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This week I have been holding client calls and roundtables with clients located in the EMEA region. In next weekâs report we will share our answers to the most common client questions. In the meantime, this week we are sending you a report about Peru that discusses the political situation and the outlook for the nationâs financial markets. Best regards, Arthur Budaghyan Highlights Do not bottom fish in Peruvian financial markets. Political volatility has not yet reached its apex. Clashes between the government and congress are inevitable. Either president Pedro Castillo will be impeached and massive protest will follow, or his partyâs radical leftist agenda will be at least partially legislated. Neither scenario bodes well for Peruâs financial markets. Capital outflows and lower metal prices pose a threat to the exchange rate. Go short the sol versus the US dollar. Dedicated EM equity and fixed-income managers should continue underweighting Peru in their respective portfolios. Feature Chart 1Peru: Absolute And Relative Equity Performance Peruâs financial assets have plummeted due to the election of left-wing president Pedro Castillo. Some investors may be tempted to bottom fish in these markets due to their lower valuations and oversold conditions (Chart 1, top panel). Some may attempt to draw parallels with Brazilâs 2002 election of Lula da Silva which initially triggered a selloff in Brazilian financial markets followed by a substantial rally during the presidentâs two terms in office. Will that be the case with Peruvian markets? We do not think so. Unlike twenty years ago in Brazil, Peru is currently facing a much worse political and economic outlook. Overall, the political volatility as well as deteriorating macro fundamentals warrant a higher risk premium on Peruvian assets. Thus, we recommend investors underweight Peru within EM equity, local, and sovereign fixed-income portfolios (Chart 1, bottom panel). A Political Showdown Is Looming One could argue that Peruvian financial markets have hit a floor and that much of the bad news has already been priced. Another argument is that Castillo will not be able to pass sweeping socio-economic reforms because of strong opposition from congress. In our opinion, Peru has yet to reach peak political tensions, which may very well end with a bang. Given this heightened political uncertainty, investors should brace themselves for a rocky ride. We identify two main risks plaguing Peruvian politics. First, the unsustainable ideological divide within Castilloâs proposed cabinet between far-left militants and the pragmatic center-left. Second, the looming clash between a government that wants to upend the countryâs socioeconomic system and a notoriously harsh congress keen on making the presidentâs job unbearable. Intra-Government Dichotomy The ideological divide in Castilloâs government is extreme. On one side is the Marxist-Leninist wing, headed by Free Peruâs party leader, Vladimir Cerrón, and prime minister candidate, Guido Bellido. On the other side is the left-to-center members, headed by Pedro Francke, the minister of finance candidate. The more extremist Marxist-Leninist camp constitutes the majority, while moderates are a minority. Critically, the Marxist-Leninist radicals will make few concessions to the moderate ministers, as the former believe they have a mandate from the people to upend the countryâs socio-economic system. Nevertheless, the policies supported by the general public are more nuanced than that. According to a national Ipsos survey from August, 85% of respondents believe president Castillo should govern with technocrats in his governmentsâ key positions. Only 11% support him making the ideology of his party the centerpiece of his policies and promoting (radical) members of his party. This shows how Castilloâs victory was more of a national referendum against Fujimori and the corrupt political elites than support for a radical socialist government. We elaborated on this topic in our previous report on Peru. The wide ideological divide between the party and a few moderate members of the cabinet in key positions will make governing extremely difficult. Cracks are already beginning to form. Bellido and Francke hold different views on the role of the state in the economy. Bellido, on the one hand, has stated he supports state-owned companies in commodity-extracting sectors (particularly natural gas and hydroelectricity) and the drafting of a new constitution to give the state greater ownership of mining contracts. Francke, on the other hand, wants to reinstate fiscal spending caps and is less harsh with multinational companies, favoring an increase only in mining taxes. Furthermore, there is significant uncertainty around the governmentâs official fiscal plan, as Francke has avoided giving clear figures on fiscal expenditures and social programs. To make matters worse, there is growing concern that it is party leader Cerrón who is de facto in charge, and that he has an enormous influence on Castillo. Cerrón is unpopular among voters as a result of his criminal allegations, close ties to the Cuban regime, and often apologetic stance toward the Maoist terrorist group, Shining Path. Although he intended to run as the presidential candidate for Free Peru, he was banned from the election because of ongoing criminal accusations, which is why he handpicked Castillo as his replacement. Without a doubt, he intends to be heavily involved in government decision-making. According to the same Ipsos poll we cited earlier, 61% of Peruvians believe Cerrón is either de facto in charge of the government or holds considerable sway over Castillo. The biggest risk to financial markets will be the eventual dismissal or resignation of finance minister Francke. This may happen as he eventually realizes that the radicals will concede very little. This would also lead to a resignation of orthodox central bank governor Julio Velarde, who Francke has been able to convince to remain in his post. These two resignations would result in another riot in Peruvian markets, as the investment and business communities fully lose confidence in Castilloâs government. An Inevitable Clash Between The Government And Congress Being president in Peru is a notoriously difficult job due to the large sway that congress has on legislation and governing. The outcome of this constant confrontation between the president and congress has been five different presidents in the past five years alone. Critically, this tension has never been higher. The government and congress hold diametrically opposed views on the broad vision and strategy for the nation and how the economy should be managed. On the one hand, congress is mainly composed of traditional centrist parties and the opposition holds a majorityâCastilloâs coalition has only about 39% of the seats. On the other hand, the government has just been elected on a far-left reformist platform. In essence, both the government and congress have incentives and the determination to be as obstructive as possible for each other. As tensions ramp up and confrontation becomes inevitable, the risks of unrest and clashes between supporters of Castillo and congress will rise. Table 1Peru: Voters Support More Moderate Politicians In congressâs point of view, they have a mandate to serve as an opposing force to Castilloâs radicalism: There is some validity to this claim. The opposition holds a majority, and congress president Maricarmen Alva is by far more popular than the leaders of the Free Peru party like Cerrón and Bellido (Table 1). Given that Castilloâs ideology is a threat to the nationâs current socio-economic model and, thereby, to the political establishment, the majority in congress would prefer to block all radical legislation, including the appointments of controversial cabinet members. In addition, they will use all manner of accusations and alleged linkages between cabinet members and Shining Path to impeach Castillo. Congress needs only 87 votes, which means they need to convince only eight members from the governing alliance to impeach Castillo. In turn, the government argues it was elected to upend the countryâs status quo and confront the unpopular political elites: Critically, the president has the ability to dissolve congress after two votes of no confidence, thereby putting pressure on congress to abide by the governmentâs radical proposals. This latter point and the fact that congress has little popular support provide leverage for the government over congress. Given the fact that current congressional members cannot be reelected, they might be more careful about how they maneuver, so that they do not provoke Castillo to dissolve congress. There are, therefore, two extreme possible outcomes. On one hand, congress may impeach the president, triggering a social revolt from Castilloâs hardline supporters against congress. On the other hand, congressional members may allow the passing of a leftist legislative agenda in order to maintain their seats, which would gravely reduce corporate profitability and productivity in Peru. Both scenarios would result in a collapse of investor and business confidence, leading to more capital flight and a riot in Peruvian financial markets. Bottom Line: Political volatility in Peru has not yet reached its apex. Clashes between the government and congress are inevitable, as well as among key cabinet members. Such elevated political volatility warrants a higher risk premium on Peruvian assets. Return Of Macro Instability Peru enjoyed a period of relative macro stability from the early 2000s until recently. Its currency, local interest rates, and sovereign spreads have fluctuated less than those in other Latin American countries. However, the nationâs economy and financial markets have entered a period of heightened volatility. Both domestic and external macro factors have turned into headwinds for the Peruvian economy and financial markets. Chart 2Peru: Business Confidence Will Continue Plummeting Domestically, the economic recovery has been uninspiring, and multiple indicators point to growth disappointments ahead: Business confidence took another serious hit with the election of Castillo and ensuing uncertainty (Chart 2). Imminent political volatility will further depress business confidence, and, consequently, capital expenditures and hiring in the coming months. This will curb household income growth and consumer spending. Peru remains one of the worldâs deadliest COVID-19 hotspots (Chart 3, top panel). In addition, vaccination rates are the lowest among major Latin American economies (Chart 3, bottom panel). As the more infectious Delta variant becomes dominant, there will not be enough immunity to hold back new cases. Consequently, either the government will introduce lockdowns or people will voluntarily limit their activities, thereby inhibiting the nascent economic recovery. The unemployment rate remains far above its pre-pandemic level (Chart 4). Thus, household income remains very depressed. The latter does not bode well for debtorsâ ability to service debt. Chart 3Peru: The Government Has Grossly Mismanaged The Pandemic Chart 4Peru: Labor Market Has Not Fully Recovered As a result, loan delinquencies will rise anew, weighing on banksâ appetite to lend. Notably, local currency loans to the private sector will contract (Chart 5). Chart 5Peru: Prepare For A Credit Slump Commercial banking profitability is also vulnerable, as president Castillo aims to strengthen the state bank (Banco de la Nación) by expanding its operations and undercutting private banking fees. Given financials of the bourseâs market cap, poor banking profitability is a major risk to this stock market. Unrelenting currency depreciationâsee below for a more detailed analysis of the exchange rateâwill prompt the central bank to hike rates further. This will not only weigh on new credit demand, but also augment loan delinquencies in the banking system. As a result, banks will become very risk averse and shrink their balance sheets. A credit crunch will ensue. Even though fiscal spending will be increased, it is unlikely to propel economic growth. The basis is that fiscal primary spending accounted for less than 15% of GDP before the pandemic and is now 17% due to the pandemic distortion (Chart 6). In the meantime, consumer spending constitutes 63% of GDP, capital spending 21%, and exports 25%. Externally, deteriorating balance of payments dynamics will weigh down on the currency: Peruvian assets tend to move with the countryâs trade balance and global metal prices. The fact that Peruvian stock prices have plummeted in the face of rising industrial and precious metal prices supports a bearish thesis on this bourse (Chart 7). Chart 6Peru: Fiscal Expenditures Have Risen Due To The Pandemic Chart 7Rising Metal Prices Have Failed To Boost Peruvian Stocks Chart 8China's Slowdown Portends A Fall In Commodities Export revenue will contract as a result of a decline in commodity prices brought on by Chinaâs slowing âold economyâ (Chart 8). Precious and industrial metals together account for 66% of Peruâs merchandise exports. A meaningful decline in metal prices will erode the trade surplus and weigh on the exchange rate. Furthermore, Peru is already experiencing capital flight. Potential anti-market policies from this government could trigger more capital exodus. The capital account deficit will widen as both FDI and portfolio inflows fall due to the negative commodity outlook as well as political uncertainty (Chart 9). Foreigners still hold 45% of local currency bonds, and they will reduce their holdings (Chart 10). Chart 9Peru: FDI Inflows Will Decline Chart 10Peruvian Domestic Bonds: Will Banks Make Up For Foreign Investor Retrenchment? Chart 11Peru: The Dollarization Rate Has Room To Rise Currency depreciation will also be reinforced by locals converting their sol deposits into foreign currency. The dollarization rateâthe ratio of foreign currency banking deposits to total depositsâwill rise (Chart 11). A weakening currency will also lead to higher inflation expectations, to which the central bank will respond by raising rates. The monetary authorities already hiked the policy rate by 25 basis points this month due to higher-than-expected inflation and a rapidly depreciating currency. As Peruâs exchange rate continues to weaken, the central bank might also sell foreign currency reserves to prevent large fluctuations in the value of the currency. This foreign exchange intervention will, in turn, shrink banking system local currency liquidity and lift interbank rates (Chart 12). Chart 12FX Reserve Sales Will Shrink Banking Liquidity And Lift Interbank Rates In short, the central bank has enough international reserves to stabilize the exchange rate, but this will come at the cost of tighter liquidity and higher interest rates. The latter will only reinforce sluggish growth in domestic demand. Bottom Line: Heightened political volatility and lower metal prices are working against the Peruvian economy and its financial markets. Peru is experiencing large capital flight, which will exacerbate currency depreciation. Investment Recommendations Keep an underweight allocation to the Peruvian bourse within an EM equity portfolio. We recommend currency traders go short the Peruvian sol versus the US dollar. While the sol has already depreciated considerably, the domestic and external headwinds entail more downside. For fixed-income investors, we maintain an underweight allocation to Peruvian sovereign credit in an EM credit portfolio. The basis for this position is that the nationâs fiscal policy may undergo a major shift, entailing larger fiscal spending and wider budget deficits. We are downgrading local bonds from neutral to underweight in an EM domestic bond portfolio. Critically, the share of foreign ownership of Peruvian local fixed income remains one of the highest in the EM universeâit has only fallen from around 55% to 45% of domestic fixed-income instruments in the past six months (Chart 10 on page 9). Thus, there is a major risk that foreign investors will sell domestic bonds as the currency depreciates further, which will weigh down on local bonds. Juan Egaña Research Analyst juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes
Highlights The baht will depreciate further, given the state of the economy and external accounts. Domestic demand was already relapsing, even before the latest surge in COVID-19 cases. Now, the recovery will be delayed more. The authorities have little to offer by way of fiscal or monetary support. Credit to the job-intensive SME sector has collapsed. The balance of payment dynamics remains negative for the currency. Investors should stay short the baht. Dedicated EM asset allocators should continue to be neutral on Thailand within respective equity and domestic bond portfolios. Feature Chart 1Thai Stocks Are Facing Several Headwinds Our negative view on the baht has played out as expected.1 The Thai currency is down 10% versus the dollar since its peak in February of this year. It has also been the worst performer in Asia. The countryâs stock market is struggling and going down in both absolute terms and relative to their EM counterparts (Chart 1). Going forward, odds are that the baht will remain weak. A weak currency will continue to stifle both Thai stocksâ and local currency bondsâ relative performance. Investors should stay short the baht and remain neutral Thai equity and local currency bonds within their respective EM portfolios. Relapsing Growth Chart 2Surging New COVID-19 Cases... The latest spike in new COVID-19 cases has dashed hopes for any early recovery of the Thai economy (Chart 2). Earlier this month, the central bank revised down their GDP forecast for 2021 from 1.8% to 0.7%. We concur with this bearish outlook: Private consumption in real terms was languishing as of June this year at 10% below 2019 levels. Car sales, both personal and commercial, are even more downbeat (Chart 3). After the latest surge in new COVID-19 cases, those numbers must have weakened further. Incidentally, the countryâs vaccination rate, at 26% of total population (7.5% fully vaccinated), remains low. It could be, therefore, several months before any meaningful recovery in consumer demand takes place. Faced with low demand, the countryâs manufacturing and shipment volumes are also weak. They are both breaking down anew from well below the 2019 levels (Chart 4, top panel). Chart 3...Will Further Delay Domestic Demand Recovery Chart 4Manufacturers Are Saddled With High Inventory Amid Weak Orders... Weak demand also means that businesses are stuck with high inventories. Indeed, there is a widening disparity between inventory levels and shipments (Chart 4, middle panel). Furthermore, order books have slipped back to levels not seen since the height of the COVID-19 scare early last year. The combination of high inventories and tumbling orders does not portend a manufacturing recovery anytime soon (Chart 4, bottom panel). Notably, jobs and wages are also weak. Employment in the manufacturing sector is well below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 5). This trend, in turn, is hurting household income and consumer demand, completing a vicious cycle of depressed demand, weak production, falling employment and household income, and further reduced demand. The softness of the economy is accentuating the disinflationary pressure that was already entrenched. Headline and core CPI in Thailand have stayed mostly below 1% over the past five years â the lower band of the central bankâs inflation target. Now, they are flirting with outright deflation. In fact, if the impact of food and oil prices is excluded, the prices are actually deflating (Chart 6). Chart 5...Which Is Hurting Jobs And Wage Growth Chart 6Thailand Is Flirting With Outright Deflation... Outright deflation makes it harder for borrowers to service their debts, which then discourages both borrowing and spending â making the recovery much harder. Notably, the banksâ prime lending rates remain high at 5.4%, which means real prime lending rates are quite steep at 5% (deflated by core CPI). This is at a time of very low household income and business revenue growth expectations. This trend is a strong disincentive for borrowing and consuming /capital spending. Little Policy Support What is more concerning for the economy is that policymakers can offer little to boost the economy. Fiscal stimulus has waned: government expenditure, after a surge last year, is now contracting (Chart 7). The budget proposal for the next fiscal year (October 2021 - September 2022) that was passed by the parliament in June 2021 (first reading)2 stipulates a 5.7% cut in nominal spending. Part of the reason is that fiscal deficits have already ballooned to a staggering 8% of GDP â from an average of 2.5% in the past ten years. The IMF estimates that the fiscal thrust will be zero this year, and a negative 2.4% of GDP in 2022 (Chart 7, bottom panel). The monetary policy transmission is also paralyzed. Despite easing by the Bank of Thailand â the policy rate is at an all-time low of 0.5% since May last year â credit growth is dismal. Lenders are wary of rising NPLs and are holding back new credit: The share of impaired loans (NPLs plus Special Mention Loans) of total bank loans has dramatically increased to 10%. In the case of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), that ratio is 20%. By comparison, loss provisions are much lower, at just 5.2% as of June of this year (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 7...Yet, The Government Is Planning To Cut Fiscal Spending Chart 8Sharp Rise In Banks' Stressed Loans Amid Tanking Profits... Notably, both operating and net profits of banks had already halved (as a % of assets) by June 2021 â as both interest and non-interest incomes dropped. Profits are slated to contract further, since banks will have to make greater provisions in the future as the recent surge in new cases will produce more loan delinquencies (Chart 8, bottom panel). The specter of rising NPLs has prompted banks to retrench loans. In particular, bank credit to SMEs has plunged by a massive 34% from 2019 levels (Chart 9). Before the pandemic, banksâ SME loans made up a significant 30% of GDP. Now, they are down to 21%. Credit retrenchment of this order to the job-intensive SME sector is going to have a significant negative ripple effect. Employment will shrink further as small businesses go bust. Shrinking jobs will dent household income, and, in turn, consumer demand. Incidentally, loans to other business segments are also not rising much. Bank loans to all non-financial corporates are growing rather minimally, at 1.5% year-over-year. Going into the pandemic, the Thai household sector was already highly leveraged. Over the past two decades, banks and other financial institutions have been lending ever more to households, shunning non-financial corporates. Householdsâ borrowing from banks have now risen to 40% of GDP; and those from other institutions another 50%. These loans had helped boost consumer demand all those years, but now, at a time when incomes are uncertain, households have very limited appetite to borrow more to spend. This means a consumer debt-fueled demand recovery is not in the cards (Chart 10). Chart 9...Induced Banks To Massively Reduce Credit To The Job-Intensive SME Sector Chart 10Thai Households Are Too Indebted To Borrow More And Spend In brief, Thai businesses are in the middle of a toxic combination of contracting sales, absent fiscal support, slashed credit facilities, and rather high borrowing costs in real terms. Chart 11 shows that corporate profit margins of non-financial firms are struggling at a low level. It is no wonder that businesses are reluctant to invest, expand, and hire. The message is similar when we examined all companies included in the MSCI Thailand stock index. On the one hand, their EPS has fallen to 10-year lows. Thai stock prices, on the other hand, have not yet fallen as much as the shrinking EPS would imply (Chart 12, top panel). The consequence is that the valuations are remarkably stretchedânear a 20-year high (Chart 12, bottom panel). Chart 11Low Margins Are Discouraging Thai Firms To Borrow, Invest, Or Hire Chart 12Thai Profits, At A Decade-Low, Are Also A Headwind For Stock Prices All in all, for Thai share prices to stage a sustainable rally, an economic recovery is essential. The first indications of that usually come from an improving order book. The latter currently shows little glimmer of hope. But investors should keep an eye on this indicator, as Thai stocksâ performance is geared to the ebbs and flows of the business order book (Chart 13). Thailand Needs A Weaker Currency The state of the Thai economy not only warrants exchange rate depreciation, but also needs a much weaker currency to help an economic recovery. The countryâs balance of payment is in deficit â for the first time since 2014. A crucial reason is that the baht is still expensive, which continues to weigh on exports. Of all the export-oriented Asian economies, Thai exports recovery has been the weakest (Chart 14). Chart 13Keep An Eye On The Order Book For A Sign In Stock Recovery Chart 14An Expensive Baht Held Back Thai Exports Recovery The fact that a quarter of Thai exports go to other ASEAN countries â where demand has been and remains weak due to the lingering pandemic â doesnât help either. As a result, the Thai trade surplus has narrowed significantly, and the current account has slipped into deficit (Chart 15, top and middle panels). The other main external revenue source of Thailand, tourism, continues to be near absent at 0.6% of GDP â a far cry from a high of 12% before the pandemic (Chart 15, bottom panel). Whatâs more, there is little hope of any recovery in the near future. The government now expects the number of foreign tourists this year to be as low as 0.3 million versus 40 million in 2019. On the capital account front, Thailand continues to hemorrhage both FDI and portfolio capital â just as it did the past several years. Despite that, the baht had remained strong until early this year, as a result of a substantial repatriation of bank deposits by Thai residents and, to a lesser extent, foreign borrowings. Those inflows prevented the Thai baht from depreciating. But such panic-stricken, one-off savings/deposit repatriations by Thai residents will certainly slow materially going forward (Chart 16). Chart 15The Thai Current Account Balance Will Struggle To Stay In Surplus... Chart 16...While The Capital Account Balance Will Slip Deeper Into Deficit... Thereâs also little hope that FDI and portfolio inflows will pick up the slack. The reason is that the Thai economy is very weak and the return on capital is low. The latter discourages capital inflows. The fact that the baht continues to be an expensive currency in real terms, and therefore not as competitive as some of its neighborsâ, doesnât help either. The multi-nationals who are planning to re-locate out of China might find some other countries â where the currency is more competitive (such as in India, Malaysia, or the Philippines) â more attractive. Overall, the Thai capital account balance will likely slide deeper into deficit, at a time when the current account will also struggle to stay in surplus. The result will be a further deterioration in the countryâs balance of payment, hurting the baht (Chart 17). Considered from another angle, if the return on capital on Thai assets is any guide, the baht could drop much more from its current levels (Chart 18). Chart 17...Putting Downward Pressure On The Baht Chart 18Thai Firms' Low Rates Of Return Point To More Baht Depreciation The reality is that, given Thailandâs current macro backdrop, a cheaper currency is what the nation needs. That will help boost growth significantly by aiding exports and promoting import substitution. Since foreign trade makes up an impressive 90% of GDP, a boost therein could kickstart the entire economy. Another result of a weaker currency will be higher inflation, something the economy seriously needs. Higher inflation will contribute to lower real interest rates which, in turn, will encourage borrowing and spending. Higher spending and inflation will help achieve higher nominal sales, boost firmsâ profits, employment, and eventually, household incomes. All in all, it could allow a productive cycle to unfold. Given all these possible benefits and given that policymakers have few other tools at their disposal at this juncture, chances are the central bank will let the baht depreciate more, albeit in an orderly fashion, in the months to come. What About Bonds? Chart 19Mantain A Neutral Allocation To Thai Domestic Bonds In An EM Basket Thai local currency bondsâ absolute return in US dollar terms, as expected, is highly dependent on the exchange rate (Chart 19, top panel). Given the weak currency outlook, foreign investors should refrain from holding Thai domestic bonds outright. For foreign asset allocators, however, the matter is more nuanced. Thai domestic bondsâ relative return versus that of overall EM did not depend on the baht movement alone. This is because Thailand has been a defensive market owing to the following: a traditionally strong current account, a manageable public debt (now 47% of GDP), and a relatively low holding of bonds by foreign investors (now 12% of total). A robust current account surplus for years meant that during periods of negative growth shocks, the baht often fell less than many other EM currencies â that is, in periods of distress, the baht helped boost the relative performance of Thai bonds vis-Ã -vis overall EM bonds in US dollar terms. Those periods of distress also saw Thai bond yields fall as the central bank was able to cut rates due to low inflation. In addition, during those periods, local investors moved from equities to government bonds. Since the holdings of local bond investors far outweighed those of foreign investors, Thai bond yields managed to go down, even when some foreign investors dumped EM and Thai domestic bonds. As a result of these factors, Thai bonds outperformed their EM counterparts during the commodity/EM slowdown in 2014-15, and again at the height of the COVID-19-scare in early 2020 â even though the baht fell versus the US dollar during those periods (Chart 19, middle panel). All that said, the reality in the ground has changed somewhat since early last year. The Thai current account is no longer in surplus, and, given the dismal tourism outlook and slowing trade surplus, it will probably stay that way for the foreseeable future. That will keep the baht relatively weak weighing on Thai bondsâ relative performance versus their EM peers. On the other hand, the grim outlook of the Thai economy and looming deflation risk means that Thai bond yields could fall going forward relative to their EM counterparts. That will be a tailwind for Thai domestic bondsâ relative outperformance versus their EM counterparts. There is, therefore, a good chance that the headwind from a relatively weaker baht could be somewhat compensated for by a drop in Thai local yields versus their EM peers. Indeed, the periods of the bahtâs weakness usually coincided with Thai bondsâ relative yield compression (Chart 19, bottom panel). This calls for a neutral outlook for relative bond performance going forward. Investment Conclusions Currency: The baht outlook remains precarious. Investors would do well to remain short the baht versus the US dollar. Domestic Bonds: Thai bond yields will go down. The Bank of Thailand will have no choice but to cut rates further. Local investors should stay long bonds. For international dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios, we downgraded Thai bonds in February of this year, from overweight to neutral in an EM bond portfolio, in view of the impending baht weakness. That turned out to be a good decision. Going forward, investors should continue to have a neutral allocation on Thai bonds, as the headwind from the baht will be mitigated by the tailwind from relative bond yield compression. Foreign absolute-return investors, however, should avoid Thai bonds in view of expected currency depreciation. Chart 20A Vulnerable Baht Will Keep Foreign Equity Investors Away Stocks: A struggling economy offers little hope for corporate margins or profits recovery soon. A vulnerable currency makes Thai stocks even less appealing to foreign investors. Without their participation, it will be hard for this market to rise sustainably in absolute terms or outperform their EM counterparts (Chart 20). Thai equities are not cheap either: the P/Book ratio is at par with EM. That said, given the Thai marketâs already very steep underperformance versus the EM equity benchmark, from a portfolio strategy point of view, we recommend investors stay neutral this market within an EM equity portfolio. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please refer to the EMS report âThailand: Beset By A Vulnerable Baht,â dated February 24, 2021. 2 The budget bill has to pass the second and third readings expected in August before it goes for senate and royal approval.
Dear Client, China Investment Strategy will take a summer break next week. We will resume our publication on July 14th. Best regards and we wish you a happy and healthy summer. Jing Sima, China Strategist Highlights A USD rebound and higher domestic bond yields pose near-term challenges to Chinese risk assets. A sharp deceleration in credit growth in the past seven months will lead to weaker-than-expected data from Chinaâs old-economy sectors in the second half of the year. Robust global trade has propelled Chinese exports, allowing the country to pursue financial deleverage and structural reforms. However, next year policymakers will face increased pressure to support the domestic economy as the global economic recovery peaks and demand slows. Investors should maintain an underweight stance towards Chinese stocks in 2H21, but remain alert to any improvements in Chinaâs policy tone. An easing monetary policy may signal a potential upgrade catalyst in 1H22. Feature Most recent macro figures confirm that Chinaâs impressive economic upcycle has peaked. We expect that the official manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs, which will be released as this report is published, will come in modestly down. We maintain the view that a major relapse in economic activity is unlikely, but the strong tailwinds that have propelled China's recovery since Q2 last year have since abated and will lead to softer growth. Meanwhile, the rate of economic and export expansions has given Chinese policymakers confidence to scale back leverage and continue with market reforms. In the second half of the year, investors' sentiment towards Chinese stocks will be tested based on three risks: A rebound in the US dollar index. A tighter liquidity environment and higher interest rates. A weakening in macro indicators beyond market expectations. As the global economic recovery peaks into 2022, pressures to support the domestic economy will become more urgent if policymakers want to maintain an average rate of 5% real GDP growth in 2020 - 2022. The current policy settings are not yet favorable to overweight Chinese risk assets. Major equity indexes remain richly valued and the market could easily correct if domestic rates move higher. However, signs of policy easing may emerge by yearend, which would prompt us to shift our view to overweight Chinese stocks in both absolute and relative terms. The Case For A Dollar Rebound On a tactical basis (next three months), a rebound in the US dollar index may curb investorsâ enthusiasm for Chinese stocks. A stronger dollar will give the RMBâs appreciation some breathing room and will be reflationary for Chinaâs economy. However, in the short term a stronger USD will also lead to weaker foreign inflows to Chinaâs equity markets. Chinese stock prices have become more closely and negatively correlated with the dollar index since early 2020 (Chart 1). A weaker dollar is usually accompanied by a global economic upturn and a higher risk appetite from investors, propelling more foreign portfolio flows to emerging markets (which includes Chinese risk assets). Although foreign inflows account for a small portion of the Chinese A-share market cap, global institutional investorsâ sentiment has become more influential and has led fluctuations in Chinese onshore stock prices (Chart 2). Chart 1Closer Correlations Between Chinese Stocks And The Dollar Index Chart 2Foreign Investors Matter To Chinese Onshore Stock Prices Chart 3Rising Market Expectations For The Fed's Rate Liftoff The US Federal Reserve delivered a slightly more hawkish surprise at its June FOMC meeting with the message that it will move the projected timing of its first fed fund rate liftoff from 2024 to 2023. Since then, market expectations have shifted from growth and inflation to focusing on the next monetary policy tightening phase, with the short end of the US yield curve rising sharply (Chart 3). Given that currency markets trade off the short end of the yield curve, higher US interest rate expectations will at least temporarily lift the US dollar. The timing and pace of the Fedâs tapering of asset purchases and rate hikes will be determined by how rapidly the US economy approaches the US central bankâs definition of âmaximum employment.â BCAâs US Bond Investment strategist anticipates that sizeable and positive non-farm payroll surprises will start in late summer/early fall, which will catalyze a move higher in bond yields. As such, we expect additional upside risks in the dollar index in the coming months, which will discourage foreign investorsâ appetite for Chinese equities. Bottom Line: A rebound in the dollar index will be a near-term downside risk to Chinese stocks. Risk Of Higher Chinese Interest Rates Another near-term risk to Chinese stock prices is a tightening in domestic liquidity conditions and a rebound in interest rates, particularly in Q3. Chart 4The PBoC Has Managed To Keep Domestic Rates Low While Pulling Back Overall Stimulus So far this year the PBoC has kept liquidity conditions accommodative to avoid massive debt defaults, while allowing a faster deceleration in the pace of credit expansion and a sharp contraction in shadow banking (Chart 4). In the coming months, however, the trend may reverse. Even though we do not think Chinaâs current inflation and growth dynamics warrant meaningful and sustainable monetary policy tightening, there is still room for rates to normalize to their pre-pandemic levels in the next few months. Our view is based on the following: First, there was a major delay in local government bond issuance in the first five months of the year. The supply of government bonds will pick up meaningfully in Q3 to meet the annual quota for 2021. An increase in government bond issuance will remove some liquidity from the banking system because the majority of these local government bonds are purchased by commercial banks. Adding to the liquidity gap is a large number of one-year, medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans that will be due in 2H21. Secondly, the PBoC may shift its policy tightening from reducing the volume of total credit creation (measured by total social financing) to raising the price of money. Credit growth (on year-over-year basis) in the first five months of 2021 dropped by three percentage points from its peak in Q4 last year, much faster than the 13-month peak-to-trough deceleration during the 2017/18 policy tightening cycle. As the rate of credit creation approaches the governmentâs target for the year, which we expect around 11%, the pressure to further compress credit expansion has eased into 2H21. Chinaâs policy agenda is still focused on de-risking in the financial and real estate sectors, therefore, we expect policymakers to keep overall monetary conditions restrictive by raising the price of money. Furthermore, we do not rule out the possibility of a hike in mortgage rates. Chart 5Rising Risk For A Bear Flattening In Domestic Yield Curve In Q3 Lastly, as the Fed prepares market expectations for its rate liftoff and Chinaâs domestic economy is still relatively solid, the PBoC may seize the opportunity to guide market-based interest rates towards their pre-pandemic levels. Thus, the market will likely price in tighter liquidity conditions while lowering expectations for the economy and inflation. The short end of the yield curve will rise faster than the longer end, resulting in a flattening of the curve (Chart 5). There is a nontrivial risk that the market will react negatively to tighter liquidity conditions and rising bonds yields, particularly when the economy is slowing. We mentioned in previous reports that rising policy rates and bond yields do not necessarily lead to lower stock prices, if rates are rising while credit keeps expanding and corporate profit growth accelerates. However, currently credit impulse has decelerated sharply, and corporate profit growth has most likely peaked in Q2. Therefore, even a small increase in bond yields or market expectations of higher rates will likely trigger risk asset selloffs. Bottom Line: Bond yields will move higher in Q3, risking market selloffs. Chinese Economy Standing On One Leg Chinaâs economic fundamentals also pose downside risks to Chinese stock prices. Macro indicators on a year-over-year comparison will soften further in 2H21 when low base effects wane, although they will weaken from very high levels. This yearâs sharp credit growth deceleration will start to drag down domestic demand, with the risk of corporate profits disappointing the market. A positive tailwind from global trade prevented China's old economy from decelerating more in the first half of the year. It is reflected in the nominal imports and manufacturing orders components in the BCA Activity Index (Chart 6). However, while rising commodity prices boosted the value of Chinese imports, the volume of imports has been moving sideways of late (Chart 7). Chart 6Our BCA Activity Index Is Still Rising... Chart 7...But The Volume Of The Import Component Has Rolled Over Chart 8Export Growth Is Moderating From Current Level Moreover, Chinaâs export volume is peaking as the reopening in other countries shifts consumer demand from goods to services. Strong export growth would likely decelerate and converge to global industrial production growth in the coming 12 months, even though a regression-based approach suggests that export growth will stay above trend-growth if global economic activity remains robust (Chart 8). All three components of the official Li Keqiang Index, which measures Chinaâs industrial sector activity and incorporates electricity consumption, railway transportation and bank lending, have rolled over (Chart 9). Among the three components in BCAâs Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, only the monetary conditions index improved on the back of lower real rates. Contributions from the money supply and credit expansion components to the overall indicator have been negative (Chart 10). Chart 9The Official Li Keqiang Index Is Weakening... Chart 10...So Is Our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator Chart 11Household Consumption Recovery Remains A Laggard The recovery in household consumption remains well behind the industrial sector in the current cycle (Chart 11). We expect consumption and services to continue recovering very gradually. Apart from Chinaâs long-standing structural issues, such as sliding household income growth and a high propensity to save, the cyclical recovery in consumption is dependent on Chinaâs domestic COVID-19 situation. The country is on track to fully vaccinate 40% of its population by the end of June and 80% by year-end (Chart 12). However, hiccups in the service sector recovery are expected through 2H21, given Chinaâs âzero toleranceâ policy on confirmed COVID cases, which could trigger sporadic local lockdowns (Chart 13). Chart 12China Is Racing To Reach âFull Inoculation Rateâ By Yearend Chart 13Expect Some Hiccups In Service Sector Recovery In 2H21 Bottom Line: Any moderation in exports in the rest of 2021 may add to the slowdown in Chinaâs economic activity. Donât Count On Fiscal Support Chart 14Fiscal Spending Has Been Disappointing In 1H21 During the first five months of the year, fiscal spending has downshifted (Chart 14). The amount of local government special-purpose bonds (SPBs) issued was far less than in the same period of the past two years, and below this yearâs approved annual quota. Although we expect fiscal support to increase into 2H21, backloading SPBs would qualify, at best, as a remedial measure rather than a meaningful boost to economic activity. The RMB3 trillion SPBs to be issued in 2H21 represent only about 10% of this yearâs total credit expansion. To substantially boost credit impulse and economic activity, the pickup in SPB issuance will need to be accompanied by looser monetary policy and an acceleration in bank loans (Chart 15). We do not expect that liquidity conditions will remain as lax as in 1H21. Additionally, given that the central governmentâs focus is to rein in the leverage of local governments and their affiliated financial vehicles (LGFV), provincial officers have little incentive to take on more bank loans against a restrictive policy backdrop. Historically, a stronger fiscal impulse linked to hefty increases in local government bond issuance has not necessarily led to meaningful improvements in infrastructure investment, which has been on a structural downshift since 2017 (Chart 16). Following a V-shaped recovery in 2H20, the growth in infrastructure investment will likely continue to slide in 2H21 due to sluggish government spending. Chart 15Bank Loans Still Hold The Key To Stimulus Impulse Chart 16Don't Count On SPBs To Meaningfully Boost Infrastructure Investment Bottom Line: There are no signs that the overall policy stance is easing to facilitate a higher fiscal multiplier from an upturn in local government bond issuance. As such, fiscal support for infrastructure spending and economic activity will disappoint in 2H21 despite more SPB issuance. Investment Conclusions Monetary conditions may tighten in Q3 although credit growth will decelerate at a slower pace. Pressures to support domestic demand will be more pronounced next year as tailwinds abate from the global recovery and domestic massive stimulus. Our view is that Chinese authorities will likely ease on the policy tightening brake towards the end of this year and perhaps even signal some reflationary measures in early 2022. Therefore, while we maintain an underweight stance on Chinese stocks for the time being, investors should remain alert to any improvements in China's policy direction. In particular, any monetary policy easing by end this year/early 2022 may signal a potential catalyst to upgrade Chinese stocks to overweight in absolute terms. Although both Chinese onshore and investable equities are currently traded at a discount relative to global stocks, they are richly valuated compared with their 2017/18 highs (Chart 17). China's economy is slowing and the corporate sector has substantially increased its leverage in the past decade. We believe that the current discount in Chinese equities relative to global stocks is warranted. Chart 18 presents a forecast for A-share earnings growth in US dollars, based on earningsâ relationship with the official Li Keqiang index. The chart shows that while an earnings contraction is not probable, without more stimulus the growth rate may fall sharply in the next 12 months from its current elevated level. This aspect, combined with only a minor valuation discount relative to global stocks, paints an uninspiring outlook for Chinese onshore stocks. Chart 17Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Traded At A Slight Discount To Global Equities Chart 18An Uninspiring Domestic Equity Earnings Outlook Our baseline view is that Chinese authorities will be more willing to step up policy supports into 2022. Fiscal impulse will likely turn negative for most major economies next year and global economic recovery will have peaked. In this scenario, both Chinaâs economy and stocks will have the potential to outperform their global peers next year. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Spread Product: The macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries in US bond portfolios. High-Yield: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. EM Corporates: Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Feature Chart 1Fed Meeting Didn't Shock Credit Markets Last weekâs report looked at how the June FOMC meeting prompted a massive re-shaping of the Treasury curve.1 It didnât discuss, however, the impact that Juneâs meeting had on credit spreads. Thereâs a simple reason for this. Corporate bond spreads didnât move very much post-FOMC. In fact, neither investment grade nor high-yield spreads have widened significantly during the past two weeks, despite the Fedâs apparent âhawkish turnâ (Chart 1). The VIX jumped briefly above 20 in the days following the Fed meeting but it has since re-discovered its lows (Chart 1, bottom panel). This weekâs report considers whether the corporate bond market is too complacent. The first section updates our assessment of where we are in the credit cycle based on two indicators that did see large swings post-Fed. The second section updates our outlook for high-yield defaults and considers whether junk spreads continue to offer adequate compensation. Finally, the third section of this report presents an introductory look at valuation in the USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) corporate sector. We find that, for the most part, investment grade EM corporates are attractively valued relative to EM sovereigns and US corporates of the same credit rating and duration. Credit Cycle Update Chart 2Credit Cycle Indicators As we have repeatedly stated in past research, the slope of the yield curve is a very important credit cycle indicator.2 We have documented that spread product tends to outperform duration-matched Treasuries by a wide margin when the yield curve is steep. This outperformance tapers off once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope falls below 50 bps and it falls off even more when the slope dips below zero.3 With that in mind, it is notable that the Treasury curve flattened dramatically following the June FOMC meeting (Chart 2). At 106 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains well above the 50 bps threshold that would start to get concerning for spread product. However, itâs likely that the yield curve will continue to flatten as we approach a Fed rate hike in 2022. In other words, we expect that monetary conditions will turn sufficiently restrictive for us to reduce our recommended spread product allocation within the next 12-18 months. On the other hand, one positive development for spread product returns is that the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate declined following the June FOMC meeting. In fact, it is now below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fedâs inflation target (Chart 2, bottom panel). This is a positive development for spread product because the Fed will strive to ensure that monetary conditions stay accommodative at least until these long-dated inflation expectations are consistent with the 2.3% to 2.5% target. Or put differently, a rebound in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates back to the target range will slow the near-term pace of curve flattening, giving the credit cycle a small amount of extra running room. In short, the macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Investment Grade Corporates The highly supportive macro environment applies to investment grade corporate bonds, just as it does to all spread sectors. However, investment grade corporates have the problem that valuation is extremely tight. Much like a flat yield curve environment, a tight spread environment tends to coincide with low excess corporate bond returns. However, our research reveals that tight spreads alone are not sufficient for investment grade corporates to underperform duration-matched Treasuries. Table 1 classifies each month since May 1973 based on the investment grade corporate bond spread and the 3/10 Treasury slope. It then shows a 90% confidence interval for corporate bond excess returns during the following 12 months. It shows that, even when the corporate bond spread is below 100 bps (it is 81 bps today), investment grade corporates still tend to outperform duration-matched Treasuries as long as the 3/10 Treasury slope is above 50 bps. Table 1Expected 12-Month Corporate Bond Excess Return* (BPs) Based On OAS And Yield Curve Slope Bottom Line: The yield curve has started to flatten but it remains very steep, consistent with spread product outperforming duration-matched Treasuries. We remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries but will re-consider this position once the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. We expect this could happen within the next 12-18 months. We maintain only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds because of stretched valuations. We see more attractive opportunities in high-yield corporates (see next section), municipal bonds, USD-denominated EM sovereigns and USD-denominated EM corporates (see final section below). High-Yield Default Update We last updated our default rate outlook in March.4 At that time, we concluded that junk spreads offered adequate compensation for expected default losses. Since then, we have received nonfinancial corporate sector profit and debt growth data for the first quarter of 2021, crucial inputs to our macro-based default rate model. Our macro-based model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (i.e. pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards (Chart 3). Lending standards enter our model with a lag, but we need a forward-looking estimate of gross leverage for our model to generate predictions. Chart 3Macro-Driven Default Rate Model To estimate gross leverage we first model corporate profit growth based on real GDP (Chart 4) and assume that real GDP grows by 7% over the next four quarters, consistent with the Fedâs median forecast. This gives us a profit growth expectation of roughly 30%. Chart 4Profit & Debt Growth We also need an estimate for corporate debt growth. Corporate debt exploded last year, growing 10% in 2020, but it then slowed to an annualized rate of 4% in Q1 2021. We think corporate debt growth will remain slow going forward. The nonfinancial corporate sector financing gap has been negative in each of the past four quarters (Chart 4, bottom panel), meaning that retained earnings have exceeded capital expenditures. In other words, firms have built up a lot of excess capital that can be deployed in place of debt to finance new investment opportunities. Table 2 shows our modelâs predicted 12-month default rate based on different assumptions for profit and debt growth. If we assume corporate profit growth of 30% and corporate debt growth between 0% and 8%, then our model predicts that the 12-month default rate will fall from its current 5.5% to a range of 2.3% - 2.8%. Table 2Default Rate Scenarios Next, we need to consider what sort of expected default rate is priced into the High-Yield index. Our analysis of historical junk spreads and returns suggests that we should require a minimum excess spread of 100 bps in the High-Yield index after subtracting default losses to be confident that junk bonds will outperform Treasuries.5 If we also assume a recovery rate of 40% on defaulted debt, then we calculate that the High-Yield index is fairly priced for a 12-month default rate of 2.9% (Chart 5). That is, junk spreads appear slightly cheap compared to the 2.3% - 2.8% range predicted by our macro model. Finally, itâs worth noting that actual corporate default events have been quite rare in recent months. In the first five months of 2021 weâve seen between 1 and 3 default events per month. If we extrapolate that trend and assume we see 3 defaults per month going forward, then we calculate that the 12-month trailing default rate will fall to 2.0% by December, before leveling off at 2.2% (Chart 6). In other words, the recent trend has been one of significantly fewer defaults than predicted by our macro model Chart 5Spread-Implied Default Rate Chart 6Recent Default Trends Bottom Line: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. An Attractive Opportunity In EM Corporates This week we present an introductory look at the risk/reward opportunity in USD-denominated EM corporate bonds. Specifically, we look at the investment grade Bloomberg Barclays USD-denominated EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index. We compare this index to both the investment grade USD-denominated EM Sovereign index and the US Credit index.6 First, we look at recent performance trends and average index statistics (Table 3). Both the EM Corporate and EM Sovereign indexes have average credit ratings between A and Baa, so we compare their performance to the A-rated and Baa-rated US Credit indexes. We observe a significant option-adjusted spread (OAS) advantage in both the EM indexes, though part of the extra spread offered by the Sovereign index is compensation for its longer duration. The EM Corporate index sticks out as offering an extremely attractive OAS per unit of duration. Table 3Performance Trends & Index Statistics As for performance, we see that the EM Corporate index experienced less of a drawdown (in excess return terms) during the COVID recession, though it has also returned less than both the EM Sovereign index and the Baa Credit index during the recent upswing. Chart 7Spreads Versus Credit Rating & Duration-Matched US Credit Next, we look at each individual credit tier of both the EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index and the EM Sovereign index, and we calculate the spread relative to a credit rating and duration-matched position in the US Credit index (Chart 7). In general, we see that both EM indexes offer a spread advantage versus duration-matched US Credit across all credit rating tiers. EM sovereigns look better than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. This is the result of attractive spreads on the sovereign bonds of UAE and Qatar. However, EM corporates clearly dominate sovereigns in both the A and Baa credit tiers. Finally, we consider the risk/reward trade-off in our EM indexes by using our Excess Return Bond Map. Our Excess Return Bond Map shows the relationship between expected return (on the vertical axis) and risk (on the horizontal axis). In Chart 8A our risk measure is the 12-month spread widening required for each index to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries divided by that indexâs historical spread volatility. It can be thought of as the number of standard deviations of spread widening required for the index to provide an excess return of -100 bps. A higher value corresponds to less risk, and vice-versa. Chart 8B uses the same risk measurement, only we use the spread widening required to lose 500 bps versus Treasuries to assess the risk of a large drawdown. Both Charts 8A and 8B use OAS as the measure of expected return. Chart 8AExcess Return Bond Map (100 BPs Loss Threshold) Chart 8BExcess Return Bond Map (500 BPs Loss Threshold) The first thing that sticks out in Charts 8A & 8B is that Baa-rated EM corporates offer greater expected return and less risk than the EM Sovereign index and the Baa US Credit Index. This is true whether our loss threshold is set at 100 bps or 500 bps. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to split the EM Sovereign index by credit tier in these charts. A-rated EM corporates offer slightly less expected return than the EM Sovereign index but with significantly less risk, they also clearly dominate the A-rated US Credit Index. Aa-rated EM corporates appear to offer a similar risk/reward trade-off as the EM Sovereign index, though we know from Chart 7 that sovereigns have a spread advantage in the Aa credit tier. The bottom line is that USD-denominated EM corporates are attractively valued relative to investment grade US corporate bonds with the same duration and credit rating. EM corporates also look preferable to EM sovereigns in the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns are more attractive than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, âHow To Re-Shape The Yield Curve Without Really Tryingâ, dated June 22, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âLower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Thinkâ, dated May 25, 2021. 3 We use the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope in place of the more widely tracked 2-year/10-year slope in our credit cycle research only because using the 3-year/10-year slope allows us to include more historical cycles in our analysis. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âThat Uneasy Feelingâ, dated March 30, 2021. 5 Please see page 33 of the US Bond Strategy Quarterly Chartpack, âTesting The Limits Of Transitory Inflationâ, dated May 18, 2021. 6 The US Credit Index consists predominantly of US corporate bonds, but also some non-corporate credit such as: Sovereigns, Foreign Agencies, Domestic Agencies, Local Authority bonds and Supranationals. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights In the near term, the RMB against the US dollar has ceased to be a one-way bet. Market sentiment will re-focus on economic fundamentals, which are less supportive of further RMB appreciation. In the longer term, the RMB still has some upside potential, but the pace of its growth should be much slower than in the past 12 months. The sharp rise in the trade-weighted RMB index is starting to threaten Chinaâs export sector and has exacerbated the tightening of domestic monetary conditions. Barring a monetary policy reset by Chinese authorities, even a small increase in the broad-RMB index would heighten the risk of a contraction in corporate profit growth in the coming 12 months. We remain risk adverse to Chinese stocks for the next 6 months. Feature Chart 1The RMB Back On A Fast Ascending Path After a brief pause in March, Chinaâs currency versus the US dollar extended its steep upward trend began in mid-2020 (Chart 1). Chinese policymakers recently ramped up their strong-worded statements warning against speculating on the RMB. Regulators have also taken steps to stem the rise. Questions we have recently been getting from our clients about the RMB can be summarized as follows: After a 10% appreciation since its trough a year ago, does the RMB have more upside in 2021 and beyond? If the RMB continues to appreciate, what would be the impact on Chinaâs economy and corporate sector? What can the PBoC do to slow the pace of the currencyâs appreciation? One could argue that the US dollar will continue to weaken, but we see substantial headwinds to the RMB within the year. A weaker US dollar would support global stock prices outside of the US and foreign inflows have driven the recent rally in Chinaâs onshore stocks. However, we think Chinaâs domestic macro policy and economic conditions pose more downside risks on a cyclical basis. How Far Can The RMB Go? A continued upswing in the CNY relative to the USD can no longer be taken for granted. In the coming months, there is a strengthening case for the RMB to fall against the greenback as factors supporting a strong RMB in the past year start to abate. Economic fundamentals will no longer prop up the RMBâs rise going into 2H21. Chinaâs growth momentum is softening due to significant tightening in the monetary environment in the second half of last year and a rapid deceleration in credit growth this year (Chart 2). Meanwhile, the massive rollouts of COVID-19 vaccines in North America and Europe have successfully reduced new infections and hospitalization rates, allowing these countries to reopen their economies. The economic growth gaps between China and the developed markets (DMs) will narrow more significantly in the coming months (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Economic Fundamentals Will Start To Weaken Chart 3China's Growth Gap Relative To DMs Will Narrow Chart 4Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods Chinaâs large current account surplus will likely start narrowing. It has been driven by strong global demand for goods, which is unlikely to be sustained as the pent-up demand for services in DMs will outpace the consumption for goods (Chart 4). Emerging countries (EMs), many of which are Chinaâs export competitors, lag far behind DMs and China on inoculation rates and some have resurging COVID cases (Chart 5). However, EMs will likely benefit from meaningful expansions in global vaccine production in the second half of the year.1 A catchup in vaccinations in these countries will reduce Chinaâs export-sector advantage, reversing the RMBâs gains over other Asian currencies in the past month. Chart 5China's Asian Neighbors Have Been Hit By Resurging COVID Cases The future trend of the USD also matters to the USD/CNY exchange rate. The recent strength of the CNY vis-Ã -vis the dollar was the mirror image of USD weakness, which has been due to low real rates in the US and recovering economic momentum outside the US (Chart 6). However, the broad dollar index is sitting at a critical technical level that could either breakout or breakdown (Chart 7). When the Fed announces the slowing of asset purchases, which our BCA US Bond Strategy expects before the end of 2021, it could lead to higher US real yields and reverse the trend of hot money flows into China. Chart 6The Sharp Rise In The RMB In The Past Two Months Has Been Dollar-Driven Chart 7The Dollar Index: Breakout or Breakdown? Furthermore, the financial market does not seem to have priced in unstable US-China relations, which could undermine global risk appetite (Chart 8). Recent actions by US President Joe Biden â from expanding the investment ban on 59 blacklisted Chinese tech companies to calling for the US intelligence community to investigate the origins of COVID-19 â point to risks for escalating tensions between the two nations. Longer term, the RMB is at about one standard deviation below its fair value, which suggests that it still has more upside potential (Chart 9). Based on our BCAâs Foreign Exchange Strategistâs real effective exchange rate (REER) model, the RMBâs fair value mostly climbed in the past three decades, driven by higher productivity in China relative to its trading partners. However, part of the RMBâs appreciation since mid-2020 has been a catch up to its pre-trade war value and its valuation gap has rapidly narrowed. From the current valuation levels, the pace of RMB appreciation should be much slower going forward. Chart 8Geopolitical Surprises Could Spook The Market Chart 9Valuation Gap Has Rapidly Narrowed We also expect Chinaâs real interest rates relative to the US to dwindle in the next three to five years. Demographic headwinds in China herald lower real rates while the Fed is primed to start rate liftoffs within the next two years. Bottom Line: The RMB still has some upside potential in the long run, but the pace of its appreciation should be much slower than in the past 12 months. In the near term, odds are high that economic fundamentals will not boost the RMB any further. How Does A Stronger RMB Affect Chinaâs Economy? Historically, a stronger RMB relative to the dollar has not had a significant impact on Chinaâs economy. However, if the CNY appreciates considerably versus the greenback so that it pushes up the trade-weighted RMB index, then Chinaâs corporate profits will be negatively affected (Chart 10). Chart 10Strengthening Broad-RMB Index Has Historically Led To Weaker Corporate Profit Growth... Chart 11...And Could Significantly Raise Prob Of A Earnings Contraction In 12 Months Our earnings growth recession probability model confirms our view. If all else is equal, a 3% rise in the trade-weighted RMB index from its current level would more than double the probability of a contraction in earnings growth in the coming 12 months (Chart 11, Scenario 1). On the other hand, all else will not be equal if the broad RMB index goes up by 3%. A quick increase in the RMBâs value against the currencies of its trading partners will impede Chinaâs export growth and tighten domestic monetary conditions. Chart 12Moving Into Restrictive Territory For Chinese Exports Chart 12 shows the impact on export growth from the speed of the RMBâs appreciation; we calculate the rise in an export-weighted RMB index relative to its highs and lows in the past few years. The metric implies that the acceleration in the RMBâs value has reached levels that should be restrictive for exports. The nominal export-weighted RMB index has been significantly above the median value since 2015 and it is approaching the peak reached in that year. Clearly, the strong RMB is linked to a recent weakness in the PMI surveys on export orders. A 3% increase in the trade-weighted RMB from the current level, coupled with a drop in export growth and further deceleration in credit impulse would prop up the earnings contraction probability to more than 50% (Scenario 2 in Chart 11 above). Bottom Line: Our metrics suggest that the RMBâs recent sharp rise is starting to threaten the export sector. An additional 3% appreciation in the broad RMB index would cause a meaningful increase in the probability of a corporate earnings growth contraction in the coming 12 months. What Can The PBoC Do To Halt The RMB Rally? We break this question into two parts: the willingness and the capability of the PBoC to intervene in the currency market. On the first aspect, the PBoC in recent years has largely refrained from draconian intervention measures in the currency market. Allowing a more market-based currency exchange rate regime is a crucial part of Chinaâs RMB internationalization process. The PBoC seems to be mostly sticking to this long-term goal. Chart 13New FX Regime Began In 2015 Has Significantly Lowered USD Weight In The Broad-RMB Index... Importantly, the new exchange rate regime that the PBoC switched to at end-2015 has greatly weakened the link between the USD and the broad RMB trend (Chart 13). Since then China has continuously cut the weighting of the USD in the CFETS currency index basket, which has reduced the impact of dollar moves on the index. Therefore, the PBoC has mostly ignored short-term volatilities in the CNY/USD exchange rate. The central bank tends to intervene only when swings in the CNY/USD exchange rate are large enough and/or the market forms a unilateral view on the Chinese currency to drive sustained movements in the broader RMB index. For example, the RMB value rose at a much faster rate against the USD compared with its other trading partners in the second half of 2020. However, this year, the pace of growth in the broad RMB index has caught up with that of the CNY/USD appreciation. Moreover, even when the RMB depreciated against the USD in March, the CFETS index basket kept rising and is now breaching its previous peak in April 2018 (Chart 14). As discussed in the previous section, a sharp jump in the trade-weighted RMB would be more detrimental to Chinaâs corporate profits than an increase in the CNY/USD. Chart 14...But The Massive Appreciation In The CNY/USD Of Late Has Pushed The RMB Index To A Three-Year High Chart 15The PBoC Has Been Trying To Guide Market Expectations Lower On The RMB On the second aspect, the PBoC is unlikely to alter its monetary policy trajectory to tame the RMBâs appreciation. A looser monetary environment would encourage more asset price bubbles domestically and jeopardize policymakersâ ongoing progress in financial and property-market de-risking. If the CFETS strengthens further, Chinese authorities will probably use tools such as managing market expectations and various capital controls to mop up excess FX liquidity generated from capital inflows. In the near term, the PBoC may set a weaker fixing rate against the dollar to dampen market expectations for more RMB growth (Chart 15). An increase in the FX deposit reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate, announced by the PBoC last week, is another example of the central bank trying to prevent a one-sided expectation by market participants. However, the previous three FX deposit RRR hikes âall taken place more than a decade agoâdid little to alter the path of the CNY exchange rate; the pace of USD/CNY depreciation actually accelerated following the May 2007 RRR hike. The two-percentage point bump in the FX deposit RRR rate will drain Chinaâs domestic FX liquidity by about US$20 billion. Its effect on domestic FX liquidity and FX loan rates is rather limited â FX inflows to Chinese financial institutions since 2H20 were more than US$20 billion a month âmore than offsetting the tightening from a RRR rate hike. The PBoC can further loosen outward capital controls to release some pressure on the RMBâs increase. In a report from November last year we wrote that Chinese policymakers attempted to slow the pace of appreciation in the RMB through a build-up in strategic FX assets by commercial banks and other financial institutions . Since August last year, China has relaxed outbound investment regulations and increased quotas to help channel domestic money into offshore financial markets. Chinaâs commercial banks significantly ramped up their FX assets last year (Chart 16). In Q1 this year, commercial banks enriched their FX asset holdings by US$518.5 billion, a record high in the past five years. Bottom Line: The PBoC is willing to allow more volatility in the USD/CNY exchange rate, but a sharp jump in the RMBâs value against a basket of other currencies would warrant further policy actions. Chart 16Chinese Banks Ramped Up FX Asset Holdings Chart 17Chinese Onshore Stocks Propped Up By Foreign Investors Investment Conclusions A tightened monetary and credit environment has created headwinds for Chinese equities since early this year. However, the domestic market appears to have found support at a key technical level of late (Chart 17). The recent rebound in Chinaâs onshore stocks on the back of a sharp CNY appreciation and accelerated foreign capital inflows, in our view, are unsustainable on a cyclical basis. Despite buoyant global economic growth, investors should consider deteriorating cyclical conditions in China when judging the appropriate allocation for Chinese equities. While policy tightening has brought multiples closer to earth than last year, the upside in Chinese stock prices will be capped by subsiding stimulus and slower profit growth ahead. As such, a decisive breakout to the upside in Chinese stock prices will require major reflationary catalysts, and it is the reason we are still risk adverse on Chinese equities (Chart 18). Meanwhile, we continue to favor onshore consumer discretionary stocks relative to the broad A-share market. A strong RMB can be a booster to domestic discretionary spending. We initiated this trade in May last year and it has largely outperformed Chinaâs onshore broad market (Chart 19). We will close the trade when the CNY loses its strength and Chinese domestic demand starts to falter. Chart 18Cyclical Performance In Chinese Stocks Is Still Driven By Economic Fundamentals Chart 19Keep A Long CD Position, But On A Short Leash Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1The UN estimates that as many as 15 billion vaccine doses could be produced by the second half of 2021, enough to inoculate most of the worldâs population. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights A slower money and credit growth in China will eventually generate disinflationary pressures by weighing on demand for commodities. The PBoC has shifted its inflation anchor and policy framework to target core CPI and the PPI rather than headline CPI. Beijing is scaling back its fiscal supports and cooling the property sector to tackle local government and housing sector debt issues. In the next six to nine months we favor companies and sectors that will benefit from global economic recovery rather than Chinaâs domestic demand. We are long CSI500 relative to Chinaâs A shares. The CSI500 has a larger exposure to the global economy and lower valuation relative to Chinaâs broad onshore market. Feature As a follow up to last weekâs report, we look at another topic raised in recent client meetings: whether rapidly rising producer prices in China will morph into a broad-based inflationary risk and how macroeconomic policies will evolve to counter such a risk. Clients who believe that the ongoing producer price inflation is transitory cited Chinaâs low consumer price inflation, and slowing money and credit growth, as leading indicators of budding disinflationary pressures. Advocates of sustained inflation pointed to robust recoveries and demand among advanced economies, extremely accommodative monetary conditions worldwide, massive fiscal stimulus in the US, a weak US dollar, and supply constraints. It remains to be seen what the worldwide pandemicâs impact will be on the balance between global production capacity and aggregate demand. In this report we analyze the PBoCâs inflation target and policy framework, and conclude that while Chinaâs monetary policy has not become more hawkish, policy tightening seems to be taking place on the fiscal front. Is Inflation In China A Risk? It is debatable whether the strong rebound in GDP growth in Q4 last year and in Q1 this year has closed Chinaâs output gap and will lead to widespread inflation. Given data distortions due to low-base effects from the previous year and uncertainty about Chinaâs productivity and labor force growth, any calculation of the output gap will be unreliable. In addition, Chinaâs employment statistics lack cyclicality and cannot be used to gauge inflationary pressure stemming from wage growth and unit labor costs. Chart 1A Rollover In Credit Growth Will Weigh On Chinese Demand For Commodities Our cyclical view of inflation is therefore based on the framework that the ongoing moderation in China's money and credit growth will eventually generate disinflationary pressures by weighing on the countryâs demand for and price of commodities (Chart 1). Furthermore, behind a resilient PPI, there are suggestions that the strength in Chinaâs economy is still bifurcated. A narrow-based uptrend in the PPI lacks the ground for sustained inflation, and is unlikely to trigger a general tightening in monetary policy. While mounting global prices for raw materials propelled strong upstream PPI, producer prices for consumer goods and core consumer price inflation remain very subdued (Chart 2). The inconsistency in producer prices among various industries highlight the unevenness of the economic recovery and, importantly, persistently muted household consumption (Chart 3). Chart 2A Bifurcated Economic Recovery Chart 3A Muted Recovery In Household Consumption Chart 4Weak Price Transmission From Upstream To Downstream Industries The transmission from upstream industrial PPI to the middle and downstream sectors has also been weak (Chart 4). It is evidenced in the faster growth of manufacturing output volume compared with price increases (Chart 5). This contrasts with the previous inflationary cycles, as well as mining and ferrous metals where surging prices for raw materials have way surpassed recovery in output volume (Chart 6). Given that price changes are more important to corporate profits than volume changes, Chinese middle-to-downstream industries face downward pressure on their profit margins and will likely deliver disappointing profits, despite a strong rebound in production. Chart 5China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices Chart 6China's Upstream Industries: Prices Surged Faster Than Production Furthermore, PMI input prices, which lead core CPI by about nine months, rolled over in April (Chart 7). While it is too soon to conclude that input prices have peaked, it is implied that upward pressure on core CPI from input prices may start to ease in 2H21. Bottom Line: So far there is no sign that elevated upstream producer prices will create sustainable inflationary pressure on consumer prices. Hence our view is that the PBoC will not respond to a rising PPI by further tightening monetary policy. Chart 7PMI Input Prices Have Rolled Over Chart 8Core CPI And PPI Have Been The PBoC's Inflation Targets Since 2015 The PBoCâs Inflation Target Since 2015, Chinaâs monetary tightening cycles have closely correlated with a combination of the core CPI and PPI instead of headline CPI (Chart 8). The shift to targeting core CPI and PPI occurred despite the central bankâs frequent mention of headline CPI as its inflation target. The reasons for the shift are twofold. First, swings in food and fuel prices have become much larger since 2014, often dominating fluctuations in headline CPI (Chart 9). Secondly, the price swings were often driven by supply-side factors and did not reflect changes in demand. Therefore, monetary policies could do little to mitigate inflationary or deflationary pressures. Furthermore, the PPI seems to play a greater role in the PBoCâs monetary policymaking than the headline and core CPI (Chart 10). The tighter relationship between the de facto policy rate and the PPI is not surprising, given that Chinaâs ex-factory price inflation reflects changes in corporate pricing, profit, and inventory cycles â all are driven by the countryâs money supply and credit cycles. Chart 9Large Swings In Food And Energy Prices Distorted Headline CPI In Recent Years Chart 10PPI Plays A Greater Role In The PBoC's Monetary Policymaking The relationship between the 7-day repo rate - the de jure policy rate - and the PPI has broken down since 2015 (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the 3-month repo rate has maintained a close relationship with the PPI (Chart 10, bottom panel). The change in the relationship is because the PBoC shifted its policy to target interest rates instead of the quantity of money supply since 2015 (Chart 12). Moreover, since 2016 the PBoC has generated monetary policy tightening measures through changes in its Macro Prudential Assessment Framework (MPA) rather than directly through interest rate hikes. Chart 11Relationship Between The 7-Day Repo Rate And The PPI Has Broken Down Since 2015... Chart 12...Due To Monetary Policy Regime Shifted Bottom Line: The PBoC has shifted its inflation anchor and policy framework since 2015. Core CPI and the PPI are now the main inflation targets. A Quiet Fiscal Tightening? Despite a jump in the PPI, the 3-month repo rate fell sharply in the past two months (Chart 10 on page 6, bottom panel). It is possible that the PBoC considers escalating producer prices as transitory and, therefore, intends to keep its overall policy stance unchanged. However, the PBoCâs relaxed policy response towards inflation risk may be explained by Beijingâs quiet tightening on the fiscal front. Chart 13The Central Bank Has Made Little Interbank Liquidity Injections Lately The PBoC can hold its policy rates steady by supplying adequate liquidity to the interbank system through open market operations or by reducing the demand for liquidity. On a net basis, the PBoC has recently injected very little liquidity into the interbank system, implying that banksâ liquidity demand has likely softened (Chart 13). This might be a sign of weakening credit origination. In a previous report we discussed how fiscal stimulus has become a more relevant driver of Chinaâs credit origination since the onset of the 2014/15 economic downcycle. A rising 3-month SHIBOR can be the result of rapid fiscal and quasi-fiscal expansions, which occurred in Q3 last year. A flood of local government bond issuance drained liquidity from commercial banks, which boosted the banksâ needs to borrow money from the interbank system and pushed up interbank rates. Despite higher interest rates, credit growth soared in Q3 as fiscal multiplier provided an imminent and powerful reflationary force to the economy. In contrast, local government bond issuance was down sharply in the first four months of this year, compared with 2019 and 2020. Local governments sold 222.7 billion yuan of special-purpose bonds (SPBs) from January to April, a plunge from 730 billion yuan of debt sold in the same period in 2019 and 1.15 trillion yuan in 2020. The total local government bond issuance in Q1 this year has also been 36% and 44% lower than in Q1 2019 and 2020, respectively. A lack of local governmentsâ appetite to borrow coupled with a shortage in profitable infrastructure projects might have contributed to the sharp drop in bond issuance this year. Local government financing and spending have been under increased scrutiny this year. Following the State Council Executive Meeting in late March, in which Premier Li Keqiang pledged to reduce government leverage ratio and raise regulatory standards on infrastructure investment, Beijing suspended two high-speed rail projects that were initiated by provincial governments. Messages from Politburoâs meeting last week reinforced our view that policymakers may be scaling back fiscal support while further tightening regulations in the property sector. Both aspects have the potential to cool Chinaâs demand for industrial metals and global industrial material prices (Chart 14 and Chart 15). Chart 14A Slowdown In Chinese Manufacturing Demand Will Have A Greater Impact On Global Industrial Material Prices Chart 15Lower Housing Demand In China Will Help To Cool Industrial Metal Prices We expect the intensity of policy tightening to reach its peak between mid-year to third-quarter 2021. It is unclear at this point whether policymakers are willing to allow local governments to significantly undershoot their SPB quota for this year. Local governments reportedly experienced a shortage in profitable investment projects towards the end of last year, and thus, parked more than 10% of proceeds from 2020 SPB issuance at the central bank. The central government may be taking a wait-and-see attitude this year, and saving more fiscal dry powder for later this year when the economic slowdown becomes more meaningful. Bottom Line: Beijing is pulling back its fiscal supports and cooling the property sector to tackle local government and housing sector debt issues. The deleveraging efforts will curb Chinaâs demand for commodities, and may work to ease inflationary pressure on prices for raw materials. Investment Conclusions The outlook for Chinaâs risk asset prices remains bearish, at least in the next six months. If the credit and fiscal impulse slow enough to depress corporate pricing power, inflation will not be a problem because disinflationary pressures will resurface. However, the growth of corporate profits will disappoint (Chart 16). Beijing may be saving more fiscal dry powder for later this year. Still, SPBs are only a small part of local governmentsâ financing source for infrastructure projects. Given the central governmentâs renewed focus on reducing public debt, policymakers are unlikely to unleash fiscal power to significantly boost infrastructure spending or economic growth. In the next six to nine months, we favor companies and sectors that will benefit from global economic recovery rather than Chinaâs domestic demand. With this week's report, we initiate a long position on the CSI500 index, which has a larger exposure to the global market and lower valuation relative to Chinaâs broad onshore market (Chart 17). Chart 16Aggregate Corporate Profit Growth Will Slow Even Though Inflation Is No Longer An Issue Chart 17Long CSI500/Broad Market Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
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1 Jed Graham, âãã€ãã³ã®çšå¶æ¡ïŒAmazonãGoogleãFacebookãAppleãMicrosoftãžã®åœ±é¿,â ã€ã³ãã¹ã¿ãŒãºã»ããžãã¹ã»ãã€ãªãŒ (2021幎4æ8æ¥).
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3 Emanuel Kopp, Daniel Leigh, Susanna Mursula, and Suchanan Tambunlertchai, â2017幎ã®Tax Cuts and Jobs Act以éã®ç±³åœæè³,â åœéé貚åºéïŒIMFïŒã¯ãŒãã³ã°ããŒã㌠(2019幎5æ31æ¥).
4 Michelle Hanlon, Jeffrey L. Hoopes, and Joel Slemrod, âTax Reform Made Me Do It!â NBER ã¯ãŒãã³ã°ããŒã㌠25283 (2018幎11æ).
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Highlights Chart 1How Long Until Full Employment? Itâs official. The vaccination roll-out is successfully suppressing the spread of COVID-19 throughout the United States and the associated economic re-opening is leading to a surge in activity. Not only did Marchâs ISM Manufacturing PMI come in at 64.7, its highest reading since 1983, but the economy also added 916 thousand jobs during the month. Interestingly, the 10-year Treasury yield was relatively stable last week despite the eye-catching economic data. This is likely because the Treasury curve already discounted a significant rebound in economic activity and last weekâs data merely confirmed the marketâs expectations. At present, the Treasury curve is priced for Fed liftoff in September 2022 and a total of five rate hikes by the end of 2023. By our calculations, the Fed will be ready to lift rates by the end of 2022 if monthly employment growth averages at least 410k between now and then (Chart 1). If payroll growth can somehow stay above 701k per month, then the Fed will hit its âmaximum employmentâ target by the end of this year. While a lot of good news is already priced in the Treasury curve, the greatest near-term risk is that the data continue to beat expectations. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 29 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +98 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. Though Treasury yields have risen, this does not yet pose a risk for credit spreads. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate remains below the Fedâs target range of 2.3% to 2.5%. We wonât be concerned about restrictive monetary policy pushing spreads wider until inflation expectations are well-anchored around the Fedâs target. Despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade corporate valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate indexâs 12-month breakeven spread is down to its 2nd percentile (Chart 2). This means that the breakeven spread has only been tighter 2% of the time since 1995. The same measure shows that Baa-rated bonds have also only been more expensive 2% of the time (panel 3). We donât anticipate material underperformance versus Treasuries, but we see better value outside of the investment grade corporate space.1 Specifically, we advise investors to favor tax-exempt municipal bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. We also prefer USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Finally, the supportive macro environment means we are comfortable adding credit risk to a portfolio. With that in mind, we encourage investors to pick up the additional spread offered by high-yield corporates. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 83 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +263 bps. In last weekâs report we looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.2 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.4% (Chart 3). Using a model of the speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (aka pre-tax profits over debt) and C&I lending standards, we can estimate a likely default rate for the next 12 months using assumptions for profit and debt growth. The median FOMC forecast of 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021 is consistent with 31% corporate profit growth. We also assume that last yearâs debt binge will be followed by relatively weak corporate debt growth in 2021. According to our model, 30% profit growth and 2% debt growth is consistent with a default rate of 3.4% for the next 12 months, exactly matching what is priced into junk spreads. Given that the Fedâs 6.5% real GDP growth forecast looks conservative given the large amount of fiscal stimulus coming down the pike, and the fact that the combination of strong economic growth and accommodative monetary policy could easily cause valuations to overshoot in the near-term, we are inclined to maintain an overweight allocation to High-Yield bonds. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +15 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries tightened 12 bps in March. This spread remains wide compared to levels seen during the past few years, but it is still tight compared to the recent pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) currently sits at 19 bps. This is considerably below the 52 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 38 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 27 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. All in all, the value in MBS is not appealing compared to other similarly risky sectors. The plummeting primary mortgage spread was a key reason for the elevated refi activity seen during the past year. However, the spread has now recovered back to more typical levels (bottom panel). The implication is that further increases in Treasury yields will likely be matched by higher mortgage rates, meaning that mortgage refinancings have probably peaked. The coming drop in refi activity will be positive for MBS returns, but we arenât yet ready to turn bullish on the sector. First, as mentioned above, value is poor compared to other similarly risky sectors. Second, the gap between the nominal MBS spread and the MBA Refinance Index remains wide (panel 2) and we could still see spreads adjust higher. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 45 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +66 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 157 bps in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +40 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 8 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +33 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 81 bps in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +286 bps. Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 2 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +14 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 7 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. We recently took a detailed look at valuation for USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereigns.3 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Mexico, Russia and Colombia We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space. Ba-rated high-yield US corporates offer a spread advantage over Ba-rated EM Sovereigns and the lower EM credit tiers are dominated by distressed credits like Turkey and Argentina. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 187 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +291 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads have tightened dramatically during the past few months and Aaa-rated Munis now look expensive compared to Treasuries, with the exception of the short-end of the curve (Chart 6). That said, if we match the duration and credit rating between the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal bond indexes and the US Credit index, we find that both General Obligation (GO) and Revenue Munis appear attractive compared to US investment grade Credit, with the possible exception of some short-maturity GO bonds. Revenue Munis offer a before-tax yield pick-up relative to US Credit for maturities above 12 years (bottom panel). Revenue bonds in the 8-12 year maturity bucket offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 13% (panel 3). Revenue bonds in the 6-8 year maturity bucket offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 24%. GO Munis with 17+ years to maturity offer an after-tax yield pick-up relative to Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 1%. This breakeven effective tax rate rises to 6% for the 12-17 year maturity bucket, 23% for the 8-12 year maturity bucket (panel 3) and 32% for the 6-8 year maturity bucket. All in all, municipal bond value has deteriorated markedly in recent months and we downgraded our recommended allocation from âmaximum overweightâ to âoverweightâ in January. However, investors should still prefer municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields moved up dramatically in March, with the curve steepening out to the 10-year maturity point and flattening thereafter. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 28 bps to end the month at 158 bps. The 5/30 slope steepened 7 bps to end the month at 149 bps (Chart 7). As we showed in a recent report, the Treasury curve continues to trade directionally with yields out to the 10-year maturity point.4 Beyond 10 years, the curve has transitioned into a bear flattening/bull steepening regime where higher yields coincide with a flatter curve and vice-versa (bottom panel). For now, we are content to stick with our recommended steepener: long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. However, we will eventually be close enough to an expected Fed liftoff date that the 5/10 slope will follow the 10/30 slope and transition into a bear-flattening/bull-steepening regime. When that happens, it will make more sense to either position for a steepener at the front-end of the curve (long 3-year bullet / short 2/5 barbell) or a flattener at the long-end of the curve (long 5/30 barbell / short 10-year bullet). We donât yet see sufficient evidence of 5/10 bear-flattening to shift out of our current recommended position and into these new ones, and so we stay the course for now. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 155 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +341 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 22 bps on the month and it currently sits at 2.38%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 30 bps in March and it currently sits at 2.15%. Despite last monthâs sharp move higher, the 5-year/5-year forward breakeven rate is still below the Fedâs target range of 2.3% to 2.5% (Chart 8). This means that the rising cost of inflation protection is not yet a concern for the Fed, and in fact, the Fed would like to encourage it to rise further still. Our recommended positions in inflation curve flatteners and real curve steepeners continued to perform well last month. The 5/10 TIPS breakeven inflation slope was relatively stable, but the 2/10 CPI swap slope flattened 8 bps (panel 4). The 2/10 real yield curve steepened 31 bps in March to reach 169 bps (bottom panel). An inverted inflation curve has been an unusual occurrence during the past few years, but we think it will be the normal state of affairs going forward. The Fedâs new strategy involves allowing inflation to rise above 2% so that it can attack its inflation target from above rather than from below. This new monetary environment is much more consistent with an inverted inflation curve than an upward sloping one, and we would resist the temptation to put on an inflation curve steepener. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +16 bps. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed by 5 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +8 bps. Non-Aaa ABS underperformed by 2 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +56 bps. The stimulus from last yearâs CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed last April. This excess savings has still not been spent and now another round of checks is poised to push the savings rate higher again (Chart 9). The large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is very high, with many households using their windfall to pay down debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and take advantage of strong collateral performance by moving down in credit quality. The Treasury departmentâs decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 does not alter our recommendation. Spreads are already well below the borrowing cost that was offered by TALF, and these tight spread levels are justified by strong household balance sheets. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +77 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 23 bps in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +14 bps. Meanwhile, non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 30 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +293 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus wonât be negatively impacted. Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +49 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 5 bps on the month and it currently sits at 38 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered back to their pre-COVID lows, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, âBullets, Barbells And Butterfliesâ, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, âMore Bullets, Barbells And Butterfliesâ, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of March 31ST, 2021) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of March 31ST, 2021) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 43 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 43 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Mapâs vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sectorâs option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the âRisk Of Losing 100 bpsâ is shown on the Mapâs horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sectorâs historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of March 31st, 2021) Footnotes 1 For a look at alternatives to investment grade corporates please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âSearching For Value In Spread Productâ, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âThat Uneasy Feelingâ, dated March 30, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âSearching For Value In Spread Productâ, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, âThe Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forwardâ, dated March 23, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance
