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Highlights Spread Product: The macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries in US bond portfolios. High-Yield: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. EM Corporates: Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Feature Chart 1Fed Meeting Didn't Shock Credit Markets Last week’s report looked at how the June FOMC meeting prompted a massive re-shaping of the Treasury curve.1 It didn’t discuss, however, the impact that June’s meeting had on credit spreads. There’s a simple reason for this. Corporate bond spreads didn’t move very much post-FOMC. In fact, neither investment grade nor high-yield spreads have widened significantly during the past two weeks, despite the Fed’s apparent “hawkish turn” (Chart 1). The VIX jumped briefly above 20 in the days following the Fed meeting but it has since re-discovered its lows (Chart 1, bottom panel). This week’s report considers whether the corporate bond market is too complacent. The first section updates our assessment of where we are in the credit cycle based on two indicators that did see large swings post-Fed. The second section updates our outlook for high-yield defaults and considers whether junk spreads continue to offer adequate compensation. Finally, the third section of this report presents an introductory look at valuation in the USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) corporate sector. We find that, for the most part, investment grade EM corporates are attractively valued relative to EM sovereigns and US corporates of the same credit rating and duration. Credit Cycle Update Chart 2Credit Cycle Indicators As we have repeatedly stated in past research, the slope of the yield curve is a very important credit cycle indicator.2 We have documented that spread product tends to outperform duration-matched Treasuries by a wide margin when the yield curve is steep. This outperformance tapers off once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope falls below 50 bps and it falls off even more when the slope dips below zero.3 With that in mind, it is notable that the Treasury curve flattened dramatically following the June FOMC meeting (Chart 2). At 106 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains well above the 50 bps threshold that would start to get concerning for spread product. However, it’s likely that the yield curve will continue to flatten as we approach a Fed rate hike in 2022. In other words, we expect that monetary conditions will turn sufficiently restrictive for us to reduce our recommended spread product allocation within the next 12-18 months. On the other hand, one positive development for spread product returns is that the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate declined following the June FOMC meeting. In fact, it is now below the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s inflation target (Chart 2, bottom panel). This is a positive development for spread product because the Fed will strive to ensure that monetary conditions stay accommodative at least until these long-dated inflation expectations are consistent with the 2.3% to 2.5% target. Or put differently, a rebound in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates back to the target range will slow the near-term pace of curve flattening, giving the credit cycle a small amount of extra running room. In short, the macro environment is highly supportive for spread product and it will likely remain supportive for the next 12-18 months, at least until the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. Investment Grade Corporates The highly supportive macro environment applies to investment grade corporate bonds, just as it does to all spread sectors. However, investment grade corporates have the problem that valuation is extremely tight. Much like a flat yield curve environment, a tight spread environment tends to coincide with low excess corporate bond returns. However, our research reveals that tight spreads alone are not sufficient for investment grade corporates to underperform duration-matched Treasuries. Table 1 classifies each month since May 1973 based on the investment grade corporate bond spread and the 3/10 Treasury slope. It then shows a 90% confidence interval for corporate bond excess returns during the following 12 months. It shows that, even when the corporate bond spread is below 100 bps (it is 81 bps today), investment grade corporates still tend to outperform duration-matched Treasuries as long as the 3/10 Treasury slope is above 50 bps. Table 1Expected 12-Month Corporate Bond Excess Return* (BPs) Based On OAS And Yield Curve Slope Bottom Line: The yield curve has started to flatten but it remains very steep, consistent with spread product outperforming duration-matched Treasuries. We remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries but will re-consider this position once the yield curve flattens to below 50 bps. We expect this could happen within the next 12-18 months. We maintain only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporate bonds because of stretched valuations. We see more attractive opportunities in high-yield corporates (see next section), municipal bonds, USD-denominated EM sovereigns and USD-denominated EM corporates (see final section below). High-Yield Default Update We last updated our default rate outlook in March.4 At that time, we concluded that junk spreads offered adequate compensation for expected default losses. Since then, we have received nonfinancial corporate sector profit and debt growth data for the first quarter of 2021, crucial inputs to our macro-based default rate model. Our macro-based model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (i.e. pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards (Chart 3). Lending standards enter our model with a lag, but we need a forward-looking estimate of gross leverage for our model to generate predictions. Chart 3Macro-Driven Default Rate Model To estimate gross leverage we first model corporate profit growth based on real GDP (Chart 4) and assume that real GDP grows by 7% over the next four quarters, consistent with the Fed’s median forecast. This gives us a profit growth expectation of roughly 30%. Chart 4Profit & Debt Growth We also need an estimate for corporate debt growth. Corporate debt exploded last year, growing 10% in 2020, but it then slowed to an annualized rate of 4% in Q1 2021. We think corporate debt growth will remain slow going forward. The nonfinancial corporate sector financing gap has been negative in each of the past four quarters (Chart 4, bottom panel), meaning that retained earnings have exceeded capital expenditures. In other words, firms have built up a lot of excess capital that can be deployed in place of debt to finance new investment opportunities. Table 2 shows our model’s predicted 12-month default rate based on different assumptions for profit and debt growth. If we assume corporate profit growth of 30% and corporate debt growth between 0% and 8%, then our model predicts that the 12-month default rate will fall from its current 5.5% to a range of 2.3% - 2.8%. Table 2Default Rate Scenarios Next, we need to consider what sort of expected default rate is priced into the High-Yield index. Our analysis of historical junk spreads and returns suggests that we should require a minimum excess spread of 100 bps in the High-Yield index after subtracting default losses to be confident that junk bonds will outperform Treasuries.5 If we also assume a recovery rate of 40% on defaulted debt, then we calculate that the High-Yield index is fairly priced for a 12-month default rate of 2.9% (Chart 5). That is, junk spreads appear slightly cheap compared to the 2.3% - 2.8% range predicted by our macro model.  Finally, it’s worth noting that actual corporate default events have been quite rare in recent months. In the first five months of 2021 we’ve seen between 1 and 3 default events per month. If we extrapolate that trend and assume we see 3 defaults per month going forward, then we calculate that the 12-month trailing default rate will fall to 2.0% by December, before leveling off at 2.2% (Chart 6). In other words, the recent trend has been one of significantly fewer defaults than predicted by our macro model Chart 5Spread-Implied Default Rate Chart 6Recent Default Trends Bottom Line: High-yield spreads still look fairly valued, or even slightly cheap, compared to our base case outlook for corporate defaults. Investors should continue to favor high-yield over investment grade corporates and maintain an overweight allocation to high-yield in US bond portfolios. An Attractive Opportunity In EM Corporates This week we present an introductory look at the risk/reward opportunity in USD-denominated EM corporate bonds. Specifically, we look at the investment grade Bloomberg Barclays USD-denominated EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index. We compare this index to both the investment grade USD-denominated EM Sovereign index and the US Credit index.6 First, we look at recent performance trends and average index statistics (Table 3). Both the EM Corporate and EM Sovereign indexes have average credit ratings between A and Baa, so we compare their performance to the A-rated and Baa-rated US Credit indexes. We observe a significant option-adjusted spread (OAS) advantage in both the EM indexes, though part of the extra spread offered by the Sovereign index is compensation for its longer duration. The EM Corporate index sticks out as offering an extremely attractive OAS per unit of duration. Table 3Performance Trends & Index Statistics As for performance, we see that the EM Corporate index experienced less of a drawdown (in excess return terms) during the COVID recession, though it has also returned less than both the EM Sovereign index and the Baa Credit index during the recent upswing. Chart 7Spreads Versus Credit Rating & Duration-Matched US Credit Next, we look at each individual credit tier of both the EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign index and the EM Sovereign index, and we calculate the spread relative to a credit rating and duration-matched position in the US Credit index (Chart 7). In general, we see that both EM indexes offer a spread advantage versus duration-matched US Credit across all credit rating tiers. EM sovereigns look better than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. This is the result of attractive spreads on the sovereign bonds of UAE and Qatar. However, EM corporates clearly dominate sovereigns in both the A and Baa credit tiers. Finally, we consider the risk/reward trade-off in our EM indexes by using our Excess Return Bond Map. Our Excess Return Bond Map shows the relationship between expected return (on the vertical axis) and risk (on the horizontal axis). In Chart 8A our risk measure is the 12-month spread widening required for each index to lose 100 bps versus a position in duration-matched Treasuries divided by that index’s historical spread volatility. It can be thought of as the number of standard deviations of spread widening required for the index to provide an excess return of -100 bps. A higher value corresponds to less risk, and vice-versa. Chart 8B uses the same risk measurement, only we use the spread widening required to lose 500 bps versus Treasuries to assess the risk of a large drawdown. Both Charts 8A and 8B use OAS as the measure of expected return. Chart 8AExcess Return Bond Map (100 BPs Loss Threshold) Chart 8BExcess Return Bond Map (500 BPs Loss Threshold) The first thing that sticks out in Charts 8A & 8B is that Baa-rated EM corporates offer greater expected return and less risk than the EM Sovereign index and the Baa US Credit Index. This is true whether our loss threshold is set at 100 bps or 500 bps. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to split the EM Sovereign index by credit tier in these charts. A-rated EM corporates offer slightly less expected return than the EM Sovereign index but with significantly less risk, they also clearly dominate the A-rated US Credit Index. Aa-rated EM corporates appear to offer a similar risk/reward trade-off as the EM Sovereign index, though we know from Chart 7 that sovereigns have a spread advantage in the Aa credit tier. The bottom line is that USD-denominated EM corporates are attractively valued relative to investment grade US corporate bonds with the same duration and credit rating. EM corporates also look preferable to EM sovereigns in the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns are more attractive than EM corporates in the Aa credit tier. Within the A and Baa credit tiers, US bond investors should favor USD-denominated EM corporates over USD-denominated EM sovereigns and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Within the Aa credit tier, investors should favor USD-denominated EM sovereigns over USD-denominated EM corporates and should favor both over US corporate bonds. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How To Re-Shape The Yield Curve Without Really Trying”, dated June 22, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think”, dated May 25, 2021. 3 We use the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope in place of the more widely tracked 2-year/10-year slope in our credit cycle research only because using the 3-year/10-year slope allows us to include more historical cycles in our analysis. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “That Uneasy Feeling”, dated March 30, 2021. 5 Please see page 33 of the US Bond Strategy Quarterly Chartpack, “Testing The Limits Of Transitory Inflation”, dated May 18, 2021. 6 The US Credit Index consists predominantly of US corporate bonds, but also some non-corporate credit such as: Sovereigns, Foreign Agencies, Domestic Agencies, Local Authority bonds and Supranationals. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The ongoing transition to a post-pandemic state and fiscal policy are either positive or net-neutral for risky asset prices. Fiscal thrust will turn to fiscal drag over the coming year, but the negative impact this will have on goods spending will likely be offset by a significant improvement in services spending, and thus is not likely to cause a concerning slowdown in overall economic activity. A modestly hawkish shift in the outlook for monetary policy is likely over the coming year, potentially occurring over the late summer or early fall in response to outsized jobs growth. However, such a shift is not likely to become a negative driver for risky asset prices over the coming 6-12 months, barring a major rise in market expectations for the neutral rate of interest. This may very well occur once the Fed begins to raise interest rates, but not likely before. Investors should overweight risky assets within a multi-asset portfolio, and fixed-income investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration position. We continue to favor value over growth on a 6-12 month time horizon, although growth may outperform in the near term. A bias toward value over the coming year supports an overweight stance toward global ex-US equities, and an overall pro-risk stance favors bearish US dollar bets. Feature Three factors continue to drive our global macroeconomic outlook and our cyclical investment recommendations. The first factor is our assessment of the global progress that is being made on the path to a post-pandemic state, and the return to pre-COVID economic conditions; the second is the likely contribution to growth from fiscal policy over the coming year; and the third is the outlook for monetary policy and whether or not monetary conditions will remain stimulative for both economic activity and financial markets. If the world continues to progress meaningfully on the path to a post-pandemic state, and if the impact of fiscal and monetary policy remains in line with market expectations, then we see no reason to alter our recommended investment stance. Equity market returns will be modest over the coming 6 to 12 months in this scenario given how significantly stocks have rebounded from their low last year, but we would still expect stocks to outperform bonds and would generally be pro-cyclically positioned. We present below our assessment of these three factors and their potential to deviate from consensus expectations over the coming year, to determine their likely impact on economic activity and financial markets. The Ongoing Transition To A Post-Pandemic World Chart I-1Enormous Progress Has Been Made In The Fight Against COVID-19 Chart I-1 highlights that meaningful progress continues to be made in vaccinating the world's population against COVID-19. North America and Europe continue to lead the rest of the world based on the share of people who have received at least one dose, but South America continues to make significant gains, and recent data updates highlight that Asia and Oceania are also making meaningful progress. Africa is the clear laggard in the war against SARS-COV-2 and its variants, but progress there has been delayed, at least in part, by India’s export restrictions of the Oxford-AstraZeneca/COVISHIELD vaccine. This suggests that, while Africa will continue to lag, the share of Africans provided with a first dose of vaccine will begin to rise once India resumes its exports and deliveries to African countries under the COVAX program continue. If variants of the disease were not a source of concern, Chart I-1 would highlight that the full transition to a post-pandemic economy over the next several months would be near certain. However, as evidenced by the recent decision in the UK to postpone the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions by 4 weeks due to the spreading of the Delta variant, the global economy is not entirely out of the woods yet. Encouragingly, the delay in the UK genuinely appears to be temporary. Chart I-2 highlights that while the number of confirmed UK COVID-19 cases has been rising over the past month, the uptick in hospitalizations and fatalities has so far been quite muted. Importantly, the rise in hospitalizations appears to be occurring among those who have not yet been fully vaccinated, underscoring that variants of the disease are only truly concerning if they are vaccine-resistant. The evidence so far is that the Delta variant is more transmissible and may increase the risk of hospitalization, but that two doses of COVID-19 vaccine offer high protection. Of course, vaccines only offer protection if you get them, and evidence of vaccination hesitancy in the US is thus a somewhat worrying sign. Chart I-3 shows that the daily pace of vaccinations in the US has slowed significantly from mid-April levels, resulting in a slower rise in the share of the population that has received at least one dose (second panel). On this metric, the US has recently been outpaced by Canada, and the gap between the UK and the US is now widening. Germany and France are close behind the US and may surpass it soon. Chart I-2The UK Delay In Removing Restrictions Seems Genuinely Temporary Chart I-3Recent Vaccination Progress In The US Has Been Underwhelming   Sadly, Chart I-4 highlights that there is a political dimension to vaccine hesitancy in the US. The chart shows that state by state vaccination rates as a share of the population are strongly predicted by the share of the popular vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 US presidential election. Admittedly, part of this relationship may also be capturing an urban/rural divide, with residents in less-dense rural areas (which typically support Republican presidential candidates) perhaps feeling a lower sense of urgency to become vaccinated against the disease. Chart I-4The US Politicization Of Vaccines Raises The Risk From COVID-19 Variants But given the clear politicization that has already occurred over some pandemic control measures, such as the wearing of masks, Chart I-4 makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the same thing has occurred for vaccines. This is unfortunate, and seemingly raises the risk that the Delta variant may spread widely in red states over the coming several months, potentially delaying economic reopening, or risking the reintroduction of pandemic control measures. However, there are two counterarguments to this concern. First, non-vaccine immunity is probably higher in red than blue states, and CDC data suggest that this effect could be large. While this figure is still preliminary and subject to change (and likely will), the CDC estimates that only 1 out of 4.3 cases of COVID-19 were reported from February 2020 to March 2021. Taken at face value, this implies that there were approximately 115 million infections during that period, compared with under 30 million reported cases. That gap accounts for 25% of the US population, and given that red states were slower to implement pandemic control measures last year and their residents often more resistant to the measures, it stands to reason that a disproportionate share of unreported cases occurred in these states. Second, as noted above, the evidence thus far suggests that the Delta variant is not vaccine resistant, at least for those who are fully vaccinated. This is significant because if Delta were to spread widely in red states over the coming several months, the resulting increase in hospitalizations would likely convince many vaccine hesitant Americans to become vaccinated out of fear and self-interest – two powerfully motivating factors. Thus, the Delta variant may become a problem for the US in the fall, but if that occurs a solution is not far from sight. And, in other developed countries where vaccine hesitancy rates appear to be lower, it would seem that a new, vaccine-resistant variant of the disease would likely be required in order to cause a major disruption in the transition to a post-pandemic state. Such a variant could emerge, but we have seen no evidence thus far that one will before vaccination rates reach levels that would slash the odds of further widespread mutation. Fiscal Policy: Passing The Baton To Services Spending Chart I-5 highlights that US fiscal policy is set to detract from growth over the coming 6-12 months, reflecting the one-off nature of some of the fiscal response to the pandemic. This is true outside of the US as well, as Chart I-6 highlights that the IMF is forecasting a two percentage point increase in the Euro Area’s cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance, representing a significant amount of fiscal drag relative to the past two decades. Chart I-5Fiscal Thrust Will Eventually Turn To Fiscal Drag In The US… Should investors be concerned about the impact of fiscal drag on advanced economies over the coming year? In our view, the answer is no. The reason is that much of the fiscal response in the US and Europe has been aimed at supporting income that has been lost due to a drastic reduction in services spending, which will continue to recover over the coming months as the effect of the pandemic continues to ebb. Chart I-7 underscores this point by highlighting the “gap” in US consumer goods and services spending relative to its pre-pandemic trend. The chart highlights that US goods spending is running well above what would be expected, whereas there is a sizeable gap in services spending (which accounts for approximately 70% of US personal consumption expenditures). Goods spending will likely slow as fiscal thrust turns to fiscal drag, but services spending will improve meaningfully – aided not just by a post-pandemic normalization in economic activity, but also by the sizeable amount of excess savings that US households have accumulated over the past year (Chart I-7, panel 2). Chart I-6... And In Europe Chart I-7But Reduced Transfers Will Only Impact Spending On Goods, Not Services While some of these savings have already been deployed to pay down debt and some may be permanently saved in anticipation of higher future taxes, the key point for investors is that the negative impact on goods spending from reduced fiscal thrust will be offset by a significant improvement in services spending, and thus is not likely to cause a concerning slowdown in overall economic activity. Monetary Policy: A Modestly Hawkish Shift Is Likely This leaves us with the question of whether or not monetary policy will become a negative driver for risky asset prices over the coming 6-12 months, which is especially relevant following last week’s FOMC meeting. The updated “dot plot” following the meeting shows that 7 of the 18 FOMC participants anticipate a rate hike in 2022, and the majority (13 members) expect at least one rate hike before the end of 2023, raising the median forecast for the Fed funds rate to 0.6% by the end of that year. Chart I-8 highlights that while 10-year Treasury yields remains mostly unchanged following the meeting, yields moved higher at the short-end and middle of the curve. Chart I-8The FOMC Meeting Resulted In Higher Short- And Mid-Term Yields Investor fears that the Fed may shift in a significantly hawkish direction at some point over the next year have been far too focused on inflation, and far too little focused on employment. It is not a coincidence that the Fed’s guidance was updated following the May jobs report, which saw a stronger pace of jobs growth relative to April. Table I-1 updates our US Bond Strategy service’s calculations showing the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth that will be required for the unemployment rate to reach 3.5-4.5% assuming a full recovery in the participation rate, which is the range of the Fed’s NAIRU estimates. May’s payroll growth number of 560k implies that the Fed’s maximum employment criterion will be met sometime between June and September next year, if monthly payroll growth continues at that pace. Table I-1Calculating The Distance To Maximum Employment Chart I-9Lighter Restrictions In Blue States Will Push Down The Unemployment Rate It is currently difficult to assess with great confidence what average payroll growth will prevail over the coming year, but we noted in last month’s report that there were compelling arguments in favor of outsized jobs growth this fall.1 In addition to those points, we note the following: Blue states have generally been slower to reopen their economies, and Chart I-9 highlights that these states have consequently been slower to return to their pre-pandemic unemployment rate. Among blue states, California and New York are the largest by population, and it is notable that both states only lifted most COVID-19 restrictions on June 15 – including the wearing of masks in most settings. This implies that services jobs are likely to grow significantly in these states over the coming few months. Both consensus private forecasts as well as the Fed’s expectation for real GDP growth imply that the output gap will be closed by Q4 of this year (Chart I-10). These expectations appear to be reasonable, given the substantial amount of excess savings that have been accumulated by US households and the fact that monetary policy remains extremely stimulative. When the output gap turned positive during the last economic cycle, the unemployment rate was approximately 4% – well within the Fed’s NAIRU range. Chart I-10 also shows that the Fed’s 7% real GDP growth forecast for this year would put the output gap above its pre-pandemic level, when the unemployment rate stood at 3.5%. In fact, it is possible that annualized Q2 real GDP growth will disappoint current consensus expectations of 10%, due to the scarcity of labor supply (scarcity that will be eased by labor day when supplemental unemployment insurance benefit programs end). Were Q2 GDP to disappoint due to supply-side limitations, it would strengthen the view that job gains will be very strong this fall ceteris paribus, as it would highlight that real output per worker cannot rise meaningfully further in the short-term and that stronger growth later in the year will necessitate very large job gains. Chart I-11 highlights that US air travel and New York City subway ridership have already returned close to 75% and 50% of their pre-pandemic levels, respectively. Based on the trend over the past three months, the chart implies that air travel will return to its pre-pandemic levels by mid-October of this year, and New York City subway ridership by June 2022. This underscores that travel-related services employment will recover significantly in the fall, and that jobs in downtown cores will rebound as office workers progressively return to work. Chart I-10Expectations For Growth This Year Suggest A Rapid Decline In The Unemployment Rate Chart I-11Services Employment Will Recover In The Fall   On the latter point, one major outstanding question affecting the outlook for monetary policy is the magnitude of the likely permanent impact of work from home policies on employment in central business districts. Fewer office workers commuting to downtown office locations suggests that some jobs in the leisure & hospitality, retail trade, professional & business services, and other services industries will never return or will be very slow to do so, arguing for a longer return to maximum employment (and the Fed’s liftoff date). We examine this question in depth in Section 2 of this month’s report, and find that the “stickiness” of work from home policies will likely cause permanent central business job losses on the order of 575k (or 0.35% of the February 2020 labor force). While this would be non-trivial, when compared with a pre-pandemic unemployment rate of 3.5%, WFH policies alone are not likely to cause a long-term deviation from the Fed’s maximum employment objective. Outsized jobs growth this fall, at a pace that quickly reduces the unemployment rate, argues for a first Fed rate hike that is even earlier than the market expects. Chart I-12 presents The Bank Credit Analyst service’s current assessment of the cumulative odds of the Fed’s liftoff date by quarter; we believe that it is likely that the Fed will have raised rates by Q3 of next year, and that a rate hike in the first half of 2022 is a possibility. These odds are slightly more aggressive than those presented by our fixed-income strategists in a recent Special Report,2 but are consistent with their view that the Fed will raise interest rates by the end of next year. Chart I-12The Bank Credit Analyst’s Assessment Of The Odds Of The First Rate Hike The odds presented in Chart I-12 are also more hawkish than the Fed funds rate path currently implied by the OIS curve, meaning that we expect investors to be somewhat surprised by a shifting monetary policy outlook at some point over the coming year, potentially over the next 3-6 months. Payroll growth during the late summer and early fall will be a major test for the employment outlook, and is the most likely point for a hawkish shift in the market’s view of monetary policy. Is this likely to become a negative driver for risky asset prices over the coming 6-12 months? In our view, the answer is “probably not.” While investors tend to focus heavily on the timing of the first rate hike as monetary policy begins to tighten, the reality is that it is the least relevant factor driving the fair value of 10-year Treasury yields. Investor expectations for the pace of tightening and especially for the terminal Fed funds rate are far more important, and, while it is quite possible that expectations for the neutral rate of interest will eventually rise, it seems unlikely that this will occur before the Fed actually begins to raise interest rates given that most investors accept the secular stagnation narrative and the view that “R-star” is well below trend rates of growth (we disagree).3 Chart I-13 highlights the fair value path of 10-year Treasury yields until the end of next year, assuming a 2.5% terminal Fed funds rate, no term premium, and a rate hike pace of 1% per year. The chart highlights that while government bond yields are set to move higher over the coming 6-12 months, they are likely to remain between 2-2.5%. This would drop the equity risk premium to a post-2008 low (Chart I-14), which would further reduce the attractiveness of stocks relative to bonds. But we doubt that this would be enough of a decline to cause a selloff, and it would still imply a stimulative level of interest rates for households and firms. Chart I-1310-Year Yields Will Rise Over The Coming Year, But Not Sharply Chart I-14Rising Yields Will Cause An Unwelcome But Contained Decline In The ERP   Investment Conclusions Among the three factors driving our global macroeconomic outlook and our cyclical investment recommendations, continued progress on the path toward a post-pandemic state and fiscal policy remain either positive or mostly neutral for risky assets. A potentially hawkish shift in the outlook for monetary policy this fall remains the chief risk, but we expect the rise in bond yields over the coming year to remain well-contained barring a sea change in investor expectations for the terminal Fed funds rate – which we believe is unlikely to occur before the Fed begins to raise interest rates. Consequently, we continue to recommend that investors should overweight risky assets within a multi-asset portfolio, and that fixed-income investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration position. We expect modest absolute returns from global equities, but even mid-single digit returns are likely to beat those from long-dated government bonds and cash positions. While value stocks may underperform growth stocks over the coming 3-4 months,4 rising bond yields over the coming year will ultimately favor value stocks and will likely weigh on elevated tech sector (and therefore growth stock) valuations (Chart I-15). Chart I-16 highlights that the attractiveness of US value versus growth is meaningfully less compelling for the S&P 500 Citigroup indexes, suggesting that investors should continue to favor MSCI-benchmarked value over growth positions over a 6-12 month time horizon.5 Chart I-15Value Is Extremely Cheap Chart I-16Value Vs. Growth: The Benchmark Matters   The likely outperformance of value versus growth also has implications for regional allocation within a global equity portfolio. The US is significantly overweight broadly-defined technology relative to global ex-US stocks, and financials – which are overrepresented in value indexes – have already meaningfully outperformed in the US this year compared with their global peers and are now rolling over (Chart I-17). This underscores that investors should favor ex-US stocks over the coming year, skewed in favor of DM ex-US given that China’s credit impulse continues to slow (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Favor Global Ex-US Stocks Over The Coming Year Chart I-18Concentrate Global Ex-US Exposure In Developed Markets   Finally, global ex-US stocks also tend to outperform when the US dollar is falling, and we would recommend that investors maintain a short dollar position on a 6-12 month time horizon despite the recent bounce in the greenback. Chart I-19 highlights that the dollar remains strongly negatively correlated with global equity returns, and that the dollar’s performance over the past year has been almost exactly in line with what one would have expected given this relationship. Thus, a bullish view toward global stocks implies both US dollar weakness and global ex-US outperformance over the coming year. Chart I-19A Bullish View Towards Global Stocks Implies A Dollar Bear Market Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 24, 2021 Next Report: July 29, 2021   II. Work From Home “Stickiness” And The Outlook For Monetary Policy Work from home policies, originally designed as emergency measures in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, are likely to be “sticky” in a post-pandemic world. This will negatively impact the labor market in central business districts, via reduced spending on services by office workers. The potential impact of working from home is often cited as an example of what is likely to be a lasting and negative effect on jobs growth, but we find that it is not likely to be a barrier to the labor market returning to the Fed’s assessment of “maximum employment.” The size of the impact depends importantly on whether employee preferences or employer plans for WFH prevail, but our sense is that the latter is more likely. A weaker pace of structures investment in response to elevated office vacancy rates will likely have an even smaller impact on growth than the effect of reduced central business district services employment. The contribution to growth from structures investment has been small over the past few decades, office building construction is a small portion of overall nonresidential structures, and there are compelling arguments that the net stock of office structures will stay flat, rather than decline. Our analysis suggests that job growth over the coming year could be even stronger than the Fed and investors expect, possibly resulting in a first rate hike by the middle of next year. This would be earlier than we currently anticipate, but it underscores that fixed-income investors should remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon, and that equity investors should favor value over growth positions beyond the coming 3-4 months. The outlook for US monetary policy over the next 12 to 18 months depends almost entirely on the outlook for employment. Many investors are focused on the potential for elevated inflation to force the Fed to raise interest rates earlier than it currently anticipates, but it is the progress in returning to “maximum employment” that will determine the timing of the first Fed rate hike – and potentially the speed at which interest rates rise once policy begins to tighten. In this report, we estimate the extent to which the “stickiness” of working from home (WFH) policies and practices could leave a lasting negative impact on the US labor market. We noted in last month's report that a large portion of the employment gap relative to pre-pandemic levels can be traced to the leisure & hospitality and professional and business services industries, both of which – along with retail employment – stand to be permanently impaired if the office worker footprint is much lower in a post-COVID world.6 Using employee surveys and a Monte Carlo approach, we present a range of estimates for the permanent impact of WFH policies on the unemployment rate, and separately examine the potential for lower construction of office properties to weigh on growth. We find that the impact of reduced office building construction is likely to be minimal, and that WFH policies may structurally raise the unemployment rate by 0.3 to 0.4%. While non-trivial, when compared with a pre-pandemic unemployment rate of 3.5%, WFH policies alone are not likely to cause a long-term deviation from the Fed’s maximum employment objective. Relative to the Fed’s expectations of a strong, lasting impact on the labor market from the pandemic, this suggests that job growth over the coming year could be even stronger than the Fed and investors expect, possibly resulting in a first rate hike by the middle of next year. This would be earlier than we currently anticipate, but it underscores that fixed-income investors should remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon, and that equity investors should favor value over growth positions beyond the coming 3-4 months (a period that may see outperformance of the latter). Quantifying The Labor Market Impact Of The New Normal For Work In a January paper, Barrero, Bloom, and Davis (“BBD”) presented evidence arguing why working from home will “stick.” The authors surveyed 22,500 working-age Americans across several survey “waves” between May and December 2020, and asked about both their preferences and their employer’s plans about working from home after the pandemic. Chart II-1 highlights that the desired amount of paid work from home days (among workers who can work from home) reported by the survey respondents is to approximately 55% of a work week, suggesting that a dramatic reduction in office presence would likely occur if post-pandemic WFH policies were set fully in accordance with worker preferences. Chart II-1Employee Preferences Imply A Dramatic Reduction In Post-COVID Office Presence However, Table II-1 highlights that employer plans for work from home policies are meaningfully different than those of employees. The table highlights that employers plan for employees to work from home for roughly 22% of paid days post-pandemic, which essentially translates to one day per week on average.7 BBD noted that CEOs and managers have cited the need to support innovation, employee motivation, and company culture as reasons for employees’ physical presence. Managers believe physical interactions are important for these reasons, but employees need only be on premises for about three to four days a week to achieve this. Table II-1 also shows that employers plan to allow higher-income employees more flexibility in terms of working from home, and less flexibility to employees whose earnings are between $20-50k per year. Table II-1Employer Plans, However, Imply Less Working From Home Than Employees Prefer Based on the survey results, BBD forecast that expenditure in major cities such as Manhattan and San Francisco will fall on the order of 5 to 10%. In order to understand the national labor market impact of work from home policies and what implications this may have on monetary policy, we scale up BBD’s calculations using a Monte Carlo approach that incorporates estimate ranges for several factors: The percent of paid days now working from home for office workers The amount of money spent per week by office workers in central business districts (“CBDs”) The number of total jobs in CBDs The percent of CBD jobs in industries likely to be negatively impacted by reduced office worker expenditure The average weekly earnings of affected CBD workers The average share of business revenue not attributable to strictly variable expenses The percent of affected jobs likely to be recovered outside of CBDs Our approach is as follows. First, we calculate the likely reduction in nationwide CBD spending from reduced office worker presence by multiplying the likely percent of paid days now permanently working from home by the number of total jobs in CBDs and the average weekly spending of office workers. This figure is then increased due to the estimated acceleration in net move outs from principal urban centers in 2020 (Chart II-2); we assume a 5% savings rate and an average annual salary of $50k for these resident workers, and assume that all of their spending occurred within CBDs. We also assume that roughly 50% of jobs connected to this spending are recovered. Chart II-2Fewer Residents Will Also Lower Spending In Central Business Districts Then, we calculate the gross number of jobs lost in leisure & hospitality, retail trade, and other services by multiplying this estimate of lost spending by an estimate of non-variable costs as a share of revenue for affected industries, and dividing the result by average weekly earnings of affected employees. For affected CBD employees in the administrative and waste services industry, we simply assume that the share of jobs lost matches the percent of paid days now permanently working from home. Finally, we adjust the number of jobs lost by multiplying by 1 minus an assumed “recovery” rate, given that some of the reduction in spending in CBDs will simply be shifted to areas near remote workers’ residences. We assume a slightly lower recovery rate for lost jobs in the administrative and waste services industry. Table II-2 highlights the range of outcomes for each variable used in our simulation, and Charts II-3 and II-4 present the results. The charts highlight that the distribution of outcomes based on employer WFH intensions suggest high odds that nationwide job losses in CBDs due to reduced office worker presence will not exceed 400k. Based on average employee preferences, that number rises to roughly 800-900k. Table II-2The Factors Affecting Permanent Central Business District Job Losses Chart II-3The Probability Distribution Of CBD Jobs Lost… Chart II-4…Based On Our Monte Carlo Approach   This raises the question of whether employer plans or employee preferences for WFH arrangements will prevail. Our sense is that it will be closer to the former, given that we noted above that employer WFH plans are the least flexible for employees whose earnings are between $20-50k per year (who are presumably employees who have less ability to influence the policy of firms). Chart II-5 re-presents the projected job losses shown in Chart II-4 as a share of the February 2020 labor force, along with a probability-weighted path that assumes a 75% chance that employer WFH plans will prevail. The chart highlights that WFH arrangements would have the effect of raising the unemployment rate by approximately 0.35%. However, relative to a pre-pandemic starting point of 3.5%, this would raise the unemployment rate to a level that would still be within the Fed’s NAIRU estimates (Chart II-6). Therefore, the “stickiness” of WFH arrangements alone do not seem to be a barrier to the labor market returning to the Fed’s assessment of “maximum employment,” suggesting that the conditions for liftoff may be met earlier than currently anticipated by investors. Chart II-5CBD Job Losses Will Not Be Trivial, But They Will Not Be Enormous Chart II-6Sticky WFH Policies Will Not Prevent A Return To Maximum Employment The Impact Of Lower Office Building Construction A permanently reduced office footprint could also conceivably impact the US economy through reduced nonresidential structures investment, as builders of commercial real estate cease to construct new office towers in response to expectations of a long-lasting glut. However, several points highlight that the negative impact on growth from US office tower construction will be even smaller than the CBD employment impact of reduced office worker presence that we noted above. First, Chart II-7 highlights the overall muted impact that nonresidential building investment has had on real GDP growth by removing the contribution to growth from nonresidential structures and for overall nonresidential investment. The chart clearly highlights that the historically positive contribution to real US output from capital expenditures over the past four decades has come from investment in equipment and intellectual property products, not from structures. Chart II-8 echoes this point, by highlighting that US real investment in nonresidential structures has in fact been flat since the early-1980s, contributing positively and negatively to growth only on a cyclical basis (not on a structural basis). Chart II-7Structures Have Not Contributed Significantly To US Growth For Some Time Chart II-8Nonresidential Structures Investment Has Been Flat For Four Decades Second, Table II-3 highlights that office properties make up a small portion of investment in private nonresidential structures. In 2019, nominal investment in office structures amounted to $85 billion, compared with $630 billion in overall structures investment, meaning that office properties amounted to just 13% of structures investment. Table II-3Office Structures Investment Is A Small Share Of Total Structures Investment Table II-4Conceivably, Vacant Office Properties Could Be Converted To Luxury Residential Units Third, it is true that investment is a flow and not a stock variable, meaning that, if the net stock of office buildings were to fall as a result from WFH policies, then the US economy would see a potentially persistently negative rate of growth from nonresidential structures (which would constitute a drag on growth). But if the net stock were instead to remain flat, then gross office property investment should equal the depreciation of those structures. The second column of Table II-3 highlights that current-cost depreciation of office structures was $53 billion in 2019 (versus nominal gross investment of $85 billion). Had office property investment been ~$30 billion lower in 2019, it would have reduced nominal GDP by a mere 14 basis points (resulting in an annual growth rate of 3.84%, rather than 3.98%). Fourth, there is good reason to believe that the net stock of office properties will stay flat, as the economics of converting offices to luxury housing units (whose demand is not substantially affected by factors such as commuting) – either fully or partially into mixed-use buildings – appear to be plausible. Table II-4 highlights that the average annual asking rent for office space per square foot in Manhattan was $73.23 in Q1 2021, and that the recent median listing home price per square foot is roughly $1,400. In a frictionless world where office space could be instantly and effortlessly sold as residential property, existing prices would imply a healthy (gross) rental yield of 5.2%. Thoughts On The Future Of Office Properties Of course, reality is far from frictionless. There are several barriers that will slow office-to-residential conversion as well as construction costs, which will meaningfully lower the net value of existing office real estate in large central business districts such as Manhattan. In a recent article in the Washington Post, Roger K. Lewis, retired architect and Professor Emeritus of Architecture at the University of Maryland, College Park, detailed several of these technical barriers (which we summarize below).8 Office buildings are typically much wider than residential buildings, the latter usually being 60 to 65 feet in width in order to enable windows and natural light in living/dining rooms and bedrooms. This suggests that office-to-residential conversion might require modifying the basic structure of office buildings, including cutting open parts of roof and floor plates on upper building levels to bring natural light into habitable and interior rooms, and other costly structural modifications to address the additional plumbing and infrastructure that will be needed. Lewis noted that floor-to-floor dimensions are typically larger in office buildings, which is beneficial for office-to-residential conversion because increased room heights augments the sense of space and openness, while allowing natural light to penetrate farther into the apartment. It also allows for extra space to place needed additional building infrastructure, such as sprinkler pipes, electrical conduits, light fixtures, and air ducts. But unique apartment layouts are often needed to use available floor space effectively in an office-to-residential conversion, which will increase design costs and raise the risk that nonstandard layouts may result in unforeseen quality-of-living problems that will necessitate additional future construction to correct. Zoning regulations and building code constraints will likely add another layer of costs to office-to-housing conversions, as these rules are written for conventional buildings, meaning that special exceptions or even regulatory changes are likely to be required. So it is clear that the process of converting office space to residential property will be a costly endeavor for office tower owners, which will likely reduce the net present value of these properties relative to pre-pandemic levels. But; this process appears to be feasible and, when faced with the alternative of persistently high vacancy rates and lost revenue, our sense is that office tower owners will choose this route – thus significantly reducing the likelihood that the growth in national gross investment in office properties will fall below the rate of depreciation. In addition, the trend in suburban and CBD office property prices suggests that there are two other possible alternatives to widespread office-to-residential conversion that would also argue against a significant and long-lasting decline in office structures investment. Chart II-9 highlights that the average asking rent has already fallen significantly in most Manhattan submarkets, and Chart II-10 highlights that suburban office prices are accelerating and rising at the strongest pace relative to CBD office prices over the past two decades, possibly in response to increased demand for workspace that is closer to home for many workers who previously commuted to CBDs. Chart II-9Working From The Office Is Getting Cheaper Chart II-10Suburban Offices Are Getting More Expensive Thus, the first alternative outcome to CBD office-to-residential conversion is that an increase in suburban office construction offsets the negative impact of outright reductions in CBD office investment if residential conversions prove to be too costly or too technically challenging. The second alternative is that owners of CBD office properties “clear the market” by dramatically cutting rental rates even further, to alter the cost/benefit calculation for firms planning permissive WFH policies. We doubt that existing rents reflect the extent of vacancies in large cities such as Manhattan, so we would expect further CBD office price declines in this scenario. But if owners of centrally-located office properties face significant conversion costs and a decline in the net present value of these buildings is unavoidable and its magnitude uncertain, owners may choose to cut prices drastically as the simpler solution. Investment Conclusions Holding all else equal, the fact that owners of CBD office properties are likely to experience some permanent decline in the value of these real estate assets is not a positive development for economic activity. But these losses will be experienced by firms, investors, and ultra-high net worth individuals with strong marginal propensities to save, suggesting that the economic impact from this shock will be minimal. And as we highlighted above, a decline in the pace of gross office building investment to the depreciation rate will have a minimal impact on the overall economy. This leaves the likely impact on CBD employment as the main channel by which WFH policies are likely to affect monetary policy. As we noted above and as discussed in Section 1 of our report, the Fed is now focused entirely on the return of the labor market to maximum employment, which we interpret as an unemployment rate within the range of the Fed’s NAIRU estimates (3.5% - 4.5%) and a return to a pre-pandemic labor force participation rate. Chart II-11On A One-Year Time Horizon, Favor Value Over Growth Our analysis indicates that WFH policies may structurally raise the unemployment rate by 0.3 to 0.4%. While non-trivial, when compared with a pre-pandemic unemployment rate of 3.5%, this suggests that WFH policies alone are not likely to cause a long-term deviation from the Fed’s maximum employment objective. The implication is that job growth over the coming year could be even stronger than the Fed and investors expect, which could mean that the Fed may begin lifting rates by the middle of next year barring a major disruption in the ongoing transition to a post-pandemic world. This is earlier than we currently expect, but the fact that it would also be earlier than what is currently priced into the OIS curve underscores that fixed-income investors should remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon. In addition, as noted in Section 1 of our report, while value stocks may underperform growth stocks over the coming 3-4 months,9 rising bond yields over the coming year will ultimately favor value stocks and will likely weigh on elevated tech sector valuations. Chart II-11 highlights that the relative valuation of growth stocks remains above its pre-pandemic starting point (Chart II-11), suggesting that investors should continue to favor MSCI-benchmarked value over growth positions over a 6-12 month time horizon. Finally, as also noted in Section 1 of our report, we do not expect rising bond yields to prevent stock prices from grinding higher over the coming year, unless investor expectations for the terminal fed funds rate move sharply higher – an event that seems unlikely, although not impossible, before monetary policy actually begins to tighten. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but more modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields since last August. The indicator still remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain very strong, and positive earnings surprises have risen to their highest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, there has been a modest tick down in global ex-US equity performance, driven by a rally in growth stocks (which may persist for a few months). EM stocks had previously dragged down global ex-US performance, and they continue to languish. A bias towards value stocks on a 1-year time horizon means that investors should still favor ex-US stocks over the coming year, skewed in favor of DM ex-US given that China’s credit impulse continues to slow. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has trended modestly lower since mid-March, after having risen to levels that were extremely technically stretched. Despite this pause, our valuation index highlights that bonds are still expensive, and we expect that yields will move higher over the cyclical investment horizon if employment growth in Q3/Q4 implies a faster return to maximum employment than currently projected by the Fed. We expect the rise to be more modest than our valuation index would imply, but we would still recommend a short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio. The extreme rise in some commodity prices over the past several months is beginning to ease. Lumber prices have fallen close to 50% from their recent high, whereas industrial metals and agricultural prices are down roughly 5% and 17%, respectively. We had previously argued that a breather in commodity prices was likely at some point over the coming several months, and we would expect further declines as supply chains normalize, labor supply recovers, and Chinese demand for metals slows. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend, and global manufacturing PMIs are strong. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries (whose vaccination progress is still lagging). Strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly later this year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2021," dated May 27, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "A Central Bank Timeline For The Next Two Years," dated June 1, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks," dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Equity Strategy "Rotate Into Growth Stocks, Be Granular In The Selection Of Cyclicals," dated June 14, 2021, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 5 For a discussion of the differences in value and growth benchmarks, please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report “Value? Growth? It Really Depends!” dated September 19, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2021," dated May 27, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 7 Readers should note that the desired share of paid work from home days post-COVID among employees is shown to be lower in Table II-1 than what is implied by Chart II-1 on a weighted-average basis. This is due to the fact that Table II-1 excludes responses from the May 2020 survey wave, because the authors did not ask about employer intensions during that wave. This underscores that the average desired number of paid days working from home declined somewhat over time, and thus argues for the value shown in Table II-1 as the best estimate for employee preferences. 8 Roger K. Lewis, “Following pandemic, converting office buildings into housing may become new ‘normal,’ Washington Post, April 3, 2021. 9 Please see US Equity Strategy "Rotate Into Growth Stocks, Be Granular In The Selection Of Cyclicals," dated June 14, 2021, available at uses.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Fed: The Fed’s interest rate projections moved up sharply in June but its verbal forward guidance on interest rates and asset purchases didn’t change in any meaningful way. Investors should ignore the Fed’s dot plot and assess the timing of rate hikes based on when they expect the Fed’s “maximum employment” goal to be met. We expect it will be met in time for Fed liftoff in 2022. Duration: The drop in long-dated yields following last week’s FOMC meeting is overdone. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. TIPS: Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have fallen below the Fed’s 2.3% to 2.5% target band. We expect they will quickly move back into that range but doubt they will move above 2.5%. Maintain a neutral allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Yield Curve: We are now close enough to Fed liftoff that investors should shift out of curve steepeners and into curve flatteners. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet and buying a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Feature Chart 1Markets React To The Fed's Hawkish Surprise The Fed caused quite a stir in bond markets last week. The 10-year US Treasury yield did a roundtrip from 1.50% before Wednesday’s FOMC meeting up to a peak of 1.58% and then back down to 1.44% by Friday’s close. This, however, wasn’t the most significant bond market move. Shorter-dated Treasury yields increased sharply after the FOMC statement was released and have remained high, resulting in a huge flattening of the curve (Chart 1). Real yields, at both the long and short ends of the curve, also jumped on Wednesday and have not fallen back down. This led to a significant drop in TIPS breakeven inflation rates. In fact, both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are now below the Fed’s 2.3% - 2.5% target range (Chart 1, bottom panel). What’s really interesting is that this massive re-shaping of both the real and nominal yield curves was prompted by an FOMC meeting where the Fed didn’t make any significant policy announcements and, at least from our perspective, didn’t alter its forward guidance on interest rates or asset purchases in any meaningful way. In this report we will try to disentangle the seeming contradiction between the Fed’s actions and the market’s reaction. The first section looks at what the Fed actually announced at last week’s meeting and considers what that means for the future course of monetary policy. The second section looks at the market’s reaction in more detail to see if it presents any investment opportunities. What The Fed Said Considering the sum total of last week’s Fed communications – the FOMC Statement, the Summary of Economic Projections and Jay Powell’s press conference – we arrive at four takeaways: 1. The Dots Moved In The Fed’s interest rate forecasts shifted noticeably higher compared to where they were in March, a change that likely catalyzed the dramatic move in bond markets. Thirteen out of 18 FOMC participants now expect to lift rates before the end of 2023 (Chart 2A). At the March FOMC meeting only seven participants forecasted rate hikes in 2023 (Chart 2B). On top of that, seven FOMC participants now expect to lift rates before the end of 2022, this is up from four in March. Finally, the median participant’s interest rate forecast went from calling for no rate hikes through the end of 2023 to two. Cahrt 2AMarket And Fed Rate Expectations After The June FOMC Meeting Chart 2BMarket And Fed Rate Expectations Before The June FOMC MeetingRate expectations embedded in the overnight index swap (OIS) market also moved up last week. The OIS curve is now priced for Fed liftoff in December 2022 and for a total of 87 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023 (Chart 2A). Prior to the FOMC meeting, the OIS curve was priced for Fed liftoff in April 2023 and for a total of 78 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023 (Chart 2B). It’s important to note that this change in the Fed’s interest rate forecasts occurred without the Fed changing its forward guidance about when it will be appropriate to lift rates. The Fed continues to communicate that it has a three-pronged test for liftoff: 12-month PCE inflation must be above 2% The labor market must be at “maximum employment” The committee must expect that inflation will remain above 2% for some time We asserted back in March that investors should focus on this verbal forward guidance from the Fed and not the dot plot, noting that the Fed’s interest rate forecasts were inconsistent with its own verbal forward guidance.1 The reason for the inconsistency is that Fed participants were trying to err on the side of signaling dovishness to the market. In his March press conference Chair Powell said that the Fed wants to see “actual progress” towards its economic objectives not “forecast[ed] progress”. This bias likely led FOMC participants to place their dots too low, ignoring the strong likelihood that the economy would make rapid progress toward its employment and inflation goals in the coming months. After last week, the Fed’s dots are now more consistent with a reasonable timeline for achieving its policy goals, but our advice remains the same. Investors should ignore the dot plot and focus instead on what the Fed is telling us about when it will lift rates. On that note, we have repeatedly made the case that the three items on the Fed’s liftoff checklist will be met in time for rate hikes to begin next year.2 2. Upside Risks To Inflation Chart 3Upside Risks To Inflation The second change the Fed made last week was in how it characterized the risks surrounding inflation. The official FOMC Statement continues to describe the recent increase in inflation as “transitory”, but the Summary of Economic Projections revealed a huge increase in the number of participants who view the risks surrounding their inflation forecasts as tilted to the upside (Chart 3). This shouldn’t be too surprising. Inflation has been incredibly strong in recent months with 12-month core CPI and 12-month core PCE rising to 3.80% and 3.06%, respectively. Importantly, however, a change in risk assessment doesn’t portend a change in policy. The Fed’s median forecast sees core PCE inflation falling from 3.4% this year to 2.1% in 2022, and we also agree that inflation has peaked.3 That said, it is interesting to consider how the Fed might respond if consumer prices continue to accelerate. On that question, Chair Powell said last week that the Fed would “be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy” if it “saw signs that the path of inflation or longer-term inflation expectations were moving materially and persistently beyond levels consistent with [its] goal.” Our sense is that the Fed would be prepared to bring forward the tapering of its asset purchases in response to stronger-than-expected inflation, but it is extremely unlikely that it would lift rates before its three liftoff criteria are met. In fact, given the Phillips Curve lens through which the Fed views inflation, it is much more likely that any increase in inflation that isn’t matched by a tight labor market will continue to be written off as “transitory”. 3. Tapering Discussions Have Begun Third, Jay Powell revealed in his post-meeting press conference that the Fed has begun discussions about when to start tapering its asset purchases. The Fed’s test for when to start tapering is “substantial further progress” toward its policy goals. This test is much vaguer than the criteria for liftoff, and this gives the Fed more flexibility on when it could announce tapering. For what it’s worth, Powell also said that “the standard of ‘substantial further progress’ is still a ways off.” We don’t view this revelation about tapering discussions as that significant for markets. For one thing, there is already a strong consensus among market participants that tapering will begin in Q1 2022 (Tables 1A & 1B). Given that the Fed has promised to “provide advance notice before announcing any decision to make changes to our purchases”, starting discussions this summer seems consistent with market expectations, as well as our own.4 Table 1ASurvey Of Market Participants Expected Fed Timeline Table 1BSurvey Of Primary Dealers Expected Fed Timeline It’s also important to note that any announcement of asset purchase tapering wouldn’t tell us much about when the Fed’s three liftoff criteria are likely to be met. In other words, a tapering announcement doesn’t tell us anything about when rate hikes are likely to occur. This means that any tapering announcement will have much less of an impact on financial markets than the 2013 taper tantrum, for example. In 2013, markets interpreted the tapering announcement as a signal that rate hikes were coming sooner than expected. The Fed’s explicit interest rate guidance will prevent that outcome this time around. 4. Operational Tweaks Finally, the Fed raised the interest rate it pays on excess reserves (IOER) from 0.10% to 0.15% and the interest rate on its overnight reverse repo facility (ON RRP) from 0% to 0.05% (Chart 4). We discussed the possibility that the Fed might make these changes in last week’s report.5 In recent months, a surplus of cash in overnight markets caused benchmark interest rates to fall toward the lower-end of the Fed’s 0% - 0.25% target range. Critically for the Fed, the ON RRP facility functioned properly as a firm floor on interest rates. It saw its usage surge (Chart 4, bottom panel) but it prevented interest rates from falling below 0%. The IOER and ON RRP rate increases are probably not necessary if the Fed’s goal is to simply keep overnight interest rates within its target band, but the increases will help push rates up toward the middle of the target range. They may also lead to some decline in ON RRP usage, though that has not occurred just yet. In any event, the surplus of cash in money markets that is applying downward pressure to overnight interest rates will evaporate within the next few months. The Treasury Department expects to hit a cash balance of $450 billion by the end of July and, as long as Congress passes legislation to increase the debt limit this summer, the Treasury’s cash balance will probably not get much below $450 billion (Chart 5). A tapering of the Fed’s asset purchases starting late this year or early next year would also remove surplus cash from money markets.     Chart 4IOER And ON RRP Rate Hikes Chart 5The Cash Surplus In Money Markets Bottom Line: The Fed’s interest rate projections moved up sharply in June but its verbal forward guidance on interest rates and asset purchases didn’t change in any meaningful way. Investors should ignore the Fed’s dot plot and assess the timing of rate hikes based on when they expect the Fed’s “maximum employment” goal to be met. We expect it will be met in time for Fed liftoff in 2022. How The Market Reacted As noted at the outset of this report, the bond market didn’t have the same sanguine reaction to the Fed’s communications as we did. It reacted as though the Fed had delivered a massive hawkish surprise. The major bond market moves were as follows: Short-maturity nominal Treasury yields jumped following the FOMC meeting on Wednesday, and those short-dated yields remained at their new higher levels through Thursday and Friday (Table 2A). Table 2AChange In Nominal Yields Following June FOMC Meeting Table 2BChange In Real Yields Following June FOMC Meeting Table 2CChange In TIPS Breakeven Inflation Rates Following June FOMC Meeting The 10-year nominal Treasury yield also increased following the Fed meeting, but then gave back all of that increase and then some on Thursday and Friday (Table 2A). The result is a significant flattening of the nominal Treasury curve, consistent with the market discounting a more hawkish path for monetary policy. Looking at real yields, we see significant increases following Wednesday’s Fed meeting for all maturities (Table 2B). Then, with the exception of the 30-year yield, real yields did not fall back down later in the week. Finally, we see large declines in the cost of inflation compensation at both the short and long ends of the curve (Table 2C). Once again, this is consistent with the market pricing-in a more hawkish Fed that will be less tolerant of an inflation overshoot. In light of these significant yield moves, we consider the investment implications for the level of bond yields, the performance of TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and the slope of the nominal Treasury curve. The Level Of Yields Chart 65y5y Yield Has Upside There were two major developments last week that influence our view on the level of Treasury yields. First, the market is now priced for a more reasonable December 2022 liftoff date and 87 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023. Second, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield fell sharply. It currently sits at 2.06%, just 6 bps above the median estimate of the long-run neutral fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants and 25 bps below the same measure from the Survey of Primary Dealers (Chart 6). On the one hand, the market-implied path for overnight interest rates looks more in line with reality, though we still see scope for it to move higher. On the other hand, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield now looks too low compared to consensus estimates of the long-run neutral interest rate. We are inclined to think that the market-implied path for rates will either stay where it is or move higher and that the drop in the 5-year/5-year forward yield is overdone. We maintain our recommended below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. TIPS Versus Nominal Treasuries As shown in Chart 1, long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have fallen back to levels below the Fed’s desired target range. We don’t think TIPS breakeven inflation rates will stay below target for long. The principal goal of the Fed’s new Average Inflation Targeting strategy is to ensure that long-term inflation expectations are well-anchored near target levels. Recent market action seems to imply that the Fed will overtighten and miss its inflation objective from below, but that is highly unlikely. We recently downgraded our recommended TIPS allocation from overweight to neutral because breakevens were threatening to break above the top-end of the Fed’s target band.6 We maintain our neutral 6-12 month allocation, but we do see long-maturity TIPS breakevens moving back into the 2.3% to 2.5% target band relatively quickly. Nimble investors may wish to buy TIPS versus nominal Treasuries as a short-term trade. Nominal Treasury Curve Slope Chart 7A Transition To Curve Flattening We see the potential for some of last week’s dramatic curve flattening to reverse in the near-term. It was, after all, a drop in long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates that was responsible for the curve flattening on Thursday and Friday and, as was already discussed, this drop in the cost of inflation compensation will likely prove fleeting. However, if we look out on a longer 6-12 month time horizon, it is much more likely that the curve will continue to flatten rather than steepen. If we assume that the first rate hike occurs in December 2022, it means that we are roughly 18 months away from the start of a rate hike cycle. In past cycles, 18 months prior to liftoff was pretty close to the inflection point between curve steepening and flattening, whether we look at the 2/10, 5/30 or even 2/5 slope (Chart 7). For this reason, we think it makes more sense to enter curve flatteners at this stage of the cycle than steepeners, even though flatteners tend to have negative carry. We therefore exit our prior curve position – long 5-year bullet / short duration-matched 2/30 barbell – a trade that was designed to be a positive carry hedge against our below-benchmark portfolio duration allocation.7 In its place, we recommend that investors enter a 2/10 curve flattener. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year note and going long a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This trade offers a negative yield pick-up of 16 bps, but the 2/10 barbell does look somewhat cheap relative to the 5-year on our model (Chart 8). Chart 8Buy 2/10 Barbell, Sell 5-Year Bullet We expect to hold this trade for some time, profiting from a bear-flattening of the 2/10 yield curve as we move closer and closer to eventual Fed liftoff.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward”, dated March 23, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Watch Employment, Not Inflation”, dated June 15, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Entering A New Yield Curve Regime”, dated May 11, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy/Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A Central Bank Timeline For The Next Two Years”, dated June 1, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Watch Employment, Not Inflation”, dated June 15, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, “Fed Won’t Catch Inflation Fever”, dated May 4, 2021. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Entering A New Yield Curve Regime”, dated May 11, 2021. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Chart 1Tracking Nonfarm Payrolls With 12-month PCE inflation already above the Fed’s 2% target, it is progress toward the Fed’s “maximum employment” goal that will determine both the timing of Fed liftoff and whether bond yields rise or fall. On that note, the bond market is currently priced for Fed liftoff in early 2023. We also calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of between 378k and 462k is required to meet the Fed’s “maximum employment” goal by the end of 2022, in time for an early-2023 rate hike. It follows from this analysis that any monthly employment print above +462k should be considered bond-bearish and any print below +378k should be considered bond-bullish (Chart 1). In that light, May’s +559k print is bond-bearish, and we anticipate further bond-bearish employment reports in the coming months as COVID fears fade and people return to a labor market that is already awash with demand. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration in US bond portfolios and also continue to favor spread product over duration-matched Treasuries. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +159 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 142 bps, the 2/10 Treasury slope is very steep and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate sits at 2.27% - almost, but not quite, within the 2.3% to 2.5% range that the Fed considers “well anchored”.1 The message from these two indicators is that the Fed is not yet ready for monetary conditions to turn restrictive. Despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade corporate valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is almost at its lowest since 1995 (Chart 2). Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, tight valuations cause us to recommend only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporates. We prefer high-yield corporates, municipal bonds and USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereigns. Last week, the Fed announced that it will wind down its corporate bond portfolio over the coming months. The corporate bond purchase facility has not been operational since December 2020, meaning that the corporate bond market has been functioning without an explicit Fed back-stop for all of 2021. The portfolio itself is also quite small compared to the size of the corporate bond market. As a result, we anticipate no material impact on spreads. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 8 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +343 bps. In a recent report, we looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.2 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.3% (Chart 3). Using a model of the speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we can estimate a likely default rate for the next 12 months using assumptions for profit and debt growth. The median FOMC forecast of 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021 is consistent with 31% corporate profit growth. We also assume that last year’s corporate debt binge will moderate in 2021. According to our model, 30% profit growth and 2% debt growth is consistent with a default rate of 3.4%, very close to what is priced into junk spreads. Given that the large amount of fiscal stimulus coming down the pike makes the Fed’s 6.5% real GDP growth forecast look conservative, and the fact that the combination of strong economic growth and accommodative monetary policy could easily cause valuations to overshoot in the near-term, we are inclined to maintain an overweight allocation to High-Yield bonds. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 36 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -9 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries widened 7 bps in May. The spread remains wide compared to recent history, but it is still tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) currently sits at 24 bps. This is considerably below the 51 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds and the 27 bps offered by Agency CMBS. It is only slightly more than the 18 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. All in all, value in MBS is not appealing compared to other similarly risky sectors. In a recent report, we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.3 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will be flat-to-higher during the next 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons over low coupons within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +87 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 32 bps in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +53 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 2 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +37 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 30 bps in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +360 bps. Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals both outperformed by 8 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +27 bps and +24 bps, respectively. We recently took a detailed look at USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign valuation.4 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Colombia. We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space where there is still some value left in US corporate spreads and where the EM space is dominated by distressed credits like Turkey and Argentina. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +286 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We took a detailed look at municipal bond performance and valuation in a recent report and came to the following conclusions.5 First, the economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bond performance. The recently enacted American Rescue Plan includes $350 billion of funding for state & local governments, a bailout that comes after state & local government revenues already exceeded expenditures in 2020 (Chart 6). President Biden has also proposed increasing income tax rates. However, there may not be time to pass these tax hikes before the 2022 midterm elections. Second, Aaa-rated municipal bonds look expensive relative to Treasuries (top panel). Muni investors should move down in quality to pick up additional yield. Third, General Obligation (GO) and Revenue munis offer better value than investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration, particularly at the long-end of the curve. Revenue munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a before-tax yield pick-up versus corporates. GO munis offer a breakeven tax rate of just 7% (panel 2). Fourth, taxable munis offer a yield advantage over investment grade corporates that investors should take advantage of (panel 3). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 22% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them prone to extension risk if bond yields gap higher. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/30 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields fell in May, with the 5-10 year part of the curve benefiting the most. The 7-year yield fell 8 bps in May while the 5-year and 10-year yields both fell 7 bps. Yield declines were smaller for shorter (< 5-year) and longer (> 10-year) maturities. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 5 bps to end the month at 144 bps. The 5/30 Treasury slope steepened 3 bps to end the month at 147 bps (Chart 7). We recently changed our recommended yield curve position from a 5 over 2/10 butterfly to a 5 over 2/30 butterfly.6 In making the switch we noted that the slope of the Treasury curve has behaved differently since bond yields peaked in early April. Prior to April, the rise in bond yields was concentrated at the very long-end (10-year +) of the curve. During the past two months, the belly of the curve (5-7 years) has seen more volatility. We conclude that we are now close enough to an expected Fed liftoff date that further significant increases in yields will be met with a flatter curve beyond the 5-year maturity point and that the 5-year and 7-year notes are likely to benefit the most if bond yields dip. We also observe an exceptional yield pick-up of +33 bps in the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Given our view that bond yields will be flat-to-higher during the next 6-12 months, we recommend buying the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/30 barbell to take advantage of the strong positive carry in a flat yield environment, and as a hedge against our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 86 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +484 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 1 bp and 2 bps on the month, respectively. At 2.42%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the top-end of the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.27%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is just below the target band (panel 3). With long-maturity breakevens already consistent (or close to consistent) with the Fed’s target, they have limited upside going forward. The Fed has so far welcomed rising TIPS breakeven inflation rates, but it will have an increasing incentive to lean against them if they continue to move up. We also think that the market has priced-in an overly aggressive inflation outlook at the front-end of the curve. The 1-year and 2-year CPI swap rates stand at 3.76% and 3.12%, respectively. There is a good chance that these lofty inflation expectations will not be confirmed by the actual data. With all that in mind, investors should maintain a neutral allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and also a neutral posture towards the inflation curve (panel 4). The inflation curve could steepen somewhat in the near-term if short-maturity inflation expectations moderate, but we expect the curve to remain inverted for a long time yet. An inverted inflation curve is more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one, and it should be considered the natural state of affairs moving forward. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +33 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 13 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +26 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 12 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +70 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. This excess savings has still not been spent and, already, the most recent round of stimulus checks is pushing the savings rate higher again (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum.     Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 41 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +163 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 27 bps in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +78 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 84 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +453 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Even with the economic recovery well underway, commercial real estate loan demand continues to weaken and banks are not making lending standards more accommodative (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +125 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 7 bps on the month and it currently sits at 27 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered their pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of May 28TH, 2021) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of May 28TH, 2021) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 57 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 57 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of May 28TH, 2021) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further discussion of how we assess the state of monetary policy vis-à-vis spread product please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think”, dated May 25, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “That Uneasy Feeling”, dated March 30, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Making Money In Municipal Bonds”, dated April 27, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Entering A New Yield Curve Regime”, dated May 11, 2021.

Highlights President Biden has called for the US intelligence community to investigate the origins of COVID-19 and one of Biden’s top diplomats has stated the obvious: the era of “engagement” with China is over. This clinches our long-held view that any Democratic president would be a hawk like President Trump. The US-China conflict – and global geopolitical risk – will revive and undermine global risk appetite. China faces a confluence of geopolitical and macroeconomic challenges, suggesting that its equity underperformance will continue. Domestic Chinese investors should stay long government bonds. Foreign investors should sell into the bond rally to reduce exposure to any future sanctions. The impending agreement of a global minimum corporate tax rate has limited concrete implications that are not already known but it symbolizes the return of Big Government in the western world. Our updated GeoRisk Indicators are available in the Appendix, as well as our monthly geopolitical calendar. Feature In our quarterly webcast, “Geopolitics And Bull Markets,” we argued that geopolitical themes matter to investors when they have a demonstrable relationship with the macroeconomic backdrop. When geopolitics and macro are synchronized, a simple yet powerful investment thesis can be discerned. The US war on terror, Russia’s resurgence, the EU debt crisis, and Brexit each provided cases in which a geopolitically informed macro view was both accessible and actionable at an early stage. Investors generally did well if they sold the relevant country’s currency and disfavored its equities on a relative basis. Chart 1China's Decade Of Troubles Of course, the market takeaway is not always so clear. When geopolitics and macroeconomics are desynchronized, the trick is to determine which framework will prevail over the financial markets and for how long. Sometimes the market moves to its own rhythm. The goal is not to trade on geopolitics but rather to invest with geopolitics. One of our key views for this year – headwinds for China – is an example of synchronization. Two weeks ago we discussed China’s macroeconomic challenge. In this report we discuss China’s foreign policy challenge: geopolitical pressure from the US and its allies. In particular we address President Biden’s call for a deeper intelligence dive into the origins of COVID-19. The takeaway is negative for China’s currency and risk assets. The Great Recession dealt a painful blow to the Chinese version of the East Asian economic miracle. By 2015, China’s financial turmoil and currency devaluation should have convinced even bullish investors to keep their distance from Chinese stocks and the renminbi. If investors stuck with this bearish view despite the post-2016 rally, on fear of trade war, they were rewarded in 2018-19. Only with China’s containment of COVID-19 and large economic stimulus in 2020 has CNY-USD threatened to break out (Chart 1). We expect the renminbi to weaken anew, especially once the Fed begins to taper asset purchases. Our cyclical view is still bullish but US-China relations are unstable so we remain tactically defensive. Forget Biden’s China Review, He’s A Hawk Chinese financial markets face a host of challenges this year, despite the positive factors for China’s manufacturing sector amid the global recovery. At home these challenges consist of a structural economic slowdown, a withdrawal of policy stimulus, bearish sentiment among households, and an ongoing government crackdown on systemic risk. Abroad the Democratic Party’s return to power in Washington means that the US will bring more allies to bear in its attempt to curb China’s rise. This combination of factors presents a headwind for Chinese equities and a tailwind for government bonds (Chart 2). This is true at least until the government should hit its pain threshold and re-stimulate. Chart 2Global Investors Still Wary New stimulus may not occur in 2022. The Communist Party’s leadership rotation merely requires economic stability, not rapid growth. While the central government has a record of stimulating when its pain threshold is hit, even under the economically hawkish President Xi Jinping, a financial market riot is usually part of this threshold. This implies near-term downside, particularly for global commodities and metals, which are also facing a Chinese regulatory backlash to deter speculation. In this context, President Biden’s call for a deeper US intelligence investigation into the origin of COVID-19 is an important confirming signal of the US’s hawkish turn toward China. Biden gave 90 days for the intelligence community to report back to him. We will not enter into the debate about COVID-19’s origins. From a geopolitical point of view it is a moot point. The facts of the virus origin may never be established. According to Biden’s statement, at least one US intelligence agency believes the “lab leak theory” is the most likely source of the virus (while two other agencies decided in favor of animal-to-human transmission). Meanwhile Chinese government spokespeople continue to push the theory that the virus originated at the US’s Fort Detrick in Maryland or at a US-affiliated global research center. What is certain is that the first major outbreak of a highly contagious disease occurred in Wuhan. Both sides are demanding greater transparency and will reject each other’s claims based on a lack of transparency. If the US intelligence report concludes that COVID originated from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Chinese government and media will reject the report. If the report exonerates the Wuhan laboratory, at least half of the US public will disbelieve it and it will not deter Biden from drawing a hard line on more macro-relevant policy disputes with China. The US’s hawkish bipartisan consensus on China took shape before COVID. Biden’s decision to order the fresh report introduces skepticism regarding the World Health Organization’s narrative, which was until now the mainstream media’s narrative. Previously this skepticism was ghettoized in US public discourse: indeed, until Biden’s announcement on May 26, the social media company Facebook suppressed claims that the virus came from a lab accident or human failure. Thus Biden’s action will ensure that a large swathe of the American public will always tend to support this theory regardless of the next report’s findings. At the same time Biden discontinued a State Department effort to prove the lab leak theory, which shows that it is not a foregone conclusion what his administration will decide. The good news is that even if the report concluded in favor of the lab leak, the Biden administration would remain highly unlikely to demand that China pay “reparations,” like the Trump administration demanded in 2020. This demand, if actualized, would be explosive. The bad news is that a future nationalist administration could conceivably use the investigation as a basis to demand reparations. Nationalism is a force to be reckoned with in both countries and the dispute over COVID’s origin will exacerbate it. Traditionally the presidents of both countries would tamp down nationalism or attempt to keep it harnessed. But in the post-Xi, post-Trump era it is harder to control. The death toll of COVID-19 will be a permanent source of popular grievance around the world and a wedge between the US and China (Chart 3). China’s international image suffered dramatically in 2020. So far in 2021 China has not regained any diplomatic ground. Chart 3Death Toll Of COVID-19 The US is repairing its image via a return to multilateralism while the Europeans have put their Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China on hold due to a spat over sanctions arising from western accusations of genocide (a subject on which China pointedly answered that it did not need to be lectured by Europeans). Notably Biden’s Department of State also endorsed its predecessor’s accusation of genocide in Xinjiang. Any authoritative US intelligence review that solidifies doubts about the WHO’s initial investigation – even if it should not affirm the lab leak theory – would give Biden more ammunition in global opinion to form a democratic alliance to pressure China (for example, in Europe). An important factor that enables the US to remain hawkish on China is fiscal stimulus. While stimulus helps bring about economic recovery, it also lowers the bar to political confrontation (Chart 4). Countries with supercharged domestic demand do not have as much to fear from punitive trade measures. The Biden administration has not taken new punitive measures against China but it is clearly not worried about Chinese retaliation. Chart 4Large Fiscal Stimulus Lowers The Bar To Geopolitical Conflict China’s stimulus is underrated in this chart (which excludes non-fiscal measures) but it is still true that China’s policy has been somewhat restrained and it will need to stimulate its economy again in response to any new punitive measures or any global loss of confidence. At least China is limited in its ability to tighten policy due to the threat of US pressure and western trade protectionism. Simultaneous with Biden’s announcement on COVID-19, his administration’s coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, proclaimed in a speech that the era of “engagement” with China is officially over and the new paradigm is one of “competition.” By now Campbell is stating the obvious. But this tone is a change both from his tone while serving in President Obama’s Department of State and from his article in Foreign Affairs last year (when he was basically auditioning for his current role in the Biden administration).1 Campbell even said in his latest remarks that the Trump administration was right about the “direction” of China policy (though not the “execution”), which is candid. Campbell was speaking at Stanford University but his comments were obviously aimed for broader consumption. Investors no longer need to wait for the outcome of the Biden administration’s comprehensive review of policy toward China. The answer is known: the Biden administration’s hawkishness is confirmed. The Department of Defense report on China policy, due in June, is very unlikely to strike a more dovish posture than the president’s health policy. Now investors must worry about how rapidly tensions will escalate and put a drag on global sentiment. Bottom Line: US-China relations are unstable and pose an immediate threat to global risk appetite. The fundamental geopolitical assessment of US-China relations has been confirmed yet again. The US is seeking to constrain China’s rise because China is the only country capable of rivaling the US for supremacy in Asia and the world. Meanwhile China is rejecting liberalization in favor of economic self-sufficiency and maintaining an offensive foreign policy as it is wary of US containment and interference. Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are still capable of stabilizing relations in the medium term but they are unlikely to substantially de-escalate tensions. And at the moment tensions are escalating. China’s Reaction: The Example Of Australia How will China respond to Biden’s new inquiry into COVID’s origins? Obviously Beijing will react negatively but we would not expect anything concrete to occur until the result of the inquiry is released in 90 days. China will be more constrained in its response to the US than it has been with Australia, which called for an international inquiry early last year, as the US is a superior power. Australia was the first to ban Chinese telecom company Huawei from its 5G network (back in 2018) and it was the first to call for a COVID probe. Relations between China and Australia have deteriorated steadily since then, but macro trends have clearly driven the Aussie dollar. The AUD-JPY exchange rate is a good measure for global risk appetite and it is wavering in recent weeks (Chart 5). Chart 5Australian Dollar Follows Macro Trends, Rallies Amid China Trade Spat Tensions have also escalated due to China’s dependency on Australian commodity exports at a time of spiking commodity prices. This is a recurring theme going back to the Stern Hu affair. The COVID spat led China to impose a series of sanctions against Australian beef, barley, wine, and coal. But because China cannot replace Australian resources (at least, not in the short term), its punitive measures are limited. It faces rising producer prices as a result of its trade restrictions (Chart 6). This dependency is a bigger problem for China today than it was in previous cycles so China will try to diversify. Chart 6Constraints On China's Tarrifs On Australia By contrast, China is not likely to impose sanctions on the US in response to Biden’s investigation, unless Biden attacks first. China’s imports from the US are booming and its currency is appreciating sharply. Despite Beijing’s efforts to keep the Phase One trade deal from collapsing, Biden is maintaining Trump’s tariffs and the US-China trade divorce is proceeding (Chart 7). Bilateral tariff rates are still 16-17 percentage points higher than they were in 2018, with US tariffs on China at 19% (versus 3% on the rest of the world) while Chinese tariffs on the US stand at 21% (versus 6% on the rest of the world). The Biden administration timed this week’s hawkish statements to coincide with the first meeting of US trade negotiators with China, which was a more civil affair. Both countries acknowledged that the relationship is important and trade needs to be continued. However, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s comments were not overly optimistic (she told Reuters that the relationship is “very, very challenging”). She has also been explicit about maintaining policy continuity with the Trump administration. We highly doubt that China’s share of US imports will ever surpass its pre-Trump peaks. The Biden administration has also refrained so far from loosening export controls on high-tech trade with China. This has caused a bull market in Taiwan while causing problems for Chinese semiconductor stocks’ relative performance (Chart 8). If Biden’s policy review does not lead to any relaxation of export controls on commercial items then it will mark a further escalation in tensions. Chart 7US Tarrifs Reduce China In Trade Deficit Bottom Line: Until Presidents Biden and Xi stabilize relations at the top, the trade negotiations over implementing the Phase One trade deal – and any new Phase Two talks – cannot bring major positive surprises for financial markets. Chart 8US Export Controls Amid Chip Shortage Congress Is More Hawkish Than Biden Biden’s ability to reduce frictions with China, should he seek to, will also be limited by Congress and public opinion. With the US deeply politically divided, and polarization at historically high levels, China has emerged as one of the few areas of agreement. The hawkish consensus is symbolized by new legislation such as the Strategic Competition Act, which is making its way through the Senate rapidly. Congress is also trying to boost US competitiveness through bills such as the Endless Frontier Act. These bills would subject China to scrutiny and potential punitive measures over a broad range of issues but most of all they would ignite US industrial policy , STEM education, and R&D, and diversify the US’s supply chains. We would highlight three key points with regard to the global impact of this legislation: Global supply chains are shifting regardless: This trend is fairly well established in tech, defense, and pharmaceuticals. It will continue unless we see a major policy reversal from China to try to court western powers and reduce frictions. The EU and India are less enthusiastic than the US and Australia about removing China from supply chains but they are not opposed. The EU Commission has recommended new defensive economic measures that cover supply chains in batteries, cloud services, hydrogen energy, pharmaceuticals, materials, and semiconductors. As mentioned, the EU is also hesitating to ratify the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China. Hence the EU is moving in the US’s direction independently of proposed US laws. After all, China’s rise up the tech value chain (and its decision to stop cutting back the size of its manufacturing sector) ultimately threatens the EU’s comparative advantage. The EU is also aligned with the US on democratic values and network security. India has taken a harder stance on China than usual, which marks an important break with the past. India’s decision to exclude Huawei from its 5G network is not final but it is likely to be at least partially implemented. A working group of democracies is forming regardless. The Strategic Competition Act calls for the creation of a working group of democracies but the truth is that this is already happening through more effective forums like the G7 and bilateral summits. Just as the implementation of the act would will ultimately depend on President Biden, so the willingness of other countries to adopt the recommendations of the working group would depend on their own executives. Allies have leeway as Biden will not use punitive measures against them: Any policy change from the EU, UK, India, and Australia will be independent of the US Congress passing the Strategic Competition Act. These countries will be self-directed. The US would have to devote diplomatic energy to maintaining a sustained effort by these states to counter China in the face of economic costs. This will be limited by the fact that the Biden administration will be very reluctant to impose punitive measures on allies to insist on their cooperation. The allies will set the pace of pressure on China rather than the United States. This gives the EU an important position, particularly Germany. And yet the trends in Germany suggest that the government will be more hawkish on China after the federal elections in September. Bottom Line: The Biden administration is unlikely to use punitive measures against allies so new US laws are less important than overall US diplomacy with each of the allies. Some allies will be less compliant with US policies given their need for trade with China. But so far there appears to be a common position taking shape even with the EU that is prejudicial to China’s involvement in key sectors of emerging technologies. If China does not respond by reducing its foreign policy assertiveness, then China’s economic growth will suffer. That drag would have to be offset by new supply chain construction in Southeast Asia and other countries. Investment Takeaways The foregoing highlights the international risks facing China even at a time when its trend growth is slowing (Chart 9) and its ongoing struggle with domestic financial imbalances is intensifying. China’s debt-service costs have risen sharply and Beijing is putting pressure on corporations and local governments to straighten out their finances (Chart 10), resulting in a wave of defaults. This backdrop is worrisome for investors until policymakers reassure them that government support will continue. Chart 9China's Growth Potential Slowing Chart 10China's Leaders Struggle With Debt China’s domestic stability is a key indicator of whether geopolitical risks could spiral out of control. In particular we think aggressive action in the Taiwan Strait is likely to be delayed as long as the Chinese economy and regime are stable. China has rattled sabers over the strait this year in a warning to the United States not to cross its red line (Chart 11). It is not yet clear how Biden’s policy continuity with the Trump administration will affect cross-strait stability. We see no basis yet for changing our view that there is a 60% chance of a market-negative geopolitical incident in 2021-22 and a 5% chance of full-scale war in the short run. Chart 11China PLA Flights Over Taiwan Strait Putting all of the above together, we see substantial support for two key market-relevant geopolitical risks: Chinese domestic politics (including policy tightening) and persistent US-China tensions (including but not limited to the Taiwan Strait). We remain tactically defensive, a stance supported by several recent turns in global markets: The global stock-to-bond ratio has rolled over. China is a negative factor for global risk appetite (Chart 12). Global cyclical equities are no longer outperforming defensives. There is a stark divergence between Chinese cyclicals and global cyclicals stemming from the painful transition in China’s bloated industrial economy (Chart 13). Global large caps are catching a bid relative to small caps (Chart 14). Chart 12Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio Rolled Over Chart 13Global Cyclicals-To-Defensives Pause Chart 14Global Large Caps Catch A Bid Versus Small Caps Cyclically the global economic recovery should continue as the pandemic wanes. China will eventually relax policy to prevent too abrupt of a slowdown. Therefore our strategic portfolio reflects our high-conviction view that the current global economic expansion will continue even as it faces hurdles from the secular rise in geopolitical risk, especially US-China cold war. Measurable geopolitical risk and policy uncertainty are likely to rebound sooner rather than later, with a negative impact on high-beta risk assets. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Coda: Global Minimum Tax Symbolizes Return Of Big Government On Thursday, the US Treasury Department released a proposal to set the global minimum corporate tax rate at 15%. The plan is to stop what Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has referred to as a global “race to the bottom” and create the basis for a rehabilitation of government budgets damaged by pandemic-era stimulus. Although the newly proposed 15% rate is significantly below President Biden’s bid to raise the US Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) rate to 21% from 10.5%, it is the same rate as his proposed minimum tax on corporate book income. Biden is also raising the headline corporate tax rate from 21% to around 25% (or at highest 28%). Negotiators at the OECD were initially discussing a 12.5% global minimum rate. The finance ministers of both France and Germany – where the corporate income tax rates are 32.0% and 29.9%, respectively – both responded positively to the announcement. However, Ireland, which uses low corporate taxes as an economic development strategy, is obviously more comfortable with a minimum closer to its own 12.5% rate. Discussions are likely to occur when G7 finance ministers meet on June 4-5. Countries are hoping to establish a broad outline for the proposal by the G20 meeting in early July. It is highly likely that the OECD will come to an agreement. However, it is not a truly “global” minimum as there will still be tax havens. Compliance and enforcement will vary across countries. A close look at the domestic political capital of the relevant countries shows that while many countries have the raw parliamentary majorities necessary to raise taxes, most countries have substantial conservative contingents capable of preventing stiff corporate tax hikes (Table 1, in the Appendix). Our Geopolitical strategists highlight that the Biden administration’s compromise on the minimum rate reflects its pragmatism as well as emphasis on multilateralism. Any global deal will be non-binding but the two most important low-tax players are already committed to raising corporate rates well above this level: Biden’s plan is noted above, while the UK’s budget for March includes a jump in the business rate to 25% in April 2023 from the current 19%. Ireland and Hungary are the only outliers but they may eventually be forced to yield to such a large coalition of bigger economies (Chart 15). Chart 15Global Minimum Corporate Tax Impact Is Symbolic Rather Than Concrete Thus a nominal minimum corporate tax rate is likely to be forged but it will not be truly global and it will not change the corporate rate for most countries. The reality of what companies pay will also depend on loopholes, tax havens, and the effective tax rate. Bottom Line: On a structural horizon, the global minimum corporate tax is significant for showing a paradigm shift in global macro policy: western governments are starting to raise taxes and revenue after decades of cutting taxes. The experiment with limited government has ended and Big Government is making a comeback. On a cyclical horizon, the US concession on global minimum tax is that the Biden administration aims to be pragmatic and “get things done.” Biden is also working with Republicans to pass bills covering some bipartisan aspects of his domestic agenda, such as trade, manufacturing, and China. The takeaway from a global point of view is that Biden may prove to be a compromiser rather than an ideologue, unlike his predecessors.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Vice President Daily Insights RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan, "Competition Without Catastrophe," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019, foreignaffairs.com. Section II: Appendix Table 1OECD: Which Countries Are Willing And Able To Raise Corporate Tax Rates? GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan – Province Of China Korea Turkey Brazil Australia Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will not immediately change its policy stance in response to rising inflation and inflation expectations. Rather, it will follow its current forward guidance and only lift rates off zero once the labor market has reached “maximum employment”. However, once the first rate hike has occurred, the Fed will shift its focus toward inflation and inflation expectations. Duration: The overnight index swap curve is priced for a total of 77 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023. We see strong odds that more hikes will be delivered and therefore continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Corporate Bonds: High and rising inflation expectations will eventually pose a risk to credit spreads, but only once the Fed tightens policy in response. For now, we remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries, though we maintain a preference for high-yield corporates, USD-denominated EM Sovereigns and municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds. Feature Recent inflationary trends are making the Fed’s job more difficult. Not only was April’s increase in core CPI the largest since 1981, but measures of long-term inflation expectations have also jumped. The 5-year/5-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has quickly risen to levels that are consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target (Chart 1). What’s more, survey measures of inflation expectations have also moved up, in many cases to uncomfortably high levels (Chart 2). Chart 1Back To Target Chart 2Inflation Expectations Have Jumped All of this makes the Fed’s zero-lower-bound interest rate policy look increasingly untenable. Can the Fed really just sit on the sidelines as inflation and inflation expectations rise to above-target levels? Our expectation is that the Fed will ignore rising inflation until the labor market is fully recovered, but it may then need to move quickly to contain inflationary pressures. The result could very well be a rate hike cycle that takes a long time to start, but then proceeds at a rapid pace. The Fed’s Liftoff Criteria Are Different Than Its Criteria For Pace A crucial point about the Fed’s forward guidance is that the criteria that will determine the timing of the first rate hike are different than the criteria that will determine the post-liftoff pace of rate hikes. Liftoff Criteria Table 1A Checklist For Liftoff For liftoff, the Fed has been very explicit that three conditions must be met before it will raise rates off the zero bound (Table 1). Of the three conditions listed in Table 1, the timing of when the labor market will reach “maximum employment” is the most uncertain. We have written extensively about how the Fed defines “maximum employment” and about the pace of employment growth that’s necessary to achieve that goal by specific future dates.1 To summarize, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of at least 698k is required to reach “maximum employment” by the end of this year and average monthly payroll growth of at least 412k is required to hit that target by the end of 2022 (Chart 3). Chart 3Employment Growth Chart 4Labor Demand Is Strong Our assessment is that “maximum employment” will be achieved in time for the Fed to lift rates in 2022, largely because employment growth must rise quickly in order to catch up with skyrocketing indicators of labor demand (Chart 4). The risk, of course, is that inflation continues to run hot as the Fed waits for its “maximum employment” condition to be met. If this occurs, we believe that the Fed will stick to its current forward guidance. It will ignore rising inflation until its liftoff criteria are met. Only then, will Fed policy turn toward containing inflation. Pace Criteria In a recent speech, Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida laid out three indicators that he will track to guide the pace of policy tightening post Fed liftoff.2 First, he pointed to inflation expectations. In particular, the Fed’s index of Common Inflation Expectations (CIE):3 Other things being equal, my desired pace of policy normalization post-liftoff to return inflation to 2 percent […] would be somewhat slower than otherwise if the CIE index is, at time of liftoff, below the pre-ELB level. [ELB = effective lower bound]. Chart 2 shows that the CIE index has already broken above its 2018 peak. It stands to reason that, all else equal, an elevated CIE index would speed up the post-liftoff pace of rate hikes. Chart 5Inflation Since August 2020 Second, Clarida noted that: Another factor I will consider in calibrating the pace of policy normalization post-liftoff is the average rate of PCE inflation since the new framework was adopted in August 2020. The annualized rate of change in core PCE since August 2020 is almost at the Fed’s 2% target already, and it will certainly rise to above-target levels when the April data are released, as was the case with core CPI (Chart 5). Finally, Clarida offered up a detailed Taylor-type monetary policy rule that he says he will consult once the conditions for liftoff are met: Consistent with our new framework, the relevant policy rule benchmark I will consult once the conditions for liftoff have been met is an inertial Taylor-type rule with a coefficient of zero on the unemployment gap, a coefficient of 1.5 on the gap between core PCE inflation and the 2 percent longer-run goal, and a neutral real policy rate equal to my SEP forecast of long-run r*. Chart 6Balanced Approach (Shortfalls) Rule* Recommendations Chart 6 shows the results of a very similar policy rule using median FOMC estimates for r*, NAIRU and the path of inflation. We use a slightly more pessimistic forecast for the unemployment rate and assume that it reaches 4.5% by the end of 2022 and 4% by the end of 2023. Even with those conservative assumptions, the rule still recommends a policy rate of 1.5% by the end of 2022 and 2.65% by the end of 2023. This is not to say that the Fed will immediately lift rates to those levels once it is ready to hike, only that the Fed will have a strong incentive to pursue a rapid pace of rate hikes once it finally lifts rates off the zero bound. Investment Implications For investors, the bottom line is that the Fed will not immediately change its policy stance in response to rising inflation and inflation expectations. Rather, it will follow its current forward guidance and only lift rates off zero once the labor market has reached “maximum employment”. However, once the first rate hike has occurred, the Fed will shift its focus toward inflation and inflation expectations. If inflation and inflation expectations rise further, or even remain sticky near current levels, the Fed will lift rates more quickly than many anticipate. At present, the overnight index swap curve is priced for a total of 77 bps of rate hikes by the end of 2023. We see strong odds that more hikes will be delivered and therefore continue to recommend a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. Is Inflation A Risk For Spread Product? Yes it is, but not just yet. In past reports, we’ve often pointed to 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates in a range between 2.3% and 2.5% as a reason to turn more cautious on spread product (see Chart 1), and the recent rise in inflation expectations certainly does set off some alarm bells. High inflation expectations pose a risk to credit spreads because of what they signal about the future course of Fed policy. If the Fed responds to high inflation expectations by tightening policy into restrictive territory, then economic growth and credit spreads are at risk. All this remains true, but the Fed’s willingness to ignore rising inflation expectations – at least until “maximum employment” and fed funds liftoff are achieved – gives spread product a little more runway than usual. One way to illustrate this dynamic is with the slope of the yield curve (Chart 7). Historically, corporate bond (both investment grade and junk) excess returns are strong at least until the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps (Table 2). Currently, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is well above 100 bps and has shown few signs of rolling over. If the Fed was still following its old forward-looking policy framework, then the yield curve would likely be much flatter today. That is, the curve would be pricing-in some policy tightening in response to high and rising inflation expectations. However, as discussed above, inflation expectations are not currently the Fed’s primary concern and they will only become the Fed’s primary concern once “maximum employment” has been achieved and the funds rate has been lifted off the zero bound. Chart 7Spread Product Returns Are Strong When The Curve Is Steep Table 2Corporate Bond Performance In Different Phases Of The Cycle All in all, we are concerned that, if inflation expectations remain elevated, the Fed may quickly ramp up its post-liftoff pace of rate hikes, sending credit spreads wider. But we are reluctant to position for that outcome when we are still many months away from Fed liftoff and the slope of the yield curve remains so steep. Chart 8Low Expected Returns In IG Another factor to consider is that value in spread product is extremely tight. In fact, our measure of the 12-month breakeven spread for the quality-adjusted investment grade corporate bond index is almost at its most expensive level since 1995 (Chart 8). This doesn’t change our assessment of when restrictive Fed policy will cause spreads to widen, but it does reduce our return expectations in the interim. All else equal, since the rewards from being overweight spread product versus Treasuries are low, we will be quicker to reduce our recommended spread product allocation when our indicators start to point toward the end of the credit cycle. Though, at the very least, we will still want to see the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope start to flatten and approach 50 bps before we get too pessimistic on spread product. The bottom line is that high and rising inflation expectations will eventually pose a risk to credit spreads, but only once the Fed tightens policy in response. For now, we remain overweight spread product versus Treasuries, though we maintain a preference for high-yield corporates, USD-denominated EM Sovereigns and municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Overshoot Territory”, dated April 13, 2021. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20210113a.htm 3 The CIE is a composite measure of different market-based and survey-based indicators of inflation expectations. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/index-of-common-inflation-expectations-20200902.htm  Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The reason to own stocks is not profit growth. The combination of unspectacular sales growth and down-trending profit margins means that global profit growth will be lacklustre, at best. The reason to own stocks is that the ultimate low in the T-bond yield is yet to come. This ultimate low in the T-bond yield will define the ultimate high in the global stock market’s valuation and the end of the structural bull market in stocks. Until that ultimate low in bond yields, long-term investors should own stocks… …and tilt towards long-duration growth sectors and growth-heavy stock markets such as the S&P500 that will benefit most from the final collapse in yields. The correction in DRAM, corn, and lumber prices suggests that the recent mania in inflation expectations is about to end. Fractal trade shortlist: copper and tin are fragile, go long T-bonds versus TIPS. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Profits Surged During The Credit Boom, But Have Gone Nowhere Since The main reason to own stocks is not what you think. The usual long-term argument to own stocks is based on profit growth – specifically, that an uptrend in profits drives up stock prices. Except that since 2008, this is not true (Chart of the Week and Chart I-2). Profits have barely grown, yet the global stock market has doubled.1 Chart I-2Since The Credit Boom Ended, Global Profits Have Barely Grown As profits have barely grown since 2008, the main reason that the global stock market has doubled is that the valuation paid for those profits has surged. Looking ahead, we expect this to remain the main reason to own stocks. The Reason To Own Stocks Is Not Profit Growth Profits are the product of sales and the profit margin on those sales. During the credit boom of the nineties and noughties, the strong tailwind of credit creation supercharged sales growth. At the same time, the profit margin on those sales trended higher (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Since The Credit Boom Ended, Sales Growth Has Slowed And Profit Margins Have Trended Lower Hence, in the decade leading up to 2008, global stock market profits surged, outstripping both sales and world GDP. Then the credit boom ended, and profits languished, because: Absent the tailwind from the credit boom, sales growth moderated. The profit margin trended lower. In the post-pandemic years, we expect both trends to persist. The credit boom is not coming back. Furthermore, as the pandemic recession was not protracted, sales are not at a depressed level from which they can play a sharp catch-up, as they did after the 2008 recession and the 2015 emerging markets recession. The structural downtrend in the profit margin will continue. Meanwhile, the structural downtrend in the profit margin will continue. Governments are desperate to mitigate – or at least, contain – the ballooning deficits that have paid for their pandemic stimuluses. Raising corporate taxes from structurally depressed levels is an easy and politically expedient response, as we have already seen from both the Biden administration in the US, and the Johnson administration in the UK. Higher corporate taxes will weigh on structural profit margins (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Corporate Taxes Will Rise From Structurally Depressed Levels The combination of unspectacular sales growth and down-trending profit margins means that global profit growth will continue to be lacklustre, at best. The Reason To Own Stocks Is That The Ultimate High In Valuations Is Yet To Come To repeat, the main reason that the global stock market has doubled since 2008 is that its valuation has surged (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Main Driver Of The Stock Market Has Been Valuation Expansion In turn, the stock market’s valuation has surged because bond yields have plummeted. Empirically, the valuation of the global stock market is tightly connected with the simple average of the (inverted) yields on the safest sovereign bond, the US T-bond, and the riskier sovereign bond, the Italian BTP. The main reason that the global stock market has doubled since 2008 is that its valuation has surged. Through 2012-13, the decline in the Italian BTP yield, by signifying the fading of euro break-up risk, boosted stock valuations. In more recent years though, it has been the US T-bond yield that has been more influential in driving the global stock market’s valuation (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Stock Market's Valuation Expansion Is Due To Lower Bond Yields But the crucial point to grasp is that the relationship between the declining bond yield and stock market valuation becomes exponential. This is because as bond yields approach their lower bound, bond prices have less additional upside but considerably more downside. This extra riskiness of bonds means that investors demand a diminishing risk premium on equities versus bonds. So, as bond yields decline, the required return on equities – which equals the bond yield plus the risk premium – collapses. And as valuation is just the inverse of required return, valuations soar. Chart I-7 and Chart I-8 demonstrate this exponential relationship in practice. Note that the bond yield is on the logarithmic left scale while the stock market’s valuation is on the linear right scale. The logarithmic versus linear scale visually demonstrates that at a lower bond yield, a given change in the bond yield has a much greater impact on the stock market’s valuation. Chart I-7The Relationship Between Lower Bond Yields And Stock Market Valuation Expansion Is Exponential Chart I-8When Bond Yields Reach Their Ultimate Low, Stock Market Valuations Will Surge Specifically, if the 30-year yield in the US reached the recent low achieved in the UK, it would boost the stock market’s valuation by nearly 50 percent. We fully expect this to happen at some point in the coming years because of The Shock Theory Of Bond Yields which we introduced in last week’s report. In a nutshell, the shock theory of bond yields states that each successive deflationary shock takes the bond yield to a lower structural level, until it can go no lower. Although it is impossible to predict the timing and nature of individual shocks such as the pandemic, it is easy to predict the statistical distribution of shocks. On this basis, the likelihood of a net deflationary shock is 50 percent within the next three years, and 81 percent within the next five years. Whatever that deflationary shock is, and whenever it arrives, it will mark the ultimate low in the 30-year T-bond yield – at a level close to the recent low in the UK. This ultimate low in the T-bond yield will also define the ultimate high in the global stock market’s valuation and the end of the structural bull market in stocks. Until that ultimate low in bond yields, long-term investors should own stocks. And tilt towards long-duration growth sectors that will benefit most from the final collapse in yields. Growth sectors and growth-heavy stock markets such as the S&P500 will continue to outperform, as they have done consistently since 2008. The Inflation Bubble Is Bursting   The last couple of months has seen a mania in inflation expectations. As industries reconfigured for the end of lockdowns, supply bottlenecks in some commodities led to understandable spikes in their prices. These commodity price increases then unleashed fears about inflation. As investors sought inflation hedges, it drove up commodity prices more broadly … which added to the inflation fears…which added further fuel to the mania in inflation expectations. And so, the indiscriminate rally in commodities continued. The inflation bubble is bursting. But now it seems that the indiscriminate rally is over. DRAM prices have rolled over, belying the thesis that there is widespread shortage in semiconductors (Chart I-9). More spectacularly in the past week, the corn price has tumbled by 12 percent while the lumber price has slumped by 25 percent (Chart I-10). Chart I-9DRAM Prices Have ##br##Rolled Over Chart I-10Lumber Prices Are Correcting, Will Other Commodities Follow? Given that the commodity rally was indiscriminate, there is a danger that any correction will spread into other commodities like the industrial metals, copper and tin – especially as their fractal structures are at a level of fragility that has identified previous turning points in 2008, 2011, 2015, 2017 and 2020 (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). Chart I-11Copper's Fractal Structure Is Fragile Chart I-12Tin's Fractal Structure Is Fragile In any case, the mania in inflation expectations is about to end. An excellent way to play this is to expect compression in the market implied inflation rate in T-bond yields versus TIPS yields (Chart I-13). Chart I-13The Mania In Inflation Expectations Is About To End Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to go long the 10-year T-bond versus the 10-year TIPS, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.6 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  To clarify, Chart 2 shows world stock market earnings per share, both 12-month forward and 12-month trailing. Whereas Charts 1 and 3 show sales and net profits (not per share). Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

ハイライト ECBのテーパリング？：ECBがカナダ銀行やイングランド銀行に続き、予想より早く国債買入を縮小し始める—ひょっとすると来月の政策会合で—かもしれないという投資家の懸念は的外れです。ECBが最も避けたいのは、欧州の成長とインフレの加速を先取りして金融緩和の縮小に踏み切った結果としてユーロ高とイタリア国債利回りの急騰を招くことです。 ユーロ圏債券ストラテジー：我々は現在の欧州債券に関する推奨を維持します：グローバル債券ポートフォリオ内で欧州をオーバーウェイトとし、コア国の国債に対してペリフェラル（周辺国）ソブリンおよびコーポレートを優先する一方、ブレークイーブンが割安なフランス、イタリア、ドイツのインフレ連動債もオーバーウェイトとします。また、ECBの利上げ織り込みを織り戻す新たな戦術取引として、2023年12月ユーロイボー金利先物（3か月）ロングを提案します。 特集 親愛なる顧客の皆様へ、 来週、月刊のバンク・クレジット・アナリスト誌の同僚と共同で、現在の世界的な住宅ブームが投資に与える影響についてのスペシャルレポートを発表します。そのレポートは5月28日金曜日にお届けします。通常の週次発行スケジュールには6月1日火曜日に戻ります。 - Rob Robis 今週のチャート 欧州債利回りの期待外れの上昇 欧州債券利回りの期待外れの上昇 欧州債券利回りの期待外れの上昇 来月の金融政策会合に向けて、欧州中央銀行（ECB）総裁のクリスティーヌ・ラガルドは、パンデミック開始以来初めて理事会メンバーを対面で招集する予定だと伝えられています。これは、ワクチン接種が進んでCOVID-19の深刻な局面から脱しつつある欧州に対して、どの程度の金融支援がまだ必要かを巡る議論が行われるであろう会合において興味深い副次的要素を提供します。先の4月のECB会合の議事要旨によれば、既に一部のECB関係者は経済成長とインフレ期待のリスクが「上振れに傾いている」と指摘しています。 欧州の景況感が改善する中、欧州の債券利回りは反応して上昇しています（今週のチャート）。ベンチマークである10年ドイツ国債利回りは現在-0.11%で、年初来46bp上昇しましたが、その半分は過去１か月での動きです。利回りの上昇はドイツやフランスといったコア国に限定されたものではなく、10年イタリア国債利回りは現在1.11%に達し、2021年初めの水準（0.52%）の倍以上になっています。インフレ期待も急速に高まっており、5年先5年物フォワードのユーロ消費者物価指数スワップは現在1.63%で、2018年12月以来の水準です。 これらの利回り上昇は他国で見られる大きな上昇に比べると遅れています。米国とカナダの10年国債利回りは年初来それぞれ72bp、90bpの上昇を記録しています。これらの国々で利回りが急騰したのは、インフレ期待の上昇と中央銀行の国債買入縮小（テーパリング）への懸念が原因であり、カナダについては先月、実際にカナダ銀行が国債買入ペースの減速を発表して的中しました。 我々の見解では、ECBがよりタカ派的な政策スタンスへの転換を検討するにはまだ時期尚早です。この見解は、上昇したものの依然としてより引き締めを示唆していない我々のECBモニターによって裏付けられます。欧州の債券売りは「過剰で、速すぎる」ケースに見えます。 ECBは今や多くの課題を抱えている 最近のユーロ圏の経済指標は、米国で先行して見られた強さに追いついただけでなく、場合によっては長年見られなかった水準に戻っています。ドイツのZEW景気期待指数の期待項目は5月に約14ポイント急上昇し、2000年以来の水準に達しました。製造業のMarkit PMIは4月に過去最高の62.9に達しました。欧州委員会のユーロ圏消費者信頼感指数はほぼパンデミック前の水準に戻っており（チャート2）、サービス業のMarkit PMIの回復継続に良い前兆です。 パンデミックに関する良いニュースが成長見通しの急伸を後押ししています。新規COVID-19感染者の増加ペースは着実に低下しており、パンデミック初期に最も深刻な被害を受けた地域の一つであるイタリアでは現在（7日移動平均）10月以来で最も低い新規感染率を示しています。一方で、ワクチン接種のペースは当初の遅い立ち上がりから加速しており、1日あたりの接種回数（100人当たり）はドイツ、フランス、イタリアで米国を上回っています（チャート3）。 チャート2 欧州の成長は回復中 欧州の成長は回復している 欧州の成長は回復している チャート3 欧州での接種加速 欧州におけるワクチン接種の加速 欧州におけるワクチン接種の加速 チャート4 欧州の余剰生産能力はどの程度か？ 欧州にはどれだけの余剰生産能力があるのか？ 欧州にはどれだけの余剰生産能力があるのか？ 接種の急速な進展は、2020年Q4と2021年Q1のロックダウンによる二番底型リセッションからの確かな回復を欧州にもたらす見込みです。欧州委員会は先週、ユーロ圏の成長見通しを上方修正し、実質GDPは2021年に4.3%、2022年に4.4%の拡大を見込むとしました（従来見通しは両年とも3.8%）。NGEU（ネクスト・ジェネレーションEU）パッケージを通じた公共投資の回復が夏の後半に資金支出を始めることで、全てのユーロ圏諸国は2022年末までにパンデミック前の生産水準に回帰する見込みです。 ECBは6月の会合で、自らの経済成長およびインフレ見通しを引き上げることは確実でしょう。後者の見通しは、ECBの理事会内で最大の議論材料になる可能性が高いです。 製造業PMIのような調査ベースの指標が比較的協調的に回復しているにもかかわらず、失業率や一般的な余剰生産能力の指標にはユーロ圏内で大きなばらつきが残っています（チャート4）。これは、ヘッドラインHICPインフレ率の年次増加率が多くのユーロ圏国で約2%に近づいている一方で、イタリアやスペインのように依然として非常に高い失業率に苦しむ国々があるため、ECBがこの実現インフレの上昇が持続するかを判断するのを難しくします。 ユーロ圏内の失業率の広い分布は、現行の政策金利水準（0%前後かそれ以下）が適切であることも示唆しています。ヨーロッパの労働市場の強さの「幅」を測る単純な指標の一つは、OECDが推定する完全雇用のNAIRU以下の失業率を有するユーロ圏国の割合を見ることです。1 この指標は、基本的なテイラールールにより算出されるユーロ圏短期金利の適正水準の推定と良く相関します。現時点では、ユーロ圏諸国のうち完全雇用を超えているのはわずか43%であり、これはECBの政策金利がおおむね0%付近である状況と整合します（チャート5）。 チャート5 政策金利が0%付近であるのが依然適切 政策金利が0％近辺でも依然として適切である 政策金利が0％近辺でも依然として適切である やや多めの国（47%）は賃金上昇の加速を見ています（下段）。これは、一部の国のNAIRU推定が低すぎる可能性があり、2015年以降のユーロ圏全体の賃金上昇加速と整合します。しかし、多くのユーロ圏国がパンデミックで増加した失業の処理途上にあることを踏まえると、ECBが労働市場の動態を十分に把握し、必要な金融政策の調整を決めるまでには時間がかかるでしょう。 データトレンドの「幅」はテイラールールのような理論的な金利指標とだけ相関するわけではありません。実際のECBの政策決定は、高い成長とインフレがユーロ圏全域にどの程度広がっているかによって動機付けられます。 チャート6では、チャート5の労働市場の幅指標と類似の指標を、他の経済・インフレデータを用いて示しています。具体的には、以下を観察するユーロ圏各国の割合を示しています： チャート6 ECBは成長とインフレが広範に及ぶときに引き締める傾向 成長かつインフレが広範に及ぶとき、ECBは通常、金融政策を引き締める 成長かつインフレが広範に及ぶとき、ECBは通常、金融政策を引き締める a) OECD景気先行指数が1年前の水準より高く、成長モメンタムが加速していること； b) ヘッドラインHICPインフレの最新値が1年前と比べて上昇しており、インフレモメンタムが加速していること； c) ヘッドラインHICPインフレがECBの「ほぼ2%未満」目標を上回っており、比較的高いインフレであること。 1998年のユーロ導入以降の過去のECBの金融引き締め局面（実際の政策金利の引上げ、あるいはECBのバランスシートの横ばい～縮小トレンドの形をとったもの）をすべて見ると、ECBは少なくともユーロ圏国の75%が成長とインフレの両方で加速していない限り引き締めに踏み切らないことが明らかです。実際の利上げは、2000年、2005～2007年、2011年の利上げサイクルのように、少なくとも75%の国でインフレ率が2%を超えていたときに発生しました。より最近では、2017年にECBは成長とインフレが加速した際にバランスシートの拡大を停止しましたが、インフレが2%を超える国が50%にとどまったため、政策金利の調整は行いませんでした。 今日、実質的に全てのユーロ圏国がパンデミックで落ち込んだ1年前の水準と比べて成長モメンタムが加速しています。ユーロ圏の59%の国でインフレが加速しており、この数字は欧州のさらなるロックダウン解除と世界的なコモディティ価格の上昇に伴いさらに上昇する可能性があります。しかし、ヘッドラインインフレが2%を超える国はわずか12%にとどまっており、2017年の経験に照らすと、実現インフレはECBのバランスシート調整を引き起こすほど強くはありません。 6月のECBテーパリングに賭けるな 過去のECBの行動から判断すると、6月の政策会合で国債買入のテーパリングを発表するのは時期尚早です。より可能性が高いのは、ECBの成長・インフレ見通しの上方修正がきっかけとなり、量的緩和、TLTROのような銀行向け資金供給プログラム、政策金利といったECBの金融刺激策の各要素をどう扱うかという議論が始まることです。しかし、ECBが方針の次の一手を決定するには、インフレ目標自体の性質がまもなく変わる可能性があるため、6月会合で結論に達するのは不可能でしょう。 ECBは現在、2003年以来初となる金融政策ストラテジーのレビューを行っており、今年後半に完了する予定です。インフレ目標にはある程度の柔軟性を持たせる調整が予想されますが、その具体的な内容はまだ不明です。ECBが連邦準備制度（Fed）の先例に倣い「平均インフレ目標」政策へ移行し、目標を下回る期間の後にインフレ目標の超過を許容する可能性はあるのでしょうか？ ECBのチーフエコノミストであるフィリップ・レーンは3月に、FRBの新たなアプローチには「非常に強い論理性がある」と述べています。同時に、いくつかの欧州諸国における「非常に異なるインフレの歴史」が、一時的に高めのインフレを許容するような制度について合意に達することを難しくする可能性があるとも指摘しました。2 より最近では、フィンランド中央銀行総裁であり理事会の穏健派メンバーで現在のECB総裁候補とも見なされたオッリ・レーンが、5月9日のフィナンシャル・タイムズのインタビューでECBが米国型の平均インフレ目標へ移行することを支持すると述べました。3 レーンは、失業を最小化することに重きを置く米国型の焦点は「より低い自然利子率という現状では理にかなっている」と述べ、ECBの現在のインフレ目標の文言は「非対称性の認識を生んでおり、『2%が上限である』と見なされてインフレ期待を抑制している」と説明しました。 我々は、ドイツ連銀のイェンス・ヴァイトマンが、ECBのインフレ目標を2%超の一時的な上振れを容認するように変更することに激しく反対するだろうと想像します。ドイツのヘッドラインHICPインフレは既に4月に2.1%に達しており、ドイツ経済の長期にわたるロックダウン解除に伴いさらに上昇する可能性があります。しかし、たとえヴァイトマンが「緩和」のいかなる動きにも強硬に反対しないとしても、ECBのストラテジーレビューの完了が近づいていることを考えると、テーパリングのような政策変更がそれ以前に信頼性を持って発表される可能性は非常に低いでしょう。もし高めのインフレが容認されるなら、そもそもなぜテーパリングを行う必要があるのでしょうか？ インフレ戦略レビューを越えて見れば、ECBが次の金融政策の一手を検討する際に重荷となり得る他の要因もあります： 中国の政策引き締め：欧州の最大の貿易相手である中国は、2020年にパンデミック対応で成長を支えるために許容した借入の急増後、信用成長や財政支出を抑制し始めています。我々の中国クレジット・インパルス指標は、欧州から中国への輸出の年次成長率を約9か月先行しており（チャート7）、今年後半に輸出の劇的な減速を示唆しています。これは特にドイツのように中国向け輸出依存度が高い国々にとってユーロ圏成長の下振れリスクとなります。 貸出成長の鈍化：ユーロ圏全体の銀行貸出の年次成長率は2月に12.2%でピークを迎え、現在は10.9%に低下しています（チャート8）。軟化の多くはドイツとフランスで発生しており、これらの国はECBのTLTROを通じた優遇銀行資金の大幅な活用を見ていました。最新のTLTROプログラムのためにECBが設定した価格面でのインセンティブは非常に魅力的であり、ドイツとフランスの銀行は安い資金を利用して貸出を拡大したようです。これは銀行貸出データの経済的解釈をECBにとってより難しくしており、特にイタリアの貸出成長とTLTRO利用が現在加速している点がそれに拍車をかけています。 チャート7 欧州の輸出需要に対する警告サイン 欧州の輸出需要の警戒サイン 欧州の輸出需要の警戒サイン チャート8 ECBのTLTROはイタリア重視に ECBのLTROがイタリアに焦点を当てつつある ECBのLTROがイタリアに焦点を当てつつある NGEU支出：前述の通り、€7,500億のNGEU（ネクスト・ジェネレーションEU、別名「リカバリー・ファンド」）からの支払いは、各国の政府投資提案がEUの承認を得れば今年後半に開始される見込みです。NGEU資金はデジタルやグリーン関連の投資など、将来の経済成長を押し上げるイニシアティブを資金供給することを目的としています。多くのユーロ圏国がすでに提案を提出しており、イタリアは€1,920億の要求で主導しています。 チャート9 NGEUは今後5年間で欧州成長に大きく寄与する ECBの見通し：卵の殻の上を歩く ECBの見通し：卵の殻の上を歩く チャート10 NGEUの影響は前倒しで現れる NGEUの影響は前倒しで現れる NGEUの影響は前倒しで現れる S&Pグローバルの最近の研究は、NGEU投資によりユーロ圏全体の成長が2021年から2026年にかけて累積で1.3～3.9ポイント押し上げられる可能性があると結論づけています（チャート9）。4 同研究はまた、支出の影響は次の2年間に前倒しで現れるだろうと指摘しています（チャート10）。イタリア政府はNGEU投資がイタリアの低迷するトレンド成長率を1.5%まで倍増させる可能性があると考えています。多くのECB関係者は、NGEUのような構造的財政刺激があれば極めて緩和的な金融政策を維持する必要性が低くなると指摘しています。しかし、NGEU提案が最終化され、承認された資金額が配分されるまでは、ECBは政府投資を考慮に入れた経済予測を調整することができません。 これらの即時的な不確実性、特に欧州がパンデミックのロックダウンからどれだけうまく再開できるかを含め、我々はECB理事会が6月の政策会合で現行の金融政策ツールやガイダンスの即時変更が必要だと結論付けるという筋の通ったシナリオは見ていません。 結論：ECBがカナダ銀行やイングランド銀行に続いて予想より早く国債買入を縮小し始める—ひょっとすると来月の政策会合で—という投資家の懸念は的外れです。 ECBの次の可能性のある動きと投資への影響 6月にテーパリング発表があるとは考えにくい一方で、将来の動きに向けた示唆が出る可能性は十分あります。ECBは政策転換のかなり前から市場を準備させることで悪名高く、したがって6月会合後の公式声明やラガルド総裁の記者会見には、ECBの次の動きに関する手がかりが含まれる可能性があります。 チャート11 ECBの緩和は多様な形態をとる ECBの金融緩和は様々な形を取る ECBの金融緩和は様々な形を取る 来年3月に終了予定のパンデミック緊急購入プログラム（PEPP）についての議論が6月に持ち上がる可能性はあります。欧州経済の再開の成功やNGEU資金の最終承認額がより明確になる9月の政策会合で取り上げられる可能性の方が高いと考えられます。これらが、COVID-19ショックに起因して導入された資産買入プログラムを維持する必要性を決定づけるからです。 緩和を段階的に縮小する際にECBが選択できる政策オプションは多岐にわたります。 調整可能な政策金利は複数あります。ECBが次に利上げを試みる際、最初に動く金利はおそらく短期金利の「下限」を示す預金金利（現在-0.5%）になるでしょう（チャート11）。 ただし、利上げはバランスシート関連ツールの縮小・巻き戻しの前には発生しないでしょう。つまり、まず資産買入が縮小されます。市場参加者はその政策選択の順序を良く認識しており、短期金利の非常にフラットな経路が欧州のOISカーブに織り込まれています。 OISとCPIスワップ曲線のフォワードレートのスプレッドは、市場の実質金利のフォワード価格付けの代理として使えます。現状、市場が示唆する実質ECB政策金利は今後10年で-2%から-1%の間にとどまると織り込まれています（チャート12）。言い換えれば、市場は今後10年間で予想インフレを上回らない非常にフラットなECB政策金利の経路を織り込んでいます。 欧州の自然実質利子率はトレンド成長が低いため非常に低い可能性がありますが、実質金利が-2%といった水準にあるということは、欧州経済に関する多くの悪い構造的ニュースを織り込んでいることを意味します。比較すると、NY連銀がパンデミック前の2020年第2四半期に算出した欧州の自然実質利子率（r-star）は+0.6%とプラスでした。 このように実質金利のマイナス期待が長期化すると、ベンチマークであるドイツ国債利回り曲線上に実質的にマイナスの実質利回りが持続することの説明がつきます。単純に言えば、ECBが本格的な利上げサイクルを演出できると信じられていないのです—これは日本のフィクスト・インカム投資家には馴染みのある結果です。 ECBがユーロの水準を常に懸念しており、それが欧州の成長とインフレ期待に影響する役割を果たすことを考えると、市場がECBにとって金利を大きく引き上げるのは通貨高を招きかねず難しいと考えるのは正しいでしょう。ECBが2014年にマイナス金利政策に移行して以来、購買力平価（PPP）ベースで一貫してユーロが過小評価されてきたのは偶然ではありません（チャート13）。 チャート12 市場は今後10年の欧州実質金利のマイナスを予想 市場は今後10年間、欧州の実質金利がマイナスになると予想している 市場は今後10年間、欧州の実質金利がマイナスになると予想している 先を見れば、ECBは市場に対して金利の将来経路を上方修正させユーロを大幅に押し上げるような政策変更（テーパリングを含む）を示唆する際には慎重である必要があります。 チャート13 低いECB金利がユーロの過小評価を維持 低いECB金利がユーロの割安感を維持している 低いECB金利がユーロの割安感を維持している つまり、欧州の実質債利回りは少なくとも2021年後半にかけて深くマイナスのままである可能性が高く、名目利回りの追加上昇は主にインフレ期待の上昇によることになります（チャート14）。これにより、現在水準から欧州債利回りがさらに上昇できる余地は限定されます。 チャート14 欧州債券ストラテジーの要約 欧州債券ストラテジー概要 欧州債券ストラテジー概要 我々は引き続き、コア欧州債利回りは少なくとも2021年後半は米国債利回りに対して「低いイールドベータ」で推移すると考えており、2022年にフェデラル・リザーブが国債買入のテーパリングを開始すると予想しています。したがって、グローバル債券ポートフォリオではコア欧州国債を米国債に対して戦略的にオーバーウェイトするという推奨を維持します。米国でのテーパリングの発生確率が欧州より高く、その後の利上げもECBよりFRBの方が実施する可能性が高いと見ているからです。 専用の欧州債券ポートフォリオ内では依然としてベンチマークよりやや短めのデュレーションを推奨しますが、もし10年ドイツ国債利回りが大きくプラス領域に上昇した場合には、欧州のデュレーションエクスポージャーを引き上げることを検討します。 我々はまた、ドイツ、フランス、イタリアのブレークイーブンが我々のグローバル評価モデル群で唯一割安であるため、欧州のインフレ連動債に対するオーバーウェイト推奨を維持します。 欧州のクレジットでは、スプレッド商品をソブリン債に対してオーバーウェイトすることを引き続き推奨します。これはイタリアやスペインの国債だけでなく、投資適格およびハイイールドのコーポレート債を含みます。これらの市場に対してより弱気になるべきタイミングは、ECBが資産買入をテーパリングし始めた時です。クレジットスプレッドはECBのバランスシートの成長が鈍化している期間に拡大する傾向があります（チャート15）。 ECBが最終的にテーパリングを決定した際には、TLTROのネット残高は現在水準近くで維持される可能性が高いと考えています（満期を迎えるものを置き換える新たなTLTROを導入することで）。これにより、イタリアのような脆弱な国々でECBのイタリア国債買入減少と安価なECB資金へのアクセス減少という二重の打撃で借入コストが急騰する事態を避けることができます。 最後に一言—我々は今週、戦術的オーバーレイ・ポートフォリオの第19ページで、市場がよりタカ派なECB見通しを織り込むのを織り戻すための新たなトレードを導入します。最初のECBによる利上げの最も可能性の高い規模は10bpであり、これはOISカーブで2023年中頃に織り込まれています。2023年末までにはフォワードレート曲線でほぼ25bpの利上げが織り込まれています。我々はECBが2023年に利上げするとは予想していませんが、たとえ利上げがあっても、6か月以内に累積で25bpの利上げが実現する可能性は低いと考えます。したがって、エントリープライス100.27で2023年12月限の3か月ユーロイボー金利先物ロングを推奨します（チャート16）。 チャート15 ECBのテーパリングは欧州クレジットにとって悪材料 ECBのテーパリングは欧州クレジットにとって悪いニュースになるだろう ECBのテーパリングは欧州クレジットにとって悪いニュースになるだろう チャート16 2023年12月ユーロイボー先物をロング 2023年12月限ユーロイボー・フューチャーズをロングする 2023年12月限ユーロイボー・フューチャーズをロングする 結論：ECBが最も避けたいのは、欧州の成長とインフレの加速に事前対応して金融緩和を縮小し始めた結果として必然的に生じるユーロ高とイタリア国債利回りの急騰です。我々は現在の欧州債券に関する推奨を維持します：グローバル債券ポートフォリオ内で欧州をオーバーウェイトとし、コア国の政府債に対してペリフェラルのソブリンおよびコーポレートを優先するとともに、ブレークイーブンが割安なフランス、イタリア、ドイツのインフレ連動債もオーバーウェイトとします。   Robert Robis, CFA チーフ・フィクスト・インカム・ストラテジスト rrobis@bcaresearch.com 脚注 1 NAIRUは失業率の非加速的インフレ率（Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment）の略称です。 2 レーンのコメントは、2021年3月16日にフィナンシャル・タイムズで掲載された広範なインタビューに由来します。記事はこちらで参照できます： https://www.ft.com/content/2aa6750d-48b7-441e-9e84-7cb6467c5366 3 レーンのコメントは今月初めの5月9日に公表され、こちらで参照できます： https://www.ft.com/content/05a12645-ceb2-4cd5-938e-974b778e16e0 4 S&Pグローバルのレポート「Next Generation EU Will Shift European Growth Into A Higher Gear」はこちらで参照できます： https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/210427-next-generation-eu-will-shift-european-growth-into-a-higher-gear-1192994 推奨 GFIS推奨ポートフォリオ対カスタムベンチマーク指数 ECBの見通し: 卵の殻の上を歩く ECBの見通し: 卵の殻の上を歩く デュレーション 地域配分 スプレッド商品 戦術的トレード 利回りとリターン グローバル債利回り 過去のリターン

特別レポート

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (May 19 at 10:00 AM EDT, 3:00 PM BST, 4:00 PM CEST, 11:00 PM HKT). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

ハイライト 米国は、欧州水準の債券利回りまで、あと1回のデフレーション・ショックを残すのみです。 複数年の視野では、デフレーション・ショックはほぼ確実です。 そのショックはデフレ型になります。仮に当初はインフレ型で始まっても、やがて迅速にデフレに転じるためです。 理由は、インフレ型ショックによる債券利回りの急上昇が、世界の不動産300兆ドル相当の価値を損ない、結果として大規模なデフレーション衝撃を引き起こすからです。 したがって、米国の30年債は最終的に、絶対リターンで概ね100％に近いリターンをもたらすでしょう… …およびコアな欧州および日本の債券に対する相対的リターンでも。 フラクタルトレード候補：株式は債券に対して調整を挟む見込み；コモディティは危険なほど過熱している；USD/CADの買い。 特集 今週のチャート 債券利回りの構造的水準は、持続的なデフレーション・ショックの回数に依存する 債券利回りの構造的水準は、持続的なデフレショックの回数によって決まる。 債券利回りの構造的水準は、持続的なデフレショックの回数によって決まる。 10年前、米国、英国、ドイツの30年債利回りはほぼ同水準の約3％でした。しかし今日ではそれらの利回りは大きく乖離しており、米国は2.3％、英国は1.3％、ドイツは0.3％です。 何が起きたのか？ 2012年、ドイツの債券利回りは英国や米国と分岐しました。ユーロ債務危機によるデフレーション・ショックがユーロ圏に集中したためです。さらに2016年には、ブレグジットによるデフレーション・ショックが英国およびEU27に集中したため、英国の債券利回りが米国から分離しました（今週のチャート）。 債券利回りの『ショック理論』 ここで新たな概念──債券利回りの『ショック理論』──へようこそ。この理論によれば、高格付け国債の構造的利回り水準は、経済が受けた持続的なデフレーション・ショックの回数の関数に過ぎません。各デフレーション・ショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へと押し下げ、下限に達するまでこれが続きます（チャート I-2）。 チャート I-2 各デフレーション・ショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へ押し下げ、下限に達するまで続く 次々と起きるデフレショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へと引き下げ、もはやこれ以上下げられなくなるまで続く。 次々と起きるデフレショックは債券利回りをより低い構造的水準へと引き下げ、もはやこれ以上下げられなくなるまで続く。 2011年以降、米国、英国、ドイツの債券利回りが乖離したのは、米国が英国より1回、ドイツより2回少ないデフレーション・ショックの影響を受けてきたためです。しかし重要な結論は、米国は欧州水準の債券利回りまであと1回のデフレーション・ショックしかない、ということです。 そのデフレーション・ショックが到来し、米国の30年債利回りが英国で記録された最近の安値に達すれば、債券価格は50％超の上昇に相当します。さらにドイツで記録された最近の安値に達すれば、価格上昇は100％を大幅に上回ることになります。 多くの人はそのような上昇は不可能だと言います。しかし10年前、同じ人々が英国やドイツの長期債利回りがゼロ近傍まで低下することはあり得ないと言っていたのを思い出してください。結果はご覧の通りです。 我々の高い確信度を持つ見解は、米国の長期債が最終的に優れた絶対リターンと、欧州および日本のコア債券に対する優れた相対リターンをもたらす、というものです。 その単純な理由は、別のデフレーション・ショックは時間の問題に過ぎない、ということです。 長期投資家は常にショックに備えるべき 大半のストラテジストや投資家は、パンデミックのようなショックは本質的に予測不可能であり、したがって備えることはできないと主張します。 我々はそうは思いません。 確かに、個々のショックの発生時期や性質は本質的に予測不可能です。しかし我々がショックを予測する方法で説明したように、ショックの統計的な分布は高度に予測可能です。 ショックとは何か？確立された定義はないため、我々の定義は、主要国の長期債価格が少なくとも25％上昇または下落する事象とします。1 （チャート I-3）この定義で過去50年を通して見た場合、任意の10年期間におけるショックの回数の統計分布はポアソン（3.33）であり、ショック間の時間の統計分布は指数分布（3.33）です。 チャート I-3 ショックとは長期債価格の25%の変動であり、ショックはおおむね3年ごとに発生する傾向がある ショックとはデュレーションの長い債券の価格が25％変動することであり、ショックはおおむね3年ごとに発生する傾向がある。 ショックとはデュレーションの長い債券の価格が25％変動することであり、ショックはおおむね3年ごとに発生する傾向がある。 したがって、任意の10年期間にショックが発生する確率はほぼ確実な96％です（チャート I-4）。さらに任意の5年期間でも、ショックの発生確率は非常に高い81％です。 チャート I-4 複数年の視野では、ショックはほぼ確実である 債券利回りの「ショック理論」 債券利回りの「ショック理論」 多くの人にとって、これは認知的不協和を生みます。ショックがほぼ確実であっても、その正確な性質や発生時期を思い描けないために、備えることを回避します。しかし長期投資家は常にショックに備えなければなりません。備えないことは許されません。 インフレ型ショックは迅速にデフレ型へ転じる 重要な問題は、次のショックがデフレ型かインフレ型かということです。我々の高確度の見解は、ネットでデフレ型になるというものです。つまり、たとえ当初はインフレ型で始まっても、すぐにデフレ型へ移行するということです。 その単純な理由は、インフレ型ショックによる債券利回りの急上昇が、世界の不動産300兆ドル相当の価値を損ない、結果として大規模なデフレーション衝撃を引き起こすからです。 2010年代の住宅ブームはその浸透力と地域的広がりにおいて前例がなく、北米、欧州、アジア、オーストララシアの都市部、郊外、農村部を同時に包含しました。ほぼすべての地域で価格が倍増した結果、世界の不動産価値は$150兆増加しました（チャート I-5）。そのうち$75兆は債券利回りの低下による評価上昇が原因です（チャート I-6）。文脈化すると、債券利回りの低下は世界の不動産価値を世界GDPに匹敵する規模だけ押し上げたことになります！ チャート I-5 2010年代の住宅ブームで、世界の不動産価値は$150兆増加した… 2010年代の住宅ブームで、世界の不動産の価値は150兆ドルも急増しました... 2010年代の住宅ブームで、世界の不動産の価値は150兆ドルも急増しました... チャート I-6 …そのうち$75兆は債券利回りの低下によるものだった ...そのうち75兆ドルは債券利回りの低下によるものです ...そのうち75兆ドルは債券利回りの低下によるものです 多くの人は不動産や株式などの実物資産はインフレ型ショックで強いと信じていますが、これは誤解です。確かに実物資産が生む収益は名目GDPに追随するはずです。しかし、その収益に対して支払われる評価が現在のように高い水準から始まっている場合、評価は崩壊します。 インフレ型ショック下で所望の実質リターンを生むために必要な初期評価は、価格安定下よりもはるかに低くなります。例えば、低インフレの1990年代・2000年代の株式では、初期の株価収益率（PER）が15であれば、一貫して将来10年の実質リターンが10％となりました。しかし1970年代のインフレショックでは、同じ初期PER15でも実質リターンはゼロでした。実質リターン10％を得るには、初期PERを7に半減させる必要がありました（チャート I-7）。 チャート I-7 1970年代のインフレ型ショックでは評価が崩壊した 1970年代のインフレ・ショックでは、バリュエーションが崩壊した 1970年代のインフレ・ショックでは、バリュエーションが崩壊した 債券利回りは世界の不動産価値を損なうまでどれだけ上昇し得るのか？過去10年で、世界の賃料利回りは世界の長期債利回りから100ベーシスポイント以上乖離したことがありません。2 現在、債券利回りは賃料利回りより約25bp高いため、世界の不動産価格が傷む前に長期債利回りが上昇できるのは最大75bpに過ぎないと推定されます（チャート I-8）。  チャート I-8 世界の不動産価格が損なわれる前に、債券利回りが上昇できるのは最大75bp 世界の不動産価格が悪影響を受ける前に、債券利回りは最大でも75ベーシスポイントしか上昇できない 世界の不動産価格が悪影響を受ける前に、債券利回りは最大でも75ベーシスポイントしか上昇できない 当社の重要な構造的推奨を改めて繰り返すと、米国の長期債は最終的に卓越した絶対リターンと、欧州および日本のコア債券に対する卓越した相対リターンをもたらすでしょう。 カウンタートレンド反転の候補 今週は、株式対債券（MSCIオール・カントリー・ワールド対30年米国債）におけるラリーが、260日フラクタル構造の脆弱性が2008、2010、2013、2020の節目と類似していることから、今後数か月で調整を挟む可能性が高いことに注目します（チャート I-9）。 チャート I-9 株式対債券のラリーは今後数か月で調整に入る可能性が高い 株式と債券のラリーは今後数か月で持ち合いになる可能性が高い。 株式と債券のラリーは今後数か月で持ち合いになる可能性が高い。 また、コモディティから距離を置くよう改めて警告します。すべてのコモディティのラリーが危険なほど過熱しており、2008年に見られたフラクタルの脆弱性の極端さを呈しています（チャート I-10およびチャート I-11）。 チャート I-10 コモディティのラリーは危険なほど過熱している... コモディティのラリーが危険なほど過熱している... コモディティのラリーが危険なほど過熱している... チャート I-11 …2008年に見られたフラクタルの脆弱性の極端さを示している …2008年に見られたフラクタル脆弱性の極端な状態を表示しています …2008年に見られたフラクタル脆弱性の極端な状態を表示しています 現時点で良いトレードはカナダドルのショートです。ルーニーの複合フラクタル構造に基づくと、多くの好材料がすでに織り込まれており、危険なほど過熱したコモディティ市場やカナダ銀行の（タカ派）資産買入のテーパリングを含んでいます。したがって、カナダドルは今後数か月で反転すると予想します（チャート I-12）。 チャート I-12 カナダドルをショート カナダドルをショートする カナダドルをショートする USD/CADをロングし、利益目標と対称的なストップロスを3.7％に設定してください。 Dhaval Joshi チーフ・ストラテジスト 脚注 1 債券利回りが下限に近づくにつれて、このショックの定義は変更する必要があります。長期債価格が25％上昇することが不可能になるためです。 2 ここでの世界の長期債利回りは、米国と中国の30年利回りの平均として定義しています。 フラクタル・トレーディング・システム フラクタルトレード 6か月の推奨 構造的推奨 決済済みフラクタルトレード 決済済みトレード 資産パフォーマンス 株式市場のパフォーマンス   注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り チャート II-1 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - ユーロ圏 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り - ユーロ圏 注目すべき指標 - 債券利回り - ユーロ圏 チャート II-2 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - 欧州（ユーロ圏除く） 注目指標 - 債券利回り - 欧州（ユーロ圏を除く） 注目指標 - 債券利回り - 欧州（ユーロ圏を除く）     チャート II-3 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - アジア 注目すべき指標 - アジアの債券利回り 注目すべき指標 - アジアの債券利回り チャート II-4 注視すべき指標 - 債券利回り - その他先進国 注目指標 - 債券利回り - その他の先進国 注目指標 - 債券利回り - その他の先進国     注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-5 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-6 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し     チャート II-7 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し チャート II-8 注視すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し 注目すべき指標 - 金利見通し