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Highlights Portfolio Strategy Lack of profit growth, deficient industry demand, perky valuations and extremely overbought conditions all suggest that the time is ripe for an underweight stance in the S&P semi equipment index. The chip down cycle is far from over, leading global semi sales indicators remain downbeat and our semi profit growth model is waving a yellow flag, compelling us to put the S&P semiconductors index on downgrade alert. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P semiconductor equipment index to underweight, today. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 made fresh all-time highs last week, despite the ongoing profit contraction and a well telegraphed hawkish Fed interest rate cut. The “hope rally” continues and the longer it lasts defying sagging profit fundamentals, the larger the snapback will be in the ensuing months. We remain cautious awaiting a turn in our proprietary four-factor macro SPX earnings growth model and in the meantime our strategy is to sell this strength and raise dry powder. Worrisomely, Chart 1 shows that analysts have thrown in the towel and are downgrading SPX long-term profit growth expectations at a faster pace than in the aftermath of the dotcom bubble. Historically, the S&P 500 and its five-year forward EPS growth estimates are joined at the hip, and the current message is bearish for the broad equity market.  Chart 1Will Sinking Profit Growth Expectations Pull Stocks Lower? Importantly, on the valuation front, in May of 2018 we first showed the SPX P/E/G ratio and at the time we accurately argued that “on this valuation measure the SPX appears cheap”.1 How times have changed since then. Following that trough, the P/E/G ratio has nearly doubled and is now sitting right at 1.5 or one standard deviation above the historical mean (we divide the 12-month forward price-to-earnings ratio by the long-term EPS growth rate using I/B/E/S data, second panel, Chart 2). We are clearly in overshoot territory and this valuation metric represents another yellow flag. Chart 2SPX P/E/G Ratio Is In Overshoot Territory Moving on to the bond market, what caught our attention was a recent WSJ article detailing how investors are no longer paying up to own the lowest quality paper and while overall junk spreads were coming in, at the bottom of the pit investors were shunning CCC rated junk bonds.2 What is interesting is that this lowest quality corner of the junk market has some excellent forward looking properties and tends to lead not only the overall junk market, but also equities. Chart 3 shows the CCC rated option adjusted spread (OAS) versus the overall high yield OAS on a year-over-year change basis on inverted scale. This measure of bond market stress is moving in the opposite direction of S&P 500 momentum and we expect stocks to converge lower to this junk bond market stress indicator (JBMSI). Chart 3Bond Market Not Buying Stock Market Euphoria This week we are downgrading a niche tech subgroup that has gone parabolic and updating another early-cyclical tech subindex. The overall corporate bond ratings migration data (defined as downgrades minus upgrades as a percent of total) corroborates the JBMSI message and warns that the steep divergence with stocks is unsustainable (corporate bond ratings migration data shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 4). Chart 4Unsustainable Divergences Similarly, the S&P 500’s net earnings revision ratio is also negative and before long it will exert downward pull on SPX momentum (bottom panel, Chart 4). Under such a backdrop, we continue to recommend investors avoid chasing the broad equity market higher and instead build up their cash coffers, at least until we get a definitive signal that the path of least resistance is higher for profits. This week we are downgrading a niche tech subgroup that has gone parabolic and updating another early-cyclical tech subindex. Sell The Semi Equipment Exuberance Tech stocks have been on a tear with the sector besting the SPX by over 40% since 2015. While such a breakneck pace is unsustainable, what is missing from this outperformance is relative forward earnings participation. In fact, tech profit expectations stalled versus the overall market in late-2018 and have not been able to keep up with relative share prices. In other words, the forward multiple has skyrocketed and is now trading at a 15% premium to the SPX, at a time when relative margins are sinking like a stone (Chart 5). Importantly, given that stock performance should follow profit performance we are perplexed by this dynamic with investors religiously bidding up the sector’s forward multiple. Tack on the recent news of a plunge in overall tech capex growth – especially excluding software – and the tech sector’s bleak profit outlook dims further (Chart 6). Worryingly, within the tech sector the semiconductor equipment space is even more puzzling. Chart 7 shows that relative forward profits are trailing relative share prices as investors have extrapolated the recent positive trade news far into the future. As a reminder this index has a 90% foreign sales exposure with roughly 30% of sales originating from China. As a result, the S&P semiconductor equipment forward P/E is just below the broad market, nearly doubling on a year-over-year basis (middle panel, Chart 7). Chart 5Mind The Gap   Chart 6Even Tech Investment Is Cracking The last time we tried to lean against semi equipment exuberance on the back of deteriorating profit fundamentals was on July 8 when we downgraded this index to underweight. But, we were offside and thankfully our risk management metric (stop loss at -7%) limited our downside a mere ten days later. Chart 7Sell Semi Equipment Stocks Since then, relative share prices have skyrocketed by 40% and we now have more confidence to re-enter our position. Today we recommend a downgrade in the S&P semi equipment index to a below benchmark allocation. This is a speculative/tactical downgrade and thus we also set a trailing stop loss near the -10% relative return mark. While bulls would buy this breakout, we are sticking our heads out and recommend selling the strength and warn that the S&P semi equipment all-time highs look more like a mania, eerily similar to the dotcom bubble era (Chart 8). Chart 8Chip Equipment Mania The contracting ISM manufacturing survey signals that relative share price momentum running at a 60%/annum clip is unwarranted and bound to return to earth (second panel, Chart 9). The same holds true for relative forward profit and revenue growth expectations, especially given the ongoing contraction in global semi sales (third & bottom panels, Chart 9). This deficient demand for semis and therefore semi equipment manufacturers is also apparent in deflating DRAM prices, our industry pricing power proxy. Historically, relative profit expectations and pricing power have moved in lockstep and the current message is to fade sell-side analysts’ buoyancy. Net earnings revisions have slingshot from extreme pessimism to extreme optimism during the past quarter and are vulnerable to disappointment (Chart 10). Chart 9To The Moon… Chart 10…And Back? Not only is the relative share price momentum running at the fastest clip in 19 years, but our proprietary Technical Indicator is also signaling that it is a good time to shun away from these hyper-cyclical tech stocks. The last three times our TI spiked to over one standard deviation above the historical mean, relative share prices corrected on average by 36% in the ensuing 12-18 months (Chart 11). While we are confident to downgrade this index to underweight, there is a risk to our bearish view. Were the U.S. dollar to depreciate definitively from current levels, then it would reflate the global economy and put this position offside. In fact, there are some green shoots in the emerging markets that are appearing, but in order for them to blossom further and not get nipped in the bud the trade-weighted U.S. dollar has to fall (Chart 12). Chart 11Time To Be Contrarian In sum, lack of profit growth, deficient industry demand, perky valuations and extremely overbought conditions all suggest that the time is ripe for an underweight stance in the S&P chip equipment index. Chart 12Risk To View: U.S. Dollar The Global Reflator Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P semi equipment index to underweight, today with a stop loss at the -10% relative return mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC. Is Semi Euphoria Warranted? Similar to the broad tech space and the S&P semiconductor equipment subgroup, semi producers are also showing signs of excess. Chart 13 shows that relative forward EPS are in a clear and steep downtrend with no end in sight, whereas relative share prices are near post GFC highs, pushing the semi forward P/E on a par with the SPX. While the relative margin squeeze in chip stocks has been a whopping 5%, semi forward margins are still projected to outpace overall market by an impressive 15% (bottom panel, Chart 13). Trailing semiconductor earnings are contracting and our newly created top-down chip profit growth model is sputtering, warning that more earnings pain lies ahead (semi pricing power, global exports and the greenback comprise our proprietary S&P semiconductors earnings model, Chart 14). While chip earnings season has been a mixed bag with INTC on the bullish side and TXN on the bearish camp, TXN’s CFO commentary really grabbed our attention musing that: “When there are tensions in trade and obstacles to trade, what do businesses do? They become more cautious. And they pull back. And we are at the very end of a long supply chain. And when the ones at the very front pull back, it becomes a traffic jam” (emphasis ours). Chart 13Falling Profits Should Exert Downward Pull On Stocks Chart 14BCA Chip Profit Growth Model Is Bearish Our global semi sales-to-inventories ratio is still contracting also warning that the path of least resistance is lower for chip profits (Chart 15). In other words, the inventory liquidation phase has just began and steep price concessions to rebalance the markets will continue to weigh on the sector’s profit prospects. With regard to chip final-demand, while 5G euphoria has gripped the sector, our proprietary global auto sales proxy and global capex indicator (using the IFO’s World Economic Survey dataset) underscore that the global chip down cycle is far from over (Chart 16). Chart 15Semi Down Cycle … Chart 16… Is Far… Netting it all out, the chip down cycle is ongoing and leading global semi sales indicators remain downbeat. Other macro variables confirm that semi end-demand remains feeble. The global manufacturing PMI is waning and our diffusion index is probing multi-year lows. Our in-house calculated Global ZEW survey is also heralding additional global semi sales weakness in the coming months as it is hovering near levels last hit during the Great Recession (middle panel, Chart 17). Chinese electronics imports remain in contractionary territory (bottom panel, Chart 17) and U.S. new orders for computers & electronic products are on the verge of contraction (not shown). Despite this souring backdrop, investors have given the semi industry the benefit of the doubt and are anticipating a swift final-demand recovery. Our indicators suggest otherwise, and we expect relative share prices to converge lower to still contracting relative profit and revenue estimates (Chart 18). Chart 17…From Over… Chart 18…But Investors Are Mesmerized Netting it all out, the chip down cycle is ongoing and leading global semi sales indicators remain downbeat. Moreover, our semi profit growth model is waving a yellow flag, compelling us to put the S&P semiconductors index on downgrade alert. Bottom Line: Stay on the sidelines in the S&P semiconductors index for now, remove the upgrade alert and put it on downgrade watch. Stay tuned. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SECO – INTC, TXN, ADI, AMD, MXIM, XLNX, MCHP, NVDA, AVGO, QCOM, MU, SWKS, QRVO.   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1.              Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Resilient” dated May 14, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2.             https://www.wsj.com/articles/wave-of-financial-stress-hits-low-rated-companies-11571736606 Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)
Informe especial In lieu of our regular weekly report, we are sending you a special report by our colleagues Bob Ryan, Chief Commodity and Energy Strategist, and Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst, from BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy. The report highlights how global economic policy uncertainty over the past year has enabled gold and the USD unusually to rise together. In the near term, the combination of global economic stimulus and a US-China trade ceasefire should reduce policy uncertainty and encourage global demand for commodities. On a cyclical basis this should allow the dollar to fall back, inflation expectations to revive, and gold to appreciate. We trust you will find this research useful and insightful. All very best, Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategy Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD was indefinitely suspended beginning in 4Q18 by the pervasive economic uncertainty we identified last week as the culprit holding back global oil demand growth via a super-charged dollar.1 This uncertainty is most pronounced in the US and Europe vis-à-vis gold, and partly explains the performance of safe havens, particularly the USD, which has soared to new heights on a trade-weighted goods basis, and gold (Chart of the Week). So far, gold has held its ground after breaking above $1,500/oz from the low $1,200s in mid-2018, indicating investors are much more concerned about economic risks arising from economic policy uncertainty than inflation and other diversifiable risks gold typically hedges (Chart 2). Cyclically we remain positive on gold prices on the back of a lower dollar and rising inflation pressure in the US. Chart of the WeekDemand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Economic policy uncertainty in Europe and the US supports gold prices. Chart 2AUS, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Chart 2BUS, Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Even so, we are putting a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long gold portfolio hedge to cover tactical risks showing up in our technical indicators. In addition, as is the case with oil demand, if the ceasefire we are expecting in the Sino-US trade war materializes in 1H20 and limited trade – mostly in ags and energy – is forthcoming, demand for safe-haven assets could weaken gold prices at the margin. Fiscal and monetary stimulus globally also could revive economic growth and commodity demand, pushing global yields higher, which would put negative pressure on gold at the margin, as well, given the high correlation between real rates and gold prices. Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term tactical horizon – 3 to 6 months – as economic policy uncertainty continues to stoke global demand for safe havens.2 This can be seen in the elevated correlations between the USD’s broad trade-weighted goods index with the Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes for the US and Europe (Chart 3).3 Rising economic uncertainty – particularly since 4Q18 – has created a rare environment in which both the USD and gold trended up simultaneously and continue to move in the same direction. The implication of this is that gold’s correlation with both the USD and EPU is weaker than before because economic policy uncertainty now is positively correlated with the dollar. Chart 3Strong USD, EPU Correlation Chart 4Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher   There is a possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the US and China can agree on a trade ceasefire... The typically negative correlation between daily returns of gold and the USD also is weakening, moving toward positive territory (Chart 4), as both the USD and gold trend higher simultaneously (Chart 5). Chart 5Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher ...If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. Our short-term technical indicator is signaling an overbought gold market (Chart 6), and our fair-value model indicates gold should be trading ~ $1,450/oz (Chart 7). The latter signal off our fair-value model is less concerning, given the demand for safe-haven assets like the USD and gold now dominates gold’s typical drivers. Chart 6Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Chart 7High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model However, to be on the safe side, we are placing a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long-term gold position, which as of Tuesday’s close was up 21% since inception on May 14, 2017. This is a precautionary measure, which recognizes the possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the US and China can agree on a trade ceasefire, and global fiscal and monetary policy are successful in reviving EM income growth, which would revive commodity demand generally, pushing up global bond yields. If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. During that period, the monetary and fiscal aggregates we track as explanatory variables for gold prices will reassert themselves as the dominant drivers of gold prices (see below). This could produce tension between a falling USD and rising real rates as growth picks up, which would send us to a risk-neutral setting re gold, given the current high correlation between gold and real rates, which should remain strong until the Fed starts hiking rates again, most likely in 2020 (Chart 8). This is part of the reason we are including the stop-loss at $1,450/oz for our existing gold position: During this risky period going into 1H20 economic uncertainty could dissipate, and real rates could rise. Although the USD depreciation would mute these effects, rising real rates would be a risk to gold prices. Chart 8Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Economic Uncertainty Dominates Gold’s Fundamentals At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. In Table 1, we collect the variables we consider when assessing gold’s fair value. At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. This variable broadly falls in the geopolitical risk we regularly account for in our analysis of gold markets. Table 1Fundamental And Technical Gold-Price Drivers If the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Checking off each of these groups, we see: · Demand for inflation hedges remaining muted over the short-term, as inflationary pressures remain weak. In line with our House view, however, we do expect inflation could move higher toward the end of next year and overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for the US. This would support gold prices. · Monetary and financial aggregates are working less well as explanatory variables for gold prices in a market dominated by economic policy uncertainty. The USD-gold correlation continues to be disrupted by strong demand for safe-haven assets. As inflation picks up next year, we expect nominal bond yields to rise. Real rates, however, could remain subdued, as long as the Fed is not aggressively raising rates to get out ahead of a possible revival of inflation (Chart 9). Later in 2020, the correlation between rates and gold should be supportive for gold prices – the correlation fades when the Fed tightens, which creates a demand for safe-haven assets like gold. All the same, an increase in real rates would be a risk to gold prices in 1H20. · At present, demand for portfolio-diversification assets via safe-haven assets is a powerful force in gold’s price evolution. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that if global economic uncertainty is resolved and global growth does rebound, recession fears will diminish, thus reducing the marginal impact of geopolitical shocks. On the other hand, if the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Should that happen, short-term volatility in gold will rise (Chart 10). Chart 9Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Chart 10Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investment Implications Over a tactical horizon – i.e., 3 to 6 months – we expect global economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated. Going into 2020 – and particularly in 2H20 – we expect the USD to weaken on the back of global monetary accommodation policies and increased fiscal stimulus. We also are expecting a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, which will revive trade somewhat and support EM income growth and commodity demand. These assumptions, which we’ve laid out in previous research, will be bullish cyclical factors supporting commodities generally. Bottom Line: A ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war, coupled with global fiscal and monetary stimulus, will reduce some of the economic uncertainty dogging aggregate demand. This should be apparent in the data in 1H20. As a result, we continue to expect rising EM income growth to be cyclically bullish for commodities generally. This will allow inflation to revive – again, assuming the Fed does not become aggressive in raising rates. Net, this will be bullish for gold: As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries (Chart 11) Chart 11EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1               Please see “Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth,” published October 17, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2              We expect a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war to be announced in 1H20, which will defuse – but not eliminate – an important risk for global growth in our analytical framework.  We expect this will allow the relationship between the USD and gold to move back to its previous equilibrium in 1Q20 or 2Q20. 3              For more info on the Baker-Bloom-Davis index, please see policyuncertainty.com
Analysis on Mexico and Central Europe is available on pages 6 and 10, respectively. Highlights Deflationary pressures have been intensifying in Malaysia and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. In Mexico, pieces are falling into place for stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. We are also keeping an overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and local currency bonds. In Central Europe (CE), inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies promote strong domestic demand. We are downgrading our allocation of CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral. Malaysia: Besieged By Deflationary Pressures Malaysian interest rates appear elevated given the state of its economy. Deflationary pressures have been intensifying and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. We are also upgrading our recommended allocation to Malaysian local currency and U.S. dollar government bonds for dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios from neutral to overweight. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures, requiring significant rate cuts by the central bank: Chart I-1 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation, and nominal GDP growth has slowed to the level of commercial banks’ average lending rates. Falling nominal growth amid elevated corporate and household debt levels is an extremely toxic mix (Chart I-2, top panel). Notably, debt-servicing costs for the private sector – both businesses and households – are high at 13.5% of GDP and are also rising (Chart I-2, bottom panel).  Chart I-1The Malaysian Economy Is Flirting With Deflation Chart I-2High Leverage & Debt Servicing Costs Among Businesses & Households Crucially, real borrowing costs are elevated. In real terms, the prime lending rate stands at 5% when deflated by the GDP deflator, and at 3% when deflated by headline CPI. Notably, private credit growth (outstanding business and household loans) has plunged to a 15-year low (Chart I-3), underscoring that real borrowing costs are excessive. Chart I-3Malaysia: Credit Growth Is In Freefall Chart I-4Malaysia's Corporate Sector Is Struggling Malaysia’s corporate sector is struggling. The manufacturing PMI is below the critical 50 threshold and is showing no signs of recovery. Listed companies’ profits are shrinking (Chart I-4, top panel). Poor corporate profitability is prompting cutbacks in capex spending (Chart I-4, middle and bottom panels) and weighing on employment and wages. The household sector has been retrenching; retail sales have been contracting and personal vehicle sales have been shrinking (Chart I-5). The property market – in particular the residential sub-sector – is still in recession. Property sales and starts are falling, and property prices are flirting with deflation (Chart I-6).   Critically, monetary policy easing and exchange rate depreciation are the only levers available to policymakers to reflate the economy. Fiscal policy is constrained as the budget deficit is already large at 3.4% of GDP, and public debt is elevated. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is in fact aiming to reduce the total national debt (including off-balance-sheet debt) back to the government’s ceiling of 54% of GDP (from 80% currently). Chart I-5Malaysian Households Are Retrenching Chart I-6Malaysia's Property Sector Is In A Downturn   Bottom Line: The Malaysian economy is besieged by deflationary pressures and requires lower borrowing costs. The central bank will deliver rate cuts in the coming months. Investment Recommendations A new trade idea: receive 2-year swap rates as a bet on rate cuts by the central bank. Consistently, for dedicated EM bond portfolios, we are upgrading local currency and U.S. dollar-denominated government bonds from neutral to overweight. Chart I-7Overweight Malaysian Local Currency And U.S. Dollar Government Bonds While we are downbeat on the ringgit versus the U.S. dollar, Malaysian domestic bonds will likely outperform the EM GBI index in common currency terms on a total return basis (Chart I-7, top panel). The same is true for excess returns on the country’s sovereign credit (Chart I-7, bottom panel).     The basis for the ringgit’s more moderate depreciation, especially in comparison with other EM currencies, is as follows: First, foreigners have reduced their holdings of local currency bonds. The share of foreign ownership has declined from 36% in 2015 to 22% now of total outstanding local domestic bonds in the past 4 years (Chart I-8). Hence, currency depreciation will not trigger large foreign capital outflows. Second, the trade balance is in surplus and improving. This will provide a cushion for the ringgit. Finally, the ringgit is cheap in real effective terms which also limits the potential downside (Chart I-9).   Dedicated EM equity portfolios should keep a neutral allocation on Malaysian stocks. We are taking profits on our long Malaysian small-cap stocks relative to the EM small-cap index position. This recommendation has generated a 6.6% gain since its initiation on December 14, 2018. Chart I-8Foreigners' Share Of Local Currency Bonds Has Dropped Chart I-9The Ringgit Is Cheap   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Raising Our Conviction On Equity Outperformance Mexican local currency bonds, as well as sovereign and corporate credit, have been one of our highest conviction overweights for some time. These positions have played out very well (Chart II-1). Presently, pieces are falling into place for Mexican stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. First, long-lasting outperformance by Mexican local currency bonds and corporate credit will lead to the stock market’s outperformance relative to the EM benchmark. Chart II-2 shows that when Mexican local currency bond and corporate dollar bond yields fall relative to their EM peers, the Bolsa tends to outperform. In brief, a relative decline in the cost of capital will eventually translate into relative equity outperformance. Chart II-1Mexico Vs. EM: Domestic Bonds And Credit Markets Chart II-2Mexico: Relative Stock Prices Are Correlated With Relative Cost Of Capital Second – as discussed in detail in our previous Special Report – market worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, especially relative to other developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa. Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, as well as low public debt, warrant a lower risk premium in Mexico, both in absolute terms and relative to other EM countries. Moreover, market participants and credit agencies have overstated the precariousness of Pemex’s debt and financing requirements. Pemex U.S. dollar bond yields have been falling steadily compared to EM aggregate corporate bond yields since the announcements of policies aimed at supporting the company’s debt sustainability. We have discussed Pemex’s financial sustainability and its effect on public finances in past reports.1  Third, having cut rates twice since September, the Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) has embarked on a rate cutting cycle. This is positive for stock prices, as it implies higher equity valuations and will eventually put a floor under the economy.  Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. Banxico members have been vocal about their desire to cut rates further, which is being foreshadowed by the swap market (Chart II-3, top panel). Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. The slowdown in the domestic economy and Andrés Manuel López Obrador’ (AMLO) administration’s tight fiscal policy will enable and encourage Banxico to further ease monetary policy (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Fourth, another positive market catalyst for Mexican equities is the ongoing outperformance of EM consumer staples versus the overall EM index. Consumer staples have a large 35% share of the overall Mexico MSCI stock index, while this sector in the EM MSCI benchmark accounts for only 7%. Therefore, durable outperformance by consumer staples often hints at a relative cyclical outperformance for the Mexican bourse (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Mexico: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Chart II-4Mexican Equities Are A Play On Consumer Staples Chart II-5Mexican Stocks Offer Reasonable Value Finally, Mexican equities are not expensive. Chart II-5 illustrates that according to our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratios, Mexican stocks offer good value in both absolute terms and relative to EM overall. We continue to believe AMLO’s administration is proving to be a pragmatic government with the aim of reducing rent-seeking activities and addressing structural issues such as poverty, corruption and crime. These policies will be positive for the economy over the long run and share prices will move higher in anticipation. Bottom Line: We are reiterating our overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and domestic local currency bonds within their respective EM benchmarks. With further rate cuts on the horizon, yet upside risks to EM local currency bond yields, we continue to recommend a curve steepening trade in Mexico: receiving 2-year and paying 10-year swap rates.  We now have high conviction that Mexican share prices will stage a cyclical outperformance relative to their EM peers. The bottom panel of Chart II-4 on page 8 illustrates that Mexican stocks seem to have formed a major bottom and are about to begin outperforming the EM equity benchmark. Dedicated EM equity managers should have a large overweight allocation to Mexican stocks. Our recommendation of favoring small-caps over large-cap companies in Mexico has been very profitable since we argued for this trade last November. We are taking a 12.9% profit on this position and recommend keeping an overweight allocation to both Mexican large- and small-caps within an EM equity portfolio.   Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Central Europe: An Inflationary Enclave In Deflationary Europe Our macroeconomic theme for Central European (CE) economies – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, elaborated in the linked report, has been as follows: Inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary as well as fiscal policies in CE promote strong domestic demand. CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Notably, CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Going forward, inflation will continue to rise across this region, despite the ongoing contraction in European manufacturing. First, Hungary’s and Poland’s central banks are behind the curve – they remain reluctant to hike rates amid rampantly rising inflation within overheating economies (Chart III-1). In turn, real policy rates across CE are becoming more negative and will promote robust money and credit growth (Chart III-2).      Chart III-1CE Central Banks Are Behind The Curve Chart III-2Low Real Rates Promote Rampant Credit Growth Policymakers are justifying stimulative policies by stressing ongoing woes in the Europe-wide manufacturing downturn. Yet, they are paying little attention to genuine inflationary pressures in their own economies. Most notably in Hungary, the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has been aggressively suppressing its policy rate and engaging in a corporate QE program, despite rising inflation and an overheating economy. Similarly, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) seems inclined to cut rates sooner rather than later. On the other end of the spectrum though, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is the only CE central bank to have embarked on a rate hiking cycle over the past 18 months. Going forward, the CNB looks most likely to normalize rates by continuing its hiking cycle. This development will favor rate differentials between it and the rest of CE. As such, we remain long the CZK versus both the HUF and PLN (Chart III-3). Chart III-3Favor CZK Versus PLN & HUF Chart III-4Germany's Manufacturing Cycles And CE Inflation Second, European manufacturing cycles have historically defined CE inflation trends, with time lags of around 12 to 18 months. However, this time around, the euro area manufacturing recession will not translate into slower CE inflation and growth dynamics (Chart III-4). Above all, booming credit induced by real negative borrowing costs has incentivized robust domestic demand in general and construction activity in particular in CE. In addition, employment growth remains strong and double-digit wage growth has supported strong consumer spending (Chart III-5). As a result, manufacturing production volumes have remained relatively resilient in Hungary and Poland, even as manufacturing output volumes in both Germany and the broader euro area have been contracting (Chart III-6). Chart III-5Strong Domestic Demand In CE… Chart III-6...Entails Divergences In Manufacturing With Euro Area Third, inflationary pressures in CE are both acute and genuine. Wage growth has been rising faster than productivity growth across the region, leading to surging unit labor costs (Chart III-7). Mounting wage pressures reflect widespread labor shortages. Further, output gaps in these economies have turned positive, which has historically been a precursor of inflationary pressures. Finally, fiscal policy in CE will remain very expansionary, supporting strong business and consumer demand. Bottom Line: Super-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies have led to a classic case of overheating within CE, particularly in Hungary and Poland, and less so in the Czech Republic. Chart III-7Genuine Inflationary Pressures In Central Europe Chart III-8A Widening Current Account Deficit Is A Symptom Of Overheating Investment Implications Deteriorating current accounts (Chart III-8), rising inflation and behind-the-curve central banks warrant further currency depreciation in both Hungary and Poland. This is why we continue to recommend a short position on both the HUF and PLN versus the CZK. We are closing our Hungarian/euro area relative three-year swap rate trade with a loss of 87 basis points. Our expectation that the market would price in rate hikes in Hungary despite the central bank’s dovishness has not materialized. Investors should remain overweight CE equities within an EM portfolio due to strong domestic demand in these economies and no direct economic exposure to China. As we expect EM equities to underperform DM stocks, we continue to recommend underweighting CE versus the core European markets. We are downgrading our allocation to CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral within an EM domestic bond portfolio. The primary reason is a risk of a selloff in core European rates.   Anddrija Vesic Research Analyst andrija@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1. Please see Emerging Markets Strategy, "Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income," dated April 23, 2019 and "Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing," dated September 5, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Informe especial Highlights In this report, we build and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese investable equity sector outperformance, based on a set of macroeconomic and equity market factors. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to help investors to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. We see this as strongly supportive of the potential returns to be earned from active top-down sector rotation within China’s investable market. Cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives, and we would favor them versus defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Feature In our June 19 Special Report, we reviewed the predictability and cyclicality of equity sector earnings in China's investable & domestic markets, and examined the relevance of earnings in predicting relative sector performance over the past decade. We noted that a few sectors scored highly in terms of earnings predictability and the relevance of those earnings in predicting relative performance. But we also highlighted that most of China's equity sectors, in both the investable and domestic markets, either demonstrated earnings trends that were difficult to predict based on the trend in overall market earnings or exhibited relative performance that was difficult to explain based on the relative earnings profile. Our models are designed to predict equity sector relative performance using a series of macroeconomic and equity market factors. In short, our June report underscored that China’s equity sectors warranted a closer examination, with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. Today’s report examines this question in depth, focused on China’s investable equity market. We hope to extend our research to the A-share market in the near future. Our approach focuses on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We conclude by highlighting the substantial underperformance of cyclical vs defensives sectors over the past two years, and argue that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming 12 months if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the economy incrementally improves, as we expect. We also explain the importance of monitoring the relative performance of health care & utilities stocks over the coming few months, and present a unique sector-based barometer for gauging China’s reflationary stance. The latter two relative performance trends are likely to assist investors in positioning for the big call: the outperformance of Chinese investable stocks vs the global benchmark. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of sector outperformance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report1), and investors will often see it (in its conceptually different but practically similar probit form) employed when analyzing the likelihood of an economic recession. The New York Fed’s US recession model is a notable example of the latter,2 which has received much attention by market participants over the past year following the inversion of the US yield curve. The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). Charts I-1A and I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models Aimed At... Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Charts I-2A and I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to 3 months in order to reduce the need to forecast. The link between tight monetary policy and industrial sector performance is one exception to this rule that we detail below. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, are detailed in Box 1. Box 1 Accounting For China’s 3½-Year Credit Cycle Over the course of the analysis detailed in this report, judgments concerning how much of a lead or lag to allow when accounting for any leading or lagging relationships between sector relative performance and either macroeconomic & stock market predictors were necessary. In cases where sector relative performance led any of our predictors, we capped the lead at 3-months to reduce the need to forecast the predictors when using the models. As explained below, the 8-month lead between industrial sector relative performance and tight monetary policy was the only exception to this rule. We also did not include any leading relationship between relative sector stock performance and the trend in relative sector EPS, and allowed at most a co-incident relationship. Limits were also required in the cases where our predictors led relative sector performance. While more lead time is usually better from the perspective of investment strategy, Chart I-B1 presents strong evidence of a 3½ -year credit cycle in China. Chart I-B2 illustrates the problem with including significant lags between predictors and relative sector performance when economic cycles are short. The chart shows the lead/lag correlation profile of the stylized cycle shown in Chart I-B1, and highlights that lags greater than 12-14 months risk picking up the impact of the previous economic cycle. Given this, we have limited the extent to which our predictors can lead relative sector performance in our models, and in practice lead times are generally less than one year. Chart I-B1Over The Past Decade, China Has Experienced A 3½-Year Credit Cycle Chart I-B2With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle The Key Drivers Of Chinese Investable Equity Sectors Pages 12-23 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 12-23 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis. Chart I-3China’s Sectors Linked Strongly To Core Inflation, Monetary Policy, And Growth Chart I-3 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by tight monetary policy, rising economic activity, rising broad market stock prices, oversold technical conditions, and rising broad market earnings. Chart I-3 highlights two important points: If regarded through the lens of causality alone, the strong relationship between rising core inflation and sector performance is somewhat surprising: normally, pricing power is subordinate to revenue/sales/demand as the primary factor driving fundamental performance. However, given that inflation is a lagging economic variable, we suspect that the significance of inflation in our models actually reflects the middle phase of the economic cycle in which sectors tend to best exhibit meaningful out/underperformance. It is also a stronger predictor of periods of tight monetary policy in China than headline inflation.3 This is an encouraging result for investors, as it suggests good odds that future episodes of meaningful sector outperformance can be identified given a particular macro view. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. While Chinese equity sector performance can sometimes be idiosyncratic, we see this as strongly supportive of the idea that investors can earn positive excess returns by actively shifting between China’s equity sectors using a top-down approach. Turning to the specific results of our sector models, we present the following big-picture findings of our research: Defining China’s Cyclical & Defensive Sectors From a top-down perspective, the most important element of sector rotation typically involves shifting from defensive to cyclical stocks when economic activity is set to improve (and vice versa). In China, it is clear from the results of our models that the investable energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors. The relative performance of these sectors exhibits a positive relationship to pro-cyclical macro variables, or broad market trends. Following last year’s GICS changes, we also include the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector) in this list. Correspondingly, investable consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive sectors in China. Chart I-4Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Chart I-4 illustrates how these sectors have performed over the past decade by grouping them into equally-weighted cyclical and defensive stock price indexes, as well as the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives. The chart makes it clear that cyclical stock performance is essentially as weak as it has ever been relative to defensives over the past decade, with the exception of a brief period in 2013. Panel 2 highlights that all of the underperformance of cyclicals over the past two years has been due to de-rating, rather than due to underperforming earnings. The Atypical Case Of Financials & Real Estate The fact that financial and real estate stocks are defensive in China is somewhat curious. In the case of financials, the abnormality is straightforward: most global equity portfolio managers would consider financials to be cyclical, and our work suggests that this is not true for the investable market. Our explanation for this apparent discrepancy is also straightforward: while small and medium banks in China have obviously grown in prominence over the past decade, large state-owned or state-affiliated commercial banks are still dominant in the provision of credit to China's old economy. In most cases China’s large banks lend to state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantees, meaning that the earnings risk for Chinese banks has typically been lower than for the investable market in the aggregate. It remains to be seen whether this will remain true in a world where Chinese policymakers are keen to slow the pace at which China’s macro leverage ratio rises and to render the existing stock of debt more sustainable for the non-financial sector. Indeed, over a multi-year time horizon, the risk are not trivial that banks will be forced to recapitalize as a result of forced changes to loan terms (eg: significant increases in the amortization period of existing loans) or the recognition of sizeable loan losses, which would clearly increase the cyclicality of the Chinese investable financial sector. Chart I-5A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive On the real estate front, the anomaly is not that real estate stocks respond defensively to macroeconomic and stock market variables, it is that real estate stock prices are considerably more volatile than this defensive characterization would suggest. Globally (and especially in the US), real estate stocks are often viewed as bond proxies and thus are typically low-beta, but Chart I-5 shows that this is not the case in China. In our view, this issue is reconciled by the fact that Chinese investable real estate stocks are also highly positively linked to Chinese house price appreciation, with relative performance typically leading a pickup in house prices by up to 1 year. This strongly leading relationship has meant that real estate stocks have often outperformed the broad market as economic activity is slowing, in anticipation that policy easing will lead to an eventual recovery in house prices. Chart I-6Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year In effect, investable real estate stocks are a high-beta sector that have acted counter-cyclically due to the historical interplay between economic activity, monetary policy, and the housing market. Real estate performance this year has not deviated from this playbook (Chart I-6), and so for now we are content to include real estate stocks in our defensive index. But similar to the case of financials, we can conceive of scenarios in which ongoing Chinese financial sector reform may change this relationship in the future. The Unique Monetary Policy Sensitivity Of Industrials And Consumer Staples Pages 14 and 16 highlight that industrials and consumer staples stocks have typically been sensitive to periods of tight monetary policy. In the case of industrials the relationship is negative, whereas consumer staples relative performance has been positively linked to these periods. In both cases, relative performance has led periods of tight monetary policy, significantly so in the case of industrials (by an average of 8 months). While the relative performance of banks, tech, and real estate stocks have also been linked to periods of tight monetary policy, industrials and consumer staples are the only sectors that have tended to lead these periods. Chart I-7Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity This is a revelatory finding, and in our view it is explained by divergences in corporate health and leverage for the two sectors. We reviewed Chinese corporate health in our August 28 Special Report,4 and noted that the food & beverage sub-industry was a clear (positive) outlier based on our corporate health monitors. In particular, Chart I-7 highlights that food & beverage corporate health is markedly better than that for machinery companies or for industrial firms in general, supporting the notion that high (low) leverage is impacting the relative performance of industrials (consumer staples). The Leading Nature Of Health Care & Utilities Health care and utilities exhibit similar key drivers of relative performance: in both cases, periods of rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices are all negatively associated with performance. Health care and utilities relative performance also happens to lead all three of those predictors, by 1-3 months on average depending on the variable in question. Our modeling work highlights that these are the only sectors whose relative performance has led multiple factors, suggesting that health care & utilities stocks are particularly interesting market bellwethers to monitor. Core Inflation Matters More Than Headline, Except For Energy & Real Estate As highlighted in Chart I-3, rising core inflation has been a much more important signal about relative sector performance than headline inflation. Chart I-8In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences The two exceptions to this rule relate to the energy and real estate sectors, with the former positively linked to headline inflation and the latter negatively linked. In both cases, we suspect that the relationship is a behavioral rather than a fundamental one. For energy, while rising headline inflation in developed countries is usually associated with rising energy prices, this is not true in the case of China. Chart I-8 highlights that differences between headline and core inflation over the past decade have almost always been driven by rising food prices. This implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are not driven by rising fuel costs. In the case of real estate, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income and its impact on the housing market are likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Investment Conclusions Our work aimed at explaining historical periods of Chinese investable sector outperformance has three investment implications in the current environment. Cyclicals will probably outperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. First, within China’s investable market, Chart I-4 illustrated that cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives. Given our view that Chinese investable stocks are likely to outperform their global peers over a 6-12 month time horizon, we would also favor cyclicals to defensives over that period. For investors who are not yet overweight cyclical stocks in China, we would advise waiting for concrete signs that growth has bottomed (which should emerge sometime in Q1) before putting on a long position as we remain tactically neutral towards Chinese versus global stocks. But the key point is that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Second, the fact that investable health care and utilities stocks have particularly leading properties suggests that they should be monitored closely over the coming few months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would be an important sign that market participants are anticipating a bottoming in China’s economy, which may give investors a green light to position for a bullish cyclical stance. For now, both of these sectors continue to outperform (Chart I-9), supporting our decision to remain tactically neutral towards Chinese stocks. Third, the heightened negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance trend between the two sectors may serve as a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. Chart I-10 shows that industrials outperformed staples last year once the PBOC shifted into easing mode, and anticipated the recovery in the pace of credit growth. However, industrials soon began to underperform staples, which also seems to have anticipated the fact that the recovery in credit was set to be less powerful than what has occurred during previous cycles. The fact that the relative performance trend is off its recent low is notable, and may suggest that China’s existing reflationary stance will be sufficient to stabilize economic activity if a trade deal with the US is indeed finalized in the near future. Chart I-9Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Chart I-10Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured As a final point, BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use the models as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We hope you will find these models to be a helpful quantification of the risk versus return prospects of allocating among China’s investable sectors. As always, we welcome any feedback that you may have about our approach.   Energy Chart II-1 Table II-1   Unsurprisingly, our energy sector model highlights that periods of energy outperformance are strongly linked to periods of rising crude oil prices. However, what is surprising is that periods of accelerating headline inflation in China are even more closely linked to periods of energy sector outperformance than episodes of rising oil prices, and that these periods of accelerating inflation are not generally caused by rising energy prices. The lack of a clear economic rationale for this relationship implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are largely driven by rising food prices. The model also highlights that periods of strong undervaluation have historically been significant in predicting future energy sector outperformance, with a lag of roughly 8 months. The probability of energy sector outperformance has fallen sharply according to our model, but for now we continue to recommend a long absolute energy sector position on a 6-12 month time horizon. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects oil prices to trade at $70/barrel on average next year,5 Chinese headline inflation continues to rise, and we noted in our October 2 Weekly Report that energy stocks are heavily discounted.6 Barring a durable decline in oil prices below $55/barrel, investors should continue to favor China’s energy sector. Materials Chart II-2 Table II-2 Our model highlights that the materials sector is one of the clearest plays on accelerating industrial activity within the investable universe. Among the macro variables that we tested, periods of investable materials outperformance are strongly positively linked with periods when our BCA Activity Index and our leading indicator for the index have been rising. Periods of materials sector outperformance have also been positively correlated with prior periods of oversold technical conditions and rising broad market stock prices, underscoring that materials are a strongly pro-cyclical sector. We currently maintain no active relative sector trades, but our model suggests that investors should be underweight the investable materials sector relative to the broad investable index. Industrials Chart II-3 Table II-3 Periods of industrial sector outperformance have historically been positively correlated with relative industrial sector earnings, broad market stock prices, and prior oversold technical conditions. They have been negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, and prior overbought technical conditions. Since 2010, periods of industrial sector performance have led periods of tight monetary policy by 8 months, the longest lead of relative equity performance to any macro variable that we tested in our model (and the longest lead that we allowed). Industrial sector performance has also been strongly negatively linked with periods of rising core inflation. These findings, and the fact that our Activity Index and its leading indicator have not been highly successful at predicting periods of industrial sector outperformance, strongly suggest that industrials, while pro-cyclical, are primarily driven by expectations of easy monetary policy. We noted in an August 2018 Special Report that state-owned enterprises have become substantially leveraged over the past decade,7 and in a more recent report we highlighted that industries such as machinery have experienced a significant deterioration in corporate health over the past decade.8 This helps explain why industrial sector performance is so negatively impacted by tight policy. Our model suggests that the best time to be overweight industrial stocks is the early phase of an economic rebound, when Chinese stock prices are rising but market participants are not yet expecting tighter policy. These conditions may present themselves sometime in Q1, but probably not over the coming 0-3 months. Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Chart II-4 Table II-4 Besides materials, China’s investable consumer discretionary sector has historically been the most positively associated with coincident and leading measures of industrial activity. Rising core inflation is also highly positively related to consumer discretionary outperformance, which may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. The strong link with industrial activity is in contrast to depictions of China’s consumer sector as being less correlated to money & credit trends than the overall economy, and is supportive of our view that industrial activity forms one of the three pillars of China’s business cycle.9 We ended the estimation period of our model as of December 2018, in order to avoid including the distortive effects of last year’s changes to the global industry classification standard (which resulted in Alibaba’s inclusion and overwhelming representation in the investable consumer discretionary sector). As such, the results of our model apply today to consumer discretionary stocks ex-internet & direct marketing retail. For now, the absence of an uptrend in our Activity Index and in core inflation is signaling underperformance of discretionary stocks outside of internet & direct marketing retail. Outperformance this year largely reflects a significant advance in consumer durable and apparel: by contrast, automobiles & components have underperformed the broad market by roughly 14% year-to-date. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Table II-5 Historically, periods of consumer staples outperformance have been predicted by a falling Activity Index, periods of tight monetary policy, and over/undervalued conditions. The impact of monetary policy is particularly heavy in the model, suggesting that consumer staples are somewhat the mirror image of industrials in terms of the impact of leverage on relative equity performance. This too is supported by our August 28 Special Report,10 which noted that corporate health for the food & beverage sector was the strongest among the sectors we examined. However, the model failed to capture what has been very significant staples outperformance this year, highlighting the occasional limits of a rule-of-thumb approach to sector allocation. Investable consumer staples are reliably low-beta compared with the broad market, and we are not surprised that investors have strongly favored the sector this year amid enormous economic and policy uncertainty. An eventual improvement in economic activity, coupled with fairly rich valuation, should work against consumer staples stocks sometime in the first quarter of 2020. Investors who are positioned in favor of China-related assets should also be watching closely for any signs of a technical breakdown in the relative performance trend of investable staples. Health Care Chart II-6 Table II-6 Among the macro variables tested in our model, periods of health care outperformance are negatively related to coincident and leading measures of industrial activity and strongly negatively related to rising core inflation.  Health care outperformance is also strongly negatively related to periods of rising broad market stock prices, and positively related to prior oversold technical conditions. These results clearly signify that investable health care is a defensive sector, to be owned when the economy is slowing and when investable stocks in general are trending lower. Our model suggests that health care stocks are likely to continue to outperform, as they have been since the beginning of the year. A substantive US/China trade deal that meaningfully reduces economic uncertainty remains the key risk to health care outperformance over a 6- to 12-month time horizon. Financials Chart II-7 Table II-7 Our model highlights that periods of financial sector outperformance over the past decade have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation (a strong relationship), and with periods of rising index earnings. Oversold technical conditions have also helped explain future episodes of financial sector outperformance. The link between core inflation and the outperformance of financials appears to represent a behavioral rather than a fundamental relationship. When modeling periods of rising financial sector relative earnings, the trend in broad market EPS is more predictive than that of core inflation, highlighting that the latter’s explanatory power is due to investor behavior. The results of our model, and the fact that core inflation leads Chinese index earnings, suggests that financials are fundamentally counter-cyclical and that investors see rising Chinese core inflation as confirmation that an economic expansion is underway (and that broad market earnings are likely to rise). Our model is currently predicting financial sector outperformance, but investable financials have modestly underperformed since the beginning of the year. This appears to have been caused by the underperformance of financial sector earnings this year as overall index earnings growth has decelerated, contrary to what history would suggest. We suspect that the ongoing shadow banking crackdown is related to financial sector earnings underperformance, and we would advise against an overweight stance towards investable financials until signs of improving relative earnings emerge. Banks Chart II-8 Table II-8 Our model shows that periods of banking sector outperformance are more linked to macro variables than has been the case for the overall financial sector. Specifically, bank performance is negatively correlated with leading indicators of economic activity and rising core inflation, and especially negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy. Banks have also typically outperformed following periods of oversold technical conditions. Similar to financials, bank earnings are typically counter-cyclical, but relative bank earnings have not been good predictors of relative bank performance over the past decade. Still, the negative association of relative stock prices with leading economic indicators, rising core inflation and rising interest rates underscores that investors should normally be underweight banks if they expect overall Chinese stock prices to rise. Also similar to the overall financial sector, our model is currently predicting outperformance for bank stocks, but investable banks have underperformed year-to-date. The shadow banking crackdown is also likely impacting investable bank earnings, leading to a similar recommendation to avoid bank stocks until relative earnings look to be trending higher. “Tech+”   Chart II-9 Table II-9 Our technology model has worked well at predicting periods of tech sector outperformance over the past several years, particularly from 2015 – 2017. The model suggests that, in addition to being negatively related to prior overbought conditions, periods of technology sector outperformance are associated with improving growth conditions, easy monetary policy, and rising prices. In other words, tech stocks are a growth & liquidity play. Owing to last year’s changes to the GICS, the results of our model apply today to Chinese investable internet & direct marketing retail, the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector), and the now considerably smaller information technology sector (the sum of which could be considered the “tech+” sector). The model has been predicting tech sector outperformance since May (in response to easier monetary policy), which has occurred for the official information technology sector. However, the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) stocks are only up fractionally in relative terms from their late-May low. Our expectation that China’s economy is likely to bottom in Q1 means that we may recommend upgrading “tech+” stocks relative to the investable benchmark in the coming months. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Table II-10 Our model for telecommunication services (now a level 2 industry group within the communication services sector) illustrates that telecom stocks have historically been counter-cyclical. Periods of telecom outperformance have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, and rising broad market EPS. It is notable that telecom services stocks are driven more by cycles in overall stock prices than by cycles in economic activity. This suggests that investors tend to focus on the fact that telecom stocks are reliably low-beta compared with the overall investable market, causing out(under)performance of telecoms when the broad market is falling(rising). Similar to financials & banks, telecom stocks have not outperformed this year, in contrast to what our model would suggest. Earnings also appear to be the culprit, with the level of 12-month trailing earnings having fallen nearly 10% since the summer. China Mobile accounts for a sizeable portion of the telecom services index, and the company’s recent earnings weakness seems to be due to depreciation charges stemming from forced investment on 5G spending (mandated by the Chinese government). Our sense is that this will have only a temporary effect on telecom services EPS, meaning that investors should continue to expect the sector to behave in a counter-cyclical fashion over the coming year. Utilities Chart II-11 Table II-11 The early performance of our utilities model was mixed, as it generated several false sell signals during the 2011 – 2013 period despite recommending, on average, an overweight stance. However, over the past five years, the model has performed extremely well in terms of explaining periods of relative utilities performance. The model highlights that utilities are straightforwardly counter-cyclical. The relative performance of utilities stocks is positively related to its relative earnings trend, and negatively related to economic activity, rising core inflation, and broad market stock prices.  Consistent with a decline in the overall MSCI China index, the model has correctly predicted utilities outperformance this year. We expect utilities to underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon, but would advise against an aggressive underweight position until hard evidence of a bottom in Chinese economic activity emerges. Real Estate Chart II-12 Table II-12 Our model for the relative performance of investable real estate has been among the most successful of those detailed in this report, which is somewhat surprising given the macro factors that the model shows drive real estate performance. While periods of relative real estate performance are modestly (negatively) associated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising headline inflation is the most important macro predictor of real estate underperformance. Among market factors driving performance, real estate stocks reliably underperform when broad market EPS are trending higher, and they historically outperform for a time after becoming relatively undervalued. Real estate relative performance is also strongly linked to periods of rising house prices, but the former tends to significantly lead the latter. Given that core inflation has better predicted episodes of tight monetary policy than headline inflation, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income is likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Beyond the negative link between higher inflation and interest rates on investable real estate performance, the strong negative association with broad market earnings underscores that investors treat real estate as a defensive sector. We thus expect real estate stocks to continue to outperform in the near term, but underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019. 2. Please see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html 3. This is despite frequent concerns among investors that the PBOC is inclined to tighten in response to detrimental supply shocks. 4. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 5. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth," dated October 17, 2019. 6. Please see China Investment Strategy, "China Macro & Market Review," dated October 2, 2019. 7. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging," dated August 29, 2018. 8. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 9. Please see China Investment Strategy, "The Three Pillars Of China’s Economy," dated May 16, 2018. 10. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Equities & Bonds: The accelerating upward momentum of global equities – the ultimate “leading economic indicator” – suggests that the current rise in global bond yields can continue. Maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure, while staying overweight global corporate credit versus government bonds. U.S. Agency MBS: U.S. agency MBS spreads are now attractive relative to high-quality U.S. corporate bonds, both in absolute terms and on a risk-adjusted basis. Increase allocations to agency MBS, while reducing exposure to Aaa-, Aa- and A-rated U.S. corporates. Feature The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (ECB) are both set to ease monetary policy this week. The Fed is almost certain to deliver a third consecutive 25bp rate cut at tomorrow’s FOMC meeting, while the ECB will restart its bond buying program on Friday. Yet government bond yields around the world continue to drift higher, as markets reduce expectations of incremental rate cuts moving forward. Equity prices are an excellent leading indicator of global growth, while bond yields typically reflect current economic conditions. Thus, equity prices should be considered a leading indicator of bond yields. Chart of the WeekMore Upside For Global Bond Yields Yields are finally responding to the evidence that global growth is troughing - a dynamic that we have been telegraphing in recent weeks. Global equity markets are rallying, with the U.S. S&P 500 hitting a new all-time high yesterday. The year-over-year increase in global equities, using the MSCI World Index, is now at +10%, the fastest pace of upward acceleration seen since January 2017. Some of that rally in U.S. stock markets can be chalked up to 3rd quarter earnings beating depressed expectations. Yet there is also a forward-looking component of the rally that bond markets are starting to notice. Equity prices are an excellent leading indicator of global growth, while bond yields typically reflect current economic conditions. Thus, equity prices should be considered a leading indicator of bond yields. We see no reason to discount the positive message on growth from rallying equity markets, especially when confirmed by an improvement in our global leading economic indicator (LEI), led by the more cyclical emerging market (EM) countries (Chart of the Week). Falling stock prices in 2018 accurately heralded the global growth slowdown of 2019 which triggered the huge decline in bond yields. Why should rising stock prices not be interpreted in the same light, predicting better global growth – and higher bond yields – over the next 6-12 months? Multiple Signals Point To Higher Bond Yields The more optimistic message on growth is not only confined to developed market (DM) stock prices. EM equities and currencies have begun to perk up, with EM corporate credit spreads remaining stable, as well, mimicking the moves seen in U.S. credit markets. Bond volatility measures like the U.S. MOVE index of Treasury options are retreating to the lower levels implied by equity volatility indices like the U.S. VIX index, which is now just above the 2019 low (Chart 2). Markets are clearly pricing out some of the more negative tail-risk outcomes that prevailed through much of 2019. Some of that reduction in volatility can be attributed to the recent de-escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions and U.K. Brexit risks, both important developments that can help lift depressed global business confidence. A reduction in trade/political uncertainty should help fortify the transmission mechanism between easing global financial conditions and economic activity – an outcome that could extend the rise in yields given stretched bond-bullish duration positioning (Chart 3). Chart 2A More Pro-Risk Global Market Backdrop Chart 3Less Uncertainty = Higher Yields The improving global growth story remains the bigger factor pushing bond yields higher, though. While the manufacturing PMI data within the DM world remain weak, the downward momentum is starting to bottom out on a rate-of-change basis (Chart 4). The EM aggregate PMI index is showing even more improvement, sitting at 51 and above the year-ago level, helping confirm the pickup in EM equity market momentum (bottom panel). Importantly, if this is indeed the trough in the EM PMI, the index would have bottomed above the 2015 trough of 48.5. Given the improvement seen in “Big Mo” for global equities and global LEIs and PMIs, we remain comfortable with our current below-benchmark stance on global interest rate duration exposure.  Given the improvement seen in “Big Mo” for global equities and global LEIs and PMIs, we remain comfortable with our current below-benchmark stance on global interest rate duration exposure. How high could yields rise in the near term? Looking at yields on a country-by-country level, a reasonable initial target for yields would be a return to the medium-term trend as defined by the 200-day moving average (MA). For benchmark 10-year DM government yields, those targets are: U.S. Treasuries: the 200-day MA is 2.18%, +23bps above the current level German Bunds: the 200-day MA is -0.22%, +11bps above the current level U.K. Gilts: the 200-day MA is 0.89%, +17bps above the current level Japanese government bonds (JGBs): the 200-day MA is -0.10%, +2bps above the current level Canadian government bonds: the 200-day MA is 1.59%, -2bps below the current level Australian government bonds: the 200-day MA is 1.53%, +43bps above the current level Among those markets, the U.S. is likely to reach the level implied by the 200-day MA, led by the market pricing out the -53bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months discounted in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap curve (Chart 5) – a number that includes the likely -25bp cut tomorrow. A move beyond that 200-day MA may take longer to develop, as it would require markets to begin pricing in some reversal of the Fed’s “mid-cycle cuts” of 2019. That outcome would first require a pickup in TIPS breakevens. The Fed would not feel justified in risking a tightening of financial conditions by signaling rate hikes without the catalyst of higher inflation expectations. Chart 4EM Growth Leading The Way? Chart 5UST Yields Have More Upside German Bund yields are even closer to that 200-day MA than Treasuries but, as in the U.S., a sustained move beyond that level would require an increase in bombed-out inflation expectations, with the 10-year EUR CPI swap rate now sitting at only 1.05% (Chart 6). As for other markets, the likelihood of reaching, or breaching, the 200-day MA is more varied (Chart 7). Chart 6Bund Yield Upside Limited By Inflation The move in the Canadian 10-year yield to just above its 200-day MA fits with Canada’s status as a “high-beta” bond market, as we discussed in last week’s report.1 Chart 7Which Yields Will Test The 200-day MA? The Bank of Canada also meets this week and, while no change in policy is expected, the central bank will be publishing a new Monetary Policy Report that will update their current line of thinking about the Canadian economy and inflation. U.K. Gilts should easily blow through the 200-day MA if and when a final Brexit deal is signed, as the Bank of England remains highly reluctant to consider any policy easing even as political uncertainty weighs on economic growth. With the European Union now agreeing to an extension of the Brexit deadline to January 31, and with U.K. prime minister Boris Johnson now pursuing an early election in December, the political risk premium in Gilts will persist. Thus, Gilt yields will likely lag the move higher seen in higher-beta markets like the U.S. and Canada. JGBs remain the ultimate low-beta bond market with the Bank of Japan continuing to anchor the 10-yield around 0%, making Japan a good overweight candidate in an environment of rising global bond yields. Australian bond yields have the largest distance to the 200-day MA, but the Reserve Bank of Australia is giving little indication that it is ready to shift away from its dovish bias anytime soon, while inflation remains subdued. We do not expect a rapid jump in yields back towards the medium-term trend in the near term, and Australian yields will continue to lag the pace of the uptrend in the higher-beta global bond markets. Net-net, a climb in yields over the next 3-6 months to (or beyond) the 200-day MA is most likely in the U.S. and Canada, and least likely in Japan, Germany and Australia (and the U.K. until the Brexit uncertainty is finally sorted out). Bottom Line: The accelerating momentum of global equities – the ultimate “leading economic indicator” – is suggesting that the current rise in global bond yields can continue. Maintain below-benchmark overall duration exposure, while staying overweight global corporate credit versus government bonds. Raise Allocations To U.S. Agency MBS Out Of Higher Quality Corporate Credit Chart 8U.S. MBS More Attractive Than High-Rated U.S. Corporates Our colleagues at our sister service, BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy, recently initiated a recommendation to favor U.S. agency MBS versus high-rated (Aaa, Aa, A) U.S. corporate bonds.2 This week, we are adding this position to the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy recommended model bond portfolio. There are three factors supporting this recommendation: 1) The absolute level of MBS spreads is competitive The average option-adjusted spread (OAS) for conventional 30-year U.S. agency MBS – rated Aaa and with the backing of U.S. government housing agencies - is currently 57bps. That is only 3bps below the spread on Aa-rated corporates and 26bps below that of A-rated credit. (Chart 8). 2) Risk-adjusted MBS spreads look very attractive Agency MBS exhibit negative convexity, with an interest rate duration that declines when yields fall. The opposite is true for positively convex investment grade corporate bonds, where the duration rises as yields decrease. This makes agency MBS look attractive on a risk-adjusted basis after the kind of big decline in bond yields seen in 2019. The average duration of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. agency MBS index is now only 3.4 compared to 7.9 for an A-rated corporate bond. Both of those durations were around similar levels at the 2018 peak in U.S. bond yields, but now the gap between them is large. With those new durations, it would take a 17bp widening of the agency MBS spread for an investor to see losses versus duration-matched U.S. Treasuries, compared to only an 11bp widening of the A-rated corporate spread (bottom panel). This is a big change in the relative risk profile of agency MBS versus high-rated U.S. corporates compared to a year ago, making the former look relatively more attractive. That was not the case the last time agency MBS duration fell so sharply in 2015/16, since corporate bond spreads were widening (getting cheaper) at that time. Today, corporate bond spreads have been stable as corporate duration has increased and agency MBS duration has plunged, making risk-adjusted MBS spreads more attractive. Given our view that U.S. Treasury yields will continue to grind higher, favoring lower duration assets like agency MBS over higher duration investment grade corporates makes sense. Given our view that U.S. Treasury yields will continue to grind higher, favoring lower duration assets like agency MBS over higher duration investment grade corporates makes sense. 3) Macro risks are reduced Mortgage refinancing activity remains the biggest macro driver of MBS spreads, particularly in an environment when mortgage rates are falling and prepayments are accelerating. There was a pickup in refinancing activity over the past year as mortgage rates fell, but the increase has been small relative to similar-sized rate declines in the past (Chart 9). We interpret this as an indication that, after the sustained period of low mortgage rates seen in the decade since the Great Financial Crisis, most homeowners have already had an opportunity to refinance. In other words, the so-called “refi burnout“ is now quite high. Chart 9Muted Refi Activity Keeping Nominal U.S. MBS Spreads Low Beyond refinancing, the other macro risks for agency MBS are subdued. The credit quality of outstanding U.S. mortgages remains solid. The median credit (FICO) score for newly-issued mortgages remains high and stable near the post-2008 crisis highs, while mortgage lending standards have mostly been easing over that same period according to the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officers Survey. In addition, U.S. housing activity remains solid, with the most reliable indicators like single-family new home sales and the National Association of Home Builders activity surveys all up solidly following this year’s sharp drop in mortgage rates (Chart 10). This makes MBS less risky for two reasons: a) stronger housing activity typically leads to higher mortgage rates, which limits future refi activity; and b) more robust housing demand will boost home prices, the value of the underlying collateral for MBS securities. Chart 10U.S. Housing Activity Hooking Up Chart 11Relative Value Favoring U.S. MBS Over U.S. Corporates Given the improved risk-reward balance of agency MBS versus higher-quality U.S. corporates, we recommend that dedicated fixed income investors make this shift within bond portfolios, reducing allocations to Aaa-rated, Aa-rated and A-rated corporates while increasing exposure to agency MBS. Agency MBS is part of the investment universe of our model bond portfolio. Thus, we are increasing the recommended weighting of agency MBS while reducing the exposure to U.S. investment grade corporates in the portfolio. The changes can be seen in the table on Page 11. We do not split out the investment grade exposure by credit tier in the portfolio, as we prefer to allocate by broad sector groupings (Financials, Industrials, Utilities). So we cannot implement the precise “MBS for high-rated corporates” switch in the model portfolio. There is still a case for reducing overall investment grade exposure and adding to MBS weightings, however. The relative option-adjusted spread of agency MBS and investment grade corporates typically leads the relative excess returns (over duration-matched U.S. Treasuries) between the two by around one year (Chart 11). Thus, the compression of the spread differential between MBS and corporates over the past year is signaling that agency MBS should be expected to outperform the broad U.S. investment grade universe over the next twelve months. Bottom Line: U.S. agency MBS spreads are now attractive relative to high-quality U.S. corporate bonds, both in absolute terms and on a risk-adjusted basis. Increase allocations to agency MBS, while reducing exposure to Aaa-, Aa- and A-rated U.S. corporates. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Cracks Are Forming In The Bond-Bullish Narrative”, dated October 23, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Themes And Two Trades”, dated October 1, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresarch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: The upturn in bond yields is not yet confirmed by our preferred global growth indicators. We anticipate that a reduction in trade uncertainty during the next few months will cause our indicators to rebound. But until then, investors should view the bond sell-off as tenuous. Yield Curve: Expect modest 2/10 steepening during the next few months, as the Fed keeps rates low even as economic growth improves. Steepening will show up in real yields, not in the TIPS breakeven inflation curve. The 2/10 slope will stay in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps for the next 6-12 months. Yield Curve Strategy: The 5-year Treasury note looks expensive compared to the rest of the yield curve, and historical correlations suggest it will rise the most if the Fed delivers fewer rate cuts than are currently expected. We recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Await Confirmation Bond yields look like they might be bottoming. The 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields are up 10 bps and 31 bps, respectively, since the 2/10 slope briefly inverted in late August (Chart 1). We are cautiously optimistic that the growth revival getting priced into Treasury yields will materialize. However, it’s vital to note that the yield rebound is not yet confirmed by the economic data. Even timely global growth indicators like the CRB Raw Industrials index remain downbeat (Chart 1, bottom panel). If global growth measures don’t bottom soon, then Treasury yields are certain to fall back. Chart 1Yields Are Ahead Of The Data We do expect the economic data to follow bond yields higher. We noted in last week’s report that the weakness in US economic data is concentrated in survey measures (aka “soft” data), while measures of actual economic activity (aka “hard data”) are holding up well.1    For example: The ISM Manufacturing survey is below its 2016 trough, but the year-over-year growth rate in industrial production is well above 2016 levels (Chart 2, top panel). Capacity utilization also remains elevated (Chart 2, bottom panel). New orders for core capital goods are holding firm, even with CEO confidence at its lowest since 2009 (Chart 2, panel 2). Employment growth remains strong, despite the employment component of the ISM Non-Manufacturing survey being just above the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 2, panel 3). Chart 2Will "Soft" Data Rebound? Our interpretation of the divergence is that uncertainty about the US/China trade war is weighing on sentiment and holding survey measures down. If that uncertainty is removed, survey measures will quickly rebound and converge with the “hard” data. On that front, we think it’s very likely that trade uncertainty diminishes during the next few months. The US and China have already agreed to an informal “phase one deal” that will require China to buy $40-$50 billion of US agricultural goods while the US delays the October 15 tariff hike. Odds are that President Trump will also delay the planned December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some existing tariffs.2 The reason is that while Trump’s overall approval rating has been consistently low; until recently, he had been receiving high marks for his handling of the economy (Chart 3). But his economic approval rating took a tumble this summer and, as we head toward the 2020 election, he desperately needs an economic boost and/or policy victory to push up his numbers. We already see some tentative signs of a rebound in the regional Fed manufacturing surveys. A tactical retreat on trade should improve sentiment and cause survey data to move higher, alongside bond yields. And in fact, we already see some tentative signs of a rebound in the regional Fed manufacturing surveys (Chart 4). October figures are out for the New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Kansas City and Dallas surveys, and they have all diverged positively from the national ISM. Chart 3It's Trump's Economy Chart 4Some Optimism From Regional Surveys Bottom Line: The upturn in bond yields is not yet confirmed by our preferred global growth indicators. We anticipate that a reduction in trade uncertainty during the next few months will cause our indicators to rebound. But until then, investors should view the bond sell-off as tenuous. Yield Curve: Macro Drivers We noted in the first section that the 2/10 Treasury slope has steepened sharply since it briefly broke below zero in late August. In this section, we consider whether this 2/10 steepening might continue. To do this we run through the main macro drivers of the yield curve. The Fed Funds Rate Traditionally, there is a very tight correlation between the fed funds rate and the slope of the curve (Chart 5). Fed tightening puts upward pressure on the curve’s front-end relative to the back-end, leading to a bear-flattening. Conversely, Fed easing drags the front-end down relative to the long-end, leading to bull-steepening. Chart 5The Fed's Yield Curve Control The traditional pattern broke down between 2009 and 2015 when the fed funds rate was pinned at zero. This period saw many episodes of bear-steepening and bull-flattening. But since the funds rate has been off zero, the traditional correlation has begun to re-assert itself. Our base case outlook calls for one more 25 bps rate cut tomorrow, followed by an extended on-hold period. This scenario might be expected to impart some mild steepening pressure to the curve, except for the fact that the front-end is already priced for 53 bps of easing during the next 12 months, significantly more than we expect. Our base case outlook calls for one more 25 bps rate cut tomorrow, followed by an extended on-hold period. If our base case scenario is incorrect, and growth continues to deteriorate, forcing the Fed to cut rates all the way back to zero. Then we would expect some initial bull-steepening, followed by bull-flattening as the funds rate approaches the zero bound. Wage Growth Wage growth is another excellent yield curve indicator, mainly because it helps determine the direction of the fed funds rate. Stronger wage growth causes the Fed to tighten and the curve to flatten. On the flipside, wage growth is a less effective indicator during Fed easing cycles, when it tends to lag changes in the funds rate (Chart 6). In fact, while wage growth is tightly correlated with the 2/10 slope, it lags changes in the slope by about 12 months (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 6Wages Lead Tightening, But Lag Easing The upshot is that if the economy heads toward recession, then wage growth will not be a timely indicator of Fed rate cuts. However, if recession is avoided and wages continue to accelerate (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels), strong wage growth will limit how accommodative the Fed can be as it seeks to re-anchor inflation expectations. As such, persistently strong wage growth will limit the amount of curve steepening that can occur. Inflation Expectations The Fed’s need to re-anchor inflation expectations in a range consistent with its target is the main reason to forecast curve steepening. At present, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is a mere 1.66%, well below the 2.3%-2.5% range that the Fed would consider “well anchored”. One might conclude that if the Fed succeeds in driving this rate higher, it will impart significant steepening pressure to the curve. However, we must also note that the 2-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is even lower than the 10-year rate (Chart 7). Given our view that long-dated inflation expectations adapt only slowly to the actual inflation data, we would expect both the 2-year and 10-year breakevens to rise in tandem, exerting some modest flattening pressure on the curve.3 Chart 7Any Steepening Will Come From Real Yields Ironically, if the Fed is successful in re-anchoring long-dated inflation expectations, we expect it will cause the yield curve to steepen, but through its impact on real yields. At present, the 2-year and 10-year real yields are 0.37% and 0.14%, respectively. The act of holding rates steady for long enough to re-anchor inflation expectations will exert downward pressure on the 2-year real yield, while the 10-year real yield will rise in response to an improved growth outlook. The Fed’s goal of re-anchoring inflation expectations will likely lead to some curve steepening, but through the real component of yields, not the inflation component. The Neutral Rate The neutral rate – the fed funds rate that is neither inflationary nor deflationary – is a major wild card when it comes to the yield curve. Right now, the median Fed estimate calls for a neutral rate of 2.5%, while the market is pricing-in an even lower rate of 2%, at least according to the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield (Chart 8). Neutral rate estimates have been revised lower during the past few years, exerting significant flattening pressure on the yield curve. In theory, if we reach an inflection point where neutral rate estimates are revised higher, it would lead to substantial curve steepening. One thing to watch to help predict movement in neutral rate estimates is the gold price.4 Gold performs well when the market perceives monetary policy as increasingly accommodative, either because the Fed is cutting rates or because the assumed neutral rate is rising. The 2013 drop in gold foreshadowed downward revisions to the Fed’s neutral rate estimate (Chart 8, bottom panel). A further increase in gold, especially once the Fed stops cutting rates, would send a strong signal that current neutral rate estimates are too low. Monetary policy arguably exerts its greatest economic impact through the housing market. Investors can also watch the housing market for clues about the neutral rate. Monetary policy arguably exerts its greatest economic impact through the housing market. If housing activity starts to wane, it can be a strong signal that interest rates are too high. Last year, housing activity started to flag once the mortgage rate moved above 4% (Chart 9). If 4% proves to be the ceiling on mortgage rates, it would mean that the Fed’s current neutral rate estimate is roughly correct. However, home prices have moderated since last year, and new construction has started to focus more on the low-end of the market, where supply remains scarce.5 This shift in focus from homebuilders has caused the price of new homes to fall considerably (Chart 9, bottom panel), a supply side re-adjustment that could make the housing market more resilient in the face of higher rates. Chart 8Tracking The Neutral Rate: Gold Chart 9Tracking The Neutral Rate: Housing An upward re-assessment of the neutral rate would impart steepening pressure to the yield curve, but only if it occurs quickly, before the Fed has time to deliver offsetting rate hikes. However, we think it’s more likely that any increase in neutral rate estimates will occur gradually, alongside Fed tightening. In that case, a roughly parallel upward shift in the yield curve would be the most likely outcome. Verdict Considering all of the above factors, we would look for some modest 2/10 curve steepening during the next few months. The steepening will be driven by the Fed’s desire to re-anchor long-dated inflation expectations, a desire that will result in them keeping rates steady (apart from one more cut tomorrow), even as economic growth improves. As noted above, this steepening will show up in real yields, not in the TIPS breakeven inflation curve. That being said, strong wage growth and overly dovish market rate cut expectations will ensure that any steepening is well contained. We expect the 2/10 slope to stay in a range between 0 bps and 50 bps for the next 6-12 months. Yield Curve Strategy Chart 10Treasury Yield Curve When thinking about how to position a Treasury portfolio for our expected yield curve outcome, we first look at the value proposition offered by different Treasury maturities. Chart 10 shows the Treasury yield curve, and also each maturity’s 12-month rolling yield. The rolling yield is simply the combination of each maturity’s 12-month yield income and the price impact of rolling down the curve. It can be thought of as the return you would earn holding each bond for 12 months in an unchanged yield curve environment. The first thing that sticks out in Chart 10 is that the 5-year note offers poor value. We also note that the curve steepens sharply beyond the 5-year maturity point, so maturities greater than 5 years benefit a lot from rolldown. The simple intuition from Chart 10 is confirmed by our butterfly spread models.6  Chart 11shows that the 5-year bullet looks very expensive relative to a duration-matched barbell portfolio consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. In fact, with only a few exceptions, bullets are expensive relative to barbells across the entire Treasury curve (see Appendix). Chart 11Bullets Are Very Expensive All else equal, bullets tend to outperform barbells when the yield curve steepens. However, given current valuations, it would take a lot of steepening for bullets to outperform barbells during the next few months. Chart 12Yield Curve Correlations Further, Chart 12 shows that the front-end of the yield curve – out to about the 5-year/7-year point – tends to steepen when our 12-month discounter rises, while the long-end of the curve – beyond the 7-year point – tends to flatten. Given that our 12-month discounter is currently -53 bps, meaning that the market is priced for 53 bps of rate cuts during the next year, we expect it will rise during the next few months. This should exert the most upward pressure on the 5-year/7-year part of the curve. We have been recommending that investors play the curve by going long a 2/30 barbell and shorting the 7-year bullet. But given the significant rolldown advantage in the 7-year compared to the 5-year, we amend that recommendation this week. We now recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet and go long a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 30-year maturities. Bottom Line: The 5-year Treasury note looks expensive compared to the rest of the yield curve, and historical correlations suggest it will rise the most if the Fed delivers fewer rate cuts than are currently expected. We recommend that investors short the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Appendix Table 1Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As of October 25, 2019) Table 2Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As of October 25, 2019) Ryan Swift U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Crisis Of Confidence”, dated October 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on BCA’s outlook for US/China trade negotiations please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Much To Buy An American President?”, dated October 25, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 For further details on how inflation expectations adapt to the actual inflation data please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market”, dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Signal From Gold?”, dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Long Awkward Middle Phase”, dated July 2, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For details on our butterfly spread models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Informe especial I am on the road this week, so instead of our regular weekly report, we are sending you an update of our long-term fair value models. I hope to report any insights I have gained next week. Regards, Chester Ntonifor  Highlights Our long-term FX models are not sending any strong signals right now, with the U.S. dollar at fair value.  The cheapest currencies are the yen, the Norwegian krone and Swedish krona. The priciest currencies are the South African rand and the Saudi riyal. Feature This week we are updating our long-term FX models, part of a set of technical tools we use to help us navigate FX markets. Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion. These models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G-10 and emerging market FX markets. The models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their main purpose is to provide information on the longevity of a currency cycle, depending on where we are in the economic cycle. For all countries, the variables are highly statistically significant, and of the expected signs. Together with other currency models we maintain in-house, these help us guide currency strategy, while providing a crosscheck when we might be offside. U.S. Dollar Chart 1The U.S. Dollar Is Close To Fair Value The uptrend in the dollar that has been in place since 2011 has lifted it only as far as the neutral zone. This is the biggest risk to our cyclical bearish dollar view. The big driver behind the uptrend has been interest rate differentials. If U.S. interest rates continue to roll over relative to their G-10 counterparts, this will lower the greenback’s fair value (Chart 1). The Euro Chart 2The Euro Is Trading At A Discount The euro is cheap by one standard deviation below its fair value. Historically, when the euro has hit its fair value bands, it has tended to mean-revert. The big driver lifting the euro’s fair value is the cumulative current account. Our bias is that the R-star for the euro area could start to head higher in the coming quarters, which will further lift its fair value (Chart 2). The Yen Chart 3The Yen Is Still Undervalued The yen is cheap by most relative price measures. The latest uptick in the yen’s fair value is driven by an appreciation in the gold-to-oil ratio, a measure of risk aversion (Chart 3). We believe the yen sits in a beautiful spot at the current economic juncture. Further deterioration in economic data will lead to higher risk aversion and a higher fair value. Meanwhile, a pickup in economic activity will still keep the fair value rising from a current account perspective.  The British Pound Chart 4GBP Grinding Higher Towards Its Fair Value The pound is cheap by most model measures, including our fundamental models. Downside in the pound has tended to capitulate around 1.5 standard deviations below fair value, even during the ERM crisis. Of course, the latest down leg has been politically driven, since the economic fair value of the pound has not really shifted by much (Chart 4). The Canadian Dollar Chart 5The Canadian Dollar Is Slightly Overvalued The fair value for the Canadian dollar has been falling since the 2011 peak in the commodity cycle. This still leaves the CAD slightly above fair value today (Chart 5). Meanwhile, the current account deficit has narrowed but remains quite wide by historical standards, which does not bode well for the CAD’s long-term fair value. The Australian Dollar Chart 6Aussie At Fair Value The recent drop in the Australian dollar has nudged it slightly below its fair value. However, like the Canadian dollar, the fair value of the Aussie has been dropping in recent years on the back of depressed commodity prices. Given the growing importance of liquified natural gas in Australia’s export mix, we believe terms of trade will remain a tailwind for the Australian currency over the longer term (Chart 6). The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7The Kiwi Has Been Fluctuating Around Its Fair Value The New Zealand dollar is currently at fair value, similar to its antipodean neighbor. Like other commodity currencies, its fair value has fallen in recent years. The catalyst has been the drop in commodity prices, along with the fall in relative real rates (Chart 7). The Swiss Franc Chart 8The Swiss Franc Is Not Expensive The Swiss franc is not as cheap as the yen, but our fundamental models show it as undervalued. The biggest driver in the rise of the franc’s fair value has been the structural trade surplus. The rise in the gold-to-oil ratio has further helped boost the fair value of the exchange rate (Chart 8). The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Krona Is Cheap The Swedish krona is one of the cheapest currencies in our universe, together with the Norwegian krone. The key model inputs for the Swedish krona are interest rate differentials and relative productivity trends. So, while the fair value of the krona has been falling for several years, the currency is still massively undershooting this fair value (Chart 9). The Norwegian Krone Chart 10The Krone Is Cheap Too The Norwegian krone is the cheapest it has been in the history of our model. More interestingly, the fair value has actually risen in recent years as the exchange rate has nosedived (Chart 10). The big driver in lifting the fair value has been the rise in crude oil prices. Within the commodity complex, the Norwegian krone is the most attractive. The Chinese Yuan Chart 11The Yuan Is Not Expensive The Chinese yuan is currently at one standard deviation below fair value. The yuan’s fair value has been mostly rising during the entire history of our model. This is driven predominately by higher relative productivity (Chart 11). We lie in the camp that there will be no significant devaluation in the RMB, in part because the exchange rate is already cheap. The Brazilian Real Chart 12The Brazilian Real Is Slightly Overvalued The Brazilian real is slightly above fair value, according to our fundamental models. Meanwhile, the fair value has been falling since 2011, in line with other commodity currencies (Chart 12). The current account component of the model should start to rise if reforms in Brazil lead to better productivity and improved competitiveness. The Mexican Peso Chart 13The Mexican Peso Is Now Above Fair Value The Mexican peso is trading a nudge above fair value. Over the last few years, opposing forces in the model have kept the fair value roughly flat. On one hand, the rising gold-to-oil ratio has been negative, as the peso is a cyclical currency. On the other hand, the cumulative current account has started to improve and bond yield differentials remain positive (Chart 13). The Chilean Peso Chart 14The Chilean Peso Is At Fair Value The fair value of the Chilean peso has been roughly flat for many years. This has also been the case for the real effective exchange rate, with fluctuations between half a percent of one standard deviation around fair value (Chart 14). This suggests the peso is mainly a trading currency, especially versus other emerging markets. The Colombian Peso Chart 15The Colombian Peso Is Depressed The Colombian peso is cheap, and is also one of our favorite petrocurrencies. The reason is that it has one of the strongest correlations to oil prices among commodity currencies, even though that correlation has been weakening (Chart 15). The South African Rand Chart 16The South African Rand Is Above Its Fair Value The South African rand is now trading slightly above its fair value (Chart 16). The correlation between precious metals prices and the South African rand has gradually weakened, largely due to domestic supply constraints and shrinking mining production. Meanwhile, the current account deficit continues to widen. This has gradually eroded the rand’s fair value. The Russian Ruble Chart 17The Russian Ruble Is Not Cheap The Russian ruble is now sitting around 0.5 standard deviations above its fair value (Chart 17). We are positive on oil, which will boost the fair value of petrocurrencies, including the Russian ruble. Meanwhile, real interest rates are at relatively high levels in Russia, even though the model’s results do not provide significant explanatory power. We are currently long RUB/EUR in our petrocurrency basket, with the Russian ruble being the best-performing petrocurrency. The Korean Won Chart 18The Korean Won Has Cheapened Further The Korean won has underperformed this year, and is now trading at a non-negligible discount to its fair value (Chart 18). Meanwhile, the fair value of the Korean won has been rising over the years. This has been partly driven by an increasing current account surplus – at least up until the trade war began. The fair value also tends to benefit from risk flare-ups. The Philippine Peso Chart 19The Philippine Peso Has Appreciated The Philippine peso has increased by 5% against the U.S. dollar year-to-date. However, despite its recent appreciation, the peso is still trading at a 6% discount to its long-term fair value (Chart 19). The Philippine peso is one of the few currencies whose REER tends to have well-defined and long cycles that last five-to-eight years. It will be important to watch if the recent appreciation is the start of a new trend. The Singapore Dollar Chart 20The Singapore Dollar Is Still Overvalued The Singapore dollar is another currency whose REER tends to have long cycles, probably a feature of the managed float (Chart 20). The Singapore dollar is a defensive currency, and so the decline in other emerging market currencies has made it slightly expensive. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 21The Hong Kong Dollar Is Overvalued The HKD’s REER has been rising in recent years, meaning inflation in Hong Kong has been outpacing that of other regions (Chart 21). This has made the HKD expensive, according to our models. However, the fair value has been on an uptrend in recent years, in part driven by rising relative productivity. The Saudi Riyal Chart 22The Saudi Riyal Is Expensive The fair value of the Saudi riyal has been falling for quite a while on declining relative productivity (Chart 22). This has made the riyal incrementally expensive. However, it may take much more stretched valuations before greater tensions arise in the peg. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD was indefinitely suspended beginning in 4Q18 by the pervasive economic uncertainty we identified last week as the culprit holding back global oil demand growth via a super-charged dollar.1 This uncertainty is most pronounced in the U.S. and Europe vis-à-vis gold, and partly explains the performance of safe havens, particularly the USD, which has soared to new heights on a trade-weighted goods basis, and gold (Chart of the Week). So far, gold has held its ground after breaking above $1,500/oz from the low $1,200s in mid-2018, indicating investors are much more concerned about economic risks arising from economic policy uncertainty than inflation and other diversifiable risks gold typically hedges (Charts 2A, 2B). Cyclically we remain positive on gold prices on the back of a lower dollar and rising inflation pressure in the U.S. Chart of the WeekDemand For Safe Havens Soars As Economic Policy Uncertainty Rises Economic policy uncertainty in Europe and the U.S. supports gold prices. Even so, we are putting a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long gold portfolio hedge to cover tactical risks showing up in our technical indicators. In addition, as is the case with oil demand, if the ceasefire we are expecting in the Sino-U.S. trade war materializes in 1H20 and limited trade – mostly in ags and energy – is forthcoming, demand for safe-haven assets could weaken gold prices at the margin. Fiscal and monetary stimulus globally also could revive economic growth and commodity demand, pushing global yields higher, which would put negative pressure on gold at the margin, as well, given the high correlation between real rates and gold prices. Chart 2AU.S., Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Chart 2BU.S., Euro Economic Uncertainty Correlated With Gold Prices Highlights · Energy: Overweight. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are on the verge of signing an historic pact to restart production from the Neutral Zone. Kuwait expects to sign the pact within 30 to 45 days. Potential production from the jointly operated fields – Khafji and Wafra – is estimated at ~ 500k b/d. Ramping up production at the Wafra field could take up to 6 months. Importantly, both countries are expected to respect their production quota mandated under the OPEC 2.0 agreement expiring in 1Q20.2 Separately, Chevron’s waiver to operate in Venezuela was extended for three months from the Trump administration this week. · Base Metals: Neutral. Chile copper production was up 1% and 11% y/y in July and August, according to the World Bureau of Metal Statistics. Earlier this week, the Union of workers at Chile’s Escondida copper mine – the world’s largest – held a strike in support of broader protests sparked by the increase of metro fare last Friday. Chile’s President suspended the fare hike on Saturday, but the protests are still ongoing and have now caused 15 deaths.3 · Precious Metals: Neutral. The gold/silver ratio fell 9% since July 2019. Our tactical long spot silver recommendation is up 3% since inception in August 2019, and our strategic long gold position is up 21%. Cyclically, we remain positive on both silver and gold prices, more on this below. A tactical pullback is possible; money managers have started liquidating some of their long gold positions, dropping by 67k contracts from September levels, according to CFTC data. · Ags/Softs: Underweight. According to USDA data, corn and soybean harvest are 30% and 46% complete, lagging behind their respective 47% and 64% five-year average pace. For corn, the USDA rates 54% of the U.S. crop good or excellent, vs. 66% a year earlier. For beans, 56% of the crop is rated good or excellent, vs. 68% last year. Separately, China announced waivers allowing up to 10mm MT of U.S. soybeans to be imported by domestic and international crushing concerns. The waivers are in place until March 2020. Feature The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term tactical horizon – 3 to 6 months – as economic policy uncertainty continues to stoke global demand for safe havens.4 The once-reliable negative correlation between gold and the USD will remain muted over the short-term. This can be seen in the elevated correlations between the USD’s broad trade-weighted goods index with the Baker-Bloom-Davis (BBD) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indexes for the U.S. and Europe (Chart 3).5 Rising economic uncertainty – particularly since 4Q18 – has created a rare environment in which both the USD and gold trended up simultaneously and continue to move in the same direction. The implication of this is that gold’s correlation with both the USD and EPU is weaker than before because economic policy uncertainty now is positively correlated with the dollar. Chart 3Strong USD, EPU Correlation Chart 4Correlation of Daily Gold, USD Returns Also Moving Sharply Higher There is a possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the U.S. and China can agree on a trade ceasefire... The typically negative correlation between daily returns of gold and the USD also is weakening, moving toward positive territory (Chart 4), as both the USD and gold trend higher simultaneously (Chart 5).   Chart 5Gold and USD Levels Trending Higher ...If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. Our short-term technical indicator is signaling an overbought gold market (Chart 6), and our fair-value model indicates gold should be trading ~ $1,450/oz (Chart 7). The latter signal off our fair-value model is less concerning, given the demand for safe-haven assets like the USD and gold now dominates gold’s typical drivers. Chart 6Gold Technical Indicators Signal Overbought Market Chart 7High USD Correlation Throws Off Fair-Value Model However, to be on the safe side, we are placing a $1,450/oz stop-loss on our long-term gold position, which as of Tuesday’s close was up 21% since inception on May 14, 2017. This is a precautionary measure, which recognizes the possibility global policy uncertainty could be reduced later this year if the U.S. and China can agree on a trade ceasefire, and global fiscal and monetary policy are successful in reviving EM income growth, which would revive commodity demand generally, pushing up global bond yields. If this occurs, the risk premium supporting gold will ease, and markets will once again turn their attention to possible inflationary consequences of the global stimulus. During that period, the monetary and fiscal aggregates we track as explanatory variables for gold prices will reassert themselves as the dominant drivers of gold prices (see below). This could produce tension between a falling USD and rising real rates as growth picks up, which would send us to a risk-neutral setting re gold, given the current high correlation between gold and real rates, which should remain strong until the Fed starts hiking rates again, most likely in 2020 (Chart 8). This is part of the reason we are including the stop-loss at $1,450/oz for our existing gold position: During this risky period going into 1H20 economic uncertainty could dissipate, and real rates could rise. Although the USD depreciation would mute these effects, rising real rates would be a risk to gold prices Chart 8Rising Real Rates Could Weaken Gold Prices Economic Uncertainty Dominates Gold’s Fundamentals At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. In Table 1, we collect the variables we consider when assessing gold’s fair value. At present, economic policy uncertainty overwhelms the other factors we typically use as explanatory variables when modeling gold prices. This variable broadly falls in the geopolitical risk we regularly account for in our analysis of gold markets. Table 1Fundamental And Technical Gold-Price Drivers If the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Checking off each of these groups, we see: · Demand for inflation hedges remaining muted over the short-term, as inflationary pressures remain weak. In line with our House view, however, we do expect inflation could move higher toward the end of next year and overshoot the Fed’s 2% target for the U.S. This would support gold prices. · Monetary and financial aggregates are working less well as explanatory variables for gold prices in a market dominated by economic policy uncertainty. The USD-gold correlation continues to be disrupted by strong demand for safe-haven assets. As inflation picks up next year, we expect nominal bond yields to rise. Real rates, however, could remain subdued, as long as the Fed is not aggressively raising rates to get out ahead of a possible revival of inflation (Chart 9). Later in 2020, the correlation between rates and gold should be supportive for gold prices – the correlation fades when the Fed tightens, which creates a demand for safe-haven assets like gold. All the same, an increase in real rates would be a risk to gold prices in 1H20. · At present, demand for portfolio-diversification assets via safe-haven assets is a powerful force in gold’s price evolution. It is worthwhile pointing out, however, that if global economic uncertainty is resolved and global growth does rebound, recession fears will diminish, thus reducing the marginal impact of geopolitical shocks. On the other hand, if the uncertainty captured by the EPU indexes is resolved, we would expect the dollar to fall and the negative gold-USD correlation to reassert itself and strengthen. Should that happen, short-term volatility in gold will rise (Chart 10). Chart 9Bond Yields Should Rise As Inflation Revives In 2H20 Chart 10Investors Expect Large Positive Moves In Gold And Silver Prices Investment Implications As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries. Over a tactical horizon – i.e., 3 to 6 months – we expect global economic policy uncertainty to remain elevated. Going into 2020 – and particularly in 2H20 – we expect the USD to weaken on the back of global monetary accommodation policies and increased fiscal stimulus. We also are expecting a ceasefire in the Sino-U.S. trade war, which will revive trade somewhat and support EM income growth and commodity demand. These assumptions, which we’ve laid out in previous research, will be bullish cyclical factors supporting commodities generally. Bottom Line: A ceasefire in the Sino-U.S. trade war, coupled with global fiscal and monetary stimulus, will reduce some of the economic uncertainty dogging aggregate demand. This should be apparent in the data in 1H20. As a result, we continue to expect rising EM income growth to be cyclically bullish for commodities generally. This will allow inflation to revive – again, assuming the Fed does not become aggressive in raising rates. Chart 11EM Income Growth Will Support Demand For Gold Net, this will be bullish for gold: As India’s and China’s economic growth picks up, we expect income to grow, which would support physical gold demand in EM countries (Chart 11).   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1               Please see our report entitled “Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth,” published October 17, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2              Please see “Kuwait Sees Neutral Zone Oil Pact With Saudis Within 45 Days,” published by Bloomberg.com on October 19, 2019. 3              Please see “Chile lawmakers call for social reforms as protests mount,”  published by reuters.com on October 22, 2019. 4              We expect a ceasefire in the Sino-US trade war to be announced in 1H20, which will defuse – but not eliminate – an important risk for global growth in our analytical framework.  We expect this will allow the relationship between the USD and gold to move back to its previous equilibrium in 1Q20 or 2Q20. 5              For more info on the Baker-Bloom-Davis index, please see policyuncertainty.com   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q3 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2016
Aspectos destacados Estrategia de cartera La débil demanda de vivienda, el mínimo en las tasas de interés, la deflación de los precios de viviendas nuevas y las pobres perspectivas de empleo en la industria sugieren que ahora procede una posición infraponderada en el índice S&P homebuilding.      El fortalecimiento de la dinámica demanda/oferta, las regulaciones IMO Sulfur 2020, y las expectativas de beneficios relativos hundidas indican que hay más ganancias por delante para las acciones puras de refino. Cambios recientes Bajar la calificación del índice S&P de construcción de viviendas a infraponderado, hoy. Tabla 1 ¿Esto es todo? ¿Esto es todo? Artículo Las acciones intentaron alcanzar nuevos máximos históricos la semana pasada, continuando con el entusiasmo por el acuerdo comercial "fase uno" y respirando con alivio por resultados bancarios mejores de lo esperado. Dudamos que se materialice un acuerdo real que incluya la Propiedad Intelectual y el sector tecnológico. En el mejor de los casos, lo único que obtuvimos fue una tregua comercial. Vale la pena repetir la reciente analogía futbolística de Larry Kudlow: “Es como estar en la línea de siete yardas en un partido de fútbol... Y como fanático sufridor de los New York Giants, podrían estar en la línea de siete y nunca logran llevar el balón a la zona de anotación... Cuando llegas al último 10 por ciento, a la línea de siete yardas, es difícil”. Como recordatorio, las altas tarifas permanecen vigentes y hay muchas probabilidades de que el daño ya infligido al comercio global sea lo suficientemente severo como para que pasen meses antes de que surjan brotes verdes. Mientras tanto, dando seguimiento a nuestro “candidato a gráfico del año” que publicamos hace dos semanas, profundizamos y descubrimos dos índices económicos sensibles adicionales que consistentemente alcanzaron su pico antes que el SPX en los tres ciclos anteriores (Gráfico 1). Ahora conforman el Indicador Líder de Acciones de la Estrategia de Renta Variable de EE. UU.: un compósito con ponderación igual del índice S&P Banks, el índice Russell 2000 y el índice Value Line Geometric, que señala que el dinero fácil ya se ha hecho este ciclo en el SPX (Gráfico 2). Gráfico 1 Tres señales infalibles... Tres señales infalibles... Tres señales infalibles... Gráfico 2 ...Combinadas en un único indicador líder de acciones ...Combinados en un único indicador líder de renta variable ...Combinados en un único indicador líder de renta variable Es importante subrayar que, en ausencia de crecimiento de beneficios, sigue siendo extremadamente difícil que las acciones emprendan un nuevo tramo alcista sostenible confiando únicamente en la expansión de múltiplos. Gráfico 3 muestra nuestro actualizado Indicador de Poder de Fijación de Precios Corporativos (CPPI) y continúa desinflándose. De hecho, la fuerte caída de nuestro CPPI compensa más que la caída en el crecimiento salarial, advirtiendo que la contracción de márgenes en el S&P 500 tiene poder de persistencia1 (panel inferior, Gráfico 3). Analizando en profundidad, nuestro CPPI está agitando una bandera roja. Como recordatorio, calculamos el poder de fijación de precios por grupo industrial a partir de las tasas de crecimiento relevantes del CPI, PPI, PCE y las materias primas para cada uno de los 60 grupos industriales que seguimos. Tabla 2 también destaca las tendencias de poder de fijación de precios a más corto plazo y la diferencia de cada industria con respecto a la inflación general. Sólo el 42% de las industrias que cubrimos están elevando los precios de venta en más del 1%, y el 33% están claramente deflacionando. Preocupantemente, solo el 26% de los sectores están subiendo precios a un ritmo superior al de la inflación general. En cuanto a las tendencias de poder de fijación de precios, dos tercios de las industrias que cubrimos están o bien planas o en tendencia descendente (Tabla 2). Gráfico 3 Poder de fijación de precios corporativo nulo Nulo poder corporativo de fijación de precios Nulo poder corporativo de fijación de precios Tabla 2 Poder de fijación de precios por grupo industrial ¿Es esto todo? ¿Es esto todo? El oro ha saltado a la cima de nuestra tabla galopando a una tasa del 26% anual (recuerde que estaba en deflación en nuestra actualización de principios de julio), y solo tres industrias adicionales relacionadas con materias primas llegaron al top veinte (Tabla 2). La desaparición del complejo de materias primas de los primeros puestos es consistente con los problemas del PPI global y la fortaleza del dólar estadounidense. Esta semana actualizamos dos grupos, uno temprano y otro profundamente cíclico. Curiosamente, los sectores defensivos tienen una presencia saludable en los diez primeros puestos con cinco entradas. Por el contrario, las materias primas en general y las industrias relacionadas con la energía en particular ocupan la parte baja de la clasificación, ya que el crudo WTI está deflacionando fuertemente desde el pico de octubre de 2018. Sumando todo, la inflación de precios de venta del sector corporativo se está hundiendo en línea con las expectativas de inflación deprimidas. Como planteamos en nuestro reciente Informe Especial sobre márgenes de beneficio, los márgenes de beneficio ya han alcanzado su pico para el ciclo. Reiteramos nuestra visión cautelosa del mercado accionario en un horizonte cíclico de 9 a 12 meses. Esta semana actualizamos dos grupos, uno temprano y otro profundamente cíclico. Resquebrajando los cimientos de la construcción de viviendas Recomendamos degradar el nicho del índice S&P homebuilding a infraponderado, ya que la mayoría, si no todos, los impulsores positivos de beneficios ya están reflejados en los precios relativos de las acciones. Específicamente, la caída de las tasas de interés ha sido más que compensada por el comportamiento superior en lo que va del año de los constructores de viviendas. Desde la Gran Recesión, los constructores de viviendas han estado en ciclos claramente definidos de subidas y bajadas, y hay muchas probabilidades de que pronto entremos en una oscilación descendente (panel inferior, Gráfico 4). Las tasas de interés tocaron fondo a principios de septiembre y hay poco impulso adicional que puedan ejercer sobre los precios relativos de las acciones (rendimiento del Treasury a 10 años mostrado invertido, panel superior, Gráfico 4). Gráfico 4 Las ganancias relativas están agotadas Las ganancias relativas están agotadas. Las ganancias relativas están agotadas. Preocupantemente, las expectativas de los consumidores de comprar una vivienda nueva se desplomaron el mes pasado según la encuesta de The Conference Board, y esa debilidad en la demanda afectará a los inicios de vivienda y, en última instancia, a los ingresos de la construcción de viviendas (Gráfico 5). Gráfico 5 Aparecen grietas Formación de grietas Formación de grietas Para colmo, los precios de venta de casas nuevas están perdiendo terreno frente a los precios de las viviendas existentes, pero dicho descuento ya no está impulsando los volúmenes dado que las ganancias de cuota de mercado de ventas de viviendas nuevas se han estancado recientemente. Ya, las ventas del S&P homebuilding están contrayéndose y existe el riesgo de que la deflación se arraigue en esta industria de la construcción (Gráfico 6). Aunque el índice de solicitudes de hipoteca para compra (MAPI) ha estado subiendo por el desplome de las tasas de interés, el aumento de 30 puntos básicos en el rendimiento del Treasury a 10 años desde el 1 de septiembre indica que el MAPI ha alcanzado tentativamente su pico (segundo panel, Gráfico 7). Gráfico 6 Ventas en contracción Ventas por contrato Ventas por contrato Gráfico 7 Problemas de margen Problemas de margen Problemas de margen Simultáneamente, los precios de la madera están cobrando fuerza y, junto con la contracción de los precios de viviendas nuevas, señalan que las ganancias de los constructores sufrirán un retroceso (paneles medio y cuarto, Gráfico 7). Esto contrasta notablemente con la comunidad sell-side que ha estado aumentando las estimaciones de beneficios para el índice S&P homebuilding (panel inferior, Gráfico 7). Resumiendo, la débil demanda de vivienda, el mínimo en las tasas de interés, la deflación de los precios de viviendas nuevas y las deterioradas perspectivas de empleo en la industria sugieren que ahora procede una posición infraponderada en el índice S&P homebuilding. En el frente operativo, el mercado laboral también emite una señal de alarma. Las ofertas de empleo en la industria de la construcción están cayendo como una piedra y el crecimiento del empleo en la construcción residencial coquetea con la zona de contracción. Históricamente, los flujos y reflujos en los empleos de la construcción han ido a la par con el rendimiento relativo de los precios de las acciones y el mensaje actual es esperar una caída en estos últimos (Gráfico 8). La mayoría de los indicadores que seguimos subrayan un entorno desafiante para la construcción de viviendas en los próximos meses. Sin embargo, existe un riesgo clave para nuestra visión: las tasas de interés. Si la tasa hipotecaria fija a 30 años cayera más desde los niveles actuales, atraerá a los compradores de primera vivienda y amortiguaría el golpe a la demanda de construcción de viviendas (tasas hipotecarias mostradas invertidas, panel superior, Gráfico 9). De forma similar, los banqueros están dispuestos a extender crédito hipotecario y están reportando una demanda creciente de préstamos inmobiliarios residenciales como consecuencia rezagada de la caída de las tasas. Pero, nuestra sensación es que las ganancias fáciles están agotadas y está a la vista una reversión en la mayoría de estas medidas (Gráfico 9). Gráfico 8 Preste atención al mensaje del mercado laboral Preste atención al mensaje del mercado laboral Preste atención al mensaje del mercado laboral Gráfico 9 La posible caída de las tasas es un riesgo clave Las Tarifas Potencialmente Más Bajas Son Un Riesgo Clave Las Tarifas Potencialmente Más Bajas Son Un Riesgo Clave Resumiendo, la débil demanda de vivienda, el mínimo en las tasas de interés, la deflación de los precios de viviendas nuevas y las deterioradas perspectivas de empleo en la industria sugieren que ahora procede una posición infraponderada en el índice S&P homebuilding. Conclusión: Bajar la calificación del índice S&P homebuilding a infraponderado, hoy. Los símbolos bursátiles de las acciones de este índice son: BLBG – S5HOME – DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR. Mantenerse con las refinerías Aunque nuestra visión alcista sobre las refinerías tuvo un comienzo resbaladizo, ha recuperado todas las pérdidas y esta posición ahora está en positivo. Los factores están alineándose para ganancias adicionales en los próximos meses y recomendamos que los inversores mantengan esta recomendación de sobreponderar en acciones puras del downstream. De manera alentadora, las acciones de refino han estado superando al índice energético general últimamente y han reanudado su tendencia relativa alcista de varios años (panel superior, Gráfico 10). En cuanto a la válvula de alivio de las exportaciones, las exportaciones netas de productos refinados de EE. UU. están en una tendencia secular al alza y sorprendentemente no se ven afectadas por los movimientos del dólar (panel inferior, Gráfico 10). Sume las regulaciones de la Organización Marítima Internacional (IMO) Sulfur 2020 que pronto se adoptarán en el combustible de transporte marítimo, y las refinerías de EE. UU. que producen fuelóleo de menor azufre están bien posicionadas para superar en rentabilidad al SPX. Gráfico 10 Reanudada la tendencia alcista Tendencia alcista reanudada Tendencia alcista reanudada El consumo doméstico de productos refinados se mantiene vigoroso y debería servir como catalizador para desbloquear un excelente valor en este subgrupo energético nicho (panel medio, Gráfico 11). De hecho, el consumo de gasolina está volviendo a expandirse por el aumento de los kilómetros recorridos por vehículo (panel inferior, Gráfico 11). Gráfico 11 Demanda sólida... Demanda sólida... Demanda sólida... La dinámica de oferta de productos de refinería también se está moviendo en la dirección correcta. Los inventarios de gasolina se están reduciendo y deberían impulsar las expectativas de beneficios relativos castigadas de las refinerías (inventarios mostrados invertidos, panel inferior, Gráfico 12). Es importante, este contexto de demanda/oferta más firme ha sido un impulso para los márgenes de refino y debería continuar sustentando el impulso relativo de los precios de las acciones (panel medio, Gráfico 12). En términos de lo que ya está descontado para esta industria, la barra esperada de crecimiento de beneficios es extremadamente baja y está cayendo, y el valor relativo se ha restaurado por completo. Primero, en términos de valoraciones relativas, la ratio precio/ventas relativa histórica se ha corregido un 35% desde el pico de mediados de 2018 (panel medio, Gráfico 11). En términos de PER a futuro, las refinerías son extremadamente atractivas comparadas con el SPX tras una casi reducción a la mitad en el PER futuro relativo en los últimos quince meses (segundo panel, Gráfico 13). Gráfico 12 ...El contexto de oferta está impulsando los 'crack spreads'  ...El entorno de la oferta está impulsando los crack spreads ...El entorno de la oferta está impulsando los crack spreads Gráfico 13 El umbral de beneficios es inusualmente bajo El umbral de ganancias está inusualmente bajo El umbral de ganancias está inusualmente bajo En segundo lugar, el crecimiento EPS relativo ha caído por debajo de la línea cero tanto a doce meses como a cinco años vista. Ese pesimismo está sobredimensionado y nos inclinaríamos a contradecir el pesimismo del sell-side (panel inferior, Gráfico 13). Incluso la ratio de revisiones de ganancias netas de la industria de refino se ha desplomado, lo cual es contrariamente positivo (tercer panel, Gráfico 13). Sumando todo, la firmeza de la dinámica demanda/oferta, las regulaciones IMO Sulfur 2020, y las expectativas de beneficios relativos hundidas indican que hay más ganancias por delante para las acciones puras de refino. Conclusión: Mantener sobreponderado el índice S&P oil & gas refining & marketing. Los símbolos bursátiles de las acciones de este índice son: BLBG – S5OILR – MPC, VLO, PSX, HFC.   Anastasios Avgeriou, Estratega de renta variable de EE. UU. anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Notas al pie 1      Consulte el Informe Especial de BCA U.S. Equity Strategy, “Peak Margins” de fecha 7 de octubre de 2019, disponible en uses.bcaresearch.com. Recomendaciones actuales Operaciones actuales Visión sobre tamaño y estilo Mantener neutral: cíclicos frente a defensivos   (alerta de degradación) Favorecer el valor sobre el crecimiento Favorecer las grandes capitalizaciones sobre las pequeñas (Stop 10%)
Aspectos destacados El mercado de divisas está bifurcado en términos de expectativas a corto plazo frente a factores a largo plazo. La corona sueca, la corona noruega y la libra esterlina son compras sólidas a largo plazo, pero podrían seguir siendo muy volátiles a corto plazo. Seguimos enfocándonos en los cruces en lugar de apuestas directas sobre el dólar. Mantener posiciones largas en SEK/NZD, GBP/JPY y NOK/SEK. Ajustar los stops en la posición larga de GBP/JPY para proteger ganancias. EUR/SEK debería alcanzar su techo una vez que mejore el crecimiento global. Vender la relación oro/plata en 90, como se recomendó en el informe de la semana pasada.1 Artículo principal Chart I-1 Una vía en un solo sentido desde 2018 Calle de sentido único desde 2018 Calle de sentido único desde 2018 De todas las monedas del G10 que seguimos, la corona sueca probablemente sea la más desconcertante. El Riksbank es uno de los pocos bancos centrales que han subido tipos este año, pero la corona sigue siendo la moneda más débil del G10. Admitimos que el desempeño del sector manufacturero sueco ha sido pésimo, y lo fue especialmente en septiembre, pero esto no ha sido una historia exclusiva de Suecia. La zona del euro, que también está experimentando una profunda recesión manufacturera, ha visto un mejor comportamiento de su moneda a pesar de un Banco Central Europeo (BCE) más dovish. El rendimiento inferior de la corona plantea la pregunta de si esto señala una recesión manufacturera global mucho más prolongada, o si es indicativo de algo más endógeno a Suecia. Dicho de otra manera, ¿el impulso de la fortaleza de USD/SEK (e incluso USD/NOK) ha sido un dólar apreciándose, o más bien factores domésticos (Chart I-1)? Y si es lo segundo, ¿cuáles son los indicadores importantes a tener en cuenta en caso de que un giro esté a la vuelta de la esquina? El debate entre datos blandos y datos duros La gran pregunta para Suecia es si el sector manufacturero solo está en un proceso volátil de establecer un fondo, o si está a punto de contraerse mucho más. La producción industrial está creciendo actualmente al 4% interanual, pero la señal de los datos blandos es que debería estar contrayéndose en cifras de dos dígitos (Chart I-2, panel superior). Como tal, hay o bien una gran desconexión entre la percepción de los inversores y la realidad, o estamos al borde de un desplome manufacturero mucho más profundo. Los tipos de cambio tienden a ser extremadamente fluidos al descontar una amplia gama de datos económicos y, en el caso de Suecia, al descontar el resultado para el crecimiento global. Sin embargo, con EUR/SEK en 10.8 y USD/SEK en 9.7 – este último muy por encima de sus máximos de 2008 – es razonable asumir que cualquier cosa que no sea una recesión profunda justificará una SEK más fuerte.  Una de las ratios más consistentes para señalar un fondo en el sector manufacturero sueco en particular (y en el de la zona euro en general) es la ratio pedidos manufactureros-niveles de inventario (Chart I-2, panel inferior). La caída en septiembre fue desconcertante. Sin embargo, a diferencia del PMI manufacturero, esta ratio no está marcando nuevos mínimos, evidencia tentativa de que podríamos estar en un proceso volátil de fondo en lugar de una caída prolongada. La última vez que encontramos tal divergencia fue en 2011/2012, en el auge de la crisis de deuda europea; en esa ocasión, los datos duros suecos terminaron enviando la señal correcta para la economía en su conjunto. El deterioro del sector manufacturero aún no ha afectado al consumo interno en general ni al mercado laboral en particular.  El deterioro del sector manufacturero aún no ha afectado al consumo interno en general ni al mercado laboral en particular. El componente de importaciones del índice PMI se mantiene muy por encima del de las exportaciones. Mientras tanto, el componente de empleo del índice PMI comenzó a estabilizarse hacia la mitad de este año, lo que significa que el crecimiento del empleo debería tocar fondo en torno al 1% aproximadamente (Chart I-3). Las exportaciones suecas están más arriba en la cadena de valor manufacturera que en la mayoría de las demás economías desarrolladas, y el sector del automóvil es bastante importante. Pero hasta ahora, la economía sueca ha resistido bastante bien la desaceleración del sector automotriz, con la producción aún registrando un 7% anual. Chart I-2 Los datos blandos son mucho peores Los datos cualitativos son mucho peores Los datos cualitativos son mucho peores Chart I-3 La demanda doméstica se mantiene bien La demanda interna se mantiene sólida La demanda interna se mantiene sólida El repunte de la tasa de desempleo sueca es problemático, pero no creemos que constituya un cambio mayor en la dinámica del mercado laboral. Suecia tiene una larga historia de mayor apertura hacia solicitantes de asilo y refugiados que muchos otros países europeos. La crisis siria de hace un par de años provocó un aumento excepcional, donde el número de solicitantes de asilo se disparó a más de 150.000 o casi el 1,5% de la población total (Chart I-4). Históricamente, la inmigración ha proporcionado un gran dividendo laboral a Suecia, permitiendo que el crecimiento supere tanto al de EE. UU. como al de la zona euro. Pero esto también ha sido una fuente de desempleo friccional, mientras los nuevos migrantes se integran en la fuerza laboral. Chart I-4 Un nuevo grupo de mano de obra que debe integrarse Una nueva reserva de mano de obra que debe integrarse Una nueva reserva de mano de obra que debe integrarse Los trabajadores nacidos en el extranjero ahora constituyen alrededor del 20% de la población total, una gran parte de los cuales necesita aprender un nuevo idioma y adquirir nuevas habilidades (Chart I-5A). Este dividendo de crecimiento se cosechará durante muchos años. La integración es un tema políticamente contencioso, y por ello la ley de asilo y reunificación familiar altamente restrictiva adoptada a mediados de 2016 probablemente signifique que el auge migratorio ya ha quedado atrás. El ascenso de los Demócratas de Suecia, antiinmigración, en las elecciones de septiembre de 2018 es un ejemplo. Sin embargo, el giro de la población democrática hacia la derecha ha sido un fenómeno global, por lo que no es tan negativo para Suecia en términos relativos. Todo ello para decir que, en comparación con la mayoría de las naciones desarrolladas, Suecia aún disfruta de una perspectiva demográfica relativamente positiva (Chart I-5B). Chart I-5A Un enorme dividendo laboral Un enorme dividendo laboral Un enorme dividendo laboral Chart I-5B Sin un evidente precipicio demográfico No hay un precipicio demográfico aparente. No hay un precipicio demográfico aparente. La afluencia de migrantes tiene un impacto mixto en la inflación. Si bien existe presión a la baja sobre los salarios, debido a un aumento en la proporción de empleo que paga salarios más bajos, todavía hay presión al alza sobre la vivienda y el consumo en respuesta al mayor número de trabajadores. Esto se suma a un impulso fiscal al aumentar el gasto del gobierno en servicios sociales. Mientras tanto, la tasa de desempleo entre las personas nacidas en el extranjero ronda el 15%. Esto significa que la curva de Phillips está plana durante los primeros años, antes de empezar a empinarse. Pero a medida que la nueva fuerza laboral finalmente se absorbe en la economía, debería comenzar a generar presiones salariales significativas. El Riksbank entiende claramente estas dinámicas, por lo que en años anteriores su postura ha sido acomodaticia incluso cuando la economía sueca ha mantenido un buen comportamiento. Los tipos de interés se recortaron a territorio negativo en 2015 y se mantuvieron en -0.5% (por debajo del tipo de política del BCE) durante toda la recuperación global en 2016 y 2017. La flexibilización cuantitativa también se ha prolongado hasta 2020, con mucha antelación respecto al anuncio del renovado programa de compras de activos del BCE. Ambos han aflojado enormemente las condiciones monetarias en Suecia, incluso a través de una moneda más débil. De cara al futuro, hay algunas razones clave para creer que la trayectoria de menor resistencia para la corona ahora es al alza: Una corona débil típicamente ha ayudado al sector manufacturero con un desfase de doce meses.  Una corona débil típicamente ha ayudado al sector manufacturero con un desfase de doce meses. Las divergencias negativas solo tienden a ocurrir antes de recesiones profundas. A menos que estemos en esa situación particular ahora, una mejor demanda de bienes suecos relativamente más baratos (piense Volvo frente a BMW) debería llevar a una corona más fuerte (Chart I-6). Sí, el Riskbank ha estado llevando a cabo QE, pero el ritmo de expansión de su balance se ha ido desacelerando en trimestres recientes. USD/SEK tiende a seguir las tendencias relativas de los balances entre el Riksbank y la Fed, pero se ha abierto una cuña a favor de la corona (Chart I-7). Mientras tanto, con la Fed a punto de reexpandir su balance, esto también debería favorecer a una SEK más fuerte frente al USD. Chart I-6 Corona sueca y manufactura Corona Sueca Y Manufactura Corona Sueca Y Manufactura Chart I-7 USD/SEK y balances relativos USD/SEK Y Balances Relativos USD/SEK Y Balances Relativos El mercado de la vivienda sueco se está convirtiendo en una espina para el Riksbank. Cuando se introdujeron los tipos negativos en 2015, el crecimiento de los precios de la vivienda se disparó hasta el 15% interanual (Chart I-8). Más recientemente, una limitación de la migración ha permitido cierto enfriamiento, pero el apalancamiento de los hogares suecos sigue siendo muy elevado. Con la memoria de la crisis inmobiliaria de los años 90 aún fresca, esto está haciendo que el Riksbank se sienta bastante incómodo con su postura de política actual. El coste de acarreo es menor por estar corto en NZD comparado con estar corto en el dólar estadounidense. Nuestra inclinación es que, aunque el gobernador Stefan Ingves prefiere renormalizar la política lo más rápido posible, dado que dirige una economía pequeña y abierta con el comercio representando un impresionante 45% del PIB, está a merced de las condiciones externas. La SEK es la moneda más barata del universo G10 y podría rebotar con fuerza ante la mínima evidencia de que el crecimiento global ha tocado fondo. Además, un crecimiento global al alza ajustará la utilización de recursos, lo que debería comenzar a impulsar las presiones inflacionarias subyacentes en Suecia (Chart I-9) Chart I-8 Precios de la vivienda en Suecia##br## Están en burbuja Los precios de la vivienda en Suecia están en una burbuja Los precios de la vivienda en Suecia están en una burbuja Chart I-9 Utilización de recursos e inflación en Suecia Utilización de Recursos e Inflación en Suecia Utilización de Recursos e Inflación en Suecia En términos de estrategia de negociación con SEK, USD/SEK y NZD/SEK tienden a estar altamente correlacionados; dado que la SEK tiene una mayor beta al crecimiento global que el kiwi (Suecia exporta el 45% de su PIB frente al 27% de Nueva Zelanda). En términos relativos, la economía sueca parece haber tocado fondo en relación con la de EE. UU., lo que hace del SEK/NZD una forma atractiva de jugar la caída de USD/SEK. Mientras tanto, el coste de acarreo es menor por estar corto en NZD comparado con estar corto en el dólar estadounidense (Chart I-10). En cuanto a EUR/SEK, el cruce podría consolidarse en los niveles actuales antes de dirigirse a la baja, pero en última instancia alcanzará su pico una vez que el crecimiento global se reoriente al alza. Chart I-10 Mantener posición larga en SEK/NZD Mantener posición larga en SEK/NZD Mantener posición larga en SEK/NZD Conclusión: Mantenemos la posición larga en SEK/NZD como una apuesta de valor relativo, pero la verdadera apreciación reside en el cruce SEK/USD. Nuestra inclinación es que la debilidad de la SEK ha sido impulsada por el enfoque del mercado en datos blandos decepcionantes, mientras que los datos duros se mantienen relativamente resilientes. Una vez que quede más claro que el entorno de crecimiento global no es tan precario como sugieren las encuestas, la corona podría rebotar con fuerza. Asuntos internos Nuestra posición larga en GBP/JPY alcanzó un 5% esta semana. Estamos ajustando stops a 138 para proteger ganancias. También fuimos sacados de la posición corta en EUR/NOK con una pérdida del 2%. Por ahora nos mantenemos al margen. EUR/NOK cotiza ahora por encima de los niveles de recesión de 2008, lo cual solo se justifica por una recesión prolongada del crecimiento, pero la gestión del riesgo requiere paciencia por ahora. Estén atentos.   Chester Ntonifor, Estratega de Divisas chestern@bcaresearch.com Notas a pie 1 Por favor consulte el Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titulado “Sobre la velocidad del dinero, EUR/USD y la plata,” con fecha 11 de octubre de 2019, disponible en fes.bcaresearch.com Divisas Dólar estadounidense Chart II-1 Técnicas USD 1 Análisis técnico USD 1 Análisis técnico USD 1 Chart II-2 Técnicas USD 2 Análisis técnico del USD 2 Análisis técnico del USD 2 Los datos recientes en EE. UU. han sido débiles: Las ventas minoristas se contrajeron un 0.3% mensual en septiembre. La producción industrial cayó un 0.4% mensual. Los precios de exportación e importación cayeron 1.6% interanual en septiembre. El índice de sentimiento del consumidor de Michigan creció hasta 96 en octubre, desde 93.2 en el mes anterior. El índice manufacturero NY Empire State aumentó a 4 en octubre, desde 2 en septiembre. Los permisos de construcción e inicios de viviendas cayeron 2.7% y 9.4% mensual en septiembre, pero la recuperación de la vivienda se mantiene intacta. Las solicitudes iniciales de subsidio por desempleo aumentaron a 214K en la semana terminada el 11 de octubre. El índice DXY se depreció un 0.7% esta semana. El último Beige Book resumió que la economía estadounidense se expandió a un ritmo de leve a moderado. La desaceleración del sector manufacturero sigue siendo el mayor riesgo para la economía, mientras que las tensiones comerciales continúan pesando sobre el sentimiento empresarial y las intenciones de gasto de capital. El más reciente “entente” en las discusiones comerciales podría representar un cambio pivotal desde la elevada incertidumbre que prevaleció durante el verano. Enlaces de informes: Sobre la velocidad del dinero, EUR/USD y la plata - 11 de octubre de 2019 Preservando capital durante puntos de disturbio - 6 de septiembre de 2019 ¿Ha cambiado el paisaje de las divisas? - 16 de agosto de 2019 El euro Chart II-3 Técnicas EUR 1 EUR Análisis técnico 1 EUR Análisis técnico 1 Chart II-4 Técnicas EUR 2 EUR Análisis Técnicos 2 EUR Análisis Técnicos 2 Los datos recientes en la zona del euro siguen siendo modestos: La inflación general cayó a 0.8% interanual en septiembre, la más baja en casi tres años. Sin embargo, la inflación subyacente aumentó a 1% interanual. La producción industrial en la zona del euro continuó contrayéndose, un 2.8% interanual en agosto. El sentimiento ZEW en la zona del euro cayó aún más a -23.5 en octubre, sin embargo esto está muy por encima de las expectativas de -33. El sentimiento ZEW para Alemania también cayó a -22.8 en octubre. Cabe señalar que las expectativas siguen mejorando en relación con la situación actual. La balanza comercial en la zona del euro mejoró a €20.3 mil millones en agosto, desde €17.5 mil millones revisados a la baja en julio. Sin embargo, esto se debe principalmente a una contracción de las importaciones. EUR/USD subió 0.9% esta semana, en parte ayudado por la amplia debilidad del dólar. La dinámica comercial en la zona del euro sigue siendo preocupante: las exportaciones cayeron un 2.2% interanual en agosto, mientras que las importaciones se desplomaron un 4.1% interanual. Notablemente, en lo que va de año, el superávit comercial de la UE con EE. UU. creció a €103 mil millones, desde €91 mil millones un año antes, mientras que el déficit comercial con China se amplió aún más a €127 mil millones desde €116 mil millones. Enlaces de informes: Sobre la velocidad del dinero, EUR/USD y la plata - 11 de octubre de 2019 Algunas ideas de trading - 27 de sept. de 2019 La batalla de los bancos centrales - 21 de junio de 2019 Yen japonés Chart II-5 Técnicas JPY 1 Análisis técnico del JPY 1 Análisis técnico del JPY 1 Chart II-6 Técnicas JPY 2 Análisis técnico del JPY 2 Análisis técnico del JPY 2 Los datos recientes en Japón continúan decepcionando: La producción industrial cayó un 4.7% interanual en agosto. La utilización de la capacidad disminuyó un 2.9% mensual en agosto. El yen japonés cayó 0.8% frente al dólar estadounidense esta semana. Kuroda ha vuelto a enfatizar que el BoJ no dudará en actuar si los desarrollos económicos continúan deteriorándose. Por otra parte, mientras la Fed y el BCE están en camino de expandir sus balances mediante compras de activos, queda abierta la cuestión de cuánto más puede hacer el BoJ, más allá del control de la curva de rendimientos. Mantenemos una postura larga en el yen en previsión de que hará falta un “momento Lehman” para que el BoJ actúe de forma agresiva. Enlaces de informes: Algunas ideas de trading - 27 de sept. de 2019 ¿Ha cambiado el paisaje de las divisas? - 16 de agosto de 2019 Ajustes de cartera en un trading veraniego poco líquido - 5 de julio de 2019 Libra esterlina Chart II-7 Técnicas GBP 1 Análisis técnico GBP 1 Análisis técnico GBP 1 Chart II-8 Técnicas GBP 2 GBP Análisis técnico 2 GBP Análisis técnico 2 Los datos recientes en el Reino Unido han sido mayormente negativos: La tasa de desempleo ILO aumentó ligeramente a 3.9% en agosto. El crecimiento trimestral de las ganancias medias se desaceleró a 3.8%, sin embargo esto estuvo por encima de las expectativas de 3.7%. El índice de precios minoristas creció 2.4% interanual en septiembre, una desaceleración desde 2.6% en el mes anterior. La inflación general se mantuvo sin cambios en 1.7% interanual en septiembre, mientras que la inflación subyacente subió a 1.7% desde 1.5%. Las ventas minoristas crecieron 3.1% interanual en septiembre, desde 2.6% en el mes anterior. GBP/USD se disparó 3.3% esta semana por el optimismo hacia la cumbre del Consejo Europeo sobre el Brexit. Desde una perspectiva de valoración, la libra cotiza con un gran descuento respecto a su valor justo. Si las noticias positivas sobre el Brexit continúan, la libra podría seguir subiendo. Mantenemos posición larga en GBP/JPY, que está más de 5% en ganancias. Ajustar el stop a 138. Enlaces de informes: Algunas ideas de trading - 27 de sept. de 2019 Reino Unido: ¿Desaceleración cíclica o malestar estructural? - 20 de sept. de 2019 La batalla de los bancos centrales - 21 de junio de 2019 Dólar australiano Chart II-9 Técnicas AUD 1 AUD Análisis técnico 1 AUD Análisis técnico 1 Chart II-10 Técnicas AUD 2 Análisis técnico del AUD 2 Análisis técnico del AUD 2 Los datos recientes en Australia han sido modestos: La confianza empresarial NAB cayó aún más a -2, mientras que las condiciones mejoraron a 1 en el tercer trimestre. En el frente del mercado laboral, la tasa de desempleo cayó a 5.2% en septiembre. Se crearon 14.7K empleos, consistentes en 26.2K empleos a tiempo completo y una pérdida de 11.4K empleos a tiempo parcial. AUD/USD aumentó 0.4% esta semana. Las actas del RBA se publicaron a principios de esta semana. Curiosamente, presentan un debate agudo sobre los efectos de los tipos bajos. Por un lado, los tipos más bajos se han justificado teóricamente para lograr el pleno empleo y el objetivo de inflación. Por otro lado, algunos miembros del RBA temen que los tipos bajos puedan alimentar precios de la vivienda ya inflados. La probabilidad de otro recorte de tipos ha disminuido tras las actas del RBA. Enlaces de informes: Una visión contraria sobre el dólar australiano - 24 de mayo de 2019 Cuidado con los rendimientos marginales decrecientes - 19 de abril de 2019 Aún no fuera de peligro - 5 de abril de 2019 Dólar neozelandés Chart II-11 Técnicas NZD 1 Análisis técnico del NZD 1 Análisis técnico del NZD 1 Chart II-12 Técnicas NZD 2 Análisis técnico del NZD 2 Análisis técnico del NZD 2 Los datos recientes en Nueva Zelanda han sido negativos: Las llegadas de visitantes aumentaron 1.8% interanual en agosto, ligeramente por debajo del 2% del mes anterior. La inflación general se desaceleró a 1.5% interanual en el tercer trimestre. NZD/USD ha estado más o menos plano esta semana. Estrechamente ligada al crecimiento global, la moneda neozelandesa ha estado fluctuando con el vaivén de los titulares sobre el conflicto comercial EE. UU.-China. Los dos países acordaron un acuerdo parcial la semana pasada, sin embargo los detalles siguen siendo vagos. Si bien el kiwi es una moneda de alta beta, debería tener un rendimiento inferior en los cruces. Seguimos jugando la debilidad del kiwi a través del dólar australiano y la corona sueca. Enlaces de informes: USD/CNY y turbulencia del mercado - 9 de agosto de 2019 ¿Hacia dónde va el dólar estadounidense? - 7 de junio de 2019 Aún no fuera de peligro - 5 de abril de 2019 Dólar canadiense Chart II-13 Técnicas CAD 1 Técnicas de CAD 1 Técnicas de CAD 1 Chart II-14 Técnicas CAD 2 Análisis técnico CAD 2 Análisis técnico CAD 2 Los datos recientes en Canadá han sido relativamente fuertes: La tasa de desempleo disminuyó aún más a 5.5% en septiembre. Además, el salario medio por hora siguió creciendo 4.3% interanual, desde 3.8% en el mes anterior. Por último, se crearon 53.7K empleos en septiembre, muy por encima de las expectativas de 10K. Tanto la inflación general como la subyacente se mantuvieron sin cambios en 1.9% interanual en septiembre. El dólar canadiense se apreció 1% frente al dólar estadounidense, gracias a los positivos datos de empleo del pasado viernes. Todos los ojos están puestos en las elecciones federales de este mes, que podrían ser cruciales para el futuro del sector energético canadiense y las políticas medioambientales.  Enlaces de informes: Preservando capital durante puntos de disturbio - 6 de septiembre de 2019 Ajustes de cartera en un trading veraniego poco líquido - 5 de julio de 2019 Sobre el oro, el petróleo y las criptomonedas - 28 de junio de 2019 Franco suizo Chart II-15 Técnicas CHF 1 CHF Técnicos 1 CHF Técnicos 1 Chart II-16 Técnicas CHF 2 Análisis técnico CHF 2 Análisis técnico CHF 2 Los datos recientes en Suiza han sido positivos: El superávit comercial (excluyendo metales preciosos) se amplió bruscamente a CHF 2.88 mil millones en septiembre. Notablemente, las exportaciones suizas aumentaron 8.2% mensual a CHF 20.3 mil millones, lideradas por mayores ventas de productos químicos y farmacéuticos. Las importaciones suizas cayeron ligeramente 1.4% mensual a CHF 17.4 mil millones. Los precios al productor y de importación continuaron cayendo 2% interanual en septiembre. USD/CHF cayó 1% esta semana. El franco suizo seguirá librando una lucha entre ser una moneda defensiva y ser una herramienta de manipulación por parte del SNB. Nuestra estimación es que EUR/CHF 1.06 es un punto de estrés último.  Las carteras globales deberían mantener el franco suizo como seguro, por la sencilla razón de que la moneda es un rendimiento estructural superior. Enlaces de informes: Notas sobre el SNB - 4 de octubre de 2019 ¿Qué hacer con el franco suizo? - 17 de mayo de 2019 Cuidado con los rendimientos marginales decrecientes - 19 de abril de 2019 Corona noruega Chart II-17 Técnicas NOK 1 NOK Análisis técnico 1 NOK Análisis técnico 1 Chart II-18 Técnicas NOK 2 Análisis técnico de NOK 2 Análisis técnico de NOK 2 Los datos recientes en Noruega han sido deprimidos: La balanza comercial pasó a un déficit de NOK 1.2 mil millones en septiembre. Eso supone una disminución de NOK 24 mil millones interanual. La corona noruega se ha depreciado casi 1% frente al dólar estadounidense esta semana. Los precios de la energía se han mantenido bajos en las últimas semanas. Además, la balanza comercial noruega pasó a déficit por primera vez desde noviembre de 2017. Las exportaciones se desplomaron 19.5% interanual, debido a menores ventas de productos energéticos, mientras que las importaciones aumentaron 12.9% interanual. El mensaje es claro: Noruega sigue resistiendo bien a nivel doméstico, pero la dependencia de las exportaciones de petróleo introduce volatilidad en cualquier pronóstico de crecimiento. BCA ha revisado a la baja sus proyecciones del precio del petróleo para 2019, lo que ha disminuido el atractivo de la corona noruega. Estén atentos. Enlaces de informes: Algunas ideas de trading - 27 de sept. de 2019 Ajustes de cartera en un trading veraniego poco líquido - 5 de julio de 2019 Sobre el oro, el petróleo y las criptomonedas - 28 de junio de 2019 Corona sueca Chart II-19 Técnicas SEK 1 Análisis técnico del SEK 1 Análisis técnico del SEK 1 Chart II-20 Técnicas SEK 2 SEK Indicadores técnicos 2 SEK Indicadores técnicos 2 Los datos recientes en Suecia han sido neutrales: La tasa de desempleo se mantuvo sin cambios en 7.1% en septiembre. USD/SEK cayó 1.1% esta semana. Como la moneda con peor rendimiento del G-10 este año, la corona sueca ahora cotiza con un gran descuento respecto a su valor justo. Consulte nuestra sección principal de esta semana, que presenta un análisis en profundidad sobre la economía sueca y la corona. Enlaces de informes: ¿Hacia dónde va el dólar estadounidense? - 7 de junio de 2019 Balanza de pagos en el G10 - 15 de febrero de 2019 Un simple ranking de atractivo para las divisas - 8 de febrero de 201 Operaciones y previsiones Resumen de previsiones Cartera central Operaciones tácticas Órdenes límite Operaciones cerradas