratio, calculated as the number of workers relative to the number of consumers, peaked early last decade after rising for nearly 40 years. This suggests that output will fall relative to spending the coming several years, which should have the effect of boosting prices. Chart II-30 also highlights that globalization is on the back foot, with the ratio of trade-to-output having moved sideways for more than a decade. Since the early 1990s, rising global trade intensity has corresponded with very low goods prices in many countries, and the end of this trend reduces the impact of a factor that has been weighing on consumer prices globally over the past two decades. Chart II-29Less Production Relative To Consumption Is Inflationary Chart II-30Trade Is Not Suppressing Prices As Much As It Used To   Positioning For Eventually Higher Inflation Below we present an assessment of several potential candidates across the major asset classes that investors can use to protect their portfolios from rising inflation once it emerges. We conclude with a new trade idea that may provide investors with inflation protection at a better valuation profile than more traditional inflation hedges. Fixed-Income Within fixed-income, inflation-linked bonds and derivatives (such as CPI swaps) are the obvious choice for investors seeking inflation protection. Inflation-linked bonds are much better played relative to nominal equivalents, as inflation expectations make up the difference between nominal and inflation-linked yields. But Table II-1 shows that 5-10 year TIPS are also likely to provide positive absolute returns over the coming year even in a scenario where 10-year Treasury yields are rising, so long as real yields do not account for the vast majority of the increase. Barring a major and positive change in the long-term economic outlook over the coming year, our sense is that the Fed would act to cap any outsized increase in real yields and that TIPS remain an attractive long-only option until the Fed becomes sufficiently comfortable with the inflation outlook. Table II-1TIPS Will Earn Positive Absolute Returns Next Year Barring A Surge In Real Yields Commodities Commodities are arguably the most traditional inflation hedge, and are likely to provide investors with superior risk-adjusted returns in an environment where inflation expectations are rising. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service is positive on gold, and recently argued that Brent crude prices are likely to average between $65-$70/barrel between 2021-2025.7 Chart II-31Gold Is Expensive And Long-Term Returns May Be Poor One caveat about gold is that, unlike oil prices, it appears to be quite expensive relative to its history. Since gold does not provide investors with a cash flow, over time real (or inflation-adjusted) prices should ultimately be mean-reverting unless real production costs steadily trend higher. Chart II-31 highlights that the real price of gold is already sky-high and well above its historical average. Over a ten-year time horizon, gold prices fell meaningfully following the last two occasions where real gold prices reached current levels, suggesting that the long-term outlook for gold returns is poor. However, over the coming few years, gold prices are likely to remain well supported given our economic outlook, the Fed’s new monetary policy regime, and the consistently negative correlation between real yields and the US dollar and gold prices. As such, we would recommend gold as a hedge against the fear of inflation, which is likely to increase over the cyclical horizon. Equities We provide two perspectives on how equity investors may be able to protect themselves against rising inflation. The first is simply to favor cyclical versus defensive sectors. The former is likely to continue to benefit next year in response to a strengthening economy as COVID-19 vaccines are progressively distributed, and historically cyclical sectors have tended to outperform during periods of rising inflation. In addition, my colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, BCA’s Equity Strategist, presented Table II-2 in a June Special Report,8 and it highlights that cyclical sectors (plus health care) have enjoyed positive relative returns on average during periods of rising inflation. Table II-2S&P 500 Sector Performance During Inflationary Periods The second strategy is to favor companies that are more likely to successfully pass on increasing prices to their customers (i.e., firms with “pricing power”). Pricing power is a difficult attribute to identify, but one possible approach is to select industries that have experienced above-average sales per share growth over the past decade. While it is true that the past ten years have seen low rather than high inflation, it has also seen firms in general struggle to achieve robust top-line growth. Industries that have succeeded in this environment may thus be able to pass on higher costs to their customers without disproportionately suffering from lower sales. Chart II-32Last Decade's Revenue Winners: Potential Pricing Power Candidates Chart II-32 presents the historical relative performance of these industries in the US plus the materials and energy sector, equally-weighted and compared to an equally-weighted industry group portfolio (level 2 GICS). The chart shows that the portfolio has outperformed steadily over the past decade, although admittedly at a slower pace since 2018. An interesting feature of this approach is that, in addition to including industries within the industrials, consumer discretionary, and health care sectors (along with the food & staples retailing component of the consumer staples sector), tech stocks show up prominently due to their outstanding revenue performance over the past decade. Table II-2 above highlighted that tech stocks have historically performed poorly during periods of rising inflation, although it is unclear whether this is due to increasing prices or expectations of rising interest rates. Tech stocks are typically long-duration assets, meaning that they are very sensitive to the discount rate, but the Fed’s new monetary policy regime all but guarantees that investors will see a gap between inflation and rates for a time. It is thus an open question how tech stocks would perform in the future in response to rising inflation, and we plan to revisit this topic in a future report. Chart II-33Owners Of Existing Infrastructure Assets Are Primarily Utilities And Telecom Companies As a final point within the stock market, we would caution against equity portfolios favoring companies that are owners or operators of infrastructure assets. While increased infrastructure spending may indeed occur in the US over the coming several years, indexes focused on companies with sizeable existing infrastructure assets tend to be highly concentrated in the utilities and telecommunications sectors. Chart II-33 shows that the relative performance of the MSCI ACWI Infrastructure Index is nearly identical to that of a 50/50 utilities/telecom services portfolio, two sectors that are defensive rather than pro-cyclical and that have historically performed poorly during periods of rising inflation. Direct Real Estate Alongside commodities, direct real estate investment is also typically viewed as a traditional inflation hedge. For now, however, the outlook for important segments of the commercial real estate market is sufficiently cloudy that it is difficult to form a high conviction view in favor of the asset class. CMBS delinquency rates on office properties have remained low during the pandemic, but those of retail and accommodation have soared and the long-term outlook for all three may have permanently shifted due to the impact of the pandemic. By contrast, industrial and medical properties are likely to do well, with the former likely to be increasingly negatively correlated with the performance of retail properties in the coming few years (i.e., “warehouses versus malls”). I noted my colleague Peter Berezin’s structural arguments for inflation above, and Peter has also highlighted farmland as a real asset that is likely to do well in an environment of rising inflation.9 Chart II-34 further supports the argument: the chart shows that despite a significant increase in real farm real estate values over the past 20 years, returns to operators as a % of farmland values are not unattractive. In addition, USDA forecasts for 2020 suggest that operator returns will be the highest in a decade relative to current 10-year Treasury yields, underscoring both the capital appreciation and relative yield potential of US farmland. A Hybrid TIPS/Currency Inflation-Hedged Portfolio Finally, as we highlighted in Section 1, in a world of extremely low government bond yields, global ex-US investors have the advantage of being able to hedge against deflationary risks in a long-only portfolio by employing the US dollar as a diversifying asset. The dollar is consistently negatively correlated with global stock prices, and this relationship tends to strengthen during crisis periods. The flip side is that US-based investors have the advantage of being able to hedge against inflationary risks in a long-only portfolio by buying global currencies. Chart II-35 presents a 50/50 portfolio of US TIPS and an equally-weighted basket of six major DM currencies against the US dollar. The chart highlights that the portfolio is strongly positively correlated with gold prices, but with a better valuation profile. We already showed in Chart II-28 on page 28 that global currencies are undervalued versus the US dollar. TIPS valuation is not as attractive given that real yields are at record low levels, but the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently sits at its 40th percentile historically (and thus has room to move higher). Chart II-34Farmland: Protection Again Inflation, At A Decent Yield Chart II-35A Hybrid TIPS/Currency Portfolio: Liquid, And Cheaper Than Gold   As such, while gold prices are likely to remain supported over the cyclical horizon, a hybrid TIPS/currency portfolio may also provide investors with long-term protection against inflation – at a better price. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts Among BCA’s equity indicators, the monetary indicator continues to fall but it remains very elevated relative to its history. This underscores that monetary policy remains extremely accommodative and will continue to support stock prices. By contrast, our technical, valuation, and speculative indicators have become quite elevated. This would normally be a very concerning profile, but an improvement in sentiment is warranted in response to the positive vaccine news over the past month. Valuation remains a source of concern, but value is not an effective market timing tool. Extended valuation ratios point more to low average returns over a multi-year time horizon than a major equity market selloff next year. Equity earnings are likely to improve meaningfully in 2021, but much of this improvement is already priced in. Over the coming 12 months, bottom-up analysts expect S&P 500 EPS to grow 20% to a point that modestly surpasses their pre-pandemic peak. Earnings growth that is merely in line with these expectations is likely to produce mid-single digit returns from stocks. Globally, the most significant regional equity trend is that the US is beginning to underperform the rest of the world. The relative performance of US versus global stocks has broken below its 200-day moving average, and sector weights suggest that euro area stocks are likely to be the biggest beneficiary within global ex-US if the trend in growth versus value follows that of the US versus global. Within the currency space, the US dollar remains quite oversold. But USD is a reliably counter-cyclical currency, and it has only modestly undershot what would be implied by the rally in global stock prices this year. The euro and commodity currencies have been especially strong versus the dollar over the past month, and may be due for a consolidation. Our composite technical indicator for commodities is the most overbought that it has been since 2011. Industrial metals and lumber appear to be at the greatest risk of a technical selloff, as gold’s correction may have already run its course. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend. A peak in our global LEI (GLEI) diffusion index suggests that the pace of advance in the GLEI will moderate, but the diffusion index has not yet fallen to a level that would herald a meaningful decline in the LEI. US labor market momentum is waning, although payroll growth remained positive in November. A massive rise in the savings rate means that savings will eventually support spending, but this is unlikely to significantly occur while pandemic restrictions remain in place. Given this, fiscal and monetary policymakers need to continue to provide a reflationary “bridge” until vaccination ends the threat to the health care system and allows a return to more normal economic conditions. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see Daily Insights "Americans Want Another Deal, Pronto!" dated November 30, 2020, available at di.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Daily Insights "The ECB: Looser For Longer," dated December 10, 2020, available at di.bcaresearch.com. 3 “Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy,” Janet Yellen, Speech at the Philip Gamble Memorial Lecture, University of Massachusetts - Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts, September 24, 2015. 4 The use of nominal GDP growth as our proxy for the neutral rate of interest is based on the idea that borrowing costs are stimulative if they are below that of income growth. 5 An adaptive expectations framework suggests that expectations for future inflation are largely determined by what has occurred in the past. Our proxy for inflation expectations is thus calculated using simple exponential smoothing of the actual PCE deflator, which provides us with a long and consistent time series for expectations. 6 The second debt service ratio shown in Chart II-24 would only rise to its 68th historical percentile if the 10-year Treasury yield were to rise to 3%, or the 75th with a 10-year yield at 4%. This would be elevated relative to history, but not extreme. 7 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Report “BCA’s 2021-25 Brent Forecast: $65-$70/bbl,” dated November 12, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report “Revisiting Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs,” dated June 1, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover?” dated May 29, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com