アメリカ合衆国

特別レポート

Highlights While not exactly conciliatory, Russian officials are signaling they will re-consider the declaration of a market-share war with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). KSA upped its shock-and-awe rhetoric promising to lift maximum sustainable capacity to 13mm b/d, which has kept prices under pressure (Chart of the Week) and will resonate into 3Q20, even if a market-share war is averted. Failure to stop a market-share war will fill global oil storage, and Brent prices again will trade with a $20 handle by year-end. Demand forecasts by the IEA and prominent banks are tilting toward the first contraction in global oil demand since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Central banks and governments are rolling out fiscal and monetary stimulus to counter the expected hit to global aggregate demand in the wake of COVID-19. Given the extraordinary uncertainty surrounding global oil supply and demand, our balances and prices forecasts are highly tentative. We are reducing our 2020 Brent forecasts to $40/bbl for 2Q-3Q20, and $50/bbl for 4Q20. For 2021, we are expecting Brent to average $60/bbl. WTI trades $3-$4/bbl below Brent in our estimates. Feature Russian officials appear to be seeking a resumption of talks with OPEC. Since the declaration of a market-share war following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 negotiations to agree a production cut to balance global oil markets, Russian officials appear to be seeking a resumption of talks with OPEC.1 Putting such a meeting together before the expiration of OPEC 2.0’s 1.7mm b/d production-cutting deal at the end of this month will be a herculean lift for the coalition, but it can be done. All the same, it may require a quarter or so of re-opened floodgates from KSA and its GCC allies to focus everyone’s attention on the consequences of market-share wars. To that end, the Kingdom announced it will lift production above 12mm b/d, and supply markets out of strategically placed storage around the world. It was joined by the UAE with a pledge to raise output to 4mm b/d. Chart of the WeekMessy OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Crashes Benchmark Crude Prices Assessing Uncertain Fundamentals While the dramatis personae on the supply side maneuver for advantage, markets still are trying to form expectations on the level of demand destruction in EM and DM wrought by COVID-19. Given the elevated uncertainty around this issue, modeling our ensemble forecast has become more complicated. On the demand side, we are modeling three scenarios for 2020: Global demand growth falls 200k b/d y/y, flat growth, and growth of 600k b/d. Our previous expectations had growth increasing 1mm b/d in 2020 and 1.7mm b/d in 2021. We maintain the rate of growth for next year – 1.7mm b/d – but note it is coming off a lower 2020 base for consumption. On the supply side, it’s a bit more complicated. We have three scenarios: In Scenario 1, we model the OPEC 2.0 breakdown, i.e., OPEC 2.0 gradually increases production by 2.5mm b/d between Apr20 and Dec20. Compared to our previous estimates it also removes the 600k b/d we previously expected would be added to the cuts in 2Q20, which produces a supply increase of 2.5mm b/d + expectation of 600k b/d vs. our previous balances. In Scenario 2, we run our previous balances expectation, which cuts production by a total of 2.3mm b/d in 2Q20, 1.7mm b/d in 2H20, and 1.2mm b/d in 2021.2 Scenario 3 models the additional cuts as recommended by OPEC last in week in Vienna of 1.5mm b/d on top of the 1.7mm b/d already agreed on for 1Q20. These cuts are realized gradually, moving to 2.3mmm b/d in 2Q20 and 3.2mm b/d in 2H20. For 2021, our supply assumptions revert to the OPEC 2.0 production cuts of 1.2mm b/d that prevailed last year. The price expectations generated by these scenarios can be seen in Table 1 and in Charts 2A, 2B, and  2C, which show our supply-side scenarios with the three demand-side scenarios above. We show our balances estimates given these different scenarios in Charts 3A, 3B, and 3C, and our inventory estimates in Charts 4A,  4B, and  4C. Table 1Unstable Brent Price Forecasts It may require a quarter or so of re-opened floodgates from KSA and its GCC allies to focus everyone’s attention on the consequences of market-share wars. Chart 2AOil Price Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Chart 2BOil Price Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Chart 2COil Price Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Chart 3AOil Balances Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Chart 3BOil Balances Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Chart 3COil Balances Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Chart 4AOECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Chart 4BOECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Chart 4COECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Given all of the moving parts in our forecast this month, we will only be publishing a summary of these estimates (Table 1). We will publish our global balances table next week after we have had time to process the EIA’s and OPEC’s historical demand estimates. Given the dynamics of supply-demand and storage adjustments these different scenarios produce, we use them to roughly estimate forecasts for 2Q and 3Q20, 4Q20 and 2021. We are reducing our 2020 Brent forecasts to $40/bbl for 2Q-3Q20, and $50/bbl for 4Q20. For 2021, we are expecting Brent to average $60/bbl. WTI trades $3-$4/bbl below Brent in our estimates. The implicit assumption here is COVID-19 is contained by 3Q20 and is in the market’s rear-view mirror by 4Q20. Obviously, such an assumption is fraught with uncertainty. Russia May Be Re-Thinking Strategy I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. Winston Churchill, BBC Broadcast, October 1, 1939.3 Russia appears to be sending up trial balloons to indicate to OPEC it would not be averse to renewing the OPEC 2.0 dialogue. It is worthwhile noting Russian officials immediately responded to KSA’s first mention of sharply higher output – going to 12.3mm bd from 9.7mm b/d – with their own assertion they will lift current output of ~ 11.4mm b/d by 200k – 300k b/d, and ultimately take that to +500k b/d. Of course, as Churchill’s observation makes plain, it is difficult to interpret Russia’s overtures in this regard, particularly in light of the growing popular dissatisfaction with President Vladimir Putin’s regime within Russia itself. At the outset, it seems to us that the cause of the breakdown in OPEC 2.0 was the collapse in demand from China following the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan Province, and Putin’s attempt to secure a longer stay in power.4 The former focused Russia’s oil oligarchs on shoring up market share, and focused Putin on maintaining the support of these important oligarchs. The basis for Russo-Saudi cooperation under the OPEC 2.0 umbrella was rising oil demand, and the simple fact that both sides had exhausted their ability to sustain low prices brought on by the 2014-16 oil-price collapse ushered in by OPEC’s previous market-share war amid the global manufacturing downturn. The slowdown in global demand due to China’s slow-down and the Sino-US trade war in 2019 weakened Russian commitment to OPEC 2.0 by end of year. Putin faced domestic popular discontent and grumbling among the oligarchs (e.g. Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft), just as he was preparing to extend his term in power. The possibility of a drastic loss of Russian influence over global oil markets – and hence of its own economic independence – emerged at a time when Putin still has the ability to maneuver ahead of the 2021 Duma election and 2024 presidential election which are essential to his maintenance of power. Going into 2020, Russia also had gained monetary and fiscal ammunition over preceding three years that would allow them to challenge KSA within OPEC 2.0, while KSA’s reserves stagnated (Chart 5). The Wuhan Coronavirus pushed things over the edge by hitting Chinese oil demand directly in the gut. Putin gave into the oil sector’s demands for prioritizing market share. As is apparent, this is the critical issue for him and the oligarchs running Russia’s oil and gas companies. Chart 5Foreign Exchange Reserves Russia’s US Focus The fact that US President Donald Trump and Iran are harmed by the oil price collapse is secondary. The Russians may have known that the US and Iran would suffer collateral damage, but their primary objective was not to unseat Trump and definitely not to increase the chances of regime collapse in Iran. It is not unthinkable that President Putin would attempt to upset the US election yet again. Regardless of the relationship between Putin and Trump, Russia benefits from promoting US polarization in general. And the Democrats will impose stricter regulations on US resource industries (including shale). All the same, Russia will suffer from Democrats taking power and strengthening NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance. A knock on shale is a short-term benefit to Russia, but the loss of Trump as a president who increases geopolitical “multipolarity,” which is good for Russia, would be a long-term loss. President Putin would not have triggered the conflict with Saudi over such a mixed combination. The breakdown of OPEC 2.0 happened after Super Tuesday, so it was clear Biden was leading the US Democratic Party’s bid for the Oval Office come November. Biden is hawkish on Russia and is more likely than Trump to get the Europeans to reduce their energy dependence on Russia. Also, it is possible Trump will benefit from lower oil prices anyway, since it will reduce prices at the pump by November and also help China recover – thus allowing it to boost global demand and follow through on Phase 1 of the Sino-US trade deal. As noted above, market share is primary. The US election, if it is relevant at all, is subsidiary. The Trump administration is furious because the turmoil threatens to upset the US election. As for Iran, Russia does at least consider its position, but is driven by its own needs and, as usual, threw Iran under the bus when necessary. Russia will continue to support the Iranian regime in other ways. And if the consequence of the market-share war is government change in the US, then Iran has its reward. Clearly President Putin was willing to throw President Trump under the bus, as well. It was not surprising to see US officials singling out Russia when discussing the oil-price collapse last week and earlier this week, when US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin and Russia’s foreign minister, Anatoly Antonov, met in Washington. This blame game is consistent with what we think we know: Russia wavered on the deal presented by OPEC. Saudi Arabia was not the instigator.5 Saudi Arabia massively reacted to retaliate against Russia’s declared price war, but it was Russia that refused to agree to more cuts.6 The Trump administration is furious because the turmoil threatens to upset the US election. From Trump’s perspective, oil and gasoline prices weren’t too high, but, now that they are lower, the risk of higher unemployment in key electoral states – even Texas – is elevated. Trump wanted more oil production but not oil market chaos.  Trump wanted more oil production but not oil market chaos. This short-term thinking is likely to drive US policy in advance of the election, although from a long-term point of view the US has little reason to regret Russia’s actions as Russia is ultimately shooting itself in the foot. From an international point of view, the breakdown shows that Russia and KSA are fundamentally competitive, not cooperative, and the fanfare over improving relations was dependent on stronger oil demand, not vice versa. Russia’s strategy for decades – in the Middle East and elsewhere – has been to take calculated risks, not to undertake reckless adventures that expose its military and economic weaknesses relative to the United States and Europe. This strategic logic applies to the market-share war as well as to Russia’s various conflicts with the West. The oil price collapse is bad for Russia’s economy and internal stability and hence the door to talks is still open. The immediate risk to both KSA and Russia is a forward oil curve that stays lower for longer, regardless of what the Russian Finance Ministry says. A reconciliation between KSA and Russia to restore the production-management deal would limit the negative fallout. The immediate risk to both KSA and Russia is a forward oil curve that stays lower for longer, regardless of what the Russian Finance Ministry says.7 Bottom Line: The COVID-19 pandemic and the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 last week in Vienna dramatically heightened uncertainty and volatility in oil markets. Although it appears Russian officials are trying to walk back the market-share war declared at the end of last week, events already in train could keep oil prices lower for longer. We lowered our oil-price forecasts for 2020 to reflect the demand destruction and a possible supply surge this year. The underlying assumption of our modeling on the demand side is the COVID-19 pandemic will be contained and the global economy will be back in working order by 4Q20. On the supply side, nothing is certain, but we are leaning to a re-formation of OPEC 2.0, which ultimately restores the production-management regime that prevailed until last week. Both of these assumptions are highly unstable. We lowered our 2020 Brent forecasts to $40/bbl for 2Q-3Q20, and to $50/bbl for 4Q20. For 2021, we are expecting Brent to average $60/bbl. WTI trades $3-$4/bbl below Brent in our estimates. These forecasts will be constantly reviewed as new information becomes available. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Total stocks of crude oil and products in the US drew another 7.6mm barrels in the week ended March 6, 2020, led by distillates, the EIA reported. Crude and product inventories finished the week at close to 1.3 billion barrels (ex SPR barrels). Total product demand – what the EIA called “Product Supplied” – was up close to 600k b/d, led by distillates (e.g., heating oil, diesel, jet and marine gasoil). Commercial crude oil inventories rose by 7.7mm barrels (Chart 6). Base Metals: Neutral After falling almost to the daily downside limit early on Monday, Singapore ferrous futures staged a recovery on Tuesday when iron ore jumped 33%, as declining inventories of the steelmaking material sparked supply concerns among investors. SteelHome Consultancy reported this week Chinese port-side iron ore stocks dropped to 126.25mm MT, down 3.4% for the year. In addition, China’s General Administration of Customs reported iron ore imports rose 1.5% in the January and February relative to the same period a year ago. The decreasing number of new COVID-19 cases in China should help iron ore and steel going forward as construction and infrastructure projects resume. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices are up 9% YTD, supported by accommodative monetary policy globally in the wake of the rapid spread of COVID-19 cases outside of China. Fixed income markets are pricing in 80bps cuts in the Fed funds rate over the next 12 months. Additionally, negative-yielding debt globally – which is highly correlated with gold prices – increased 26% since January 2020. Continued elevated uncertainty stemming from the spread of the coronavirus keeps demand for safe assets buoyant. We estimate the risk premium in gold prices related to this persistent uncertainty is ~$140/oz (Chart 7). Nonetheless, positioning and technical signal it is overbought and vulnerable to a short-term pullback. Ags/Softs:  Underweight In its World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE), the USDA lowered its season-average price expectations for the current crop year for corn to $3.80/bu, down 5 cents, and for soybeans to $8.70/bu, a decrease of 5 cents. The USDA kept its expectation for wheat at $4.55/bu. The Department estimates global soybean production will increase 2.4mm MT, with most of this stemming from increases in Argentina and Brazil. CONAB, Brazil’s USDA equivalent, confirmed this projected increase, saying the country’s soybean output is poised to rise 8% to a record 124.2 Mn Tons this year. May soybean futures were up slightly, as were corn and wheat on Tuesday. Chart 6 Chart 7   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Russia keeps door open for OPEC amid threats to raise output, published by worldoil.com; Russian ministry, oil firms to meet after OPEC talks collapse -sources, published by reuters.com March 10, 2020, and Russia says it can deal with pain of a Saudi oil price war published by ft.com March 9, 2020. 2     For non-OPEC 2.0 countries, we also included downward adjustments to Libya and US shale production vs. our previous balances 3    Please see “The Russian Enigma,” published by The Churchill Society. See also Kitchen, Martin (1987), “Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2), pp. 415-436. 4    We also would observe Russian producers never fully abided by the output cuts voluntarily in every instance. Often, compliance was due to (1) seasonal maintenance; (2) extreme temperatures in the winter, and (3) the pipeline contamination incident. Thus, producers were probably close to full capacity most of the time OPEC 2.0's production cuts were in place. This implies that for a minor voluntary production cut, Russia enjoyed prices close to $70/bbl, vs. mid $30s currently. This begs the question why they would provoke a market-share war when they would have been better off continuing to flaut their quotas instead of collapsing prices. 5    Please see Mnuchin wants ‘orderly’ oil markets in talk with Russian ambassador published by worldoil.com March 9, 2020. 6    One could argue that while the Saudis reacted quickly and threatened a massive response, they may have been less fearful of a breakdown given the recognition that it could seriously damage Iran’s economy. 7     The Financial Times noted Russia’s confidence that its National Wealth Fund of ~ $150 billion, equivalent to ~ 9% of GDP, which officials believe allows it “to remain competitive at any predicted price range and keep its market share” – i.e., the state will draw down the fund to cover any difference between low oil prices and domestic oil company’s breakeven prices. Energy Minister Alexander Novak said Russia would “pay special attention to providing the domestic market with a stable supply of oil products and protecting the sector’s investment potential.” Please see Russia says it candDeal with the pain of a Saudi price war, published by ft.com March 9, 2020.  

The SPX collapsed on Monday in a mini-crash, reminiscent of the 20% October 1987 Black Monday crash. True, in 1987 the stock market fell 20% in a single day, but it is equally painful when the S&P 500 drops roughly 20% in 13 trading days, erasing 52 weeks of gains. While the equity market is extremely oversold and a short-term bounce is likely, we doubt a V-shaped SPX recovery looms similar to what prevailed following the 20% peak-to-trough December 2018 drawdown. Instead, 1987 (see chart), 2011, 2015/16 and early-2018 are the closest parallels we could think of, when the market had to digest those tremors over a three-to-six month troughing period. We deem the current equity market bottoming process will play out over the next two quarters leaving investors plenty of time to commence deploying long-term capital. Bottom Line: Stay patient before putting cash to work on a 9-12 month horizon, and for additional analysis please look forward to reading our upcoming Monday weekly report.  ​​​​​​​

There is a lot of uncertainty that reverberates through the equity markets and the dust has yet to settle down from Monday’s big crack. Small caps (similar to weak balance sheet stocks, middle panel) have cratered for three reasons: First, they are massively indebted as the bottom panel of the chart shows not only in absolute terms, but also compared with their large cap brethren. Second, small caps have been mired in earnings deflation for a while and the looming recession now aggravates the fall in these high beta stocks. Finally, small caps have a large weighting in financials in general and small regional banks in particular. As such, the recent double whammy of the oil price collapse and bond yield plunge has wreaked havoc in small cap indexes. We have been cyclically avoiding small caps and instead preferring large caps since mid-2018 and late-last year we also added this size preference to our high-conviction call list as a modest hedge to most other high-conviction calls that were levered to higher interest rates. Today, from a portfolio risk management perspective, we are instituting a trailing stop at the 10% return mark in order to protect gains. Bottom Line: Stick with the large cap bias for a while longer.  

Dear Clients, This week we are issuing two Special Alerts on the Russo-Saudi market share war, one of which you have already received. Our weekly publication will proceed as usual on Friday, March 13. In this Special Alert, we update our view of the US election and address the urgent question of US fiscal stimulus. Upcoming reports will address the question of stimulus outside the United States. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Feature Turmoil has engulfed financial markets as a Russo-Saudi market share war erupts at the same time as panic over the coronavirus spreads from China to Europe and the United States. The US and global stock markets are nearing bear market territory while the 10-year Treasury and global bond yields plumb new lows and deeper negatives (Chart 1). Our key risk-off indicators have all broken down (Chart 2). Chart 1The Bear Awakens Chart 2Global Risk-Off While the daily new cases of the virus are far from peaking in the US, the Democratic Party nomination process has eliminated the downside risk of a left-wing populist presidency. Political risk in the US will shift to Congress, fiscal stimulus, the general election, and the “lame duck” risk now threatening President Trump. Trump Not Yet Doomed, But No Longer Favored The US election is now “too close to call,” with the risks tilted toward a Trump loss. Bear markets tend to coincide with recessions (Chart 3). Woe betide a president seeking reelection amid a recession. Chart 3Bear Markets Tend To Coincide With Recessions We need to look to a previous era to identify precedents for Trump’s survival. William McKinley hung onto the office in 1900, Teddy Roosevelt in 1904, and Calvin Coolidge in 1924, all despite recessions.1 Rising unemployment will undo Trump’s re-election bid. In today’s terms, it is still possible that the virus panic will subside over the summer while a wave of global monetary and fiscal stimulus will kick in around September, creating a rebound that sends voters to the polls in an optimistic mood. But it is increasingly unlikely. Unemployment will rise as consumer confidence collapses in the face of the virus outbreak (Chart 4). This is deadly to a president with such narrow margins of victory in the key swing states. Chart 4Confidence Will Suffer, Layoffs To Ensue Chart 5Trump’s Approval Heading South Chart 6Republican Revival To Fall Back The coronavirus scare is already derailing President Trump’s approval rating. It had only tentatively recovered from a very low level throughout his first term and is highly unlikely ever to breach 50% (Chart 5). The surge in voters identifying as Republicans – which had recently, remarkably, surpassed Democrats – will reverse (Chart 6). Our quant election model is “too close to call” but will soon signal Trump loss. Our quant model was already flashing that the election is “too close to call,” due to the negative impact of Trump’s trade war on key swing states like Michigan and Pennsylvania. The weight of a feather can shift Wisconsin into the Democratic camp and turn the election against Trump (Chart 7). The model will inevitably show Trump losing the election once state-level data starts to reflect the virus shock. Chart 7Our Quant Election Model Says “Too Close To Call” … But Virus Panic Will Cause Wisconsin To Switch Bottom Line: The US election is too close to call at this point. With eight months to go, many things could still change, but a spike in unemployment will ruin Trump’s reelection bid. Biden, Not Sanders, Waiting In The Wings Chart 8Biden Has All But Clinched The Democratic Nomination The bad news for Trump – but the good news for markets – is that former Vice President Joe Biden has solidified his status as presumptive nominee for the Democratic Party presidential candidate. Biden romped to victory in Michigan and Missouri on March 10 – and is virtually tied with Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders in Washington, a liberal state that should favor the self-professed democratic socialist Sanders. Biden now clearly leads the count of pledged delegates to the Democratic National Convention on July 13 – and voting patterns in the remaining primary elections would have to reverse entirely in order to give Sanders a 1,991-vote majority of delegates in the first round of voting in July (Chart 8). It is unlikely that Sanders can deprive Biden of a majority of delegates even though he will trounce Biden in the final debate on March 15. The important state elections on March 17 are all favorable to Biden: Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Ohio. Our delegate projections show Biden winning an outright majority by May 12 (Chart 9). Chart 9Biden Set To Win Majority Of Democratic Delegates By Spring Over the past year many clients have argued to us that neither Biden nor Sanders is electable. We have rejected this view on the basis that the economic cycle would most likely determine the election, since Trump had the misfortune of being a late-cycle president. The financial markets have dodged a bullet with Biden’s nomination since Sanders was capable of winning the nomination and now, with an impending recession, would be even odds (or favored) to take the White House. Chart 10Head-To-Head Polls Show Trump Vulnerability Average head-to-head polls show both Biden and Sanders beating Trump in the battleground states. This always suggested that Trump was highly vulnerable. But on the margin Biden is more electable than Sanders: he polls better against Trump than any Democrat, while Trump polls worse against him than any Democrat. Biden has an Electoral College pathway to victory via Florida and Arizona, as well as via the Midwestern states where Sanders is also competitive (Chart 10). Democrats ultimately chose Biden because he seemed the most likely to beat Trump. He also has the best position on the issue most important after the economy, which is health care (Chart 11). This reputation comes from his association with both President Barack Obama and the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). A contested convention, in which the Democratic Party splits and progressive voters sit out the election, was always unlikely and is now virtually foreclosed. As he clinches the nomination Biden will seek to win over the support of progressives by choosing a progressive running mate and adopting more left-leaning policies on issues like inequality and the environment. Chart 11Democrats Chose Biden To Win And Restore Obamacare Chart 12Democratic Primary Turnout Strong In Vital Midwest Voter turnout in the primary elections suggests that voters are fired up in the Midwest (Michigan, Minnesota) but more complacent in the South (Texas, North Carolina) (Chart 12). Primary elections are different from general elections, but a worsening economy will provoke higher turnout. At minimum these data reinforce the point above that Trump is highly vulnerable in the Midwestern “Blue Wall” that narrowly brought him to power. Bottom Line: Biden is not only electable but at this stage equally likely as Trump to sit in the Oval Office in 2021. This is a market-positive policy outcome compared with the alternative – a Sanders presidency – which was almost equally probable in the event of a recession. Financial markets will see Biden as less negative than Sanders on regulation and taxes, and less negative than Trump on trade and foreign policy. Fiscal Stimulus A major source of uncertainty surrounding the election is fiscal policy, as a Democratic victory implies an increase in taxes on households and businesses. Not only is there a spike in tax provisions set to expire (top panel, Chart 13), but President Trump’s signature Tax Cut and Jobs Act could be repealed if he loses or made permanent if he wins. Chart 13Fiscal Uncertainty Looms Over US The short-term outlook is also in flux because the Trump administration is frantically trying to piece together an economic stimulus package to respond to the coronavirus shock. Democrats control the House of Representatives and have an incentive to delay and water down Trump’s stimulus proposals. However, they cannot be seen as playing politics with the nation’s health and livelihood and will ultimately agree to fiscal stimulus. This contradiction implies that financial markets will experience ongoing volatility as talks take place. Ultimately, Trump and the Democrats will cooperate, particularly as the financial constraint intensifies through market selling. Trump’s bid will be to stimulate the overall economy while House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer will target the virus so as to keep the nation’s attention on health care without granting Trump a re-election fiscal bonus. The most significant short-term stimulus on offer would be a cut to payroll taxes. Trump’s preference may be to eliminate the entire 6% tax levied on worker income permanently, but he is more likely to get something on the magnitude of the 2011-12 temporary payroll tax cut (second panel, Chart 13). This was a two percentage point reduction in the tax (to 4%) for one year that ended up being extended for a second year. The size of the impact is roughly $75 billion for each percentage point for each year ($300 billion for two percentage points over two years). The risk is that the House Democrats may require modifications to Trump’s Tax Cut and Jobs Act that cause an impasse and financial markets to sell off before an agreement is reached.2 The Democrats, for their part, have a wish list of spending programs that they will insist on in exchange for a payroll tax cut. In particular they will seek to expand unemployment insurance for workers who lose their jobs in the impending slowdown, food stamps for unemployed and for children at home amid school closures, and mandatory paid leave (for parents with kids at home as well as sick people). The bill for such items can easily add up to $50-$100 billion in new spending. In addition, Congress and the White House have already approved an $8 billion virus mitigation package and additional packages of this size can happen quickly as the crisis requires. Trump is interested in another round of farm aid, given that China will fall short of its commodity purchases under the “phase one” trade deal, which could amount to $12-$15 billion. And Trump could always unilaterally rollback some of his tariffs on China or other trade partners. The combination of new spending and payroll tax cuts could bring the package to the $300-$400 billion range that Trump’s top economic adviser, Larry Kudlow, disapprovingly said was out of the question. It could easily amount to half of that. If the market continues to tank and the outlook for the US economy grows blacker, it will convince the Democrats that Trump is ruined unless they hurt their own image by appearing blatantly obstructionist amid a crisis. Bear in mind that the market wants a substantial stimulus not only because of the desire for a clear rebound in activity once the virus panic subsides, but also because the increasing odds of a Democratic victory in November mean that US tax rates will go up and corporate earnings will be revised downward. The country now faces a 50% chance of a 1%-2% fiscal tightening for each year in 2021-25 (Chart 14). Chart 14Biden Tax Hike Will Hit Corporate Earnings Chart 15US Fiscal Thrust To Surprise To Upside Thus a 1% of GDP fiscal stimulus for 2020 is the minimum necessary to improve sentiment. The US fiscal thrust – the change in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit – has already turned slightly positive this year, from what was expected to be a slight negative, due to a fiscally profligate budget deal between Trump and the Democrats last year (Chart 15). The one thing these blood enemies have in common is the need for more spending. Infrastructure spending is popular and has room to rise. Eventually the US will get stimulus, and it will surprise to the upside, even if the Democrats drag their feet to ensure that maximum political damage is inflicted on Trump this year. Not only is the fiscal setting inherently more dovish than it was in 2008, but Congress is bailing out plague-stricken households, not just Wall Street, this time around. The real game changer would be an infrastructure package. Americans spend about $140 billion or 0.7% of GDP each year on transport infrastructure, but popular opinion in both major political parties supports increases (Chart 16). The proposed sums are very large – Trump is proposing $1 trillion over a decade while Biden is proposing $1.3 trillion. The House Democrats have a bill worth $760 billion in new spending over five years ready to be passed. Also Trump is willing to capitulate on the Democrats’ preferred type of spending (direct deficit spending) due to his election constraint. These plans are all projecting considerable infrastructure spending on top of the Congressional Budget Office’s base line projection (Chart 17). Chart 16US Spends 0.7% Of GDP On Infra Each Year Chart 17Median Voter Wants More Infra Spending The fiscal multiplier of government spending is generally higher than tax cuts. Furthermore, the coronavirus hurts the economy by frightening households into their homes, which means that even the Democrats’ proposed cash transfers for low-income earners (those with a high marginal propensity to consume) may be impeded. Government-mandated infrastructure spending, by contrast, ensures that economic activity will pick up once the measures take effect (that is, with a 6-12 month lag … something the Democrats will become increasingly willing to agree to this spring given the election calendar). The impending US fiscal stimulus provides justification for going long infrastructure, construction, engineering, materials, mining, and environmental services sub-sectors included in the BCA Infrastructure Equity Basket (Chart 18). China’s large-scale stimulus measures reinforce this recommendation, since these firms are levered to China/EM growth. On a tactical basis, this trade is akin to catching a falling knife. Given our expectation that the world still faces challenges in overcoming the current turmoil, and the Democrats will hem and haw so as not to grant Trump his re-election wish list immediately, we await an opportune time to initiate this trade. A final reason to remain defensive on risk assets: the “lame duck” risk. If and when Trump’s re-election appears out of reach, he has an incentive to turn the tables. This could involve a radical or disruptive move in foreign or trade policy (e.g. on Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, China, or even Russia). At that point Trump could attempt to cement his legacy of cold war with China, or he could even lash out against Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has ostensibly stabbed him in the back by initiating a market share war with Saudi Arabia that may not be pieced back together in time to prevent job losses in shale oil swing states (Chart 19). Chart 18Look For Chance To Go Long Infrastructure Stocks Chart 19A Russo-Saudi Oil Market War Hurts Trump In Shale Swing States Presidential powers are least constrained in the international sphere. At the moment Trump is trying to save the economy and his presidency. But if it becomes a foregone conclusion that they cannot be saved, then he becomes a pure liability for risk assets. Housekeeping We are throwing in the towel on our US tech sector shorts for a loss of 36% and 11%, respectively, and also closing our long Thailand relative trade for a loss of 17%. We are also closing our tactical long Italian government bonds relative to Spanish for a loss of 2%. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Coincidentally all were Republicans, like Trump – not that it matters. 2 The Democrats may seek to have Trump increase the tax rate on the highest income earners to the pre-TCJA level, or they may seek to increase the cap on the state and local tax deduction, which allows households (mostly high-income earners) in high-tax states to reduce their federal tax bill.