サウジアラビア

ハイライト 世界の製造業サイクルはまもなくボトムに達する公算が大きく、消費とサービスは依然として堅調です。今後12か月の景気後退リスクは低く、これは株式が債券より引き続きアウトパフォームすることを示唆しています。 しかし、この楽観的なシナリオに対するリスクは高まっています。消費者信頼感の低下や地政学的緊張の悪化はリスク資産に打撃を与える可能性があります。我々はこれをヘッジするためにキャッシュをオーバーウェイトしています。 中国は現時点では積極的な金融緩和の使用に及び腰です。中国が動くまでは、景気循環性が低い米国株式市場がアウトパフォームするはずです。 中国が景気刺激を本格化させ、製造業サイクルが明確にボトムを打ったときに、新興市場（EM）および欧州株へシフトする可能性があります。この上振れリスクをヘッジするために、我々はファイナンシャルズを戦術的にオーバーウェイトとし、またインダストリアルズのオーバーウェイトとオーストラリアのニュートラルを再確認します。 債券利回りはリバウンドを継続するはずです。デュレーションをアンダーウェイトとし、TIPSを優先します。クレジットは景気循環の視点ではアウトパフォームするはずですが、企業の高負債はリスクですのでニュートラルを推奨します。 推奨 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し：全面的なヘッジ 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し：全面的なヘッジ   特集 概要 万全のヘッジ 世界経済にとって特に不確実な時期であり、資産配分担当者にとっては悩ましい局面です。製造業の活動はまもなく底打ちするのか、それともサービス部門や消費を巻き込んで下押しするのか。債券利回りは強いリバウンドを続けるのか。米連邦準備制度理事会（Fed）は利下げを終了したのか。中国は今や積極的に金融刺激を拡大するのか。イランはサウジアラビアとの対立を激化させるのか。トランプ大統領は次に何をツイートするのか。 こうした環境ではポートフォリオ構築の手腕が試されます。我々はこれらすべての問いについて見解を持っていますが、確信度は通常よりやや低めです。投資家が取るべき対応は、最も起こりそうなシナリオすべてにおいてポートフォリオが強靭であるように資産配分を計画することです。 我々は世界の製造業サイクルがまもなくボトムに達すると予想しています。グローバル先行経済指標はすでに回復しており、グローバルPMIも底打ちの兆候を示しています（チャート 1）。最短期の先行指標であるシティグループ経済サプライズ指数は、欧州を除くすべての地域で最近急上昇しました（チャート 2）。（サイクル底のより風変わりな指標については、7ページのクライアントが尋ねていることも参照してください。）底打ちの要因は、この9か月間の金融環境の緩和、 中国成長の安定化、そして単純に時間の経過です。製造業サイクルの下落局面は典型的に18か月続き、このサイクルは2018年上半期にピークをつけました。 チャート 1底打ちの最初の兆候 底打ちの最初の兆し 底打ちの最初の兆し チャート 2予想外に強いサプライズ 驚くほど強いサプライズ 驚くほど強いサプライズ     同時に、国債利回りはさらに上昇余地があるはずです。Fedはあと一度利下げする可能性がありますが、米国経済の堅調さを踏まえるとそれ以上にはならないでしょう。これはフェドファンド先物が織り込んでいる今後12か月の59ベーシスポイントの利下げよりも小さい幅です。最近の経済サプライズの持ち直しは、米10年国債利回りが少なくとも6か月前の水準である2.3～2.4％に戻ることを示唆しています（チャート 3）。ただし、例えば米中貿易協議の破綻のような政治的緊張の高まりがあると、この動きは遅れる可能性があります（チャート 4）。 チャート 3長期金利はさらにリバウンドへ... 長期金利、さらに反発へ... 長期金利、さらに反発へ... チャート 4...しかし地政学的緊張は依然リスク ...しかし地政学的緊張は依然としてリスクである ...しかし地政学的緊張は依然としてリスクである これは、今後数四半期にわたり株式が債券をアウトパフォームし続ける可能性が高いことを意味し、我々は12か月の投資期間でグローバル株式をオーバーウェイト、グローバル債券をアンダーウェイトの立場を維持しています。ただし、この明るいシナリオに対するリスクは増しています。我々は第二次世界大戦以降、ほぼ18か月前にほぼすべての景気後退を的中させてきたイールドカーブの逆イールド化を依然として懸念しています（チャート 5）。3か月/10年のカーブは今年中頃に逆イールド化しました。また、製造業部門の弱さが消費者信頼感を損なうことを懸念しています。これは欧州と日本にいくつかの兆候がありますが、米国ではまだ顕著ではありません（チャート 6）。したがって先月、景気後退に対するヘッジとして我々はキャッシュをオーバーウェイトしました。リスク／リワードの観点から、債券よりもキャッシュをより魅力的なヘッジとみなしています。 チャート 5イールドカーブのメッセージを無視できますか？ イールド・カーブからのメッセージを無視できますか？ イールド・カーブからのメッセージを無視できますか？ チャート 6消費者信頼感の弱さのいくつかの兆候 消費者信頼感の弱まりを示すいくつかの兆候 消費者信頼感の弱まりを示すいくつかの兆候     我々はまた、ベータが低く他地域の株式ほど構造的逆風が少ない米国株式を引き続きオーバーウェイトします。ただし、中国のより大胆な刺激策の恩恵を受けるであろう、より景気循環性の高い株式市場への参入ポイントを引き続き探しています。中国の金融緩和はこれまでの景気刺激局面に比べてなお慎重です。国内活動を安定化させるにはおそらく十分でした（チャート 7）が、2016年のように工業用コモディティ価格や新興市場資産、ユーロ圏株式のラリーを引き起こすほどではありません。グローバルPMIの上昇と中国の信用成長の強まりの兆候は、明らかに新興市場と欧州を助けるでしょう（チャート 8）が、我々が実際にそれらが起きているとより高い確信を持つまではその動きを取ることはしません。その間、欧州株がアウトパフォームし始めた場合に有利になるはずのため、我々は上振れリスクをヘッジする目的でグローバルの金融セクターを戦術的にオーバーウェイトに引き上げています。今年初めには、より積極的な中国刺激による上振れリスクをヘッジするためにインダストリアルズをオーバーウェイト、オーストラリア株式をニュートラルに引き上げました。 チャート 7中国の刺激は成長を単に安定化させただけ 中国の景気刺激策は成長を単に安定させただけに過ぎない 中国の景気刺激策は成長を単に安定させただけに過ぎない チャート 8欧州と新興市場は最も景気循環的な市場 欧州と新興市場は最も景気循環性の高い市場だ 欧州と新興市場は最も景気循環性の高い市場だ     チャート 9原油価格の急騰はしばしば景気後退に先行する 原油価格の急騰は景気後退に先行することが多い。 原油価格の急騰は景気後退に先行することが多い。 我々の楽観的なシナリオに対する最大の地政学的リスクは、サウジの石油精製施設への攻撃後の中東情勢です。過去50年のすべての景気後退は、原油価格の前年同月比100％の急騰に先行されてきました（ただし、この事態が現実となるにはブレントが年末までに現在の61ドルから100ドル超へ上昇する必要があります（チャート 9   チャート 10原油のリスクプレミアムは低すぎるのか？ 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し：全方位のヘッジ 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し：全方位のヘッジ   ギャリー・エヴァンス、シニア・バイス・プレジデント チーフ・グローバル・アセット・アロケーション・ストラテジスト garry@bcaresearch.com     クライアントが尋ねていること 世界成長の反発のタイミングを図るために投資家はどの先行指標を注視すべきか？ チャート 11世界成長に関するポジティブなシグナル ユーロ圏の製造業は底打ちに近いか？ 世界経済の成長に対するポジティブなシグナル ユーロ圏の製造業は底打ちに近いか？ 世界経済の成長に対するポジティブなシグナル 2019年の世界的な成長鈍化は、債券ラリーとディフェンシブ資産のアウトパフォーマンスの主要因でした。したがって、この下落がいつ反転するかのタイミングを見極めることは極めて重要です。反転はディフェンシブから景気循環性の資産へのリーダーシップの交代ももたらすからです。では、どのようにしてこれを行うか。以下に、過去に世界経済に関する信頼できる先行シグナルを提供してきた我々のお気に入りの指標を三つ挙げます。 キャリートレードのパフォーマンス：非常に高いキャリーを持つ新興国通貨の対円でのパフォーマンスは、世界成長の先行指標となる傾向があります（チャート 11, パネル1）。一般に、キャリートレードは資金が豊富だが利回りが低い国（日本のような）から、貯蓄不足でリスクは高いが見込み収益が高い国へ流動性を分配します。これらの通貨のポジティブなパフォーマンスは、世界的な流動性の改善を示す傾向があり、通常は世界成長を後押しします。 スウェーデンの在庫サイクル：スウェーデンの受注在庫比率は世界の製造業サイクルの先行指標です（パネル2）。なぜか。スウェーデンは小さな開放経済であり、世界成長のダイナミクスに非常に敏感です。さらに、スウェーデンの輸出は中間財に重心が置かれており、これはグローバルなサプライチェーンの早い段階に位置します。これによりスウェーデンの在庫サイクルは世界の製造業サイクルの良い早期のバロメーターとなります。 G3のマネタリートレンド：G3の実質的なマネーサプライ超過（マネーサプライ成長率と貸出成長率の差として測定）は、世界の工業生産の先行指標です（パネル3）。ベースマネーと預金が既存の貸出プールに対して銀行システム内でより豊富になると、商業銀行の流動性ポジションは改善します。これにより銀行はより多くの貸出成長を生み出す燃料を得られ、最終的に経済活動に追い風を提供します。 重要なのは、これらすべての先行指標が世界経済に対してポジティブなシグナルを送っていることです。これは、世界成長が強まるにつれて金利は上昇すべきだという我々の見解を裏付けます。したがって、投資家はポートフォリオで株式をオーバーウェイト、債券をアンダーウェイトのままにしておくべきです。   ユーロ圏の銀行を買う時期か？ 2018年12月のユーロ圏の銀行に関するスペシャルレポートでは、「歴史的に、相対P/Bディスカウントが下限バンドに達し、相対配当利回りが上限バンドに達したとき、相対リターンの反発が期待できる」と指摘しました。1 当時の我々の推奨は「長期投資家はこの地域の銀行を避けるべきだが、より戦術的な権限を持ち、機動的なスタイルの投資家は評価指標を利用して銀行への出入りを短期トレードとして『タイミング』できる」というものでした。 それ以降、銀行は市場全体を10％以上アウトパフォームできずに引き続きアンダーパフォームし、相対的な評価指標をさらに押し下げました。現在、相対P/Bと相対配当利回りはともに、歴史的に少なくとも短期的な反発を予告してきた極端な水準にあります。 ユーロ圏のPMIはまだ50を下回っていますが、ユーロ圏経済が今年後半に持ち直す兆候があり、これは銀行の相対的な収益にとってポジティブになるはずです。すでに、フォワードの1株当たり利益（EPS）成長は幅広い市場に対して安定化しています（チャート 12、パネル4）。 さらに、2018年12月当時の主要な懸念材料の二つはイタリア政府債務と量的緩和（QE）の巻き戻しでした。現在、イタリア債務はもはや危機的な状況にはなく、ECBはQEを再開しています。 したがって、戦術的な権限を持ち機動的に運用できる投資家はユーロ圏の銀行を買う（オーバーウェイト）べきです。長期投資家は構造的な問題が残っているため、依然としてこのような短期トレードは避けるべきです。 チャート 12戦術的にユーロ圏の銀行をアップグレード 戦術的にユーロ圏の銀行を格上げ 戦術的にユーロ圏の銀行を格上げ  金相場の上昇は終わったのか？ スポット金価格は年初来で17%上昇しており、その背景には世界的な成長鈍化、ハト派に傾いた中央銀行、そして高まる政治的緊張がある。投資家は今、金のエクスポージャーを削減すべきだろうか。常識的にはそうすべきだろう。しかし、今回は通常の時期ではない。 短期的には、テクニカル面での買われ過ぎと行き過ぎたポジティブなセンチメントのために一部利益確定が入り、金価格は下押しを受ける可能性がある（チャート13、パネル1）。さらに、今年の金価格の動きは中央銀行の緩和期待の高まりによるところが大きい（パネル2）。今後、市場は利下げが限定的にとどまることに失望する可能性があり、それが金の下落圧力となり得ると予想する。 他方で、現在世界の債務の約27%、すなわち14.9兆ドルがマイナス利回りであるため、投資家は次善の資産である利回りゼロの金へ引き続きシフトしていくだろう（パネル3）。中央銀行と投資家の双方によるここ数年の金保有増加（パネル4・5）からもこれが明らかである。投資家がマイナス利回りを回避し資本保全に重点を置く動きが続く限り、この傾向は持続すると見ている。 年初以来、地政学的緊張は強まっている：米中間の継続するが決定的でない貿易交渉、さらなる関税の実施、ブレグジットの不確実性、そして中東での最近の軍事攻撃（パネル6）。このような環境は金価格を押し上げ続けるはずだ。 我々は引き続き、今後12か月で加速すると見ているインフレに対するヘッジとして、また世界成長や地政学的状況のさらなる悪化に対するヘッジとして金を推奨する。 Chart 13Gold: Sell Or Hold? ゴールド：売却か保有か？ ゴールド：売却か保有か？ 楽観的シナリオへのリスクは高まっている。我々は依然として逆イールド曲線を懸念している。逆イールド曲線は第二次世界大戦以降のすべての景気後退を正確に予測してきた。 金利はどこまで下がり得るか？ ゼロ下限は過去のものだ。先月、デンマーク中央銀行は金利を-0.75%に引き下げ、スイスの10年国債は主要国として歴史的最低水準の-1.12%に達した。次の景気後退において、理論上金利はさらにどこまで下落し得るだろうか？ 個人にとって、紙幣の保管コストが現金金利の下限を制約する可能性がある。紙幣自体は利回りゼロだからだ（政府が現金を禁止する方法や年会費を課す方法を見出さない限り）。銀行の貸金庫は年間約300ドル、また100万ドルを保管するのに十分なプロ用金庫（100ドル札の山で31 x 55 cm、重さ約10kg）は設置費を含め約2,000ドルである。後者を10年で償却すれば、100万ドルの保管コストは年率約0.2%〜0.3%になる。スイスフラン紙幣（最高額面CHF1,000）は保管コストがより低くなるだろう。しかし、現物金の保管コストは年率約2%である。 金利がこれを下回っている場合、他の制約が存在するはずだ。個人が現金を保管することは危険であり、確実に非常に不便である（税金の支払いのために現金を銀行に運ばなければならないことを想像してみてほしい）。また、例えば10億ドル（重さ10トン）を保管する個人や企業のコストははるかに高くなるだろう。低金利国の歴史を踏まえると（チャート14、パネル1）、現金保有者が政府短期債の銀行預金の代替を模索し始める水準は概ね-1%前後だと我々は考えている。 Chart 14How Low Can They Go? どこまで下がるのか？ どこまで下がるのか？ Chart 15Yield Curves When Rates Are At Zero Or Below 金利がゼロ以下のときのイールドカーブ 金利がゼロ以下のときのイールドカーブ   長期側では、短期金利がゼロまたはマイナスのときにイールドカーブが大きく逆転することは通常ない（チャート15）。今年初めにスイスで観測された3か月/10年の最大逆イールドは-0.05%だった。 したがって、どこであれ10年債の絶対的な最低水準は、たとえ厳しい景気後退の只中であっても概ね-1.1%付近であろうという示唆になる。 これは資産配分担当者にとっての懸念材料だ。現在の水準（スイス-0.8%）からスイス国債が取り得る数学的最大上昇幅は3%であり、ドイツ国債（現-0.5%）では5%である。これはあまり有効なヘッジとは言えない。米国だけが相対的に有利に見える：10年物米国債利回りが0%に低下した場合、トータルリターンは18%になる。   世界経済 Chart 16U.S. Growth Remains Solid 米国の成長は堅調を維持 米国の成長は堅調を維持 概観：世界的に産業部門の成長は弱く、多くの国で製造業PMIが50を下回っている。しかし、消費とサービスはほぼすべての地域で持ち堪えており、製造業比重の高いユーロ圏でも例外ではない。製造業の底打ちの兆しが断続的に見られるが、本格的な回復は中国におけるさらなる金融緩和の規模に依存するだろう。中国当局は2016年に行ったほどの大規模な緩和を展開することには慎重な姿勢を崩していないようだ。 米国：米国の製造業は既に世界の他地域に続いて収縮局面に入っており、ISM製造業景況指数は8月に50を下回った（チャート16、パネル2）。しかし、消費とサービスは概ね好調を維持している。雇用は拡大を続けている（ただし昨年よりやや鈍いペースで、求職者不足が一因かもしれない）、解雇の増加は見られず、消費者信頼感は依然として歴史的高水準に近い（9月にわずかに低下した）。住宅は昨年の減速後に回復しており、最近の議会での予算合意により今後12か月は財政政策がやや拡張的になる見込みだ。設備投資（パネル5）のみが、貿易戦争を巡る不確実性のために企業が投資判断を先送りしている影響で鈍化している。コンセンサスは今年の米国実質GDP成長率を2.2%と見込んでおり、多くの潜在成長率の推定を上回っている。 ユーロ圏：製造業の比重が高いため、欧州の成長は米国より弱い。製造業PMIは2月以来50を下回り、8月にはさらに45.6に低下した。鉱工業生産は前年比で2%縮小している。イタリアは2四半期のマイナス成長を経験しており、ドイツも第3四半期にテクニカルリセッションに入る可能性がある（第2四半期はGDPが0.1%縮小した）。しかし、製造業の底打ちの兆候は断続的に見られる：例えば9月のZEW調査は上振れのサプライズとなった。また、米国同様に消費は強い。製造業比重の高いドイツでも雇用は増加を続け、7月の小売売上高は前年同月比で4.4%増だった。一方、英国ではブレグジットを巡る不確実性が企業の投資を損なっているが、雇用は堅調である。2 Chart 17First Signs Of A Rebound In The Rest Of The World? 世界のその他地域で反発の兆候が見え始めたか？ 世界のその他地域で反発の兆候が見え始めたか？ 日本：消費は既に低下しており、10月に予定された消費税率の引き上げ前でさえ落ち込んでいる。7月の小売売上高は前年比で2%減少し、賃金のマイナス成長と消費者センチメントの5年ぶりの低水準への低下が原因である。製造業は中国の減速と強い円（過去12か月で6%上昇）の影響を受け続けており、輸出は6%減、鉱工業生産は過去3か月で前年比2%減少している。消費税率引上げの影響は自動車税の軽減や高校教育の無償化といった政府の措置により緩和される可能性があるし、中国成長の回復が輸出を押し上げるだろう。しかし、活動の底打ちの兆候はまだ乏しい。 新興市場：中国の成長は安定化しているように見え、製造業・非製造業の両PMIが50を上回っている（チャート17、パネル3）。しかし、景況感は脆弱で、小売売上高の伸びは20年ぶりの低水準に鈍化し、自動車販売は8月に7%減少した。これは新排出基準適合車の導入にもかかわらずである。当局は追加の緩和策（9月の預金準備率の追加引き下げを含む）で対応したが、2016年のような本格的な金融刺激を再度実施することには消極的なようだ。他の新興国では、構造的な問題を抱える国で成長が鈍化している（アルゼンチンの最新の前年比実質GDP成長率は-5.7%、トルコは-1.5%、メキシコは-0.8%）が、他方で比較的堅調なのはインド5%、インドネシア5%、ポーランド4.2%、コロンビア3.4%である。 金利：ほぼすべての中央銀行がハト派に転じており、FRBは2回目の利下げを行い、ECBは資産買入れを再開し、日銀は10月に緩和を示唆した。しかし、さらなる金融緩和は市場の期待よりも小幅にとどまる可能性が高い。FRBは今回の利下げを中間的な修正に過ぎないと示し、追加緩和は考えにくいと示唆した。ECBと日銀には利用可能な手段がほとんど残っていない。成長の底打ちの兆しと、中央銀行のハト派転換が終盤に差し掛かっているという市場の理解を踏まえ、既に米国で1.45%から9月に1.72%へと上昇している長期金利はさらに上昇する可能性が高い。投資家はまた、米国のインフレに注意深く注視すべきである。基調の強さを示す兆候があり、コアCPIは8月に前年比2.4%上昇している（過去3か月の年率換算では最大3.4%に達する）。   世界株式 Chart 18Has Earnings Growth Bottomed? 利益の伸びは底を打ったか？ 利益の伸びは底を打ったか？ 依然として慎重だが、上方リスクに対するヘッジを追加：地政学的リスクや弱まる経済指標といったヘッドラインリスクにもかかわらず、グローバル株式は第3四半期に8ベーシスポイントの小幅な損失にとどまった（チャート18）。総じて、我々のディフェンシブな国別配分は第3四半期によく機能した。先進国（DM）株式は新興国（EM）を4.5%上回り、米国はユーロ圏を2.8%上回った。 ただしセクター配分は期待通りにはいかなかった。ユーティリティーと生活必需品のアンダーウェイト、および資本財、エネルギー、ヘルスケアのオーバーウェイトがすべて逆方向に動いたためである。とはいえマテリアルのアンダーウェイトが損失の一部を相殺するのに寄与した。 四半期の間、債券利回りの大きな変動に合わせて、グローバル株式の世界ではセクターおよび国別のローテーションが明確に見られた。9月には先進国／新興国、米国／ユーロ圏、景気循環株／ディフェンシブ株で一部の反転が確認された。 今後について、BCAのハウスビューは世界経済成長がここ数か月のうちに回復し始めるという見方を維持しているが、以前に予想したよりやや遅れると予想している。したがって、我々のディフェンシブな国別配分は依然として適切だ。4月にユーロ圏と新興国株をアップグレード監視リストに入れたが、世界的な回復の遅れはまだその判断を発動する時ではないことを示している。3 我々は債券利回りが底を打ったとの見方を持っているため4、グローバルのセクター配分で1つ調整を行い、金融セクターをニュートラルからオーバーウェイトへ格上げする。資金はヘルスケアのダブルオーバーウェイトを半分にしてオーバーウェイトに削減することで賄う（詳細は次ページ参照）。この調整は、1) ユーロ圏が米国をアウトパフォームする場合、2) 今後の米国大統領選でエリザベス・ウォーレンが勝利する場合、という二つの可能性に対するヘッジにもなる。5  グローバル金融株をニュートラルからオーバーウェイトへ格上げ Chart 19Upgrade Global Financials グローバル・ファイナンシャルズをアップグレード グローバル・ファイナンシャルズをアップグレード グローバルの金融株の総株式市場に対する相対パフォーマンスは、グローバル債券利回りの動きに大きく影響を受けてきた（Chart 19、パネル1）。9月に債券利回りが急反転したのに伴い、金融株の相対パフォーマンスも反転した。ただし、近年にわたり金融株が幅広い市場に対して大きくアンダーパフォームしてきたことから、チャート上ではほとんど見えない。 債券利回りの急反転がどの程度持続するかは明確ではないが、BCAのハウスビューでは今後9～12か月で債券利回りは上昇すると見ている。したがって、以下の追加的な理由により金融株をニュートラルからオーバーウェイトへ格上げする。 バリュエーションはパネル2に示されているように非常に魅力的である。さらに重要なのは、相対バリュエーションが現在、歴史的に金融株の相対パフォーマンスの反発を予告してきた極端な水準にあることである。 ローンの質が改善している。米国の不良債権（NPL）比率は世界金融危機（GFC）前に達した底に近づいている。スペインやイタリアにおいてもNPL比率は大幅に低下しているが、GFC前の水準よりは依然高いままである（パネル3）。 米国の消費は堅調で、住宅は回復し、ローン需要は強まっている（パネル4）。シティ・エコノミック・サプライズ・インデックスなどのデータと一致しており、経済指標が底入れした可能性を示唆している。 この格上げを資金繰りするため、ヘルスケアのダブル・オーバーウェイトをオーバーウェイトに引き下げた。これは、来年の米大統領選でエリザベス・ウォーレンが勝利し医薬品価格規制を厳格化するリスクへのヘッジである。 国債 デュレーションはややアンダーウェイトを維持。 第3四半期の最初の2か月間、我々のベンチマーク比デュレーション縮小の判断はグローバル債券市場によって大きく試された。米国の10年物国債利回りは9月3日に1.43%を付けたが、これは米国のISM製造業指数が予想を下回ったことを受けたもので、前四半期末の水準より57ベーシスポイント低く、2016年7月6日に記録した歴史的低水準1.32%をわずかに上回る水準だった。ただし、9月5日以降の債券利回りの反発は、米中貿易政策の起伏だけでなく、Chart 20に示される通り経済指標のサプライズがポジティブだったことにも牽引されている。 BCAのグローバル・デュレーション・インジケーターは、当社のグローバル・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジーチームが複数の先行経済指標を用いて構築したもので、今後世界的に利回り上昇を示唆している。投資家は今後9～12か月間、デュレーションをややアンダーウェイトで維持すべきである。 名目債よりインフレ連動債を優先。 グローバルのインフレ期待も、四半期の最初の2か月間に続いた下降トレンドの後に反発している。これは主に8月にコアCPI、コアPCE、平均時給といった実現インフレ指標が加速したことを反映している。加えて、歴史的に原油価格の変化はインフレ期待と良好な相関を持つ傾向がある。サウジアラビアの石油生産施設への攻撃を受けて原油価格は一時20%急騰した。中東の地政学的緊張がどのように進展するかは不透明だが、サウジ側が主張するように失われた生産の70%を復旧できると仮定すると、OPECの余剰生産能力（日量約180万バレル）が市場の均衡を保ち、残る失われた生産をカバーできるはずである。年末まで原油価格が横ばいで推移するという保守的な前提でも、インフレ期待ははるかに高まる方向にあり、これが名目債よりインフレ連動債を支持する根拠となる。日本およびオーストラリアにおいても、それぞれの名目債よりインフレ連動債を好む（Chart 21）。 Chart 20Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom 債券利回りは底を打った 債券利回りは底を打った Chart 21Favor Inflation Linkers リンク債を選好 リンク債を選好 より大胆な中国の景気刺激が実現した場合に恩恵を受ける、景気循環性の高い市場への参入機会を引き続き探している。 社債 我々がフィクスト・インカム・ポートフォリオ内で景気循環的にクレジットをオーバーウェイトに転じて以来、投資適格社債とハイイールド債は、それぞれデュレーションを合わせた国債に対して220および73ベーシスポイントの超過リターンを生み出している。 我々は今後12か月のクレジット見通しに対して引き続き強気である。年末までにグローバル成長が加速すると予想しているからである。歴史的に見ると、グローバル成長の改善はクレジットが国債に対して持続的にアウトパフォームすることをもたらしてきた。さらに、貸出基準が緩和を続けていることを踏まえれば、デフォルト率は今後1年にわたり抑制されると見られる（Chart 22、パネル1）。 どのくらいの期間クレジットをオーバーウェイトにするのか。米国企業債市場における高いレバレッジ水準、利息支払能力（interest coverage ratio）の低下、およびBaa格付け債の比率の高さは、構造的にクレジットをリスクの高い選択肢にしている。しかし、インフレ期待が依然として非常に低いため、FRBは金融政策を緩和的に保つインセンティブが強い。このハト派的な金融政策は金利コストを抑え、クレジットが今後1年でアウトパフォームするのを助けるだろう。 とはいえ、魅力的なクレジットのカテゴリーには差があると我々は考えている。具体的には、Baa格付けとハイイールド証券を優先することを推奨する。これらのクレジット・バケットにはさらなるスプレッド圧縮の余地が残されているためである（パネル2およびパネル3）。一方で、最上位の信用カテゴリーはもはやバリューを提供していないため避けるべきである（パネル4）。 Chart 22Baa-rated And High-Yield Credit Offer The Most Value Baa格付けおよびハイイールド・クレジットは最も高い価値を提供する Baa格付けおよびハイイールド・クレジットは最も高い価値を提供する   コモディティ Chart 23No Supply Shock In The Oil Market 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し：全方位でのヘッジ 四半期ポートフォリオ見通し：全方位でのヘッジ エネルギー（オーバーウェイト）：9月のドローン攻撃はサウジの原油施設に対する供給懸念を引き起こし、攻撃直後の数日間で原油価格は最大で約20%上昇したが、その後攻撃前の水準まで下落した。初期の推計では供給障害は日量約570万バレル、つまり世界供給量の約5.5%に相当し、史上最大の原油供給停止となった。ただし、サウジが主張するように失われた生産の70%を復旧できると仮定すれば、OPECの予備能力である日量約180万バレルが市場を均衡させ、残る失われた生産をカバーできるはずである。より長期的には、経済成長の回復に伴う世界的な原油需要の伸びと供給の緊張が原油価格を押し上げる見込みで、ブレントは今年70ドルに達し、2020年は平均74ドルになると予想される（Chart 23、パネル1およびパネル2）。 工業用金属（ニュートラル）：年初来の中国当局による消極的な刺激策と2019年第2四半期・第3四半期の米ドル高が工業用金属のスポット価格を押し下げてきた。しかし、中国政府は9月に追加の刺激策を発表し、インフラ事業の資金調達のためのさらなる債券発行や金融緩和を行うと表明した（パネル3）。これにより、今後6～12か月で工業用金属価格に上振れ余地が出るはずである。 貴金属（ニュートラル）：年初来の力強いパフォーマンスを踏まえつつも、我々は金に対して依然としてポジティブである。金は景気後退、インフレ、地政学リスクに対する優れたヘッジと見なせるからである。金については第9ページのクライアントからの質問セクションで詳述している。銀も短期的には魅力的に見える。過去20年で銀の利用用途の性質は変化し、主に工業用素材としての側面から、安全資産としての貴金属的側面が強まっている。金と銀の価格の相関は世界金融危機前の平均0.5から危機後は0.8へと上昇している（パネル4およびパネル5）。グローバル成長と政治的不確実性が今後数か月で銀価格を支えるだろう。 通貨 米ドル：4月にニュートラルに転じて以来、貿易加重ドルは2.5%上昇している。利回りの急落は金融条件を緩和し、年末の第4四半期に世界成長を下支えする公算が大きい。米ドルは逆景気循環的な通貨であるため、世界的な成長の回復局面は歴史的にドルにとってネガティブであった。 ユーロ：4月に強気に転じて以来、EUR/USDは2.7%の下落となっている。全体として、我々は景気循環的な時間軸においてEUR/USDに対して引き続きポジティブである。ECBが金利を10ベーシスポイント引き下げ、追加の量的緩和を発表した後、ユーロ圏が米国に対してさらに緩和を続ける余地はあまり残っていない（Chart 24、パネル1）。加えて、ユーロ圏の利益成長見通しが米国に比べて改善することが期待されれば、資金フローは欧州へ向かい、それがEUR/USDを押し上げるだろう（パネル2）。 新興国通貨：当面の間、新興国通貨に対しては弱気の見方を維持する。ただし、年末に向けては格上げ監視中である。世界成長が反転しつつある兆候が複数みられ、これは歴史的に記録的に低い債券利回りがもたらす緩和的な金融環境の結果である。さらに、新興国成長の主要エンジンである中国における限界的な消費傾向（M1成長率とM2成長率の差で代理される）は、新興国通貨のさらなる上昇を示唆し続けている（パネル3）。 Chart 24Interest Rate And Profit Expectation Differentials Favor The Euro ユーロはまもなく急騰するかもしれない。金利と利益期待の差がユーロに有利だ。 ユーロはまもなく急騰するかもしれない。金利と利益期待の差がユーロに有利だ。     オルタナティブ Chart 25Favor Hedge Funds Untill Global Growth Bottoms グローバル成長が底打ちするまでヘッジファンドを推奨 グローバル成長が底打ちするまでヘッジファンドを推奨 リターン増強策：過去12か月にわたり、我々は投資家に対してプライベート・エクイティの配分を減らし、ヘッジファンド、特にマクロ・ヘッジファンドへの配分を増やすことを推奨してきた。これは、我々の判断として景気サイクルが後期にあるためである。成長が今後数か月で回復すると期待しているが、現時点のデータではまだ明確ではない（Chart 25、パネル1）。この不確実なマクロ環境は、特にマルチプルの上昇と買収競争の激化という環境下でプライベート・エクイティにとって厳しいものとなるだろう。グローバル・マクロ・ヘッジファンドは次の景気後退に先立つ最良のヘッジであると引き続き見ており、非流動性資産への配分を変更するには時間がかかるため、投資家には今のうちに資金を配分することを勧める。 インフレ・ヘッジ：現状では、TIPSは非流動性のオルタナティブ資産よりも優れたインフレ・ヘッジである可能性が高い。2019年5月のスペシャルレポート8は、インフレが上昇しているが依然として比較的低い（2.3%未満）局面では、TIPSが特に魅力的なリスク調整後リターンを生み出すことを示している。したがって、FRBがハト派を維持し、金利をもう一度引き下げるかもしれない一方でインフレの中程度の加速を容認するという我々の見通しの下では、TIPSは今後数か月の環境で良好に推移するはずである（パネル2）。 ボラティリティ抑制策：ストラクチャード・プロダクツ、主にモーゲージ担保証券（MBS）は、ポートフォリオのボラティリティを低減する点で優れた実績を持っている（パネル3）。それにもかかわらず、現在の評価は必ずしも魅力的ではないため、MBSへの配分はニュートラルを超えて推奨しない。今シーズンは長期金利が100ベーシスポイント以上低下し、借り換え活動が活発化しているにもかかわらず、名目ベースのMBSスプレッドは史上最低水準付近にとどまっている。ただし、国債利回りが底打ちするにつれて借り換えは減速し、スプレッドに下押し圧力がかかると予想している。当社見解に対するリスク 最も起こり得る上方リスクは、FRB（米連邦準備制度理事会）が過度にハト派になり、対応が遅れることである。米国の基調的なインフレ圧力は依然として強い（コア消費者物価指数は過去3か月で年率換算3.4％上昇）。2回の利下げ後、フェデラルファンド金利は現在中立金利を大きく下回っている：実質で0.1％、Laubach‑Williamsのr*は0.8％に対してである（チャート26）。マネー・マーケットのタイトさからFRBは再びバランスシートの拡大を開始している。来年に製造業の成長が加速し、賃金と利益が上昇し始めれば、1999年のような株式市場のメルトアップが起こり得る。しかし最終的には、インフレを抑えるためにFRBは利上げ（場合によっては急激な利上げ）を行う必要があり、それが次の景気後退を招く可能性がある。 下方リスクの範囲はより広い。 本四半期報告全体で論じた通り、景気後退の引き金になり得る要因は様々ある：特に中国が景気刺激に失敗することや、消費者の信頼の喪失などである。一部の景気後退モデルは今後12か月のリスクを最大30％と見積もっている（チャート27）。構造的に見て、最大のリスクはおそらく米国における企業債務の高水準である（チャート28）。昨年12月に短期間観測されたようなジャンク債市場の崩壊は、今後18か月で満期を迎える大量の債務を企業が借り換えできなくなる事態を招く可能性がある。 地政学的リスクも依然として高止まりしており、その性質上予測が困難である。ブレグジットの帰結は依然として非常に不確実であるが、合意なき離脱のリスクは低いと見ている。米中の貿易協議は包括的な合意なく長期化すると予想しており、明確な決裂はネガティブである。トランプ大統領の弾劾はおそらく市場にとって重大な出来事ではないが、市場心理を一時的に悪化させる可能性がある（特にそれがエリザベス・ウォーレンの当選可能性を高める場合）。イランとサウジ間の紛争がエスカレートする可能性もある。これらの脅威を織り込むためにリスクプレミアムは上昇する必要があるかもしれない。 チャート26FRBは過度にハト派になっているのか？ 米FRBはハト派に傾きすぎているのか？ 米FRBはハト派に傾きすぎているのか？ チャート27景気後退のリスクはどの程度か？ 景気後退のリスクは？ 景気後退のリスクは？ チャート28企業債務が最大のリスクか？ 企業債務は最大のリスクか？ 企業債務は最大のリスクか？   脚注 1詳細はグローバル・アセット・アロケーション・スペシャル・レポート、「ユーロ圏の銀行：バリュー・プレイかバリュー・トラップか？」2018年12月14日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 2詳細はフォーリン・エクスチェンジ・ストラテジー・スペシャル・レポート、「英国：循環的減速か構造的停滞か？」2019年9月20日付、fes.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 3詳細はグローバル・アセット・アロケーション・クォータリー、「クォータリー - 2019年4月」2019年4月1日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 4詳細はグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・ウィークリー・レポート、「債券利回りは底を打った,」2019年9月6日付、gis.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 5詳細はグローバル・インベストメント・ストラテジー・ウィークリー・レポート、「エリザベス・ウォーレンと市場,」2019年9月13日付、gis.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 6Dmitry Zhdannikov and Alex Lawler “独占：サウジの石油生産、当初予想より速く回復へ－関係筋,” ロイター、2019年9月17日付。 7詳細はジオポリティカル・ストラテジー・スペシャル・アラート、「サウジの重要インフラへの攻撃は米国の対応に疑問を投げかける」2019年9月16日付、gps.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 8詳細はグローバル・アセット・アロケーション・スペシャル・レポート、「インフレ・ヘッジのための投資家ガイド：インフレ上昇時の投資方法」2019年5月22日付、gaa.bcaresearch.comで入手可能。 GAA アセット・アロケーション

特別レポート

Feature News reports suggesting the U.S. agrees with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) assessment that the unprecedented attacks on the Kingdom’s oil infrastructure over the weekend were conducted with Iranian weapons will keep markets in overdrive sussing out the scope of an expected retaliation.1 Given the magnitude of this provocation, it is highly unlikely this war-like aggression goes unanswered. The U.S. has a range of retaliatory options, but the U.S. belief that the attacks originated in Iran makes for a much higher constraint for President Donald Trump to respond with direct air strikes, i.e. strikes on Iranian territory. On Wednesday, Trump ordered additional sanctions against Iran. This, combined with Trump’s dovish, establishment pick for a new national security adviser, suggests that whatever retaliatory strikes the U.S. authorizes, its intention will be to minimize the potential for escalation. Iran continues to deny any involvement in the attacks. Its response to any direct retaliation will be telling. If Iran’s response is to up the ante even further, events could escalate to head-on confrontation with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Even as tensions rise, a possible diplomatic off-ramp cannot be dismissed, given the political constraints confronting President Trump as the U.S. general election looms.2 KSA has stated its desire to bring the United Nations into the picture, presumably to either help it form a coalition to prosecute the actors determined to be responsible for the attacks, or to work out a diplomatic solution to de-escalate tensions in the Persian Gulf. In addition, the EU, which has maintained diplomatic relations with Iran, could be asked by the U.S. to mediate negotiations among the dramatis personae to avoid further escalation. For its part, Iran is ruling out any discussions with the U.S., insisting it does not want to give Trump anything that might be useful to him politically. Lastly, markets must fold in U.S. monetary policy – particularly as it affects the evolution of the USD – into its calculations, given the damage a strong dollar already has inflicted on oil demand globally over the past year or so.3 The Fed’s monetary accommodation could be significantly muted by similar efforts by central banks globally, keeping the broad trade-weighted USD well bid. This would continue to weigh on industrial commodity demand. Fundamentals driving price formation are highly dependent on how these issues resolve themselves. Considerable uncertainty exists on all fronts, given the forces shaping the evolution of supply, demand and prices are shaped by political outcomes, which still are in flux.4 At the very least, this will firmly embed a risk premium in prices – the range of which still is being defined – going forward. Despite Attacks, Fundamentals Remain Stable As tumultuous as the past week has been, little has changed in our base case supply-demand estimates, or in our price forecast. KSA officials are indicating repairs to its damaged 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq will mostly be completed by month-end. They indicate KSA has been able to use its 190mm barrels of storage – domestic and global – to meet contractual obligations while these repairs are underway.5 As tumultuous as the past week has been, little has changed in our base case supply-demand estimates, or in our price forecast (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) This leaves our price forecasts similar to last month, with Brent averaging $65/bbl for this year and $74/bbl next year (Chart of the Week). We continue to expect WTI to trade $6.50/bbl below Brent this year, and $4.00/bbl lower next year. While demand growth has weakened, available evidence suggests this process has bottomed. Chart of the WeekOil Fundamentals, Price Forecasts Little Changed, Despite Supply Shock On the supply side, the U.S. continues to be the dominant source of output growth going into next year, even as rig counts continue to fall due to lower prices at the end of last year and in 1H19. Despite the supply shock the attack on KSA induced, global physical imbalances have  largely been minimized, given the Abqaiq facility will be returned to service over the course of the coming month, and KSA has been able to supply contractual volumes out of global storage (Chart 2).  However, this implies global inventories will continue to draw (Chart 3), which will steepen the backwardation in crude-oil forward curves (Chart 4). Chart 2Absent Long-Lasting Shock, Balances Remain Unchanged Chart 3Inventories Will Continue To Draw Chart 4Crude Oil Backwardation Likely Steepens Chart 5U.S. Shales Continue To Drive Global Oil Supply Growth Chart 6U.S. Shale-Oil Output Rises In Top Five Basins On the supply side, the U.S. continues to be the dominant source of output growth going into next year, even as rig counts continue to fall due to lower prices at the end of last year and in 1H19 (Chart 5). Even so, U.S. shale-oil well completions continue to rise as more drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells are brought online (Chart 6, top panel). Nonetheless, DUCs are not being completed as fast as we expected earlier, suggesting productivity gains to date are high enough to offset this slower DUC-completion rate (Chart 6, bottom panel). Geopolitics Dominates A Fraught Oil Market Moreso than at any point in the past, our base-case estimate is highly conditioned on what happens in the geopolitical realm. Markets are being forced to assess probabilities on outcomes that are, at this moment, highly uncertain. To account for some of the risk and uncertainty that will drive supply-demand fundamentals, we model several scenarios assessing the impact of prolonged production outages. Chart 7 shows our estimates of the price impact of 2.85mm b/d of KSA production remaining offline until the end of September (Scenario 1), October (Scenario 2), and December (Scenario 3). These scenarios are largely in line with guidance from KSA that processing and production will be fully restored by November. The end-December scenario makes the point that, without any adjustments in demand and supply elsewhere, prices will spike sharply if Saudi production fails to come back online completely by year-end.6 Chart 7Prolonged Loss of KSA Output Leads To Higher Prices Production outages of the sort simulated in scenario 3 above likely would be destabilizing to markets generally, which, all else equal, would strengthen the USD, as market participants sought safe-haven investments. A stronger USD, coupled with higher absolute oil prices, would lead to demand destruction. The effects of higher prices and a stronger dollar most likely would become apparent in 2020 (Chart 8). We would expect demand destruction would be most acute in EM economies, although DM would not be immune.7 Chart 8Demand Destruction Would Follow Higher Prices and Stronger USD Oil Market Enters Unknown Terrain The attacks on KSA – either by Iran or its proxies – indicates U.S. sanctions against Iran’s oil exports are forcing it to take increasingly desperate measures. Iran would prefer to remove sanctions than engage a large-scale war with the U.S., or with a U.S./GCC military coalition. Nevertheless we continue to believe Iran has a higher threshold for pain than the Trump administration. Under extreme economic sanctions, Iran believes it must show it can strike deep into the heart of KSA’s oil industry, almost at will. At present, we believe any KSA or U.S. militarily retaliation against Iran will be mostly symbolic – e.g., cyber-attacks, pinprick strikes at specific areas where the attack was launched from, or at Iran’s militant proxies across the region rather than at Iran proper. The point would be a warning back to Iran. If no action is taken by the U.S. or KSA, then Iran will conclude that it can continue pressing aggressively. Its previous actions this year – e.g., against tankers in Hormuz, the shooting down of an American drone – have not led to U.S. retaliation, so it has pressed on. This is dangerous because it erodes credibility of U.S. security guarantees in the region – and invites Iran to take even bolder actions. The U.S. public is opposed to wars in the Middle East and an expanding conflict threatens an oil price shock and recession that would get Trump kicked out of the Oval Office. This is a compelling set of reasons not to re-escalate tensions with Iran, but only to seek symbolic retaliation. Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, has a clear incentive to push and test Trump: He suffered the most from Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal – i.e., the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which allowed Iran back into the oil export markets. Although his government is still in power, it is dealing with the fallout from U.S. economic sanctions. He has a great interest in renegotiating the deal – preferably with a Democratic President but possibly also with Trump. But Rouhani must be extremely hawkish in order to get it done and secure political cover at home. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) do not accept Rouhani’s approach and do not want rapprochement with Donald Trump. Moreover they ultimately have an interest to create a conflict that would unify Iran and buttress the regime.  Therefore, chances are that the regime hardliners triggered the attack against KSA to poison the atmosphere, prevent talks, and force Rouhani into a corner where he can no longer pursue diplomacy with the U.S. The chances of a political settlement between the U.S. and Iran are fading rapidly. The U.S. will need to retaliate somehow, diplomatically, economically, or militarily.  Either way it will push back the time frame for a political settlement with Iran. President Trump would need to make an incredibly bold diplomatic overture to convert this incident into a new nuclear deal and political settlement – he would have to give sanctions relief, rejoin the JCPOA, and, most important,  he would have to be matched by Rouhani’s own steps in the context of Iranian factional struggle. Given the fact that Trump ordered new sanctions on Iran Wednesday, the odds of any political settlement are approaching zero. President Trump is reportedly nominating Patrick C. O’Brien as his new national security adviser to replace John Bolton. O’Brien is an establishment Republican pick — he has worked with Senator Mitt Romney as well as the George W. Bush administration. He is also manifestly a “dovish” pick, not only in relation to the uber-hawkish Bolton but even compared to other candidates for the position. He has a specialty in hostage negotiations and legal work representing marginal groups as well as powerful U.S. interests. This suggests that President Trump is seeking negotiations rather than war as his ultimate objective and staging a “tactical retreat” from his aggressive foreign policy so far this year. However, O’Brien is only a single person and the underlying dynamic — Iran’s higher pain threshold for conflict and awareness of Trump’s fear of oil shock and recession — still entails that Trump will need to heighten deterrence, or Iran will press its advantage further. This means we are far from de-escalation in the wake of Abqaiq and markets will continue to add a risk premium. Bottom Line: The U.S. and KSA agree that Iran is responsible for the attacks. It is still unclear that they were launched from Iran by Iranians, however. Ahead of any formal finding, President Trump ordered increased sanctions against Iran on Wednesday. We strongly believe the U.S. will retaliate against Iran or its proxies in the Middle East in response to the attacks on KSA. But the retaliation will be limited because of U.S. political and economic constraints. Iran has the higher pain threshold, and it remains uncertain whether this dynamic will escalate into a full-on kinetic engage­ment involving Iran against the U.S., KSA and their GCC allies.     Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1      Please see Saudi oil attacks came from southwest Iran, U.S. official says, raising tensions, published by reuters.com September 17, 2019. 2      We discuss these in detail in the Special Report Attacks On Critical Infrastructure In KSA Raise Questions About U.S. Response published jointly by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy September 16, 2019. 3      We examined the impact of the strong USD on industrial-commodity demand in two reports – Central Bank Easing Key To Oil Prices and Industrial Commodity Demand Recovery Will Boost Metals, Oil, published September 5 and 12, 2019. We conclude dollar strength, along with China’s deleveraging campaign in 2017 – 18 likely explains a significant amount of the dramatic contraction in oil demand over the 2H18 – 1H19 period. The Sino-U.S. trade war also contributed to lower demand, in our estimation, but its primary effect has been to increase firms’ reticence to fund longer-term capex and households’ desire to hold precautionary savings balances. 4      We are referring once again to Knightian uncertainty, i.e., risks that are “not susceptible to measurement.” This differs from the “risk” we routinely consider in this publication, which can be measured via implied volatilities in options markets. A pdf of Dr. Knight’s 1921 book "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit" can be downloaded at the St. Louis Fed’s FRASER website. 5      In our Special Report earlier this week (see footnote 1), we estimated KSA could cover ~ 33 days of its contractual obligations from its storage, if the outage remained at 5.7mm b/d. The Saudi Press Agency detailed the loss as follows: 4.5mm b/d are accounted for by Abqaiq plants going off line. Please see Saudi says oil output to be restored by end of September, published by khaleejtimes.com. 6      NB: This is the marginal price impact. It is not a forecast. Should production stay off line for an extended period, we would expect other OPEC members’ production to increase, and, at a minimum, the U.S. SPR would release barrels to the market. Eventually, demand destruction – from higher prices – would force oil prices lower. 7      Our demand-decline scenario in Chart 8 shows the impact of a stronger USD and lower demand brought on by high prices. We raise the probability of a stronger USD to 30% in our ensemble model, and simulate a loss of demand equal to 250k b/d next year – 200k b/d from non-OECD economies and 50k b/d from OECD economies. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Following drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the weekend, which removed ~ 5.7mm b/d of output, the U.S. is likely to conduct a limited retaliatory strike. In addition, the U.S. will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and prepare for a larger response if necessary. After this initial response, the Trump administration will likely seek to contain tensions, as neither Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in launching a large-scale conflict with Iran. But that does not mean that one will not happen – indeed, the odds are now higher that this risk could materialize. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes prolonged and unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the negative impact on the global and U.S. economy will grow. Faced with a recession – which is not our base case but is possible – the incentive for Trump to engage war with Iran will rise sharply. Attack On KSA Will Prompt U.S. Retaliation If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions. Over the weekend, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacks on two critical oil assets in Saudi Arabia, removing ~ 5.5% of world crude output – a historic shock to global oil supply, and the largest unplanned outage ever recorded (Chart 1).1 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of being behind the attacks and said there was no evidence that Houthis launched them from Yemen. As we go to press, neither Saudi Arabian officials nor President Trump have confirmed Iran was the culprit, although the sophistication of the attack’s targeting and execution suggest that they will. President Trump said the U.S. is “locked and loaded depending on verification” and offered U.S. support to KSA in a call to Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.2 Chart 1Oil Supply Disruption + Volume Lost A direct missile strike from Iran is the least likely source, as the Iranians have sought to act through proxies this year, in staging attacks to counter U.S. sanctions, precisely in order to maintain plausible deniability and avoid provoking a full-blown American retaliation. If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions, relative to a situation where militant groups in Iraq or Yemen (or even in Saudi Arabia) are found to be responsible. Assuming the strike came from outside Iran, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would presumably retaliate against its proxies in those locations – e.g., the Houthis in Yemen, or the Shia militias in Iraq. Washington is certain to dial up its military deterrent in the region and use the attacks to gain greater worldwide support for a tighter enforcement of sanctions to isolate Iran. This deterrence includes a multinational naval fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, where ~ 20% of the world’s crude oil supply transits daily. Electoral Constraints Facing Trump There are several reasons President Trump will not rush to a full-scale conflict with Iran. First, the attack did not kill U.S. troops or civilians. Miraculously, not even a single casualty is reported in Saudi Arabia. Yet, unlike the Iranian shooting of an American drone, which nearly brought Trump to launch air strikes on June 21, the latest attack clearly impacted critical infrastructure in a way that threatens global stability, making it more likely that some retaliation will occur. Second, Trump faces a significant electoral constraint from high oil prices. True, the U.S. economy is not as exposed to oil imports as it was (Chart 2). Also, global oil producers and strategic reserves including the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can handle the immediate short-term loss from KSA (Chart 3). However, the duration of the cut-off is unknown and further disruptions will occur if the U.S. retaliates and Iranian-backed forces attack yet again. Third, there is still a chance to show restraint in retaliation, contain tensions over the coming months, limit oil supply loss and price spikes, and thus keep an oil-price shock from tanking the U.S. economy. Chart 2U.S. Imports Continue Falling But as tensions escalate in the short term, they could hit a point of no return at which the economic damage becomes so severe that President Trump can no longer seek re-election based on his economic record (Chart 4). At that point the incentive is to confront Iran directly – and run in 2020 as a “war president” intent on achieving long-term national security interests despite short-term economic pain. Chart 3Key SPRs Are Still Adequate Chart 4An Oil Price Shock Lowers Trump's Re-Election Chances U.S.’s Volatile Attempt At Diplomacy What triggered the attack and what does it say about the U.S. and Iranian positions going forward? Ever since Trump backed away from air strikes in June, he has become more inclined to de-escalate the conflict he began with Iran by withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorists, and imposing crippling sanctions to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions. What prompted this backtracking was Iran’s demonstration of a higher pain threshold than Trump expected. President Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, were personally invested in the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, which they negotiated despite grave warnings from the regime’s conservative factions that they would be betrayed. Trump’s reneging on that deal confirmed their opponents’ expectations, while his sanctions have sent the economy into a crushing recession (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Sanctions Hammer Iran's Economy With Iranian parliamentary elections in February 2020, and a consequential presidential election in 2021 in which Rouhani will seek to support a political ally, the Rouhani administration needed to respond forcefully to Trump’s sanctions. Iran staged several provocations in the Strait of Hormuz to warn the U.S. against stringent sanctions enforcement (Map 1). And recently, even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions, a very high bar for talks. Map 1Abqaiq Is At The Very Core Of Global Oil Supply Realizing the large appetite for conflict in Tehran, and the ability to sustain sanctions and use proxy warfare damaging global oil supply, Trump took a step back – he withheld air strikes in late June, discussed a diplomatic path forward with French President Emmanuel Macron, and subsequently fired his National Security Adviser John Bolton, a known war hawk on Iran who helped mastermind the return to sanctions. The proximate cause of Bolton’s ouster was reportedly a disagreement about sanctions relief that would have been designed to enable a meeting with Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly next week. Such a summit could possibly have led to a return to the pre-2017 U.S.-Iran détente. If Trump had compromised, Iran could have gone back to observing the 2015 nuclear pact provisions, which it has only gradually and carefully violated. Moreover the French proposal to convince Iran to rejoin talks by offering a $15 billion credit line for sanctions relief was gaining traction. Apparently these recent moves toward diplomacy posed a threat to various actors in the region that benefit from U.S.-Iran conflict and sanctions. Hardliners in Iran want to weaken the Rouhani administration and prevent further Rouhani-led negotiations (i.e. “surrender”) to American pressure. On August 29, three days after Rouhani hinted that he might still be willing to talk with Trump, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weekly publication warned that “negotiations with the U.S. are definitely out of the question.”3 The IRGC and others continue to benefit from black market activity fueled by sanctions. And Iranian overseas militant proxies have their own reasons to fear a return to U.S.-Iran détente. Saudi Arabia and Israel also worry that President Trump will follow in President Obama’s footsteps with Iran and strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which has considerable popular support in the United States (Chart 6). Both the Saudis and Israelis have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s support and have expanded their regional military targeting of Iranian-backed forces, prompting Iranian pushback. The hard-line factions know that a full-fledged American attack would be devastating to Iranian missile, radar, and energy facilities and armed forces. The Iranians remember the devastating impact on their navy from Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. But with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions cutting oil exports nearly to zero, Iran’s economy is getting strangled and militant forces may feel they have no choice. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Moreover Trump’s electoral constraint – his need to make deals in order to achieve foreign policy victories and lift his weak approval ratings ahead of the election – means that foreign enemies have the ability to drive up the price of a deal. This is what the Iranians just did. But negotiations may be impossible now before 2020. Rouhani may be forced to play the hawk, Supreme Leader Khamenei is opposed to talks, and the hard-line faction is apparently willing to court conflict with America to consolidate its power ahead of the dangerous and uncertain period that awaits the regime in the near future, when Khamenei’s inevitable succession occurs. Bottom Line: We argued in May that the risk of U.S. war with Iran stood as high as 22%, on a conservative estimate of the conditional probability that the U.S. would engage in strikes if Iran restarted its nuclear program outside of the provisions of the JCPOA. Recent events make the risk even higher. This does not mean that Rouhani and Trump cannot make bold diplomatic moves to contain tensions, but that the risk of widening conflict is immediate. Supply Risk Will Remain Front And Center The risk to supply made manifest in these drone attacks will remain with markets for the foreseeable future. They highlight the vulnerability of supply in the Gulf region, and, importantly, the now-limited availability of spare capacity to offset unplanned production outages. There’s ~ 3.2mm b/d of spare capacity available to the market, by the International Energy Agency’s reckoning, some 2mm b/d or so of which is in KSA (Chart 7). These drone attacks highlight the need to risk-adjust this spare capacity. When the infrastructure needed to deliver it to markets comes under attack, its availability must be adjusted downward. Chart 7Limited Availability Of Spare Capacity To Offset Outages Chart 8Commercial Inventories Will Draw ... In the immediate aftermath of the temporary loss of ~ 5.7mm b/d of KSA crude production to the drone attacks, we expect commercial inventories to be drawn down hard, particularly in the U.S., where refiners likely will look to increase product exports to meet export demand (Chart 8). This will backwardate forward crude oil and product curves – i.e., promptly delivered oil will trade at a higher price than oil delivered in the future (Chart 9). Chart 9... Deepening Forward-Curve Backwardations We expect the U.S. SPR to monitor this evolution closely. It is near impossible to handicap the level of commercial inventories – or backwardation – that will trigger the U.S. SPR release, given the unknown length of the KSA output loss, however. Worth noting is the fact that U.S. crude-export capacity is limited to ~ 1mm b/d of additional capacity. Thus, the SPR cannot be directly exported to cover the entire loss of KSA barrels. Other members of OPEC 2.0 will be hard-pressed to lift light-sweet exports, which, combined with constraints on U.S. export capacity, mean the light-sweet crude oil market could tighten. Interestingly, these attacks come as the U.S. has been selling down its SPR. The sales to date have been to support modernization of the SPR, but, for a while now, the Trump administration has been signalling it no longer believes they are critical to U.S. security. That likely changes with these events. The EIA estimates net crude-oil imports in the U.S. are running at 3.4mm b/d. The SPR is estimated at 645mm barrels. There are 416mm barrels of commercial crude inventories in the U.S., giving ~ 1.06 billion barrels of crude oil in the SPR and commercial inventory in the U.S. This translates into about 312 days of inventory in the U.S. when measured in terms of net crude imports. China has been building its SPR, which we estimated at ~ 510mm barrels. As a rough calculation using only China imports of ~ 10mm b/d, and production of ~ 3.9mm b/d, net crude-oil imports are probably around 6mm b/d. With SPR of ~ 510mm barrels, the public SPR (i.e., state-operated stocks) equates to roughly 85 days of imports.4 Members of the IEA – for the most part OECD states – are required to have 90 days of oil consumption on hand. The IEA estimates its SPR totals 1.54 billion barrels, which consists of crude oil and refined products. Together, the IEA’s SPRs plus spare capacity likely could cover the loss of KSA’s crude exports, but the timing and coordination of these releases will be tested. KSA has ~ 190mm b/d of crude oil in storage as of June, the latest data available from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) Oil World Database. If the 5.7mm b/d of output removed from the market by these oil attacks persists, these stocks would be exhausted in 33 days. Based on press reports, repairs to the KSA infrastructure will take weeks – perhaps months – which means the longer it takes to repair these facilities the tighter the global oil market will become. This is exacerbated if additional pipelines or infrastructure in KSA come under attack or are damaged. Critical Next Steps How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. The next steps here are critical: Tactically, the Houthis or other Iranian proxies could continue with drone attacks aimed at KSA infrastructure. They’ve obviously figured out how to target Abqaiq, which is the lynchpin of KSA’s crude export system (desulfurization facilities there process most of the crude put on the water in the Eastern province). The Abqaiq facility has been hardened against attack, but these attacks show the supporting infrastructure remains vulnerable. In addition, militants could target KSA’s western operations on the Red Sea, which include pipelines and refineries. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the bottom of the Red Sea empties into the Arabia Sea. More than half the 6.2mm b/d of crude oil, condensates and refined-product shipments transiting the strait daily are destined for Europe, according to the U.S. EIA.5 In addition, the 750-mile East-West pipeline running across KSA terminates on the Red Sea at Yanbu. The Kingdom is planning to increase export capacity off the pipeline from 5mm b/d to 7mm b/d, a project that will take some two years to complete.6 During a July visit to India, former Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih stated importers of Saudi crude and products, “have to do what they have to do to protect their own energy shipments because Saudi Arabia cannot take that on its own.” On top of all this, Iran could ramp up its threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz once again. These actions could put the risk to supply into sharp relief in very short order. Even Iranian rhetoric will have a larger impact in this environment. In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage. How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. Whether the deal being brokered with France – and the $15 billion oil-for-money loan from the U.S. that goes with it – is now DOA, or is put on a fast track to reduce tensions in the region will be telling. It is entirely possible the U.S. launches an attack on Yemen to take out these drone bases and to neutralize the threat there. If Iraq is identified as the source of the attacks, the U.S., along with Iraqi forces, likely would stage a special-forces operation to take out the bases used to launch the drone attacks. The U.S. has significant forces in theater right now: The U.S. 5th Fleet is in Bahrain, with the Abe Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike force on station at the Strait of Hormuz; and the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are on patrol in the Red Sea under the command of the U.S. 5th Fleet (Map 2). In addition, the U.S. also deployed B52s earlier this year to Qatar to have this capability in theater. Map 2U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group Disposition, 9 September 2019 Bottom Line: In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage that removed 5.7mm b/d of crude-processing capacity from the market and damaged one Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields. We expect the U.S. will conduct a limited retaliatory strike, and will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a larger response if necessary. While neither President Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in a large-scale conflict with Iran, the risk of such an outcome has increased. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the risk of recession increases. While this is not our base case, it could push Trump to adopt a “war president” strategy going into the U.S. general election next year.   Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which produces close to 2mm b/d, were attacked on Saturday, September 14, 2019.  Since then, press reports claim the attack could have originated in Iraq or Iran, and could have included cruise missiles – a major escalation in operations in the region involving Iran, KSA and their respective allies – in addition to drones.  Please see Suspicions Rise That Saudi Oil Attack Came From Outside Yemen, published by The Wall Street Journal September 14, 2019. 2      Please see "Houthi Drone Strikes Disrupt Almost Half Of Saudi Oil Exports", published September 14, 2019, by National Public Radio (U.S.). 3      See Omer Carmi, "Is Iran Negotiating Its Way To Negotiations?" Policy Watch 3172, The Washington Institute, August 30, 2019, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. 4      China is targeting ~500mm bbls by 2020, and is aiming to have 90 days of import oil cover in its SPR. 5      Please see The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments, published by the EIA August 27, 2019. 6      Please see "Saudi Arabia aims to expand pipeline to reduce oil exports via Gulf," published by reuters.com July 25, 2019.

特別レポート

Following drone attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) over the weekend, which removed ~ 5.7mm b/d of output, the U.S. is likely to conduct a limited retaliatory strike. In addition, the U.S. will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran and prepare for a larger response if necessary. After this initial response, the Trump administration will likely seek to contain tensions, as neither Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in launching a large-scale conflict with Iran. But that does not mean that one will not happen – indeed, the odds are now higher that this risk could materialize. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes prolonged and unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the negative impact on the global and U.S. economy will grow. Faced with a recession – which is not our base case but is possible – the incentive for Trump to engage war with Iran will rise sharply. Attack On KSA Will Prompt U.S. Retaliation If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions. Over the weekend, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for attacks on two critical oil assets in Saudi Arabia, removing ~ 5.5% of world crude output – a historic shock to global oil supply, and the largest unplanned outage ever recorded (Chart 1).1 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of being behind the attacks and said there was no evidence that Houthis launched them from Yemen. As we go to press, neither Saudi Arabian officials nor President Trump have confirmed Iran was the culprit, although the sophistication of the attack’s targeting and execution suggest that they will. President Trump said the U.S. is “locked and loaded depending on verification” and offered U.S. support to KSA in a call to Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman.2 Chart 1Oil Supply Disruption + Volume Lost A direct missile strike from Iran is the least likely source, as the Iranians have sought to act through proxies this year, in staging attacks to counter U.S. sanctions, precisely in order to maintain plausible deniability and avoid provoking a full-blown American retaliation. If Iran is confirmed as the base, it will limit Trump’s options and ensure that any retaliation leads to a greater escalation of tensions, relative to a situation where militant groups in Iraq or Yemen (or even in Saudi Arabia) are found to be responsible. Assuming the strike came from outside Iran, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would presumably retaliate against its proxies in those locations – e.g., the Houthis in Yemen, or the Shia militias in Iraq. Washington is certain to dial up its military deterrent in the region and use the attacks to gain greater worldwide support for a tighter enforcement of sanctions to isolate Iran. This deterrence includes a multinational naval fleet in the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Gulf, where ~ 20% of the world’s crude oil supply transits daily. Electoral Constraints Facing Trump There are several reasons President Trump will not rush to a full-scale conflict with Iran. First, the attack did not kill U.S. troops or civilians. Miraculously, not even a single casualty is reported in Saudi Arabia. Yet, unlike the Iranian shooting of an American drone, which nearly brought Trump to launch air strikes on June 21, the latest attack clearly impacted critical infrastructure in a way that threatens global stability, making it more likely that some retaliation will occur. Second, Trump faces a significant electoral constraint from high oil prices. True, the U.S. economy is not as exposed to oil imports as it was (Chart 2). Also, global oil producers and strategic reserves including the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) can handle the immediate short-term loss from KSA (Chart 3). However, the duration of the cut-off is unknown and further disruptions will occur if the U.S. retaliates and Iranian-backed forces attack yet again. Third, there is still a chance to show restraint in retaliation, contain tensions over the coming months, limit oil supply loss and price spikes, and thus keep an oil-price shock from tanking the U.S. economy. Chart 2U.S. Imports Continue Falling But as tensions escalate in the short term, they could hit a point of no return at which the economic damage becomes so severe that President Trump can no longer seek re-election based on his economic record (Chart 4). At that point the incentive is to confront Iran directly – and run in 2020 as a “war president” intent on achieving long-term national security interests despite short-term economic pain. Chart 3Key SPRs Are Still Adequate Chart 4An Oil Price Shock Lowers Trump's Re-Election Chances U.S.’s Volatile Attempt At Diplomacy What triggered the attack and what does it say about the U.S. and Iranian positions going forward? Ever since Trump backed away from air strikes in June, he has become more inclined to de-escalate the conflict he began with Iran by withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorists, and imposing crippling sanctions to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions. What prompted this backtracking was Iran’s demonstration of a higher pain threshold than Trump expected. President Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, were personally invested in the 2015 nuclear deal with the Obama administration, which they negotiated despite grave warnings from the regime’s conservative factions that they would be betrayed. Trump’s reneging on that deal confirmed their opponents’ expectations, while his sanctions have sent the economy into a crushing recession (Chart 5). Chart 5U.S. Sanctions Hammer Iran's Economy With Iranian parliamentary elections in February 2020, and a consequential presidential election in 2021 in which Rouhani will seek to support a political ally, the Rouhani administration needed to respond forcefully to Trump’s sanctions. Iran staged several provocations in the Strait of Hormuz to warn the U.S. against stringent sanctions enforcement (Map 1). And recently, even as Rouhani and Trump publicly mulled a summit and negotiations, Rouhani insisted that any negotiations with the United States would require Trump to rejoin the JCPOA and remove all sanctions, a very high bar for talks. Map 1Abqaiq Is At The Very Core Of Global Oil Supply Realizing the large appetite for conflict in Tehran, and the ability to sustain sanctions and use proxy warfare damaging global oil supply, Trump took a step back – he withheld air strikes in late June, discussed a diplomatic path forward with French President Emmanuel Macron, and subsequently fired his National Security Adviser John Bolton, a known war hawk on Iran who helped mastermind the return to sanctions. The proximate cause of Bolton’s ouster was reportedly a disagreement about sanctions relief that would have been designed to enable a meeting with Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly next week. Such a summit could possibly have led to a return to the pre-2017 U.S.-Iran détente. If Trump had compromised, Iran could have gone back to observing the 2015 nuclear pact provisions, which it has only gradually and carefully violated. Moreover the French proposal to convince Iran to rejoin talks by offering a $15 billion credit line for sanctions relief was gaining traction. Apparently these recent moves toward diplomacy posed a threat to various actors in the region that benefit from U.S.-Iran conflict and sanctions. Hardliners in Iran want to weaken the Rouhani administration and prevent further Rouhani-led negotiations (i.e. “surrender”) to American pressure. On August 29, three days after Rouhani hinted that he might still be willing to talk with Trump, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weekly publication warned that “negotiations with the U.S. are definitely out of the question.”3 The IRGC and others continue to benefit from black market activity fueled by sanctions. And Iranian overseas militant proxies have their own reasons to fear a return to U.S.-Iran détente. Saudi Arabia and Israel also worry that President Trump will follow in President Obama’s footsteps with Iran and strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which has considerable popular support in the United States (Chart 6). Both the Saudis and Israelis have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s support and have expanded their regional military targeting of Iranian-backed forces, prompting Iranian pushback. The hard-line factions know that a full-fledged American attack would be devastating to Iranian missile, radar, and energy facilities and armed forces. The Iranians remember the devastating impact on their navy from Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. But with the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions cutting oil exports nearly to zero, Iran’s economy is getting strangled and militant forces may feel they have no choice. Chart 6Americans Do Not Support War With Iran Moreover Trump’s electoral constraint – his need to make deals in order to achieve foreign policy victories and lift his weak approval ratings ahead of the election – means that foreign enemies have the ability to drive up the price of a deal. This is what the Iranians just did. But negotiations may be impossible now before 2020. Rouhani may be forced to play the hawk, Supreme Leader Khamenei is opposed to talks, and the hard-line faction is apparently willing to court conflict with America to consolidate its power ahead of the dangerous and uncertain period that awaits the regime in the near future, when Khamenei’s inevitable succession occurs. Bottom Line: We argued in May that the risk of U.S. war with Iran stood as high as 22%, on a conservative estimate of the conditional probability that the U.S. would engage in strikes if Iran restarted its nuclear program outside of the provisions of the JCPOA. Recent events make the risk even higher. This does not mean that Rouhani and Trump cannot make bold diplomatic moves to contain tensions, but that the risk of widening conflict is immediate. Supply Risk Will Remain Front And Center The risk to supply made manifest in these drone attacks will remain with markets for the foreseeable future. They highlight the vulnerability of supply in the Gulf region, and, importantly, the now-limited availability of spare capacity to offset unplanned production outages. There’s ~ 3.2mm b/d of spare capacity available to the market, by the International Energy Agency’s reckoning, some 2mm b/d or so of which is in KSA (Chart 7). These drone attacks highlight the need to risk-adjust this spare capacity. When the infrastructure needed to deliver it to markets comes under attack, its availability must be adjusted downward. Chart 7Limited Availability Of Spare Capacity To Offset Outages Chart 8Commercial Inventories Will Draw ... In the immediate aftermath of the temporary loss of ~ 5.7mm b/d of KSA crude production to the drone attacks, we expect commercial inventories to be drawn down hard, particularly in the U.S., where refiners likely will look to increase product exports to meet export demand (Chart 8). This will backwardate forward crude oil and product curves – i.e., promptly delivered oil will trade at a higher price than oil delivered in the future (Chart 9). Chart 9... Deepening Forward-Curve Backwardations We expect the U.S. SPR to monitor this evolution closely. It is near impossible to handicap the level of commercial inventories – or backwardation – that will trigger the U.S. SPR release, given the unknown length of the KSA output loss, however. Worth noting is the fact that U.S. crude-export capacity is limited to ~ 1mm b/d of additional capacity. Thus, the SPR cannot be directly exported to cover the entire loss of KSA barrels. Other members of OPEC 2.0 will be hard-pressed to lift light-sweet exports, which, combined with constraints on U.S. export capacity, mean the light-sweet crude oil market could tighten. Interestingly, these attacks come as the U.S. has been selling down its SPR. The sales to date have been to support modernization of the SPR, but, for a while now, the Trump administration has been signalling it no longer believes they are critical to U.S. security. That likely changes with these events. The EIA estimates net crude-oil imports in the U.S. are running at 3.4mm b/d. The SPR is estimated at 645mm barrels. There are 416mm barrels of commercial crude inventories in the U.S., giving ~ 1.06 billion barrels of crude oil in the SPR and commercial inventory in the U.S. This translates into about 312 days of inventory in the U.S. when measured in terms of net crude imports. China has been building its SPR, which we estimated at ~ 510mm barrels. As a rough calculation using only China imports of ~ 10mm b/d, and production of ~ 3.9mm b/d, net crude-oil imports are probably around 6mm b/d. With SPR of ~ 510mm barrels, the public SPR (i.e., state-operated stocks) equates to roughly 85 days of imports.4 Members of the IEA – for the most part OECD states – are required to have 90 days of oil consumption on hand. The IEA estimates its SPR totals 1.54 billion barrels, which consists of crude oil and refined products. Together, the IEA’s SPRs plus spare capacity likely could cover the loss of KSA’s crude exports, but the timing and coordination of these releases will be tested. KSA has ~ 190mm b/d of crude oil in storage as of June, the latest data available from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) Oil World Database. If the 5.7mm b/d of output removed from the market by these oil attacks persists, these stocks would be exhausted in 33 days. Based on press reports, repairs to the KSA infrastructure will take weeks – perhaps months – which means the longer it takes to repair these facilities the tighter the global oil market will become. This is exacerbated if additional pipelines or infrastructure in KSA come under attack or are damaged. Critical Next Steps How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. The next steps here are critical: Tactically, the Houthis or other Iranian proxies could continue with drone attacks aimed at KSA infrastructure. They’ve obviously figured out how to target Abqaiq, which is the lynchpin of KSA’s crude export system (desulfurization facilities there process most of the crude put on the water in the Eastern province). The Abqaiq facility has been hardened against attack, but these attacks show the supporting infrastructure remains vulnerable. In addition, militants could target KSA’s western operations on the Red Sea, which include pipelines and refineries. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the bottom of the Red Sea empties into the Arabia Sea. More than half the 6.2mm b/d of crude oil, condensates and refined-product shipments transiting the strait daily are destined for Europe, according to the U.S. EIA.5 In addition, the 750-mile East-West pipeline running across KSA terminates on the Red Sea at Yanbu. The Kingdom is planning to increase export capacity off the pipeline from 5mm b/d to 7mm b/d, a project that will take some two years to complete.6 During a July visit to India, former Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih stated importers of Saudi crude and products, “have to do what they have to do to protect their own energy shipments because Saudi Arabia cannot take that on its own.” On top of all this, Iran could ramp up its threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz once again. These actions could put the risk to supply into sharp relief in very short order. Even Iranian rhetoric will have a larger impact in this environment. In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage. How the U.S. follows up Pompeo’s accusations against Iran will be critical. Whether the deal being brokered with France – and the $15 billion oil-for-money loan from the U.S. that goes with it – is now DOA, or is put on a fast track to reduce tensions in the region will be telling. It is entirely possible the U.S. launches an attack on Yemen to take out these drone bases and to neutralize the threat there. If Iraq is identified as the source of the attacks, the U.S., along with Iraqi forces, likely would stage a special-forces operation to take out the bases used to launch the drone attacks. The U.S. has significant forces in theater right now: The U.S. 5th Fleet is in Bahrain, with the Abe Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike force on station at the Strait of Hormuz; and the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are on patrol in the Red Sea under the command of the U.S. 5th Fleet (Map 2). In addition, the U.S. also deployed B52s earlier this year to Qatar to have this capability in theater. Map 2U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group Disposition, 9 September 2019 Bottom Line: In the immediate aftermath of the drone attacks on critical KSA infrastructure, markets will be hanging on every announcement coming from the Kingdom regarding the duration of the outage that removed 5.7mm b/d of crude-processing capacity from the market and damaged one Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields. We expect the U.S. will conduct a limited retaliatory strike, and will continue to build up forces in the Persian Gulf to prepare for a larger response if necessary. While neither President Trump nor the United States has an immediate interest in a large-scale conflict with Iran, the risk of such an outcome has increased. If the oil-price shock caused by these attacks becomes unmanageable – either because of additional attacks against Saudi Arabian or other regional infrastructure, or direct Iranian action to restrict the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf – the risk of recession increases. While this is not our base case, it could push Trump to adopt a “war president” strategy going into the U.S. general election next year.   Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The massive 7-million-barrel-per-day processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field, which produces close to 2mm b/d, were attacked on Saturday, September 14, 2019.  Since then, press reports claim the attack could have originated in Iraq or Iran, and could have included cruise missiles – a major escalation in operations in the region involving Iran, KSA and their respective allies – in addition to drones.  Please see Suspicions Rise That Saudi Oil Attack Came From Outside Yemen, published by The Wall Street Journal September 14, 2019. 2      Please see "Houthi Drone Strikes Disrupt Almost Half Of Saudi Oil Exports", published September 14, 2019, by National Public Radio (U.S.). 3      See Omer Carmi, "Is Iran Negotiating Its Way To Negotiations?" Policy Watch 3172, The Washington Institute, August 30, 2019, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. 4      China is targeting ~500mm bbls by 2020, and is aiming to have 90 days of import oil cover in its SPR. 5      Please see The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments, published by the EIA August 27, 2019. 6      Please see "Saudi Arabia aims to expand pipeline to reduce oil exports via Gulf," published by reuters.com July 25, 2019.

特別レポート

Highlights So What? Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical risks and still-elevated domestic risks reinforce our cyclically constructive view on oil prices. Why? Saudi Arabia is still in a “danger zone” of internal political risk due to the structural transformation of its economy and society. External risks arising from the Iran showdown threaten to cutoff oil production or transportation, adding to the oil risk premium. We expect oil price volatility to persist, but on a cyclical basis we are constructive on prices. We are maintaining our long EM oil producer equities trade versus the EM equity benchmark excluding China. This basket includes Saudi equities, although in the near term these equities face downside risks. Feature The pace of change in Saudi Arabia has been brisk. Women are driving, the IPO of Aramco is in the works, and the next monarch is likely to be a millennial. Changes to the global energy economy have raised the urgency for an economic transformation that will have political and social consequences, forcing a structural transformation. While the results thus far are attractive, the adjustment phase will be rocky. Saudi Arabia’s successful transition depends on its ability to navigate three main threats: Chart 1The Epic Shale Shake-Up Continues The growth of U.S. shale producers and the dilution of Saudi Arabia’s pricing power: Since the emergence of shale technology, Saudi Arabia faces a new reality in oil markets (Chart 1). Even in the current environment of supply disruptions from major producers such as Iran, Venezuela, and Libya, Brent prices have averaged just $66/bbl so far this year, weighed down by the global slowdown, and the macro context of rising U.S. production. Saudi Arabia has had to enlist the support of Russia in the production management agreement (OPEC 2.0) in effort to support oil prices. But continued oil production cuts come at the expense of the coalition’s market share, and crude exports are no longer a dependable source of revenue for Saudi Arabia. Domestic social and political uncertainties: The successful functioning of the political system has been dependent on the government’s ability to support the lifestyles of its citizens, who have grown accustomed to the generosity of their rulers. But economic challenges bring fiscal challenges. Moreover, shifting powers within the state raise the level of uncertainty and risks during the transition phase. Saber-rattling in the region: Heightened tensions with arch-enemy Iran are posing significant risks of instability and armed conflict that could affect oil production and transportation. And as the war in Yemen enters its fifth year, it poses risks to Saudi finances and oil infrastructure – as highlighted by the multiple drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities in May. These structural risks now dominate Saudi Arabia’s policy-making. OPEC 2.0’s decision at the beginning of this month to extend output cuts into 2020 aims to smooth the economic transition by maintaining a floor under oil prices. Meanwhile Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s Vision 2030 is underway – it is a blueprint for a future Saudi Arabia less dependent on oil (Table 1). Table 1Vision 2030 Highlights Saudi leadership will struggle to minimize near term instability without jeopardizing necessary structural change. In addition to an acute phase of tensions with Iran that could lead to destabilizing surprises this year or next, Saudi Arabia’s economy has just bottomed and is not yet out of the woods. Saudi Arabia’s Economy And Global Oil Markets: Adapting To The New Normal The trajectory of Saudi Arabia’s economic performance has improved since the U-turn in its oil-price management. From 2014-16 Riyadh attempted to drive U.S. shale producers out of business by cranking up production and running prices down. Since then it has supported prices through OPEC 2.0’s production cuts (Chart 2). Export earnings have rebounded over the past two years, reversing the current account deficit (Chart 3). Although net inflows from trade in real terms contribute a much smaller share of overall economic output compared to the mid-2000s, the good news is that the trade balance is back in surplus. Chart 2Return To Cartel Tactics Boosted Economy Nevertheless, the external balance remains hostage to oil prices and may weaken anew over a longer time horizon. Chart 3Current Account Balance Has Improved Chart 4Oil Revenues Easing Budget Strain ... For Now Greater government revenues are helping to improve the budget (Chart 4), but it remains in deficit. Moreover, we do not expect Saudi Arabia to flip the budget to a surplus over the coming two years. Despite our Commodity & Energy Strategy team’s expectation of higher oil prices in 2019 and 2020,1 Saudi Arabia will struggle to balance its budget in the coming 18 months (Chart 5). Their average Brent projection of $73-$75/bbl over the next 18 months still falls short of Saudi’s fiscal breakeven oil price. Most importantly, the kingdom’s black gold is no longer a reliable source of income. Weak oil revenues create a “do-or-die” incentive for Saudi policymakers to diversify the economy. As Chart 1 above illustrates, Saudi Arabia is losing global oil influence to U.S. shale producers. While OPEC 2.0 restrains production, the U.S. will continue dominating production growth, with shale output expected to grow ~1.2mm b/d this year and ~1 mm b/d in 2020.2 Saudi Aramco has been the driving force behind the production cuts (Chart 6), yielding more and more of its market share to American producers. The bad news for Saudi Arabia is that shale producers are here to stay. The kingdom is poorly positioned for this loss of control over oil markets (Chart 7) and is being forced to adapt by diversifying its economy at long last. Chart 7A Long Way To Go In Diversifying Exports Little progress has been made on this front, despite the fanfare surrounding the Vision 2030 plan. 70% of government revenues were derived from the oil sector last year, an increase from the 64% share from two years prior, and Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil trade has actually increased over the past year (Chart 8).3 This week’s announcement of Aramco’s plans to increase output capacity by 550k b/d does not support the diversification strategy. Nevertheless, the Saudis appear to be redoubling their efforts on Aramco’s delayed initial public offering. The IPO is an important aspect of the diversification process. It is also a driver of Saudi oil price management – other things equal, higher prices support the Saudis’ rosy assessments of the company’s total worth. While an excessively ambitious timeline and indecision over where to list the shares have been setbacks to the plan, last weekend’s meeting between King Salman and British finance minister Philip Hammond follows Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s reassertion last month that the IPO would take place in late 2020 or early 2021.4 On the non-oil front, given that Saudi Arabia’s fiscal policy is procyclical, activity in that sector is dependent on the performance of the oil sector. Strong oil sales not only improve liquidity, but also allow for greater government expenditures – both of which stimulate non-oil activity (Chart 9). This means the improvement in the non-oil sector is more a consequence of the rebound in oil revenues than an indication of successful diversification. Chart 8Saudi Reliance On Oil Not Falling Yet Yet the reform vision is not dead. Weak oil revenues may be a blessing in disguise, presenting Saudi policymakers with a “do-or-die” incentive to intensify diversification efforts. Chart 9Non-Oil Activity Still Depends On Oil Sales Bottom Line: By enlisting the support of Russia, Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain a floor beneath oil prices. However, this comes at the expense of falling market share. This leaves authorities with no choice but to diversify the economy – a feat yet to be performed. Domestic Instability Is A Potential Threat Political and social instability in Saudi Arabia is the second derivative of the new normal in global oil markets. So far instability has been limited, but the transition phase is ongoing and the government may not always manage the rapid pace of structural change as effectively as it has over the past two years. Traditionally, Saudi decision-making has comprised the interests of three main social actors: (1) the ruling al Saud family and Saudi elites (2) religious rulers, and (3) Saudi citizens. In the past, the royal family has been able to mitigate social dissent and maintain stability by ensuring that the financial interests of its citizens are satisfied while granting extensive authority to religious groups. The government has transferred profits amassed from oil to Saudi citizens in the form of subsidies for housing, fuel, water, and electricity; public services; and employment opportunities in bloated and inefficient bureaucracies. Going forward, pressure on Riyadh to reduce expenditures and adapt its budget to the changing oil landscape will persist. The authorities will have to continue to shake down elites for funds, or make cuts to these entitlements, or both. Hence policymakers are attempting to walk a thin line between near-term stability and long-term structural change. Several instances of official backtracking show that authorities fear the potential backlash. Following mass discontent in 2017, the Saudi government rolled back most of a series of cuts to public sector wages and benefits that would have led to massive fiscal savings. Instead, the government raised revenue by increasing prices of subsidized goods and services, including fuel, while doling out support to low-income families. The government also introduced a 5% value-added tax in January 2018. Unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is elevated. This is frightening for the authorities. What about the guarantee of cushy government jobs? 45% of employed Saudis work in the public sector. The consequence is an unproductive labor force lacking the skills necessary to succeed in the private sector. Declining oil revenues remove the luxury of supporting a large, unproductive labor force. Chart 10Youth And Woman Unemployment A Structural Constraint Against this backdrop, unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is elevated (Chart 10). This is frightening for the authorities as over half of Saudi citizens are below 30 years of age and the fertility rate is above replacement level implying continued rapid population growth. It will be a challenge to find employment for the rising number of young people. All the while, jobs in the private sector – which will need to take in the growing labor force – are dominated by expatriate workers. Saudi citizens hold only 20% of jobs in the private sector – but this sector makes up 60% of the country’s employment. Fixing these distortions is challenging. Overall, monthly salaries of nationals are more than double those of expatriates (Chart 11). High wage gaps also exist among comparably skilled workers, reducing the incentive to hire nationals. With non-Saudis holding over 75% of the jobs, the incentive to employ low-wage expatriate workers has also weighed on the current account balance through large remittance outflows (Chart 12). And while the share of jobs held by Saudi citizens increased, this is not on the back of an increase in the number of employed Saudis. Rather, while the number of nationals with jobs contracted by nearly 10% in 2018, jobs held by non-Saudis declined at a faster pace. The absolute number of employed Saudis is down 37% since 2015. “Saudization” efforts are aimed at reducing the wage gap – such as a monthly levy per worker on firms where the majority of workers are non-Saudi; wage subsidies for Saudi nationals working in the private sector; and quotas for hiring nationals. But these have mixed results. While Saudi employment has improved, the associated reduced productivity and higher costs have been damaging. Thus, these labor market challenges pose risks to both domestic stability, and the economy. Moreover, even though improved liquidity conditions have softened interbank rates, loans to government and quasi-government entities still outpace loans to the private sector (Chart 13). This “crowding out” effect is not conducive to a private sector revival. It is conducive to central government control, which the leadership is tightening. Chart 12Jobs For Expatriate Workers Have Declined Chart 13Monetary Conditions Ease But Private Credit Lags Facing these structural factors, authorities are attempting to appease the population through social change. There has been a marked relaxation in the ultra-conservative rules governing Saudi society. Permission for women to drive cars has been granted and the first cinemas and music venues opened their doors last year. Critically, religious rulers are seeing their wide-ranging powers curtailed. The hai’a or religious police are now only permitted to work during office hours. They no longer have the authority to detain or make arrests, and may only submit reports to civil authorities. While these changes appeal to the new generation, they also run the risk of provoking a “Wahhabi backlash.” This risk is still alive despite the past two years of policy change. The recently approved “public decency law” – which requires residents to adhere to dress codes and bans taking photos or using phrases deemed offensive – reveals the authorities’ need to mitigate this risk. Popular social reforms are occurring against a backdrop of an unprecedented centralization of power. Mohammad bin Salman will be the first Saudi ruler of his millennial generation. The evolving balance of power between the 15,000 members of the royal family will hurl the kingdom into the unknown. The concentration of power into the Sudairi faction of the ruling family, through events such as the 2017 Ritz Carlton detentions, is still capable of provoking a destabilizing backlash. Discontent among royal family members and Saudi elites may give rise to a new, fourth faction, resentful of the social and political changes. At the moment, the state’s policies have generated some momentum. A number of major hardline religious scholars and clerics have apologized for past extremism and differences over state policy and have endorsed MBS’s vision of a modern Saudi state and “moderate” Islam – the crackdown on radicalism has moved the dial within the religious establishment.5 But structural change is not quick and the social pressures being unleashed are momentous. Saudi Arabia’s oil production and transportation infrastructure are currently in danger from saber-rattling or conflict in the region. The government is guiding the process, but the consensus is correct that internal political risk remains extremely high. There has been a structural increase in that risk, as outlined in this report – and it is best to remain cautious even regarding the cyclical increase in political risk over the past two years. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia’s new economic reality is ushering in social and political change at an unprecedented pace. Unless the interests of the three main social actors – the royal family, religious elites, and Saudi citizens – are successfully managed, a new faction comprised of disaffected elites may arise. A Dangerous Neighborhood Putting aside the longer term threat from U.S. energy independence, Saudi Arabia’s oil production and transportation infrastructure are currently in danger from saber-rattling or conflict in the region. Saudi officials originally expected the war in Yemen to last only a few weeks, but the conflict is now in its fifth year and still raging. The claim by the Iran-backed Houthi insurgents that a recent drone attack on Saudi oil installations was assisted by supporters in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province – home to the majority of the country’s 10%-15% Shia population and oil production – is also troubling as it shows that the above domestic risks can readily combine with external, geopolitical risks. The U.S. is also joining Israel and Saudi Arabia in applying increasing pressure on Iran, which risks sparking a war. Our Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree illustrates that the probability of war between the U.S. and Iran – which would involve the Saudis – is as high as 40% (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree We are not downgrading this risk in the wake of President Trump’s decision not to conduct strikes on Iranian radars and missile launchers on June 20. President Trump claims he wants negotiations instead of war, but his administration’s pressure tactics have pushed Iran into a corner. The Iranian regime is capable of pushing the limits further (both in terms of its nuclear program as well as regional oil production and transport), which could easily lead to provocations or miscalculation. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is structurally unstable as a result of Iran’s capitalization on major strategic movements of the past two decades. The Saudis have lost a Sunni-dominated buffer in Iraq, they have lost influence in Syria and Yemen, and their aggressive military efforts to counter these trends have failed.6 The Israelis are equally alarmed by these developments and trying to persuade the Americans to take a much more aggressive posture to contain Iran. As a result, the Trump administration reneged on the 2015 U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement and broader détente – intensifying a cycle of distrust with Iran that will be difficult to reverse even if the Democratic Party takes the White House in 2020. Hence there is a real possibility of attacks on Saudi oil production facilities, domestic pipelines, and tankers in transit in the near term. Moreover, the majority of Saudi Arabia’s exports transit through two major chokepoints making these barrels vulnerable to sabotage: The Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has resumed threatening to block; The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, located between Yemen and East Africa, which was the site of an attack on two Saudi Aramco tankers last year, forcing a temporarily halt in shipments. Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of these risks. It is the top buyer of U.S. arms and, as a result of the dramatic strategic shifts since the American invasion of Iraq, it is the world’s leading spender on military equipment as a share of GDP (Chart 14). One of our key “Black Swan” risks of the year is that the Saudis may be emboldened by the Trump administration’s writing them a blank check. Bottom Line: In addition to the structural risks associated with Saudi Arabia’s economic, social and political transition, geopolitical tensions in the region are elevated. Warning shots are still being fired by Iran and their proxies (such as the Houthis), and oil supplies are at the mercy of additional escalation. Investment Implications Saudi Arabia’s equity market is halfway through the process of joining the benchmark MSCI EM index. The process will finish on August 29, 2019 with Saudi taking up a total 2.9% weighting in the index. Research by our colleague Ellen JingYuan He at BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy shows that in the case of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Pakistan, inclusion into MSCI created a “buy the rumor, sell the news” phenomenon and suggested that a top of the market was at hand.7 Saudi equities have recently peaked in absolute terms and relative to the emerging market benchmark, supporting this thesis. Saudi equity volatility has especially spiked relative to the emerging market average, which is appropriate. We expect ongoing bouts of volatility due to the immediate, market-relevant political risks outlined above. The risk of a disruptive conflict stemming from the Saudi-Iran and U.S.-Iran confrontation is significant enough that investors should, at minimum, expect minor conflicts or incidents to disrupt oil markets in the immediate term. We expect oil price volatility to persist. Because Riyadh is maintaining OPEC 2.0 discipline in this environment, oil prices should experience underlying upward pressure. It is not that the Saudis are refusing to support the Trump administration’s maximum pressure against Iran but rather that they are calibrating their support in a way that hedges against the risk that Trump will change his mind, since that risk is quite high. This is the 55% chance of an uneasy status quo in U.S.-Iran relations in Diagram 1, which requires at least secret U.S. relaxation of oil sanction enforcement. Moreover, the Saudis want to reduce the downside risk of weak global growth and support their national interest in pushing Brent prices toward $80/bbl for fiscal and strategic purposes. Our pessimistic assessment of the Osaka G20 tariff truce between the U.S. and China is more than offset by our expectation since February that China’s economic policy has shifted toward stimulus rather than the deleveraging of 2017-18. We assign a 68% probability to additional trade war escalation in Q4 this year or at least before November 2020. But since a dramatic trade war escalation would lead to even greater stimulus, we still share our Commodity & Energy Strategy’s cyclical view that the underlying trend for oil prices is up. We are maintaining our recommendation of being long EM oil producers’ equities relative to EM-ex-China. This trade includes Saudi Arabian equities, but as a whole it has upside in the near-term as Brent prices are below our expected average and Chinese equities are still down 10% from their April highs.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Our Commodity & Energy Strategy team expects Brent prices to average $73/bbl this year and $75/bbl in 2020. For their latest monthly balances assessment, please see “Supply-Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices,” dated June 20, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Supply-Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices,” dated June 20, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 The higher export dependence on oil reflects the rebound in oil prices in 2018, rather than a decline in non-oil exports. Given the strong relationship between activity in the oil and non-oil sectors, non-oil exports also increased in 2018. 4 Saudi Aramco’s purchase of a 70 percent stake in SABIC from the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) earlier this year reportedly contributed to the IPO delay. The deal will capitalize the PIF, enabling it to diversify the economy. 5 See, for example, James M. Dorsey, “Clerics and Entertainers Seek to Bolster MBS’s Grip on Power,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1220, July 7, 2019, available at besacenter.org. 6 The U.S., Saudi Arabia, and their allies are trying to restore Iraq as a geopolitical buffer by cultivating an Iraq that is more independent of Iranian influence – and this is part of rising regional frictions. Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s recently issued decree to reduce the power of Iraq’s Iran-backed milita, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and integrate them into Iraq’s armed forces by forcing them to choose between either military or political activity. Just over a year ago, Iraq’s previous Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi issued a decree granting members of the PMF many of the same rights as members of the military. 7 Please see BCA Frontier Markets Strategy, “Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand,” March 13, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The risk premium in crude oil prices is rising again, as policy risk – and the potential for large policy-driven errors – increases (Chart of the Week).1 This is not being fully reflected in options markets, where implied volatilities are trading close to their long-term average levels (Chart 2). In the past month, risks to oil flows – military and otherwise – and supply have risen, which is keeping a bid under prices. The Sino – U.S. trade war has worsened, and threatens to put global supply chains at risk, along with EM demand growth in the medium term. Meanwhile, amid global monetary easing, the USD has strengthened, producing a more immediate headwind for EM commodity demand. Against this backdrop of opposing forces, oil prices remain elevated and relatively stable in the low $70/bbl range for Brent. Our balances estimates and price forecasts have not changed materially this month. However, the balance of risks has widened in both tails of the price distribution. We expect implied volatilities in the crude oil options markets – particularly Brent – to move higher, as a result. As for prices, we continue to expect Brent to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, with WTI trading $7/bbl and $5/bbl below those levels in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Energy: Overweight. The U.S. EIA moved closer to our fundamental assessment and Brent forecast in its most recent market update, lifting its Brent spot-price expectation for this year to an average of $70/bbl, ~ $5/bbl above its April forecast. The EIA’s revision reflects “tighter expected global oil market balances in mid-2019 and increasing supply disruption risks globally.” Base Metals: Neutral. In the wake of Vale’s January supply disaster at its Córrego do Feijão mine, iron ore shipments from Brazil were down 60% in April y/y. Cyclones disrupted supply in Western Australia, pushing 62% Fe iron ore prices to a 5-year high above $100/MT last week. Chinese steelmakers registered a 12.7% y/y gain in crude steel output last month, which, along with dockside iron ore inventory draws of ~ 20 MT ytd, is supporting prices generally. Precious Metals: Neutral. A stronger USD is weighing on gold. Global geopolitical tensions – chiefly in the Persian Gulf and in Sino – U.S. trade relations – are keeping prices above $1,270/oz. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Severe weather conditions in the Midwest continues to delay corn planting, and is contributing to a rally this week in corn prices to $3.94/bushel on Tuesday, up $3.48/bushel from last week’s level. Feature The risk of a military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran is higher than it was a month ago and rising. Should it erupt, such a confrontation would threaten oil exports from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, where ~ 20% of global supply transits daily.2 Bellicose rhetoric from the U.S. – some of it directed at materially reducing Iran’s influence in Iraq – alternately is ramped up and walked back, while attacks on soft targets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) – e.g., oil shipping and west-bound oil pipelines – draw attention to the exposure of this critical infrastructure, upon which global oil markets rely.3 Iran, meanwhile, uses the media to prepare its population for further economic deprivation, and to lob its own vituperative rhetoric at the U.S. Venezuela’s collapse as an oil producer and exporter continues unabated, keeping markets for the heavier sour crude favored by U.S. refiners tight. Civil war threatens to cut into Libyan production, which we are carrying at just over 1mm b/d, while whiffs of another Arab Spring can be detected in Algeria, where popular discontent with ruling elites grows.4 On the demand side, the summer driving season is about to kick off in the Northern Hemisphere, heralding increased gasoline demand. Countering that, the Sino – U.S. trade war shows signs of devolving into a Cold War, which could force a re-ordering of supply chains globally, lifting costs and consumer-level inflation in the process. Longer-term, this could work against central-bank easing globally, and retard growth in EM consumer demand. The risk of a military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran is higher than it was a month ago and rising. Should it erupt, such a confrontation would threaten oil exports from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. For the present, we continue to expect EM demand growth to hold up, expanding by 1.5mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year. This will be supported by continued monetary easing globally, and additional fiscal stimulus from China if its trade war with the U.S. worsens. There is a chance weakness in DM demand will persist, but we think the odds of a normal seasonal pick-up in 2H19 will continue to support demand overall (Chart 3). That said, given the threats to demand growth – an expanded Sino – U.S. trade war and stronger USD, in particular – we will continue to monitor the health of EM demand closely. Chart 2Brent Implied Volatility Will Move Higher Chart 3DM Oil Demand Growth Wobbles, EM Steady   OPEC 2.0 Maintains Production Discipline Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Production Discipline, Strong Demand Drained Inventories The goal of OPEC 2.0 from its inception at the end of 2016 has been to drain OECD inventories, which swelled to 3.1 billion barrels in July 2016, on the back of a market-share war launched by the old OPEC under the leadership of KSA, and a surge in U.S. shale-oil production. KSA continues to stress the need to restrain crude oil production so as to draw down global oil inventories, and has done much of the heavy lifting this year to make that happen (Chart 4). The other putative leader of OPEC 2.0, Russia, continues to express misgivings with such a strategy, arguing instead the producer coalition should make more oil available to the market. We are more aligned with Russia’s view, and continue to believe OPEC 2.0 will need to increase production. In our balances (Table 1), our base case assumes those producers that can lift production – core OPEC and Russia – will do so to keep prices below $85/bbl (Chart 5). We expect OPEC 2.0 will be able to offset the loss of ~ 700kb/d from Iran exports by increasing production gradually from May to September in proportion to its quota agreement. In our base case, we have Iranian exports falling to 600k b/d. We continue to expect OPEC 2.0 to be able to offset the loss of Venezuela’s production throughout the year, which we expect to fall to 500k b/d by December (vs. ~ 735k b/d presently). Going into next month’s Vienna meeting, we do not expect KSA to dramatically increase production, but would not be surprised if it took production from its current 9.8mm b/d level closer to its OPEC 2.0 quota of 10.33mm b/d in 2H19. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Going into next month’s Vienna meeting, we do not expect KSA to dramatically increase production, but would not be surprised if it took production from its current 9.8mm b/d level closer to its OPEC 2.0 quota of 10.33mm b/d in 2H19. We also expect Russia to lift its production closer to 11.6mm b/d from ~ 11.4mm b/d at present. Even with OPEC 2.0 lifting production ~ 900k b/d in 2H19 vs. 1H19, the bulk of global production increases will be concentrated in the U.S., where we expect shale-oil output to grow 1.2mm b/d this year, and 840k b/d next year. This will account for 85% of the overall increase of 2.4mm b/d we expect in the U.S. this year and next. Our estimates of production growth in the U.S. shales is tempered by a growing conviction the large integrated oil majors and stand-alone E&P companies will continue to put the interests of shareholders above their desire to increase production just for the sake of increasing it, as was done in the past. This is driven by a desire to attract and retain capital, which will be critical to the majors and the big E&Ps in the years ahead.5 We continue to see demand growth exceeding supply growth this year. This will produce a physical deficit, which will continue to drain inventories. Even with these production increases, we continue to see demand growth exceeding supply growth this year. This will produce a physical deficit, which will continue to drain inventories (Chart 6). Chart 5Core OPEC 2.0 Will Lift Production Chart 6Balances Continue To Tighten   Spare Capacity Will Be Stretched In addition to Iran and Venezuela, we are closely following what appears to be the early stages of another civil war in Libya, which threatens the ~ 1mm b/d of production flowing from there. In addition, we are seeing signs of growing civil discontent in Algeria not unlike that of 2011, which was sparked by popular dissatisfaction with ruling elites throughout the Middle East in the lead-up to the Arab Spring. We have maintained existing spare capacity can handle the loss of Iranian and Venezuelan production and exports we’ve built into our balances and price-forecast models. However, covering these losses will stretch the capacity of global supply to accommodate unplanned outages, which could leave markets extremely tight in the event of production losses in Libya or Nigeria, or in producing provinces prone to natural disasters (e.g., Canadian wildfires or U.S. Gulf hurricanes). At present, markets appear to be comfortable with OPEC 2.0’s ability to cover losses from Iran and Venezuela, given current spare capacity of ~ 3mm b/d, most of which remains in KSA, and continued growth in non-OPEC output (Chart 7). As inventories continue to draw globally, markets’ attention will turn more toward this spare capacity.   Expect Higher Volatility We remain long Brent call spreads in July and August 2019, which are up an average 101% since they were recommended in February. These positions benefit from higher prices and higher volatility. Chart 8Geopolitics, Increasing Backwardation Support Higher Brent Implied Volatility Our fundamental assessments of supply, demand and inventory levels remain fairly steady. Thus, our price forecasts – $75 and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7 and $5/bbl under that – remain unchanged. With OPEC 2.0 maintaining production discipline and U.S. shale producers maintaining capital discipline, the rate of growth on the supply side will be restrained, and below the rate of growth in global demand. These forces combine to keep inventories drawing this year, which will lead to a steeper backwardation in forward curves, particularly Brent’s (Chart 8). Coupled with true uncertainty re how the U.S. – Iran confrontation in the Persian Gulf is resolved, and how the Sino – U.S. trade war plays out, this steepening backwardation will lead to higher implied volatility in crude oil options markets. Bottom Line: Our expectation of higher prices and steepening backwardation in forward curves is supported by our analysis of fundamentals and the current political economy of global oil markets, which emphasizes policy risk arising from the actions of geopolitically significant states. These factors also will push implied volatility in options markets higher. As a result, we remain long Brent call spreads in July and August 2019, which are up an average 101% since they were recommended in February. These positions benefit from higher prices and higher volatility. We also remain long 2H19 Brent vs. short 2H20 Brent futures in line with our view backwardation will increase; this position is up 155.4% since it was initiated in February, as a result of the steepening of backwardation in the forward curve. Steepening backwardation also will benefit our long S&P GSCI recommendation, which is heavily weighted to energy markets; this position is up 8% since inception. Lastly, we remain long spot WTI, which is up 34.6% since it was recommended in January.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the price decomposition shown in our Chart of the Week, we account for the contribution that changes in global supply, demand and inventory levels make to the evolution of Brent prices, using a proprietary econometric model. We treat the residual term of the model – what’s left of the price decomposition after these fundamental variables are accounted for – as a measure of the risk premium in prices. An expansion of the risk premium – in the positive or negative direction – is coincident with an expansion of the implied volatility of Brent crude oil options typically expands (sometimes with a lag or two), and vice versa. This is intuitively appealing, since risk premia and volatility expand as uncertainty in the market rises. 2 We considered this topic in depth in a Special Report written with BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy entitled “U.S., OPEC Talk Oil Prices Down; Gulf Tensions Could Become Kinetic,” published July 19, 2018, and in “Brinkmanship Fuels Chaos In Oil Markets, And Raises The Odds Of Conflict In The Gulf,” published July 5, 2018. Both reports are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Iran’s influence in Iraq is an internally divisive issue, and a focal point of the U.S., a view we share. Please see, “Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply,” a Special Report we published with BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy September 5, 2018. KSA and Western intelligence agencies allege Iran is behind the attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. Please see “Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of ordering drone attack on oil pipeline,” published by reuters.com. The westbound pipelines in KSA are critical to maintaining the Kingdom’s export capacity, as we noted in “Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy October 25, 2018. This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “Algeria Has a Legitimacy Problem,” posted on the LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog by Benjamin P. Nickels on May 20, 2019, and “Algeria’s Second Arab Spring?” by Ishac Diwan posted at project-syndicate.org March 28, 2019. 5 We will be exploring this topic in depth in a Special Report next month. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in

Highlights OPEC 2.0 will meet in June to decide whether to continue its production cuts into 2H19. Once again, the leaders are sending conflicting signals – KSA is subtly indicating OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts will need to be extended to year-end. Russia, not so much. Much will depend on whether the U.S. extends waivers on Iran oil-export sanctions when they expire May 2. Not surprisingly, Trump administration officials also are not providing much in the way of forward guidance to markets, other than to insist they want Iran’s exports at zero. Our modeling indicates OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – will need to raise production in 2H19, as markets tighten on the back of Venezuela’s collapse, continued unplanned outages (most recently in Libya) and still-strong demand. This aligns our view somewhat with that of Russia. That said, OPEC 2.0’s leaders – and member states – all benefit from higher prices, as we show below. Some, like Russia, more so than others – e.g., KSA, hard as that is to reconcile with their respective stances on production cuts. But none benefits if EM demand is crushed by high prices. It’s a delicate balancing act, given the aggregate GDP of EM commodity-importing countries exceeds that of commodity-exporting countries (Chart of the Week).1 Chart of the WeekEM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand We continue to expect Brent to trade at $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, given our expectation for global supply and demand. KSA and Russia remain the fulcrum of the oil market, as we argued recently, and anticipating their decision-making process remains the critical task for understanding the new political economy of oil.2 Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded opposing forces in Libya cease fighting this week. The country recently lifted oil production over 1mm b/d, but renewed fighting threatens this output. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC) earlier this week tee’d up markets to expect higher infrastructure and transportation spending, which lifted steel and iron ore markets. Markets continue to tighten on the back of the Vale high-grade iron-ore supply losses, which could lift prices above $100/MT in the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral. Central banks continued buying gold in February, the World Gold Council reported this week. Central-bank holdings rose a net 51 tonnes in February bringing total additions to 90 tonnes in the first two months of the year. Agriculture: Underweight. The USDA lifted its estimate of global ending stocks for corn by 5.5mm tons for the 2018/19 crop year. With total use estimates unchanged at 1.13 billion tons, this raises ending stocks-to-use estimates, which will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Feature KSA and Russia share a common feature in that both are petro states, and thus heavily dependent on crude and product exports to fund their governments and economies. Both suffered a near-death experience during the 2014-16 oil-market-share war launched by OPEC, and both have seen their GDPs slowly recover, following the successful production-cutting agreements they jointly engineered to drain excess inventories and restore balance to the market beginning in 2017 and renewed this year (Chart 2). Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. At first blush, it would be logical to assume KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs are driven by the same economic forces of oil supply and demand. In broad terms, they are. Both benefit from higher oil prices, given they are predominantly petro-economies, although Russia tends to benefit more as prices rise (Chart 3). In the post-GFC era, we find that a 1% increase in Brent prices lifts Russia’s GDP ~ 0.07%, while KSA’s goes up ~ 0.03%. Another way of saying this is Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. Chart 2KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Chart 3Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Looking a bit deeper into KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs’ sensitivities to Brent prices, we modeled income growth for both using our Brent forecast (Table 1), the futures markets’ forward curve and compare both to the World Bank’s expectation (Chart 4, bottom panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Given our expectation for EM GDP growth (Chart of the Week), we expect KSA’s GDP to show relatively strong growth with GDP up ~ 5.4% this year and ~ 3.5% next year, propelled partly by higher oil prices (Chart 4, top panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Russia’s GDP goes up ~ 0.25% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. We expect Russia’s GDP to dip then recover in 4Q19, then rise 3.5% by the end of 3Q20 before tapering off toward the end of 2020. This is not surprising given the trajectory for Brent prices in our forecasts and in the futures curves, and the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP to oil prices.We found a similar impact of EM oil demand on Russia and KSA GDPs when controlling for EM FX rates instead of Brent prices (Chart 5).3 Chart 4Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Chart 5While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand U.S. Waivers Dictate OPEC 2.0’s Decision On Production KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. Russia’s a bit of a cipher. President Vladimir Putin this week stated Russia will continue to cooperate with KSA vis-à-vis managing production, although his energy minister, Alexander Novak, has indicated he sees no reason for extending OPEC 2.0’s production deal. Both sides are waiting on fundamental data, and the decision of the U.S. on its waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions. There’s also the ever-likely collapse of Venezuela to consider, and renewed violence in Libya, both of which argue against letting the waivers expire. The Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. The countries granted waivers on U.S. sanctions against Iranian crude oil imports appear to be exercising their option to lift additional barrels, based on data showing loadings out of Iran increased for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 6 and Table 2).4 Loadings out of Iran rose to 1.30mm b/d in March, from 1.24mm b/d in February. Table 2Iran Exports By Country 2018-2019 (‘000 b/d) Bottom Line: We continue to expect U.S. waivers on Iranian oil sanctions will be extended to year end in some form. The collapse of Venezuela and renewed violence in Libya show how tenuously balanced oil markets are at present. Going into a general election in the U.S. next year, the Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. When they meet in June, ministers from OPEC 2.0 member states will be ideally set up to respond to the Trump administration’s decision on waivers for Iranian oil imports, which expire May 2. We are closing our June 2019 $70 vs. $75/bbl call spread, as the position is close to expiry.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      In the post-GFC world, we find total EM oil demand rises ~ 0.4% for each 1% rise in EM commodity-importers’ GDP, while it only rises ~ 0.3% for each 1% rise in EM commodity exporters’ GDP, based on our modeling. According to World Banks’ constant 2010 USD series, EM commodity importers’ GDP represented 66% of total EM GDP in 2018, up from 56% in 2010. The EM income elasticity of oil demand has remained at roughly ~ 0.60 from 2000 to now, meaning a 1% increase in EM GDP – hence EM income – lifts oil demand by ~ 0.6%. This has been remarkably stable pre-GFC, post-GFC and from 2000 to now. 2      The new political economy of oil is a continuing theme in our research. For an extended discussion of this theme, please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” and “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy on February 21 and March 21, 2019. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      When using EM FX rates instead of Brent prices as an explanatory variable, we find KSA’s GDP still increases a little more than 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand, but Russia’s rises closer to 0.6%. NB: All GDP measures use historical World Bank data, and BCA Research estimates using the Bank’s projections in constant 2010 USD.  We proxy EM oil demand using non-OECD oil consumption.  KSA’s production is crude oil only, while Russia’s production is crude and liquids. 4      For a discussion of the waivers’ optionality, please see our BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published on March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades