医療

Highlights New structural recommendation: long GBP/USD. The substantial Brexit discount in the pound makes it a long-term buy for investors who can tolerate near-term volatility. The most powerful equity play on a fading Brexit discount would be the U.K. homebuilders. Specifically, Persimmon still has a further 25 percent of upside. Take profits in long Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. Within Europe, close the overweight to Switzerland and the underweight to the Netherlands. Stay overweight banks versus industrials. Stay overweight the Euro Stoxx 50 versus the Nikkei 225. Fractal trade: long NZD/JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Pound Has Substantial Upside If The Brexit Discount Fades Carnival Says The Pound Is Cheap Carnival, the world’s largest cruise liner company, lists its shares on both the London and New York stock exchanges. But there is an apparent riddle: in London the shares trade on a forward PE of 8.8, while in New York they trade on 9.4. How can Carnival trade at different valuations on the two sides of the Atlantic when the market should instantly arbitrage the difference away? The answer to the riddle is that the London listing is quoted in pounds, the New York listing is quoted in dollars, while Carnival’s sales and profits are denominated in a mix of international currencies. Neither Brexit developments nor a potential Jeremy Corbyn led government will prevent the pound from rallying in the longer term.  Carnival is trading on a higher valuation in New York versus London because the market is expecting its mixed currency earnings to appreciate more in dollar terms than in pound terms. Put another way, the valuation differential is expecting the pound to appreciate versus the dollar to a ‘fair value’ of around $1.40 (Chart I-2). Likewise, BHP Billiton shares are trading on a higher valuation in their Sydney listing compared to their London listing. This valuation differential is expecting the pound to appreciate versus the Australian dollar to around A$2.00 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Carnival Says The Pound Is Cheap Chart I-3BHP Billiton Says The Pound Is Cheap In other words, the market believes that neither Brexit developments nor a potential Jeremy Corbyn led government will prevent the pound from rallying in the longer term. We tend to agree. The Wrong Way To Pick Stock Markets… And The Right Way Before continuing with the pound’s prospects, let’s wander into the wider investment landscape. One important lesson from dual-listed companies like Carnival and BHP Billiton is that a multinational’s valuation will appear attractive in a market where the currency is structurally cheap.1 This lesson has deep ramifications. Today, multinationals dominate all the major stock markets, meaning that the entire stock market will appear cheap if its currency is cheap. The stock market will also appear cheap if it is skewed towards lower-valued sectors. But sectors trade on a low valuation for a reason – poor long-term growth prospects. Through the past decade, Japanese banks seemed a relative bargain, trading on a forward PE of less than half of that on personal products companies (Chart I-4). Yet Japanese banks were not a relative bargain. Quite the contrary. Through the past decade Japanese personal products have outperformed the banks by 500 percent! (Chart I-5) Chart I-4Japanese Banks Seemed A Relative Bargain... Chart I-5...But Japanese Banks Were Not A Relative Bargain Hence, beware of picking stock markets on the basis of observations such as ‘European stocks are cheaper than U.S. stocks’. Given that a stock market valuation is the result of its currency valuation and its sector composition, assessing relative value across major stock markets is extremely difficult, if not impossible. To repeat, Carnival appears to be trading at a valuation discount in London versus New York, but the cheapness is illusory. Here’s the right way to pick major stock markets. Identify your preferred sectors and currencies, and then pick the regional and country stock markets that are skewed to these preferred sectors and currencies. In this regard, large underweight sector skews also matter. For example, China and EM have a near-zero exposure to healthcare equities, so their performances tend to correlate negatively with that of the global healthcare sector – albeit the causality could run in either direction. Identify your preferred sectors and currencies, and then pick the regional and country stock markets that are skewed to these preferred sectors and currencies. In early May, we noticed that the extreme outperformance of technology versus healthcare was at a critical technical point at which there was a high probability of a trend reversal. This high conviction sector view implied overweight Europe versus China, as well as overweight Switzerland and underweight Netherlands within Europe (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6When Tech Underperforms Healthcare, China Underperforms Switzerland Chart I-7When Tech Underperforms Healthcare, The Netherlands Underperforms Switzerland   Given that this sector trend reversal has played out exactly as anticipated, it is time to bank the profits:   Close long Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. And within Europe, close the overweight to Switzerland and the underweight to the Netherlands. Right now, it is appropriate to overweight banks versus industrials. It is the pace of the bond yield’s decline that has weighed on bank performance this year. But if the sharpest decline in bond yields is behind us, as seems likely, then banks should fare better versus other cyclicals (Chart I-8). Chart I-8If The Sharpest Decline In Bond Yields Is Over, Banks Will Outperform Industrials Once again, this sector view carries an equity market implication: stay overweight the Euro Stoxx 50 versus the Nikkei 225 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Euro Stoxx 50 Vs. Nikkei 225 = Global Banks In Euros Vs. Global Industrials In Yen The Pound Is A Long-Term Buy Back to the pound. The message from the dual listings of Carnival and BHP Billiton is that the pound is cheap, and this is neatly corroborated by the relationship between relative interest rates and the pound versus the euro and dollar. Based on the pre-Brexit relationship between relative real interest rates and the pound’s exchange rate, we can quantify the ‘Brexit discount’. Absent this discount, the pound would now be trading close to €1.30 and well north of $1.40 (Chart of the Week and Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Pound Has Substantial Upside If The Brexit Discount Fades In the Brexit psychodrama, we do not claim to know exactly how the next few days or weeks will play out. In the short term, Brexit is a classic non-linear system, and non-linear systems are inherently unpredictable. However, in the longer term we expect the Brexit discount to fade in any sort of transitioned resolution that allows the U.K. to adapt to a new trading relationship with the world, or alternatively to stay in a relationship broadly similar to the current one. Whatever the eventual endpoint is, the key requirement to remove the Brexit discount is to avoid a cliff-edge. We expect the Brexit discount to fade in any sort of transitioned resolution. The stumbling block to a resolution is that the three key actors – the EU, the U.K. government, and the U.K. parliament – have conflicting red lines, so the Brexit ‘Venn diagram’ has had no overlap. The EU will not countenance a customs border that divides Ireland; the current U.K. government wants a Free Trade Agreement, which implies casting away Northern Ireland into the EU customs union; and the current U.K. parliament – unless its intentions suddenly change – wants the whole of the U.K., including Northern Ireland, to remain in the EU customs union.   Given that the EU will not budge its red line, the only way to a lasting resolution is for the government and parliament red lines to realign, This could happen via parliament being willing to sacrifice Northern Ireland, via a second referendum, or via a general election in which the government’s intentions and/or the composition of parliament changed. Given a long enough investment horizon – 2 years or more – it is likely that the government and parliament will realign their red lines to a Free Trade Agreement or to a customs union, one way or another. On this basis, the substantial Brexit discount in the pound makes it a long-term buy for investors who can tolerate near-term volatility. Accordingly, today we are initiating a new structural recommendation: long GBP/USD.  For equity investors, the most powerful play on a fading Brexit discount would be the U.K. homebuilders (Chart I-11). Specifically, if the pound reached $1.40, Persimmon still has a further 25 percent of upside. Chart I-11U.K. Homebuilders Have Substantial Upside If The Brexit Discount Fades Fractal Trading System*  Based on its collapsed fractal structure, we anticipate a countertrend rally in NZD/JPY within the next 130 days. Accordingly, go long NZD/JPY setting a profit target of 3 percent and a symmetrical stop-loss. Chart I-12 For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.   * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 There are also several companies with dual listings in the U.K. and the euro area. Unfortunately, these valuation differentials have been temporarily distorted by the risk of a no-deal Brexit, in which EU27 investors may have been forbidden from trading in the U.K. listed shares. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Fractal Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

特別レポート

2010年晩夏、我々はデフレーション期における米国株式のセクター間相対パフォーマンスを概観するスペシャルレポートを公表しました。それ以降、インフレーション—より具体的にはコアPCEデフレーター—は2018年中頃に連邦準備制度理事会（FRB）の2％目標と短く“戯れ”たに過ぎず、長期のインフレ期待は高い水準へ再定着することはありませんでした。 憂慮すべきことに、インフレが今後数四半期で頭をもたげるのではなく、むしろ弱まる兆候が出始めています。 評論家たち—我々も含めて—は依然としてインフレ圧力が最終的に浸透するのを待っています。憂慮すべきことに、インフレが今後数四半期で頭をもたげるのではなく、むしろ弱まる兆候が出始めています（チャート1）。 2018年後半の金融状況の引き締まりは、若干のラグを伴って前年比CPI成長率を下押しするでしょう（上段、チャート1）。より広く見れば、ISM製造業PMIの急落（およびそのほとんどのサブコンポーネントに見られる動き）が示すように、米国経済の継続的な減速はインフレにとって深刻な逆風です（第2パネル、チャート1）。 世界的な成長の弱さを受け、逆循環通貨である米ドルの上昇も今後のインフレを抑制する要因となるでしょう（図示せず）。さらに、最近の力強いインフレ数値を我々は持続可能とは見なしていません。実際、コア・グッズCPI—コアCPIの25％を占め、最近の主な牽引役になっている—は、今後18か月でピークアウトして縮小する見込みです（第3パネル、チャート1）。 チャート1 まだインフレを探しているのか？ まだインフレを探していますか？ まだインフレを探していますか？ U.S. エクイティ・ストラテジーの企業の価格決定力（プライシング・パワー）代理指標も急落しており、コアインフレの下落が最も抵抗の少ない経路であることを裏付けています（下段、チャート1）。 言い換えれば、もしマーティ・マクフライが再びデロリアンに乗って過去へ戻れるなら、デフレーション／ディスインフレーションがBCAにおける主要な株式テーマであることを確かに支持し、我々に以前の分析をさらに掘り下げるよう頼むでしょう。本レポートはまさにその作業です。 我々は現在のディスインフレ傾向を認め、そのような期間における各株式セクターの歴史的相対パフォーマンスの詳細を示します。我々は単純なトレーディングルールを紹介します。デフレ期を企業部門価格デフレーターの成長が2四半期以上連続でマイナスとなる期間と定義しています（チャート2）。より広いデフレ傾向の中で単発のプラス成長四半期は外れ値として扱い、塗りつぶされた期間内の時折の四半期反発として扱います。 チャート2 デフレーション期 デフレ期 デフレ期 次のページでは、各セクターの歴史的相対パフォーマンスについてさらに詳述します。特筆すべきは、企業部門価格デフレーターの成長が2四半期連続でマイナスとなったシグナルに従うことで得られた年率換算リターンの概要を短く示す点です。1960年以降、そのようなシグナルは27回あり、中央値の継続期間は15か月、最短は6か月でした。したがって、我々は6か月、12か月、24か月の投資期間を用いて、デフレーション期に好成績を示したセクターをロング、インフレ期に好成績を示したセクターをショートすることに自信を持っています。 表1はこの実証的検証の結果を要約したものです。 表1 セクター相対パフォーマンスとデフレーション（1960年〜現時点） デフレ環境下におけるセクターのパフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ デフレ環境下におけるセクターのパフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ 我々の仮説は、ディスインフレーション期にはディフェンシブがサイクリカルを上回るというものです。GICS11の相対セクターパフォーマンスはこの仮説と一致しています。具体的には、我々のデフレシグナルに続き、ディフェンシブは6か月で1.4％上昇する一方、サイクリカルは2.5％下落します。12か月時点では転換点が見られ、サイクリカルは-2.5％から-0.21％へと損失を回復し始め、ディフェンシブは1.38％から0.76％へと利得を手放します。この結果は前述の中央値である15か月のデフレ期間と整合します。同様に、24か月先を見ると、サイクリカルが0.5％で市場をアウトパフォームしており（主にテクノロジーが牽引）、ディフェンシブは-1.2％で市場に劣後している（通信とユーティリティが足を引っ張る）、すなわち市場が回復していることを示唆しています。 図1 パフォーマンス・タイムライン デフレの世界におけるセクター・パフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ デフレの世界におけるセクター・パフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ 重要なのは、我々の定義する2四半期シグナルにより2018年中頃に始まったデフレーション環境下に我々は現在いるということであり、U.S. エクイティ・ストラテジーは過去6か月にわたってサイクリカルのエクスポージャーを積極的に削減し、幅広い株式市場の見通しに対して投資家に慎重であるべきことを強調してきました。 再び表1に戻ると、GICS1のセクターパフォーマンスには我々の期待と異なるいくつかの乖離も見られます。ユーティリティーズはディスインフレーション期にアウトパフォームするはずで、理由は2つあります：(1) 安定したキャッシュフロー成長、(2) 低下する金利が高利回りの代替資産の魅力を高めるためです。もう一つの注目すべき外れ値はS&P コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー指数です。具体的には、我々のデフレシグナル後の6か月で約2％のアンダーパフォームが見られ、これは金利低下が辺際で裁量的支出を押し上げるはずという我々の期待を覆すものでした。 結論として、我々は表1の結果とセクター別コメントを要約したタイムラインも提示します。重要なのは、このタイムラインはデフレーション環境をナビゲートするための「経験則」としてのみ使うべきロードマップであるという点です。中央値が15か月であっても、デフレーション期間は1年足らずから4年以上まで幅があります。常に文脈が重要です。 最後に、今後数か月内に予定している我々の従来の米国株式セクターの利益率見通しレポートの更新にご期待ください。 以下は各セクター別の追加分析の詳細と、セクター別の価格決定力および売上回転率に関するチャートです。     Jeremie Peloso, リサーチアナリスト JeremieP@bcaresearch.com   Arseniy Urazov, リサーチアソシエイト ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   コンシューマー・ステープルズ（オーバーウェイト） 生活必需品 生活必需品 S&P コンシューマー・ステープルズ指数はデフレーション期に良好なパフォーマンスを示します。この指数の避難先としての性格と、業界の継続的な再編が説明要因と考えられます。 当社のセクター価格決定力代理指標は、ステープルズが2003年以降、価格決定力の収縮を経験していないことを示しています。 相対株価は回復基調にありますが、依然として歴史的トレンドを下回る1標準偏差の位置にあります。デフレシグナル後の6か月、12か月、24か月の驚異的なリターンを考えれば、さらなる上昇が期待されます。 我々はS&P コンシューマー・ステープルズ指数をオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 コンシューマー・ステイプルズ コンシューマー・ステイプルズ エネルギー（オーバーウェイト） エネルギー エネルギー サイクリカル群の中で、S&P エネルギーは2番目に大きなアンダーパフォーマーであり、我々のデフレシグナル後6か月で平均して相対的に3.4％下落します。 このアンダーパフォーマンスは当社の価格決定力（PP）代理指標にも明確に表れています。エネルギー企業のPPは経済がデフレに入ると同時に低下します。これは、原油がほぼ全てのインフレ／デフレ指標において重要な役割を果たすという我々の予想と一致します。 ただし現時点での注意点として、最近の原油価格の急騰は、暴落したエネルギー株に格好の価値機会をもたらす触媒となり得ます。サウジアラビアの生産・精製施設に対するドローン攻撃の結果、地政学的プレミアムが原油価格に持続的に織り込まれることを我々は想定しています。 我々は現時点でS&P エネルギー指数をオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 エネルギー エネルギー ヘルスケア（オーバーウェイト） ヘルスケア ヘルスケア デフレーション期において、S&P ヘルスケア・セクターはS&P コンシューマー・ステープルズと同様に市場をアウトパフォームしています。 ヘルスケア産業の避難先的性格に加え、価格決定力はデータ系列の全期間を通じてゼロラインを下回ったことがありません。この顕著な実績は同セクターの売上成長にも当てはまります。 我々は現時点でS&P ヘルスケア指数をオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 ヘルスケア ヘルスケア インダストリアルズ（オーバーウェイト） インダストリアルズ インダストリアルズ デフレーションの瀬戸際では、インダストリアル株は2つの相反する力に直面します：原材料の値下がりと経済活動の減速です。 最終的には経済の軟化が勝ち、この深いサイクリカル指標は6か月、12か月、24か月でそれぞれ-1.4％、-1.0％、-0.5％と市場に対してアンダーパフォームします。 このセクターの価格決定力はしばしばデフレーション域に入ると鋭く低下し、インダストリアルズの収益見通しと相対パフォーマンスに重しをかけます。 我々は現時点でS&P インダストリアルズ・セクターをオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 インダストリアルズ インダストリアルズ ファイナンシャルズ（オーバーウェイト） 金融 金融 早期に反応するサイクリカルセクターであるため、我々の2四半期デフレシグナル後、S&P ファイナンシャルズ・セクターが6か月、12か月、24か月で市場にアンダーパフォームするのは驚くべきことではありません。 ファイナンシャルズの最大のアンダーパフォーマンスはデフレーション期の後半に現れます。実際、もしユーティリティーズを分析から除外していたなら、S&P ファイナンシャルズは12か月および24か月の両期間で最も成績の悪いセクターになっていたでしょう。 約42％を占めるヘビーウェイトの銀行サブグループがこのアンダーパフォーマンスを説明します。思い出していただきたいのは、銀行はデフレーション／ディスインフレーションによってクレジットの価格が下落する際にアンダーパフォームするという点です。 当社のフィクスト・インカム・ストラテジストは債券市場の売りを予想しているため、我々はS&P ファイナンシャルズ指数をオーバーウェイトで維持します。 金融 金融 テクノロジー（ニュートラル – 格下げ注意） テクノロジー テクノロジー 2010年に我々はテック株がデフレーション期の勝者であると再確認しましたが、これは現在も変わっていません。革新の猛烈なペース自体が、セクターをデフレーションの局面に耐えうるものにしています。 サイクリカル内では、テクノロジーは表1で圧倒的に最良のパフォーマーですが、現在の地政学的および貿易緊張は我々に同セクターをニュートラルとすることを促しています。将来的にソフトウェアのサブグループの格下げを通じた本格的な格下げが到来する可能性があります。 テックの価格決定力はデフレーション期でも頑強です。しかし、サイクルでピークアウトしたように見えるテックの売上成長は激しく振れるため、下振れ局面が近づくと潜在的な乱高下を警告しています。 我々はS&P テクノロジー・セクターをニュートラルとし、格下げ監視リストに載せています。 テクノロジー テクノロジー テレコミュニケーション・サービス（ニュートラル） テレコミュニケーション・サービス テレコミュニケーション・サービス 伝統的にディフェンシブであるテレコム・サービス株は近年苦戦しており、債務の増加に悩まされ、「ダムパイプ（単なる通信路）」にならないよう重要性を維持しようともがいています。 業界の価格決定力代理指標も同様の点を強調しており、テレコム各社は世界金融危機（GFC）以来、地盤を取り戻すことができていません。 もう一つ重要な点は、この指数が我々が検証した全ての期間で市場に対して著しくアンダーパフォームしていることです：-1.5％、-2.0％、-4.4％。我々の仮説では、テレコム事業者は安定したキャッシュフロー生成と高い配当利回りプロファイルのためデフレーション期にアウトパフォームするはずでしたが、実証的事実は逆を示しています。 おそらく、この数十年にわたる持続的なアンダーパフォーマンスは、もはやニッチ化したこの避難先産業のセクター固有のダイナミクスに原因があることを示唆しています。 我々は現時点でS&P テレコミュニケーション・サービス指数をニュートラルとします。 テレコミュニケーション・サービス テレコミュニケーション・サービス マテリアルズ（アンダーウェイト） 資料 資料 ここ数年の中国および一般的に新興市場複合体からのコモディティ需要の大きさにもかかわらず、S&P マテリアルズ・セクターは構造的な下降トレンドから脱却できていません。 このセクターはディスインフレーションの主要な敗者の一つであり、チャートからも明らかです。重要なのは、1970年代中盤以降、マテリアルズが市場をアウトパフォームしたほとんどの期間は塗りつぶされた領域や景気後退の外側で発生している点です。 平均して、グローバル成長が弱まるとマテリアルズの価格決定力は急落する傾向があり、僅かな遅れを伴って同セクターの売上成長も後退する可能性が高く、サイクルの売上成長は既にピークアウトしたことを示唆しています。 我々はS&P マテリアルズ・セクターの最近の格下げを受け、アンダーウェイトを繰り返します。 資料 資料 コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー（アンダーウェイト – 格上げ注意) コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー 我々の仮説に反して、S&P コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー株は金利を押し下げるディスインフレーション期においてアンダーパフォームします。おそらく、経済活動の減速が金利低下を上回り、消費者はディスクリショナリーな購入からステープルズ系の商品・サービスへと寄り添うためです。 表1は、コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー株が実際にはデフレーション期の初期に最も打撃を受け（-2.0％）、その後12か月で急速に回復しわずかにプラス（0.1％）に転じることを示しています。 我々は現時点でS&P コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー指数をアンダーウェイトとしていますが、買い機会の可能性として格上げ注意リストに載せています。 コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー ユーティリティーズ（アンダーウェイト） ユーティリティ ユーティリティ 本スペシャルレポートの最後のセクターとして、S&P ユーティリティーズは我々の分析で顕著な外れ値であり、期待通りに振る舞わないことを指摘していました。おそらく業界固有のダイナミクスが働いており、高利回りの避難先であるユーティリティーズ株はデフレーション期に大きくアンダーパフォームしています。 同セクターは6か月、12か月、24か月でそれぞれ市場に対して-3.5％、-4.3％、-4.5％のリターンです。理論的には、相対株価を押し上げるはずの2つの要因がありました：(1) 安定したキャッシュフロー成長、(2) 低下する金利は高利回りの代替資産の魅力を高める、の両方です。 しかし、どちらも長年にわたる構造的な下降トレンドからの脱却には十分ではありませんでした。 我々は現時点でS&P ユーティリティーズ指数をアンダーウェイトとします。 ユーティリティ ユーティリティ   脚注 1    GICS 1の親インデックスであるCommunication Services指数は最近導入されたためデータが不足しており、代わりにGICS 2のテレコミュニケーション・サービス指数を使用しています。

Overweight While the latest ISM manufacturing survey made for grim reading, there is a corner of the manufacturing landscape that excels when overall manufacturing is in retreat: health care equipment (HCE) makers (second panel, ISM shown inverted). This defensive health care sub-group is firing on all cylinders. Not only is medical equipment industrial production going against the grain and climbing at a healthy clip, but also the industry’s new orders-to-inventories ratio is in its third consecutive year of a sling shot recovery. Moreover, HCE pricing power is expanding smartly at a time when our overall corporate pricing power proxy is contracting. All of this suggests that the earnings-driven vault to all-time relative performance highs has staying power. Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent boost to an overweight stance in the S&P health care equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the index are: BLBG: S5HCEP – ABT, MDT, DHR, BDX, SYK, ISRG, BSX, BAX, EW, ZBH, IDXX, RMD, TFX, HOLX, ABMD, VAR.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Despite the Fed’s supra natural powers, the deep rooted global growth slowdown will likely win the tug of war versus flush liquidity, especially if the trade war spat stays unresolved and the U.S. dollar remains well bid, both of which undermine U.S. corporate sector profitability. Recent Changes There are no changes to the portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature Equities hit all-time highs last week, eagerly anticipating this Wednesday’s Fed decision to commence an easing interest rate cycle and save the day. The looming global liquidity injection is the sole reason that stocks are holding near their all-time highs. While markets are treating the Fed as a deity, empirical evidence suggests that risks are actually lurking beneath the surface. Over the past two decades the correlation between stocks and the fed funds rate has been tight and positive. Given the bond market’s view of four fed cuts in the coming year, equity gains are likely running on fumes (Chart 1). Chart 1Mind The Positive Correlation As we highlighted recently, we remain perplexed that stocks are diverging from earnings.1 Anticipating a flush global liquidity backdrop (i.e. global central banks increasing their reflationary efforts) likely explains this dynamic as the former should ultimately rekindle economic growth, which in turn should boost profit growth. However, the disinflationary fallout from the ongoing manufacturing recession and the petering out in the global credit impulse signal that the liquidity pipes remain clogged. We recently read and re-read the Bank For International Settlements (BIS) Hyun Song Shin’s “What is behind the recent slowdown” speech where he eloquently argues that the global trade deceleration predates last spring’s U.S./China trade dispute.2 Shin has a compelling argument blaming the growth deceleration on the drop in manufactured goods global value chains (GVC) and he depicts this as global trade trailing global GDP (top panel, Chart 2). Interestingly, despite the V-shaped recovery following the Great Recession, global trade never really regained its footing, failing to surpass the 2007 peak. Shin then links this slowdown in global supply chains to financial conditions and the role that banking plays in global trade financing. The middle panel of Chart 2 shows that the GVC move with the ebbs and flows of global banks. In other words, healthy banks tend to boost global trade and vice versa. Finally, given that most trade financing is conducted in U.S. dollars, the greenback’s recent appreciation also explains trade blues. Simply put, decreased availability of U.S. dollar denominated bank credit as a result of a rising greenback is another culprit (U.S. dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 2). Ergo, there is no miracle cure for the sputtering world economy, especially given the recent re-escalation in global trade tensions and the stubbornly high U.S. dollar, and the gap between buoyant share prices and poor profit performance is likely to narrow via a fall in the former. Two weeks ago we highlighted that foreign sourced profits for U.S. multinationals are under attack as BCA’s global ex-U.S. ZEW survey ticked down anew (top panel, Chart 3). Tack on the global race to ZIRP (and in some cases further into NIRP) and it is crystal clear that the profit recession has yet to run its course. Chart 2Grim Trade Backdrop... Chart 3...Will Continue To Weigh On Foreign Sourced Profits   Meanwhile, China is likely exporting its deflation to the rest of the world and until its business sector regains pricing power, U.S. profits will continue to suffer (bottom panel, Chart 3). Turning over to U.S. shores and domestic corporate pricing power, the news is equally grim. Our pricing power proxy is outright contracting and warns that revenue growth is also under duress for U.S. corporates. Similarly, the ISM manufacturing prices paid subcomponent fell below the 50 boom/bust line and steeply contracting raw industrials commodities are signaling that 6%/annum top line growth for the SPX is unsustainable (Chart 4). On a cyclical 3-12 month time horizon we remain cautious on the broad equity market. Chart 4Sales Pressures... Chart 5...Are Building Rapidly Melting inflation expectations and the NY Fed’s softening Underlying Inflation Gauge (UIG) best encapsulate this softening revenue backdrop and warn that any further letdown in inflation risks sinking S&P 500 sales growth below the zero line (Chart 5).   Netting it all out, despite the Fed’s supra natural powers, the deep rooted global growth slowdown will likely win the tug of war versus flush liquidity, especially if the trade war spat stays unresolved and the U.S. dollar remains well bid, both of which undermine U.S. corporate sector profitability. On a cyclical 3-12 month time horizon we remain cautious on the broad equity market. This is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which stands in contrast to the more sanguine equity BCA House View. What follows is a recap of recent (mostly) defensive moves in the health care, consumer staples, materials, tech, consumer discretionary and communication services sectors.   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   S&P Health Care (Overweight) Upgraded from Neutral S&P Health Care Equipment (Overweight) Upgraded from Neutral Fear-based sell-off created a buying opportunity in the U.S. health care equipment index as fundamentals remain upbeat. Rising U.S. medical equipment exports are a tailwind for this health care subgroup as 60% of its revenues are generated outside the United States (second panel). The EM demographic shift (not shown) represents yet another boost to the sector as U.S. companies are the technology leaders and often the only source for equipping hospitals/clinics around the globe. Our move to upgrade the S&P health care equipment index also pushed the entire health care sector from neutral to overweight (bottom panel). S&P Health Care S&P Managed Health Care (Overweight) Upgraded from Neutral The Bernie Sanders “Medicare For All” bill reintroduction created a buying opportunity in the S&P managed health care index and we were swift to act on it in mid-April. Contained industry cost factors including wages staying at the 2% mark help preserve industry margins (bottom panel). Melting medical cost inflation signals that HMO profit margins will likely expand (third panel). Overall healthy labor market conditions with unemployment insurance claims probing 60-year lows should underpin managed health care enrollment (top & second panels). S&P Managed Health Care   S&P Hypermarkets (Overweight) Upgraded from Neutral S&P Soft Drinks (Neutral) Upgraded from Underweight A deteriorating macro landscape reflected in the steep fall in U.S. economic data surprises, the drubbing of the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and melting inflation make a compelling case for an overweight stance in the S&P Hypermarkets index (top & second panels). Similarly, safe haven soft drinks stocks shine when economic conditions are deteriorating (third panel). This defensive pure-play consumer goods sub-sector is also enjoying a rebound in operating metrics, and thus it no longer pays to stay bearish. We lifted exposure to neutral last week, locking in gains of 5.5% since inception. S&P Hypermarkets   S&P Materials (Neutral) Downgraded from Overweight S&P Chemicals (Underweight) Downgraded from Neutral Global macro headwinds continue to weigh on this deep cyclical sub-index as the risks of a full-blown trade war will likely take a bite out of final demand (third panel). Chemical producers garner 60% of their revenues from abroad and falling U.S. chemical exports are troublesome for this index (top & second panels). Given that chemicals have a 74% market cap weight in the S&P materials index, our move to underweight on the sub-index level also pushed the entire S&P materials index to neutral from overweight. S&P Materials   S&P Technology (Neutral) Downgrade Alert S&P Software (Overweight) Lifted trailing stops As a part of our portfolio de-risking measures, we put a 27% profit-taking stop loss on our overweight S&P software index call on June 10. Once triggered, a downgrade to neutral in the S&P software index would also push our S&P tech sector weight to a below benchmark allocation. Meanwhile, our EPS model for the overall tech sector is on the verge of contraction on the back of sinking capex and a firming U.S. dollar (middle panel). The San Francisco Fed’s Tech Pulse Index is also closing in on the expansion/contraction line warning that tech stocks are in for a rough ride (bottom panel). S&P Technology   S&P Technology Hardware, Storage & Peripherals (Neutral) Downgraded from Overweight As nearly 60% of the revenues for the S&P technology hardware, storage & peripherals (THS&P) index are sourced from abroad, deflating EM currencies sap foreign consumer purchasing power and weigh on the industry’s exports (third panel). Global export volumes have sunk into contractionary territory, to a level last seen during the Great Recession (not shown) and underscore that industry exports will remain under pressure. The IFO World Economic Survey confirms this challenging export backdrop as it is still pointing toward sustained global export ails (second panel). As a result, all of this has shaken our confidence in an overweight stance in the S&P THS&P and we were compelled to move to the sidelines in early June for a modest relative loss since inception. S&P Technology Hardware, Storage & Peripherals S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Upgrade Alert S&P Home Improvement Retail (Neutral) Upgraded from underweight In the July 8 Weekly Report, we put the S&P consumer discretionary sector on an upgrade alert as this early-cyclical sector benefits the most from lower interest rates (bottom panel). The way we will execute this upgrade will be by triggering the upgrade alert on the S&P internet retail index. Melting interest rates and rebounding lumber prices are a boon for home improvement retailers (HIR, second & third panels). Tack on profit-augmenting industry productivity gains and it no longer pays to be bearish HIR. S&P Consumer Discretionary S&P Homebuilders (Neutral) Downgraded from overweight Long S&P Homebuilders / Short S&P Home Improvement Retail Booked Profits Lumber represents an input cost to homebuilders (we booked profits of 10% in our overweight recommendation on May 22 and downgraded to neutral) whereas it is an important selling item in Big Box building & supply retailers that make a set margin on it (third panel). On June 18, as part of our de-risking strategy, we locked in 10% gains in the long S&P homebuilders/short S&P home improvement retail trade that hit our stop loss and we moved to the sidelines. S&P Homebuilders S&P Telecommunication Services (Neutral) Upgraded from Underweight The recent escalation of the trade spat has pushed July’s Markit’s flash U.S. manufacturing PMI reading to 50 - the lowest level since the history of the data. Historically, relative S&P telecom services share price momentum has moved inversely with the manufacturing PMI and the current message is to expect a sustained rebound in the former (bottom panel). Rock bottom profit expectations and firming industry operating metrics signal that most of the grim news is priced in bombed out telecom services valuations (middle panel), and it no longer pays to be underweight. In late-May, we lifted exposure to neutral for 6% relative gains since inception. S&P Telecommunication Services S&P Movies & Entertainment (Overweight) Upgraded from Neutral Structural shifts in the streaming services industry marked a start of a pricing war with incumbents and new entrants fighting for market share, as evidenced by DIS’s pricing of their upcoming Disney+ service. Consumer confidence remains glued to multi-decade highs and there are high odds that the big gulf that has opened up between confidence and relative S&P movies & entertainment share prices will narrow via a rise in the latter (top panel). Moreover, more dollars spent on recreation is synonymous with a margin expansion in the S&P movies & entertainment index (bottom panel). This consumer spending backdrop is also conducive to a rise in relative profitability, the opposite of what the sell-side currently expects. S&P Movies & Entertainment   Arseniy Urazov, Research Associate ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Beware Profit Recession” dated July 8, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp190514.pdf   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

特別レポート

Productivity growth is experiencing a cyclical rebound, but remains structurally weak. The end of the deepening of globalization, statistical hurdles, and the possibility that today’s technological advances may not be as revolutionary as past ones all hamper productivity. On the back of rising market power and concentration, companies are increasing markups instead of production. This is depressing productivity and lowering the neutral rate of interest. For now, investors can generate alpha by focusing on consolidating industries. Growing market power cannot last forever and will meet a political wall. Structurally, this will hurt asset prices.   “We don’t have a free market; don’t kid yourself. (…) Businesspeople are enemies of free markets, not friends (…) businesspeople are all in favor of freedom for everybody else (…) but when it comes to their own business, they want to go to Washington to protect their businesses.” Milton Friedman, January 1991. Despite the explosion of applications of growing computing power, U.S. productivity growth has been lacking this cycle. This incapacity to do more with less has weighed on trend growth and on the neutral rate of interest, and has been a powerful force behind the low level of yields at home and abroad. In this report, we look at the different factors and theories advanced to explain the structural decline in productivity. Among them, a steady increase in corporate market power not only goes a long way in explaining the lack of productivity in the U.S., but also the high level of profit margins along with the depressed level of investment and real neutral rates. A Simple Cyclical Explanation The decline in productivity growth is both a structural and cyclical story. Historically, productivity growth has followed economic activity. When demand is strong, businesses can generate more revenue and therefore produce more. The historical correlation between U.S. nonfarm business productivity and the ISM manufacturing index illustrates this relationship (Chart II-1). Chart II-1The Cyclical Behavior Of Productivity Chart II-2Deleveraging Hurts Productivity Since 2008, as households worked off their previous over-indebtedness, the U.S. private sector has experienced its longest deleveraging period since the Great Depression. This frugality has depressed demand and contributed to lower growth this cycle. Since productivity is measured as output generated by unit of input, weak demand growth has depressed productivity statistics. On this dimension, the brief deleveraging experience of the early 1990s is instructive: productivity picked up only after 1993, once the private sector began to accumulate debt faster than the pace of GDP growth (Chart II-2). The recent pick-up in productivity reflects these debt dynamics. Since 2009, the U.S. non-financial private sector has stopped deleveraging, removing one anchor on demand, allowing productivity to blossom. Moreover, the pick-up in capex from 2017 to present is also helping productivity by raising the capital-to-workers ratio. While this is a positive development for the U.S. economy, the decline in productivity nonetheless seems structural, as the five-year moving average of labor productivity growth remains near its early 1980s nadir (Chart II-3). Something else is at play. The Usual Suspects Three major forces are often used to explain why observed productivity growth is currently in decline: A slowdown in global trade penetration, the fact that statisticians do not have a good grasp on productivity growth in a service-based economy, and innovation that simply isn’t what it used to be. Slowdown In Global Trade Penetration Two hundred years ago, David Ricardo argued that due to competitive advantages, countries should always engage in trade to increase their economic welfare. This insight has laid the foundation of the argument that exchanges between nations maximizes the utilization of resources domestically and around the world. The collapse in new business formation in the U.S. is another fascinating development. Rarely was this argument more relevant than over the past 40 years. On the heels of the supply-side revolution of the early 1980s and the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization took off. The share of the world's population participating in the global capitalist system rose from 30% in 1985 to nearly 100% today. Generating elevated productivity gains is simpler when a country’s capital stock is underdeveloped: each unit of investment grows the capital-to-labor ratio by a greater proportion. As a result, productivity – which reflects the capital-to-worker ratio – can grow quickly. As more poor countries have joined the global economy and benefitted from FDI and other capital inflows, their productivity has flourished. Consequently, even if productivity growth has been poor in advanced economies over the past 10 years, global productivity has remained high and has tracked the share of exports in global GDP (Chart II-4). Chart II-4The Apex Of Globalization Represented The Summit Of Global Productivity Growth This globalization tailwind to global productivity growth is dissipating. First, following an investment boom where poor decisions were made, EM productivity growth has been declining. Second, with nearly 100% of the world’s labor supply already participating in the global economy, it is increasingly difficult to expand the share of global trade in global GDP and increase the benefit of cross-border specialization. Finally, the popular backlash in advanced economies against globalization could force global trade into reverse. As economic nationalism takes hold, cross-border investments could decline, moving the world economy further away from an optimal allocation of capital. These forces may explain why global productivity peaked earlier this decade. Productivity Is Mismeasured Recently deceased luminary Martin Feldstein argued that the structural decline in productivity is an illusion. As the argument goes, productivity is not weak; it is only underestimated. A parallel with the introduction of electricity in the late 19th century often comes to mind. Back then, U.S. statistical agencies found it difficult to disentangle price changes from quantity changes in the quickly growing revenues of electrical utilities. As a result, the Bureau Of Labor Statistics overestimated price changes in the early 20th century, which depressed the estimated output growth of utilities by a similar factor. Since productivity is measured as output per unit of labor, this also understated actual productivity growth – not just for utilities but for the economy as a whole. Ultimately, overall productivity growth was revised upward. Chart II-5Plenty Of Room To Mismeasure Real Output Growth In today’s economy, this could be a larger problem, as 70% of output is generated in the service sector. Estimating productivity growth is much harder in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector, as there is no actual countable output to measure. Thus, distinguishing price increases from quantity or quality improvements is challenging. Adding to this difficulty, the service sector is one of the main beneficiaries of the increase in computational power currently disrupting industries around the world. The growing share of components of the consumer price index subject to hedonic adjustments highlight this challenge (Chart II-5). Estimating quality changes is hard and may bias the increase in prices in the economy. If prices are unreliably measured, so will output and productivity. Pushing The Production Frontier Is Increasingly Hard Chart II-6A Multifaceted Decline In Productivity Another school of thought simply accepts that productivity growth has declined in a structural fashion. It is far from clear that the current technological revolution is much more productivity-enhancing than the introduction of electricity 140 years ago, the development of the internal combustion engine in the late 19th century, the adoption of indoor plumbing, or the discovery of penicillin in 1928. It is easy to overestimate the economic impact of new technologies. At first, like their predecessors, the microprocessor and the internet created entirely new industries. But this is not the case anymore. For all its virtues, e-commerce is only a new method of selling goods and services. Cloud computing is mainly a way to outsource hardware spending. Social media’s main economic value has been to gather more information on consumers, allowing sellers to reach potential buyers in a more targeted way. Without creating entirely new industries, spending on new technologies often ends up cannibalizing spending on older technologies. For example, while Google captures 32.4% of global ad revenues, similar revenues for the print industry have fallen by 70% since their apex in 2000. If new technologies are not as accretive to production as the introduction of previous ones were, productivity growth remains constrained by the same old economic forces of capex, human capital growth and resource utilization. And as Chart II-6 shows, labor input, the utilization of capital and multifactor productivity have all weakened. Some key drivers help understand why productivity growth has downshifted structurally. Let’s look at human capital. It is much easier to grow human capital when very few people have a high-school diploma: just make a larger share of your population finish high school, or even better, complete a university degree. But once the share of university-educated citizens has risen, building human capital further becomes increasingly difficult. Chart II-7 illustrates this problem. Growth in educational achievement has been slowing since 1995 in both advanced and developing economies. This means that the growth of human capital is slowing. This is without even wading into whether or not the quality of education has remained constant. This is pure market power, and it helps explain the gap between wages and productivity. Human capital is also negatively impacted by demographic trends. Workers in their forties tend to be at the peak of their careers, with the highest accumulated job know-how. Problematically, these workers represent a shrinking share of the labor force, which is hurting productivity trends (Chart II-8). Chart II-8Demographics Are Hurting Productivity   The capital stock too is experiencing its own headwinds. While Moore’s Law seems more or less intact, the decline in the cost of storing information is clearly decelerating (Chart II-9). Today, quality adjusted IT prices are contracting at a pace of 2.3% per annum, compared to annual declines of 14% at the turn of the millennium. Thus, even if nominal spending in IT investment had remained constant, real investment growth would have sharply decelerated (Chart II-10). But since nominal spending has decelerated greatly from its late 1990s pace, real investment in IT has fallen substantially. The growth of the capital stock is therefore lagging its previous pace, which is hurting productivity growth. Chart II-10The Impact Of Slowing IT Deflation Chart II-11A Dearth Of New Businesses   The collapse in new business formation in the U.S. is another fascinating development (Chart II-11). New businesses are a large source of productivity gains. Ultimately, 20% of productivity gains have come from small businesses becoming large ones. Think Apple in 1977 versus Apple today. A large decline in the pace of new business formation suggests that fewer seeds have been planted over the past 20 years to generate those enormous productivity explosions than was the case in the previous 50 years.   The X Factor: Growing Market Concentration The three aforementioned explanations for the decline in productivity are all appealing, but they generally leave investors looking for more. Why are companies investing less, especially when profit margins are near record highs? Why is inflation low? Why has the pace of new business formation collapsed? These are all somewhat paradoxical. Chart II-12Wide Profit Margins: A Testament To The Weakness Of Labor This is where a growing body of works comes in. Our economy is moving away from the Adam Smith idea of perfect competition. Industry concentration has progressively risen, and few companies dominate their line of business and control both their selling prices and input costs. They behave as monopolies and monopsonies, all at once.1 This helps explain why selling prices have been able to rise relative to unit labor costs, raising margins in the process (Chart II-12). Let’s start by looking at the concept of market concentration. According to Grullon, Larkin and Michaely, sales of the median publicly traded firms, expressed in constant dollars, have nearly tripled since the mid-1990s, while real GDP has only increased 70% (Chart II-13).2 The escalation in market concentration is also vividly demonstrated in Chart II-14. The top panel shows that since 1997, most U.S. industries have experienced sharp increases in their Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI),3 a measure of concentration. In fact, more than half of U.S. industries have experienced concentration increases of more than 40%, and as a corollary, more than 75% of industries have seen the number of firms decline by more than 40%. The last panel of the chart also highlights that this increase in concentration has been top-heavy, with a third of industries seeing the market share of their four biggest players rise by more than 40%. Rising market concentration is therefore a broad phenomenon – not one unique to the tech sector.     This rising market concentration has also happened on the employment front. In 1995, less than 24% of U.S. private sector employees worked for firms with 10,000 or more employees, versus nearly 28% today. This does not seem particularly dramatic. However, at the local level, the number of regions where employment is concentrated with one or two large employers has risen. Azar, Marinescu and Steinbaum developed Map II-1, which shows that 75% of non-metropolitan areas now have high or extreme levels of employment concentration.4 Chart II-15The Owners Of Capital Are Keeping The Proceeds Of The Meagre Productivity Gains This growing market power of companies on employment can have a large impact on wages. Chart II-15 shows that real wages have lagged productivity since the turn of the millennium. Meanwhile, Chart II-16 plots real wages on the y-axis versus the HHI of applications (top panel) and vacancies (bottom panel). This chart shows that for any given industry, if applicants in a geographical area do not have many options where to apply – i.e. a few dominant employers provide most of the jobs in the region – real wages lag the national average. The more concentrated vacancies as well as applications are with one employer, the greater the discount to national wages in that industry.5 This is pure market power, and it helps explain the gap between wages and productivity as well as the widening gap between metropolitan and non-metropolitan household incomes. Growing market power and concentration do not only compress labor costs, they also result in higher prices for consumers. This seems paradoxical in a world of low inflation. But inflation could have been even lower if market concentration had remained at pre-2000s levels. In 2009, Matthew Weinberg showed that over the previous 22 years, horizontal mergers within an industry resulted in higher prices.6 In a 2014 meta-study conducted by Weinberg along with Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Hosken, the authors showed that across 49 studies ranging across 21 industries, 36 showed that horizontal mergers resulted in higher prices for consumers.7 While today’s technology may be enhancing the productive potential of our economies, this is not benefiting output and measured productivity. Instead, it is boosting profit margins. In a low-inflation environment, the only way for companies to garner pricing power is to decrease competition, and M&As are the quickest way to achieve this goal. After examining nearly 50 merger and antitrust studies spanning more than 3,000 merger cases, John Kwoka found that, following mergers that augmented an industry’s concentration, prices increased in 95% of cases, and on average by 4.5%.8 In no industry is this effect more vividly demonstrated than in the healthcare field, an industry that has undergone a massive wave of consolidation – from hospitals, to pharmacies to drug manufacturers. As Chart II-17 illustrates, between 1980 and 2016, healthcare costs have increased at a much faster pace in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. However, life expectancy increased much less than in other advanced economies. In this context of growing market concentration, it is easy to see why, as De Loecker and Eeckhout have argued, markups have been rising steadily since the 1980s (Chart II-18, top panel) and have tracked M&A activity (Chart II-18, bottom panel).9 In essence, mergers and acquisitions have been the main tool used by firms to increase their concentration. Another tool at their disposal has been the increase in patents. The top panel of Chart II-19 shows that the total number of patent applications in the U.S. has increased by 3.6-fold since the 1980s, but most interestingly, the share of patents coming from large, dominant players within each industry has risen by 10% over the same timeframe (Chart II-19, bottom panel). To use Warren Buffet’s terminology, M&A and patents have been how firms build large “moats” to limit competition and protect their businesses. Chart II-18Markups Rise Along With Growing M&A Activity Chart II-19How To Build A Moat?   Why is this rise in market concentration affecting productivity? First, from an empirical perspective, rising markups and concentration tend to lead to lower levels of capex. A recent IMF study shows that the more concentrated industries become, the higher the corporate savings rate goes (Chart II-20, top panel).10 These elevated savings reflect wider markups, but also firms with markups in the top decile of the distribution display significantly lower investment rates (Chart II-20, bottom panel). If more of the U.S. output is generated by larger, more concentrated firms, this leads to a lower pace of increase in the capital stock, which hurts productivity. Second, downward pressure on real wages is also linked to a drag on productivity. Monopolies and oligopolies are not incentivized to maximize output. In fact, for any market, a monopoly should lead to lower production than perfect competition would. Diagram II-I from De Loecker and Eeckhout shows that moving from perfect competition to a monopoly results in a steeper labor demand curve as the monopolist produces less. As a result, real wages move downward and the labor participation force declines. Does this sound familiar?   The rise of market power might mean that in some way Martin Feldstein was right about productivity being mismeasured – just not the way he anticipated. In a June 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, Peter Berezin showed that labor-saving technologies like AI and robotics, which are increasingly being deployed today, could lead to lower wages (Chart II-21).11 For a given level of technology in the economy, productivity is positively linked to real wages but inversely linked to markups – especially if the technology is of the labor-saving kind. So, if markups rise on the back of firms’ growing market power, the ensuing labor savings will not be used to increase actual input. Rather, corporate savings will rise. Thus, while today’s technology may be enhancing the productive potential of our economies, this is not benefiting output and measured productivity. Instead, it is boosting profit margins.12 Unsurprisingly, return on assets and market concentration are positively correlated (Chart II-22).     Finally, market power and concentration weighing on capex, wages and productivity are fully consistent with higher returns of cash to shareholders and lower interest rates. The higher profits and lower capex liberate cash flows available to be redistributed to shareholders. Moreover, lower capex also depresses demand for savings in the economy, while weak wages depress middle-class incomes, which hurts aggregate demand. Additionally, higher corporate savings increases the wealth of the richest households, who have a high marginal propensity to save. This results in higher savings for the economy. With a greater supply of savings and lower demand for those savings, the neutral rate of interest has been depressed. Investment Implications First, in an environment of low inflation, investors should continue to favor businesses that can generate higher markups via pricing power. Equity investors should therefore continue to prefer industries where horizontal mergers are still increasing market concentration. Second, so long as the status quo continues, wages will have a natural cap, and so will the neutral rate of interest. This does not mean that wage growth cannot increase further on a cyclical basis, but it means that wages are unlikely to blossom as they did in the late 1960s, even within a very tight labor market. Without too-severe an inflation push from wages, the business cycle could remain intact even longer, keeping a window open for risk assets to rise further on a cyclical basis. Third, long-term investors need to keep a keen eye on the political sphere. A much more laissez-faire approach to regulation, a push toward self-regulation, and a much laxer enforcement of antitrust laws and merger rules were behind the rise in market power and concentration.13 The particularly sharp ascent of populism in Anglo-Saxon economies, where market power increased by the greatest extent, is not surprising. So far, populists have not blamed the corporate sector, but if the recent antitrust noise toward the Silicon Valley behemoths is any indication, the clock is ticking. On a structural basis, this could be very negative for asset prices. An end to this rise in market power would force profit margins to mean-revert toward their long-term trend, which is 4.7 percentage-points below current levels. This will require discounting much lower cash flows in the future. Additionally, by raising wages and capex, more competition would increase aggregate demand and lift real interest rates. Higher wages and aggregate demand could also structurally lift inflation. Thus, not only will investors need to discount lower cash flows, they will have to do so at higher discount rates. As a result, this cycle will likely witness both a generational peak in equity valuations as well as structural lows in bond yields. As we mentioned, these changes are political in nature. We will look forward to studying the political angle of this thesis to get a better handle on when these turning points will likely emerge. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       A monopsony is a firm that controls the price of its input because it is the dominant, if not unique, buyer of said input. 2       G. Grullon, Y. Larkin and R. Michaely, “Are Us Industries Becoming More Concentrated?,” April 2017. 3       The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated by taking the market share of each firm in the industry, squaring them, and summing the result. Consider a hypothetical industry with four total firm where firm1, firm2, firm3 and firm4 has 40%, 30%, 15% and 15% of market share, respectively. Then HHI is 402+302+152+152 = 2,950. 4       J. Azar, I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration,” December 2017. 5     J. Azar, I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration,” December 2017. 6     M. Weinberg, “The Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 4, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 433–447. 7     O. Ashenfelter, D. Hosken, M. Weinberg, "Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages S67 - S100. 8    J. Kwoka, “Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy,” MIT Press, 2015. 9     J. De Loecker, J. Eeckhout, G. Unger, "The Rise Of Market Power And The Macroeconomic Implications," Mimeo 2018. 10     “Chapter 2: The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects,” World Economic Outlook, April 2019. 11     Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?"dated May 31, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 12     Productivity can be written as: 13     J. Tepper, D. Hearn, “The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition,” Wiley, November 2018.

Yesterday we were stopped out on our long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis market neutral pair trade initiated on May 13, 2019 for a gain of 10%. Our thesis remains intact that a lot of negative news has been priced into HMOs on the back of the threat of the “Medicare For All” bill passage, while a lot of euphoria has been baked in the cake for semis despite their current down cycle. However, portfolio risk management is forcing our hand and given our ongoing de-risking, we are obeying our trailing stop loss for a gain of 10% in a very short time span. Bottom Line: Book gains of 10% in the long S&P managed health care/short S&P semis pair trade since inception and move to the sidelines for now.  

Overweight As a follow up to yesterday’s Insight Report where we highlighted our sanguine view on the S&P health care equipment index, a structural EM macroeconomic trend further reiterates our constructive view on the U.S. health care equipment providers. Aging population, one of the major factors that has been driving the explosion of health care spending in DM for the past 20 years, is now rapidly impacting EM. According to the UN, the share of the population aged 65 and older in EM countries will rise from roughly 7% this year to 16% by 2060, while population growth slows to below the replacement rate (see chart). Meanwhile, IMF data shows that EM health care spending is approximately 5% of GDP, whereas it stands in excess of 14% in DM. U.S. health care equipment providers are the first in line to benefit from the upcoming increase in health care spending in EM. Indeed, U.S. companies are often the only source of equipment for hospitals/clinics globally given their status of technological leaders. Bottom Line: Long-term EM demographic trends as well as the short-term “fear selling” discussed in Monday’s Special Report create an exploitable trading opportunity in the S&P health care equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P health care equipment index are: BLBG: S5HCEP – ABT, MDT, DHR, BDX, SYK, ISRG, BSX, BAX, EW, ZBH, IDXX, RMD, TFX, HOLX, ABMD, VAR.

Overweight This past Monday we co-authored a Special Report with our sister Geopolitical Strategy service gauging the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law. Our analysis showed that the odds of universal health care legislation being enacted in the U.S. by 2022 are about 10%-15%. As a result, we were compelled to boost the S&P health care index to overweight as fear selling created an exploitable trading opportunity in this defensive sector. We are executing this upgrade by lifting the S&P health care equipment index to overweight (as a reminder we have been overweight the S&P managed health care index since April 15, 2019). This move is not contingent upon earnings outperformance. Rather, it is a combination of overwrought investors creating a buying opportunity, along with health care’s historic outperformance at the end of the business cycle. Our prior research shows that health care stocks have been the top performer in the last equity market surge to take place between the peak of the ISM manufacturing composite index and the beginning of the subsequent recession (see chart). Bottom Line: Lift the S&P health care equipment index to overweight. This move also lifts the overall health care index to an above benchmark allocation. Please see this Monday’s Special Report for additional details.