新興市場

Highlights The rapid spread of the COVID-19 delta variant in Asia will re-focus precious metals markets anew on the possibility of another round of lockdowns and the implications for demand, particularly in Greater China and India, which account for 33% and 12% of global physical demand for gold (Chart of the Week).1 Regulatory crackdowns across various sectors in China will continue to roil markets over coming months.  Policy uncertainty around these crackdowns is elevated in local financial markets, and could spill into global markets.  This will support the USD at the margin, which creates a headwind for gold and silver prices. Ambiguous and contradictory signaling from Fed officials following the July FOMC meeting re its $120-billion-per-month bond-buying program also adds uncertainty to precious-metals and general commodity forecasts. Despite this uncertainty, we remain bullish gold and silver.  More efficacious jabs will become available, which will support the global economic re-opening, particularly in EM economies.  In DM economies, vaccination uptake likely increases as risks become more apparent.  We continue to expect gold to trade to $2,000/oz and silver to trade to $30/oz this year. Feature Markets once again are focused on the possibility lockdowns will follow rising COVID-19 infections and deaths, as the delta variant – the most contagious variant to date – spreads through Asia and elsewhere. Chart of the WeekCOVID-19 Delta Variant Rampages Chart 2COVID-19 Infections, Deaths Rising Infection and death rates are moving higher globally (Chart 2). COVID-19 infections are still rising in 78 countries. Based on the latest 7-day-average data, the countries reporting the most new infections daily are the US, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Iran. The countries reporting the most deaths each day are Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, India, and Mexico. Globally, more than 42% of infections were in Asia and the Middle East, where ~ 1mm new infections are reported every 4 days. We expect more efficacious jabs will become available, which will support the global economic re-opening, particularly in EM economies. In DM economies, vaccination uptake likely increases as risks become more apparent. China's Regulatory Crackdown Markets also are contending with a regulatory crackdowns across multiple sectors in China, which is part of a years-long reform process initiated by the Politburo.2 Industries ranging from internet, property, education, healthcare to capital markets will have new rules imposed on them under China's 14th Five-Year Plan as part of this process. Our colleagues in BCA's China Investment Service note the pace of regulatory tightening will not moderate in the near term, as policymakers transition from an annual planning cycle focused on setting economic growth targets to a multi-year planning horizon. "This allows policymakers to have a higher tolerance for near-term distress in exchange for long-term benefits," according to our colleagues. The overarching goal of this reform process is to introduce more social equality in the society. Of immediate import for precious metals markets is the potential for spillover effects outside China arising from the policy uncertainty that already is emanating from that market. Uncertainty boosts the USD and gold. This makes its effect uncertain. In our most recent modeling of gold prices, we have found strong two-way feedback between US and Chinese policy uncertainty.3 We also find that broad real foreign exchange rates for the USD and RMB exert a negative influence on gold prices, while higher economic uncertainty pushes gold prices higher (Chart 3). In addition, across markets – Chinese and US economic policy uncertainty – have similar effects, suggesting economic uncertainty across these markets has a similar effect as domestic uncertainty at home (Chart 4).4 Chart 3Domestic Uncertainty, Real FX Rates Strongly Affect Gold Prices... Chart 4...As Do Cross-Border Uncertainty, Real FX Rates This is yet another reason to pay close attention to PBOC and Fed policy innovations and surprises: they affect each other in similar ways within and across borders. Fed Officials Add Uncertainty Following the FOMC meeting at that end of last month, various Fed officials expressed their views of Chair Jerome Powell's post-meeting remarks, or again resumed their campaigns to begin tapering the US central bank's bond-buying program. Chair Powell's remarks reinforced the data-dependency of the Fed in directing its bond buying and monetary accommodation. He emphasized the need to see solid improvement in the jobs picture in the US before considering any lift-off of rates. As to the Fed's bond-buying program, this, too, will depend on progress on reducing unemployment in the US. Powell also reiterated the Fed views the current inflation in the US as transitory, a point that was emphasised by Fed Governor Lael Brainard two days after Powell's presser. Some very important Fed officials, most notably Fed Vice Chair Richard Clarida, are staking out an early position on what will get them to consider reducing the Fed's current accommodative policies, chiefly an "overshoot" of PCE inflation, the Fed's favored gauge, above 3%. Other Fed officials are urging strong action now: St. Louis Fed President James Bullard is adamant that tapering of the Fed's bond-buying program needed to begin in the Autumn and should be done early next year. Bullard is supported by Governor Christopher Waller. The Fed's bond-buying program is more than a year old. Beginning in July 2020, the Fed started buying $80 billion of Treasurys and $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities every month, or ~ $1.6 trillion so far. This lifted the Fed's balance sheet to ~ $8.3 trillion. Thinking about this as a commodity, that's a lot of asset supply removed from the Treasury and MBS market, which likely explains the high cost of the underlying debt instruments (i.e., their low interest rates). It is understandable why the gold market would get twitchy whenever Fed officials insist the winddown of this program must begin forthwith and be done in relatively short order. The loss of that steady stream of buying could send interest rates higher quickly, possibly raising nominal and real interest rates in the process, which, given the sensitivity of gold prices to US real rates would be bearish (Chart 5). While it is impossible to know when the tapering of the Fed's asset-purchase program will end, these occasional choruses of its imminent inauguration add to uncertainty in the US, which also depresses precious metals prices, as Chart 5 indicates. A larger issue attends this topic: economic policy uncertainty is not contained within national borders. Above, we noted there is a two-way feedback between US and China economic policy uncertainty. There also is a long-term relationship in levels of economic policy uncertainty re China and Europe, which makes sense given the trading relationship between these states. Changes in the two measures of economic policy uncertainty exhibit strong co-movement (Chart 6). Chart 5Taper Talk Makes Precious Metals Markets Twitchy Chart 6Economic Policy Uncertainty Goes Across National Borders Investment Implications The increase in COVID-19 infection and re-infection rates, and death rates, is forcing commodity markets to reevaluate demand projections and the likelihood of continued monetary accommodation globally. This ultimately affects the prospects for commodity prices. Conflicting interpretations of the state of local and the global economies increases uncertainty across markets, especially precious metals, which are exquisitely sensitive to even a hint of a change in policy. This uncertainty is compounded when top officials at systematically important central banks provide sometimes-contradictory interpretations of the state of their economies. Despite this uncertainty we remain bullish gold and silver, expecting efficacious vaccines to become more widely available, which will allow the global recovery to regain its footing. We are less sanguine about the prospects for the winding down of the massive monetary accommodation globally, particularly that of the US, where data-dependent policymakers still feel compelled to provide almost-certain policy prescriptions in an increasingly uncertain world.This is a fundamental factor driving global uncertainty. We remain long gold expecting it to trade to $2,000/oz this year, and long silver, expecting it to hit $30/oz.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish While US crude oil inventories rose 3.6mm barrels in the week ended 30 July 2021 gasoline stocks fell 5.3mm barrels, contributing to an overall decline in crude and product inventories in the US of 1.2mm barrels, according to the US EIA's latest tally (Chart 7). US crude and product stocks have been falling throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, and now stand ~ 13% below year earlier levels at 1.7 billion barrels. Crude oil stocks, at 439mm barrels, are just over 15% below year-ago levels. This reflects the decline in US domestic production, which is down 7.1% y/y and now stands at 11.2mm b/d. US refined-product demand, however, is up close to 9% over the January-July period y/y, and stands at 21.2mm b/d. Base Metals: Bullish Workers at the world's largest copper mine, Escondida in Chile, are in government-mediated talks with management that end on Saturday to see if they can avert a strike. There is a chance talks could be extended five days beyond that date, under Chilean law. The mine is majority owned by BHP. Workers at a Codelco-owned mine also voted to strike and will enter government-mediated talks as well. These potential strikes most likely explain why copper prices have been holding relatively steady as other commodities have come under pressure, as markets reassess the odds of a demand slowdown brought about by surging COVID-19 infections, which are hitting Asian markets particularly hard (Chart 8). Chart 7 Chart 8   Footnotes 1     We flagged this risk in our July 8, 2021 report entitled Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views, which is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Pricing A Tighter Regulatory Grip published on August 4, 2021 by our China Investment Strategy.  It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3    We measure this using Granger-Causality tests. 4    These broad real FX rates are handy explanatory variables, in that they combine two very important factors affecting gold prices – inflation and broad FX trade-weighted indexes.  Additional modelling also suggests these broad real FX rates for the USD and RMB coupled with US real 2- and 5-year rates also provide good explanatory models for gold prices. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights Last week’s market gyrations do not mark the end of China’s structural reforms. The country’s macro policy setting has shifted to allow a higher tolerance for short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain. Chinese policymakers will temporarily put the brakes on its reform agenda if policy measures threaten domestic economic stability; a spillover from the equity market rout to the currency market and private-sector investment will be a pressure point for the authorities. Messages from last week’s Politburo meeting were only marginally more positive than in April. While policymakers seem to be paying more attention to the economic slowdown, they do not appear to be in a rush to rescue the economy. We present three scenarios describing how the equity markets and policy may develop in the coming months. In all the scenarios, investors should avoid trying to catch a falling knife. Feature July was an extraordinarily difficult time for Chinese stocks and last week’s steep slide intensified as a slew of announced regulatory changes spooked market participants (Chart 1). Chart 1Chinese Stocks Had A Tough MonthWe have repeatedly outlined the risks to Chinese equities in the past month. Since the PBoC cut the reserve requirement ratio in early July, the negative impact on the financial markets from tightening industry policies has outweighed the limited positive effects from a slightly more dovish central bank policy stance.  Chart 2Chinese TMT Stock Prices Were Hammered Is now a good time to buy Chinese stocks? Multiple compressions have made Chinese equities, particularly the hard-hit technology, media & telecom (TMT) stocks in the offshore market, appear cheap compared with their global counterparts (Chart 2). In this report we present three scenarios how China’s equity market and policies will likely evolve. In our view, more than a week of stock selloffs will be needed for policymakers to halt reforms. Furthermore, even if the pace of reforms eases and policymakers start to reflate the economy, it will likely take between 6 and 12 months for stock prices to find a bottom.  In light of escalating uncertainty over China’s financial market performance, the China Investment Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services will jointly publish a Special Report on August 18. We will examine how global investors can improve the risk-reward profile of their multi-asset portfolios with exposure to Chinese assets.   Three Scenarios While the regulatory landscape is unclear, we can draw on previous experience to analyze how China’s equity market and policy directions may evolve. In the first scenario, which is our baseline case, the economy would weaken, but would not cross policymakers’ pain threshold. There would be marginal policy easing action to alleviate market anxiety and monetary policy would be slightly loosened along with polices on some non-core sectors, such as infrastructure investment. In this scenario, structural reforms could continue for another 6 to 12 months, as suggested by colleagues at the BCA Geopolitical Strategy services. Investors should resist the urge to buy on the dip. Investors would be kept on edge by a confluence of a slowing economy (even though the slowdown is measured) and heighted regulatory oversight. The market would oscillate between technical rebounds when macro policy eases and selloffs when industry regulations tighten. There are two reasons why the pace of regulatory tightening will not moderate in the near term. First, China’s economic policy has shifted from setting an annual economic growth target to multi-year planning. This allows policymakers to have a higher tolerance for near-term distress in exchange for long-term benefits. Despite a deep dive in stock prices last week, China’s bond and currency markets have been stable relative to the market gyrations in both 2015 and 2018 (Chart 3A and 3B).  Furthermore, the newly released PMIs and recent economic data show that the China’s economic activity is weakening, but the speed of softening seems to be within the policymakers’ comfort zone (Chart 4). Chart 3AChinese Bond And Currency Markets Have Been Relatively Calm Despite Equity Market Selloffs Chart 3BChinese Bond And Currency Markets Have Been Relatively Calm Despite Equity Market Selloffs Chart 4Economic Pain Has Not Crossed Policymakers' Threshold Secondly, the new rules imposed on industries - ranging from internet, property, education, healthcare to capital markets - are part of China’s long-term structural reform agenda outlined in the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP).  As China transitions from building a "moderately prosperous society" by 2020 to becoming a "great modern socialist nation" by 2049, the country’s policy priority has shifted from a rapid accumulation of wealth to addressing income inequality and social welfare for average households.  The policy objective is not only to close regulatory loopholes and end the disorderly expansion of capital and market shares, but also assign a larger weight of social equality and responsibility to the private sector’s business practices. The pace in achieving this overarching goal will only moderate when China’s economy and financial markets show meaningful signs of stress. The second possibility would be if policymakers fail to restore investors’ confidence. Foreign and domestic investors would reassess China’s policy directions and reprice the outlook for corporate profit growth. Market selloffs would continue, like in 2015 and 2018 following policy shocks,1 equity market gyrations would spill over to the currency market through capital outflows and real economic sectors through dwindling investment (Chart 5). In this scenario, Chinese policymakers would likely abandon their reform agenda, at least temporarily, and decisively shift policy to reflate the economy (Chart 6). Chart 5Financial Market Panic Spilled Over To Other Sectors In Both 2015 and 2018... Chart 6...Triggering Decisive Reflationary Policy Responses A third scenario would be if China is challenged by the external environment, either due to a significant increase in geopolitical conflicts or a widespread resurgence of new COVID cases. Both aspects would pose sizable downside risks to China’s economic activity. The risks would force authorities to shift to an easier stance and slow the pace of domestic reforms. Chart 7It Took 6 To 12 Months (And Sizable Stimulus) For Stock Prices To Bottom Out In the second and third scenarios, the rout in the equity market would likely deepen in the near term, before prices bottom in response to a halt in regulatory crackdowns and a decisive turn to reflationary measures. As illustrated in Chart 7, in both 2015 and 2018, it took 6 to 12 months and significant stimulus for Chinese stock prices to bottom in absolute terms. Bottom Line: Our baseline scenario suggests a continuation of structural reforms. Investors should refrain from jumping into the market until there are firm signs that regulatory tightening is over and reflationary measures have started. Key Messages From The Politburo Meeting Last week’s much-anticipated Politburo meeting, chaired by President Xi Jinping, adopted a slightly more dovish tone towards macroeconomic policy than in April, but also indicated that the leadership will stick to its long-term reform agenda. The stance was mildly positive for the overall economy and financial markets. Macro policies in some non-core sectors, such as infrastructure investment, will likely ease at the margin during the rest of the year. However, the meeting’s statement warned “a more complex and challenging external environment” lies ahead, which indicates that heightened concerns over geopolitical tensions will only exacerbate regulatory oversights in data and national security.  Regarding fiscal policy in 2H21, the authorities seem to be growing more concerned about growth outlook.  The meeting mentioned that fiscal support should make “reasonable progress” later this year and early next year. The pace of local government special purpose bond (SPB) issuance will pick up in Q3 and into Q4. However, we maintain our view that without a significant rise in bank credit growth, an acceleration in SPB issuance will only provide a moderate boost to local infrastructure spending. The reference to cross-cycle policy adjustment from the meeting readout is also in line with our view that policymakers may save their fiscal ammunition for next year when the economy comes under greater downward pressure. Odds are rising that the authorities will allow a frontloading of SPBs in Q1 2022 before the National People’s Congress in March next year. The statement also notably mentioned that government officials shall “ensure the supply of commodities and stabilize prices" and called for a more rational pace in carbon reduction. We think this message implies a temporary easing of production curbs in some heavy industries, such as steel, coal, and possibly a further release of strategic reserves of industrial metals (Chart 8A and 8B). The supply-side policy shift should add downward pressure on global industrial prices in addition to the ongoing slowdown in demand from China (Chart 9). Chart 8ASome Backpaddling Likely In Decarbonization Progress Chart 8BSome Backpaddling Likely In Decarbonization Progress Chart 9Downward Pressure On Commodity Prices From China's Weakening Demand And Rising Domestic Production Meanwhile, the meeting repeated the "three stabilization” policy, which targets stabilizing land prices, housing prices and property market expectations. This sends a strong signal that policymakers are unwilling to soften the tone on restrictions in the housing market. Bottom Line: The July Politburo meeting’s messaging was only modestly more dovish than three months ago. Investment Implications Chinese offshore stocks have fallen by 26% from their February peak, compared with approximately 14% for onshore stocks. The offshore TMT stocks are approaching their long-term technical resistance, measured by the three-year moving average in prices (Chart 10). While the magnitude of last week’s stock price decline seems excessive relative to previous market selloffs, the multiple compression reflects considerable uncertainty surrounding the outlook for China’s policy direction. New antitrust regulations in China are intended to limit the monopolistic business practices of internet companies. As a result, these companies’ operational costs will rise and profit growth will decline, and their valuations will converge with those of non-TMT companies. The trailing P/E ratio in Chinese investable TMT stocks is still elevated, making the equities vulnerable to further regulatory tightening and multiple compressions (Chart 11). Chart 10Chinese TMT Stocks: On The Verge Of Breaking Below Their Technical Resistance... Chart 11...But Still Vulnerable To Further Multiple Compression     Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1On August 11, 2015, the PBOC surprised the market with three consecutive devaluations of the Chinese yuan, knocking over 3% off its value. On April 3, 2018 former US President Donald Trump unveiled plans for 25% tariffs on about $50 billion of Chinese imports. Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

特別レポート

Dear Client, This week, in lieu of our regular report, I am sending you a special report written by my colleague Jonathan LaBerge, chief strategist of our flagship The Bank Credit Analyst service. Jonathan argues that investors should see social media as a technological innovation that harms productivity. While Jonathan concedes that social media was not the main driver of policy uncertainty and political risk over the past decade, he makes a good case that it plays an aggravating role. He warns that social media and political polarization still pose risks to the macroeconomic outlook in the coming years, while also highlighting idiosyncratic risks threatening social media stocks. We trust that you will find this report insightful. We will resume regular publication next week. All very best, Matt Gertken   Vice President Geopolitical Strategy US Political Strategy BCA Research Highlights Investors should view social media as a technological innovation with negative productivity growth. Social media has contributed to policy mistakes – such as fiscal austerity and protectionism – that have acted as shocks to aggregate demand over the past 15 years. The cyclical component of productivity was long lasting in nature during the last economic expansion. Forces that negatively impact economic growth but do not change the factors of production necessarily reduce measured productivity, and repeated policy mistakes strongly contributed to the slow growth profile of the last economic cycle. Political polarization in a rapidly changing world is the root cause of these policy shocks, but social media likely facilitated and magnified them. The risks of additional mistakes from populism remain present, even before considering other risks to society from social media: a reduction in mental health among young social media users, and the role that social media has played in spreading misinformation. A potential revival in protectionist sentiment is a risk to a constructive cyclical view that we will be closely monitoring over the coming 12-24 months. Investors with concentrated positions in social media stocks should be aware of the potential idiosyncratic risks facing these companies from the public’s impression of the impact of social media on society – especially if social media companies come to be widely associated with political gridlock, the polarization of society, and failed economic policies (as already appears to be the case). Feature Investors should view social media as a technological innovation with negative productivity growth. Social media has contributed to policy mistakes – such as fiscal austerity and protectionism – that have acted as shocks to aggregate demand over the past 15 years. Political polarization in a rapidly changing world is the root cause of these policy shocks, but social media likely facilitated and magnified them. While the risk of premature fiscal consolidation appears low today compared to the 2010-14 period, the pandemic and its aftermath could force the Biden administration or Congressional Democrats toward protectionist or otherwise populist actions over the coming year in the lead up to the 2022 mid-term elections. The midterms, for their part, are expected to bring gridlock back into US politics, which could remove fiscal options should the economy backslide. Frequent shocks during the last economic expansion reinforced the narrative of secular stagnation. In the coming years, any additional policy shocks following a return to economic normality will again be seen by both investors and the Fed as strong justification for low interest rates – despite the case for cyclically and structurally higher bond yields. In addition, investors with concentrated positions in social media companies should take seriously the long-term idiosyncratic risks facing these stocks. These risks stem from the public’s impression of the impact of social media on society, particularly if social media comes to be widely associated with political gridlock, the polarization of society, and failed economic policies. A Brief History Of Social Media The earliest social networking websites date back to the late 1990s, but the most influential social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, originated in the mid-2000s. Prior to the advent of modern-day smartphones, user access to platforms such as Facebook and Twitter was limited to the websites of these platforms (desktop access). Following the release of the first iPhone in June 2007, however, mobile social media applications became available, allowing users much more convenient access to these platforms. Charts 1 and 2 highlight the impact that smartphones have had on the spread of social media, especially since the release of the iPhone 3G in 2008. In 2006, Facebook had roughly 12 million monthly active users; by 2009, this number had climbed to 360 million, growing to over 600 million the year after. Twitter, by contrast, grew somewhat later, reaching 100 million monthly active users in Q3 2011. Social media usage is more common among those who are younger, but Chart 3 highlights that usage has risen over time for all age groups. As of Q1 2021, 81% of Americans aged 30-49 reported using at least one social media website, compared to 73% of those aged 50-64 and 45% of those aged 65 and over. Chart 4 highlights that the usage of Twitter skews in particular toward the young, and that, by contrast, Facebook and YouTube are the social media platforms of choice among older Americans. Chart 1Facebook: Monthly Active UsersChart 2Twitter: Monthly Active Users Worldwide Chart 3A Sizeable Majority Of US Adults Regularly Use Social Media Chart 4Older Americans Use Facebook Far More Than Twitter As a final point documenting the development and significance of social media, Chart 5 highlights that more Americans now report consuming news often (roughly once per day) from a smartphone, computer, or tablet other than from television. Radio and print have been completely eclipsed as sources of frequent news. The major news publications themselves are often promoted through social media, but the rise of the Internet has weighed heavily on the journalism industry. Social media has, for better and for worse, enabled the rapid proliferation of alternative news, citizen journalism, rumor, conspiracy theories, and foreign disinformation. Chart 5Social Media Has Changed The Way People Consume News The Link Between Social Media And Post-GFC Austerity Following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC), there have been at least five deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to the US and global economies that have contributed to the disconnection between growth and interest rates: A prolonged period of US household deleveraging from 2008-2014 The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis Fiscal austerity in the US, UK, and Euro Area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The rise of populist economic policies, such as the UK decision to leave the European Union, and the US-initiated trade war of 2018-2019. Among these shocks to growth, social media has had a clear impact on two of them. In the case of austerity in the aftermath of the Great Recession, a sharp rise in fiscal conservatism in 2009 and 2010, emblematized by the rise of the US Tea Party, profoundly affected the 2010 US midterm elections. It is not surprising that there was a fiscally conservative backlash following the crisis: the US budget deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio soared after the economy collapsed and the government enacted fiscal stimulus to bail out the banking system. And midterm elections in the US often lead to significant gains for the opposition party However, Tea Party supporters rapidly took up a new means of communicating to mobilize politically, and there is evidence that this contributed to their electoral success. Chart 6 illustrates that the number of tweets with the Tea Party hashtag rose significantly in 2010 in the lead-up to the election, which saw the Republican Party take control of the House of Representatives as well as the victory of several Tea Party-endorsed politicians. Table 1 highlights that Tea Party candidates, who rode the wave of fiscal conservatism, significantly outperformed Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans in the use of Twitter during the 2010 campaign, underscoring that social media use was a factor aiding outreach to voters. Chart 6Tea Party Supporters Rapidly Adopted Social Media To Mobilize Politically Table 1Tea Party Candidates Significantly Outperformed In Their Use Of Social Media And while it is more difficult to analyze the use and impact of Facebook by Tea Party candidates and supporters owing to inherent differences in the structure of the Facebook platform, interviews with core organizers of both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements have noted that activists in these ideologically opposed groups viewed Facebook as the most important social networking service for their political activities.1 Under normal circumstances, we agree that fiscal policy should be symmetric, with reduced fiscal support during economic expansions following fiscal easing during recessions. But in the context of multi-year household deleveraging, the fiscal drag that occurred in following the 2010 midterm elections was clearly a policy mistake. This mistake occurred partially under full Democratic control of government and especially under a gridlocked Congress after 2010. Chart 7 highlights that the contribution to growth from government spending turned sharpy negative in 2010 and continued to subtract from growth for some time thereafter. In addition, panel of Chart 7 highlights that the US economic policy uncertainty index rose in 2010 after falling during the first year of the recovery, reaching a new high in 2011 during the Tea Party-inspired debt ceiling crisis. Chart 7The Fiscal Drag That Followed The 2010 Midterm Elections Was A Clear Policy Mistake In addition to the negative impact of government spending on economic growth, this extreme uncertainty very likely damaged confidence in the economic recovery, contributing to the subpar pace of growth in the first half of the last economic expansion. Chart 8 highlights the weak evolution in real per capita GDP from 2009-2019 compared with previous economic cycles, which was caused by a prolonged household balance sheet recovery process that was made worse by policy mistakes. To be sure, the UK and the EU did not have a Tea Party, and yet political elites imposed fiscal austerity. It is also the case that President Obama was the first president to embrace social media as a political and public relations tool. So it cannot be said that either social media or the Republican Party are uniquely to blame for the policy mistakes of that era. But US fiscal policy would have been considerably looser in the 2010s if not for the Tea Party backlash, which was partly enabled by social media. Too tight of fiscal policy in turn fed populism and produced additional policy mistakes down the road. Chart 8Policy Mistakes Significantly Contributed To Last Cycle's Subpar Growth Profile From Fiscal Drag To Populism While social media is clearly not the root cause of the recent rise of populist policies, it has had a hand in bringing them about – in both a direct and indirect manner. The indirect link between social media use and the rise in populist policies has mainly occurred through the highly successful use of social media by international terrorist organizations (chiefly ISIL) and its impact on sentiment toward immigration in several developed market economies. Chart 9 highlights that public concerns about immigration and race in the UK began to rise sharply in 2012, in lockstep with both the rise in UK immigrants from EU accession countries and a series of events: the Syrian refugee crisis, the establishment and reign of the Islamic State, and three major terrorist attacks in European countries for which ISIL claimed responsibility. Given that the main argument for “Brexit” was for the UK to regain control over its immigration policies, these events almost certainly increased UK public support for withdrawing from the EU. In other words, it is not clear that Brexit would have occurred (at least at that moment in time) without these events given the narrow margin of victory for the “leave” campaign. The absence of social media would not have prevented the rise of ISIL, as that occurred in response to the US’s precipitous withdrawal from Iraq. The inevitable rise of ISIL would still have generated a backlash against immigration. Moreover, fiscal austerity in the UK and EU also fed other grievances that supported the Brexit movement. But social media accelerated and amplified the entire process.  Chart 10 presents fairly strong evidence that Brexit weakened UK economic performance relative to the Euro Area prior to the pandemic, with the exception of the 2018-2019 period. In this period Euro Area manufacturing underperformed during the Trump administration’s trade war as a result of its comparatively higher exposure to automobile production and its stronger ties to China. Panel 2 highlights that GBP-EUR fell sharply in advance of the referendum, and remains comparatively weak today. Chart 9Terrorism And Immigration Likely Contributed To Brexit Chart 10Brexit Weakened UK Economic Performance Prior To The Pandemic Turning to the US, Donald Trump’s election as US President in 2016 was aided by both the direct and indirect effects of social media. In terms of indirect effects, Trump benefited from similar concerns over immigration and terrorism that caused the UK to leave the EU: Chart 11 highlights that terrorism and foreign policy were second and third on the list of concerns of registered voters in mid-2016, and Chart 12 highlights that voters regarded Trump as the better candidate to defend the US against future terrorist attacks. Chart 11Terrorism Ranked Highly As An Issue In The 2016 US Election Chart 12Voters Regarded Trump As Better Equipped To Defend Against Terrorism Trump’s election; and the enactment of populist policies under his administration, were directly aided by Trump’s active use of social media (mainly Twitter) to boost his candidacy. Chart 13 highlights that there were an average of 15-20 tweets per day from Trump’s Twitter account from 2013-2015, and 80% of those tweets occurred before he announced his candidacy for president in June 2015. This strongly underscores that Trump mainly used Twitter to lay the groundwork for his candidacy as an unconventional political outsider rather than as a campaign tool itself, which distinguishes his use of social media from that of other politicians. In other words, new technology disrupted the “good old boys’ club” of traditional media and elite politics. Chart 13Trump Used Twitter To Lay The Groundwork For His Candidacy Chart 14The Trump Tax Cuts A Huge Rise In Corporate Earnings Some policies of the Trump administration were positive for financial markets, and it is fair to say that Trump fired up animal spirits to some extent: Chart 14 highlights that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act caused a significant rise in stock market earnings per share. But the Trump tax cuts were a conventional policy pushed mostly by the Congressional leadership of the Republican Party, and they did not meaningfully boost economic growth. Chart 15 highlights that, while the US ISM manufacturing index rose sharply in the first year of Trump’s administration, an uptrend was already underway prior to the election as a result of a significant improvement in Chinese credit growth and a recovery in oil prices after the devastating collapse that took place in 2014-2015. Chart 15But The Tax Cuts Did Not Do Much To Boost Growth Similarly, Chart 15 highlights that the Trump trade war does not bear the full responsibility of the significant slowdown in growth in 2019, as China’s credit impulse decelerated significantly between the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and the onset of the trade war because Chinese policymakers turned to address domestic concerns. But Chart 16 highlights that the aggressive imposition of tariffs, especially between the US and China, caused an explosion in trade uncertainty even when measured on an equally-weighted basis (i.e., when overweighting trade uncertainty, in countries other than the US and China), which undoubtedly weighed on the global economy and contributed to a very significant slowdown in US jobs growth in 2019 (panel 2). Moreover, Chinese policymakers responded to the trade onslaught by deleveraging, which weighed on the global economy; and consolidating their grip on power at home. In essence, Trump was a political outsider who utilized social media to bypass the traditional media and make his case to the American people. Other factors contributed to his surprising victory, not the least of which was the austerity-induced, slow-growth recovery in key swing states. While US policy was already shifting to be more confrontational toward China, the Trump administration was more belligerent in its use of tariffs than previous administrations. The trade war thus qualifies as another policy shock that was facilitated by the existence of social media. Chart 16The Trade War Caused An Explosion In Global Trade Uncertainty Viewing Social Media As A Negative Productivity-Innovation A rise in fiscal conservatism leading to misguided austerity, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, and the Trump administration’s trade war have represented significant non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies over the past 12 years. These shocks strongly contributed to the subpar growth profile of the last economic expansion, as demonstrated above. Given the above, it is reasonable for investors to view social media as a technological innovation with negative productivity growth, given that it has facilitated policy mistakes during the last economic expansion. Chart 17 underscores this point, by highlighting that multi-factor productivity growth has been extremely weak in the post-GFC environment. While productivity is usually driven by supply-side factors over the longer term, it has a cyclical component to it – and in the case of the last economic expansion, the cyclical component was long lasting in nature. Any forces negatively impacting economic growth that do not change the factors of production necessarily reduce measured productivity; it is for this reason that measured productivity declines during recessions; and policy mistakes negatively impact productivity growth. Chart 17Policy Mistakes, Partially Enabled By Social Media, Reduced Productivity During The Last Expansion Chart 18State & Local Government Finances Are In Much Better Shape Today The Risk Of Aggressive Austerity Seems Low Today… Fiscal austerity in the early phase of the last economic cycle was the first social media-linked shock that we identified, but the risk of aggressive austerity appears low today. Much of the fiscal drag that occurred in the aftermath of the global financial crisis happened because of insufficient financial support to state and local governments – and the subsequent refusal by Congress to authorize more aid. But Chart 18 highlights that state and local government finances have already meaningfully recovered, on the back of bipartisan stimulus in 2020, while the American Rescue Plan provides significant additional funding. While it is true that US fiscal policy is set to detract from growth over the coming 6-12 months, this will merely reflect the unwinding of fiscal aid that had aimed to support household income temporarily lost, as a result of a drastic reduction in services spending. As we noted in last month’s report,2 goods spending will likely slow as fiscal thrust turns to fiscal drag, but services spending will improve meaningfully – aided not just by a post-pandemic normalization in economic activity, but also by the deployment of some of the sizable excess savings that US households have accumulated over the past year. Fiscal drag will also occur outside of the US next year. For example, the IMF is forecasting a two percentage point increase in the Euro Area’s cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance, which would represent the largest annual increase over the past two decades. But here too the reduction in government spending will reflect the end of pandemic-related income support, and is likely to occur alongside a positive private-sector services impulse. During the worst of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis, the impact of austerity was especially acute because it was persistent, and it occurred while the output gap was still large in several Euro Area economies. Chart 19 highlights that Euro Area fiscal consolidation from 2010-2013 was negatively correlated with economic activity during that period, and Chart 20 highlights that, with the potential exception of Spain, this austerity does not appear to have led to subsequently stronger rates of growth. Chart 19Euro Area Austerity Lowered Growth During The Consolidation Phase… Chart 20…And Did Not Seem To Subsequently Raise Growth This experiment in austerity led the IMF to conclude that fiscal multipliers are indeed large during periods of substantial economic slack, constrained monetary policy, and synchronized fiscal adjustment across numerous economies.3 Similarly, attitudes about austerity have shifted among policymakers globally in the wake of the populist backlash. Given this, despite the significant increase in government debt levels that has occurred as a result of the pandemic, we strongly doubt that advanced economies will attempt to engage in additional austerity prematurely, i.e., before unemployment rates have returned close-to steady-state levels. …But The Risk Of Protectionism And Other Populist Measures Looms Large The role that social media has played at magnifying populist policies should be concerning for investors, especially given that there has been a rising trend towards populism over the past 20 years. In a recent paper, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch have compiled a cross-country database on populism dating back to 1900, defining populist leaders as those who employ a political strategy focusing on the conflict between “the people” and “the elites.” Chart 21 highlights that the number of populist governments worldwide has risen significantly since the 1980s and 1990s, and Chart 22 highlights that the economic performance of countries with populist leaders is clearly negative. Chart 21Populism Has Been On The Rise For The Past 30 Years The authors found that countries’ real GDP growth underperformed by approximately one percentage point per year after a populist leader comes to power, relative to both the country’s own long-term growth rate and relative to the prevailing level of global growth. To control for the potential causal link between economic growth and the rise of populist leaders, Chart 23 highlights the results of a synthetic control method employed by the authors that generates a similar conclusion to the unconditional averages shown in Chart 22: populist economic policies are significantly negative for real economic growth. Chart 22Populist Leaders Are Clearly Growth Killers Even After… Chart 23… Controlling For The Odds That Weak Growth Leads To Populism This is especially concerning given that wealth and income inequality, perhaps the single most important structural cause of rising populism and political polarization, is nearly as elevated as it was in the 1920s and 1930s (Chart 24). This trend, at least in the US, has been exacerbated by a decline in public trust of mainstream media among independents and Republicans that began in the early 2000s and helped to fuel the public’s adoption of alternative news and social media. The decline in trust clearly accelerated as a result of erroneous reporting on what turned out to be nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and other controversies of the Bush administration. Chart 21 showed that the rise in populism has also yet to abate, suggesting that social media has the potential to continue to amplify policy mistakes for the foreseeable future. Chart 24Inequality: The Most Important Structural Cause Of Populism And Polarization It is not yet clear what economic mistakes will occur under the Biden administration, but investors should not rule out the possibility of policies that are harmful for growth. The likely passage of a bipartisan infrastructure bill or a partisan reconciliation bill in the second half of this year will most likely be the final word on fiscal policy until at least 2025,4 underscoring that active fiscal austerity is not likely a major risk to investors. Spending levels will probably freeze after 2022: Republicans will not be able to slash spending, and Democrats will not be able to hike spending or taxes, if Republicans win at least one chamber of Congress in the midterms (as is likely). Biden has preserved the most significant of Trump’s protectionist policies by maintaining US import tariffs against China, and the lesson from the Tea Party’s surge following the global financial crisis is that major political shifts, magnified by social media, can manifest themselves as policy with the potential to impact economic activity within a two-year window. Attitudes toward China have shifted negatively around the world because of deindustrialization and now the pandemic.5 White collar workers in DM countries have clearly fared better during lockdowns than those of lower-income households. This has created extremely fertile ground for a revival in populist sentiment, which could force the Biden administration or Congressional Democrats toward protectionist or otherwise populist actions over the coming year, in the lead up to the 2022 mid-term elections. Investment Conclusions In this report, we have documented the historical link between social media, populism, and policy mistakes during the last economic expansion. It is clear that neither social media nor even populism is solely responsible for all mistakes – the UK’s and EU’s ill-judged foray into austerity was driven by elites. Furthermore, we have not addressed in this report the impact of populism on actions of emerging markets, such as China and Russia, whose own behavior has dealt disinflationary blows to the global economy. Nevertheless, populism is a potent force that clearly has the power to harness new technology and deliver shocks to the global economy and financial markets. The risks of additional mistakes from populism are still present, and that is even before considering other risks to society from social media: a reduction in mental health among young social media users, and the role that social media has played in spreading misinformation – contributing to the vaccine hesitancy in some DM countries that we discussed in Section 1 of our report. Two investment conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, we noted in our April report that there is a chance that investor expectations for the natural rate of interest (“R-star”) will rise once the economy normalizes post-pandemic, but that this will likely not occur as long as investors continue to believe in the narrative of secular stagnation. Despite the fact that the past decade’s shocks occurred against the backdrop of persistent household deleveraging (which has ended in the US), these shocks reinforced that narrative, and any additional policy shocks following a return to economic normality will again be seen by both investors and the Fed as strong justification for low interest rates. Thus, while the rapid closure of output gaps in advanced economies over the coming year argues for both cyclically and structurally higher bond yields, a revival in protectionist sentiment is a risk to this view that we will be closely monitoring over the coming 12-24 months. Second, for tech investors, the bipartisan shift in public sentiment to become more critical of social media companies is gradually becoming a real risk, potentially affecting user growth. Based solely on Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, and Snapchat, social media companies do not account for a very significant share of the overall equity market (Chart 25), suggesting that the impact of a negative shift in sentiment toward social media companies would not be an overly significant event for equity investors in general. Chart 25 highlights that the share of social media companies as a percent of the broad tech sector rises if Google is included; YouTube accounts for less than 15% of Google’s total advertising revenue, however, suggesting modest additional exposure beyond the solid line in Chart 25. Chart 25The Underperformance Of Social Media Would Not Excessively Weigh On The Broad Market Still, investors with concentrated positions in social media stocks should be aware of the potential idiosyncratic risks facing social media companies as a result of the public’s impression of the impact of social media on society. If social media companies come to be widely associated with political gridlock, the polarization of society, and failed economic policies (as already appears to be the case), then the fundamental performance of these stocks is likely to be quite poor regardless of whether or not tech companies ultimately enjoy a relatively friendly regulatory environment under the Biden administration.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1     Grassroots Organizing in the Digital Age: Considering Values and Technology in Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street by Agarwal, Barthel, Rost, Borning, Bennett, and Johnson, Information, Communication & Society, 2014. 2     Please see The Bank Credit Analyst “July 2021,” dated June 24, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3    “Are We Underestimating Short-Term Fiscal Multipliers?”,IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2012 4    Please see US Political Strategy Outlook "Third Quarter Outlook 2021: Game Time," dated June 30, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 5    “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries,” PEW Research Center, October 2020.