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Highlights As US and China’s grand strategies collide, expect major and minor geopolitical earthquakes whose epicenter will now lie in South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin. Another tectonic change will drive South Asia’s emergence as a new geopolitical battle ground - South Asia is now heavily weaponized. All key players operating in this theater are nuclear powers. South Asia’s democratic traditions are well-known but notable institutional and social fault lines exist. These could trigger major geopolitical events in Afghanistan, Pakistan and in pockets of India too. We are bullish on India strategically but bearish tactically. Dangerous transitions are underway to India’s east and west. Within India, key elections are approaching, and it is possible that growth may disappoint. For reasons of geopolitics, we are strategically bullish on Bangladesh but strategically bearish on Pakistan and Sri Lanka. We are booking gains of 9% on our long rare earths basket and 1% on our long GBP-CZK trade. Feature Over the 1900s, East Asia and the Middle East emerged as two key geopolitical focal points on the world map. Global hegemons flexed their muscles and clashed in these two theaters. Meanwhile South Asia was a geopolitical backstage at best. The majority of South Asia was a British colony until the second half of the twentieth century. After WWII it struggled with the difficulties of independence and mostly missed out on the prosperity of East Asia and the Pacific. But will the twenty-first century be any different? Absolutely so. We expect the current century to be marked by major and minor geopolitical earthquakes in which South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin will play a major part. This seismic change is likely to be the result of several tectonic forces: Population: A quarter of the world’s people live in South Asia today and this share will keep growing for the next four decades. India will be the most populous country in the world by 2027 and will account for about a fifth of global population. Supply: China’s growth model has left it heavily dependent on imports of raw materials from abroad. It is clashing with the West over markets and supply chains. Beijing is building supply lines overland while developing a navy to try to secure its maritime interests. These interests increasingly overlap with India’s, creating economic competition and security concerns over vital sea lines of communication. Access: Whilst the Himalayas and Tibetan plateau have historically prevented China from expanding its influence in South Asia, China’s alliance with Pakistan is strengthening. Physical channels like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and other linkages under the Belt and Road Initiative, now provide China a foot in the South Asian door like never before (Map 1). Weapons: The second half of the twentieth century saw China, India, and Pakistan acquire nuclear arms. Consequently, South Asia today is one of the most weaponized geographies globally (Map 1). Map 1South Asia To Emerge As A Key Geopolitical Theater In The 21st Century With the South Asian economy ever developing, and US-China confrontation here to stay, we expect China to make its presence felt in South Asia over the coming decades. The US’s recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the failure of democratization in Myanmar, are but two symptoms of a grand strategic change by which China seeks to prevent US encirclement and Indo-American cooperation develops to counter China. Throw in the abiding interests of all these powers in the Middle East and it becomes clear that South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin writ large will become increasingly important over the coming decades. The Lay Of The Land - India Is The Center Of Gravity Chart 1South Asia Managed Rare Feat Of ‘Steady’ Growth South Asia stands out amongst developing regions of the world for its large and young population. In recent decades, South Asia has also managed to grow its economy steadily, surpassing Sub-Saharan Africa and rivaling the Middle East (Chart 1). While South Asia’s growth rates have not been as miraculous as East Asia post World War II, its growth engine has managed to hum slowly but surely. India and Bangladesh have been the star performers on the economic growth front (Chart 2). Despite decent growth rates, the South Asian region is characterized by very low per capita incomes due to large population. On per capita incomes, Sri Lanka leads whilst Pakistan finds itself at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 3). Chart 2India And Bangladesh Have Been Star Performers Chart 3Per Capita Incomes In South Asia Have Grown, But Remain Low Chart 4India Accounts For About 80% Of South Asia’s GDP South Asia constitutes eight nations. However only four are material from an investment perspective: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. India is the center of gravity as it offers the most liquid scrips and accounts for 80% of the region’s GDP (Chart 4). In addition: India accounts for 101 of the 110 companies from South Asia listed on MSCI’s equity indices. MSCI India’s market capitalization is about $1 trillion. In fact, India’s equity market could soon become larger than that of the UK and join the world’s top-five club.1 The combined market cap of MSCI Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan amounts to only about $6 billion. Liquidity is a constraint that investors must contend with whilst investing in these three countries in South Asia. Pakistan is the home of 220 million – set to grow to 300 million by 2040. It lags its neighbors on economic growth and governance but has nuclear weapons and a 650,000-strong military. Bottom Line: India is the center of gravity for the regional economy and financial markets in South Asia. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are small but are developing. Pakistan is the laggard, but is militarily strong, which raises political and geopolitical risks. South Asia: Major Consumer, Minor Producer Chart 5Manufacturing Capabilities Of South Asian Economies Are Weak South Asia’s defining economic characteristic is that it is a major consumer. This feature contrasts with the region’s East Asian cousins, which worked up economic miracles based on their manufacturing capabilities. South Asia’s appetite to consume is partly driven by population and partly driven by the fact that this region’s economies have an unusually underdeveloped manufacturing base (Chart 5). It’s no surprise that all countries in South Asia (with the sole exception of Afghanistan) are set to have a current account deficit over the next five years (Charts 6A and 6B). Chart 6ASouth Asian Economies Tend To Be Net Importers Chart 6BSouth Asian Economies Tend To Be Net Importers India is set to become the third largest global importer of goods and services (after the US and UK) over the next five years. Its rise as a large client state of the world will be both a blessing and a curse, as increased business leverage will coincide with geopolitical insecurity. Structurally, Sino-Indian tensions are rising and growing bilateral trade will not be enough to prevent them. Meanwhile dependency on the volatile Middle East is a geopolitical vulnerability. Either way, India and its region become more important to the rest of the world over time. Whilst the structure of South Asia’s economy is relatively rudimentary, it is worth noting that Bangladesh and Sri Lanka present an exception. Bangladesh has embarked on a path of manufacturing-oriented development via labor-intensive production. Sri Lanka has a well-developed services sector (Chart 7). In particular: Bangladesh: Within South Asia, Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector stands out as being better developed than regional peers. More than 95% of Bangladesh’s exports are manufactured goods –a level that is comparable to China (Chart 8). China’s share in the global apparel and footwear market has been systematically declining and Bangladesh is one of the countries that has benefited most from this shift. Bangladesh’s share in global apparel and footwear exports to the US as well as EU has been rising steadily and today stands at 4.5% and 13% respectively.2 Chart 7Bangladesh’s And Sri Lanka’s Economies Are Relatively Modern Chart 8Bangladesh Has The Most Developed Exports Franchise In South Asia Sri Lanka: Whilst Sri Lanka social complexities are lower and per capita incomes are higher as compared to peers in South Asia, its transition from a long civil war to a focus on economic development recently suffered a body blow, first owing to terrorist attacks in 2019 and then owing to the pandemic. The economic predicament was then worsened by its government’s hasty transition to organic farming which hit domestic food production. Geopolitically it is worth noting that China is one of the largest lenders to Sri Lanka. Whilst Sri Lanka’s central bank may be able to convince markets of the nation’s ability to meet debt obligations for now, its foreign exchange reserves position remains precarious and public debt levels remain high. Sri Lanka’s vulnerable finances are likely to only increase Sri Lanka’s reliance on capital-rich China. Despite Democracy, South Asia Has Political Tinderboxes Another factor that sets South Asia apart from developing regions like Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia is the region’s democratic moorings. India and Sri Lanka lead the region on this front, although the last decade may have seen minor setbacks to the quality of democracy in both countries (Chart 9). Pockets of South Asia are socially and politically unstable, characterized by religious or communal strife, terrorist activity, and even the occasional coup d'état. Risk Of Social Conflict Most Elevated In Pakistan And Afghanistan India’s demographic dividend is real, but its benefits should not be overstated. For instance, India’s northern region is a demographic tinderbox. It is younger than the rest of the country, yet per capita incomes are lower, youth underemployment is higher, and society is more heterogeneous. The rise of nationalism in India is an important consequence and could engender potential social unrest. Chart 9India’s Democracy Strongest, But May Have Had Some Setbacks Chart 10South Asia Is Young And Will Age Slowly   Chart 11Social Complexities Are High In Afghanistan & Pakistan A similar problem confronts South Asia as a whole. Pakistan and Afghanistan are younger than India by a wide margin (Chart 10). But both countries are economically backward and have either poor or non-existent democratic traditions. Lots of poor youths and inadequate political valves to release social tensions make for an explosive combination. These countries are highly vulnerable to social conflict that could cause political instability at home or across the region via terrorism (Chart 11). The Gatsby Effect Most Prominent In Pakistan While various regions struggle with inequality, South Asia has less of a problem that way (Chart 12). However South Asia is characterized by very low levels of social mobility as compared to peer regions. This can partially be attributed to two centuries of colonial rule as well as to endemic traditions of social stratification. Chart 12Gatsby Effect: Social Mobility Is Lowest In Pakistan Within South Asia it is worth noting that social mobility is the lowest in Pakistan and highest in Sri Lanka. Chart 13Military’s Influence Most Elevated In Pakistan And Nepal Too Military Influential In Pakistan (And Nepal) Events that transpired over January 2020 in the US showed that even the oldest constitutional democracy in the world is not immune to a breakdown of civil-military relations. South Asia has seen the occasional coup d'état, one reason for the political tinderboxes highlighted above. Obviously, Myanmar is the worst – it saw its nascent democratization snuffed out just last year. But other countries in the region could also struggle to maintain civilian order in the coming decades. The military’s influence is outsized in Pakistan as well as Nepal (Chart 13). India maintains high levels of defense spending but has a strong tradition of civilian control (Chart 14). Chart 14Pakistan’s Military Budget Is Most Generous, India A Close Second South Asia: A New Global Battle Ground Historically global hegemons have sought to assert their dominance by staking claim over coastal regions in Europe and Asia. Over the past two centuries Asia has emerged as a geopolitical theater second only to Europe. Naval and coastal conflicts have emerged from the rise of Japan (the Russo-Japanese War) and the Cold War (the Korean War & the Vietnam War). Today the rise of China is the destabilizing factor. The “frozen conflicts” of the Cold War are thawing in Taiwan, South Korea, and elsewhere. China is pursuing territorial disputes around its entire periphery, including notably in the East and South China Seas but also South Asia. Meanwhile the US, fearful of China, is struggling to strike a deal with Iran and shift its focus from the Middle East to reviving its Pacific strategic presence. A budding US-China competition is creating conditions for a new cold war or a series of “proxy battles” in Asia. Over the next few decades, we expect disputes to continue. But the focal points are likely to cover South Asia too. In specific, landlocked regions in South Asia are likely to see rising tensions in the twenty-first century (Map 2). Also as mentioned above, China’s naval expansion and the US’s attempt to form a “quadrilateral” alliance with India, Japan, and Australia will generate tensions and potentially conflict. European allies are also becoming more active in Asia as a result of US alliances as well as owing to Europe’s independent need for secure supply lines. Map 2China’s Interest In Landlocked Regions Of South Asia Is Rising While border clashes between India and China will ebb and flow, Indo-Chinese confrontations along India’s eastern border will become a structural theme. Arguably, Sino-Indian rivalries pre-date the twenty-first century. But in a world in which the Asian giants are increasingly economically and technologically developed, Sino-Indian confrontations are likely to persist and result in major geopolitical events. Consider: China is adopting nationalism and an assertive foreign policy to cope with rising socioeconomic pressures on the Communist Party as potential GDP growth slows. China is developing a navy as well as a stronger alliance with Pakistan, which includes greater lines of communication. North India is a key constituency for the political party in power in India today (i.e., the Bhartiya Janata Party or BJP) and this geography harbors especially unfavorable views of Pakistan (Chart 15). Thus, there is a risk that the India of today could respond far more decisively or aggressively to threats or even minor disputes. More broadly, nationalism is rising in India as well as China. India is shedding its historical stance of neutrality and aligning with the US, which fuels China’s distrust (Chart 16). Chart 15Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India Chart 16India Has Aligned With The QUAD To Counter The Sino-Pak Alliance Turning attention to India’s western border, clashes between India and Pakistan relating to landlocked areas in Kashmir will also be a recurring theme. Whilst India currently has a ceasefire agreement in place with Pakistan, peace between the two countries cannot possibly be expected to last. This is mainly because: Kashmir: Core problems between the two countries, like India’s control over Kashmir and Pakistan’s use of militant proxies, remain unaddressed. India’s unexpected decision in 2019 to abrogate article 370 of the Indian constitution has reinforced Pakistan’s attention on Kashmir. Sino-Pak Alliance: Pakistan accounted for 38% of China’s arms exports over 2016-20. Pakistan accounts for the lion’s share of Chinese investments made in South Asia (Chart 17). Sino-India rivalries will spill into the Indo-Pak relationship (and vice versa). Revival Of Taliban: The US withdrawal from Afghanistan has revived Taliban rule in that country. Taliban’s rise will resuscitate a range of dormant terrorist movements in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. India has a long history of being targeted. South Asia today is very different from what it looked like for most of the post-WWII era: it is heavily weaponized. India, Pakistan, and China became nuclear powers in the second half of the twentieth century and have been steadily building their nuclear stockpiles ever since (Chart 18). North Korea’s growing arsenal is theoretically able to target India, while Iran (more friendly toward India) may also obtain nuclear weapons. Chart 17China And Pakistan: Joined At The Hip? Chart 18South Asia: The New Epicenter For Nuclear Activity While nuclear arms create a powerful incentive for nations to avoid total war, they can also create unmitigated fear and uncertainty during incidents of major strategic tension. This is especially true when countries have not yet worked out a mode of living with each other, as with the US and USSR in the early days of the Cold War. Investment Takeaways For investors with an investment horizon exceeding 12 months, we highlight that India presents a long-term buying opportunity for two key reasons: China’s Internal And External Troubles Will Benefit India: As long as US and China do not reengage in a major way, global corporations will fall under pressure to diversify from China and the US will pursue closer relations with India. China faces an array of challenges across its periphery, whereas India need only focus on the South Asian sphere. India Is Rising As A Global Consumer: As long as a major Middle East war and oil shock is avoided (not a negligible risk), India should see more benefits than costs from its growing importance as a client of the world. However, over the next 12 months we worry that India is priced for perfection. India currently trades at a punchy premium relative to emerging markets (Table 1) at a time of when both geopolitical and macroeconomic headwinds are at play. In particular: Table 1We Are Bearish On India Tactically, But Bullish On India & Bangladesh Strategically Major Transitions Are Dangerous: Recent developments in South Asia have added to geopolitical risks for India. The assumption of power by Taliban in Afghanistan will activate latent terrorist forces that could target India. Pakistan’s chronic instability combined with the change of power in Afghanistan could set off an escalation in Indo-Pakistani tensions, sooner rather than later. On India’s eastern front, China’s need to distract its population from a souring economy could trigger a clash between China and India. Down south, China’s rising influence over crisis-hit Sri Lanka is notable and could potentially engender security risks for India. Chart 19Politics Can Trump Economics In Run Up To General Elections Growth Slowing, Elections Approaching: We worry that India’s growth engine may throw up a downside surprise over the next 12 months owing to poor jobs growth and poor investment growth. History suggests that politics often trumps economics in the run up to general elections (Chart 19). Hence there is a real risk that policy decisions will be voter-friendly but not market-friendly over 2022. As both India and Pakistan are gearing up for elections in the coming years, major military showdown or saber rattling should not be ruled out. Both countries may engineer a rally around the flag effect to bump up their pandemic-battered approval. Tension with China may escalate as Xi Jinping extends his term in power next year and seeks to enforce red lines in China’s eastern and western borders. Globally what are the key geopolitical factors that could lead to India’s underperformance in the short run? We highlight a checklist here: China Stimulates: The near-term clash between markets and policymakers in China should eventually give way to meaningful fiscal stimulus by Chinese authorities. This buoys China as well as emerging markets that depend on China for their growth. However, even if China flounders, India may not continue to outperform. The correlation between MSCI India and China equities has been positive. Fed Tightens Quickly: A faster-than-expected taper and tightening guidance could cause those emerging markets that are richly priced like India to correct. A Crisis Over Iran’s Nuclear Program: If the US is unable to return to diplomacy, tensions in the Middle East will rise and stoke oil prices. This will affect India adversely, given global price pressures and India’s high dependence on oil imports. Conversely, if these developments fail to materialize then that would lower our conviction regarding India’s underperformance in the short run. In summary, we are bullish India strategically but bearish tactically. As regards the three other investable markets in South Asia: We are bearish on Pakistan and Sri Lanka on a strategic time horizon. Whilst both nations’ rising alignment with China could be an advantage ceteris paribus, ironically their deteriorating finances are driving their proximity to capital-rich China (Chart 20). To boot, Sri Lanka’s ability to pay its way out of its economic crisis on its own steam is worsening. This is evident from its rising debt to GDP ratio (Chart 21). Chart 20Pakistan And Sri Lanka Running Low On Reserves Pakistan faces elevated risks of internal social conflict, must deal with a rapidly changing external environment, has a weak democracy and an unusually influential military. Sri Lanka’s social risks are low, but its economic crisis appears likely to persist. The fact that both markets have been characterized by a high degree of volatility in earnings in the recent past implies that even a cyclical “Buy” case for either of these markets is fraught with risks (Table 1). The outlook for Bangladesh is better. Exports account for 15% of GDP and the US and Europe account for around 70% of its exports. Strong fiscal stimulus in these developed markets should augur well for this frontier market. Additionally, Bangladesh is characterized by moderate social risks, reasonably strong democracy scores and low levels of influence from the military. Its healthy public finances (Chart 21) and the fact that it shares no border with China creates the potential to leverage a symbiotic relationship with China. Chart 21Sri Lanka’s Debt Now Exceeds Its GDP But there is a catch. Bangladesh as a market has a low market cap and hence offers low levels of liquidity (Table 1). We thus urge investors to avoid making cyclical investment calls on this South Asian market. However, from a long-term perspective we highlight our strategic bullish view on Bangladesh given supportive geopolitical factors. Watch out for an upcoming report from our Emerging Markets Strategy team, that will delve into the macroeconomic aspects of Bangladesh.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Abhishek Vishnoi and Swetha Gopinath, "India's stock market on track to overtake UK in terms of m-cap: Report" Business Standard, October 2021. 2 Arianna Rossi, Christian Viegelahn, and David Williams, "The post-COVID-19 garment industry in Asia" Research Brief, International Labour Organization, July 2021. Open Trades & Positions

Highlights The surge in energy prices going into the Northern Hemisphere winter – particularly coal and natgas prices in China and Europe – will push inflation and inflation expectations higher into the end of 1Q22 (Chart of the Week).  Over the medium-term, similar excursions into the far-right tails of price distributions will become more frequent if capex in hydrocarbon-based energy sources continues to be discouraged, and scalable back-up sources of energy are not developed for renewables. It is not clear China will continue selectively relaxing price caps for some large electricity buyers, which came close to bankrupting power utilities this year and contributed to power shortages.  The current market set-up favors long commodity index products like the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF.  We remain long both. Higher energy and metals prices also will work in favor of long-only commodity index exposure over the medium term. Longer-term supply-chain issues will be sorted out. Still, higher costs will be needed to incentivize production of the base metals required to decarbonize electricity production globally, and  to keep sufficient supplies of fossil fuels on hand to back up renewable generation.  This will cause inflation to grind higher over time. Feature Back in February, we were getting increasingly bullish base metals on the back of surging demand from China. Most other analysts were looking for a slowdown.1 The metals rally earlier this year drew attention away from the fact that China had fundamentally altered its energy supply chain, when it unofficially banned imports of Australian thermal coal. It also altered global energy flows and will, over the winter, push inflation higher in the short run. Building new supply chains is difficult under the best of circumstances. But last winter had added dimensions of difficulty: A La Niña drawing arctic weather into the Northern Hemisphere and driving up space-heating demand; flooding in Indonesia, which limited coal shipments to China; and a manufacturing boom that pushed power supplies to the limit. Over the course of this year, Chinese coal inventories fell to rock-bottom levels and set off a scramble for liquified natural gas (LNG) to meet space-heating and manufacturing demand last winter (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekEnergy-Price Surge Will Lift Inflation Chart 2Coal Shortage China While this was evolving, the volume of manufactured exports from China was falling (Chart 3), even while the nominal value of these exports was rising in USD terms (Chart 4).  This is a classic inflationary set-up: More money chasing fewer goods.  This is occurring worldwide, as supply-chain bottlenecks, power rationing and shortages, and falling commodity inventories keep supplies of most industrial commodities tight.  China's export volumes peaked in February 2021, and moved lower since then.  This likely persists going forward, given the falloff of orders and orders in hand (Chart 5). Chart 3Volume Of China's Exports Falls … Chart 4… But The Nominal USD Value Rises Chart 5China's Official PMIs, Export And In-Hand Orders Weaken Space-heating and manufacturing in China are both heavily reliant on coal. Space-heating north of the Huai River is provided for free, or is heavily subsidized, from coal-fired boilers that pump heat to households and commercial establishments. This is a practice adopted from the Soviet Union in the 1950s and expanded until the 1980s, according to Fan et al (2020).3 Manufacturing pulls its electricity from a grid that produces 63% of its power from coal. China's coal output had been falling since December 2020, which complicated space heating and electricity markets, where prices were capped until this week. This meant electricity generators could not recover skyrocketing energy costs – coal in particular – and therefore ran the risk of bankruptcy.4 The loosening of price caps is now intended to relieve this pressure. Competition For Fuels Will Continue Europe was also hammered over the past year by a colder-than-normal winter brought on by a La Niña event, which sharply drew natgas inventories. The cold weather lingered into April-May, which slowed efforts to refill storage, and set off a scramble to buy up LNG cargoes (Chart 6). Chart 6The Scramble For Natgas Continues This competition has lifted global LNG prices to record levels, and continues to drive prices higher. Longer-term, the logic of markets – higher prices beget higher supply, and vice versa – virtually assures supply chains will be sorted out. However, the cost of energy generally will have to increase to incentivize production of the base metals needed to pull off the decarbonization of electricity production globally, and to keep sufficient supplies of fossil fuels on hand to back up renewable generation. This will cause inflation to grind higher over time. Decarbonization is a strategic agenda for leading governments, especially China and the European Union. China is fully committed to renewables for fear of pollution causing social unrest at home and import dependency causing national insecurity abroad. In the EU, energy insecurity is also an argument for green policy, which is supported by popular opinion. The US has greater energy security than these two but does not want to be left behind in the renewable technology race – it is increasing government green subsidies. The current set of ruling parties will continue to prioritize decarbonization for the immediate future. Compromises will be necessary on a tactical basis when energy price pressures rise too fast, as with China’s latest measures to restart coal-fired power production. The strategic direction is unlikely to change for some time. Investment Implications Over time, a structural shift in forward price curves for oil, gas and coal – e.g., a parallel shift higher from current levels – will be required to incentivize production increases. This would provide hedging opportunities for the producers of the fuels used to generate electricity, and the metals required to build the infrastructure needed by the low-carbon economies of the future. We continue to expect markets to remain tight on the supply side, which will make backwardation – i.e., prices for prompt-delivery commodities trade higher than those for deferred delivery – a persistent feature of commodities for the foreseeable future.  This is because inventories will remain under pressure, making commodity buyers more willing to pay up for prompt delivery. The current market set-up favors long commodity index products like the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF. We remain long both, given our expectation. Over the short term, inflation will be pushed higher by the rise in coal and gas prices.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), industrial consumption of natgas in the US is on track to surpass its five-year average this year. Over the January-July period, US natgas consumption average 22.4 BCF/d, putting it 0.2 BCF/d over its five-year average (2016-2020). US industrial consumption of natgas peaked in 2018-19 at just over 23 BCF/d, according to the EIA (Chart 7). The EIA expects full-year 2021 industrial consumption of natgas to be 23.1 BCF/d, which would tie it with the previous peak levels. Base Metals: Bullish Following a sharp increase in refined copper usage in China last year resulting from a surge in imports, the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) is expecting a 5% decline this year on the back of falling imports. Globally, the ICSG expects refined copper consumption to be unchanged this year, and rise 2.4% in 2022. Refined copper production is expected to be 25.9mm MT next year vs. 24.9mm MT this year. Consumption is forecast to grow to 25.6mm MT next year, up to 700k MT from the 24.96mm MT usage expected this year. Precious Metals: Bullish Lower-than-expected job growth in the US pushed gold prices higher at the end of last week on the back of expectations the Fed will continue to keep policy accessible as employment weakened. All the same, gold prices remain constrained by a well-bid USD, which continues to act as a headwind, and only minimal weakening of the 10-year US bond yield, which dipped slightly below the 1.61% level hit earlier in the week (Chart 8). Ags/Softs: Neutral This week's USDA World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) were mostly neutral for grains and bearish for soybeans. Global ending bean stocks are expected to rise almost 5.4% in the USDA's latest estimate for ending stocks in the current crop year, finishing at 104.6mm tons. Corn and rice ending stocks were projected to rise 1.4% and less than 1%, ending the crop year at 301.7mm tons and 183.6mm tons, respectively. According to the department, global wheat ending stocks are the lone standout, expected to fall 2.1% to 277.2mm tons, the lowest level since the 2016/17 crop year. Chart 7 Chart 8   Footnotes 1     Please see Copper Surge Welcomes Metal Ox Year, which we published on February 11, 2021.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     China’s move to switch to Indonesian coal at the beginning of this year to replace Aussie coal was disruptive to global markets.  As argusmedia.com reported, this was compounded by weather-related disruptions in Indonesian exports earlier this year.  It is worthwhile noting, weather-related delays returned last month, with flooding in Indonesia's coal-producing regions again are disrupting coal shipments.  We expect these new trade flows in coal will take a few more months to sort out, but they will be sorted. 3    Please see Maoyong Fan, Guojun He, and Maigeng Zhou (2020), " The winter choke: Coal-Fired heating, air pollution, and mortality in China," Journal of Health Economics, 71: 1-17.  4    In August and September, the South China Morning Post reported coal-powered electric generators petitioned authorities to relax price caps, because they faced bankruptcy from not being able to recover the skyrocketing cost of coal. Please see China coal-fired power companies on the verge of bankruptcy petition Beijing to raise electricity prices, published by scmp.com on September 10, 2021. This month, Shanxi Province, which provides about a third of China's domestically produced coal, was battered by flooding, which forced authorities to shut dozens of mines, according to the BBC. Please see China floods: Coal price hits fresh high as mines shut published by bbc.co.uk on October 12, 2021. Power supplies also were lean because of the central government's so-called dual-circulation policies to reduce energy consumption and the energy intensity of manufacturing. This is meant to increase self-reliance of the state. Please see What is behind China’s Dual Circulation Strategy? Published by the European think tank Bruegel on September 7, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations