アメリカ合衆国

Highlights Portfolio Strategy We have identified 20 reasons to start buying equities. We highlight positive catalysts that should underpin the equity market as the pandemic progresses. Investors with higher risk tolerance should continue to layer in slowly and put cash to work with a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon. Consumer staples in general and hypermarkets and household products in particular are defensive areas where we are comfortable to deploy fresh longer-term oriented capital. Recent Changes Erratic trading compelled us to close out all our high-conviction calls for the year last Friday, booking handsome gains for our portfolio.1 Table 1 Feature Equities oscillated violently last week and remain mostly rudderless (Chart 1). While the relentless COVID-19 news bombardment kept on feeding the bears, on the flip side monumental monetary easing and fiscal packages the world over emboldened the bulls. This tug of war is far from over, but it is becoming crystal clear that both monetary and fiscal authorities will throw the proverbial kitchen sink at it until the hemorrhaging stops. Last week we showed that it takes a median two full years for the SPX to make fresh all-time highs following a bear market.2 This week we highlight the median and mean profile of the bear market recoveries since WWII (Chart 2). Crudely put, if history at least rhymes the SPX will not make any fresh all-time highs until early 2022. Chart 1Rudderless Chart 2Profile Of A Bear As a reminder, our equity market roadmap for the next few months is a drawn out consolidation phase leaving investors ample time to shift portfolios and put cash to work. This bottoming roadmap is something akin to the 1987, 2011, 2015/16 or early-2018 episodes.3 We cannot rule out further downside to equities. Moreover, we can neither time the tops nor the bottoms. However, the same way we were cautioning investors not to chase this market higher – as we were not willing to risk 100-200 points of SPX upside for a potential 1000 point drawdown – we are now compelled to nibble on the way down. Turning over to volatility, the VIX hit 85.47 intraday last week and clocked its highest close since the history of the data. Its sibling the VXO (volatility on the OEX or S&P 100) that predated the VIX hit an intraday high of 172.79 on Tuesday, following Black Monday, October 20, 1987, and clearly warns that if another crash takes root the VIX will explode higher.4 Importantly, vol at 85 translates into a 25% move in the SPX, in either direction, in the next 30 days. Chart 3 shows that actual SPX realized volatility jumped to 103 last week, trumping the VIX’s spike. Historically, when realized volatility trumps the VIX, it is time to sell the VIX; the opposite is also true. Given that we still do not expect a repeat of the GFC, or a depression, we recommend investors with higher risk tolerance start to deploy long-term oriented capital in the equity market. Chart 3Realized Versus Implied Vol Below are 20 reasons to start buying equities. We highlight positive catalysts that should underpin the equity market as the pandemic progresses. We are already in recession. Markets trough in recessions and historically offer enticing risk/reward return profiles. China’s manufacturing PMI and other hard data fell below the GFC lows. As a general rule of thumb investors should buy stocks when the global PMI is well below 50 (Chart 4). Cupboards are bare. A drawdown in inventories is usually followed by a jump in production. That is one of the reasons to be bullish staples. As for durables, pent-up demand due to delayed purchases will eventually be violently unleashed, especially given zero rates. Consumers will benefit from the oil market carnage and the super low mortgage refinancing rates. The Fed cut rates to zero, did QE5, and brought back the alphabet soup of programs like CPFF, PDCF and MMLF from the GFC, more will likely follow (Chart 5). Chart 4Time To Buy Chart 5The Fed Put The DXY has gone from 95 on March 9 to 103 on Friday. King dollar will soon have to reverse course and provide some much-needed relief globally as the Fed’s US dollar swap lines aim to alleviate the shortage of US dollars (Chart 6). Keep in mind what Dr. Bernanke told Scott Pelley in a 60 Minutes interview with regard to money creation: “PELLEY: Is that tax money that the Fed is spending? BERNANKE: It's not tax money. The banks have accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed (emphasis ours). So it's much more akin to printing money than it is to borrowing.”5 Other global Central Banks are cutting rates and doing QE. Beyond Christine Lagarde’s recent €750bn bazooka, the ECB has the OMT ready from previous crises. Already last week the ECB intervened in Italian BTPs via Banca d’Italia. Germany has hinted that it would not be opposed to a “Covid-bond” A mega US fiscal package looms near the $1tn mark.6 The recession-related automatic stabilizers and government spending will soar. China’s fiscal response will likely be as large as in late 2008 (as a reminder in Q4/2008 the Chinese fiscal spending announcement equated “to 12.5% of China’s GDP in 2008, to be spent over 27 months”7). Germany and a slew of other countries have already pledged fiscal spending. Spain has announced a 20% of GDP package. Countries will bid-up the size of the bailout. IMF announced a $1tn bailout package. Nibbling at stocks when the VIX is at 85 makes sense versus when the VIX is at 12 (Chart 7). Chart 6Greenback Falls And Rates Rise When The Fed Does QE Chart 7Compelling Entry Point   The yield curve slope is steepening (Chart 8). Chart 8The Yield Curve Always Leads Stocks The 10-year real Treasury yield hit a low of -50bps that indicator has also priced in recession (Chart 7). Chart 9Recession Nearly Fully Priced In Equity market internals have fully priced recession, small caps and weak balance sheet stocks in particular (Chart 9). Sentiment is washed out as per our Capitulation, Sentiment and Complacency-Anxiety Indicators (Chart 9). Bernie Sanders has lost his bid to become the nominee of the Democratic Party. Buffett will either bailout a company or two or buyout a company he likes. Jamie Dimon and/or other prominent CEOs (insiders) will start buying their own company stock. Social-distancing measures in the West will ultimately break the Epidemic Curve first derivative and arrest the panic. Even if COVID-19 comes back in force, the fact is that most of the patients who succumb to it are elderly. In Italy, the average age of death is 80 years old. As such, the final circuit-breaker ahead of a GFC would be desensitization by the population, as selective quarantines – targeting the elderly cohorts – get implemented in order to allow other people to return to work. Furthermore, two “silver bullet” solutions remain as tail risks to the bearish narrative. First, a biotech or pharmaceutical company may make a breakthrough in the fight against COVID-19. Not necessarily a vaccine, but a treatment. Finally, upcoming warm weather in the northern hemisphere may also help the fight against the virus.   Nevertheless, there are some risks we are closely monitoring. First, if we are offside and this turns into a GFC, another big down-leg will ensue. One reason for this would be a Spanish Flu parallel where the second wave of deaths trounced the first wave. In that case, the GDP contraction will be longer-lived and SPX EPS will suffer a long-lasting setback. Second, a credit crunch can cause a credit event, which is a big risk as we have been highlighting recently. Counter party as well as bank insolvency risks will also come into play. Third, non-financial non tech corporate net debt-to-EBITDA is at all-time highs according to company reported data and non-financial corporate debt as a percent of GDP is at all-time highs according to national accounts (Chart 10). Finally, while lower rates are helpful in the long run, a long era of low rates in Japan and more recently the euro area have not helped equities in the longer-term. The NIKKEI 225 is still down 58% from the December 1989 all-time highs and the MSCI Eurozone index is down 46% from the March 2000 all-time highs (Chart 11). Chart 10Risk: Too Much Indebtedness Chart 11Japan And The Euro Area Are Scary ZIRP Parallels Netting it all out, following a nine-month cyclical period of being in the bearish camp, we are now selectively nibbling on stocks with a 9-12 month time horizon, as we deem the potential positive catalysts will overwhelm the few risks that we are closely monitoring. This week we reiterate our overweight stance in the second largest defensive sector – the S&P consumer staples index – and two of its key sub-components. Continue To Favor Defensive Staples… Consumer staples stocks have caught on fire lately as investors have been seeking refuge in defensive equities during the current “risk off” phase. Behind health care (15.6% of the SPX weight), their safe haven siblings, staples are the second largest defensive sector comprising 8.5% of the S&P 500, and we reiterate our overweight stance in this sector. Historically, staples equities thrive in recessions and in deflationary/disinflationary environments. The reason is the allure of their stable cash flows especially in times of duress when growth is really hard to come by, a staples company growing revenues 5%/annum is sought after aggressively. Currently, relative share prices have troughed near the GFC bottom, and are probing to break out of the one standard deviation below the historical time trend mean (Chart 12), offering a compelling entry point to deploy new capital. Chart 12Bouncing Last week’s jump in unemployment insurance claims to 281,000 is a small precursor of things to come as more parts of the US get locked down (middle panel, Chart 13). This recessionary backdrop, coupled with the surging VIX, which will take months to die down to 20 near the historical average, and investors hiding in Treasurys all argue that it pays to stay with defensive staples stocks (top & bottom panels, Chart 13). Two of our preferred vehicles to continue to explore an overweight in the consumer staples sector are via above benchmark allocation in both hypermarkets and household products stocks. Chart 13Sticks With Staples …Stick With Hypermarkets… Last summer, following our recession thought experiment report8 we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight preparing our portfolio for the inevitable recession.9 Since then, hypermarket stocks have bested the SPX by over 36%. While a consolidation phase looms that will allow hypermarkets to build a base before vaulting higher, today we are instituting a rolling 10% stop from the highs in order to protect handsome gains for our portfolio. The savings rate more than trebled from the GFC lows as the once in a generation Great Recession scared consumers. The savings rate has remained elevated ever since and is primed to rise further in the current recession as consumers tighten their purse strings. Historically, relative share prices and the savings rate have been positively correlated as even wealthier consumers opt for rock bottom selling price points. The current message is to expect a durable bidding up phase of hypermarket equities (Chart 14). Chart 14When The Going Gets Tough, Buy Hypermarkets The soaring greenback is underpinning these pricing strategies from Big Box retailers as it keeps import prices in deflation, allowing retailers to pass these on to the consumer (fourth & bottom panels, Chart 15). The recent drubbing in oil prices is an added catalyst to boost hypermarket equities as lower prices at the pump will translate into more cash in consumers’ wallets (top panel, Chart 15). Keep in mind that WMT is the number one grocery store in the US with near 25% market share – COST is also a large mover of US groceries – thus the coronavirus pandemic will not deal a blow to their demand profile. Chart 15Defense Is… The 10-year Treasury yield recently melted to 0.31%, fully discounting ZIRP, QE5 and recession. Last week’s Philly Fed survey made for grim reading, a harbinger of acute economic pain in the weeks to come. Tack on the 40% jump in weekly unemployment insurance claims, and things are falling into place for additional gains in relative share prices (Chart 16). Finally, overall tighter financial conditions and the more than doubling in the junk spread also corroborate that the path of least resistance remains higher for hypermarket equities (second & middle panels, Chart 15). Bottom Line: We reiterate our overweight stance in the S&P hypermarkets index. Today, we are also instituting a risk management metric in order to protect profits: we are implementing a rolling 10% stop from the highs in order to protect gains. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HYPC – WMT, COST. Chart 16…The Best Offense   …And Overweight Household Products Household products stocks have recently bounced off of long-term support and have sling shot higher (Chart 17). While we continue to recommend an above benchmark allocation of this safe haven index, we are also obliged to initiate a 5% rolling stop in order to protect our recent explosive gains. We reckon that the COVID-19 experience will scar consumers and alter behaviors with long lasting effects. We doubt this sanitization craze will completely subside following the passing of the pandemic. Our sense is that use of disinfectants and cleaning products in general will experience a parallel shift higher in the demand curve. Chart 17Held The Line Therefore, consumer outlays on household products will continue to gain share from the overall spending pie and underpin relative share prices (top panel, Chart 18). US household products exports are another important source of demand for the industry. Exports recently ticked higher and the coronavirus pandemic underscores that US manufacturers that are held in high regard abroad especially sanitation household products will struggle to meet export demand (bottom panel, Chart 18). Domestically, overall grocery store level wholesale selling prices are expanding smartly paving the way for a similar trajectory for household products pricing power (second panel, Chart 18). Importantly, given the recent consumer behavior, shortages all but assure that non-durable goods factories will be humming at a time when almost all other industries will grind to a halt (third panel, Chart 18). Moreover, household products are part of consumer goods that have a fairly inelastic demand profile and really shine during recessions. The recent collapse of the Philly Fed survey heralds a durable outperformance phase for household products equities (Chart 18). While relative valuations appear expensive, relative forward EPS and revenues are slated to trail the market in the coming 12 months. If our thesis pans out then household products stocks will grow into their pricey valuations as profits will overwhelm (Chart 19). Chart 18Demand Driven Advance In fact, our macro based S&P household products sale per share growth model does an excellent job in capturing all these drivers and signals that top line growth will continue to accelerate for the rest of the year (Chart 20). Chart 19Low Bar To Surpass Chart 20Macro Model Says Buy Bottom Line: Stick with the S&P household products index, but institute a 5% rolling stop from the highs in order to protect profits. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOPRX – PG, CL, KMB, CLX, CHD. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Closing Out All High-Conviction Calls” dated March 20, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Inflection Point” dated March 16, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Gravitational Pull” dated March 12, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4    http://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/vix-options-and-futures/vix-index/vix-historical-data 5    https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ben-bernankes-greatest-challenge/2/ 6    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, “Don’t Be A Hero” dated March 11, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 7     https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Public%20Governance%20Issues%20in%20China.pdf 8    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 9    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Divorced From Reality” dated July 15, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views June 3, 2019 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert)  January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth May 10, 2018 Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%) June 11, 2018 Long the BCA  Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V).

Highlights Financial markets are in a state of upheaval, and no one knows where or when they’ll bottom: We reiterate that it’s too early to dive back into equities or spread product. The policy path is not nearly as clear as it was during the last crisis, and central banks and legislatures may be hard-pressed to blunt the effects of a pandemic until it’s contained: Developed-world central banks and legislatures are committed to doing whatever they can to aid their economies, but their measures won’t gain full traction until the coronavirus is bottled up. Uncertainty breeds opportunities, however, … : There’s a good chance that the baby will be thrown out with the bathwater as the selling accentuates and turns indiscriminate. … so we’re seeking out the most attractive risk-reward profiles: Those with cash who keep their head may find multiple opportunities to earn outsized profits. We’re actively trying to insulate ourselves from the current surge of emotion. Feature We don’t know. We don’t know where stocks will bottom, or when. We don’t know how much the economy will contract, or how long second-round effects will extend the recession. We don’t know how many businesses will go bust, or how many people will lose jobs and default on mortgages and other loans. But no one ever does in the midst of crashes, or when a sudden-stop economic tsunami looms, and only the foolish, naïve or arrogant think they do. Investing is never a sure thing, and its difficulty is a feature, not a bug. Alpha is earned by correctly intuiting securities’ future direction from a limited number of data points. We were slow to grasp the global health ramifications of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, and the probability of a 2020 recession turned out to be considerably larger than we judged. We were also off the mark when we said the economy would likely bottom swiftly, roughly tracing the course of a V. We did not foresee the economically crippling strictures that would be imposed to slow COVID-19’s spread. We now recognize that the recession will be quite severe and that the market rout has further to go for as long as the self-reinforcing adverse consequences from quarantine-like conditions continue unabated. We suspect that markets are giving short shrift to the idea that something could short-circuit the vicious circle, however, and on that basis we think the outlook may not be as unrelentingly gloomy as market action is making it out to be. To be clear, we do not think risk assets have bottomed. We do not think investors should be in any rush whatsoever to buy stocks or spread product. Investors with cash should not lose sight of the fact that they are in control right now, and they should strike a hard bargain before parting with it. We still have a constructive 12-month view, however, and we do think investors should be making lists of assets they find attractive and the prices where they’d happily own them. We sketch out the reasons why across the following pages, but the nature of the analysis departs from our typical data-driven process. Market action has left the data far behind as investors have rushed to apply valuation haircuts in advance of economic releases that are sure to be dreadful. We are therefore pulling our focus out to 30,000 feet in this report, and highlighting the mindset we’re trying to bring to the task of navigating markets caught in the throes of peak fear. Crises Happen [W]hen the crisis began, governments around the world were too slow to act. When action came, it was late and inadequate. Policy was always behind the curve, always chasing an escalating crisis. And as the crisis intensified and more dramatic government action was required, the emergency actions meant to provide confidence and reassurance too often added to public anxiety and to investor uncertainty. The force of government support was not comprehensive or quick enough to withstand the deepening pressure brought on by a weakening economy. … We believe that the policy response has to be comprehensive, and forceful. There is more risk and greater cost in gradualism than in aggressive action. We believe that action has to be sustained until recovery is firmly established.1 Monetary and fiscal policy measures can still move markets, but their full effect won't be felt until the coronavirus is contained. Here we go again. Confronted with freefalling markets and the prospect of widespread business failures, Congress is preparing a gigantic fiscal stimulus package aimed at limiting the second-order effects of the crippling measures implemented to stem COVID-19’s spread and the Fed has already raided its 2008-9 playbook (Table 1). Officials could lift much of Treasury Secretary Geithner’s 2009 remarks announcing the stress tests to explain the rationale for the measures they’re proposing now. The difference is that policymakers in 2008 and 2009 could directly wield their monetary and fiscal tools to backstop a wobbling banking system, whereas now, the potent resources they’ve marshaled to spur the economy won’t be able to take full effect until the pandemic recedes. Table 1Borrowing From The 2008-09 Playbook As much as investors pine for a policy measure that puts a firewall around markets, and the cumulative global monetary and fiscal responses become truly substantial, the selloff may continue to rage until withering deleveraging pressure abates. The pattern may be very similar to 2009, when the S&P 500 didn’t bottom until four weeks after the financial crisis effectively ended upon Secretary Geithner’s pledge that the Treasury would provide sufficient capital to any of the largest 19 banks that failed the stress tests (Chart 1). Chart 1Deleveraging Pressure Might Drag On Stocks Even After Policymakers Fire Their Bazookas One Damn Thing After Another As we noted at the outset, investors are currently bedeviled by a multitude of significant unknowns about the coronavirus. Even epidemiologists don’t know if social distancing measures will be enough to arrest its spread within the US, how severe the mortality rate will be, or how long it will take to develop more effective treatment protocols. The current plunge was triggered by a pandemic that hadn’t occurred on a similar scale since the 1918-19 Spanish influenza outbreak, but significant unknowns are at the heart of every financial market panic. We were in the audience at the Economic Club of New York in October 2007, during the early stages of the subprime crisis, when Fed Chair Bernanke, asked what market and economic information he would like to have to improve the Fed’s decision-making process, replied, “I’d like to know what those damn things [securitized credit products] are worth.”2 Markets’ Outstanding Characteristic As Benjamin Graham pointed out repeatedly in The Intelligent Investor, markets have a deeply entrenched tendency to overreact. “The market is always making mountains out of molehills and exaggerating ordinary vicissitudes into major setbacks.”3 “[W]hen an individual company … begins to lose ground in the economy, Wall Street is quick to assume that its future is entirely hopeless and it should be avoided at any price.”4 “[T]he outstanding characteristic of the stock market is its tendency to react excessively to favorable and unfavorable influences.”5 In times of severe stress, the market tendency to overreact at the individual-stock level radiates out to the entire market. As the buzzards circle, and the margin calls arrive, investors scramble to sell stocks that have managed to dodge the brunt of the decline, and therefore bring something closer to their perceived fair value than the stocks that have already been savaged. In Dennis Gartman’s memorable phrasing, “when the cops raid the house of ill repute, they take away the good girls and the piano player, too.” The indiscriminate selling that draws better stocks into the vortex creates opportunities, and it seems to us that there must be many sound issues that are being tarred with the same brush as companies in the travel, hospitality, restaurant and brick-and-mortar retail industries, and the oil producers who are caught in the Russia-Saudi Arabia crossfire. Outstanding Investors’ Characteristics About 25 years ago, we read the Market Wizards profiles of elite traders before interviewing for trading positions with broker-dealers. We distilled them into seven characteristics of successful traders that were at the heart of our pitch: Competitiveness, Humility, Ability to Psychologically Handle Losses, Patience, Discipline, Emotional Detachment and Willingness to Be a Contrarian. We haven’t worked on a trading desk in a while, but those qualities would suit all investors, and we think they’re especially apropos at times of peak emotion. No one can manufacture them out of nothing, but by keeping them in mind, and trying to live up to them, we can draw on the reserves we do possess to make better decisions in the midst of the rout (Table 2). Cash is precious right now, and investors should part with it only when they're certain they're getting quite a bit in return. Table 2Honing One's Mental Edge What Now? We reiterate that it is too early to re-risk portfolios. Markets in the throes of daily convulsions are not healthy markets, and we do not expect that stocks will bottom until there is evidence that the global virus infection curve is flattening. Investors should always prune or exit positions that have become poor fits as the backdrop changes, but we would not dramatically alter asset allocation strategies now. Take a deep breath, and focus on the internal aspects you can control. Cash is precious during major selloffs, because it stabilizes portfolios while the storm rages and provides valuable optionality when it inevitably ends. We would deploy it slowly, via limit orders below the market in selected stocks that have been unfairly lumped in with the most vulnerable issues. We continue to embrace the idea of writing out-of-the-money puts in stocks we would happily own at lower levels. When the VIX spent most of last week in the 70s and 80s (Chart 2), implied volatilities on single-stock options soared into the triple digits. In the four largest banks, it was possible to earn an annualized return exceeding 100% by writing an April put between 12 and 15% below last sale (Box, page 8). Similar opportunities must be available in other besieged industries. Chart 2Implied Volatility On S&P 500 Index Options Made A New All-Time High These are unquestionably trying times for investors of all stripes, but they are especially hard on those with long-only mandates. Professional investors add much of their value by saving their clients from themselves – by keeping them from succumbing to the temptation to go all-in near market tops and run screaming from risk assets near market bottoms. We all need to make a conscious effort to overcome counterproductive emotions and impulses when markets plunge; reminders that the general pattern is similar, even if the specific circumstances change, help us to keep our eye on the ball. Trying to live up to the seven items we memorized 25 years ago when trying to secure a junior seat on a trading desk does, too.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Box: Extreme Volatility In SIFI Bank Options There are two possible outcomes for an investor who writes a put option. The option will expire without being exercised, in which case the writer will pocket the premium, or the holder will exercise it, compelling the writer to purchase the stock at the strike price. The writer keeps the premium in that case, too, so that his/her basis in the stock is equivalent to the strike price less the premium. The top panel in Table 3 shows the pricing data for April puts on the four largest banks with strike prices 12 to 15% below Thursday’s closing prices. The bottom panel uses that data to calculate the implied annualized return for each put option in the event that it is not exercised, and the option writer’s basis in the stock as a share of its tangible book value in the event that it is. Table 3Insuring SIFI Equities Is Tremendously Expensive We understand that banks are on the credit front lines, and that defaults will impair their book value. We further understand that their net interest margins, and therefore their revenues, are pressured by declines in longer-term interest rates, though it is our long-held conviction that markets overestimate the largest banks’ exposure to a flattening yield curve. The decision to own them is hardly a slam dunk, but the cost of insuring against further declines is staggering. We recognize that not every investor has discretion to write puts, and it is not something to be done lightly in any event. Writers of puts on SIFI banks are being paid annualized returns of 100% because equity prices are plunging, and investors are especially worried about banks’ exposure to the spreading pain. The compensation is so high, however, that we think the risk-reward proposition merits careful consideration. It may not be a no-brainer to write puts on the SIFI banks right now, but we certainly wouldn’t buy them at these prices. Footnotes 1 Prepared Remarks by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner Introducing the Financial Stability Plan, February 10, 2009. Accessed from https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg18.aspx on March 18, 2020. 2https://www.econclubny.org/legacyarchive/-/blogs/2007-ben-bernanke Accessed on March 18, 2020. The referenced Q&A exchange begins at the 51:49 mark. 3 Graham, Benjamin, The Intelligent Investor, HarperCollins: New York, 2005, p. 97. 4Ibid, p. 15 5Ibid, p. 18

特別レポート

Dear Client, This week, I provided an update through a webcast on the economic and financial market outlook in the era of the COVID-19 outbreak. You can access the webcast here. In lieu of our regular report this week, we are sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan shows why the most widely cited estimate of the US neutral rate of interest, the Laubach & Williams estimate of “R-star”, is very likely wrong and that the true neutral rate may be higher than many investors believe. While bond yields may not rise significantly in the near-term, this underscores that they have the potential to rise meaningfully over a cyclical and secular horizon once a post-COVID-19 expansion takes hold. I hope you find the report insightful. Please note that next week we will be publishing our quarterly Strategy Outlook. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to the only available real time estimate of the real neutral rate of interest: the Laubach & Williams (“LW”) “R-star” estimate. With this apparent visualization of secular stagnation as a guide, many investors have concluded that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative last year and that recent Fed rate cuts will be of limited benefit to economic activity even once economic recovery takes hold unless inflation meaningfully accelerates (thus pushing real rates lower for any given nominal Fed funds rate). This report revisits the “LW” R-star estimate in detail, and demonstrates why the estimation is almost certainly wrong, at least over the past two decades. We also outline an inferential approach that investors can use to monitor where the neutral rate is in real time and whether it is rising or falling. The core conclusion for investors is that US Treasury yields reflect a “low rates forever” view with much higher certainty than is analytically warranted and thus appear to be anchored by a false narrative. While bond yields may not rise significantly in the near-term, investors should avoid dogmatic medium-to-longer term views about yields as they may rise meaningfully over a cyclical and secular horizon once a post-COVID-19 expansion takes hold. Feature Over the past several weeks financial markets have moved rapidly to price in a global recession stemming from the COVID-19 outbreak. As financial market participants began to turn to policy makers for support, eyes focused first on the Federal Reserve, and then fiscal authorities. Earlier this week, the ECB joined the party and announced aggressive further measures of its own. When responding to the Fed’s return to the lower bound and its other recent monetary policy decisions, many market participants have expressed the view that the Fed is largely impotent to deal with a global pandemic. There are three elements to this view. The first is that interest rate cuts are ill equipped to stimulate domestic demand if quarantine measures or other forms of “social distancing” are in effect. The second element is that the Fed has only been capable of delivering a fraction of the reduction in interest rates compared to what has occurred in response to previous contractions. The third aspect of this view is that because the neutral rate of interest is so much lower now than it was in the past, Fed rate cuts will not be as stimulative as they were before. Chart 1Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative Last Year, According To The LW R-star Estimate While we at least partly agree with the first and second elements of this view, we feel strongly that the third is flawed. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013,1 and have gravitated to the only available real time estimate of the neutral rate of interest: the Laubach & Williams (“LW”) “R-star” estimate. This time series, which is regularly updated by the New York Fed,2 suggests that the real fed funds rate reached neutral territory in the first quarter of 2019 (Chart 1). With this apparent visualization of secular stagnation as a guide, many investors have concluded that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative last year and that recent Fed rate cuts will be of limited benefit to economic activity even beyond the near term unless inflation meaningfully accelerates (thus pushing real rates lower for any given nominal Fed funds rate). In this Special Report we revisit the “LW” R-star estimate in detail, and demonstrate why the estimation is almost certainly wrong, at least over the past two decades. Our analysis does not reveal a precise alternative estimate of the neutral rate, although we do provide some inferential perspective on how investors may be able to monitor where the neutral rate is in real time and whether it is rising or falling. However, the core insight emanating from our report, particularly for US fixed income investors, is that US Treasury yields reflect a “low rates forever” view with much higher certainty than is analytically warranted and thus appear to be anchored by a false narrative. While bond yields may not rise significantly in the near-term, this underscores that they have the potential to rise meaningfully over a cyclical and secular horizon once economic activity recovers. As such, we caution fixed-income investors against dogmatic medium-to-longer term views about bond yields, as their potential to rise may be larger than many investors currently expect. Demystifying The LW R-star Estimate The LW estimate of the neutral rate of interest has gained credibility for three reasons. First, as noted above, the evolution of the series fits with the secular stagnation narrative re-popularized by Larry Summers. Second, the series is essentially sponsored by the Federal Reserve even if it is not officially part of the Fed’s forecasting framework, as its two creators are long-time Fed employees (Thomas Laubach is a director of the Fed’s Board of Governors, and John Williams is the current President of the New York Fed). But, in our view, there is a third important reason that global investors have accepted the LW R-star estimate of the neutral rate of interest: the methodology used to generate the estimate is extremely technically complex, and thus is difficult for most investors to penetrate. Much of the technical complexity of the LW estimate is centered around the use of a statistical procedure called a Kalman filter (“KF”). Simply described, the KF is an algorithm that tries to estimate an unobservable variable based on 1) an idea of how the unobservable variable might relate to an observable variable (the “measurement equation”), and 2) an idea of how the unobservable variable might change through time (the “transition equation”). Through a repeated process of simulating the unobserved variable based on a set of assumptions, the KF is able to compare predicted results to actual results on an observation-by-observation basis, and use that information to generate ever more reliable future estimates of the unobserved variable (Chart 2). Chart 2A Very Simplified Overview Of The Kalman Filter Algorithm We acknowledge that a full technical treatment of the Kalman Filter as it relates to the LW estimate of the neutral rate of interest is beyond the scope of this report, and we provide a more technical overview in Box 1. But what emerges from a detailed analysis of the model is that the Kalman Filter jointly estimates R-star, potential GDP growth, potential GDP, and the variable “z”, the determinants of R-star that are not explained by potential GDP growth. As we will highlight in the next section, this joint estimation of these four variables is a crucial aspect of the model, because a valid estimate of R-star necessitates a valid estimate of the remaining variables. Box 1 A Technical Overview Of The Laubach & Williams R-star Model Debunking The LW R-star Estimate Before criticizing the LW estimate of the neutral rate of interest, it is important for us to note that we have the utmost respect for the Federal Reserve and its research methods. We fully acknowledge that the LW R-star estimation is rooted in solid economic theory, and we have identified no technical errors in the setup of the LW model. Nevertheless, valid analytical efforts sometimes lead to problematic real-world results, and there are two key reasons to believe that the Kalman filter in the LW model is almost certainly misspecifying R-star, at least in terms of its estimate over the past two decades. The first reason relates to the sensitivity of the model to the interval of estimation (the period over which R-star is estimated). Chart 3 presents the range of quarterly estimates of R-star since 2005, along with the difference between the high and low end of the range in the second panel. The chart shows that while previous estimates of R-star have generally been stable for values ranging between the early-1980s and 2006/2007, pre-1980 estimates have varied quite substantially and we have seen material revisions to the estimates over the past decade. Q1 2018 serves as an excellent example: in that quarter R-star was estimated to be 0.14%; today, the Q1 2018 R-star estimate sits at 0.92%. Chart 3Since 2005, There Has Been Some Instability In The LW R-star Estimates   However, Table 1 and Chart 4 highlight the real instability of the Kalman filter estimation by demonstrating the effect of varying the starting point of the model (please see Box 2 for a brief description of how our estimation of R-star using the LW approach differs slightly from the original procedure). Laubach & Williams originally estimated R-star beginning in Q1 1961; Table 1 shows what happens to today’s estimate of R-star simply by incrementally varying the starting point of the model from Q1 1958 to Q4 1979. Table 1Alternative Current LW Estimates Of R-star By Model Starting Point Chart 4Alternative Starting Points Produce Wildly Different Estimates Of R-star Today Box 2 The Laubach & Williams R-star Model With Simplified Inflation Expectations The table highlights that the model fails to even generate a result in a majority of the cases (only 39 out of 88 of the model runs were error-free). In addition, Chart 4 shows that of the successful estimates of R-star using the LW procedure and alternate starting dates of the model, the estimate of R-star today varies from -2% (in one case) to +2%. Excluding the one extremely negative outlier results in an effective estimate range of 0% to 2%, but the key point for investors is that this range is massive and underscores that the original model’s estimate of R-star today is heavily and unduly influenced by the interval of estimation. Investors should also note that of all of the alternative estimates of R-star today shown in Chart 4, the estimate using the original interval is very much on the low end of the distribution. The second (and most important) reason to believe that the LW estimate is misspecifying R-star is that the output gap estimate generated by the model is almost certainly invalid, at least over the past two decades. Chart 5 presents the LW output gap estimate alongside an average of the CBO, OECD, and IMF estimates of the gap; panel 1 shows the official current LW output gap estimate, whereas panel 2 shows the range of output gap estimates that are generated using the different estimation intervals highlighted in Table 1 and Chart 4. Given that the Kalman filter in the LW model jointly determines R-star and the output gap (by way of estimating potential output via estimating potential GDP growth) and that these estimates are dependent on each other, Chart 5 highlights that in order to believe the LW R-star estimate investors must believe three things: That the US economy was chronically below potential in the late-1990s when the unemployment rate was below 5%, real GDP growth averaged nearly 5%, and the equity market was booming, That output exceeded potential in 2004/2005 by a magnitude not seen since the late-1970s / early-1980s despite an average unemployment rate, That the 2008/2009 US recession was not particularly noteworthy in terms of its deviation from potential output, and that the economy had returned to potential output by 2010/2011 when the unemployment rate was in the range of 8-9%. Chart 5The LW Output Gap Estimates, Upon Which R-star Depends, Have Been Wrong For Two Decades While we do not believe any of these three statements, the third is especially unlikely. Chart 6 highlights that the economic expansion from 2009 – 2020 was the weakest on record in the post-war era in terms of average annual real per capita GDP growth. To us, this is a clear symptom of a chronic deficiency in aggregate demand, and that it is essentially unreasonable to argue that the economy was operating at full employment prior to 2014/2015. This means that the Kalman filter is generating incorrect and unreliable estimates of the output gap, which means in turn that the filter’s estimation of R-star is almost assuredly wrong. Chart 6The US Economy Was Definitely Not At Full Employment In 2010 How Can Investors Tell What The Neutral Rate Is? An Inferential Approach Table 2 presents the sensitivity of the original Q1 1961 LW estimate of R-star to a series of counterfactual scenarios for inflation, real GDP growth, nominal interest rates, and import and oil prices since mid-2009. While these scenarios do not in any way improve the validity of the LW R-star estimate, they do help clarify the theoretical basis of the model and they help reveal how investors may infer whether the neutral rate of interest is higher or lower than prevailing market rates, and whether it is rising or falling. Table 2 highlights that today’s estimate of R-star using the original LW approach is mostly sensitive to our counterfactual scenarios for growth and interest rates, but not inflation or oil prices. Shifting down import price growth also has a meaningful effect on R-star, but since core import price growth has been particularly weak over the past several years (Chart 7), it seems unreasonable to suggest that they have been abnormally high and thus “explain” a low R-star estimate today. Table 2Sensitivity Of Current LW R-star Estimate To Counterfactual Scenarios (2009 - Present) Chart 7Core Import Price Growth Has Been Weak On Average During This Expansion Table 2 essentially highlights that the entire question of the neutral rate of interest over the past decade, and the core contradiction that led to the re-emergence of the secular stagnation thesis, can effectively be boiled down to the following simple question: “Why hasn’t US economic growth been stronger this cycle, given that interest rates have been so low?” Based on the (hopefully uncontroversial) view that interest rates influence economic activity and that economic activity influences inflation, we propose the following checklist for investors to ask themselves in order to not only determine the answer to this important question, but to help identify whether R-star in any given country is likely higher or lower than existing policy rates at any given point in time. Are interest rates above or below the prevailing level of economic growth? Are interest rates rising or falling, and how intensely? Are there identifiable non-monetary shocks (positive or negative) that appear to be influencing economic activity? Is private sector credit growth keeping pace with economic growth? Are debt service burdens in the economy high or low? The first question reflects the most basic view of R-star, which is that the real neutral rate of interest should be equal to, or at least closely related to, the potential growth rate of the economy, ceteris paribus. Questions 2 through 5 attempt to determine whether ceteris paribus holds. In terms of how the answers to these questions relate to identifying the neutral rate, consider two economies, “Economy A” and “Economy B” (Chart 8). Economy A has broadly stable or slightly rising interest rates that are well below prevailing rates of economic growth (questions 1 & 2), no obvious beneficial shocks to domestic demand from fiscal policy or other factors (question 3), and strong private sector credit growth that is perhaps above or strongly above the current pace of GDP growth (question 4). Chart 8''Economy A'', Versus ''Economy B'' Inferentially, it would seem that interest rates in this hypothetical economy are below R-star today. Question 5 is in our list because the more that active private sector leveraging occurs (thus pushing up debt burdens), the more that we would expect R-star in the future to fall. This is because debt payments as a share of income cannot rise forever, and we would expect that the capacity of economy A’s central bank to raise interest rates in the future are negatively related to economy A’s private sector debt service burden today. Now, imagine another economy (“Economy B”) with interest rates well below average rates of economic growth, an interest rate trend that is flat-to-down, no identifiable non-monetary policy shocks that are restricting aggregate demand, persistently sluggish credit growth, and high private sector debt service burdens in the past. If economy B is growing (even sluggishly) and not in the middle of a recession, it would seem that prevailing interest rates are below R-star, but not significantly so. In this scenario it would seem reasonable to conclude that R-star in economy B has fallen non-trivially below its potential growth rate, and that interest rate increases are likely to move monetary policy into restrictive territory earlier than otherwise would be the case. Is The United States “Economy B”? From the perspective of some investors, our description of economy B above perfectly captures the experience of the US over the past decade: an extremely low Fed funds rate, sluggish to weak growth and inflation, all the result of a huge build-up in leverage and debt service burdens during the last economic cycle. We do not doubt that R-star fell in the US for some period of time during the global financial crisis and in the early phase of the economic recovery. But we doubt that it is as low today as the secular stagnation narrative would imply, in large part because it ignores several important aspects concerning questions 2 through 5 noted above. Chart 9Fiscal Austerity Has Been A Serious Non- Monetary Shock To Aggregate Demand Non-monetary shocks to the US and global economies: Over the past 12 years, there have been at least five deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies that have contributed to the disconnect between growth and interest rates: 1) a prolonged period of US household deleveraging from 2008-2014, 2) the euro area sovereign debt crisis, 3) fiscal austerity in the US, UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 (Chart 9), 4) the US dollar / oil price shock of 2014, and 5) the recent trade war between the US and China. Several of these shocks have been policy-driven, and in the case of austerity the negative consequences of that policy has led to a lasting change in thinking among fiscal authorities (outside of Japan) that is unlikely to reverse in the near-future. Private sector credit growth: Chart 10 highlights the extent of household deleveraging noted above by showing the growth in total household liabilities over the past decade alongside income growth. Panel 2 shows the leveraging trend of firms, as represented by the nonfinancial corporate sector debt-to-GDP ratio. Chart 10 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it is now growing again and has largely closed the gap with income growth. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector has clearly leveraged itself over the course of the expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. While it is true that firms have largely leveraged themselves to buy back stock instead of significantly increasing capital expenditures, in our view this reflects the fact that US consumer demand was impaired for several years due to deleveraging. We doubt that firms would have altered their capital structures to this degree if they did not view interest rates as extremely low. Chart 10Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Debt service burdens: Chart 11 highlights that US household debt service burdens were at very elevated levels prior to the financial crisis, suggesting that the neutral rate did fall for some time following the recession. But today, the debt burden facing households is the lowest it has been in the past 40 years due to both rate reductions and deleveraging, arguing against the view that household debt levels will structurally weigh on interest rates in the years to come. Chart 12 shows that the picture is different for nonfinancial corporations, as the substantial leveraging noted above has indeed raised debt service burdens for firms. However, the nonfinancial corporate sector debt service ratio remains 400 basis points below early-2000 levels when excess corporate sector liabilities had a clear impact on the economy, suggesting that the Fed’s capacity to raise interest rates still exists following the onset of economic recovery if corporate sector credit growth does not rise sharply relative to GDP over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 11The Debt Burden Facing US Households Is At A Record Low Chart 12Businesses Have Levered Up Their Balance Sheets, But There Is Still Room For Rates To Rise The intensity of recent interest rate changes: Finally, many investors have pointed to sluggish housing activity over the past three years as evidence of a low neutral rate. However, Chart 13 highlights that the rise in the 30-year US mortgage rate from late-2016 to late-2018 was one of the largest two-year changes in US history, and Chart 14 shows that the growth in household mortgage credit did not fall below its trend during this period until Q4 2018, when the US stock market fell 20% from its high in response to the economic consequences of the US/China trade war. Chart 14 also shows that mortgage credit growth responded sharply to a recent reduction in interest rates. All in all, Charts 13 & 14 cast doubt on the notion that the level of mortgage rates over the past three years reached restrictive territory. Chart 13Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late-2016 To Late-2018 Chart 14A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market Investment Conclusions In the face of a global pandemic and an attendant global recession this year, the idea of eventual Fed rate hikes and the notion that the US economy will be able to tolerate them likely seems preposterous to many investors. We agree that over the coming 6-12 months US Treasury yields are unlikely to rise; even at current levels of the 10-year Treasury yield, we are reluctant to call a trough. Chart 15US 10-Year Treasurys Are Mostly Priced For A Repeat Of The Past Decade However, Chart 15 highlights that over a long-term time horizon, the bond market is now essentially priced for a repeat of the ten-year path of the Fed funds rate following the global financial crisis. While some investors will view this as a reasonable expectation in the face of what they see as a persistent and unexplainable gap between growth and interest rates over the past decade, we think this gap is explainable and we highly doubt that a pandemic with minimal mortality risk to the working age population and the young will cause the US economy to be afflicted with active consumer deleveraging lasting 4 to 6-years, substantial and wide-ranging fiscal austerity, persistently rising trade tariffs, and sharply lower oil prices. So while we agree that the US economy will be substantially cyclically affected by COVID-19, US Treasury yields reflect a “low rates forever” view with much higher certainty than is analytically warranted and thus appear to be anchored by a false narrative. As such, we caution fixed-income investors against dogmatic medium-to-longer term views about bond yields, as their potential to rise following the upcoming recession may be larger than many investors currently believe.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    "IMF Fourteenth Annual Research Conference in Honor of Stanley Fischer," Washington DC, November 8, 2013. 2    "Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest," Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix

In our 20+ years in the equity markets we have rarely seen such erratic moves on a daily basis across sectors and subindustries. While our portfolio has withstood the recent tremor, our confidence has taken the back seat with regard to our high-conviction calls for the year initiated in the December 2, 2019 report.1 Therefore we are closing out all high-conviction trades, both overweights and underweights, for a combined relative net gain of 27% (and average gain of 3.4%) since inception. In more detail, our underweight in homebuilders, preference of large caps to small caps and underweight in semi cap names have netted us 43%, 26%, and 6% in gains, respectively (see Charts 1& 2below). On the flip side, the overweight in banks and machinery and underweight in utilities have shaved off 25%, 13% and 12%, respectively (see Charts 1&2 below). Table 1 summarizes all our profits and losses. Further, from a portfolio management perspective we are instituting a rolling 10% stop from the highs on two extremely volatile cyclical positions in order to protect gains: our overweight in the S&P homebuilders index is up 51% since the October 2019 inception, and our large cap over small cap preference is up 45% since the May 2018 inception. Bottom Line: We are moving to the sidelines on the high-conviction calls for the year and are closing out all eight positions for a net gain of 27% (and average gain of 3.4%), since inception. Stay tuned. Chart 1 Chart 2   1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “2020 Key Views: High-Conviction Calls” dated December 2, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.