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Informe especial BCA se enorgullece de su independencia. Los estrategas publican lo que realmente creen, informados por su marco y su análisis. Ocasionalmente, esta independencia resulta en opiniones fuertemente divergentes y actualmente estamos en uno de esos momentos. Dentro de BCA han surgido dos posturas sobre las perspectivas cíclicas (seis a 12 meses) para los activos. Un grupo espera que el crecimiento global se recupere en la segunda mitad del año. Junto con un crecimiento acelerado, anticipan que los precios de las acciones y los activos de riesgo se mantendrán firmes, que las acciones cíclicas superarán a las defensivas, que los rendimientos de los activos refugio subirán y que el dólar se debilitará. Mientras tanto, otro grupo prevé una mayor deterioro de la actividad o una recuperación retrasada, nuevas caídas en las acciones y los activos de riesgo, el mejor desempeño de las defensivas frente a las cíclicas, rendimientos refugio bajos y, en general, un dólar más fuerte. En aras de la transparencia, hemos pedido a representantes de cada grupo que expongan su postura en una mesa redonda, permitiendo a nuestros clientes decidir por sí mismos qué visión les resulta más atractiva. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, y Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis toman la voz por el bando alcista. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, y European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi representan al grupo bajista.1 La discusión de la mesa redonda a continuación se centra en las perspectivas cíclicas. Para horizontes de inversión más largos, la mayoría de los estrategas coinciden en que una recesión es muy probable para 2022. Además, a largo plazo, las valoraciones tanto de los activos de riesgo como de los bonos refugio son muy exigentes. En este contexto, una subida significativa de los rendimientos podría castigar a los activos de riesgo. La Mesa Redonda de BCA Mathieu Savary: Las inversiones de la curva de rendimientos a menudo han sido presagios de recesiones. Anastasios, estás entre esos inversores preocupados por esta inversión. ¿No te inquieta que este episodio pueda ser similar a 1998, cuando la curva solo se invirtió temporalmente y no anticipó una recesión? Además, ¿cómo explicas los plazos tan variables entre la inversión de la curva y la ocurrencia de una recesión? Anastasios Avgeriou: La curva de rendimiento se invierte en o cerca del pico del ciclo económico y eventualmente advierte sobre recesiones próximas. El pasado diciembre, partes de la curva se invirtieron y ahora, el servicio de U.S. Equity Strategy de BCA está atendiendo la señal de este indicador simple, especialmente dado que el SPX posteriormente ha marcado máximos históricos como predijo nuestra investigación.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS) El episodio de 1998 revisitado El episodio de 1998 revisitado El episodio de 1998 revisitado La inversión de la curva anticipa un recorte de tasas de la Fed, y nunca se ha equivocado en ese aspecto. Fue útil para los inversores que hicieron caso al mensaje en junio de 1998, ya que el mercado cayó un 20% en un abrir y cerrar de ojos poco después. Si los inversores salieron en el pico de 1998 cerca de 1200 y renunciaron a unos 350 puntos de ganancias hasta el pico del ciclo del SPX de marzo de 2000, aún se beneficiaron si aguantaron, ya que el mercado finalmente marcó un mínimo cerca de 777 en octubre de 2002 (Chart 1). En cuanto a la sincronización de las siete recesiones anteriores usando la curva de rendimiento, si aceptamos que la mitad de 1998 es el punto de inicio de la inversión, se tardaron 33 meses antes de que comenzara la recesión. El ciclo anterior, la recesión comenzó 24 meses después de la inversión. Consecuentemente, diciembre de 2020 es el inicio más temprano posible de la recesión y septiembre de 2021, el más tardío. Nuestra previsión pronostica que el BPA del SPX caiga un 20% en 2021 hasta $140 con el múltiplo cayendo entre 13.5x y 16.5x para un rango objetivo del SPX a fines de 2020 de 1,890-2,310.3 En otras palabras, no estamos dispuestos a jugar una subida de 100-200 puntos por una posible caída de 1,000 puntos. La relación riesgo/recompensa está sesgada a la baja, y optamos por no participar en esta ocasión. Mathieu: Rob, tú tienes una visión mucho más optimista sobre la inversión actual de la curva. ¿Por qué? Rob Robis: Aunque las cuatro palabras más peligrosas en inversión son “esta vez es diferente”, esta vez realmente parece diferente. Nunca antes han coexistido primas de plazo negativas en los rendimientos de los bonos del Tesoro a más largo plazo y una inversión de la curva (Chart 2). Por lo tanto, los rendimientos del Tesoro a más largo plazo han sido empujados a niveles extremadamente bajos por factores que van más allá de las expectativas de una tasa de fondos federales más baja. La prima de plazo negativa del Tesoro está distorsionando el mensaje económico de la inversión de la curva de EE. UU. Chart 2 (ROB) La prima de plazo negativa distorsiona el mensaje económico de una curva invertida Prima por plazo negativa que distorsiona el mensaje económico de una curva de rendimientos invertida Prima por plazo negativa que distorsiona el mensaje económico de una curva de rendimientos invertida Las primas de plazo están deprimidas en todas partes, como se ve en los rendimientos alemanes, japoneses y otros, reflejando la intensa demanda de activos seguros como los bonos gubernamentales durante un periodo de incertidumbre elevada. Los mercados de bonos globales también pueden estar descontando una mayor probabilidad de que el BCE reinicie su Programa de Compras de Activos, ya que las primas de plazo típicamente caen bruscamente cuando los bancos centrales inician el alivio cuantitativo. Esto tiene efectos de contagio globales. Antes de recesiones previas, las inversiones de la curva del Tesoro de EE. UU. ocurrieron cuando la Fed aplicaba una política monetaria inequívocamente restrictiva. Ese no es el caso hoy. La tasa de fondos federales real aún no está por encima de la estimación de la Fed de la tasa real neutral, también conocida como “r-star”, que fue el ingrediente necesario para todas las inversiones de la curva del Tesoro desde 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB) La política de la Fed no es lo bastante restrictiva para una inversión sostenida de la curva La política de la Fed no es lo suficientemente restrictiva para una inversión sostenida de la curva La política de la Fed no es lo suficientemente restrictiva para una inversión sostenida de la curva Mathieu: El nivel de acomodación de la política probablemente determinará si Anastasios o Rob tienen razón. Peter, has sostenido firmemente que la política, al menos en EE. UU., sigue siendo acomodaticia. ¿Puedes explicar por qué? Peter Berezin: Recuerden que la tasa neutral de interés es la tasa que iguala el nivel de demanda agregada con el potencial de oferta de la economía. La política fiscal laxa y la desaparición de los vientos en contra de desapalancamiento están impulsando la demanda en los Estados Unidos. También lo está el aumento de los salarios, especialmente en la base de la distribución de ingresos. Dado que EE. UU. actualmente no sufre desequilibrios importantes, creo que la economía puede tolerar tasas más altas sin efectos adversos significativos. En otras palabras, la política monetaria es actualmente bastante acomodaticia. Por supuesto, no podemos observar la tasa neutral directamente. Como un agujero negro, solo se puede detectar por el efecto que tiene en su entorno. La vivienda es, con diferencia, el sector más sensible a las tasas de interés de la economía. Si la historia sirve de guía, la reciente caída en las tasas hipotecarias impulsará la actividad del sector inmobiliario en lo que resta del año (Chart 4). Si esa relación se rompiera, como ocurrió durante la Gran Recesión, sugeriría que la tasa neutral es bastante baja. Chart 4 (PETER) La caída de las tasas hipotecarias augura bien para la vivienda La disminución de las tasas hipotecarias augura un buen panorama para la vivienda La disminución de las tasas hipotecarias augura un buen panorama para la vivienda Dado que los estándares de suscripción hipotecaria han sido bastante estrictos y la tasa de viviendas desocupadas es actualmente muy baja, suponemos que la vivienda se mantendrá bien. Deberíamos saberlo mejor en los próximos meses. Mathieu: Dhaval, no estás de acuerdo. ¿Por qué crees que las tasas globales no son acomodaticias? Dhaval Joshi: En realidad, creo que las tasas globales sí son acomodaticias, pero que el rendimiento global de los bonos puede subir solo 70 pb antes de que las condiciones se vuelvan peligrosamente no acomodaticias. Aquí es donde discrepo con Peter: para mí, el peligro no proviene de la economía, proviene de las matemáticas de los rendimientos de bonos ultra bajos. La panacea sin precedentes y experimental de nuestra era ha sido la ‘QE universal’, que ha llevado a rendimientos de bonos ultra bajos en todas partes. Pero lo que no se entiende es que cuando los rendimientos de los bonos alcanzan y permanecen cerca de su límite inferior, ocurren cosas extrañas en los mercados financieros. Gráfico 5 Remito a otros informes para los detalles, pero en pocas palabras, la proximidad del límite inferior a los rendimientos aumenta el riesgo de poseer bonos supuestamente “seguros” hasta el riesgo de poseer los llamados “activos de riesgo”. El resultado es que la valoración de los activos de riesgo aumenta exponencialmente (Chart 5). Porque cuando la asunción de riesgo de las clases de activos converge, los inversores valoran los activos de riesgo para que ofrezcan el mismo rendimiento nominal ultra bajo que los bonos.4 Las comparaciones con ciclos económicos previos pasan por alto el peligro actual. El alivio de política posterior a 2000 distorsionó la economía global al generar un auge crediticio, por lo que el peligro subsiguiente emanó de los sectores más sensibles al crédito en la economía, como el préstamo hipotecario. En contraste, la ‘QE universal’ posterior a 2008 ha distorsionado severamente la relación de valoración entre los bonos y los activos de riesgo globales; por tanto, aquí es donde reside el peligro actual. Rendimientos de bonos más altos pueden de repente socavar el soporte de valoración de los activos de riesgo globales, cuyo valor de $400 billones eclipsa a la economía global en una proporción de cinco a uno. ¿Dónde está este punto de inflexión? Es cuando el rendimiento global a 10 años —definido como el promedio de EE. UU., la zona euro,5 y China— se aproxima al 2.5%. Durante los últimos cinco años, la incapacidad de este rendimiento para mantenerse por encima del 2.5% confirma la hipersensibilidad de las condiciones financieras a este punto de inflexión (Chart 6). Ahora mismo, estoy de acuerdo en que los rendimientos de los bonos son acomodaticios. Pero el margen para que los rendimientos suban es bastante limitado. Chart 6 (DHAVAL) Desde 2015, el rendimiento global del bono a largo plazo ha tenido dificultades para superar 2.5 por ciento Desde 2015, el rendimiento de los bonos globales a largo plazo ha tenido dificultades para superar el 2,5 por ciento Desde 2015, el rendimiento de los bonos globales a largo plazo ha tenido dificultades para superar el 2,5 por ciento Mathieu: La política monetaria es importante para las perspectivas, pero también lo es el ciclo manufacturero global. La desaceleración del crecimiento global se ha concentrado en el sector manufacturero, especialmente en bienes transables. En las economías avanzadas, los sectores de servicios y consumo han sido sorprendentemente resistentes, pero esto no durará si el sector industrial se desacelera más. Arthur, sigues sin anticipar una mejora importante en el comercio global y la producción industrial. ¿Puedes explicar por qué? Chart 7 (ARTHUR) El comercio global ha caído debido a China, no a EE. UU. El comercio mundial cae por China, no por EE. UU. El comercio mundial cae por China, no por EE. UU. Arthur Budaghyan: Para evaluar correctamente las perspectivas económicas, es necesario entender qué ha causado la actual recesión del comercio/sector manufacturero global. Una cosa que sabemos con certeza: se originó en China, no en EE. UU. Chart 7 ilustra que las exportaciones de Corea, Japón, Taiwán y Singapur a China han estado disminuyendo a una tasa anual del 10%, mientras que sus envíos a EE. UU. han estado creciendo. Las importaciones agregadas de China también se han contraído. Esto implica que, desde la perspectiva del resto del mundo, China ha estado y permanece en recesión. La manufactura estadounidense es la menos expuesta a China, lo cual es la principal razón por la que ha sido la última en caer. Por tanto, EE. UU. se ha rezagado en esta desaceleración, y no se debe mirar a EE. UU. en busca de pistas sobre una posible recuperación global. Necesitamos evaluar qué hará que la demanda china se recupere. En este sentido, el impulso creciente del crédito y del gasto fiscal es positivo, pero hasta ahora no ha logrado poner en marcha una recuperación (Chart 8). La razón clave ha sido una propensión marginal decreciente a gastar entre hogares y empresas. Notablemente, la propensión marginal a gastar de las empresas del continente precede a los precios de los metales industriales por unos meses, y actualmente continúa apuntando hacia abajo (Chart 8, panel inferior). La falta de voluntad de consumidores y empresas chinas para gastar se debe a varios factores: (1) la confrontación EE. UU.-China; (2) altos niveles de endeudamiento tanto en empresas como en hogares (Chart 9); (3) la continua supervisión regulatoria sobre bancos y la banca en la sombra, así como la deuda de los gobiernos locales; y (4) la falta de subsidios gubernamentales directos para compras de autos y vivienda. Chart 8 (ARTHUR) Estímulo versus propensión marginal a gastar Estímulo frente a la propensión marginal al gasto Estímulo frente a la propensión marginal al gasto Chart 9 (ARTHUR) Los hogares chinos están más apalancados que los de EE. UU. Los hogares chinos están más apalancados que los estadounidenses Los hogares chinos están más apalancados que los estadounidenses   En conjunto, la caída de la propensión marginal a gastar casi garantizará que cualquier recuperación del gasto de hogares y empresas del continente se demore. Mathieu: Mientras tanto, Peter, tienes una postura mucho más optimista. ¿Por qué discrepas tan profundamente con la visión de Arthur? Peter: La campaña de desapalancamiento de China comenzó más de un año antes de que el sector manufacturero global alcanzara su pico. No tengo duda de que el menor crecimiento del crédito chino pesó sobre la inversión global en capital fijo, pero no debemos perder de vista que existen flujos y reflujos naturales en juego. La mayoría de los bienes manufacturados mantienen algo de valor durante un tiempo después de ser comprados. Si el gasto en, por ejemplo, bienes duraderos de consumo o equipo empresarial sube a un nivel alto durante un periodo prolongado, se formará una sobreoferta que requerirá un periodo de producción más baja. Chart 10 (PETER) El ciclo manufacturero global probablemente ha tocado fondo Es probable que el ciclo manufacturero global haya tocado fondo Es probable que el ciclo manufacturero global haya tocado fondo Estos ciclos de demanda típicamente duran alrededor de tres años; aproximadamente 18 meses en la subida y 18 meses en la bajada (Chart 10). La última fase bajista del ciclo manufacturero global comenzó a principios de 2018, así que si la historia sirve de guía, nos acercamos a un mínimo. El hecho de que la producción manufacturera de EE. UU. subiera en mayo y junio, seguido por el fuerte repunte esta semana en la encuesta manufacturera Philly Fed de julio, apoya esta visión. Por supuesto, fuerzas externas podrían complicar las cosas. Si las tensiones comerciales se intensifican, esto debilitaría mi tesis alcista. No obstante, con China estimulando su economía de nuevo, probablemente haría falta una guerra comercial severa para empujar a la economía global a la recesión. Mathieu: Dhaval, no eres tan negativo como Arthur, pero aun así esperas una desaceleración en la segunda mitad del año. ¿Cuál es tu argumento? Dhaval: Para ser claro, no pronostico una recesión o una caída importante —a menos que, como indiqué antes, el rendimiento global a 10 años se aproxime al 2.5% y desencadene una dislocación severa en los activos de riesgo globales. De hecho, mucha gente invierte la relación entre la recesión y la dislocación del mercado financiero: piensa que la recesión causa la dislocación financiera cuando, en la mayoría de los casos, ¡la dislocación financiera causa la recesión! No obstante, creo que el crecimiento europeo y global está entrando en una oscilación bajista regular basándome en la siguiente evidencia convincente: Desde un mínimo el verano pasado, las tasas de crecimiento del PIB trimestral en las economías desarrolladas ya han rebotado hasta el extremo superior de rangos plurianuales. Los impulsos de crédito a corto plazo en Europa, EE. UU. y China están entrando en oscilaciones bajistas (Chart 11). Los mejores indicadores de actividad actuales, específicamente los indicadores de sentimiento económico ZEW, han girado a la baja. El mejor desempeño de los industriales —el sector de renta variable más expuesto al crecimiento global— también ha girado a la baja. ¿Por qué esperar una oscilación a la baja? Porque es la velocidad de la caída en el rendimiento del bono la que impulsó la recuperación del crecimiento después de su mínimo el verano pasado. Además, es imposible que la velocidad de la caída del rendimiento del bono siga aumentando, o incluso mantenerse donde está. Contrario a lo que podría pensarse, si los rendimientos de los bonos disminuyen, pero a un ritmo reducido, el efecto es frenar el crecimiento económico. Mathieu: Una visión positiva y otra negativa del mundo resultan lógicamente en perspectivas bifurcadas para las tasas de interés y el dólar. Rob, ¿cómo ves la evolución de los rendimientos de EE. UU., Alemania y Japón en los próximos 12 meses? Rob: Si el crecimiento global se recupera, los rendimientos del Tesoro de EE. UU. tendrán mucho más recorrido al alza que los rendimientos de los Bunds o los JGBs. Las expectativas de inflación deberían recuperarse más rápido en EE. UU., con la Fed asumiendo riesgos inflacionarios recortando tasas con una tasa de desempleo del 3.7% y una inflación subyacente del IPC del 2.1%. Es probable que la Fed también decepcione al entregar menos recortes de tasas de los que actualmente descuentan los mercados (90 pb en los próximos 12 meses). Por tanto, los rendimientos del Tesoro pueden aumentar más que los rendimientos alemanes y japoneses, con el BCE y el BoJ más propensos a ofrecer los modestos recortes de tasas que ya están descontados en sus curvas (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL) Los impulsos a corto plazo rebotaron... pero ahora están girando a la baja Los impulsos a corto plazo rebotaron... pero ahora están empezando a girar a la baja Los impulsos a corto plazo rebotaron... pero ahora están empezando a girar a la baja Chart 12 (ROB) Los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. rindarán peor que Bunds y JGBs Los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. se desempeñarán peor que los Bunds y los JGBs Los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. se desempeñarán peor que los Bunds y los JGBs Los rendimientos japoneses permanecerán estancados en o por debajo de cero durante los próximos 6-12 meses, ya que el crecimiento salarial y la inflación subyacente siguen siendo demasiado anémicos para que el BoJ altere su objetivo del 0% en los rendimientos a 10 años. Los rendimientos alemanes tienen un poco más de potencial de subida si el crecimiento europeo comienza a recuperarse, pero quedarán rezagados respecto a cualquier movimiento al alza en los rendimientos del Tesoro. Eso significa que los diferenciales Tesoro-Bund y Tesoro-JGB se moverán al alza durante el próximo año. Los rendimientos negativos alemanes y japoneses pueden parecer completamente poco atractivos comparados con +2% en los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU., pero esta desventaja desaparece cuando los tres rendimientos se expresan en términos de dólares estadounidenses. Cubrir un Bund alemán o un JGB a 10 años hacia dólares estadounidenses de mayor rendimiento crea rendimientos que son 50-60 pb más altos que un Tesoro de EE. UU. a 10 años. Es claramente evidente que los bonos alemanes y japoneses rendirán mejor que los Treasuries durante el próximo año si el crecimiento global se recupera. Mathieu: Peter, tu visión positiva sobre el crecimiento global implica que la Fed recortará menos de lo que actualmente está descontado en la curva OIS. ¿Por qué esperas entonces que el dólar se debilite en la segunda mitad de 2019? Peter: Lo que hace la Fed afecta a los diferenciales de tasas de interés, pero igual de importante es lo que hacen otros bancos centrales. El BCE no va a subir las tasas en los próximos 12 meses. Sin embargo, si el crecimiento de la zona euro sorprende al alza más adelante este año, los inversores empezarán a cuestionar la necesidad de que el BCE mantenga las tasas de política en territorio negativo hasta mediados de 2024. La expectativa del mercado sobre dónde estarán las tasas de política dentro de cinco años tiende a correlacionar bien con el tipo de cambio actual. Por esa medida, hay margen para que los diferenciales de tasas se estrechen frente al dólar estadounidense (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER) Las expectativas de tasas frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (I) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (I) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (I) Chart 13B (PETER) Las expectativas de tasas frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (II) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (II) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (II) Tengan en cuenta que el dólar estadounidense es una moneda contracíclica, lo que significa que se mueve en la dirección opuesta al crecimiento global (Chart 14). Esta contraciclicidad proviene del hecho de que la economía estadounidense está más orientada hacia los servicios que hacia la manufactura en comparación con el resto del mundo. Chart 14 (PETER) El dólar es una moneda contracíclica El Dólar Es Una Moneda Contracíclica El Dólar Es Una Moneda Contracíclica Como tal, cuando el crecimiento global se acelera, el capital tiende a fluir desde EE. UU. hacia el resto del mundo, traduciéndose en mayor demanda de moneda extranjera y menor demanda de dólares. Si el crecimiento global se recupera en lo que queda del año, como espero, el dólar se debilitará. Mathieu: Arthur, como eres significativamente más negativo sobre el crecimiento que Rob o Peter, ¿cómo ves la evolución del dólar y de los rendimientos globales en los próximos seis a 12 meses? Arthur: Soy positivo sobre el dólar ponderado por el comercio por las siguientes razones: El dólar estadounidense es una moneda contracíclica: muestra una correlación negativa con el ciclo económico global. La debilidad persistente en la economía global que emana de China/EM es positiva para el dólar porque la economía estadounidense es el principal bloque económico menos expuesto a una desaceleración China/EM. Mientras tanto, el billete verde solo está débilmente correlacionado con las tasas de interés de EE. UU. Por tanto, el argumento de que unas tasas estadounidenses más bajas harán que la divisa caiga mucho está sobreenfatizado. La Reserva Federal recortará las tasas por más de lo que actualmente está descontado en el mercado solo en un escenario de colapso completo del crecimiento global. Sin embargo, ese escenario sería alcista para el dólar. En ese caso, la fuerte relación inversa del dólar con el crecimiento global compensaría su débil relación positiva con las tasas de interés.   Contrario a la opinión dominante, el dólar no está muy caro. Según los costos laborales unitarios basados en el tipo de cambio real efectivo —la mejor medida de valoración de divisas— el billete verde está solo una desviación estándar por encima de su valor justo. A menudo, los mercados financieros tienden a sobrepasar 1.5 o 2 desviaciones estándar por debajo o por encima de su media histórica antes de revertir su tendencia. Uno de los vientos en contra a menudo citados para el dólar es la posicionamiento, pero existe una gran discrepancia entre el posicionamiento en monedas de mercados desarrollados y emergentes frente al dólar estadounidense. En agregado, los inversores —gestores de activos y fondos apalancados— tienen exposición neutral a las monedas DM, pero están muy largos en tipos de cambio líquidos de mercados emergentes como BRL, MXN, ZAR y RUB frente al billete verde. La fortaleza del dólar ocurrirá principalmente frente a las monedas de EM y las monedas vinculadas a materias primas. En otras palabras, el euro, otras monedas europeas y el yen superarán a las divisas de EM. Tengo menos convicción sobre los rendimientos de los bonos globales. Aunque el crecimiento global decepcionará, los rendimientos ya han caído mucho y la economía estadounidense actualmente no está lo bastante débil como para justificar alrededor de 90 puntos básicos de recortes de tasas en los próximos 12 meses. Mathieu: Antes de pasar a las recomendaciones de inversión, Anastasios, has realizado mucho trabajo interesante sobre las perspectivas de las ganancias estadounidenses. ¿Cuál es el mensaje de tu análisis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS) Atracción gravitatoria Atracción gravitatoria Atracción gravitatoria Anastasios: Aunque los mercados celebraron la tregua comercial tras la reciente reunión del G-20, no se acordó una retirada de aranceles. Desde que la tasa arancelaria sobre $200bn de importaciones chinas subió del 10% al 25% el 10 de mayo, las probabilidades son altas de que la manufactura permanezca en la penumbra. Esto probablemente seguirá pesando sobre las ganancias durante el resto del año. El crecimiento de las ganancias debería debilitarse aún más en los próximos seis meses. Los periodos de descenso de los PMI manufactureros resultan en sorpresas negativas de crecimiento de beneficios mayores, ya que los pronosticadores del mercado rara vez anticipan toda la amplitud y profundidad de las desaceleraciones. En ausencia de crecimiento de beneficios, los mercados de acciones carecen del ‘oxígeno’ necesario para un rally duradero y de alta calidad. Hasta que el momentum del crecimiento global cambie, los inversores deberían desaprovechar los repuntes. Nuestro modelo de crecimiento de BPA del SPX de cuatro factores coquetea con la zona de contracción. Además, nuestro proxy de poder de fijación de precios corporativos y el Indicador de Actividad Actual de Goldman Sachs envían una señal de alarma para las ganancias del SPX (Chart 15). Ya se estima que más de la mitad de los beneficios de los sectores GICS1 del S&P 500 se contrajeron en el Q2, y tres sectores podrían ver ingresos decrecientes en términos interanuales, según datos de I/B/E/S. El Q3 presenta un panorama igualmente sombrío para las ganancias que también se filtrará al Q4. Sumándolo todo, las ganancias decepcionarán hasta fin de año. Mathieu: Doug, no compartes la ansiedad de Anastasios. ¿Qué compensaciones prevés? Además, no te preocupan los balances corporativos estadounidenses. ¿Puedes explicar por qué? Doug Peta: En lo que respecta a las ganancias, prevemos compensaciones procedentes de una recuperación en el resto del mundo. Una política monetaria global cada vez más acomodaticia y la reactivación del crecimiento chino darán un impulso a las economías globales fuera de EE. UU. Ese punto de inflexión puede pasar en gran parte desapercibido en el PIB estadounidense, pero ayudará al S&P 500, ya que las ganancias de las multinacionales con sede en EE. UU. se benefician de una mayor demanda en el extranjero y de un dólar más débil. En lo que respecta a los balances corporativos, trasladar parte de la carga de financiación a deuda desde patrimonio cuando las tasas de interés están en mínimos generacionales es una elección obvia. Aun así, las corporaciones no financieras no han añadido tanto apalancamiento (Chart 16). Las bajas tasas de interés, los amplios márgenes de beneficio y el gasto de capital conservador les han dejado un flujo de caja libre amplio para atender sus obligaciones (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG) Las empresas no han añadido mucho apalancamiento ... Las corporaciones no han aumentado mucho su apalancamiento... Las corporaciones no han aumentado mucho su apalancamiento... Chart 17 (DOUG) ...aunque tienen flujo de caja suficiente para atenderlo ...Aunque Tienen Amplio Flujo de Caja Para Atenderlo ...Aunque Tienen Amplio Flujo de Caja Para Atenderlo Toda entidad corporativa viable con una tasa impositiva federal efectiva por encima del 21% se volvió un mejor crédito cuando la tasa marginal superior se redujo del 35% al 21%. Cada una de esas corporaciones ahora tiene más ingreso neto con el que atender la deuda, y mantendrán ese ingreso a menos que se revise el código tributario. No se ve en los múltiplos EV/EBITDA, pero se manifestará en menores defaults. Mathieu: La última y más importante pregunta. ¿Cuáles son sus principales recomendaciones de inversión para capitalizar las tendencias económicas que anticipan en los próximos 6-12 meses? Empecemos con los pesimistas: Arthur: Primero, el repunte en los cíclicos globales y las apuestas por China desde diciembre ha sido prematuro y está en riesgo de revertirse conforme el crecimiento global y los beneficios cíclicos decepcionen. La evidencia histórica sugiere que los precios globales de las acciones no han liderado sino que han sido coincidentes con el PMI manufacturero global (Chart 18). La divergencia reciente es sin precedentes. Chart 18 (ARTHUR) Históricamente, las acciones globales no adelantaron a los PMIs Las acciones globales históricamente no precedieron a los PMIs Las acciones globales históricamente no precedieron a los PMIs Segundo, los activos y monedas de riesgo de EM siguen siendo vulnerables. Las ganancias por acción de EM y China están contrayéndose. Los indicadores adelantados señalan que la tasa de contracción se intensificará, al menos hasta fin de año (Chart 19). Los asignadores de activos deberían seguir con una infraponderación en EM frente a DM en renta variable. Finalmente, mi operación de mayor convicción y neutral al mercado es vender en corto bancos de EM o chinos y comprar bancos estadounidenses. Estos últimos están mucho más saludables que los bancos de EM/China, como discutimos en nuestro informe reciente.6 Anastasios: El equipo de U.S. Equity Strategy se está moviendo de una cartera cíclica hacia una orientación más defensiva. Nuestra visión de mayor convicción es sobreponderar las mega caps frente a las small caps. Las small caps están cargadas de deuda y sufren un estrechamiento de márgenes. Además, aproximadamente 600 componentes del Russell 2000 no tienen ganancias futuras. Solo una compañía del S&P 500 tiene BPA futuro negativo. Dado que tanto el S&P como el Russell omiten estas cifras en el cálculo del P/E futuro, esto está enmascarando la sobrevaloración de las small caps. Cuando se ajusta por esta discrepancia, las small caps cotizan a una prima considerable frente a las large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR) China y las ganancias de EM se están contrayendo Los beneficios en China y en los mercados emergentes se contraen Los beneficios en China y en los mercados emergentes se contraen Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS) Sigan evitando las small caps Continúe evitando las versalitas Continúe evitando las versalitas También hemos mejorado la calificación del grupo S&P managed health care y del grupo S&P hypermarkets. Si la desaceleración económica persiste hasta inicios de 2020, ambos subgrupos defensivos se desempeñarán bien. A mediados de abril, elevamos el grupo S&P managed health care a una asignación por encima del índice de referencia y propusimos que la venta masiva en este grupo fue exagerada dado que las probabilidades de que “Medicare For All” se convierta en ley eran escasas. Además, un mercado laboral ajustado junto con la caída de la inflación de costos médicos aumentaría los márgenes y las ganancias de la industria (Chart 21). Esta semana, mejoramos el índice defensivo S&P hypermarkets a sobreponderar argumentando que el empeoramiento del panorama macro junto con una perspectiva de demanda de la industria más firme apoyarán los precios relativos de las acciones (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS) Comprar hypermarkets Comprar Hipermercados Comprar Hipermercados Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS) Mantener el sobreponderado en managed health care Sigue con la atención médica administrada Sigue con la atención médica administrada   Dhaval: Para ser justo, no soy un pesimista. Siempre que el rendimiento global de los bonos se mantenga muy por debajo del 2.5 por ciento, el soporte a las valoraciones de los activos de riesgo evitará una dislocación mayor. Pero en una oscilación bajista del crecimiento, el gran tema será la rotación sectorial hacia apuestas pro-defensivas, especialmente hacia aquellas defensivas que han tenido peor desempeño (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL) Cambiar fuera de sensibles al crecimiento hacia salud Cambie de valores sensibles al crecimiento al sector sanitario. Cambie de valores sensibles al crecimiento al sector sanitario. Sobre esa base: Sobreponderar Salud frente a Industriales. Sobreponderar el Eurostoxx 50 frente al Shanghai Composite y al Nikkei 225. Sobreponderar los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. frente a los bunds alemanes. Sobreponderar el JPY en una cartera de monedas del G10. Mathieu: Y ahora, los optimistas: Doug: So What? es la pregunta fundamental que guía toda la investigación de BCA: ¿Cuál es la aplicación de inversión práctica de esta observación macro? Pero Why Now? es una corolaria crítica para quien asigna capital: ¿Por qué el desequilibrio que has observado está a punto de convertirse en un problema? Como dijo Herbert Stein, “Si algo no puede continuar para siempre, se detendrá.” Los desequilibrios importan, pero la Ley de Dornbusch aconseja paciencia al reposicionar carteras por ese motivo: “Las crisis tardan más en llegar de lo que puedes imaginar, pero cuando llegan, ocurren más rápido de lo que puedes imaginar.” Miren el Chart 24, que muestra un vasto cielo azul (mercados alcistas) con racimos intermitentes de gris (recesiones) y rojo claro (mercados bajistas). Las inflexiones del mercado son severas, pero poco comunes. Cuando la condición por defecto de una economía es crecer, y los precios de las acciones subir, no basta con que un inversor identifique un desequilibrio; también debe identificar por qué está a punto de revertirse. Ahora mismo, en lo que respecta a EE. UU., no hay desequilibrios significativos ni en los mercados ni en la economía real. Chart 24 (DOUG) Recesiones y mercados bajistas viajan juntos Las recesiones y los mercados bajistas van de la mano Las recesiones y los mercados bajistas van de la mano Incluso si tuviéramos conocimiento perfecto de que una recesión llegará en 18 meses, ahora sería demasiado pronto para vender. Históricamente, el S&P 500 ha alcanzado su pico un promedio de seis meses antes del inicio de una recesión, y ha ofrecido rendimientos jugosos en el año previo a ese pico (Table 1). Los mercados alcistas tienden a acelerar hacia la meta (Chart 25). Si este es como sus predecesores, un inversor corre el riesgo de una subperformance relativa significativa si no participa en sus etapas finales en auge. Table 1 (DOUG) El S&P 500 no alcanza su pico hasta seis meses antes de una recesión ... ¿Qué ocurre entre esos muros? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto ¿Qué ocurre entre esos muros? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto Gráfico 25 Somos alcistas sobre las perspectivas para los próximos seis a doce meses, y recomendamos sobreponderar acciones y productos de spread en carteras equilibradas de EE. UU. mientras se infraponderan significativamente los Treasuries. Peter: Estoy de acuerdo con Doug. Los mercados bajistas de acciones rara vez ocurren fuera de recesiones y las recesiones raramente ocurren cuando la política monetaria es acomodaticia. La política es actualmente acomodaticia, y se volverá aún más estimulativa si la Fed y varios otros bancos centrales recortan tasas. Las acciones globales no están súper baratas, pero tampoco particularmente caras. Actualmente cotizan en torno a 15 veces las ganancias futuras. Dado el nivel ultra bajo de los rendimientos de los bonos globales, esto genera una prima por riesgo de acciones (ERP) que está por encima de su promedio histórico (Chart 26). Se debe favorecer las acciones frente a los bonos cuando la ERP es alta. Chart 26A (PETER) Las primas por riesgo de acciones permanecen elevadas (I) Las primas de riesgo de renta variable permanecen elevadas (I) Las primas de riesgo de renta variable permanecen elevadas (I) Chart 26B (PETER) Las primas por riesgo de acciones permanecen elevadas (II) Las primas de riesgo de la renta variable siguen siendo elevadas (II) Las primas de riesgo de la renta variable siguen siendo elevadas (II) La ERP está especialmente elevada fuera de Estados Unidos. Esto se debe en parte a que las acciones no estadounidenses cotizan a unas módicas 13 veces las ganancias futuras, pero también refleja que los rendimientos de los bonos son más bajos en el extranjero. Chart 27 (PETER) Las acciones de EM y de la zona euro superan cuando el crecimiento global mejora Las acciones de los mercados emergentes y de la zona del euro rinden mejor cuando el crecimiento global mejora Las acciones de los mercados emergentes y de la zona del euro rinden mejor cuando el crecimiento global mejora A medida que el crecimiento global se acelere, el dólar se debilitará. Los sectores y regiones de renta variable con una inclinación más cíclica se beneficiarán (Chart 27). Esperamos mejorar la recomendación sobre acciones de EM y europeas más adelante este verano. Un dólar más suave también beneficiará al oro. El metal recibiría un impulso adicional a principios de la próxima década cuando la inflación comience a acelerarse. Entramos largos en oro el 17 de abril de 2019 y seguimos creyendo en esta apuesta. Rob: Para los inversores en renta fija, la forma más obvia de jugar una combinación de relajación monetaria y recuperación del crecimiento global es sobreponderar deuda corporativa frente a bonos gubernamentales (Chart 28). Dentro de EE. UU., las valoraciones de la deuda corporativa parecen más atractivas en high-yield que en investment grade. Suponiendo un panorama benigno para el riesgo de impago en una economía estadounidense que se acelera de nuevo, con la Fed aflojando, buscar el carry en high-yield resulta interesante. El crédito de mercados emergentes también debería comportarse bien si vemos cierta debilidad del dólar y medidas de estímulo adicionales en China. Chart 28 (ROB) Mejores apuestas en bonos: sobreponderar corporativos globales y bonos ligados a la inflación Mejores apuestas en bonos: sobreponderar bonos corporativos globales y bonos ligados a la inflación Mejores apuestas en bonos: sobreponderar bonos corporativos globales y bonos ligados a la inflación Sin embargo, las corporativas europeas podrían terminar siendo las grandes ganadoras si el BCE decide reiniciar su Programa de Compras de Activos y aumenta sus compras de deuda de empresas europeas. Hay menos restricciones para que el BCE compre deuda corporativa en comparación con los límites autoimpuestos sobre compras de deuda soberana. El BCE entraría en un campo de minas político si decidiera comprar más deuda italiana y menos deuda alemana, pero a nadie le importaría si el BCE ayudara a financiar a las empresas europeas comprando sus bonos. Si se espera que la reflación tenga éxito, una posición de duración por debajo del índice también tiene sentido dado el nivel deprimido actual de los rendimientos de los bonos gubernamentales en todo el mundo. Es más probable que los rendimientos suban de forma gradual que que se disparen, y estarán liderados primero por un incremento de las expectativas de inflación. Los bonos ligados a la inflación deberían figurar prominentemente en las carteras de renta fija, especialmente en EE. UU., donde los TIPS superarán a los Treasuries de rendimiento nominal. Mathieu: Muchas gracias a todos. A continuación hay un resumen comparativo de los principales argumentos y recomendaciones de inversión de cada bando.   Resumen de perspectivas y recomendaciones ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA a la luz pública ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA a la luz pública   Anastasios Avgeriou Estratega de Renta Variable de EE. UU. anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Estratega Global Jefe peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Jefe de Estrategia de Mercados Emergentes arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Jefe de Estrategia de Inversión en Europa dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Jefe de Estrategia de Inversión en EE. UU. dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Jefe de Estrategia de Renta Fija rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Notas al pie 1      Para ser justos con cada persona involucrada, esto simplifica sus puntos de vista. Incluso dentro de cada bando, la negatividad o positividad varía en un espectro, como podrán apreciar en el propio debate. 2      Véase BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” fechado el 17 de diciembre de 2018, disponible en uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Véase BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” fechado el 10 de junio de 2019, disponible en uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Véase el European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” 25 de octubre de 2018, disponible en eis.bcaresearch.com. 5      Francia es un buen proxy para la zona euro. 6      Véase Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” disponible en ems.bcaresearch.com.
Informe especial BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1   The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart 1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart 2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart 2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart 4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart 4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart 5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4   Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart 6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart 6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart 7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S.  Chart 7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart 8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart 8, bottom panel).   The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart 9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart 8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart 9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones   On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production.  Chart 10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart 10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart 11). The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth.  Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Chart 12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I) Chart 13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. Chart 14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates.   Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart 15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart 16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart 17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart 18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart 18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart 19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6  Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart 21). This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care   Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart 24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart 24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table 1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart 25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. Table 1 (DOUG)The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession … We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart 26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart 26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart 26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II) The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. Chart 27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart 27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade.  Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart 28). Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. Chart 28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp.   Summary Of Views And Recommendations   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5      France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com.
Informe especial BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1   The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart 1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart 2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart 2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart 4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart 4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart 5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4   Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart 6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart 6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart 7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S.  Chart 7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart 8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart 8, bottom panel).   The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart 9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart 8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart 9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones   On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production.  Chart 10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart 10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart 11). The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth.  Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Chart 12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I) Chart 13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. Chart 14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates.   Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart 15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart 16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart 17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart 18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart 18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart 19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6  Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart 21). This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care   Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart 24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart 24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table 1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart 25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. Table 1 (DOUG)The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession … We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart 26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart 26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart 26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II) The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. Chart 27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart 27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade.  Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart 28). Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. Chart 28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp.   Summary Of Views And Recommendations   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5      France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com.
Informe especial BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1   The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart 1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart 2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart 2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart 4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart 4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart 5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4   Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart 6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart 6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart 7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S.  Chart 7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart 8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart 8, bottom panel).   The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart 9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart 8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart 9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones   On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production.  Chart 10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart 10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart 11). The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth.  Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Chart 12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I) Chart 13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. Chart 14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates.   Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart 15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart 16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart 17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart 18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart 18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart 19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6  Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart 21). This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care   Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart 24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart 24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table 1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart 25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. Table 1 (DOUG)The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession … We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart 26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart 26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart 26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II) The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. Chart 27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart 27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade.  Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart 28). Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. Chart 28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp.   Summary Of Views And Recommendations   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5      France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com.
One way to benefit from the global growth soft-patch is to go long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas E&P stocks on a tactical three-to-six month basis. Since our Monday inception three days ago, this pair trade is already up 9%. The relative moves in the underlying commodities that serve as pricing power proxies are the key drivers of this share price ratio (top panel). Given the massive currency debasement potential that has gripped Central Banks the world over, such a flush liquidity backdrop will boost the allure of the shiny metal more so than crude oil. Meanwhile, global manufacturing PMIs are foreshadowing recession and our diffusion index has plummeted to the lowest level since 2011 (diffusion shown inverted, middle panel). In the U.S. specifically there is a growth-to-liquidity handoff and the ISM manufacturing survey’s new order versus prices paid subcomponents confirms that global gold miners have the upper hand compared with E&P equities (bottom panel). Bottom Line: We initiated a tactical long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas E&P pair trade on a three-to-six month time horizon with a stop at the -10% mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: GDX:US and BLBG – S5OILP – COP, EOG, APC, PXD, CXO, FANG, HES, DVN, MRO, NBL, COG, APA, XEC, respectively. Please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report for additional details.    
Highlights Analysis on Brazil is available below. If banks in China are forced by regulators to properly recognize and provision for non-performing assets, large banks would become substantially undercapitalized while many small- and medium-sized banks (SMBs) would have little equity capital left. That would hammer their ability to finance the economy. Provided on aggregate SMBs have actually outgrown larger ones in terms of balance sheet size, the precarious state of the former’s financial health has become a matter of macro significance. The principal danger to shareholders of mainland banks is equity dilution. We reiterate our long U.S. banks/short Chinese bank shares trade, and within the latter our long large/short SMB stocks position. Feature Chinese Banks: A Value Trap Chart I-1Chinese Bank Share Prices Are On Edge Banks are crucial to financing the private sector as well as all levels of government in China. Not only do banks originate a substantial share of credit, but also they account for 82% of purchases of government bonds. That is why today we revisit the fundamentals of the Chinese banking sector. Besides, their equity valuations appear very cheap, and many investors are tempted to buy their shares. Chinese banks’ financial ratios look healthy and valuations appear extremely cheap because they have not recognized and provisioned for non-performing assets. By expanding their balance sheets enormously and not provisioning for bad assets, their profits have mushroomed. Banks have retained a share of these profits, boosting their capital. Yet, their share prices have been flat over the past 10 years. Recently, investable bank stocks have been lingering around their December lows. Another gap down could be lurking around the corner (Chart I-1). We highlight their poor financial health in the section below, where we perform stress tests for both large as well as small and medium sized banks (SMB). The principal danger to shareholders is equity dilution that will continue occurring among mainland banks (Chart I-2). Our bearish view on Chinese bank stocks has not been contingent on a systematic financial crisis but on inevitable and substantial equity dilution. Investment conclusions: Absolute return investors should stay clear of Chinese bank stocks – they are the ultimate value trap. For relative value traders, we reiterate our long U.S. banks/short Chinese bank shares trade, and within the latter our long large/short SMB stocks position (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Beware Of Equity Dilution Chart I-3Our Trades On Chinese Banks   Large Versus Small And Medium Banks China’s banking system consists of five large banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of Communications) and about 3150 small- and medium-sized banks (SMBs). All five large banks are publically listed but the central government still holds about 70-80% of their equity. About 36 of the SMBs are also listed but the central authorities in Beijing have a stake in some of the medium-sized banks. Notably, the central government has no equity in any of the small banks. In recent years, SMBs have been playing a greater role in sustaining the credit boom: First, on aggregate SMBs have actually outgrown the five large banks in terms of balance sheet size. The former’s risk-weighted assets1 (RWAs) of RMB 73 trillion exceeds the RMB 65 trillion of large banks (Chart I-4). Recently, investable bank stocks have been lingering around their December lows. Another gap down could be lurking around the corner. The value of RWAs emphasizes banks’ claims on enterprises, non-bank financial institutions and households over holdings of government bonds. Hence, RWAs of banks are a more pertinent measure of non-government financing than total assets. Second, over the past 12 months large banks and SMBs have accounted for 40% and 60% of the rise in the aggregate banking system’s RWAs, respectively (Chart I-5). Therefore, further credit acceleration will be difficult to engineer if – as we discuss below – SMBs begin retrenching under regulatory pressures and amid tighter market financing in the wake of the Baoshang bank failure. Chart I-4SMBs Have Outgrown Large Ones Chart I-5SMBs Have Contributed Enormously To The Credit Boom   Finally, there has so far been no deleveraging among SMBs. Large banks’ RWAs-to-nominal GDP ratio has been in decline since 2014, but the same ratio for SMBs has not dropped at all (Chart I-6). This chart corroborates that the credit boom between 2015 and 2017 was driven by SMBs, rather than by large banks. In fact, SMBs along with shadow banking are what primarily drove the credit boom that occurred over the past decade. This confirms the thesis that the unprecedented credit bubble has spiraled beyond the central authorities’ control. While China’s entire banking system is in poor health, SMBs are in considerably worse shape than large ones. In particular: SMBs have much more assets classified as equity and other investments than large banks (Chart I-7). Equity and other investments stands for non-standard credit assets that are typically much riskier than loans and corporate bonds. This is the principal reason why in our stress test we use higher ratios of non-performing assets for SMBs than for large banks. Chart I-6No Deleveraging Among SMBs Chart I-7SMBs Exposure To Non-StandarD Credit Assets Is Huge Chart I-8Large Banks Versus SMBs Big banks are better capitalized than SMBs. The capital adequacy ratio among big banks is higher compared with the other banks (Chart I-8, top panel). Similarly, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans is considerably lower for large banks than for SMBs (Chart I-8, bottom panel). On the liquidity side, SMBs are more dependent on the wholesale funding market than their larger peers. Interbank transactions account for 10% of SMBs own liabilities. On the other hand, big banks are the main lenders in the interbank market. Bottom Line: SMBs have become more important than large ones in providing financing to companies and households. Yet these SMBs are much more vulnerable. A Stress Test We conducted separate stress tests on large banks and SMBs. Our findings are not optimistic. Some 71% of equity of SMBs will be wiped out if 14% of their RWAs turn sour (Table I-1). 43% of large banks’ equity will be impaired if 12% of their RWAs become non-performing (Table I-2). The reason we use RWAs rather than loans is because banks have been accumulating claims on enterprises, non-bank financial institutions and households beyond their loan books. Hence, RWAs better captures all credit assets. We use a higher impairment rate for SMBs than for large banks because the former have substantially more non-standard credit assets. Typically, the quality of non-standard credit assets is inferior to those of corporate bonds or loans. We used the following assumptions in our stress tests: For large banks, we assumed non-performing assets (NPAs) ratios of 10% in the optimistic scenario, 12% (baseline), and 14% (pessimistic) (Table I-2). For SMBs, we employed NPAs ratios of 12% (optimistic), 14% (baseline), and 16% (pessimistic) (Table I-1). The magnitude and duration of China’s current credit boom has considerably surpassed that of the 1990s, when Chinese banks held over 25% of non-performing loans (Chart I-9). Therefore, our stress test assumption that the NPAs ratio will rise above 10% is reasonable. Chart I-9China's Credit Booms In Perspective We applied a 30% recovery rate on NPAs. The recovery rate on Chinese banks’ NPLs from 2001 to 2005 was 20%. This occurred amid much stronger economic growth. Thus, an assumption of a 30% recovery rate today is realistic. Finally, we calculated overvaluations assuming the fair price-to-book value ratio for all banks is 1. How has it been possible for banks in China to continue expanding their balance sheets aggressively despite such moribund financial health? Banks can operate and expand their balance sheets with zero or even negative de facto equity capital, so long as they obtain liquidity from other banks or the central bank. This is how many Chinese SMBs have been operating in recent years. Barring institutional and regulatory constraints, banks theoretically can expand their balance sheets indefinitely by creating loans and deposits “out of thin air.” We have deliberated extensively in past reports that banks do not intermediate savings or deposits into loans and credit. Rather, they create deposits when they make a loan to or buy an asset from a non-bank entity. Loans and deposits are nothing other than accounting entries on banks’ books. It is regulators’ and shareholders’ forbearance – or lack of it – that allows banks to, or prevents banks from, expanding their balance sheets. Although Chinese authorities have been easing both monetary and fiscal policies, they have not completely abandoned their regulatory tightening efforts on banks and shadow banking, or their plans to curb leverage and speculation in the real estate market. For example, in April bank regulators released draft rules on how banks should classify all types of assets and provision for them. Over the past several years, many banks have transformed their bad loans into non-loan assets to disguise the true level of their non-performing loans (NPLs). The new regulation, if and when it is adopted and properly executed, will force banks to recognize NPAs and increase their provisions. Although Chinese authorities have been easing both monetary and fiscal policies, they have not completely abandoned their regulatory tightening efforts on banks and shadow banking, or their plans to curb leverage and speculation in the real estate market. Ultimately, this will substantially impair banks’ capital and dampen their ability to originate new credit – both in the form of making loans and buying securities. Consequently, the credit impulse will relapse and the business cycle recovery will be delayed. Bottom Line: If banks in China are forced by regulators to properly recognize and provision for NPAs, large banks would become substantially undercapitalized while many SMBs would have little equity capital left. That would hammer their ability to finance the economy. Investment Ramifications Given the increased importance of SMBs in China, the precarious state of their financial health has become a matter of macro significance. Even if regulators partially reinforce recognition of provisions for NPAs, aggregate credit growth will decelerate. A simple simulation to illustrate this point: If SMBs RWAs growth were to decelerate from 11% currently to 8%, large banks’ RWA annual growth would need to surge from 8% now to 16% for all banks’ RWA growth to accelerate from the current 9.5% to 12%. The latter is probably what is required to promote an economic recovery. Such a ramp-up in large banks’ RWAs is unlikely, given they would also be facing stricter regulatory requirements. The key point is that the positive effects of monetary and fiscal easing continue to be hampered by regulatory tightening on the credit system. The latter will delay a business cycle recovery in China. For now, although the credit plus fiscal spending impulse has picked up, economic growth has not yet revived (Chart I-10, top two panels). The reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies (Chart I-10, bottom two panels). We have discussed this issue at great length in past reports. Consistently, nominal industrial output, car sales and smartphone sales as well as total imports are either very weak or are in outright contraction (Chart I-11). All series in Chart I-11 and I-12 include June data. Chart I-10Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart I-11Chinese Economy: No Recovery So Far   Chart I-12Chinese Corporate EPS: The Outlook Is Downbeat Importantly, Chinese corporate per-share earnings in RMB are contracting for the MSCI investable universe and will soon be contracting for A-share companies as well (Chart I-12). We maintain our negative outlook for EM risk assets and China-plays globally due to our downbeat view on China’s credit cycle. This differs from BCA’s House View, which is positive on global/Chinese growth.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Brazil: Buy The Rumor, Sell The News? Having surged on the back of Congress’s initial approval of the social security reform, Brazilian financial markets are attempting to break above important technical resistance levels both in absolute and relative terms (Chart II-1 and Chart II-2). If the Bovespa decisively breaks above these technical resistance lines, it would mean it is in a structural bull market. A failure to break out will lead to a sizable setback. Chart II-1Are Brazilian Equities Poised For A Breakout In Absolute Terms… Chart II-2…And Relative Terms?     We upgraded Brazilian equity and fixed-income markets right after the first round of presidential elections on October 7, but then downgraded them in early April. In retrospect, the downgrade was a miscalculation. Presently, investor confidence in Brazil is very high, sentiment is very bullish and markets are overbought. Faced with the choice of chasing the market higher or waiting, we are opting for the latter. Pension Reform: Necessary But Not Sufficient Chart II-3Public Debt-To-GDP Ratio Will Rise Further The nation’s pension bill is a very positive and much-needed step in the structural reform process. However, in its current form, it is insufficient to make public debt dynamics sustainable – i.e., halt the rise in the government debt-to-GDP ratio (Chart II-3). Table II-1 illustrates the savings from the social security reform adopted in the lower house. As estimated by the Independent Fiscal Institute, an advisory think-tank of the Senate, the reform would bring only BRL 744 billion of savings over the next decade. Is this sufficient to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio? One way these reforms could contain the rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is if the savings generated significantly exceed the primary fiscal deficits over the next several years – i.e., the government runs continuous robust primary fiscal surpluses. Yet, the pension bill falls short of achieving this goal. The estimated savings in the first four years will likely be around BRL 130 billion. This amounts to annual savings of BRL 33 billion. Chart II-4 demonstrates that savings from the reform are too small to flip the government’s (often optimistic) projected primary fiscal deficit into a surplus in the forecast period. One way these reforms could contain the rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is if the savings generated significantly exceed the primary fiscal deficits over the next several years. Another scenario for stabilizing the public debt-to-GDP ratio is for interest rates to drop meaningfully below nominal GDP growth. Having plummeted amid very benign global and domestic backdrops, local currency bond yields still remain about 100 basis points above current nominal GDP growth (Chart II-5). It remains to be seen whether local currency borrowing costs will drop and stay below nominal GDP in the years to come. Chart II-4Primary Fiscal Balance Will Remain Negative Despite Pension Reform Chart II-5Borrowing Costs Remain Above Nominal GDP Growth   Overall, the pension reform in current form does not guarantee public debt sustainability in Brazil: It is simply insufficient to get the government to run recurring primary fiscal surpluses. Another prerequisite – nominal GDP growth exceeding local bond yields over next several years – is contingent on further reforms as well as on a substantial improvement in confidence among investors, companies and households. It Is All About Confidence The sustainability of public debt, economic growth and financial markets are interlinked, with the common thread being confidence. In a virtuous cycle, financial markets typically rally while the currency stays firm. Subdued inflation will allow the central bank to rapidly reduce interest rates. This will help boost confidence among businesses and consumers, buoying the economy. In turn, lower policy rates could sustain the stampede into domestic bonds, pushing government borrowing costs below rising nominal GDP growth. At that point, the country’s public debt dynamics will become sustainable, the risk premium will continue to fall, and the nation’s financial markets will be in a secular bull market. On the contrary, a vicious cycle is possible if there is a negative external or internal shock that prompts the Brazilian real to depreciate by more than 10%. On the contrary, a vicious cycle is possible if there is a negative external or internal shock that prompts the Brazilian real to depreciate by more than 10%. In this case, the central bank cannot slash interest rates. On the contrary, government bond yields – which are presently at record lows – could or will likely rise (Chart II-6 and Chart II-7). These events will hurt confidence and suppress nominal GDP growth below borrowing costs. This could aggravate investors’ anxiety over Brazil’s public debt, leading them to demand a higher risk premium. As a result, a vicious cycle could unfold. Chart II-6Government Bond Yields Are At Historical Lows Chart II-7Credit Spreads Are Very Tight   Chart II-8Commodity Prices And The BRL: Positive Correlation To be clear, we are not presently forecasting the onset of a vicious cycle. Nevertheless, given our negative view on EM risk assets and currencies, we expect a pullback in the Brazilian real and risk assets in the near term. The U.S. dollar is about to rally, as we discussed in detail in last week’s report. Commodities prices will tumble as China’s growth downshift persists. Given that the Brazilian real is a high-beta currency and is often positively correlated with commodities prices (Chart II-8), it could depreciate quite a bit. Patience is especially warranted in the case of Brazilian equities because share prices have decoupled from corporate profits and the business cycle. Stock prices have surged despite plummeting net EPS revisions and contracting profits of non-financial and non-resource companies (Chart II-9) and relapsing economic growth (Chart II-10). Clearly, the rally has been driven by expanding equity multiples due to progress on the social security reform. Chart II-9Stock Prices Are Diverging From Corporate Profits Chart II-10Domestic Demand Has Stalled   Bottom Line: A lot of good news has been priced into Brazilian financial markets. For now, the risk-reward profile is not attractive: investors should wait for a better entry point. This is true for both absolute return investors and dedicated EM equity and fixed-income managers. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Risk-weighted asset is a bank's assets or off-balance sheet exposures, weighted according to risk. It is used in determining the capital requirement or Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for a financial institution. Usually, different classes of assets have different risk weights associated with them.   Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Overweight The tide has shifted and on Monday we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to an above benchmark allocation. While valuations are stretched, trading at a 50% premium to the overall market on a 12-month forward P/E basis (not shown), our thesis is that these Big Box retailers will grow into their pricey valuations in the coming months. The chart shows three macro variables that signal brighter times ahead for the relative share price ratio. The drubbing in the 10-year U.S. treasury yield reflects a souring macro backdrop, melting inflation and a steep fall in U.S. economic data surprises. The ISM manufacturing index that continues to decelerate and is now closing in on the boom/bust line corroborates the bond market’s grim message. Tack on the Fed’s expected four cuts in the coming 12 months, and factors are falling into place for a durable rally in relative share prices. Bottom Line: Boost the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight. Please refer to Monday’s Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HYPC – WMT, COST. ​​​​​​​
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Recession odds continue to tick higher, according to the NY Fed’s probability of recession model, at a time when global growth is waning, U.S. profit growth is contracting and the non-financial ex-tech corporate balance sheet is degrading rapidly. On a cyclical 3-12 month time horizon we remain cautious on the broad equity market. This is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which stands in contrast to the more sanguine equity BCA House View. The souring macro backdrop coupled with a firming industry demand outlook signal that more gains are in store for hypermarket stocks. The global growth slowdown, declining real bond yields, missing inflation, rising policy uncertainty and a favorable relative demand backdrop suggest that there is an exploitable tactical trading opportunity in a long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas E&P pair trade. Recent Changes Upgrade the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight, today. Initiate a long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas exploration & production (E&P) pair trade, today Table 1 Feature Obsession with the Fed easing continues to trump all else, with the SPX piercing through the 3,000 mark to fresh all-time highs last week. However, it is unrealistic for the Fed to do all the heavy lifting for the equity market as we have argued recently (see Chart 3 from June 24),1 at a time when profit cracks are spreading rapidly. This should be cause for some trepidation. Since the Christmas Eve lows essentially all of the 26% return in equities is explained by valuation expansion. The forward P/E has recovered from 13.5 to nearly 17.2 (Chart 1). There is limited scope for further expansion as four interest rate cuts in the coming 12 months are already priced in lofty valuations. Now profits will have to do the heavy lifting. But on the eve of earnings season, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors are forecast to have contracted profits last quarter, and three sectors could not lift revenue versus year ago comps, according to I/B/E/S data. Looking further out, there is a plethora of indicators that we highlighted last week that suggest that a profit recession is looming.2 Our sense is that once the euphoria around the looming Fed easing cycle settles, there will be a massive clash between perception and reality (Chart 2) that will likely propagate as a surge in volatility. Chart 1Multiple Expansion Explains All Of The SPX’s Return Chart 2Unsustainable Divergence This addiction to low rates has come at a great cost to the non-financial corporate sector. As a reminder, this segment of the economy is where the excesses are in the current cycle as we have been highlighting in recent research.3 Using stock market related data for the non-financial ex-tech universe, net debt has increased by 70% to $4.2tn over the past five years, but cash flow has only grown 18% to $1.7tn. As a result, net debt-to-EBITDA has spiked from 1.7 to 2.5, an all-time high (Chart 3). While stocks are at all-time highs (top panel, Chart 3), the debt-saddled non-financials ex-tech universe will likely exert substantial downward pressure to these equities in the coming months (Chart 4). Chart 3Balance Sheet Degrading Chart 4Something’s Got To Give Moving on to the labor market, we recently noticed an interesting behavior between the unemployment rate and wage inflation since the early-1990s recession: a repulsive magnet-type property exists where like magnetic poles repel each other (middle panel, Chart 5). In other words, every time the falling unemployment rate has kissed off accelerating wage growth, a steep reversal ensued at the onset of recession during the previous three cycles. A repeat may be already taking place, as average hourly earnings (AHE) growth has been stuck in the mud since peaking in December 2018. Importantly, the AHE impulse is quickly losing steam and every time the Fed embarks on an aggressive easing cycle it typically marks the end of wage inflation (bottom panel, Chart 5). Chart 5Beware Of Repulsion Chart 6Waiting For Growth Meanwhile, BCA’s global manufacturing PMI diffusion index has cratered to below 40% (middle panel, Chart 6). Neither the G7 nor the EM aggregate PMIs are above the boom/bust line (top panel, Chart 6). Our breakdown of the Leading Economic Indicators into G7 and EM14 also signals that global growth is hard to come by, albeit EMs are showing some early signs of a trough (bottom panel, Chart 6). As the early-May announced increase in Chinese tariffs begin to take a toll, we doubt global growth can have a sustainable recovery for the rest of 2019, despite Chinese credit growth picking up. Now, even Japan and Korea are fighting it out and are erecting barriers to trade, dealing a further blow to these economically hyper-sensitive export-oriented economies. Netting it all out, the odds of recession by mid-2020 continue to tick higher according to the NY Fed’s model (NY Fed’s probability of recession shown inverted, top panel, Chart 5) at a time when global growth is waning, U.S. profit growth is contracting and the non-financial ex-tech corporate balance sheet is degrading rapidly. On a cyclical 3-12 month time horizon we remain cautious on the broad equity market. This is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which stands in contrast to the more sanguine equity BCA House View. This week we are upgrading a consumer staples subgroup to overweight and initiating an intra-commodity market neutral trade. Time To Buy The Hype The tide is shifting and we are upgrading the S&P hypermarkets index to an above benchmark allocation. While valuations are stretched, trading at a 50% premium to the overall market on a 12-month forward P/E basis (not shown), our thesis is that these Big Box retailers will grow into their pricey valuations in the coming months.  The macro landscape is aligned perfectly with these defensive retailers. Consumer confidence has been falling all year long and now cracks are spreading to the labor market (confidence shown inverted, top panel, Chart 7). ADP small business payrolls declined for the second month in a row. Similarly, the NFIB survey shows that small business hiring plans are cooling (hiring plans shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 7). As a reminder, 2/3 of all new hiring typically occurs in the small and medium enterprise space. In the residential real estate market, the drop in interest rates that is now in its eighth month has yet to be felt, and house price inflation has ground to a halt. Historically, Costco membership growth has been inversely correlated with house prices (house price inflation shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 7). Chart 7Deteriorating Macro Backdrop … Chart 8…Is A Boon To Hypermarkets… Chart 8 shows three additional macro variables that signal brighter times ahead for the relative share price ratio. The drubbing in the 10-year U.S. treasury yield reflects a souring macro backdrop, melting inflation and a steep fall in U.S. economic data surprises. The ISM manufacturing index that continues to decelerate and is now closing in on the boom/bust line corroborates the bond market’s grim message. Tack on the Fed’s expected four cuts in the coming 12 months, and factors are falling into place for a durable rally in relative share prices. This disinflationary backdrop along with the Fed’s looming easing interest rate cycle have put a solid bid under gold prices. Hypermarket equities and bullion traditionally move in lockstep, and the current message is to expect more gains in the former (top panel, Chart 9). On the trade front specifically, these Big Box retailers do source consumer goods from China, but up to now these imports have been nearly immune to the U.S./China trade dispute as prices have been deflating (import prices shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 9). However, this does pose a risk going forward and we will be closely monitoring it for two reasons: First, because downward pressures may intensify on the greenback and second, President Trump may impose additional tariffs, both of which are negative for industry pricing power. Chart 9Profit Margins… Chart 10…Will Likely Expand Meanwhile, industry demand is on the rise and will likely offset the potential trade and U.S. dollar induced margin pressures. Hypermarket retail sales are climbing at a healthy clip outpacing overall retail sales (bottom panel, Chart 10). Already non-discretionary retail sales are outshining discretionary ones, which is a precursor to recession at a time when overall consumer outlays have sunk below 1% (real PCE growth shown inverted, top panel, Chart 10). The implication is that hypermarkets will continue to garner a larger slice of consumer outlays as the going gets tough. In sum, the souring macro backdrop coupled with a firming industry demand outlook signal that more gains are in store for hypermarket stocks. Bottom Line: Boost the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HYPC – WMT, COST. Initiate A Long Global Gold Miners/Short S&P Oil & Gas E&P Pair Trade One way to benefit from the global growth soft-patch and looming global liquidity injection is to go long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas E&P stocks on a tactical three-to-six month basis. While this market neutral and intra-commodity pair trade has already enjoyed an impressive run, there is more upside owing to a favorable macro backdrop. The key determinant of this share price ratio is the relative move in the underlying commodities that serve as pricing power proxies (top panel, Chart 11). Given the massive currency debasement potential that has gripped Central Banks the world over, such a flush liquidity backdrop will boost the allure of the shiny metal more so than crude oil. Global manufacturing PMIs are foreshadowing recession and our diffusion index has plummeted to the lowest level since 2011 (diffusion shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 11). In the U.S. specifically there is a growth-to-liquidity handoff and the ISM manufacturing survey’s new order versus prices paid subcomponents confirms that global gold miners have the upper hand compared with E&P equities (bottom panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Global Soft-Patch… Chart 12…Disinflation… As a result of this growth scare that can easily morph into recession especially if the U.S./China trade war continues into next year, inflation is nowhere to be found. Unit labor costs are slumping (top panel, Chart 12), the NY Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge has rolled over decisively (not shown),4 and the GDP deflator is slipping (middle panel, Chart 12).      Parts of the yield curve first inverted in early-December and the 10-year/fed funds rate slope is still inverted, signaling that gold miners will continue to outperform oil producers (yield curve shown on inverted scale, bottom panel, Chart 13). The near 100bps dive in real interest rates since late-December ties everything together and is a boon to bullion (and gold producers) that yields nothing (TIPS yield shown inverted, top panel, Chart 13). Meanwhile, bond volatility has spiked of late and the bottom panel of Chart 14 shows that historically the MOVE index has been joined at the hip with relative share prices. Chart 13…Melting Real Yields And… Chart 14…The Spike In Bond Vol, All Favor Gold Miners Over Oil Producers On the relative demand front, we peer over to China to take a pulse of the marginal moves in these commodity markets. China (and Russia) has been aggressively shifting their currency reserves into gold, and bullion holdings are rising both in volume terms and as a percentage of total FX reserves. In marked contrast, oil demand is feeble and Chinese apparent diesel consumption that is closely correlated with infrastructure and manufacturing activity has tumbled. Taken together, the message is to expect additional gain in relative share prices (middle & bottom panels, Chart 15). Adding it all up, the global growth slowdown, declining real bond yields, missing inflation, rising policy uncertainty and a favorable relative demand backdrop suggest that there is an exploitable tactical trading opportunity in a long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas E&P pair trade. Bottom Line: Initiate a tactical long global gold miners/short S&P oil & gas E&P pair trade on a three-to-six month time horizon with a stop at the -10% mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in these indexes are: GDX:US and BLBG – S5OILP – COP, EOG, APC, PXD, CXO, FANG, HES, DVN, MRO, NBL, COG, APA, XEC, respectively. Chart 15Upbeat Relative Demand Backdrop   Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Cracks Forming” dated June 24, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Beware Profit Recession” dated July 8, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/underlying-inflation-gauge   Current Recommendations Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Internal equity dynamics are sending a powerful signal for the broad equity market. Not only are defensives outshining cyclicals and mega caps trouncing small and micro caps, but also transports are warning that the broad equity market is skating on thin ice (top panel). Importantly, drilling deeper into the highly cyclical trucking industry is instructive. Heavy-duty trucks new orders have plunged (middle panel). While this is likely a consequence of the U.S./China trade war that commenced in the spring of 2018, there are also elements of domestic demand ills that have pushed “class 8 trucks” orders to the lowest point since the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession. In addition, the American Trucking Association’s trucking tonnage index has fallen recently and is contracting at an accelerating pace on a six-month rate of change basis (third panel). Bottom Line: We heed the signal from the highly sensitive transportation sector and remain cautious on the broad equity market.
Underweight A tactical trading opportunity has re-emerged in semi equipment stocks. This week we recommended trimming the S&P semi equipment index to underweight on a three-to-six month time horizon, but with a tight stop at the -7% relative return mark. Semi equipment stocks are capital intensive and require precision manufacturing, which makes their sales cycle a carbon copy of the broad manufacturing cycle. The middle panel of the chart shows this tight positive correlation with the ISM manufacturing index and sends a grim message for semi equipment manufacturers. With regard to industry operating metrics, the news is equally glum. Global semi cycles typically last four-to-five quarters and we only just passed the half way mark. Thus, there is more downside to industry sales momentum and we would lean against recent analyst relative revenue euphoria (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P semiconductor equipment index to underweight on a tactical – three-to-six month horizon – basis, but set a tight stop at the -7% relative return mark. For additional details please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC.