一般消費財

ハイライト 欧州および世界の成長は第4四半期に反発するが、その反発は長続きしないだろう。 債券：債券利回りはわずかに上昇すると予想され、特に深くマイナス圏にある利回りがそうである。欧州または世界の債券ポートフォリオではドイツ国債をアンダーウェイトする。 通貨：ゼロ／マイナス利回りの通貨が最も上昇余地を持ち、我々の選好は引き続き円である。 株式：成長とバリュエーションの綱引きにより、広範な株式市場指数は横ばいチャネルにとどまるだろう。しかし利回りがより高いため、債券より株式を優先する。 株式セクター：中国以外の景気循環株が中国関連株をアウトパフォームするだろう。資源および／または工業セクターに対して銀行を引き続きオーバーウェイトする。 株式地域：ユーロストックス50を上海総合指数および／または日経225に対して引き続きオーバーウェイトする。 特集 快適さと不快感は絶対的なものではなく相対的なものである。手を冷たい水に入れると、それが快適に感じるか不快に感じるかは、手がどこから来たかによる。室温から来た手なら冷たい水は不快に感じられるだろう。しかしもし手が氷水から来たなら、冷たい水は至福に感じられるだろう！ 同じ原理が、我々や金融市場が短期的な経済成長をどのように認識するかにも当てはまる。強い拡大の後では、年率1％の穏やかな成長率は不快に感じられる。しかし経済収縮の後では、1％の成長は非常に心地よく感じられる。 ここから重要な点が二つ導かれる： 短期的には、市場は成長率そのものよりも、成長率が加速しているのか減速しているのかを重視する。 成長の短期的なドライバー、すなわち債券利回り、クレジット、そして原油価格については、それらの単なる変化ではなく、それらの変化の変化、すなわちインパルスに注目しなければならない。なぜなら、債券利回り、クレジット、原油価格のインパルスが経済成長の加速や減速を引き起こし、しばしば数ヶ月の先行性を持つからである。 今週のチャートとチャート I-1–I-4を組み合わせれば疑いはない。ユーロ圏、米国、中国では、国内債券利回りの6か月インパルスが国内の6か月クレジットインパルスをほぼ完璧な精度で先導してきた。 今週のチャート 信用成長は第4四半期に反発、その後減速する クレジットの伸びは第4四半期に回復、その後は鈍化する クレジットの伸びは第4四半期に回復、その後は鈍化する チャート I-2 ユーロ圏の債券利回りインパルスは信用インパルスをリードする ユーロ圏の債券利回りインパルスはクレジット・インパルスに先行する ユーロ圏の債券利回りインパルスはクレジット・インパルスに先行する チャート I-3 米国の債券利回りインパルスは信用インパルスをリードする 米国の債券利回りインパルスは同国のクレジット・インパルスに先行している 米国の債券利回りインパルスは同国のクレジット・インパルスに先行している チャート I-4 中国の債券利回りインパルスは信用インパルスをリードする 中国の債券利回りインパルスはクレジット・インパルスに先行する 中国の債券利回りインパルスはクレジット・インパルスに先行する このほぼ完璧な精度に基づけば、ユーロ圏と米国の信用インパルスは第4四半期に短期間反発するはずである。しかし中国では、反発はほとんど、あるいは全く期待できない。ユーロ圏と米国では債券利回りが急落し、それが信用インパルスに追い風をもたらしたが、中国では動きが小さかった。実際、中国の債券利回りの6か月インパルスは過去数か月でむしろ逆風領域へと深まっている（チャート I-5）。 チャート I-5 ユーロ圏と米国では債券利回りインパルスが追い風だったが、中国ではそうではない 債券利回りのインパルスはユーロ圏と米国では追い風だったが、中国ではそうではなかった 債券利回りのインパルスはユーロ圏と米国では追い風だったが、中国ではそうではなかった したがって、第4四半期の信用成長の反発は中国ではなく欧州と米国に起因するだろう。戦術的には、これは中国以外の景気循環株を中国株より有利にする。しかし2020年前半にかけては、債券利回りが今後あらゆる地域で非常に急落しない限り、主要経済圏全てで信用インパルスは薄れていくと予想する。 インパルスに基づく投資 多くの人にとって、債券利回り、クレジット、原油価格の変化ではなくインパルスが経済成長の加速・減速を駆動するという点は混乱を招く。混乱を解消するために、その点を明確にしよう。 ユーロ圏と米国の信用インパルスは第4四半期に短期間反発するはずだ。 債券利回りの低下は新たな借入を誘発する。例えば、米国の債券利回りが0.5％低下すると、住宅ローン申請件数が一定程度増加する（チャート I-6）。新規借入は需要を押し上げ、成長を生む。しかし次期にさらに0.5％低下しても、同じ程度の新規借入と成長を生むだけであり、重要な点は利回りの低下が同じであれば成長は加速しないということである。 チャート I-6 一定の債券利回り低下は一定の新規借入増加を引き起こす 債券利回りの一定の低下は新規借入の一定の増加を引き起こす 債券利回りの一定の低下は新規借入の一定の増加を引き起こす 最初の0.5％の利回り低下に続いて、より大きな例えば0.6％の低下が起これば成長は加速する――これは追い風インパルスを意味する。逆に直感に反して、最初の0.5％の低下に続いて0.4％のようなより小さな低下が続けば、成長は減速する――これは逆風インパルスを意味する。 ドイツの景気後退を自動車のせいにするな チャート I-7 ドイツの自動車生産は第3四半期に反発した ドイツの自動車生産は第3四半期に反発した ドイツの自動車生産は第3四半期に反発した もしドイツ経済が第3四半期に縮小し、いわゆるテクニカル・リセッションに入れば、反射的に自動車産業の問題が原因だと非難されるだろう。しかし証拠はその説明を支持していない。ドイツの新車生産は第3四半期に反発した（チャート I-7）。問うべきは：もし自動車でないとすれば、減速の真の原因は何か、である。 もっともらしい答えは、ドイツは最近、原油価格インパルスから深刻な逆風を受けたということだ。ドイツはGDP単位当たりの道路交通量が世界で非常に高く、米国に次いで2番目である（表 I-1）。ドイツの高い交通強度の説明として考えられるのは、米国と同様にドイツが複数のハブとスポークを持つ分散型経済であり、交通の交差が多いことだろう。しかし米国とは異なり、ドイツの輸送は原油輸入に大きく依存しており、これらは代替が難しく価格に対して非常に非弾力的である。原油価格と歩調を合わせてドイツの原油輸入の価値が上昇すると、ドイツの純輸出は減少し、成長を押し下げる。 表 I-1 ドイツはGDP単位当たりの道路交通強度が非常に高い 成長は第4四半期に持ち直すが、2020年に失速する 成長は第4四半期に持ち直すが、2020年に失速する   要するに、原油価格インパルスはドイツの短期的な成長の加速と減速に大きな影響を与えている。2019年6月ごろまでの6か月期間は深刻な逆風インパルスに相当した。これは、その期間の原油価格が30％上昇したが、直前の6か月期間では40％下落しており、合わせて70％の逆風インパルスに相当するからである。1  ドイツはGDP単位当たりの道路交通量が世界で非常に高い国の一つである。 通常の数か月のラグを考慮すると、この深刻な逆風インパルスはドイツの最近の減速に大きく寄与した。原油価格の6か月インパルスの振動は、ドイツの6か月経済成長の振動を不気味なほどの精度で説明している（チャート I-8）。良いニュースは、原油価格の深刻な逆風インパルスが緩和され、第4四半期にドイツ経済成長の反発を可能にしたことだ。 チャート I-8 原油価格インパルスがドイツの成長変動を説明する 原油価格のインパルスがドイツの成長の変動を説明する 原油価格のインパルスがドイツの成長の変動を説明する それでも、想定される反発はワイルドカード、すなわち「地政学的リスクインパルス」によって無効化される可能性がある。明確にしておくと、これは技術的な意味でのインパルスではないが、類似の概念である：潜在的なテールイベントの数が増えているのか減っているのか。第4四半期について我々の主観的な答えは、それらは減少している、である。 欧州では、イタリアでの新しい連立政権の形成が当面の間イタリア政治をテールイベントの候補から外した。一方、英国ではベン・バート法案が10月31日の合意なきブレグジットを排除するのに十分に起草されたと我々は想定する。他方、米中貿易戦争や中東の緊張は第4四半期を通じて停滞状態にある可能性が高い。 第4四半期のポジショニング 世界および欧州の成長が第3四半期に失望的であった後、我々は第4四半期の反発を期待する。しかし現時点では、その反発の勢いが2020年深くまで続くと確信するには至っていない。第4四半期に向けたポジショニングは以下の通りである： 第4四半期の反発を期待する。 債券： 債券利回りはわずかに上昇すると予想され、特に深くマイナス圏にある利回りがそうである。欧州あるいは世界の債券ポートフォリオではドイツ国債をアンダーウェイトする。 通貨： ゼロ／マイナス利回りの通貨が最も上昇余地を持ち、我々の選好は引き続き円である。ブレグジットの決着が付けば、ポンドが最大の動き手となる可能性があり、我々の印象は上方向である。ただし実行する前により明確な状況を待つ。 株式： 成長とバリュエーションの綱引きにより、広範な株式市場指数は過去2年間に存在している横ばいレンジにとどまるだろう（チャート I-9）。しかし債券より利回りが高いため、醜い対決では株式を優先する。 株式セクター： 中国以外の景気循環株が中国関連株をアウトパフォームするだろう。資源および／または工業に対して銀行を引き続きオーバーウェイトする。 株式地域： ユーロストックス50を上海総合指数および／または日経225に対して引き続きオーバーウェイトする（チャート I-10）。 チャート I-9 グローバル株式はここ2年間ほとんど動いていない グローバル・エクイティはこの2年間ほとんど動いていない グローバル・エクイティはこの2年間ほとんど動いていない チャート I-10 引き続き欧州をオーバーウェイトする ##br## 中国に対して 中国に対してヨーロッパを引き続きオーバーウェイトで保つ 中国に対してヨーロッパを引き続きオーバーウェイトで保つ   フラクタル・トレーディング・システム* ニッケル価格の最近の急騰は供給混乱、特にインドネシアの輸出禁止に関する懸念によるものである。しかし、その上昇幅はテクニカルに過熱しているように見える。これを金とのペアトレードとして表現する：金ロング／ニッケルショート。 チャート I-11 ニッケル対金 ニッケル VS. ゴールド ニッケル VS. ゴールド 利食い目標を11％に設定し、対称的なストップロスを適用する。 いかなる投資においても、過度のトレンド追随やグループシンクが自然な不安定点に達すると、外的な触媒の有無にかかわらず既存のトレンドが崩壊しやすくなる。初期の警告サインは、投資のフラクタル次元がその自然な下限に近づくことである。励みになることに、このトリガーはあらゆる資産クラスにわたるさまざまな規模の逆トレンド・ムーブを一貫して特定してきた。 2016年6月9日以降のフラクタルトレーディング・モデルのルールは次の通りである： 投資が確立されたトレンドにある状態でフラクタル次元が下限に近づくと、それは流動性によるトレンド反転の潜在的トリガーである。したがって、逆トレンドのポジションを建てる。 利食い目標は直前13週間の動きの3分の1の反転幅とする。対称的なストップロスを適用する。 利食い目標またはストップロスでポジションをクローズする。そうでなければ13週間後にポジションをクローズする。 リスク管理にはポジションサイズの倍率を用いる。リスクが高いポジションほどポジションサイズは小さくする。 * 詳細はヨーロピアン・インベストメント・ストラテジー特別レポート「フラクタル、流動性 & トレーディング・モデル」（2014年12月11日付）を参照。eis.bcaresearch.comで入手可能である。 Dhaval Joshi, チーフ 欧州インベストメント・ストラテジスト dhaval@bcaresearch.com フットノート 1 WTI原油価格の6か月ステップは$74.15、$45.21、$58.24であった。最初の変化は40％の下落に相当し、二番目の変化は30％の上昇に相当した。したがって6か月インパルスは70％であった。 フラクタル・トレーディング・モデル 景気循環向け推奨 構造的推奨 終了したフラクタルトレード トレード 終了したトレード 資産パフォーマンス 通貨＆債券 株式セクター 国別株式 指標 債券利回り チャート II-1 注目指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り チャート II-2 注目指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り チャート II-3 注目指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り チャート II-4 注目指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り   金利 チャート II-5 注目指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-6 注目指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-7 注目指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利期待 注目すべき指標 - 金利期待 チャート II-8 注目指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し  

特別レポート

2010年晩夏、我々はデフレーション期における米国株式のセクター間相対パフォーマンスを概観するスペシャルレポートを公表しました。それ以降、インフレーション—より具体的にはコアPCEデフレーター—は2018年中頃に連邦準備制度理事会（FRB）の2％目標と短く“戯れ”たに過ぎず、長期のインフレ期待は高い水準へ再定着することはありませんでした。 憂慮すべきことに、インフレが今後数四半期で頭をもたげるのではなく、むしろ弱まる兆候が出始めています。 評論家たち—我々も含めて—は依然としてインフレ圧力が最終的に浸透するのを待っています。憂慮すべきことに、インフレが今後数四半期で頭をもたげるのではなく、むしろ弱まる兆候が出始めています（チャート1）。 2018年後半の金融状況の引き締まりは、若干のラグを伴って前年比CPI成長率を下押しするでしょう（上段、チャート1）。より広く見れば、ISM製造業PMIの急落（およびそのほとんどのサブコンポーネントに見られる動き）が示すように、米国経済の継続的な減速はインフレにとって深刻な逆風です（第2パネル、チャート1）。 世界的な成長の弱さを受け、逆循環通貨である米ドルの上昇も今後のインフレを抑制する要因となるでしょう（図示せず）。さらに、最近の力強いインフレ数値を我々は持続可能とは見なしていません。実際、コア・グッズCPI—コアCPIの25％を占め、最近の主な牽引役になっている—は、今後18か月でピークアウトして縮小する見込みです（第3パネル、チャート1）。 チャート1 まだインフレを探しているのか？ まだインフレを探していますか？ まだインフレを探していますか？ U.S. エクイティ・ストラテジーの企業の価格決定力（プライシング・パワー）代理指標も急落しており、コアインフレの下落が最も抵抗の少ない経路であることを裏付けています（下段、チャート1）。 言い換えれば、もしマーティ・マクフライが再びデロリアンに乗って過去へ戻れるなら、デフレーション／ディスインフレーションがBCAにおける主要な株式テーマであることを確かに支持し、我々に以前の分析をさらに掘り下げるよう頼むでしょう。本レポートはまさにその作業です。 我々は現在のディスインフレ傾向を認め、そのような期間における各株式セクターの歴史的相対パフォーマンスの詳細を示します。我々は単純なトレーディングルールを紹介します。デフレ期を企業部門価格デフレーターの成長が2四半期以上連続でマイナスとなる期間と定義しています（チャート2）。より広いデフレ傾向の中で単発のプラス成長四半期は外れ値として扱い、塗りつぶされた期間内の時折の四半期反発として扱います。 チャート2 デフレーション期 デフレ期 デフレ期 次のページでは、各セクターの歴史的相対パフォーマンスについてさらに詳述します。特筆すべきは、企業部門価格デフレーターの成長が2四半期連続でマイナスとなったシグナルに従うことで得られた年率換算リターンの概要を短く示す点です。1960年以降、そのようなシグナルは27回あり、中央値の継続期間は15か月、最短は6か月でした。したがって、我々は6か月、12か月、24か月の投資期間を用いて、デフレーション期に好成績を示したセクターをロング、インフレ期に好成績を示したセクターをショートすることに自信を持っています。 表1はこの実証的検証の結果を要約したものです。 表1 セクター相対パフォーマンスとデフレーション（1960年〜現時点） デフレ環境下におけるセクターのパフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ デフレ環境下におけるセクターのパフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ 我々の仮説は、ディスインフレーション期にはディフェンシブがサイクリカルを上回るというものです。GICS11の相対セクターパフォーマンスはこの仮説と一致しています。具体的には、我々のデフレシグナルに続き、ディフェンシブは6か月で1.4％上昇する一方、サイクリカルは2.5％下落します。12か月時点では転換点が見られ、サイクリカルは-2.5％から-0.21％へと損失を回復し始め、ディフェンシブは1.38％から0.76％へと利得を手放します。この結果は前述の中央値である15か月のデフレ期間と整合します。同様に、24か月先を見ると、サイクリカルが0.5％で市場をアウトパフォームしており（主にテクノロジーが牽引）、ディフェンシブは-1.2％で市場に劣後している（通信とユーティリティが足を引っ張る）、すなわち市場が回復していることを示唆しています。 図1 パフォーマンス・タイムライン デフレの世界におけるセクター・パフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ デフレの世界におけるセクター・パフォーマンス：バック・トゥ・ザ・フューチャー？ 重要なのは、我々の定義する2四半期シグナルにより2018年中頃に始まったデフレーション環境下に我々は現在いるということであり、U.S. エクイティ・ストラテジーは過去6か月にわたってサイクリカルのエクスポージャーを積極的に削減し、幅広い株式市場の見通しに対して投資家に慎重であるべきことを強調してきました。 再び表1に戻ると、GICS1のセクターパフォーマンスには我々の期待と異なるいくつかの乖離も見られます。ユーティリティーズはディスインフレーション期にアウトパフォームするはずで、理由は2つあります：(1) 安定したキャッシュフロー成長、(2) 低下する金利が高利回りの代替資産の魅力を高めるためです。もう一つの注目すべき外れ値はS&P コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー指数です。具体的には、我々のデフレシグナル後の6か月で約2％のアンダーパフォームが見られ、これは金利低下が辺際で裁量的支出を押し上げるはずという我々の期待を覆すものでした。 結論として、我々は表1の結果とセクター別コメントを要約したタイムラインも提示します。重要なのは、このタイムラインはデフレーション環境をナビゲートするための「経験則」としてのみ使うべきロードマップであるという点です。中央値が15か月であっても、デフレーション期間は1年足らずから4年以上まで幅があります。常に文脈が重要です。 最後に、今後数か月内に予定している我々の従来の米国株式セクターの利益率見通しレポートの更新にご期待ください。 以下は各セクター別の追加分析の詳細と、セクター別の価格決定力および売上回転率に関するチャートです。     Jeremie Peloso, リサーチアナリスト JeremieP@bcaresearch.com   Arseniy Urazov, リサーチアソシエイト ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   コンシューマー・ステープルズ（オーバーウェイト） 生活必需品 生活必需品 S&P コンシューマー・ステープルズ指数はデフレーション期に良好なパフォーマンスを示します。この指数の避難先としての性格と、業界の継続的な再編が説明要因と考えられます。 当社のセクター価格決定力代理指標は、ステープルズが2003年以降、価格決定力の収縮を経験していないことを示しています。 相対株価は回復基調にありますが、依然として歴史的トレンドを下回る1標準偏差の位置にあります。デフレシグナル後の6か月、12か月、24か月の驚異的なリターンを考えれば、さらなる上昇が期待されます。 我々はS&P コンシューマー・ステープルズ指数をオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 コンシューマー・ステイプルズ コンシューマー・ステイプルズ エネルギー（オーバーウェイト） エネルギー エネルギー サイクリカル群の中で、S&P エネルギーは2番目に大きなアンダーパフォーマーであり、我々のデフレシグナル後6か月で平均して相対的に3.4％下落します。 このアンダーパフォーマンスは当社の価格決定力（PP）代理指標にも明確に表れています。エネルギー企業のPPは経済がデフレに入ると同時に低下します。これは、原油がほぼ全てのインフレ／デフレ指標において重要な役割を果たすという我々の予想と一致します。 ただし現時点での注意点として、最近の原油価格の急騰は、暴落したエネルギー株に格好の価値機会をもたらす触媒となり得ます。サウジアラビアの生産・精製施設に対するドローン攻撃の結果、地政学的プレミアムが原油価格に持続的に織り込まれることを我々は想定しています。 我々は現時点でS&P エネルギー指数をオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 エネルギー エネルギー ヘルスケア（オーバーウェイト） ヘルスケア ヘルスケア デフレーション期において、S&P ヘルスケア・セクターはS&P コンシューマー・ステープルズと同様に市場をアウトパフォームしています。 ヘルスケア産業の避難先的性格に加え、価格決定力はデータ系列の全期間を通じてゼロラインを下回ったことがありません。この顕著な実績は同セクターの売上成長にも当てはまります。 我々は現時点でS&P ヘルスケア指数をオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 ヘルスケア ヘルスケア インダストリアルズ（オーバーウェイト） インダストリアルズ インダストリアルズ デフレーションの瀬戸際では、インダストリアル株は2つの相反する力に直面します：原材料の値下がりと経済活動の減速です。 最終的には経済の軟化が勝ち、この深いサイクリカル指標は6か月、12か月、24か月でそれぞれ-1.4％、-1.0％、-0.5％と市場に対してアンダーパフォームします。 このセクターの価格決定力はしばしばデフレーション域に入ると鋭く低下し、インダストリアルズの収益見通しと相対パフォーマンスに重しをかけます。 我々は現時点でS&P インダストリアルズ・セクターをオーバーウェイトで推奨します。 インダストリアルズ インダストリアルズ ファイナンシャルズ（オーバーウェイト） 金融 金融 早期に反応するサイクリカルセクターであるため、我々の2四半期デフレシグナル後、S&P ファイナンシャルズ・セクターが6か月、12か月、24か月で市場にアンダーパフォームするのは驚くべきことではありません。 ファイナンシャルズの最大のアンダーパフォーマンスはデフレーション期の後半に現れます。実際、もしユーティリティーズを分析から除外していたなら、S&P ファイナンシャルズは12か月および24か月の両期間で最も成績の悪いセクターになっていたでしょう。 約42％を占めるヘビーウェイトの銀行サブグループがこのアンダーパフォーマンスを説明します。思い出していただきたいのは、銀行はデフレーション／ディスインフレーションによってクレジットの価格が下落する際にアンダーパフォームするという点です。 当社のフィクスト・インカム・ストラテジストは債券市場の売りを予想しているため、我々はS&P ファイナンシャルズ指数をオーバーウェイトで維持します。 金融 金融 テクノロジー（ニュートラル – 格下げ注意） テクノロジー テクノロジー 2010年に我々はテック株がデフレーション期の勝者であると再確認しましたが、これは現在も変わっていません。革新の猛烈なペース自体が、セクターをデフレーションの局面に耐えうるものにしています。 サイクリカル内では、テクノロジーは表1で圧倒的に最良のパフォーマーですが、現在の地政学的および貿易緊張は我々に同セクターをニュートラルとすることを促しています。将来的にソフトウェアのサブグループの格下げを通じた本格的な格下げが到来する可能性があります。 テックの価格決定力はデフレーション期でも頑強です。しかし、サイクルでピークアウトしたように見えるテックの売上成長は激しく振れるため、下振れ局面が近づくと潜在的な乱高下を警告しています。 我々はS&P テクノロジー・セクターをニュートラルとし、格下げ監視リストに載せています。 テクノロジー テクノロジー テレコミュニケーション・サービス（ニュートラル） テレコミュニケーション・サービス テレコミュニケーション・サービス 伝統的にディフェンシブであるテレコム・サービス株は近年苦戦しており、債務の増加に悩まされ、「ダムパイプ（単なる通信路）」にならないよう重要性を維持しようともがいています。 業界の価格決定力代理指標も同様の点を強調しており、テレコム各社は世界金融危機（GFC）以来、地盤を取り戻すことができていません。 もう一つ重要な点は、この指数が我々が検証した全ての期間で市場に対して著しくアンダーパフォームしていることです：-1.5％、-2.0％、-4.4％。我々の仮説では、テレコム事業者は安定したキャッシュフロー生成と高い配当利回りプロファイルのためデフレーション期にアウトパフォームするはずでしたが、実証的事実は逆を示しています。 おそらく、この数十年にわたる持続的なアンダーパフォーマンスは、もはやニッチ化したこの避難先産業のセクター固有のダイナミクスに原因があることを示唆しています。 我々は現時点でS&P テレコミュニケーション・サービス指数をニュートラルとします。 テレコミュニケーション・サービス テレコミュニケーション・サービス マテリアルズ（アンダーウェイト） 資料 資料 ここ数年の中国および一般的に新興市場複合体からのコモディティ需要の大きさにもかかわらず、S&P マテリアルズ・セクターは構造的な下降トレンドから脱却できていません。 このセクターはディスインフレーションの主要な敗者の一つであり、チャートからも明らかです。重要なのは、1970年代中盤以降、マテリアルズが市場をアウトパフォームしたほとんどの期間は塗りつぶされた領域や景気後退の外側で発生している点です。 平均して、グローバル成長が弱まるとマテリアルズの価格決定力は急落する傾向があり、僅かな遅れを伴って同セクターの売上成長も後退する可能性が高く、サイクルの売上成長は既にピークアウトしたことを示唆しています。 我々はS&P マテリアルズ・セクターの最近の格下げを受け、アンダーウェイトを繰り返します。 資料 資料 コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー（アンダーウェイト – 格上げ注意) コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー 我々の仮説に反して、S&P コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー株は金利を押し下げるディスインフレーション期においてアンダーパフォームします。おそらく、経済活動の減速が金利低下を上回り、消費者はディスクリショナリーな購入からステープルズ系の商品・サービスへと寄り添うためです。 表1は、コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー株が実際にはデフレーション期の初期に最も打撃を受け（-2.0％）、その後12か月で急速に回復しわずかにプラス（0.1％）に転じることを示しています。 我々は現時点でS&P コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー指数をアンダーウェイトとしていますが、買い機会の可能性として格上げ注意リストに載せています。 コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー コンシューマー・ディスクリショナリー ユーティリティーズ（アンダーウェイト） ユーティリティ ユーティリティ 本スペシャルレポートの最後のセクターとして、S&P ユーティリティーズは我々の分析で顕著な外れ値であり、期待通りに振る舞わないことを指摘していました。おそらく業界固有のダイナミクスが働いており、高利回りの避難先であるユーティリティーズ株はデフレーション期に大きくアンダーパフォームしています。 同セクターは6か月、12か月、24か月でそれぞれ市場に対して-3.5％、-4.3％、-4.5％のリターンです。理論的には、相対株価を押し上げるはずの2つの要因がありました：(1) 安定したキャッシュフロー成長、(2) 低下する金利は高利回りの代替資産の魅力を高める、の両方です。 しかし、どちらも長年にわたる構造的な下降トレンドからの脱却には十分ではありませんでした。 我々は現時点でS&P ユーティリティーズ指数をアンダーウェイトとします。 ユーティリティ ユーティリティ   脚注 1    GICS 1の親インデックスであるCommunication Services指数は最近導入されたためデータが不足しており、代わりにGICS 2のテレコミュニケーション・サービス指数を使用しています。

Highlights While a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence that plunges the global economy into recession cannot be excluded, it is far from our base case. Provided the trade war does not spiral out of control, it is highly likely that global equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. The auto sector has been the main driver of the global manufacturing slowdown. As automobile output begins to recover later this year, so too will global manufacturing. Go long auto stocks. As a countercyclical currency, the U.S. dollar will weaken once global growth picks up. We expect to upgrade EM and European equities later this year along with cyclical equity sectors such as industrials, energy, and materials. Financials should also benefit from steeper yield curves. We still like gold as a long-term investment. However, the combination of higher bond yields and diminished trade tensions could cause bullion to sell off in the near term. As such, we are closing our tactical long gold trade for a gain of 20.5%. Feature “The Democrats are trying to 'will' the Economy to be bad for purposes of the 2020 Election. Very Selfish!” – @realDonaldTrump, 19 August 2019 8:26 am “The Fake News Media is doing everything they can to crash the economy because they think that will be bad for me and my re-election” – @realDonaldTrump, 15 August 2019 9:52 am Bad Juju Chart 1Spike In Google Searches For The Word Recession President Trump’s remarks, made just a few days after the U.S. yield curve inverted, were no doubt meant to deflect attention away from the trade war, while providing cover for any economic weakness that might occur on his watch. But does the larger point still stand? Google searches for the word “recession” have spiked recently, even though underlying U.S. growth has remained robust (Chart 1). Could rising angst induce an actual recession? Theoretically, the answer is yes. A sudden drop in confidence can generate a self-fulfilling cycle where rising pessimism leads to less private-sector spending, higher unemployment, lower corporate profits, weaker stock prices, and ultimately, even deeper pessimism. Two things make such a vicious cycle more probable in the current environment. First, the value of risk assets is quite high in relation to GDP in many economies (Chart 2). This means that any pullback in equity prices or jump in credit spreads will have an outsized impact on financial conditions.   Chart 2The Total Market Value Of Risk Assets Is Elevated Chart 3Not Much Scope To Cut Rates Second, policymakers are currently more constrained in their ability to react to adverse shocks, such as an intensification of the trade war, than in the past. Interest rates in Europe and Japan are already at zero or in negative territory (Chart 3). Even in the U.S., the zero-lower bound constraint – though squishier than once believed – remains a formidable obstacle. Chart 4 shows that the Federal Reserve has cut rates by over five percentage points, on average, during past recessions. It would be impossible to cut rates by that much this time around if the U.S. economy were to experience a major downturn.   Chart 4The Fed Is Worried About The Zero Bound Fiscal stimulus could help buttress growth. However, both political and economic considerations are likely to limit the policy response. While China is stimulating its economy, concerns about excessively high debt levels have caused the authorities to adopt a reactive, tentative approach. Japan is set to raise the consumption tax on October 1st. Although a variety of offsetting measures will mitigate the impact on the Japanese economy, the net effect will still be a tightening of fiscal policy. Germany has mused over launching its own Green New Deal, but so far there has been a lot more talk than action. President Trump floated the idea of cutting payroll taxes, only to abandon it once it became clear that the Democrats were unwilling to go along. On The Positive Side Despite these clear risks, we are inclined to maintain our fairly sanguine 12-to-18 month global macro view. There are a number of reasons for this: First, the weakness in global manufacturing over the past 18 months has not infected the much larger service sector (Chart 5). Even in Germany, with its large manufacturing base, the service sector PMI remains above 50, and is actually higher than it was late last year. This suggests that the latest global slowdown is more akin to the 2015-16 episode than the 2007-08 or 2000-01 downturns. Chart 5AThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) Chart 5BThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) Second, manufacturing activity should benefit from a turn in the inventory cycle over the remainder of the year. A slower pace of inventory accumulation shaved 90 basis points off of U.S. growth in the second quarter and is set to knock another 40 basis points from growth in the third quarter, according to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model. Excluding inventories, U.S. GDP growth would have been 3% in Q2 and is tracking at 2.7% in Q3 – a fairly healthy pace given the weak global backdrop (Chart 6). Chart 6The U.S. Economy Is Still Holding Up Well Outside the U.S., inventories are making a negative contribution to growth (Chart 7). In addition to the official data, this can be seen in the commentary accompanying the Markit manufacturing surveys, which suggest that many firms are liquidating inventories (Box 1). Falling inventory levels imply that sales are outstripping production, a state of affairs that cannot persist indefinitely. Third, and related to the point above, the automobile sector has been the key driver of the global manufacturing slowdown. This is in contrast to 2015-16, when the main culprit was declining energy capex. According to Wards, global vehicle production is down about 10% from year-ago levels, by far the biggest drop since the Great Recession (Chart 8). The drop in automobile production helps explain why the German economy has taken it on the chin recently. Chart 7Inventories Are Making A Negative Contribution To Growth Chart 8Auto Sector: The Culprit Behind The Manufacturing Slowdown Importantly, motor vehicle production growth has fallen more than sales growth, implying that inventory levels are coming down. Despite secular shifts in automobile ownership preferences, there is still plenty of upside to automobile usage. Per capita automobile ownership in China is only one-fifth of what it is in the United States, and one-fourth of what it is in Japan (Chart 9). This suggests that the recent drop in Chinese auto sales will be reversed. As automobile output begins to recover later this year, so too will global manufacturing. Investors should consider going long automobile makers. Chart 10 shows that the All-Country World MSCI automobiles index is trading near its lows on both a forward P/E and price-to-book basis, and sports a juicy dividend yield of nearly 4%.1 Chart 9The Automobile Ownership Rate Is Still Quite Low In China Chart 10Auto Stocks Are A Compelling Buy   Fourth, our research has shown that globally, the neutral rate of interest is generally higher than widely believed. This means that monetary policy is currently stimulative, and will become even more accommodative as the Fed and a number of other central banks continue to cut rates. Remember that unemployment rates have been trending lower since the Great Recession and have continued falling even during the latest slowdown, implying that GDP growth has remained above trend (Chart 11). As diminished labor market slack causes inflation to rebound from today’s depressed levels, real policy rates will decline, leading to more spending through the economy.  Chart 11Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower The Trade War Remains The Biggest Risk The points discussed above will not matter much if the trade war spirals out of control. It is impossible to know what will happen for sure, but we can deduce the likely course of action based on the incentives that both sides face. President Trump has shown a clear tendency in recent weeks to try to de-escalate trade tensions whenever the stock market drops. This is not surprising: Despite his efforts to deflect blame for any selloff on others, he knows full well that many voters will blame him for losses in their 401(k) accounts and for slower domestic growth and rising unemployment. What about the Chinese? An increasing number of pundits have warmed up to the idea that China is more than willing to let the global economy crash if this means that Trump won’t be re-elected. If this is China’s true intention, the Chinese will resist making any deal, and could even try to escalate tensions as the U.S. election approaches. It is an intriguing thesis. However, it is not particularly plausible. U.S. goods exports to China account for 0.5% of U.S. GDP, while Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.4% of Chinese GDP. Total manufacturing value-added represents 29% of Chinese GDP, compared to 11% for the United States. There is no way that China could torpedo the U.S. economy without greatly hurting itself first. Any effort by China to undermine Trump’s re-election prospects would invite extreme retaliatory actions, including the invocation of the War Powers Act, which would make it onerous for U.S. companies to continue operating in China. Even if Trump loses the election, he could still wreak a lot of havoc on China during the time he has left in office. Moreover, as Matt Gertken, BCA’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist, has stressed, if Trump were to feel that he could not run for re-election on a strong economy, he would try to position himself as a “War President,” hoping that Americans rally around the flag. That would be a dangerous outcome for China.  Chart 12Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? In any case, it is not clear whether China would be better off with a Democrat as president. The popular betting site PredictIt currently gives Elizabeth Warren a 34% chance of winning, followed by Joe Biden with 26%, and Bernie Sanders with 15% (Chart 12). This means that two far-left candidates with protectionist leanings, who would stress environmental protection and human rights in their negotiations with China, have nearly twice as much support as the former Vice President. All this suggests that China has an incentive to de-escalate the trade war. Given that Trump also has an incentive to put the trade war on hiatus, some sort of détente between the U.S. and China, as well as between the U.S. and other players such as the EU, is more likely than not. Investment Conclusions Provided the trade war does not spiral out of control, it is very likely that global equities will outperform bonds over the next 12 months. Since it might take a few more months for the data on global growth to improve, equities will remain in a choppy range in the near term, before moving higher later this year. As we discussed last week, the equity risk premium is quite high in the U.S., and even higher abroad, where valuations are generally cheaper and interest rates are lower (Chart 13).2 Chart 13AEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Chart 13BEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency (Chart 14). If global growth picks up later this year, the greenback should begin to weaken. European and emerging market stocks have typically outperformed the global benchmark in an environment of rising global growth and a weakening dollar (Chart 15). We expect to upgrade EM and European equities – along with more cyclical sectors of the stock market such as industrials, materials, and energy – later this year. Chart 14The U.S. Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Chart 15EM And Euro Area Equities Usually Outperform When Global Growth Improves     Thanks to the dovish shift by central banks around the world, government bond yields are unlikely to return to their 2018 highs anytime soon. Nevertheless, stronger economic growth should lift long-term yields at the margin, causing yield curves to steepen (Chart 16). Steeper yield curves will benefit beleaguered bank stocks. Chart 16Stronger Economic Growth Should Lift Long-Term Bond Yields, Causing Yield Curves To Steepen Finally, a word on gold: We still like gold as a long-term investment. However, the combination of higher bond yields and diminished trade tensions could cause bullion to sell off in the near term. As such, we are closing our tactical long gold trade for a gain of 20.5%. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Box 1 Evidence of Inventory Liquidation In The Manufacturing Sector Footnotes 1 The top ten constituents of the MSCI ACWI Automobiles Index are Toyota (22.6%), General Motors (7.8%), Daimler (7.3%), Honda Motor (6.2%), Ford Motor (5.7%), Tesla (4.8%), Volkswagen (4.8%), BMW (3.8%), Ferrari (3.0%), Hyundai Motor (2.4%). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Underweight The latest University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey made for grim reading and such souring in confidence will continue to weigh on lodging equities (second panel). As a result, we remain underweight the niche S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines consumer discretionary subgroup. Labor-related input costs are also on fire as the sector’s wage inflation is climbing at a 3.9%/ annum pace or roughly 120 bps higher that the overall business sector employment cost index (bottom panel). Taken together, there are high odds that a profit margin squeeze will weigh on profits and on relative share prices (top panel). Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. Please see our most recent Weekly Report for additional details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL – MAR, HLT, RCL, CCL, NCLH.  

特別レポート

Highlights It will be impossible for China to undertake even mild deleveraging and simultaneously accelerate household income growth. All deposits in the banking system have been created by banks “out of thin air” and have not been engendered by household savings. Contrary to widespread beliefs, mainland households are highly leveraged. Cyclically, high equity valuations, crowded investor positioning and the delayed cyclical recovery in the Chinese economy pose downside risks to consumer stocks. Structurally, real income growth per capita is contingent on productivity growth. The latter will slow in China but remain relatively elevated. Overall, investors should consider buying Chinese consumer plays on weakness. Feature Deliberations about China’s successful rebalancing often boils down to whether one believes that consumers will be able to offset the slowdown in investment and exports and keep overall real GDP growth close to current levels. The narrative typically presumes that Chinese households are not spending enough and can boost their spending counteracting the ongoing slowdowns in capital spending as well as in exports. This conjecture is fallible. Chart I-1The Myth Of Deficient Consumer Demand In China Consumer spending in China has in fact been booming over the past 20 years – it has been growing at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10% in real terms since 1998 (Chart I-1, top panel). Hence, the imbalance in China has not been sluggish consumer spending. Rather, capital expenditure has been too strong for too long (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Healthy rebalancing entails a slowdown in investment spending – not an acceleration in household demand. Hence, the market relevant question is: Can the growth rate of household expenditure accelerate above 10% CAGR in real terms as capital spending and exports decelerate? Our hunch is that this is unlikely. As the authorities attempt to contain credit and investment excesses and trade war-induced relocation of manufacturers out of China gathers steam, the pertinent question is whether the slowdown in household expenditures in real terms will be mild (from the current 10% pace to 7.5-9% CAGR), medium (6-7.5%) or material (below 6%). In our opinion, the medium scenario has the highest odds of playing out. There are many positives about the vitality of Chinese consumers and we do not mean to downplay them. Nevertheless, many of these positives are well known, and the objective of our report is to reveal misconceptions about this segment.  Deleveraging And Consumers If and when deleveraging does transpire in China, the household income growth rate will decelerate, resulting in weaker spending growth. It will be impossible for the mainland economy to undertake even mild deleveraging and simultaneously accelerate household income growth. Chart I-2Capital Spending Is Much More Important Than Exports Our focus for this report is on a slowdown in credit and capital spending rather than exports. The basis is that the latter in general, and shipments to the U.S. in particular, have a much smaller impact than investment expenditures (Chart I-2). In turn, capital spending is mostly financed by credit. It is crucial to understand the significance of credit in driving national and household income growth in China since 2008. Currently, 2.5 yuan of new credit is needed to generate one yuan of GDP growth. This certifies that the mainland economy has become addicted to credit. As we have argued in depth in past reports, commercial banks do not intermediate savings into credit, but rather create new money/credit “out of thin air” when they lend to or buy securities from non-banks. This entails that output and income growth would have been much weaker had banks not provided credit equal to RMB 19 trillion over the past 12 months. For instance, a company affiliated with the provincial government has borrowed money from banks to build three bridges over the past 10 years, accumulating a lot of debt in the process. Ostensibly, operating these bridges does not generate enough cash flow to service its debt – a common occurrence in China. With the three bridges completed, the company would then apply for a new loan to build a fourth bridge. Should banks lend additional money to construct it? Notwithstanding this hypothetical company’s low creditworthiness, if banks provide additional financing, the credit bubble will become larger, and the issue of overcapacity will intensify. On the other hand, household income and spending growth will remain robust. If banks do not finance the construction of the fourth bridge, labor income growth in the province – employees of this company and its suppliers – will slump. Thus, if for whatever reason banks are unable or unwilling to extend as much in new credit as last year, output and income growth in this province will decelerate, all else equal. Given credit has been playing an enormous role in driving China’s economic growth over the past 10 years, it will be almost impossible to slow down credit without a downshift in household income growth. This example and analysis is not meant to suggest that bank credit origination is the sole growth driver in China. Theoretically, GDP can expand even with bank credit/money contracting. According to the quantity theory of money: Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money This means nominal GDP can grow even when the supply of money/credit is shrinking. For this to happen, the velocity of money should rise faster than the pace of decline in the supply of money/credit. From a practical perspective, this requires enterprises and consumers to increase the turnover (velocity) of their bank deposits and cash on hand (money supply). We have deliberated in past reports that the velocity of money and the savings rate are inversely related: A rising velocity of money entails a declining savings rate, and vice versa. Going back to our example of bridge construction, the relevant question is: Will companies and households in that province increase their spending (i.e., reduce their savings rate) if banks do not finance the construction of the fourth bridge? The realistic answer is not likely. If the fourth bridge does not receive financing, weaker income growth in that province – due to employment redundancies among construction companies and their suppliers – would lead to slower spending growth. Faced with slowing demand growth, other enterprises and households would likely turn cautious and increase their savings rates – i.e., reduce the velocity of money supply. In short, reduced credit origination will mostly likely generate slower household income growth and, consequently, spending. Chart I-3China: No Deleveraging So Far Broadly speaking, household income growth has not yet downshifted because deleveraging in China has not started. Chart I-3 illustrates that aggregate domestic credit – including public sector, enterprises and households – continues to grow above 10% and well above nominal GDP growth. In fact, credit growth has exceeded nominal GDP growth since 2008. This is local currency credit and does not include foreign currency debt, but the latter is small at 14.5% of GDP (or about US$ 2 trillion). To us, deleveraging implies credit growth that is no greater than nominal GDP growth – i.e., a flat or declining credit-to-GDP ratio for at least several years. If China is serious about deleveraging and curbing its money/credit bubble, the pace of credit expansion should decline to or below nominal GDP growth – which is presently 8%. If and when this occurs it will dampen household income and spending growth. Bottom Line: Chinese household income and spending will inevitably slow if money/credit growth slumps, given the Chinese economy’s excessive reliance on new credit origination over the past 10 years. Do Households Have A Savings Or Debt Glut? What about households’ enormous savings in China? Why wouldn’t households reduce their savings and boost spending? When referring to household savings, most allude to bank deposits. But in conventional economic theory – and according to the way household savings are statistically calculated at a national level – savings actually have no relation to bank deposits. Chart I-4No Empirical Evidence That Deposits = Savings Chart I-4 illustrates that in China, the annual change in household deposits is not equal to household savings (Chart I-4, top panel). Similarly, the annual rise in all deposits (based on central bank data) is vastly different from annual national savings (as defined by conventional macroeconomics and calculated by the National Bureau of Statistics) (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Bank deposits are a monetary concept that we will refer to as “money savings.” Deposits are created by banks “out of thin air,” as illustrated in our past reports.Meanwhile, the term “savings” in conventional macroeconomics denotes goods and services that are produced but not consumed, which is a real economic (not monetary) variable. Not surprisingly, there is no relationship between these “real savings” and “money savings,” as illustrated in Chart I-4. To illustrate that household “savings” (as defined by conventional macroeconomics) are not related to money supply/deposits, let us go back to the example of the company building bridges in China. When the company wire transfers a salary of RMB 1,000 to an employee, the amount of money supply in the banking system does not change. Suppose this employee decides to save 100% of her income this month. Will the supply of money increase or decrease? The answer is that it will not change: the deposit will remain at her bank account. Alternatively, if she decides to spend all RMB 1,000 (100% of her income), the supply of money also will not change – deposits will be transferred to other banks where her suppliers have their accounts.  If she cashes out her deposit and puts it under her mattress, the amount of bank deposits will decline, but cash in circulation will rise by the same amount. Provided money supply is equal to the sum of all bank deposits and cash in circulation, the amount of money supply will not change. The only way the supply of money will decline is if she pays down her loan to a bank. Conversely, the supply of money only rises when banks originate loans or buy assets from non-banks. In short, saving/not spending does not alter the amount of money supply. Rather, broad money supply is equal to the cumulative net money creation “out of thin air” primarily by commercial banks and less so by the central bank over the course of their history. This has nothing to do with household and national “savings.” The latter stand for goods and services produced but not consumed. We have discussed what “savings” mean in conventional economics in past reports. Chart I-5Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones Critically, Chinese households presently carry more debt as a share of their disposable income than American households (Chart I-5). This chart compares household debt to disposable income using official data from both China and the U.S. In the case of China, we add Peer-to-Peer (P2P) credit to consumer credit data published by the People’s Bank of China to calculate household debt. The argument by many commentators that consumers in China are not highly leveraged is grounded on the comparison of their debt to GDP. However, in all countries, household debt is assessed versus disposable income – not GDP. The income available to households to service their debt is their disposable income – not GDP. It is correct that Chinese households’ assets have surged in the past two decades as they have purchased significant amounts of real estate, and property prices have skyrocketed. A survey by China Economic Trend Institute holds that property accounts for 66% of household assets in China. To assess creditworthiness, investors should not rely on debtors’ asset values. If debtors are en masse forced to sell their assets to service debt, equity prices would tumble well beforehand. Rather, creditworthiness should be assessed based on recurring cash flow (income) available to debtors to service their debt. One should not be surprised as to why real estate prices are very high in China. Money and credit have been surging – have grown four-fold – over the past 10 years (Chart I-6) and are still expanding at close to a 10% pace. In particular, household debt is still growing at a whopping 15.5% annually (Chart I-7). If and as money/credit growth downshifts, property prices will deflate. Chart I-6Helicopter Money In China Chart I-7Household Credit Is Expanding Twice As Fast As Income Growth Importantly, housing affordability is low and households’ ability to service their mortgages is troubling. Chart I-8 exhibits the nationwide house price-to-income ratio for China and the U.S. In the Middle Kingdom, it is currently about 7.2, while in the U.S. the ratio has never been above 4. It only approached 4  at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006. Chart I-8House Prices Are Very Expensive In China   In turn, Table I-1 illustrates mortgage interest-only payments as a share of household disposable income. The national average is 25.5%. These are very high ratios, suggesting an average new home buyer will have to allocate about a quarter of her or his household income just to pay the interest on a mortgage. These averages do not divulge enormous variations among households. High-income and rich households probably do not have much debt, and debt sustainability is not an issue for them. This also implies that there are many low-income households for whom the interest payments on mortgages absorb more than 25% of their disposable income.  Bottom Line: All deposits in the banking system have been created by banks “out of thin air” and have not been engendered by household savings. Contrary to widespread beliefs, mainland households have a lot of debt, and the latter is still expanding faster than nominal disposable income growth (Chart I-7 above). Positives And The Cyclical Outlook This section lists some positives for household incomes and spending, while also highlighting inherent risks: In the long run, per-capita real income growth in any country is equal to productivity growth. Productivity in China is still booming, justifying high real income growth. The question is whether such buoyant productivity growth can be sustained at a high level to justify robust real-income per-capita growth. Typically, easy money breeds complacency, misallocation of capital and ultimately lower productivity growth. Can China sustain productivity growth of 6% to assure a similar growth rate in real income per capita if the nation continues to experience easy money and a misallocation of capital? Forecasting productivity is not easy; only time will tell. Chart I-9Nominal Household Income, Wages And Salaries Per capita aggregate income as well as both wages and salaries are still expanding briskly – by about 8.5% in nominal terms from a year ago (Chart I-9). This is a formidable growth rate and entails vigorous spending power. The cyclical and long-term concern is whether the current rate of income growth is sustainable. So far there has been few redundancies, despite the fact that corporate revenue and profits have slumped. There is anecdotal evidence that the authorities are actively discouraging dismissals among both state-owned and private enterprises. If layoffs are avoided in this cycle, it will imply that the full pain of the slowdown is absorbed by shareholders. As a result, wages and salaries will rise as a share of GDP, causing a profit margin squeeze for companies. Will private shareholders be willing to invest in the future? Over the past year,  authorities have targeted the stimulus at consumers by cutting personal income taxes. However, this has not boosted consumption: First, the individual taxpayers’ base was very small; only one quarter of total employment (or 16% of the population) was paying personal income taxes before the most recent cut. Second, personal income tax savings have amounted to less than 2% of disposable income.   Finally, the savings from tax cuts are unevenly distributed across households. High-income families will probably get higher tax savings than lower-income ones, whereas the propensity to spend is higher for the latter than the former. Household deposit expansion has accelerated at the expense of enterprises (Chart I-10). This confirms that companies have not slowed the payments to employees (wage bill). Consequently, households have firepower which can be unleashed at any time.  However, there are presently no signs of a growing appetite to spend. Quite the contrary, our proxy for household marginal propensity to spend is falling (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Households Are Hoarding Money, Not Spending Chart I-11Household Marginal Propensity To Spend Is Still Falling Non-discretionary consumer spending has remained very robust. In contrast, discretionary spending has been extremely weak and shows no signs of recovery (Chart I-12). Finally, the impulses of non-government credit, broad money and household credit are weak (Chart I-13). Without these improving substantially and households’ marginal propensity to spend rising, it is difficult to expect a meaningful recovery in consumption. Chart I-12Discretionary Spending Is Sluggish Chart I-13Credit/Money Impulses Are Much Weaker Than In Previous Stimulus Bottom Line: A cyclical recovery in consumer spending hinges on another round of major credit and fiscal stimulus as well as improvement in households’ willingness to spend. Structurally, real income growth is contingent on China’s ability to sustain high productivity growth. Investment Implications If and as capital spending and exports growth slow further, the pace of expansion in consumer expenditure will also moderate. In such a scenario, overall economic growth in China will inevitably downshift. Structurally, Chinese consumer spending will slow from the torrid pace of 10% CAGR of the past 10 years to around 6-7.5% CAGR in real terms. This is a formidable growth rate, and warrants a bullish stance on the consumer sector. We identified Chinese consumers as a major investment theme for the current decade in our 2010 report titled How To Play EM This Decade? 1 In that report, we recommended selling commodities and sectors exposed to Chinese construction and instead favoring consumer plays, especially in the health care and tech sectors. This structural theme has played out well and has further to go. Chinese household spending on health care, education and other high-value services will rise as income per capita expands, albeit at a slower rate than before. Chart I-14 demonstrates that Chinese imports of medical and pharmaceutical products are surging, even though overall imports are currently contracting. Domestically, profit margins are expanding within the medical and pharmaceuticals industries but stagnating for the overall industrial sector (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Surging Demand For Medical Products/Goods Chart I-15Continue Favoring Companies In Health Care/Medical Space All that said, a bullish growth story does not always translate into strong equity returns. Charts I-16A and I-16B reveal that share prices of Chinese investible consumer sub-sectors have had mixed performance. With the exception of Alibaba and Tencent, a few of consumer equity sub-sectors have generated strong equity returns. Chart I-16AChinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Chart I-16BChinese Consumer Stocks: Mixed Performance Such poor equity performance given strong headline consumption growth has often been due to bottom-up problems such as profit margins squeeze, overexpansion, over-indebtedness, equity dilution, quality of management and other issues. Apart from company specific risks, investors should also consider valuations. Buying good companies in great industries at very high equity multiples will probably produce meager returns. Table I-2 shows the trailing P/E ratio for various consumer sub-sectors. The majority of them trade at a trailing P/E ratio of above 20 and in some cases above 30. Besides, China’s consumer story has been well known for some time, and many portfolios are overweight China consumer plays. Consequently, investor positioning adds to near-term risks. Cyclically, high equity valuations, crowded investor positioning and the delayed cyclical recovery in the Chinese economy pose downside risks to consumer stocks as well. However, such a selloff will create conditions for selectively investing in reasonably valued high quality companies.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “How To Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade”, dated June 10, 2010, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The sustained global growth slowdown, widening junk spreads, along with the risk of a U.S. recession becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy suggest that caution is still warranted in the broad equity market on a 3-12 month time horizon. Weakening consumer sentiment, softening hotel industry operating metrics that point to a margin squeeze, anemic relative outlays on lodging and a decelerating ISM non-manufacturing index, all signal that more pain lies ahead for the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index.   Waning industry operating metrics, a bearish signal from our EPS growth model along with the mighty U.S. dollar warns against bottom fishing in the S&P electrical components & equipment (EC&E) index.  Recent Changes There are no changes to the portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 traded in an uncharacteristically tight range last week before falling apart on Friday on the back of a re-escalation in the U.S./China trade war. Worries of recession also resurfaced. Not only did the MARKIT flash manufacturing PMI break below the 50 expansion/contraction line, but it also pulled down the MARKIT flash services PMI survey that barely held above the boom/bust line. Adding insult to injury, the 10/2 yield curve slope inverted anew last week further fanning these recession fears. Worrisomely, consumer sentiment took a hit recently according to the University of Michigan survey (top panel, Chart 1). Importantly, what caught our attention was the following commentary: “The main takeaway for consumers from the first cut in interest rates in a decade was to increase apprehensions about a possible recession. Consumers concluded, following the Fed’s lead, that they may need to reduce spending in anticipation of a potential recession.” While the consumer is the last and most significant pillar standing for the U.S. economy, reflexivity may spoil the party and a recession may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is the message the bond market is sending and it is warning that the path of least resistance is a lot lower for stocks (bottom panel, Chart 1). Chart 1“The First Cut Is The Deepest” Economists are also downgrading their U.S. real GDP growth estimates and that forecast now stands at 2.3% for the current year according to Bloomberg. While the recession alarm bells are not sounding off, these downward revisions bode ill for stocks (Chart 2)  Chart 2Watch Out Down Below Moving to another part of the fixed income market, stress is slowly building in the high yield market especially given the recent tick up in bankruptcies and the blind sides that cove-lite loans now pose to bond investors. As a reminder, the U.S. high yield option adjusted spread (OAS) troughed last September and continues to emit a distress signal for the broad equity market (junk OAS shown inverted, top panel, Chart 3). Chart 3Mind The Gaps With regard to global growth, it is still missing in action, and given that Dr. Copper is on the verge of a breakdown, a global growth recovery is a Q1/2020 story at the earliest. This week we update a consumer discretion­ary subindex and also highlight an industrials sector subgroup. Chart 4SPX: The Next Shoe To Drop? Chart 5Risk To View Other financial market variables concur that global growth is elusive. J.P. Morgan’s EM FX index has broken down and EM equities are also hanging from a thread. The EM high yield OAS has broken out signaling that the risk off phase has yet to fully run its course (EM junk OAS shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 4). Finally, there is a short-term risk to our cautious equity market view. Indiscriminate buying in U.S. Treasurys has now pushed the 10-year yield down almost 180bps from last November’s peak deeply in overvalued territory. While such a move is not unprecedented, buying may be exhausted and in need of at least a short-term breather (Chart 5).     Netting it all out, the sustained global growth slowdown, widening junk spreads, along with the risk of a U.S. recession becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy suggest that caution is still warranted in the broad equity market on a 3-12 month time horizon. As a reminder, this is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which contrasts BCA’s sanguine equity market house view. This week we update a consumer discretionary subindex and also highlight an industrials sector subgroup. Empty Spaces When the consumer is worried about a possible recession as the latest survey revealed, the knee jerk reaction is to tighten the purse strings and marginally retrench. The latest University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey made for grim reading and such souring in confidence will continue to weigh on lodging equities (Chart 6). As a result, we remain underweight the niche S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines consumer discretionary subgroup. When the consumer is worried about a possible recession as the latest survey revealed, the knee jerk reaction is to tighten the purse strings and marginally retrench. Chart 6Stay Checked Out Of Hotels   Already discretionary retail sales have taken the back seat and non-discretionary retail sales are in the driver’s seat. In fact, the top panel of Chart 7 shows that the relative retail sales backdrop has plunged to levels last seen during the GFC, warning that relative share prices have ample room to fall. Drilling deeper in the consumption data is instructive. Lodging outlays are decelerating and are also trailing overall PCE. The implication is that relative profits will likely underwhelm sustaining the 18-month long de-rating phase (middle & bottom panels, Chart 7). On the operating front the news is equally dour. While selling prices are expanding, the relentless construction binge will lead to a mean reversion sooner rather than later (bottom panel, Chart 8).   Chart 7De-rating Phase To Gain Steam Chart 8Margin Squeeze Looming   Tack on the ongoing assault from the new sharing economy unicorns like Airbnb, and industry pricing power will remain in check in coming quarters. Similarly, the ISM non-manufacturing price subcomponent is warning that a deflation scare is looming in the lodging industry (second panel, Chart 8). Not only are selling prices under attack, but also labor-related input costs are on fire. The sector’s wage inflation is climbing at a 3.9%/annum pace or roughly 120bps higher that the overall employment cost index (third panel, Chart 8). Taken together, there are high odds that a profit margin squeeze will weigh on profits and on relative share prices (top panel, Chart 8). Importantly, the overall ISM services survey best encapsulates the bearish backdrop of the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. Historically, relative share prices have been moving in tandem with the ISM non-manufacturing survey and the current message is that selling pressures on relative share prices will persist in the coming months (Chart 9). Chart 9Heed The Message From The ISM Services Survey In sum, weakening consumer sentiment, softening hotel industry operating metrics that point to a margin squeeze, anemic relative outlays on lodging and a decelerating ISM non-manufacturing index signal that more pain lies ahead for the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL – MAR, HLT, RCL, CCL, NCLH. Short Circuited The S&P EC&E index broke down recently (top panel, Chart 10) and we reiterate our underweight recommendation in this industrials sector subgroup. While it is tempting to bottom fish here especially given oversold technical and bombed out valuations (bottom panel, Chart 11), a number of the indicators we track suggest that more losses are around the corner. Chart 10Sell The Weakness Chart 11Good Reasons For Valuation Discount   First the trade-weighted dollar has broken out to fresh cyclical highs despite the collapse in the 10-year yield. Historically, relative share prices and the greenback are tightly inversely correlated and the current weak global growth message the U.S. dollar is emitting is bearish for the S&P EC&E index (U.S. dollar shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 10). This global growth soft patch is not only negative for new orders owing to deficient foreign demand, but the appreciating currency also makes EC&E exports less competitive in the global market place (U.S. dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 10). Second, while industry new orders have been resilient, the massive inventory buildup dwarfs new order growth and warns that a deflationary liquidation phase is looming (middle panel, Chart 11). In fact, the recent drubbing in the ISM manufacturing prices paid subcomponent portends a deflationary industry phase (third panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, waning industry operating metrics, a bearish signal from our EPS growth model along with the mighty U.S. dollar warns against bottom fishing in the S&P EC&E index. Other operating metrics are also warning that EC&E profits will underwhelm. Industry weekly hours worked have plunged and sell-side analysts have been aggressively cutting EPS estimates (bottom panel, Chart 13). On the productivity front, executives have not adjusted labor cost structures to lower running rates yet (second panel, Chart 13) and, thus, our EC&E productivity gauge (industrials production versus employment) is contracting which bodes ill for industry earnings (third panel, Chart 13). Chart 12Weak Profit Backdrop Chart 13Deteriorating Operating Metrics   Finally, our S&P EC&E EPS growth model does an excellent job in encapsulating all these moving parts and is signaling that the path of least resistance is lower for EPS growth in the coming months (bottom panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, waning industry operating metrics, a bearish signal from our EPS growth model along with the mighty U.S. dollar warns against bottom fishing in the S&P EC&E index. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P EC&E index. BLBG: S5ELCO – AME, EMR, ETN, ROK.     Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Highlights Markets expressed disappointment over last week’s FOMC meeting, … : Equities sold off, Treasury yields slid, and the curve flattened. … but we didn’t think there was all that much to get excited about, … : Data dependence remains the Fed’s mantra, and it was never likely that the FOMC would signal that policy through September has been pre-programmed. … though the specter of escalating trade tensions was a bummer: We have followed our repeated exogenous-shock caveat with an acknowledgement of the gravity of trade barriers. Our geopolitical strategists don’t expect a resolution any time soon, though, and White House tweets are here to stay. Marginally easier monetary policy is not likely to have all that much of an effect on the economy: A reduction in the fed funds rate from 2.5% to 2% isn’t likely to turbo-charge housing or corporate investment, but we do expect that the major central banks’ easing bias will support risk assets. Feature The FOMC delivered the result we expected at the conclusion of its meeting last week: a 25-basis-point cut and a dovish adjustment to its balance sheet runoff plans. Markets acted as if they’d been blindsided. Apparently it really isn’t what you say, it’s how you say it. Or maybe, as our colleague Martin Barnes has long contended, press conferences and all the other assorted communications strategies do more harm than good. We have nearly reached the point of Fed fatigue ourselves, but there’s no ignoring the elephant in the room. The Fed is squarely in the center of every investor’s mind and may well remain there for the rest of what was shaping up as a slow-news month before the latest tariff move. American and Chinese negotiators have called it quits until September; lawmakers have left the building in London and Brussels; the ECB’s Governing Council will be idle until mid-September; and the winnowing of the Democratic field is so far off that even Bill de Blasio remains a presidential candidate. We devote this week’s report to an examination of increased accommodation’s implications for financial markets and the U.S. economy. What did the FOMC do on Wednesday? Chart 1An Adjustment, Not A New Direction The FOMC cut the fed funds rate by 25 basis points, to a range of 2-2.25%, and terminated its modest balance sheet reduction effort two months ahead of time. It studiously kept its options open with regard to future policy rate adjustments, with Chair Powell describing the cut as a “mid-cycle adjustment,” rather than a transition to full-on policy easing. The mid-cycle reference kiboshed hopes that the cut was meant to bring the curtain down on the tightening cycle that began at the end of 2015 (Chart 1). The hawkish surprise concerning the future direction of the fed funds rate overwhelmed the modestly dovish news that the Fed is immediately ending small-scale quantitative tightening. How did markets take the developments? Not so well, especially over the two hours of Wednesday afternoon trading following the decision. The S&P 500 sold off by close to 2% during the press conference, the dollar surged against the euro, and the yield curve flattened as long-dated Treasuries surged while the 2-year note sold off sharply. Equities recovered their losses in Thursday morning’s trading, though bonds and the dollar held much of their gains, before the latest salvo in the U.S.-China dispute sent investors in all markets scurrying for cover. Overall, financial markets were disappointed that they didn’t get a clearer signal that additional accommodation is on the way. Did markets overreact? In retrospect, it looks like they’d gotten their hopes up too high. The Fed wants to avoid surprises by keeping markets apprised of future developments, but it’s hard to envision it deliberately boxing itself in. It wants to preserve the flexibility to act as it sees fit, so data dependence remains the order of the day, just as it has for the last several years. We continue to take the Fed at its word that policy is not on a pre-set course. Markets seemed to be looking for a little more solicitousness from the Fed. Central bankers will presumably always attempt to guard their discretion, but the monetary policy path is far from clear, given elevated economic uncertainty. Between the stop-and-start trade hostilities with China and the Whack-a-Mole emergence of tariff threats against long-standing allies and trade partners, global manufacturing is reeling and corporate managers have every reason to hold back on capex. The differences of opinion within BCA reflect the lack of an obvious economic direction. Dissention within the Fed – Boston’s Rosengren and Kansas City’s George voted against last week’s cut, while Minneapolis’ Kashkari surely wanted it to be larger – shows that the way forward is not so clear-cut. So is it a good thing or a bad thing that the Fed cut rates? We view easier policy as a market positive over the one-year timeframe that drives most investors. There will come a point of diminishing returns, when risk assets no longer respond to incremental accommodation, but we don’t think we’re there yet. Equity multiples have room to expand before they become silly and the ECB is apparently preparing a new round of asset purchases. Given that it’s exhausted the supply of Eurozone sovereigns, it will have to proceed to evicting incumbent holders from their positions somewhat further out the risk curve, prodding them to venture out still further to redeploy the proceeds, putting downward pressure on spreads globally. How will a lower fed funds rate impact the economy? How much time do you have? The textbook answer is that a lower fed funds rate directly reduces the cost of financing big-ticket consumer purchases and corporate initiatives while indirectly nudging households and corporate managers to make them by boosting their confidence. Unconventional measures like asset purchases (QE) push investors further out the risk curve, lifting the prices of risky assets, lowering lending spreads and increasing asset holders’ wealth. They also promote a broader sense of well-being (the CNBC screen is framed in green, print headlines are cheerful, and jobs are increasingly easier to find), fueling confidence that helps reinforce the direct effects of easier policy. As Chair Powell put it in January, “Our policy works through changing financial conditions[,] … it’s … the essence of what we do.” The logic behind the textbook answer is undeniably sound, and it’s displayed in the simple six-channel model in Figure 1. People respond to incentives, and when the cost of consumption and investment falls, they are likely to save less and consume and invest more (Interest Rates/Substitution Effect). Increasing numbers of observers are becoming restless, however, as events on the ground don’t seem to jibe with the theory. Ten years of a negative real fed funds rate has failed to generate much oomph, and markets sputtered on cue once it tiptoed into positive territory (Chart 2), coinciding with the current global economic softness. Chart 2Real Rates Are Still Low Relative To History Martin Barnes, our resident grumpy economist, scoffs at how little extraordinary accommodation has been able to achieve. (Don’t get him started on the communication strategies.) Even after adjusting for how a half-century of Scotland and Montreal weather has colored his perspective, he has a point. “Do you really want to buy equities and riskier bonds in an economy that needs this much help just to grow at 2%?” he might ask. For the time being, yes, we still do. Although the channels promoting economic activity are not functioning as reliably as they have in the past, the channels boosting asset prices – Portfolio Balance, Confidence/Risk Taking, and Interest Rates/Substitution – are still A-Okay (Figure 1). The initial reaction to the FOMC meeting suggests that it will be very hard for the Fed to surprise dovishly in a relative sense, blocking the Currency channel for the time being. The Credit channel is still hindered by post-crisis regulations from Basel to Capitol Hill, at least in terms of the official banking system. Trade tensions have roiled net exports via retaliatory tariffs and suppressed global aggregate demand.1 Shouldn’t housing be at the forefront of any pickup in activity? Chart 3Lower Rates Haven't Helped Much Yet Housing is the classic proxy for tracing the effects of easier policy on the domestic economy, since nearly all of its end consumers finance their purchases, and its domestic concentration insulates it from trade effects. It has failed to respond much to the monetary policy shifts that have brought 30-year fixed mortgage rates down nearly 100 basis points year to date (Chart 3). Fed skeptics suggest that the muted response is evidence of the declining efficacy of easy policy, though we have been inclined to read the data as an indication that homebuilders aren’t building enough starter and move-up homes to bring homeownership within reach of first-time homebuyers and median-income households. Housing should exhibit a high sensitivity to changes in monetary policy, but an abundance of other debt burdens and a lack of affordable supply may be holding it back.   One should have expected that the housing pickup would be muted, and slower to take hold in this expansion, given the severity of the recession and its mortgage-lending roots. Adjusted for inflation, private residential investment, which has declined slightly for four straight quarters, is just over two-thirds of its 2005 peak (Chart 4, middle panel). In the past, residential investment has been more sensitive to the level of the fed funds rate than its direction. Since 1961, the Fed has hiked rates in as many quarters as it has cut them, and the difference in annualized growth has been relatively modest: 2.8% when the Fed has been cutting rates, and 1.6% when it’s been raising them. Chart 4Residential Investment Responds To The Monetary Policy Backdrop... Per our equilibrium fed funds rate framework, we deem monetary policy to be accommodative when the fed funds rate is below our estimate of equilibrium, and restrictive when the funds rate exceeds it (Chart 4, top panel). Despite the fact that the Fed has hiked as often as it has cut since 1961, we estimate that policy has been easy for two-thirds of the time, and the difference in residential investment growth in the two policy states has been dramatic: 6.8% when policy is easy and -6.6% when policy is tight (Chart 4, bottom panel). With the Fed keeping policy easy for longer, housing will have the wind at its back, though it isn’t much more than a breeze at the moment. The same goes for construction employment, which has grown more rapidly under accommodative monetary policy (2.1% versus 0.7% when policy is tight), but has merely treaded water over the last 11 years of easy policy (Chart 5). Chart 5... And So Does Construction Employment The bottom line is that the jury is still out on housing activity. Low mortgage rates will help renters buy homes (and fill them with furniture and appliances), and put more cash in the pockets of homeowners who refinance their existing loans, but the market remains soft. Though it can’t be captured by the aggregate data, it does seem possible that median-income households may be burdened by too much student loan, automobile and/or credit card debt to save the required down payment.2 Disparities between households may well be holding the economy back, but they have a silver lining if they encourage the Fed to pursue accommodative policies for longer than it otherwise would. Will rate cuts give the economy a tangible lift? We don’t know for sure, but no one else does, either. We are convinced that easier monetary conditions will help the economy at the margin. Ten years into the expansion, though, it is not clear if the economy has pent-up demand that easier conditions will help release. Externally, worsening trade tensions could exacerbate the global manufacturing slowdown, further squeezing global aggregate demand, and exporting recession pressures to the U.S. Our mandate is not to forecast the economy in itself, though. We and our clients are investors, not government officials or public-policy professors, and we focus on the economy only to the extent that it impacts financial markets. In the near term, incremental accommodation should boost risk asset prices, provided that trade tensions don’t ratchet up enough to undermine investor, consumer and business confidence. Animal spirits matter, and if they shift decisively from greed and toward fear, they can become a self-fulfilling prophecy that sweeps monetary policy efforts before them. Ex-a significantly negative exogenous event, we remain constructive on the U.S. economy, and continue to look for a global revival outside of the U.S. Investment Implications The incremental information received this week – an FOMC meeting that mostly went off as we expected, a modest escalation in U.S. pressure on China in line with our geopolitical strategists’ warnings that a final deal is not at hand, mixed global manufacturing PMIs, a surge in U.S. consumer confidence, a straight-down-the-middle employment situation report, and an upward inflection in S&P 500 earnings growth that has 2Q EPS now tracking to a 2.7% year-over-year gain – did not change our perspective. We see U.S. economic growth decelerating from its 2018 pace, but remaining above trend, and an absence of imbalances that would make the economy more vulnerable. We have made our peace with recurring flare-ups of hostilities between the U.S. and China, and trade tensions will only change our investment outlook if they worsen materially. The Fed is not magic, but it is doing the best it can to keep the expansion going for the purpose of spreading its gains as broadly as possible, and the easing bias among major central banks is gathering force. On balance, the new information received last week didn’t do anything to change our overall take. We remain constructive, and think investment portfolios should as well. We recognize that the climate is uncertain, and that we should accordingly dial back our conviction. Part of the reason the agency mortgage REITs appeal to us at this juncture is that they offer the opportunity to reduce equity beta and enhance a balanced portfolio’s capacity to absorb shocks. We watched the flattening in the yield curve with dismay, but we continue to expect that incremental monetary accommodation will promote a steeper curve. Easier monetary conditions promote growth, boosting the real component of interest rates, and can stoke inflation pressures when an economy is operating at or above capacity, as the U.S. has been for over a year. We remain vigilant, but our base-case constructive take is unchanged.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 As we were preparing to go to press on Thursday, the U.S. announced the imposition of new tariff levies on the subset of Chinese imports that hadn’t yet been subjected to tariffs. The move supported our geopolitical strategists’ view that the trade war is unlikely to be settled soon. 2 Andriotis, AnnaMaria; Brown, Ken; and Shifflett, Shane, “Families Go Deep in Debt to Stay in the Middle Class,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2019.