Países Desarrollados

Highlights The economic performance of Sweden, which did not have a lockdown, has been almost as bad as Denmark, which did have a lockdown. This proves that the current recession is not ‘man-made’, it is ‘pandemic-made’. While the pandemic remains in play, investors should maintain a defensive bias to their portfolios: favouring US T-bonds in bond portfolios, and technology and healthcare in equity portfolios. The technology sector has become defensive, largely because it has flipped from hardware dominance to software dominance. A new recommendation is to overweight technology-heavy Netherlands. Fractal trade: short AUD/CHF. Feature Chart I-IASweden: Avoiding A Lockdown Did Not Prevent A Slump In Consumption... Chart I-1B...But Led To Many More ##br##Infections Sweden and Denmark are neighbours. They speak near-identical languages and share a broadly similar culture and demographic. Yet the two countries have followed completely different strategies to halt the coronavirus pandemic. Sweden chose not to impose a lockdown. Instead, it opted for a ‘trust based’ approach, relying on its citizens to act sensibly and appropriately. Whereas Denmark imposed one of Europe’s earliest and most draconian lockdowns. The contrasting approaches of Sweden and neighbouring Denmark provide us with the closest thing to a controlled experiment on pandemic strategies. The Recession Is Not ‘Man-Made’, It Is ‘Pandemic-Made’ The surprising thing is that the economic performance of Sweden, which did not have a lockdown, has been almost as bad as Denmark, which did. This year, the unemployment rates in both economies have surged by 2 percentage points (albeit the latest data is for May in Sweden and April in Denmark). Furthermore, high-frequency measures of consumption show that Sweden suffered almost as severe a contraction as Denmark (Chart of the Week and Chart I-2). Chart I-2Unemployment Has Surged In Both No-Lockdown Sweden And Lockdown Denmark This surprising result challenges the popular view that this global recession is man-made. This view argues that without the government-imposed lockdowns, the global economy would not have entered a tailspin. But if this view is right, then why did consumption crash in Sweden? The simple answer is that in a pandemic, most people will change their behaviour to avoid catching the virus. The cautious behaviour is voluntary, irrespective of whether there is no lockdown, as in Sweden, or there is a lockdown, as in Denmark. People will shun public transport, shopping, and other crowded places, and even think twice about letting their children go to school. In a pandemic, the majority of people will change their behaviour even without a lockdown. But if the cautious behaviour is voluntary, then why impose a lockdown? The answer is that without a lockdown, the majority will behave sensibly to avoid catching the virus, but a minority will take a ‘devil may care’ attitude. In the pandemic, this is critical because less than 10 percent of infected people are responsible for creating 90 percent of all coronavirus infections. If this tiny minority of so-called ‘super-spreaders’ is left unchecked, then the pandemic will let rip. All of which brings us back to Sweden versus Denmark.  As a result of not imposing a mandatory lockdown to rein in its super-spreaders, Sweden now has one of the world’s worst coronavirus infection and mortality rates, four times higher than Denmark (Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5). Chart I-3No-Lockdown Sweden Has Suffered Many More Deaths Than Lockdown Denmark Chart I-4Avoiding A Lockdown Meant More Infections… Chart I-5…And More ##br##Deaths Put simply, containing the pandemic depends on reining in a minority of super-spreaders. Which explains why no-lockdown Sweden suffered a much worse outbreak of the disease than lockdown Denmark. In contrast, the economy depends on the behaviour of the majority. In a pandemic the majority will voluntarily exercise caution. Which explains why no-lockdown Sweden and lockdown Denmark suffered similar contractions in consumption. Looking ahead, will the widespread adoption of face masks and plexiglass screens change the public’s cautious behaviour? To a certain extent, yes – it will permit essential activities and let people take calculated risks. That said, if you are forced to wear a mask on public transport and in the shops, and you have to spread out in restaurants while being served by a masked waiter, then – rightly or wrongly – you are getting a strong signal: the danger is still out there. Meaning that many people will continue to shun discretionary activities and spending. The upshot is that while the pandemic remains in play, investors should maintain a defensive bias to their portfolios. Explaining Why Technology Is Now Defensive A defensive bias to your portfolio now requires an exposure to technology – because in 2020 the tech sector is behaving like a classic defensive. Its relative performance is correlating positively with the bond price, like other classic defensive sectors such as healthcare (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6In 2020, Tech Is Behaving Like A Defensive... Chart I-7...Like Healthcare The behaviour of the technology sector in the current recession contrasts with its performance in the global financial crisis of 2008. Back then, it behaved like a classic cyclical – its relative performance correlated negatively with the bond price (Chart I-8). Begging the question: why has the tech sector’s behaviour flipped from cyclical to defensive? Chart I-8In 2008, Tech Behaved Like A Cyclical The main reason is that the tech sector’s composition has flipped from hardware dominance to software dominance. In 2008, the sector market cap had a 65:35 tilt to technology hardware. But today, it is the mirror-image: a 65:35 tilt to computer and software services (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Tech Is More Defensive Now Because It Is Dominated By Software Computer and software services have many defensive characteristics suited to the current environment: For many companies, enterprise software is now business critical. It is a must-have rather than a like-to-have. Computer and software services use a subscription-based revenue model, minimising the dependency on discretionary spending. Computer and software services are helping firms to cut costs through automation and back-office efficiencies as well as facilitating the boom in ‘working from home’. The sector is cash rich. Despite these defensive characteristics, there remains a lingering worry: is the tech sector overvalued? The Rally In Growth Defensives Is Not A Mania  Some people fear that the recent run-up in stock markets does not make sense, other than as a ‘Robin Hood’ day-trader fuelled mania. After all, the pandemic is still very much in play, and so are other geopolitical risks, so how can some stock prices be near all-time highs? Yet the recent run-up in growth defensives such as tech and healthcare does make sense. Their valuations have moved in near-perfect lockstep with the bond yield, implying that the rally is based on fundamentals (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Tech And Healthcare Valuations Are Tracking The Bond Yield Simply put, if the 10-year T-bond is going to deliver a pitiful 0.7 percent a year over the next decade, then the prospective return from growth defensives must also compress. It would be absurd to expect these stocks to be priced for high single digit returns. Since late 2018, the decline in growth defensives’ forward earnings yield has broadly tracked the 250bps decline in the 10-year T-bond yield. Given that the forward earnings yield correlates well with the 10-year prospective return, the depressed bond yield is depressing the prospective return from growth defensives – as it should. Tech and healthcare valuations have moved in near-perfect lockstep with the bond yield. But with the pandemic and geopolitical risks menacing in the background, shouldn’t the gap between the prospective return on stocks and bonds – the equity risk premium – be larger? This is open to debate. When bond yields approach the lower bound, the appeal of owning bonds also diminishes because bond prices have limited upside. Nevertheless, the gap between the tech and healthcare forward earnings yield and the bond yield has gone up this year and is much larger than in 2018 (Chart I-11). This suggests that valuations are taking some account of the pandemic and other risks. Moreover, in a longer-term perspective the current gap between the tech and healthcare forward earnings yield and the bond yield, at +4 percent, hardly indicates a mania. In the true mania of 2000, the gap stood at -4 percent! (Chart I-12) Chart I-11The Equity Risk Premium Has Risen In 2020 Chart I-12Tech And Health Care Valuations Are Not In A Mania In summary, until the pandemic is conquered, investors should maintain a defensive bias to their portfolios. Bond investors should overweight US T-bonds versus core European bonds. Equity investors should overweight the growth defensives, technology and healthcare, which implies overweighting the technology-heavy US versus Europe. A new recommendation is to overweight technology-heavy Netherlands. Stay overweight healthcare-heavy Switzerland, and bank-light France and Germany (albeit expect a technical 5 percent underperformance of Germany versus the UK in the coming weeks). And stay underweight bank-heavy Austria. Fractal Trading System* The AUD is technically overbought and vulnerable to a tactical reversal. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short AUD/CHF, with a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss set at 4.2 percent. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 63 percent. Chart I-13AUD/CHF When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Feature Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart II-1). Chart II-1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.1  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. Chart II-2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism Chart II-3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism   For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart II-2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart II-3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart II-4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession Chart II-5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises   COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.2 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart II-6).3 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart II-6Globalization Hits A Major Top Chart II-7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart II-7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyberspace has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart II-8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.4  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism Chart II-9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration   There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart II-10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart II-10).5 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a “coalition of the willing” to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) Chart II-11English Versus Scottish Nationalism European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart II-11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart II-12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart II-12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart II-13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart II-13AChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery Chart II-13BChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery   The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart II-14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart II-14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart II-15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market’s capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart II-15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist   Footnotes 1  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 2  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020.  3  Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95.  4  Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 5  In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights The cyclical rally in stocks is not over, but the S&P 500 will churn between 2800 and 3200 this summer. Supportive policy, robust household balance sheets and budding economic growth have put a floor under global bourses. Political risk, demanding valuations and COVID-related headlines are creating potent headwinds in the near term that must be resolved. During the ongoing flat but volatile performance of equities, investors should build short positions against government bonds and the dollar. Deep cyclicals, banks and Japanese equities offer opportunities to generate alpha. In the long term, structurally rising inflation will ensure that stocks outperform bonds, but commodities will beat them both. Feature Institutional investors still despise the equity market rebound that began on March 23. Relative to history, professional investors are heavily overweight cash, bonds and defensive sectors but they are underweight equities as an asset class and cyclical sectors specifically. Furthermore, the beta of global macro hedge funds to the stock market is in the bottom of its distribution, which indicates the funds’ low net exposure to equities. The attitude of market participants is understandable given that the economy is in tatters. According to the New York Fed Weekly Economic Index, Q2 GDP in the US will contract by 8.4% compared with last year. Industrial production is still 15.9% below its pre-pandemic high and the US unemployment rate stands at either 13.3% or 16.4%, depending how the BLS accounts for furloughed employees. Moreover, deflationary forces are building, which hurts profits. Despite these discouraging economic reports, the S&P 500 is trading only 7.9% below its February 19 all-time high and is displaying a demanding forward P/E ratio of 21.4. Stocks will continue to churn over the summer with little direction. Financial markets are forward looking and the collapse of risk asset prices in March forewarned of an economic calamity. Stimulus, liquidity conditions and an eventual recovery are creating strong tailwinds for stocks. However, demanding valuations, rising political risks and overbought short-term technicals argue for a correction. These forces will probably balance out each other in the coming months. Investors must be nimble. Buying beta is not enough; finding cheap assets levered to the nascent recovery will be a source of excess returns. Bonds are vulnerable to the recovery and purchasing deep cyclicals at the expense of defensives makes increasing sense. Japanese stocks offer another attractive opportunity. Five Pillars Behind Stocks… Our BCA Equity Scorecard remains in bullish territory despite the conflict between the sorry state of the global economy and the violence of the equity rally since late March (Chart I-1). Five forces support share prices. Chart I-1The Rally Is Underpinned The first pillar is extraordinarily accommodative liquidity conditions created by global central banks, which have aggressively slashed policy rates and allowed real interest rates to collapse. Additionally, forward guidance indicates that policy will remain easy for the foreseeable future. For example, the Federal Reserve does not anticipate tightening policy through 2022 and the Bank of Japan expects to stand pat until at least 2023. In response, the yield curve in advanced economies has started to steepen, which indicates that the policy easing is having a positive impact on the world’s economic outlook (Chart I-2). Various liquidity measures demonstrate the gush of high-powered money in the financial and economic system in the wake of monetary policy easing. Our US Financial Liquidity Index and dollar-based liquidity measure have skyrocketed. Historically, these two indicators forecast the direction of growth and the stock market (Chart I-3). Chart I-2The Yield Curve Likes What It Sees Chart I-3Exploding Liquidity Conditions   The second pillar is the greatest fiscal easing since World War II. The US government has increased spending by $2.9 trillion since March. House Democrats have passed an additional $3 trillion plan. Senate Republicans will not ratify the entire proposal, but our Geopolitical Strategy service expects them to concede to $2 trillion.1 Meanwhile, the White House is offering a further $1 trillion infrastructure program over five years. Details of the infrastructure plan are murky, but its existence confirms that fiscal profligacy is the new mantra in Washington and the federal deficit could reach 23% of GDP this year. Chart I-4Loosest Fiscal Policy Since WWII The list of new fiscal measures worldwide is long; the key point is that governments are injecting funds to lessen the COVID-19 recession pain on their respective populations and small businesses (Chart I-4). Excluding loans guarantees, even tight-fisted Germany has rolled out EUR 0.44 trillion in relief programs, amounting to 12.9% of GDP. Japan has announced JPY 63.5 trillion of “fresh water” stimulus so far, representing 11.4% of GDP. Loan guarantees administered by various governments along with the Fed’s Primary and Secondary Market Credit Facilities also limit how high business bankruptcies will climb. As we discussed last month, it is unlikely that countries will return to the level of spending and budget deficits that prevailed prior to COVID-19, even if the intensity of fiscal support declines from its current extreme.2 Voters in the West and emerging markets are fed up with the Washington Consensus of limited state intervention. Consequently, the median voter has pivoted to the left on economic matters, especially in Anglo-Saxon nations (Chart I-5).3 The fiscal laxity consistent with economic populism and dirigisme will boost aggregate demand for many years. The third supporting pillar is the private sector’s response to monetary and fiscal easing unleashed by global policymakers. Unlike in 2008, the amount of loans and commercial papers issued by US businesses is climbing, which indicates stronger market access than during the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). A consequence of the large uptick in credit growth has been an explosion in banking deposits. Given the surge in private-sector liquidity – not just base money – broad money creation has eclipsed that of the GFC (Chart I-6). Part of this money will seek higher returns than the -0.97% real short rate available to investors in the US (or -0.9% in Europe), a process that will bid up risk assets. Chart I-5The US Population's Shift To The Left Chart I-6The Private Sector's Liquidity Is Improving   The financial health of the US household sector is the fourth pillar buttressing stocks. Households entered the recession with debt equal to 99.4% of disposable income, the lowest share in 19 years. Moreover, debt servicing only represents 9.7% of disposable income, the lowest percentage of the past four decades. Along with generous support from the US government, the resilience created by strong balance sheets explains why delinquency rates remain muted despite a surge in unemployment (Table I-1).4 Moreover, the decline in household net worth pales in comparison with the GFC (Chart I-7). Hence, the wealth effect will not have the same deleterious impact on consumption as it did after 2008. In the wake of large fiscal transfers, the savings rate explosion to an all-time high of 32.9% is a blessing. The surge in savings is applying a powerful brake on 67.7% of the US economy, but its eventual decline will fuel a quick consumption recovery, a positive trend absent after the GFC. Table I-1Consumer Borrowers Are Hanging In There Chart I-7Smaller Hit To Net Worth Than The GFC     The final pillar is the path of the global business cycle. Important predictors of the US economy have improved. The June Philly Fed and Empire State surveys are gaining ground, thanks to their rebounding new orders and employment components. The Conference Board’s LEI is also climbing, even when its financial constituents are excluded.  Residential activity, which also leads the US business cycle, is sending positive signals. According to the June NAHB Housing market index, homebuilder confidence is quickly recouping lost ground and building permits are bottoming. These two series suggest that the contribution of housing to GDP growth will only expand. Household spending is showing promising growth as the economy re-opens. In May, US auto sales jumped 44.1% higher and retail sales (excluding autos) soared by 12.4%. Additionally, the retail sales control group5 has already recovered to its pre-pandemic levels. The healing labor market and the bounce in consumer confidence have fueled this record performance because they will prompt a normalization in the savings rate. Progress is also evident outside the US. The expectations component of the German IFO survey is rebounding vigorously, a good omen for European industrial production (Chart I-8). Similarly, the continued climb in China’s credit and fiscal impulse suggests that global industrial production will move higher. Finally, EM carry trades are recovering, which indicates that liquidity is seeping into corners of the global economy that contribute the most to capex (Chart I-9). Chart I-8European Hopes Chart I-9Positive Signals For Global Manufacturers     Against this backdrop, there is an increasing probability that analysts will upgrade their 2020 EPS estimates. The odds of upward revisions to 2021 and 2022 estimates (especially outside of the tech and healthcare sectors) are much more significant, especially because the historical pattern of deep recessions followed by sharp rebounds should repeat itself (Chart I-10). A strong recovery will ultimately foster risk-taking. Mechanically, higher expected cash flows and lower risk premia will remain tailwinds behind stocks. Chart I-10The Deeper The Fall, The Faster The Rebound … And Three Reasons To Worry The five pillars shoring up stocks face three powerful factors working at cross purposes against share prices. The first hurdle against stocks is that in aggregate, the S&P 500 is already discounting the coming economic recovery. In the US, the 12-month forward P/E ratio bounced from a low of 13.4 on March 23 to the current 21.4. Bidding up multiples to such heights in a short timeframe opens up the potential for investor disappointments with economic activity or earnings. Equally concerning, the global expectations component of the German ZEW survey has returned to near-record highs. The ZEW is a survey of financial professionals largely influenced by the performance of equities. In order for stocks to continue to rise, they will need an even greater global economic rebound than implied by the ZEW (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Stocks Already Know That IP Will Jump Back Political risk poses a second hurdle against stocks. As intense as it is today, policy uncertainty will not likely abate this summer, which will put upward pressure on the equity risk premium. According to BCA Research’s Geopolitical strategy service, the combination of elevated share prices and President Trump’s low approval rating will increase the prospect of erratic moves by the White House. A pitfall particularly under-appreciated by risk assets is a new round of tariffs in the Sino-US trade war.6 Another hazard is an escalation of tensions with the European Union. US domestic politics are also problematic. Fiscal stimulus has been a pillar for the market. However, as the economy recovers, politicians could let down their guard and resist passing new measures on the docket. This danger is self-limiting. If legislators delay voting on proposed laws, then the resulting drop in the market will put greater pressure on policymakers to continue to support the economy. Either way, this tug-of-war could easily cause some painful bouts of market volatility. Chart I-12How Long Will Stocks Ignore Politics? In recent months, the equity risk premium could ignore rising political risk as long as financial liquidity was expanding at an accelerating pace (Chart I-12). However, the bulk of monetary easing is over because the Fed, the ECB and the global central banks have already expended most of their ammunition. Moreover, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank have agreed to slow the pace at which they tap the Fed’s dollar swap line from daily to three times a week. This indicates that the private sector’s extreme appetite for liquidity has been satiated by the increase in base money since March 19. Thus, the expansion of liquidity will decelerate, even if its level remains plentiful. Overlooking political uncertainty will become harder after the second derivative of liquidity turns negative. The third hurdle against the stock market is the evolution of COVID-19. A second wave of infection has started in many countries and it will only continue to escalate as economies re-open, loosen social distancing rules and test more potential cases. Investors will be rattled by headlines such as the resumption of lockdowns in Beijing and mounting new cases in the southern US.  Chart I-13A Different Wave BCA’s base case is that a second wave of infections will not result in large-scale lockdowns that paralyzed the global economy in Q1 and Q2. Importantly, the number of new deaths is lagging the spread of recorded new infections (Chart 1-13). This dichotomy highlights better testing, our improved understanding of the disease and our greater capacity to protect vulnerable individuals. A Summer Of Discontent The S&P 500 and global equities will face a summer of directionless gyrations with elevated volatility. Before we can escape this pattern, the technical froth that has engulfed the market must dissipate. Our Tactical Strength Indicator is massively overbought and is consistent with a period of consolidation. (Chart I-14). The same is true of short-term breadth. The proportion of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving average is close to its highest level in the past 20 years, which indicates that meaningful equity gains are doubtful in the coming months. (Chart I-14, bottom panel). A correction should not morph into a renewed bear market because the pillars behind stocks are too strong. Nonetheless, the S&P 500 may retest the 2800-2900 zone during the summer. On the upside, it will be capped near 3200 during that same period. A resolution of the political risks surrounding the market is needed to settle the churning pattern. Another factor will be the progressive normalization of our tactical indicators after an extended period of sideways trading. Finally, continued progress on the treatment of COVID-19 (not necessarily a vaccine) and the formulation of a coherent health policy for the fall will create the impetus for higher share prices later this year. How To Profit When Stocks Churn A strategy most likely to generate the highest reward-to-risk ratio will be to focus on assets and sectors that have not yet fully priced in the upcoming global economic recovery, unlike the broad stock market. The bond market fits within this strategy. G-7 and US yields remain extremely expensive (Chart I-15). Additionally, according to our Composite Technical Indicator, Treasuries are losing momentum (see Section III, page 41). This valuation and technical backdrop renders government bonds vulnerable to both a strong economy and an upward reassessment of the outlook for inflation. Chart I-14A Needed Digestive Break Chart I-15Bonds Are Pricey...   Cyclical dynamics also paint a poor outlook for bonds. Globally, the supply of government securities is swelling by approximately $6 trillion, which will slowly lift depressed term premia. Moreover, there has been a sharp incline in excess liquidity as approximated by the gap between our US Financial Liquidity Index and the rate of change of the US LEI. Such a development has led yields higher since the GFC (Chart I-16). Finally, the diffusion index of fifteen Swedish economic variables has started to recover, an indicator that often signals higher yields (Chart I-17). Sweden is an excellent bellwether for the global business cycle because it is a small, open economy where shipments of industrial and intermediate goods account for 55% of exports. Chart I-16...And Vulnerable To Excess Liquidity Chart I-17Sweden's Message   The FX market also offers reasonably priced vehicles to bet on the burgeoning global cyclical upswing. Balance-of-payments dynamics are increasingly bearish for the US dollar. A fall in the household savings rate will widen the current account deficit because the fiscal balance remains deeply negative. Meanwhile, US real interest rate differentials are narrowing, thus the capital account surplus will likely recede. The resulting balance-of-payment deficit will accentuate selling pressures on the USD created by a pick-up in global industrial activity (Chart I-18). AUD/CHF offers another attractive opportunity. The AUD trades near a record low relative to the CHF, yet this cross will benefit from a rebound in global nominal GDP growth (Chart I-19). Moreover, Australia managed the COVID-19 crisis very well and it can proceed quickly with its re-opening. Meanwhile, the expensiveness of the CHF versus the EUR will continue to foster deflationary pressures in Switzerland. This contrast ensures that the Swiss National Bank remains more dovish than the Reserve Bank of Australia. Chart I-18Bearish Dollar Backdrop Chart I-19AUD/CHF As A Bet On The Recovery   Within equities, deep cyclical stocks remain attractive relative to defensive ones. The same acceleration in our excess liquidity proxy that warned of a fall in bond prices indicates that the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio should appreciate. This ratio also benefits meaningfully when the dollar depreciates. A weaker dollar is synonymous with stronger global industrial production. It also eases deflationary pressures and boosts the price of commodities, which increases pricing power for industrial, material and energy stocks. Finally, the cyclical-to-defensives ratio rises when the silver-to-gold ratio turns up. An outperformance of silver has been an important signal that reflation is starting to improve the global economic outlook (Chart I-20).7 Chart I-20Cyclicals Have Not Priced In The Recovery Banks also offer attractive opportunities. Investors have clobbered banks because they expect prodigious non-performing loans (NPL) due to the threats to private-sector balance sheets from the deepest recession in nine decades. However, NPLs are not expanding by as much as anticipated thanks to the ample support by global monetary and fiscal authorities. Moreover, banks were conservative and built loss reserves ahead of the crisis. In this context, the extreme valuation discount embedded in banks relative to the S&P 500 seems exaggerated (Chart I-21). Additionally, the gap between the expected growth rate of banks’ long-term earnings and that of the broad market is wider than at any other point in the past 15 years. Investors have also bid up the price of protection against bank shares (Chart I-22). Therefore, despite near-term risks induced by the Fed’s Stress Test, banks are a cheap contrarian bet on a global recovery. Chart I-21Banks Are Cheap Chart I-22Banks As A Contrarian Bet     Investors should continue to favor foreign versus US equities, which is consistent with our positive outlook on banks and deep cyclical stocks, as well as our negative disposition toward the dollar. Foreign stocks outperform US ones when the dollar depreciates because the former overweight cyclical equities and financials (Chart I-23). Moreover, foreign stocks trade at discounts to US equities and embed significantly lower expected cash flow growth, which suggests that they would offer investors upside from the impending global economic recovery. Chart I-23Favor Foreign Stocks EM stocks fit within this context. Both EM FX and equities trade at a valuation discount consistent with an upcoming rally (Chart I-24). Moreover, cheap valuations increase the likelihood that a depreciating US dollar will boost EM currencies by easing global financial conditions. Moreover, the momentum of EM equities relative to global ones is forming a positive divergence with the price ratio, which is consistent with liquidity making its way into these markets (Chart I-25). Our Emerging Markets Strategy team is more worried about EM stocks than we are because EM bourses would be unlikely to participate as much as US ones in a mania driven by retail investors.8 Chart I-24Attractive EM Valuations Chart I-25EM: A Coiled-Spring Bet On A Weaker Dollar?   Chart I-26Japanese Stocks As A Trade Finally, an opportunity to overweight Japanese equities has emerged. The Nikkei has collapsed in conjunction with a meltdown in Japanese industrial production. However, Japanese earnings should recover faster than in the rest of the world. Japan has efficiently handled its COVID-19 outbreak with fewer lockdowns. Moreover, Japan’s earnings per share (EPS) are highly levered to both the global business cycle and China’s economic fluctuations. Consequently, if we expect global activity to recover and China’s credit and fiscal impulse to continue to improve, then we also anticipate that Japan’s EPS will outperform the MSCI All-Country World Index (Chart I-26). Additionally, on a price-to-cash flow basis, Japanese equities trade at a deep-enough discount to global stocks to foreshadow an upcoming period of outperformance. Bottom Line: Equities will be tossed about for the coming quarter or two, buffeted between five tailwinds and three headwinds. While the S&P is expected to gyrate between 2800 and 3200 this summer, investors can seek alpha by selling bonds, selling the dollar and buying AUD/CHF, and favoring deep cyclical stocks as well as banks at the expense of defensives. As a corollary, foreign equities, especially Japanese ones, have a window to outperform the US. EM stocks could also generate excess returns, but they are a more uncertain bet. Exploring Long-Term Risks We explore some investment implications linked to our theme of structurally rising inflation, which will cause lower real long-term portfolio returns than in the previous four decades. Populism and the ossification of the supply-side of the economy will push inflation up this cycle toward an average of 3% to 5%.9  Chart I-27S&P 500 Long-Term Perspective Adjusted for inflation, the 10-year cumulative average return for stocks stands at 12.4%, which is an elevated reading. The strength of the past performance increases the probability that a period of mean reversion is near (Chart I-27). The end of the debt supercycle raises the likelihood that an era of low real returns will materialize. Non-financial debt accounts for 258.7% of GDP, a level only topped at the depth of the Great Depression when nominal GDP collapsed by 46% from its 1929 peak. Meanwhile, yields are at record lows (Chart I-28). Such a combination suggests that there is little way forward to boost debt by enough to enhance growth, especially when each additional dollar of debt generates a diminishing amount of output. Chart I-28The End Of The Debt Super Cycle Chart I-29Little Room To Cut Taxes Populist governments will remain profligate and play an expanding role in the economy instead of accepting the necessary increase in savings required to reduce debt and create a more robust economy. However, effective personal and corporate tax rates are already very low in the US (Chart I-29). Therefore, the only way to offer fiscal support would be to increase government spending. Growth will become less vigorous as the government’s share of GDP increases (Chart I-30). Moreover, monetary policy will likely remain lax, which boosts the chance of stagflation developing.   Chart I-30The Bigger The Government, The Lower The Growth Elevated stock multiples are a problem for long-term investors. The S&P 500’s Shiller P/E ratio stands at 29.1, and its price-to-sales ratio is at 2.2. If bond yields remain minimal, then low discount rates can rationalize those extreme multiples. However, if inflation moves above 4%, especially when real output is not expanding robustly, then multiples will mean-revert and equities will generate subpar real returns. Chart I-31Profit Margins: From Tailwind To Headwind? Profit margins pose an additional problem for stocks. The decline in unit labor costs relative to selling prices has allowed abnormally wide domestic EBITDA margins to persist (Chart I-31). However, inflation, populism, greater government involvement in the economy and lower efficiency of supply chains will conspire to undo this extraordinary level of profitability. In other words, while the share of national income taken up by wages will expand, profits will account for a progressively smaller slice of output. (Chart I-31, bottom panel). Lower profit margins will push down RoE and accentuate the decline in multiples while also hurting projected long-term cash flows. Chart I-32Elevated Household Exposure To Stocks Finally, from a structural perspective, households are already aggressively overweighting equities. Stocks comprise 54% of US households’ discretionary portfolios. US households held more shares only in 1968 and 2000, two years that marked the beginning of painful drops in real stock prices (Chart I-32). US stocks are most vulnerable to the increase of inflation. Not only are they much more expensive than their global counterparts, but as the Section II special report written by Matt Gertken highlights, the growing nationalism spreading around the world hurts the global order built by and around the US during the past 70 years. With this system of influence diminished, US firms will not be able to command their current valuation premium. Despite low expected real rates of return, equities will still outperform bonds in the coming decade (Table I-2). Even though stocks are more volatile than bonds, stocks have not significantly outperformed bonds during the past 35 years. This was possible because inflation fell from its peak in the early 1980s. However, bonds are unlikely to once again generate higher risk-adjusted returns than equities if inflation bottoms. Moreover, bonds are more expensive than stocks (Chart I-33). A structural bear market in bonds would hurt risk-parity strategies and end the incredible strength in growth stocks. Table I-2Rising Inflation Flatters Stocks Over Bonds The outperformance of stocks over bonds will be of little solace to investors if equities generate poor real returns. Instead, investors should explore commodities, an asset class that benefits from rising inflation, especially given the combination of strong government spending and too-accommodative monetary policy. Moreover, after a decade of weak capex in natural resource extraction, the supply of commodities will expand slowly. Hence, our base case this cycle is for a weakening in the stock-to-gold ratio (Chart I-34). The stock-to-industrial commodities ratio will also fall from its heady levels. As a result, the energy, materials and industrial sectors are attractive on a long-term basis beyond the next six to 12 months. Chart I-33Bonds Look Worse Than Stocks... Chart I-34...But Gold Looks The Best   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 25, 2020 Next Report: July 30, 2020   II. Nationalism And Globalization After COVID-19 Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart II-1). Chart II-1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.10  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. Chart II-2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism Chart II-3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism   For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart II-2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart II-3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart II-4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession Chart II-5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises   COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.11 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart II-6).12 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart II-6Globalization Hits A Major Top Chart II-7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart II-7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyberspace has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart II-8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.13  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism Chart II-9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration   There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart II-10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart II-10).14 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a “coalition of the willing” to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) Chart II-11English Versus Scottish Nationalism European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart II-11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart II-12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart II-12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart II-13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart II-13AChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery Chart II-13BChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery   The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart II-14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart II-14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart II-15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market’s capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart II-15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist   III. Indicators And Reference Charts We continue to favor stocks at the expense of bonds, a view held since our April issue. Global fiscal and monetary conditions remain highly accommodative. Now that the global economy is starting to recover as lockdowns ease, another tailwind for stocks has emerged. Nonetheless, last month we warned that the S&P 500 was entering a consolidation phase and that a pattern of volatile ups and downs would ensue. The combination of tactically overbought markets, elevated geopolitical risk, and a looming second wave of infections continues to sustain this short-term view. Hence, the S&P 500 is likely to churn between 2088 and 3200 over the coming months. On a cyclical basis, the same factors that made us willing buyers of stocks since late March remain broadly in place. Stocks are becoming increasingly expensive, but monetary conditions are extremely accommodative. Our Speculation Indicator continues to send a benign signal, which indicates that from a cyclical perspective, the market is not especially vulnerable. Finally, our Revealed Preference Indicator is flashing a strong buy signal. Tactically, equities must still digest the heady gains made since March 23. We have had five 5% or more corrections since March 23. More of them are in the cards. Both our Tactical Strength Indicator and the share of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving averages point to a pullback of 5% to 10%. Moreover, while it remains extremely stimulative, our Monetary Indicator is not rising anymore, which increases the probability that traders start to pay more attention to geopolitical risks. According to our Bond Valuation Index, Treasurys are significantly more overvalued than equities. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator is losing momentum. This backdrop is dangerous for bonds, especially when sentiment towards this asset class is as high as it is today and economic growth is turning the corner. Finally, we expect the yield curve to steepen, especially for very long maturities where the Fed is less active. In a similar vein, inflation breakeven rates are a clean vehicle to bet on higher yields. Since we last published, the dollar has broken down. The greenback is expensive and its counter-cyclicality is a major handicap during a global economic recovery. Additionally, the US twin deficits are increasingly problematic. The fiscal deficit remains exceptionally wide and the re-opening of the US economy will pull down the household savings rate. The current account deficit is therefore bound to widen. The continued low level of real interest rates will complicate financing this deficit and to equilibrate the funding of US liabilities, the dollar will depreciate. The widening in the current account deficit also means that the large increase in money supply by the Fed will leak out of the US economy. This process will accentuate the dollar’s negative impulse. Technically, the accelerating downward momentum in our Dollar Composite Technical Indicator also warns of additional downside for the USD. Commodities continue to gain traction. The rapid move up in the Baltic Dry index suggests that more gains are in store for natural resource prices, especially as our momentum indicator is gaining strength. Moreover, the commodity advance/decline line remains in an uptrend. A global economic recovery, a weakening dollar, and falling real interest rates (driven by easy policy) indicate that fundamental factors – not just technical ones – are also increasingly commodity bullish. Tactically, if stocks churn, as we expect, commodities will likely do so as well. However, this move should also be seen as a consolidation of previous gains. Finally, gold remains strong, lifted by accommodative monetary conditions and a weak dollar. However, the yellow metal is now trading at a significant premium to its short-term fundamentals. Gold too is likely to trade in a volatile sideways pattern, especially if bond yields rise. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME:   Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Social Unrest Can Still Cause Volatility," dated June 5, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2020," dated May 28, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see US Investment Strategy "So Far, So Good (How Markets Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Washington, DC)," dated June 8, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 5  The control group excludes auto and gas stations, and building materials. 6  Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Geopolitics Is The Next Shoe To Drop," dated April 10, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 7  Gold and silver are precious metals that benefit from lower interest rates and a weak dollar. However, a much larger proportion of the demand for silver comes from industrial processes. Thus, silver outperforms gold when an economic recovery is imminent. 8  Please see Emerging Markets Strategy "A FOMO-Driven Mania?," dated June 4, 2020, and Emerging Markets Strategy "EM: Follow The Momentum," dated June 18, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2020," dated May 28, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 11  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020.  12  Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95.  13  Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 14  In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.

Highlights Global Inflation: The worst of the 2020 collapse in global inflation is over; economic growth is starting to rebound, monetary and fiscal policies are highly stimulative, commodity prices are rising and the US dollar is losing some steam. This boosts the investment case for developed market inflation-linked bonds, which appear cheap on our models on a breakeven basis versus nominal government debt. Inflation-Linked Bonds: Starting this week, we are permanently adding inflation-linked bonds as a “discretionary” allocation option in our model bond portfolio framework. We begin with allocations to linkers in the US, Italy and Canada. Tactical Overlay 2.0: We are introducing our revamped Tactical Trade Overlay, using specific securities to implement shorter-term trade ideas in a practical fashion. This week, we begin by initiating inflation-linked bond breakeven trades in the US, Italy and Canada. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Early Days Of An Inflation Expectations Revival With global growth now showing signs of rebounding from the COVID-19 recession as lockdown restrictions ease, inflation expectations in the major developed economies have started to drift upward. Higher inflation breakevens have helped stabilized nominal government bond yields in the majority of countries, even with the latest reads on realized inflation still showing few signs of life (Chart of the Week). In our view, it is still far too soon for bond investors to shift to a below-benchmark stance on overall duration exposure. The threat of a new set of COVID-19 lockdowns is growing, given surging numbers of new infections across much of the southern US and in major emerging economies like Brazil and India. The social and political instability in the US, with elections less than five months away, raises the risk of a renewed flare-up of negative headline risk that can upset overheated equity and credit markets. Amidst all that uncertainty, policymakers worldwide will continue to use aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus to fight off the risk of an extended recession. That means there is little risk of a big surge in global bond yields from a hawkish repricing of central bank policy expectations over at least the next 6-12 months. At the same time, the extraordinarily loose policy settings, combined with the continued rebound in global commodity prices (most notably, oil), should allow inflation expectations to continue drifting higher. While this will likely also push nominal bond yields higher as well, positioning for wider inflation breakevens remains the “cleaner” way to position for the initial impact of policy reflation. In a report published back on April 28, we introduced a series of valuation models for inflation-linked bonds in the developed economies.1 These models showed that the historic collapse in global oil prices earlier this year, combined with the deflationary impulse from the deep global COVID-19 recession, pushed breakeven inflation rates to levels well below fair value in most countries. Positioning for wider inflation breakevens remains the “cleaner” way to position for the initial impact of policy reflation.  This week, we take the output from our inflation breakeven models to determine specific inflation-linked trade recommendations over both strategic (6-12 months) and tactical (0-6 months) time horizons. For the former, we are adding inflation-linked bonds as an allocation option for all countries in our model bond portfolio. For the latter, we are reviving our Tactical Trade Overlay by introducing some specific trade recommendations using actual inflation-linked bonds in the US, Europe and Canada. Why Global Inflation Expectations Have Bottomed The recent pickup in global market-based inflation expectations has occurred even as actual realized headline inflation rates have fallen dangerously close to 0% in the US, euro area and the UK (Chart 2). Canada is now in outright deflation, with the year-over-year rate of headline CPI inflation falling to -0.4% in May. The decline is not fully attributable to the earlier collapse in oil prices, as core inflation rates have also fallen across the developed world. Chart 2A Threat Of Realized Deflation Despite the plunge in realized inflation, inflation expectations have moved higher for both market-based indicators like inflation breakevens and survey-based measures as well. Chart 3Inflation Expectations Improving Everywhere …. Chart 4… Even Within Europe The German ZEW economic research institute - well known for their surveys of economic forecasters for Germany and the major developed countries - also produces inflation expectations surveys for the same countries. In Charts 3 & 4, we show those ZEW inflation expectations measures alongside the breakeven inflation rates for 10-year government bonds in the US, UK, Japan and the euro area including country-level data for Germany, France and Italy. It is clear that the upturn in breakevens has also occurred as a growing number of economic forecasters have started to anticipate a move higher in both economic growth and inflation over the next year. With recent economic data surprising to the upside in the US, China and in much of Europe, a more optimistic view on global growth is a logical reason helping explain why inflation expectations have been drifting higher. Even more so has been a shift in the deflationary momentum stemming from a rising US dollar and falling commodity prices – trends that are in the process of reversing. Perhaps the strongest deflationary force over the past couple of years has been the persistent strength of the US dollar. World export prices have been contracting on a year-over-year basis since December 2018, which has coincided with a similar period of positive annual growth in the trade-weighted US dollar since June 2018 (Chart 5). While the dollar is still at elevated levels, its momentum has started to roll over (middle panel), suggesting less deflationary pressure from the currency. The same can be said for commodity prices, which reflect both the global demand story and the trend in the US dollar as well, given that important industrial commodities like oil and copper are priced in US dollars. With the prices of those commodities off their lows, the annual growth rates of the CRB Energy and Metals indices have bottomed out, implying less global deflationary pressure from commodities (bottom panel). A reflationary boost to the global economy – and to inflation expectations – from a softer dollar is likely over the next 6-12 months. Looking ahead, the US dollar is likely to continue losing strength for two reasons: less-supportive interest rate differentials and improving global growth (Chart 6). The Fed’s aggressive interest rate cuts over the past year have eliminated much of the attractive carry that helped fuel the dollar’s rise over the past few years. At the same time, the US dollar remains an “anti-growth” currency that tends to weaken during periods of improving global growth, and vice versa. Chart 5Easing Of Disinflationary Pressures From The USD & Commodities Chart 6A Softer USD Will Help Lift Global Inflation Expectations With global growth starting to emerge from the COVID-19 recession, the US dollar is now more exposed to less attractive interest rate differentials. This suggests that a reflationary boost to the global economy – and to inflation expectations – from a softer dollar is likely over the next 6-12 months. Chart 7Rising Oil Prices Will Help Lift Global Inflation Expectations The same can be said for commodity prices like oil, which have considerable upside as global growth improves. Our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy are quite bullish on the outlook for oil over the next 12-18 months, given the improved demand/supply balance and aggressive global monetary and fiscal stimulus. Their expect the Brent benchmark to rise to $46/bbl by the end of 2020 and $73/bbl by the end of 2021 – levels that would push inflation expectations in the US and other major developed markets higher given the usual strong correlation between oil and breakevens (Chart 7).2 Summing it all up, the trends that have helped stabilize and lift global inflation expectations look set to continue over the next 6-12 months. Bottom Line: The worst of the 2020 collapse in global inflation is over; economic growth is starting to rebound, monetary and fiscal policies are highly stimulative, commodity prices are rising and the US dollar is losing some steam. This boosts the investment case for developed market inflation-linked bonds, which appear cheap on our models on a breakeven basis versus nominal government debt. Adding Inflation-Linked Bonds To Our Model Bond Portfolio Our model bond portfolio framework is how we translate our main global fixed income strategic themes into actual investment recommendations. We apply specific weightings to government bond and spread product allocations within a fully invested hypothetical portfolio with a custom benchmark index (which is essentially the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate with additional allocations to high-yield and emerging market corporates). We had not included inflation-linked bonds in the model portfolio, as we have always maintained a focus on the larger and more liquid parts of the developed market fixed income universe. We chose to express views on inflation expectations through duration or yield curve positioning, under the assumption that wider breakevens correlate to higher bond yields and/or steeper yield curves. Chart 8Global Inflation Breakevens Are Too Low We now are of the view that inflation-linked bonds should be included in our model portfolio investment universe, but on an “opportunistic” basis. In other words, we are not adding linkers to the custom benchmark index. Instead, we will be using potential allocations to inflation-linked bonds as another way to play for periods of rising inflation expectations beyond recommended duration and curve tilts in the model portfolio – particularly now that we have valuation models for inflation breakevens in almost all countries in the portfolio (the US, UK, Japan, Germany, Italy, France, Canada and Australia). Based on the output of our fundamental fair value framework for 10-year inflation breakevens, inflation protection looks “cheap” in all countries where we have valuation models except the UK (Chart 8). Charts with the details of each country’s 10-year inflation breakeven model can be found in the Appendix on pages 11-14. The inputs to the model are the same for each country: a) the 5-year moving average of headline CPI, representing the medium-term trend that anchors inflation expectations; and b) the annual percentage change in the Brent oil price in local currency terms, which creates deviations from the trend to account for moves in oil and currencies. For all countries excluding the UK, breakevens are below fair value because of the collapse in oil prices earlier this year. Inflation protection looks “cheap” in all countries where we have valuation models except the UK. The UK is the one market that does not appear cheap in our framework, with breakevens very close to both fair value and the medium-term trend in realized inflation. Those relatively high breakevens are also a reflection of the very low real bond yields for UK index-linked Gilts. Chart 9Linkers Offer Better Value In The US & Euro Area Than The UK For the past several years, UK real yields have traded well below measures of equilibrium real interest rates like the New York Fed’s estimates of “r-star”. This differs from real yields for US TIPS or French OATis, which trade roughly in line with the r-star estimates for the US and euro area (Chart 9). We suspect that is because of the chronic demand/supply mismatch for UK inflation-linked bonds, which are always in high demand from UK pension funds who need real assets for asset/liability management and regulatory purposes. So based on the output from the fair value models, inflation-linked bonds look most attractive on a breakeven basis in Italy, Canada, the US, Japan, Germany and France. From this list, we are choosing to add recommended positions in the US, Italy and Canada only. For Germany and France, we are already very underweight both countries in the model portfolio, so it is difficult to make a meaningful switch out of nominal bonds into linkers. For Japan, the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy, which caps the level of 10-year bond yields near 0%, makes us reluctant to recommend any breakeven widening positions. The changes to the model bond portfolio can be found in the tables on pages 15-16. Bottom Line: Starting this week, we are permanently adding inflation-linked bonds as a “discretionary” allocation option in our model bond portfolio framework. We begin with allocations to linkers in the US, Italy and Canada. Tactical Trade Overlay 2.0, Starting With Inflation-Linked Bonds This week, we are introducing a remodeled version of our Tactical Trade Overlay, which we put on hiatus a few months ago because of “mission creep”. Many of our recommendations were being held too long to be truly considered tactical, or short-term, in nature, thus defying the original purpose of the Overlay. This week, we are introducing a remodeled version of our Tactical Trade Overlay, which we put on hiatus a few months ago because of “mission creep”. All trades in the new Overlay will have a shorter term investment horizon of six months or less. All recommended trades will be implemented with specific securities, rather than just using generic Bloomberg tickers or bond indices. This will allow for a more transparent process where clients can “follow along” with the performance of our trades. Chart 10Inflation-Linked Bonds Have A Duration To Real Yields, Unlike Nominals To begin, we are putting three inflation-linked bond trades into our new Tactical Trade Overlay, positioning for wider 10-year breakevens in the US, Italy and Canada. All trades will be implemented using a long position in an inflation-linked bond and a short position in the government bond futures contract for each country. We are using futures rather than a short position in a cash government bond for the sake of simplicity, both for implementing the trade and measuring returns. The new trades will be implemented on a duration-matched basis. This means only selling enough of the 10-year bond futures to hedge against any directional move in the yield of the long 10-year inflation-linked bond. A straight comparison of the duration of linkers to futures cannot be made, since inflation-linked bonds have a duration to real yields while futures (and cash government bonds) have a duration to nominal yields. The durations for inflation-linked bonds are always higher than those of nominals (Chart 10), thus the index-linked durations must be adjusted by the beta of changes in real yields to changes in nominal bond yields. To determine the correct duration adjustment, we use betas taken from rolling three-year regressions of monthly changes of 10-year inflation-linked yields on changes in 10-year nominal government yields, using generic Bloomberg tickers. The common convention is to simply apply a yield beta of 0.5 for all inflation-linked bonds (this is the default setting on Bloomberg valuation tools). We think having a variable yield beta is a more accurate way to hedge out the directional risk in each trade from shifts in real bond yields. Chart 11Yield Betas For Inflation-Linked Bonds Vary Across Countries The current yield betas for all eight countries where we have inflation breakeven fair value models are shown in Chart 11 – it is clear from the chart that using a constant yield beta of 0.5 across countries is not accurate, as they vary widely across countries. Multiplying the duration of the actual inflation-linked bond used in our breakeven trades by our rolling yield beta creates a “nominal” duration measure that can then be compared to the duration on the short leg of the breakeven trade. For futures, we use the empirical duration estimates from Bloomberg using the “FRSK” function. The ratio of the beta-adjusted linker duration to the empirical duration of the bond futures creates the hedge ratio that we will use when measuring the returns of this now “risk-matched” breakeven trade. The actual bonds, futures contracts and hedge ratios for all of our new breakeven trades can all be found in the table on page 18, with initial entry prices for all securities. We will begin to monitor the trade returns in next week’s report. Bottom Line: We are reviving our Tactical Trade Overlay with inflation-linked bond breakeven trades in the US, Italy and Canada. Appendix: 10-Year Inflation Break Even Model Chart 12Our US 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 13Our UK 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 14Our France 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 15Our Italy 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 16Our Japan 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 17Our Germany 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 18Our Canada 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 19Our Australia 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Vol, High Uncertainty Keeps Oil-Price Rally On Tenterhooks", dated June 18, 2020, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

We are compelled to downgrade banks and investment banks to neutral in advance of the release of the Fed’s stress tests this Thursday. This downgrade also pushes the financials sector overweighting to neutral. Our worry is centered on a possible dividend cut/suspension given the lack of confidence the Fed has with regard to the economic recovery owing to COVID-19. Even if the Fed strikes a more balanced note on the banks’ cash buffers and capitalization and does not force them the chop their dividend payouts (bottom panel), we would still want to be on the sidelines at least until the election uncertainty lifts in November. A blue sweep would, at the margin, be negative for the banking sector (second panel). Moreover, following a near month-long rebound from the early May trough, banks have not been responsive to the steepening yield curve and this is disconcerting (third panel). Moreover, following a near month-long rebound from the early May trough, banks have not been responsive to the steepening yield curve and this is disconcerting (middle panel). Bottom Line: Downgrade the S&P banks and S&P investment banks indexes to neutral, which also pushes the S&P financials sector to a benchmark allocation. Please look forward to reading our upcoming Monday June 29 Weekly Report for a more detailed analysis on these two financials subgroups.      

Highlights Treasuries: Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark on a 6-12 month horizon, but continue to hold tactical overlay positions that will profit from modestly higher bond yields: Overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, hold duration-neutral nominal curve steepeners, hold real yield curve steepeners. IG Tech: Given our positive outlook for investment grade corporate bond spreads, the Technology sector’s high credit rating and defensive characteristics make it decidedly un-compelling. However, Tech spreads are attractive compared to other A-rated corporate bonds. HY Tech: We want to focus our high-yield allocation on defensive sectors where a large proportion of issuers are able to benefit from Fed support. The high-yield Technology sector checks both of those boxes and offers attractive risk-adjusted compensation to boot. Feature Chart 1Three Treasury Trades As we have previously written, bond yields should move modestly higher over the course of the summer as the US economy re-opens.1 However, there are enough potential medium-term pitfalls related to US politics and COVID transmission that we aren’t yet comfortable with below-benchmark portfolio duration. Instead, we recommend that investors keep portfolio duration close to benchmark on a 6-12 month horizon, but add three tactical overlay positions that will profit from higher bond yields: Overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries Duration-neutral nominal Treasury curve steepeners Real yield curve steepeners All three of these positions have performed well during the past couple of months (Chart 1), and in the first section of this report we assess whether they have further to run. The remaining two sections of this week’s report consider the outlooks for investment grade and high-yield Technology bonds, respectively. Three Trades To Profit From Higher Yields 1) Overweight TIPS Versus Nominals Chart 2Adaptive Expectations Model TIPS breakeven inflation rates have moved up considerably since mid-March. Back then, the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate troughed at 0.50%. It currently sits at 1.31%. Despite the large move, TIPS breakeven inflation rates still have a considerable amount of upside. One way to assess how much is through the lens of our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 2).2 This model considers several different measures of inflation expectations (based on realized CPI inflation and surveys) and uses the difference between those measures of inflation expectations and the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate to forecast the future 12-month change in the 10-year TIPS breakeven. At present, the model forecasts that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate will rise 23 bps during the next 12 months, bringing it to 1.54%. It’s important to note that our model is biased towards measures of longer-run inflation expectations. As a result, it can be surprised from time to time by large fluctuations in drivers of short-term inflation expectations, like the oil price. This year’s massive drop in oil – and concurrent decline in headline inflation – were the main factors that caused the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate to fall so far below our model’s fair value. However, as we discussed in last week’s report, the oil price looks to have troughed and there is preliminary evidence that we might also be past the lowest point for headline CPI.3 Profit from rising bond yields by entering a duration-neutral yield curve steepener. We see TIPS continuing to outperform nominal Treasuries over both short- and long-run horizons. 2) Duration-Neutral Yield Curve Steepeners Chart 3Stick With Steepeners Another way to profit from rising bond yields without taking a large duration bet is via a duration-neutral yield curve steepener. One example would be a long position in the 5-year note and a short position in a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Alternatively, you could use the 2-year note and 30-year bond as the two legs of the barbell. These sorts of duration-matched trades where you take a long position in a bullet maturity near the middle of the curve and go short the wings are designed to perform well in periods of yield curve steepening.4  In the current environment, where dovish Fed guidance has dampened volatility at the front-end of the yield curve, any bond sell-off will be felt disproportionately at the long-end, leading to a steeper curve. The only problem with this proposed trade is that it is no longer cheap. The spread between the 5-year bullet and 2/10 barbell is -6 bps and the spread relative to the 2/30 barbell is -3 bps (Chart 3). What’s more, the 5-year bullet trades expensive relative to the 2/10 and 2/30 barbells, according to our fair value models (Chart 3, bottom panel). However, for the time being we are inclined to overlook stretched valuations. The 5-year bullet does appear expensive but it has been more expensive in the past, most notably during the last zero-lower-bound episode from 2010 to 2013. Similar to then, the market is now priced for an extended period of a zero fed funds rate. We would not be surprised to see bullets become much more expensive in that sort of environment, and possibly even return to extended 2010-2013 valuations.   We recommend holding onto duration-neutral yield curve steepeners, despite unattractive valuations. Specifically, we favor going long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. 3) Real Yield Curve Steepeners Chart 4Higher Inflation Means Steeper Real Yield Curve The final position we recommend is a steepener along the real yield curve. We first recommended this trade on April 28 when a plunge in oil (and spike in deflationary sentiment) caused the real 2-year yield to jump to 0.28% compared to a real 10-year yield of -0.70%.5 Since then, the real 2-year yield has collapsed to -1% compared to a real 10-year yield of -0.87%. Although the real 2-year/10-year slope is once again positive, it has typically been higher during the past few years (Chart 4). We therefore expect further steepening as long as the oil price and headline inflation continue to recover from April’s lows. Much like during the 2008/09 financial crisis, the combination of the Fed’s zero-lower-bound forward guidance and a massive drop in both oil and headline inflation caused short-dated real yields to jump. Subsequently, this led to a massive steepening of the real yield curve, once the oil price and headline inflation started to recover. We believe that same dynamic is playing out today. Investors should continue to hold real yield curve steepeners, at least until rebounding oil and headline CPI return short-dated inflation expectations to more reasonable levels. Investment Grade Tech Risk Profile Technology accounts for 9% of the overall Bloomberg Barclays investment grade corporate index, which makes it the second biggest industry group, after Banking. Its large index weight is due to the presence of three tech giants: Microsoft (Aaa-rated), Apple (Aa-rated) and Oracle (A-rated) which, combined, constitute 38% of the Tech sector.  Investment grade Technology is a highly defensive corporate bond sector. In sharp contrast with the equity market, Technology is a highly defensive corporate bond sector. That is, it tends to outperform the overall corporate bond index during periods of spread widening and underperform during periods of spread tightening. This largely comes down to the fact that Tech has a higher credit rating than the overall corporate index. Twenty five percent of the Tech sector’s market cap carries a Aaa or Aa rating compared to just 9% for the overall index (Chart 5). Further, of the high-flying FAANG stocks that garner a lot of attention from equity analysts, only Apple is a significant presence in the Technology bond index.6 Chart 5Investment Grade Credit Rating Distributions* Chart 6IG Technology Risk ##br##Profile The Tech sector’s defensive nature is confirmed by looking at its duration-times-spread (DTS) ratio and historical excess returns (Chart 6).7 The sector’s DTS ratio is consistently below 1.0, and its excess returns show a clear pattern of outperformance during periods of spread widening and underperformance during periods of spread tightening. Valuation In terms of valuation, although the Tech sector does not offer a spread advantage over the corporate index – which should be expected given its higher credit rating – we find that it trades cheap relative to its comparable credit tier (Table 1). Tech offers an option-adjusted spread of 115 bps versus 111 bps for the A-rated corporate index, and the sector still appears attractive after controlling for duration differences by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread. In absolute terms, Tech sector spreads are just above their median since 2010. The A-rated corporate index spread currently sits right on top of its post-2010 median. Table 1IG Technology Valuation Balance Sheet Health Chart 7IG Technology Debt Growth The Technology sector added a large amount of debt during the last recovery. The par value of the Tech index’s outstanding debt has grown 5.2 times since 2010 compared to 2.4 times for the benchmark. As a result, Tech’s weight in the corporate index has more than doubled, from 4% to 9% (Chart 7). However, earnings have done a pretty good job of keeping pace with the large increase in debt. The market cap-weighted net debt-to-EBITDA ratio for the investment grade Tech index is only 2.4, and the sector’s average credit rating has been stable since 2010. At the individual issuer level, there are 58 issuers in the Tech index and only 4 currently have a negative ratings outlook from Moody’s (Appendix B). What’s more, of the 16 Tech sector ratings that Moody’s has reviewed this year, 12 have been affirmed with a stable outlook, 1 was assigned a positive outlook and only 3 were assigned negative outlooks. Macro Considerations Chart 8Technology Sector Macro Drivers The Tech sector can be split into three major segments that have distinct macro drivers: Software (26% of Tech index market cap, includes Microsoft and Oracle) Hardware (29% of Tech index market cap, includes Apple, IBM and Dell) Semiconductors (24% of Tech index market cap, includes Intel and Avago Technologies) Software investment has been in a structural bull market for many years, and should remain resilient during the COVID recession as demand for remote working solutions increases. While we only have data through the end of March, software investment did not see the same collapse as other sectors during the first quarter (Chart 8). The Hardware and Semiconductor segments are more cyclical and geared toward manufacturing. As such, their macro outlooks were already challenged pre-COVID, due to the US/China trade war and manufacturing downturn of 2019. Both US computer exports and global semiconductor sales were showing signs of life near the end of last year, but were decimated when the pandemic struck in 2020 (Chart 8, panels 3 & 4). A revival in this space is contingent upon continued gradual re-opening and a return to economic growth. More optimistically, US consumer spending on personal computers and peripheral equipment has not fallen as much as broad consumer spending during the past few months (Chart 8, bottom panel). In the long-run, the 5G smartphone rollout is a significant structural tailwind for both semiconductor issuers and Apple. Meanwhile, the threat of significant regulatory crackdown on Tech firms remains a long-run risk. Our sense is that any push toward stricter regulations won’t have that much impact on Technology bond returns. This is because the subjects of most lawmaker scrutiny – Facebook, Amazon and Google – are largely absent from the Bloomberg Barclays Tech index. Investment Conclusions We expect that investment grade corporate bond spreads will tighten during the next 6-12 months. Against this positive back-drop, investors should focus exposure on cyclical (lower-rated) sectors that offer greater expected returns. With that in mind, the Tech sector’s high credit rating and defensive characteristics make it decidedly un-compelling. However, Tech does offer a slight spread advantage compared to other A-rated bonds and the macro back-drop is reasonably supportive. We would therefore recommend Tech bonds to investors looking for some A-rated corporate bond exposure. But in general, we prefer the greater spreads on offer from sectors that occupy the high-quality Baa space, such as subordinate bank debt.8 High-Yield Tech Risk Profile High-Yield Technology’s credit rating profile is similar to that of the overall benchmark, but with a slightly larger presence of low-rated (Caa & below) issuers (Chart 9). The largest issuers in the space are Dell (5.7% of Tech index market cap, Ba-rated), MSCI Inc. (5.1% of Tech index market cap, Ba-rated, see copyright declaration) and CommScope (8.1% of Tech index market cap, B-rated). High-yield Tech recently transitioned from being a cyclical sector to a defensive one. Interestingly, the high-yield Tech sector recently transitioned from being a cyclical sector to a defensive one. The sector behaved cyclically during the 2008 recession, underperforming the index when spreads widened and outperforming when they tightened. But Tech then outperformed the High-Yield index during the spread widening episodes of 2015 and 2020. Based on the sector’s low DTS ratio, this defensive behavior should persist for the next 12 months (Chart 10). Chart 9High-Yield Credit Rating Distributions* Chart 10HY Technology Risk Profile Valuation The High-Yield Technology option-adjusted spread (OAS) is significantly lower than the average OAS for the benchmark High-Yield index. However, it offers a spread premium compared to other Ba-rated issuers (Table 2). Adjusting for duration differences by looking at the 12-month breakeven spread makes high-yield Tech look significantly more attractive. The high-yield Tech spread would have to widen by 146 bps for the sector to underperform duration-matched Treasuries during the next 12 months. This compares to 96 bps for other Ba-rated issuers and 152 bps for the overall junk index. Table 2HY Technology Valuation It is apparent that the Tech sector’s low average duration (Chart 10, bottom panel) is a major reason for its relatively tight OAS. On a risk-adjusted basis, high-yield Tech valuation actually appears quite compelling, with a 12-month breakeven spread only 6 bps below that of the overall index. Balance Sheet Health Chart 11HY Technology Debt Growth The amount of outstanding high-yield Technology debt has grown a bit more rapidly than overall junk index debt since 2010 (Chart 11). As a result, Technology’s weight in the index has increased from 5% in 2010 to 6% today. At the issuer level, the Tech sector should benefit from having a large number of issuers that will be able to take advantage of the Fed’s Main Street Lending facilities. To be eligible for the Main Street facilities, issuers must have less than 15000 employees or less than $5 billion in 2019 revenue. Also, the issuers must be able to keep their Debt-to-EBITDA ratios below 6.0, including any new debt added through the Main Street programs. Of the 43 high-yield Tech issuers with available data, we estimate that 30 are eligible to receive support from the Main Street facilities (Appendix C). This even includes 11 out of the 16 B-rated issuers. Typically, we don’t expect that many B-rated issuers will be eligible for the Main Street facilities, which makes this result encouraging for Tech sector spreads. Investment Conclusions We recommend an overweight allocation to high-yield Technology bonds. As we wrote last week, high-yield spreads appear too tight if we ignore the impact of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities and consider only the fundamental credit back-drop.9 With that in mind, we want to focus our high-yield allocation on defensive sectors where a large proportion of issuers able to benefit from Fed support. The Technology sector checks both of those boxes and offers attractive risk-adjusted compensation to boot. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table 3Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Appendix B Table 4Investment Grade Technology Issuers Appendix C Table 5High-Yield Technology Issuers   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bonds Vulnerable As North America Re-Opens”, dated May 26, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For more details on our Adaptive Expectations Model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For an explanation of why this works please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Of the other FAANG stocks: Google accounts for just 0.5% of Tech bond sector market cap, Facebook has close to no debt, Amazon is included in the Consumer Cyclical corporate bond index and Netflix is included in the Media: Entertainment sector of the High-Yield index. 7 Duration-Times-Spread (DTS) is a simple measure that is highly correlated with excess return volatility for corporate bonds. The DTS ratio is the ratio of a sector’s DTS to that of the benchmark index. It can be thought of like the beta of a stock. A DTS ratio above 1.0 signals that the sector is cyclical (or “high beta”), a DTS ratio below 1.0 signals that the sector is defensive or (“low beta”). For more details on the DTS measure please see: Arik Ben Dor, Lev Dynkin, Jay Hyman, Patrick Houweling, Erik van Leeuwen & Olaf Penninga, “DTS (Duration-Times-Spread)”, Journal of Portfolio Management 33(2), January 2007. 8 For more details on our recommendation to overweight subordinate bank bonds please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification