Japan

Aspectos destacados El mundo sigue inmerso en una recesión manufacturera. Por lo tanto, aún es demasiado pronto para iniciar nuevas operaciones pro-cíclicas. Enfóquese en los cruces en lugar de apuestas directas contra el dólar estadounidense. Dos nuevas ideas de operación: vender EUR/NOK y comprar GBP/JPY. También considere vender la relación oro/plata. Destacado Los mercados de divisas tienden a entrar y salir de varios regímenes. Esto significa que, para ser un gestor de FX eficaz, debe ser extremadamente flexible. Por ejemplo, los diferenciales de tasas de interés pueden dominar los movimientos de FX durante un período determinado, pivotando su trabajo hacia la monitorización de los bancos centrales. Otras veces, los flujos dominan, quizás incluso los flujos de acciones, como cuando se desarrolla una tecnología disruptiva en un mercado específico. La sobresaliente actuación de las acciones estadounidenses, concretamente las de tecnología, es un buen ejemplo. Las dinámicas de balanza de pagos suelen importar sobre todo en puntos de inflexión críticos, por lo que no son muy útiles como indicadores de timing. El privilegio exorbitante del dólar estadounidense que discutimos hace dos semanas también es un ejemplo. Pero, más a menudo que no, ser capaz de identificar si el clima de inversión está a punto de volverse más hostil o no podría ser la diferencia clave entre ser un gestor de FX exitoso o un fósil. No han faltado noticias para que los inversores las digieran en los últimos días, desde el lío del Brexit, hasta la Fed, los ataques con drones en Arabia Saudita y, finalmente, el posible impeachment del presidente de EE. UU., Donald Trump. Pero lo más desconcertante (y quizás lo más importante) ha sido la lectura flash del PMI manufacturero alemán para el mes de septiembre de 41.4, la más baja en más de una década (Gráfico I-1). Si el país con la “moneda más barata” no puede salir de una recesión manufacturera, entonces el mensaje para la periferia es claramente que tienen un problema inminente. En resumen, nuestra afirmación de que el euro estaba cerca de un mínimo podría estar fuera de juego por unos meses, con base en la última publicación de datos manufactureros (Gráfico I-2). Gráfico I-1 Una recesión manufacturera en la zona euro Una recesión manufacturera en la zona euro Una recesión manufacturera en la zona euro Gráfico I-2 El euro necesita un crecimiento más fuerte El euro necesita un crecimiento más fuerte El euro necesita un crecimiento más fuerte ¿Qué régimen de divisas? Gráfico I-3 Una recesión será alcista para el dólar Algunas ideas de trading Algunas ideas de trading El comportamiento del dólar desde la inversión de la curva de rendimientos el 2/10 es instructivo. Hasta ahora, estamos siguiendo tanto las hojas de ruta de 2005 como de 1998, lo que significa que la ventana para un optimismo cauteloso sobre los activos de riesgo aún podría materializarse (Gráfico I-3). Específicamente, el dólar tiende a apreciarse durante las recesiones, pero la ventana antes de que la tendencia alcista del dólar se afiance puede ser bastante larga. En 2006 y 1998, el dólar finalmente se catapultó al alza, pero tardó más de 12 meses. Por lo tanto, disponer de un modelo de probabilidad de recesión y su timing preciso es crucial para la estrategia. Históricamente, los flujos domésticos han sido un indicador muy puntual, ya que la repatriación por parte de residentes ocurre durante episodios de fuga masiva de capitales. En 2005, los individuos domésticos estaban desplegando fondos fuera de EE. UU., lo que sugería paciencia antes de posicionarse por la fortaleza del dólar. Esto tenía sentido, ya que el retorno del capital era mayor fuera de EE. UU. con el auge de los mercados emergentes y de las materias primas en pleno apogeo. La mayoría de las veces, los mercados de FX tienden a favorecer las regiones con el mayor retorno sobre el capital. Estas tienden a ser las más difíciles de apostar en contra, pero potencialmente el mayor factor sorpresa en los puntos de inflexión. Si los datos económicos continúan deteriorándose debido a factores endógenos mucho mayores, claramente está justificada una estrategia defensiva. Una forma de saberlo será una divergencia emergente entre nuestros indicadores líderes y los datos subyacentes reales, como está ocurriendo hasta ahora en septiembre. Por otro lado, cualquier espectro de noticias positivas podría avivar sectores, monedas y países que han soportado el peso de la desaceleración. Ambos son apuestas altamente arriesgadas. Por ahora, preferimos centrarnos en los cruces en lugar de apuestas directas contra el dólar estadounidense. Vender EUR/NOK A veces, las mejores ideas son las más sencillas. El Norges Bank es el banco central más hawkish del G-10, mientras que el Banco Central Europeo reinició el QE en su última reunión. Esto es un catalizador poderoso para una operación corta en EUR/NOK: El dólar tiende a apreciarse durante las recesiones, pero la ventana antes de que la tendencia alcista del dólar se afiance puede ser bastante larga. La desaceleración en la zona del euro se ha concentrado en el sector manufacturero, pero el impulso deflacionario está empezando a trasladarse a otras partes de la economía. El IPC subyacente general de la zona del euro sigue cayendo, lo que históricamente ha sido un mal presagio para el euro (Gráfico I-4). Esperamos que las expectativas de inflación de la zona euro eventualmente aumenten, en parte ayudadas por la recuperación de los precios del petróleo (Gráfico I-5), pero esto también beneficiará a la corona noruega. EUR/NOK ha seguido históricamente el desempeño relativo de los precios de las acciones entre Europa y Noruega, pero se abrió una brecha enorme en 2018 (Gráfico I-6). Esta divergencia es insostenible. En resumen, es una apuesta sobre los campos petrolíferos en Noruega frente a los bancos europeos. La aplicación de tramos en las reservas por parte del BCE podría impedir que los bancos de la zona del euro coqueteen con el abismo, pero a menos que la recesión manufacturera termine pronto y las empresas empiecen a pedir prestado para invertir, los bancos seguirán teniendo un problema de demanda. Mientras tanto, el estallido de tensión en Oriente Medio significa que los precios del petróleo se mantendrán al alza en el corto plazo. Esto debería favorecer a las acciones noruegas sobre las de la zona del euro, y ser negativo para EUR/NOK (Gráfico I-7). Los bunds alemanes a 10 años rinden -0.57%, mientras que el diferencial de rendimiento con los bonos noruegos ofrece un carry positivo de 1.8%, a pesar de las preocupaciones por la liquidez. En su última reunión de política, el gobernador del banco central Øystein Olsen destacó que Noruega tenía mucho más margen fiscal para maniobrar en caso de una desaceleración, lo que significa que la oferta de deuda noruega podría aumentar, aliviando la prima de liquidez. Gráfico I-4 La deflación sigue predominando en la zona euro La deflación sigue predominando en la zona euro La deflación sigue predominando en la zona euro Gráfico I-5 Un aumento de los precios del petróleo ayudará a las expectativas de inflación Un aumento en los precios del petróleo contribuirá a elevar las expectativas de inflación. Un aumento en los precios del petróleo contribuirá a elevar las expectativas de inflación. Gráfico I-6 Acciones y divisas: una divergencia insostenible Acciones y divisas: una divergencia insostenible Acciones y divisas: una divergencia insostenible Gráfico I-7 Un petróleo más alto es negativo ##br##para EUR/NOK Un aumento del precio del petróleo es negativo para EUR/NOK Un aumento del precio del petróleo es negativo para EUR/NOK Conclusión: Vender EUR/NOK en 9.937. Comprar GBP/JPY El Informe especial de la semana pasada defendió una recuperación cíclica en el Reino Unido, aunque los factores estructurales siguen siendo un viento en contra. Esta semana, volvemos a intentar comprar cable frente al yen: Lo más importante es que el Banco de Inglaterra se mantuvo inmóvil en su última reunión de política, mientras que el Banco de Japón probablemente introducirá más estímulos o una orientación más contundente. Los diferenciales de tasas de interés reales favorecen una libra más fuerte. Lo más importante es que el Banco de Inglaterra se mantuvo inmóvil en su última reunión de política, mientras que el Banco de Japón probablemente introducirá más estímulos o una orientación más contundente (Gráfico I-8). Gráfico i-8 Es probable un rebote táctico en GBP/JPY Es probable un rebote táctico en el par GBP/JPY Es probable un rebote táctico en el par GBP/JPY Gráfico I-9 El beneficio de una libra más débil El Beneficio De Una Libra Más Débil El Beneficio De Una Libra Más Débil Los especuladores están muy cortos con la libra, mientras que han estado cubriendo sus apuestas cortas en el yen, a medida que el entorno de inversión se ha vuelto más incierto. La caída de la libra debería comenzar a mejorar la dinámica de balanza de pagos del Reino Unido en relación con Japón (Gráfico I-9). Conclusión: Comprar GBP/JPY en 132.6. Pensamientos finales Seguimos monitorizando varios indicadores para el dólar, desde diferenciales de tasas de interés, dinámicas de balanza de pagos, valoraciones, flujos de cartera y posicionamiento, y ninguno de ellos está enviando una señal alcista en este momento. El crecimiento global sigue estancado, lo que ha potenciado a los alcistas del dólar. Sin embargo, las apuestas largas por el dólar siguen siendo vulnerables si el crecimiento global se estabiliza. Nuestra estrategia es continuar centrándonos en los cruces hasta que emerja evidencia categórica de que el crecimiento global ha tocado fondo.  En nuestra cartera de trading, seguimos favoreciendo la NOK, SEK, las petromonedas y el AUD. Hasta ahora, estas operaciones se han ejecutado en los cruces para limitar el riesgo a la baja, en caso de que nuestra visión sobre el dólar estuviera fuera de lugar. Tenemos la intención de empezar a realizar apuestas directas en dólares una vez que emerja evidencia de que el crecimiento global ha tocado fondo y el mundo ha evitado una recesión.   Chester Ntonifor, Estratega de Divisas chestern@bcaresearch.com Divisas Dólar estadounidense Gráfico II-1 Técnicas del USD 1 Análisis técnicos USD 1 Análisis técnicos USD 1 Gráfico II-2 Técnicas del USD 2 Indicadores técnicos USD 2 Indicadores técnicos USD 2 Los datos recientes en EE. UU. han sido relativamente sólidos: El PMI manufacturero flash de Markit se recuperó a 51 en septiembre desde 50.3. El PMI de servicios flash aumentó a 50.9. El índice de actividad nacional del Chicago Fed aumentó a 0.1 desde -0.4 en agosto. El índice manufacturero del Richmond Fed cayó a -9 en septiembre desde 1. La confianza del consumidor del Conference Board cayó a 125.1 en septiembre desde 135.1. En el frente inmobiliario, los precios de la vivienda crecieron 0.4% mes a mes en julio. Las solicitudes de hipoteca disminuyeron 10% en la semana terminada el 20 de septiembre, pero las ventas de viviendas nuevas aumentaron 7% mes a mes en agosto. Las solicitudes iniciales de subsidio por desempleo aumentaron a 213,000 para la semana terminada el 20 de septiembre. El crecimiento del PIB anualizado se mantuvo sin cambios en 2% trimestre a trimestre en el segundo trimestre. El déficit comercial de bienes se mantuvo prácticamente sin cambios en $72.8 mil millones. El PCE interanual y subyacente aumentaron a 2.4% y 1.9% trimestre a trimestre, respectivamente, en el segundo trimestre. El índice DXY se apreció 0.6% esta semana. Los datos recientes de EE. UU. se han mantenido bastante bien en comparación con el resto del mundo. Las posiciones especulativas netas en el billete verde siguen elevadas debido a la relativa fortaleza de EE. UU. Si bien vemos resiliencia del dólar en el corto plazo, la disminución de las compras netas extranjeras de valores estadounidenses, el acortamiento de los diferenciales de tasas de interés y la caída de la relación bono/oro sugieren que la senda de menor resistencia para el dólar es a la baja. Enlaces de informes: Preservando capital durante puntos de motín - 6 de septiembre de 2019 ¿Ha cambiado el panorama de las divisas? - 16 de agosto de 2019 USD/CNY y turbulencia del mercado - 9 de agosto de 2019 El euro Gráfico II-3 Técnicas del EUR 1 Aspectos técnicos del EUR 1 Aspectos técnicos del EUR 1 Gráfico II-4 Técnicas del EUR 2 EUR Técnicos 2 EUR Técnicos 2 Los datos recientes en la zona del euro continúan deteriorándose: Los PMIs flash de fabricación y servicios de Markit para la zona del euro cayeron a 45.6 y 52, respectivamente, en septiembre. En Francia, el PMI manufacturero flash de Markit cayó a 50.3; el PMI de servicios disminuyó a 51.6. En Alemania, el PMI manufacturero se desplomó a 41.4; el PMI de servicios cayó a 52.5. La valoración actual del IFO alemán aumentó a 98.5 en septiembre. Sin embargo, las expectativas del IFO cayeron a 90.8. La oferta monetaria (M3) creció 5.7% interanual en agosto. La confianza del consumidor alemán Gfk aumentó a 9.9 en octubre. El EUR/USD cayó 0.8% esta semana. Los datos recientes de la zona del euro, desgraciadamente, no han mostrado señales de que el crecimiento global esté tocando fondo. El PMI manufacturero en Alemania está ahora en su nivel más bajo desde la Gran Crisis Financiera. Una preocupación importante para los inversores es que la débil actividad en manufactura puede ya haber comenzado a infiltrarse en los sectores de servicios. Dicho esto, los PMIs de servicios en las principales economías, aunque en descenso, todavía se mantienen en territorio expansivo por encima de 50. Enlaces de informes: Batalla de los bancos centrales - 21 de junio de 2019 EUR/USD y la tasa de interés neutral - 14 de junio de 2019 Tomar algo de seguro - 3 de mayo de 2019 Yen japonés Gráfico II-5 Técnicas del JPY 1 Análisis técnico del JPY 1 Análisis técnico del JPY 1 Gráfico II-6 Técnicas del JPY 2 Indicadores técnicos del JPY 2 Indicadores técnicos del JPY 2 Los datos recientes en Japón han sido negativos: La inflación general nacional cayó de 0.5% interanual a 0.3% interanual en agosto. La inflación subyacente se mantuvo sin cambios en 0.6% interanual. El PMI manufacturero flash de Markit cayó a 48.9 en septiembre desde 49.3. El PMI de servicios también cayó a 52.8 desde 53.3. El índice líder y el índice coincidente se mantuvieron prácticamente sin cambios en 93.7 y 99.7, respectivamente, en julio.  El USD/JPY se ha mantenido plano esta semana. Las exportaciones japonesas han sido débiles, lastradas por la guerra comercial global y la desaceleración manufacturera. Sin embargo, según el BoJ, la demanda interna se ha mantenido firme y la inversión en capital fijo continúa aumentando. Además, el aumento del impuesto al consumo el próximo mes probablemente tendrá un impacto marginal comparado con aumentos de impuestos anteriores. En un discurso esta semana, el gobernador del BoJ, Haruhiko Kuroda, enfatizó que el banco central aflojará sin dudar si la economía pierde impulso. Enlaces de informes: ¿Ha cambiado el panorama de las divisas? - 16 de agosto de 2019 Ajustes de cartera en un verano de negociación delgado - 5 de julio de 2019 Batalla de los bancos centrales - 21 de junio de 2019 Libra esterlina Gráfico II-7 Técnicas del GBP 1 Análisis técnico GBP 1 Análisis técnico GBP 1 Gráfico II-8 Técnicas del GBP 2 Análisis técnicos de GBP 2 Análisis técnicos de GBP 2 Hay pocos datos del Reino Unido esta semana: Las aprobaciones hipotecarias disminuyeron ligeramente a 42,576 en agosto desde 43,303 en julio. El GBP/USD cayó 1.4% esta semana. El primer ministro británico Boris Johnson ha perdido ahora su mayoría en Westminster tras importantes deserciones de los llamados rebeldes, por lo que otra elección es muy probable antes de fin de año. Además, un nuevo aplazamiento del Brexit es casi seguro. Hemos rebajado la probabilidad de un Brexit sin acuerdo. Mantenemos una visión positiva sobre la libra y esta semana estamos comprando GBP/JPY. Enlaces de informes: Reino Unido: ¿Desaceleración cíclica o malestar estructural? - 20 de septiembre de 2019 Batalla de los bancos centrales - 21 de junio de 2019 Una visión contraria sobre el dólar australiano - 24 de mayo de 2019 Dólar australiano Gráfico II-9 Técnicas del AUD 1 Análisis técnicos de AUD 1 Análisis técnicos de AUD 1 Gráfico II-10 Técnicas del AUD 2 Análisis técnicos del AUD 2 Análisis técnicos del AUD 2 Los datos recientes en Australia han sido mixtos: El PMI manufacturero preliminar commonwealth cayó a 49.4 en septiembre desde 50.9 en agosto. Por otro lado, el PMI de servicios se recuperó a 52.5 desde 49.1, volviendo a territorio expansivo por encima de 50. La confianza del consumidor aumentó a 110.1 desde 109.3 esta semana. El AUD/USD cayó 1% esta semana. El gobernador del Reserve Bank of Australia, Philip Lowe, comentó el martes que la economía australiana se está recuperando y se encuentra ahora en un “punto de inflexión suave”. Los recortes de tasas previos han permitido que los mercados inmobiliarios de ciudades grandes como Sídney y Melbourne recuperen cierta fuerza, pero probablemente tardarán más en transmitirse a toda la economía. En términos de política monetaria, el gobernador Lowe reiteró su compromiso de aflojar las condiciones monetarias cuando sea necesario, aunque no indicó un movimiento inminente para la próxima semana. Australia tiene una gran beta a los cambios globales como una economía pequeña y abierta. Si la recesión manufacturera global llega a su fin, los fundamentos positivos seguirán impulsando la economía australiana durante el resto del año y en 2020. Enlaces de informes: Una visión contraria sobre el dólar australiano - 24 de mayo de 2019 Cuidado con los rendimientos marginales decrecientes - 19 de abril de 2019 Aún no fuera de peligro - 5 de abril de 2019 Dólar neozelandés Gráfico II-11 Técnicas del NZD 1 Análisis técnico NZD 1 Análisis técnico NZD 1 Gráfico II-12 Técnicas del NZD 2 Análisis técnico del NZD 2 Análisis técnico del NZD 2 Los datos recientes en Nueva Zelanda han sido negativos: Las importaciones aumentaron NZ$30 millones hasta NZ$5.69 mil millones en agosto, mientras que las exportaciones cayeron NZ$830 millones hasta NZ$4.13 mil millones. El déficit comercial total se amplió de NZ$700 millones a NZ$1.57 mil millones. El NZD/USD se apreció 1% inicialmente, luego cayó tras la reunión de política del Reserve Bank of New Zealand, quedando plano esta semana. Como ampliamente se esperaba, el RBNZ mantuvo su tasa oficial de efectivo sin cambios en 1% este miércoles mientras señalaba que hay más margen para aliviar la política si es necesario en medio de una desaceleración global. El mercado actualmente está valorando una probabilidad del 80% de un recorte de tasas para la próxima reunión de política en noviembre, reflejando la débil confianza empresarial. Estamos jugando la debilidad del kiwi a través del dólar australiano y la corona sueca, que están 1.9% y 1.95% en el dinero, respectivamente. Enlaces de informes: USD/CNY y turbulencia del mercado - 9 de agosto de 2019 ¿Hacia dónde va el dólar estadounidense? - 7 de junio de 2019 Aún no fuera de peligro - 5 de abril de 2019 Dólar canadiense Gráfico II-13 Técnicas del CAD 1 Técnicas de CAD 1 Técnicas de CAD 1 Gráfico II-14 Técnicas del CAD 2 Técnicas CAD 2 Técnicas CAD 2 Los datos recientes en Canadá han sido resilientes: La confianza Bloomberg Nanos aumentó a 57.4 esta semana desde 56.7. Las ventas minoristas aumentaron 0.4% mes a mes en julio, por debajo de las expectativas de un crecimiento mensual de 0.6%. El USD/CAD se ha mantenido plano esta semana. Los precios del petróleo han vivido una montaña rusa este año. Desde el ataque con drones hace dos semanas, Arabia Saudita ha afirmado que se está recuperando más rápido de lo esperado, superando sus propias metas. Los precios spot del crudo Brent han caído 6% desde su pico del 16 de septiembre, mientras que los precios del Western Canada Select (WCS) han bajado 12.3%, lo que atenúa el potencial alcista del loonie. Enlaces de informes: Preservando capital durante puntos de motín - 6 de septiembre de 2019 Ajustes de cartera en un verano de negociación delgado - 5 de julio de 2019 Sobre el oro, el petróleo y las criptomonedas - 28 de junio de 2019 Franco suizo Gráfico II-15 Técnicas del CHF 1 Análisis técnicos del CHF 1 Análisis técnicos del CHF 1 Gráfico II-16 Técnicas del CHF 2 Indicadores técnicos del CHF 2 Indicadores técnicos del CHF 2 Los datos recientes en Suiza han sido mayormente negativos: La balanza comercial se redujo a CHF 1.2 mil millones en agosto desde CHF 2.6 mil millones en julio.  Las expectativas de la encuesta de Credit Suisse se situaron en -15.4 en septiembre, frente a la lectura anterior de -37.5 en agosto. El USD/CHF se ha mantenido plano esta semana. Como economía pequeña y abierta, Suiza pertenece a los países con la mayor proporción comercio exterior/PIB. La balanza comercial en agosto ha sido la más baja desde enero de 2018, con menores exportaciones de bienes principales, incluidos productos químicos y farmacéuticos. Entre los socios comerciales, las exportaciones a Alemania, Italia y Francia disminuyeron, reflejando la reciente desaceleración manufacturera en Europa. Dicho esto, seguimos siendo positivos sobre el franco suizo como refugio durante periodos de riesgo a la baja en medio de las incertidumbres de la guerra comercial, el caos del Brexit, las tensiones en Oriente Medio y, más recientemente, el lío del impeachment de Trump. Enlaces de informes: ¿Qué hacer con el franco suizo? - 17 de mayo de 2019 Cuidado con los rendimientos marginales decrecientes - 19 de abril de 2019 Balanza de pagos en el G10 - 15 de febrero de 2019 Corona noruega Gráfico II-17 Técnicas del NOK 1 NOK Análisis técnico 1 NOK Análisis técnico 1 Gráfico II-18 Técnicas del NOK 2 NOK Técnicos 2 NOK Técnicos 2 Hay escasos datos de Noruega esta semana: La tasa de desempleo aumentó a 3.8% en julio, 0.6 puntos porcentuales más que en abril, según la reciente Encuesta de Fuerza Laboral. El USD/NOK se apreció 0.5% esta semana. El Norges Bank, el único banco central hawkish entre el G-10, subió su tasa de interés en 25 puntos básicos hasta 1.5% la semana pasada. Desde septiembre pasado, el Norges Bank ha subido las tasas cuatro veces en total, resultando en un aumento de un punto porcentual en las tasas. El banco central declaró que “la economía noruega ha sido sólida; el empleo ha aumentado; la utilización de la capacidad parece estar algo por encima de un nivel normal; la inflación está cerca del objetivo.” Una tasa de interés más alta también ayudaría a frenar la subida vertiginosa de los precios de la vivienda y los niveles de deuda de los hogares. Además, el banco central rebajó su trayectoria proyectada para la corona, indicando que los factores que describió, incluida la actividad más débil en el sector petrolero, probablemente seguirían lastrando a la corona en los próximos años. Enlaces de informes: Ajustes de cartera en un verano de negociación delgado - 5 de julio de 2019 Sobre el oro, el petróleo y las criptomonedas - 28 de junio de 2019 Complacencia cambiaria en medio de un giro global hacia el dovish - 26 de abril de 2019 Corona sueca Gráfico II-19 Técnicas del SEK 1 Análisis técnico del SEK 1 Análisis técnico del SEK 1 Gráfico II-20 Técnicas del SEK 2 SEK Técnicos 2 SEK Técnicos 2 Los datos recientes en Suecia han sido negativos: La confianza del consumidor cayó a 90.6 en septiembre. El crecimiento anual del IPP cayó de 2% en julio a 1.4% en agosto. La balanza comercial cambió a un déficit de SEK 5.4 mil millones en agosto. USD/SEK se ha mantenido plano esta semana. Estamos monitorizando de cerca el comercio exterior sueco como un indicador líder del crecimiento global. La balanza comercial sueca ha pasado a déficit por primera vez este año. Sin embargo, en comparación con agosto pasado, el déficit se redujo en SEK 2.6 mil millones. En lo que va de año, el superávit comercial sueco ascendió a SEK 27 mil millones. Cabe destacar que el comercio de bienes con países no pertenecientes a la UE resultó en un superávit de SEK 6.6 mil millones, mientras que el comercio con la UE resultó en un déficit de SEK 12 mil millones. Enlaces de informes: ¿Hacia dónde va el dólar estadounidense? - 7 de junio de 2019 Balanza de pagos en el G10 - 15 de febrero de 2019 Una clasificación simple de atractivo para las divisas - 8 de febrero de 2019 Operaciones y previsiones Resumen de previsiones Cartera central Operaciones tácticas Órdenes límite Operaciones cerradas

Highlights The structural message for equities: prefer equities over bonds. As long as the global 10-year bond yield remains below 2 percent, the equity market’s rich valuation is underpinned, albeit the long-term return from equities is likely to be a feeble low single-digit. The structural message for bonds: overweight the higher yielding versus the lower yielding quality sovereigns, most notably overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. 10-year yields cannot rise much – maybe only 50-100 basis points – before the rise destabilises equity and other risk-asset valuations. But 10-year yields that are deeply in negative territory can fall even less. The structural message for currencies: tilt towards lower yielding currencies, with a preference for the yen. Once monetary policy is already ultra-accommodative, a central bank’s ability to devalue its currency becomes more and more constrained. Feature Japanification: Bring It On! I have always been bemused and perplexed by people using ‘Japanification’ as a pejorative for the European economy (Chart of the Week). In the west, the received wisdom is that Japan is a ‘basket case’, a fate to be avoided at all costs. Yet nothing could be further from the truth: Japan is, in many ways, an economic role model to which Europe and the rest of the western world should aspire. Chart of the WeekEmbrace 'Japanification' Over the past twenty years, Japan’s productivity growth has outperformed all the other major economies (Chart I-2). To be clear, this is based on real GDP per head of working age (15-64) population, the cohort of people who generate economic output. Still, some people counter that this definition flatters Japan’s productivity growth by omitting the significant number of over 65s who work, and that a fairer definition should divide by the total population. Yet even on this alternative definition, Japan has been doing just fine, performing better than France and broadly in line with Canada (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Japan Is Not A 'Basket Case' Chart I-3Japan Is Doing Just Fine Japan’s real output per head has improved while consumers have enjoyed genuine price stability (Chart I-4). Meaning zero inflation, and not the ‘fake price stability’ of 2 percent inflation that central banks are trying – and failing – to reach. ‘Japanification’ is a state that Europe should not eschew; it is a state that Europe should espouse. Moreover, contrary to what the Philips Curve would have you believe, the absence of inflation does not mean there is a reserve army of the unemployed. Japan’s unemployment rate, at 2.2 percent, is one of the lowest in the world. As is income inequality (Chart I-5). While life expectancy is one of the highest in the world. Chart I-4Japan Has Enjoyed Genuine ##br##Price Stability... Chart I-5...And The Absence Of Extreme Income Inequality This combination of rising productivity, genuine price stability, absence of extreme income inequality, and rising life expectancy means that, in Japan, living standards have been rising for the many, and not just for the few. In turn this has meant that while populist backlashes have erupted elsewhere in the world, Japan has remained a paragon of political stability. In all of these important regards, ‘Japanification’ is a state that Europe should not eschew; it is a state that Europe should espouse. Countering The Counterarguments Nevertheless, in the interests of a balanced debate, we must address the main counterarguments: First, isn’t Japan’s declining population evidence of a national malaise? No. Japan lacks living space. Its mountainous islands are habitable on only tiny slivers along the coasts, and these are among the most densely populated regions in the world. Therefore, as the journalist and Japan specialist Eamonn Fingleton explains, Japan’s low birth rate is a fundamental national policy that can be traced back to the late 1940s. Japan lacks living space. Shorn of empire, Japan faced a major food security problem. At a stroke, Japanese officials stopped dead in its track a huge baby boom which took hold between 1946 and 1948. Ever afterwards Japan has enjoyed – yes, that is the appropriate word – a low birth rate. Although the program’s rationale is not recognized in the West, it is fully understood in the East and both Singapore and China went on to formulate similar policies. Chart I-6Japan's Rising Public Indebtedness Counterbalanced A Plunge In Private Indebtedness Clearly, a nation whose working population is shrinking will produce less than it otherwise might have, but this doesn’t mean the economy is a basket case. Far from it. On a per head basis, as we have shown, Japan is doing just fine, and the imbalance between workers and retirees will gradually work out as people adjust their retirement ages (just as they will have to in the west). A second counterargument is that Japan’s government indebtedness has skyrocketed to over 200 percent of GDP, the highest among any major economy. But this increase in public debt was needed as a crucial counterbalance to a sharp decline in private indebtedness, and thereby prevent a deep slump (Chart I-6). Japan’s total indebtedness has remained broadly flat for decades. Third, the Nikkei 225, at 21,500 today, is barely at half of its 39,000 peak value in 1989. The simple explanation is that the main determinant of any long-term return is the starting valuation. The 1989 peak bubble valuation was so extreme – a price to sales of 2.2 compared to 0.75 today – that the subsequent dire returns were baked in the cake (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Japan's Bubble Was So Extreme That Subsequent Dire Returns Were Inevitable Fourth, Japanese bond yields have been near-zero or negative for almost two decades, which some commentators claim is a classic sign of an economy in ‘secular stagnation’. But as we have shown, these ultra-low yields have coexisted with a Japanese economy that is doing just fine. More recently, the residents of Switzerland and Sweden will vouch for the same thing – that negative bond yields categorically do not mean that their economies are ‘basket cases’. But have these economies progressed only because they have these ultra-low bond yields? No, the charts in this report show no (inverse) relationship between bond yields and long-term productivity growth. Which begs the question: if ultra-low bond yields are not a sign of an economy stuck in a funk, what are they a sign of? The Real Reason For Ultra-Low Bond Yields Chart I-8Inflation Is Stuck Well Short Of The 2 Percent Target Today, like a stuck record, the ECB will repeat again that inflation remains well short of its 2 percent target (Chart I-8), but that its resolve to reach the target is unwavering. Just as it was at the last meeting… last year… the year before that… and five years before that! Instead of loosening even further, the ECB should be explaining why, in spite of years of negative interest rates and trillions of euros of QE, inflation expectations have barely budged. As the ECB will not provide the explanation, we will. The public’s expected inflation – a fundamental input into economists’ models during the past half-century – is not well defined when an economy has reached price stability, as it has now. Chart I-9Unemployment Rates Are At Multi-Decade Lows Confirming what this publication has previously argued, Professor Jeffrey Frankel of Harvard University explains “most people pay little attention to the inflation rate when price growth is as low as it has been in recent years.” As a result, argues a paper from the NBER, large policy change announcements in the U.S., the U.K., and the euro area seem to have only limited effects on the inflation expectations of households and firms.1 However, as most economists and central banks fear that their credibility is at stake, they remain fixated on the need to reach the 2 percent inflation target. This requires them to double down, triple down, and then quadruple down on extreme accommodation, even though prices are stable, the economy is progressing, and unemployment rates have declined to multi-decade lows (Chart I-9). So in answer to our previous question, ultra-low bond yields are not a sign of an economy stuck in a funk; they are a sign of central banks that are chasing the wrong inflation target, and that are too scared to change the target for the damage it would do to their credibility. What Does This Mean For Stocks, Bonds, And Currencies?   Ultra-low bond yields are coexisting with economies that are doing fine, as we have seen in Japan, Switzerland, and Sweden. But at such low yields, the unattractive asymmetry of limited bond price upside with unlimited downside justifies exponentially higher valuations for equities and other risk-assets. Chart I-1010-Year Bond Yields Can Rise By Only 50-100 Basis Points So the structural message for equities is: as long as the global 10-year bond yield remains below 2 percent, the equity market’s rich valuation is underpinned. And on anything other than a trading horizon, equities are to be preferred over bonds – albeit the long-term return from equities is likely to be a feeble low single-digit. The structural message for bonds is: 10-year yields cannot rise much – maybe only 50-100 basis points – before the rise destabilises equity and other risk-asset valuations, thereby acting as a limiter (Chart I-10). But given that there is a lower bound to policy interest rates, 10-year yields that are deeply in negative territory can fall even less. Hence, the risk-reward dynamic suggests going overweight the higher yielding versus the lower yielding quality sovereigns: most notably, overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. On a structural horizon, prefer equities over bonds. The structural message for currencies is essentially the opposite to that for bonds: tilt towards lower yielding currencies because in a ‘race to the bottom’, a central bank’s ability to devalue its currency becomes more and more constrained. But which low yielding currency? As Japan has already undergone its ‘Japanification’, we like the yen. Fractal Trading System* With geopolitical risks having ebbed somewhat, a good tactical trade would be to lean against the technically overbought conditions in high-quality government bonds. Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to short the U.S. 10-year T-bond setting a profit target of 1.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In yield terms, this broadly equates to a target yield of 1.9% and stop-loss at 1.5%. Chart I-11U.S. 10-year T-Bond Price For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Footnotes 1 Please see http://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f117592.pdf and the European Investment Strategy Special Report ‘The Case Against Secular Stagnation’ August 29, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Content Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

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Feature Feature ChartNo 'Secular Stagnation' In Japan! Bond yields have plummeted to all-time lows and inflation has continued to undershoot the 2 percent target which central bankers tell us is ‘price stability’. This configuration has led to renewed fears that the European and global economies are entering a so-called ‘secular stagnation’. We strongly disagree with this line of thinking. Near-zero bond yields and inflation are categorically not portents of a long-term drought in economic progress. Quite the opposite. Chart I-2Japan Has Experienced Near-Zero Inflation For Decades Japan has experienced near-zero bond yields and inflation for decades (Chart I-2). Yet since the late 1990s, the growth in Japan’s real GDP per head has outperformed every other major economy1 (Feature Chart). Granted, the Japanese government has been running persistent deficits, but this is to counterbalance private sector de-levering. Total indebtedness as a share of GDP has not been rising. In the post credit boom era, Japan’s economic progress has come entirely from productivity improvements. The ability to learn, experiment, and innovate boosts the quality and/or quantity of output from a fixed set of inputs. Unlike the unsustainable growth that is fuelled by credit booms and asset bubbles, real growth that comes from productivity improvements marks genuine and sustainable economic progress. In Europe, Switzerland tells a similar tale. Swiss bond yields and inflation have been near zero for decades, but they have not defined a secular stagnation. Real GDP per head and living standards have steadily advanced, even from an already high base. In the post credit boom era, Japan’s economic progress has come entirely from productivity improvements.  But the best counterexample comes from economic history. At the height of the British Empire in 1914, British consumer prices were little different to where they stood at the end of the English Civil War in 1651 – meaning that Britain experienced near-zero inflation and low bond yields for almost three centuries (Chart I-3). Did these define a secular stagnation? No, quite the opposite. For Britain, this was a golden epoch in which it emerged as the world’s preeminent economy. Chart I-3Britain Experienced Near-Zero Inflation For Centuries The Real Reason For Near-Zero Inflation And Bond Yields The fear-mongering about a secular stagnation misses the real reason for today’s sub-2 percent inflation and record low bond yields. Central banks have wrongly defined price stability. Central banks have wrongly defined price stability because they think of it in terms of the economics and mathematics in which they have expertise. Their models tell them that they can nail inflation to one decimal place – two point zero. But price stability has as much to do with biology and psychology. Biologists will tell you that the human brain cannot distinguish inflation rates between -1 and 2 percent, a range we indistinguishably perceive as ‘price stability’. If biology teaches us that we cannot distinguish between -1 and 2 percent inflation, then central banks have a huge problem. It is impossible for a central bank to change our inflation expectations within that range, because the entire range just feels the same to us. Therefore, our behaviour in terms of wage demands and willingness to borrow will also stay unchanged. And if our economic behaviour is unchanged, what is the transmission mechanism to fine tune inflation within the -1 to 2 percent range? Central banks have wrongly defined price stability.  Therefore, price stability is actually like a ‘quantum state’. You’re in the state or you’re out of the state, but once you’re in the state you cannot then fine tune inflation to an arbitrary number like two point zero. In fact, average inflation over, say, five years will gravitate to the mid-point of the price stability state, 0.5 percent, which is a long way below the central bank’s arbitrary target of 2 percent (Chart I-4). This forces the central bank into drastic and prolonged monetary policy easing – which depresses bond yields (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Central Banks Have Wrongly Defined Price Stability... Chart I-5...Forcing Them To Depress Bond Yields Monetary Policies Will Ultimately Converge As structural credit booms have sequentially ended, economies have one by one entered the state of price stability. First it was Japan; then it was Switzerland; more recently it has been the euro area and the United States. It follows that the 5-year annualised inflation rates have also sequentially tumbled to the mid-point of the price stability state, around 0.5 percent. By which point, inflation is so far below the misplaced 2 percent target, that the central bank’s drastic and prolonged monetary policy easing has depressed the 5-year bond yield to near zero. Japan reached this point in the late 1990s, Switzerland in the early 2010s, and the euro area in the late 2010s. Begging the question: why has the 5-year inflation rate in the U.S. not tumbled towards 0.5 percent too?  The answer is that actually, it has. On a like-for-like basis, 5-year inflation rates are way below the 2 percent target in all the major jurisdictions. You see, the Americans measure inflation differently to the Europeans. In the U.S., the consumer price basket includes owner-occupied housing costs at a substantial weighting, while in Europe it is completely excluded. Using the same definition of inflation as in Europe, the U.S. 5-year inflation rate is not at 1.5 percent, it is at a feeble 0.6 percent (Chart I-6). Chart I-6On a Like-For-Like Basis, U.S. 5-Year Inflation Is A Feeble 0.6 Percent Crucially, on a like-for-like basis, 5-year inflation rates are way below the 2 percent target in all the major jurisdictions: the U.S., euro area, and Japan. This leads us to believe that the current chasm in monetary policies is unsustainable. Even including owner-occupied housing in the consumer price basket, as the U.S. does, the long run boost to annual inflation is only about 0.2 percent (Chart I-7). Meaning that it is only a matter of time before U.S. structural inflation and bond yields converge with those in the euro area. Chart I-7Owner-Occupied Housing Boosts Inflation, But In The Long Run By Only 0.2 Percent In the meantime, the chasm between monetary policies has become a major geopolitical risk. This is because it has depressed the euro versus the dollar by at least 10 percent – based on the ECB’s own competitiveness indicators. The exchange rate distortion stemming from polarised monetary policies is the culprit for the euro area’s huge trade surplus with the United States (Chart I-8). On this point, President Trump is spot on to complain that the Fed’s policy stance relative to other central banks is severely handicapping U.S. manufacturers. As the president tries to counter this handicap with tariffs, real or threatened, the Fed is being forced to lean against the risks to growth and inflation. Chart I-8Blame Polarised Monetary Policies For The Euro Area’s Huge Trade Surplus With The U.S. What Does All Of This Mean? One way or another, the dollar will come under structural pressure in the coming years as the current chasm in monetary policies proves to be unjustified. However, in the near term, we prefer to express this not via the euro, but via the yen. The corollary is that U.S bond yields will eventually converge with their European counterparts. But to reiterate, a world with near-zero inflation is categorically not a portent of secular stagnation. It is just the true state of price stability as the human brain perceives it, rather than the over-precise two point zero that central banks have arbitrarily picked. In turn, ultra-low bond yields stem from the monetary policy response to this massive undershoot of true price stability from central bank defined price stability.   All of this raises a fascinating question: if bond yields are lower than is truly required, why hasn’t it created a new inflation? The answer is that it has, but the new inflation is not in the real economy. The reason is that the world has just been through a structural credit boom, remains heavily indebted, and is still unwinding some of the credit excesses. In this world, as Japan has illustrated in recent decades, productivity growth must drive economic progress. Instead, the new inflation is in equity and other risk-asset prices. At ultra-low bond yields the prospect of bond capital gains diminishes versus potential losses, making bonds as risky as equities. This removes the need for an excess return on equities and other risk-assets versus bonds, meaning that the valuation of risk-assets inflates exponentially (Chart I-9). So long as bond yields remain depressed, this new inflation in risk-asset valuations is well justified and supported.2  But be very careful if the global 10-year bond yield rises above 2 percent.3   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Based on real GDP per working age (15-64) population, but also broadly true for real GDP per total population. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance”, October 25 2018, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The global 10-year bond yield is the simple average of 10-year government bond yields in the U.S., euro area (or France as a proxy), and China.

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Dear Client, Please note that there will be no regular Weekly Report next week, as we take a summer break. Our regular publication will resume September 6th. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights Our PPP models show the DXY index to be overvalued by 10-15%. Within the G10 universe, the cheapest currencies are the Swedish krona, the British pound, the Japanese yen and the Norwegian krone. Look to go short CHF/GBP on valuation grounds. Feature Regular readers of our publication will notice that we tend to adhere to very simple and time-tested ideas. One such is the concept of purchasing power parity (PPP). The beauty comes from its simplicity. If the price of a good in Sweden is rising faster than in South Africa, then the krona should depreciate versus the rand to equalize prices across both borders. Otherwise, the krona becomes incrementally expensive, relative to the rand. In practice, various models have shown PPP to be a very poor tool for managing currencies. One roadblock comes from measurement issues, since consumer price baskets tend to differ in composition from one country to the next. Second, there is less price discovery for services, than there is for tradable goods. For example, it is rather difficult to import a haircut from Mumbai into the U.S., and so arbitraging those prices away tends to be impractical. Tariffs, trade restrictions and transport costs also tend to dampen the explanatory power of PPP models, though those have had diminishing importance over time. In order to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison across countries, we make two adjustments. First, we divide the consumer price index (CPI) baskets into five major groups. In most cases, this breakdown captures 90% of the national CPI basket: Food, restaurants and hotels Shelter Health, culture and recreation Energy and transportation Household goods The second adjustment is to run two regressions with the exchange rate as the dependent variable. The first regression (call it REG1) uses the relative price ratios of the five groups as independent variables. This allows us to observe the most influential price ratios that help explain variations in the exchange rate. The second regression (call it REG2) uses a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If for example, shelter is 33% in the U.S. CPI basket, but 19% in the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, compared to using the national CPI weights. The results were largely consistent: Both regressions were statistically significant, but more so for REG1. This makes intuitive sense, as the number of variables were higher in the first regression. The sign for household goods was negative for some countries. This could be due to some specter of multicollinearity, if the tradable goods price effect is captured in other categories. There is also the low value-to-weight ratio for many household goods such as refrigerators or air conditioners, which could make currency deviations from PPP persistent. The shelter sign was also negative for some countries, meaning rising shelter prices tended to be associated with an incrementally cheaper currency. This could be due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Rising incomes (one key determinant of rising house prices) usually reflect rising productivity levels, which tend to lift the fair value of the exchange rate. The results showed the U.S. dollar as overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, British pound and Norwegian krone. Commodity currencies were closer to fair value, and within the safe haven complex, the Japanese yen was more attractive than the Swiss franc. The euro was less undervalued than implied by the overvaluation in the DXY index. As a final note, PPP models are just an additional kit to our currency toolbox, and so should never be used in isolation, but in conjunction with other currency signals. This is just a first iteration in our PPP modelling work, which we intend to improve in the months to come. U.S. Dollar We reverse-engineered the fair value for the DXY index by aggregating the model results from its six constituents. This includes the euro, the Japanese yen, the British pound, the Canadian dollar, the Swedish krona, and the Swiss franc, using the corresponding DXY weights. The message from the synthetic model is clear: the U.S dollar is above its fair value, in line with our fundamental view (Chart 1). Chart 1The Dollar is Slightly Expensive Americans spent 35% of their income in 2018 on goods and 65% on services. Shelter remains the single largest consumption item for American households, which makes up 33% of the consumption basket. However, the relative importance of shelter is dwarfed by much more rampant rent and house price increases in other developed countries. Medical care accounts for 8.7% of the CPI basket, and is the highest in the developed world on a per capita basis. Total spending on health care accounts for almost 20% of nominal GDP. Since the 1980s, the CPI for medical care has risen fivefold, far outpacing many developed countries. This makes the dollar incrementally expensive.  Core CPI edged higher to 2.2% in July, driven by medical care and shelter. While above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, the risks to inflation remain asymmetric to the downside. That will keep the Fed on a dovish path near-term, which should help close overvaluation in the dollar. Euro We had limited data for the euro area, and so our regression results were less robust. REG1 shows the euro as cheap, while REG2 is more ambiguous (Chart 2). In short, a PPP model for the euro had one of lowest explanatory powers within the G10 universe. Food, restaurants and hotels are the largest consumption item in the euro CPI basket. Looking at the details, food and non-alcoholic beverages account for 14%, alcohol and tobacco make up 4%, and restaurant and hotels account for about 10% (Table). Relative price trends have moved to undermine the fair value of the euro. Chart 2The Euro Is Slightly Cheap Euro Area CPI Weights Shelter’s weight in the euro area CPI basket currently stands at 16.7%, the smallest among G10 countries. Since 2012, relative house and rent prices in the euro area have been decreasing compared with that in the U.S. Rampant rent controls, especially in places like Germany have subdued housing CPI, and tempered the fair value of the euro. This makes sense to the extent that it represents a concomitant rise in the welfare state. It is well-known that the euro area is relatively open and so tradable goods prices are important for the fair value of the euro. Given that the epicenter of trade tensions is between the U.S. and China, this will act to boost the relative attractiveness of European goods, which will be a bullish underpinning for the euro. Inflation expectations have collapsed in the euro area. However, compared to the Federal Reserve, there is little the European Central Bank can do to boost inflation. This is relatively euro bullish. Once global growth eventually picks up, improved competitiveness in the periphery will allow for non-inflationary growth. Japanese Yen The yen benefits from being cheap, as well as being a safe-haven currency (Chart 3). The overarching theme for Japan is a falling (and rapidly aging) population, which means that deficient demand and falling prices are the norm. This makes the yen relatively attractive on a recurring basis. Most of the Heisei era in Japan has been characterized by deflation. Importantly, all categories in Japan have been in a relative price downtrend during this period (Table). Domestically, an aging population (that tends to be a large voting base), prefer falling prices. Meanwhile, the bursting of the asset bubble in the late 80s/early 90s led to a powerful deleveraging wave that undermined prices. Chart 3The Yen Is Quite Cheap Japan CPI Weights The relative prices for most items have been decreasing, but culture and recreation inflation have experienced a meaningful rebound since 2013, largely due to a booming tourism industry in Japan.1 According to tourism statistics, the number of international visitors to Japan reached 31 million in 2018, almost five times the number ten years ago. But as long as the younger generation in Japan continues to save more and consume less, prices will remain under pressure. BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda remains committed to achieving a 2% inflation target, but inflation expectations are falling to historical lows at a time when the BoJ is running out of policy bullets.2  That means inflation will likely lag that of other developed countries, lifting the fair value of the yen. British Pound Both regressions show the pound as undervalued. This supports our view that over the long term, the pound is a categorical buy (Chart 4). The consumption baskets in both the U.K. and the U.S. are roughly similar, which means traditional PPP models do a good job at capturing the true underlying picture of price differentials (Table). For example, OECD PPP models, based on national expenditure, show the pound as 15% undervalued. Chart 4The Pound Is Cheap U.K. CPI Weights Housing is the largest item in the consumption basket, with a total weight close to 30% (including housing electricity and water supply). The shelter consumer price index in the U.K. started to fall relative to the U.S. in 2016, which has lowered the fair-value of the pound (in the Balassa-Samuelson framework). That said, the fall in the pound has been much more deep and violent than suggested by domestic price fundamentals. For example, food restaurants and hotels are 10% cheaper in the U.K. compared to the U.S. over the last half decade. However, rather than appreciating 10%, the pound has plummeted by about 30%. Brexit will continue to dictate the ebb and flow of sterling gyrations, but the reality is that the pound should be higher on a fundamental basis. Meanwhile, a pick up in the global economy will benefit the pound. Going short CHF/GBP on valuation grounds is an attractive bet today. Australian Dollar As a commodity currency, PPP models are less useful for the Australian dollar than terms of trade, or even interest rate differentials. That said, the Aussie dollar is still relatively cheap versus the USD on a PPP basis (Chart 5). The key driver for value in the AUD has been a drop in the currency, relative to what price differentials will dictate. Food, restaurants and hotels comprise 23% of the Australian CPI basket, with the alcohol and tobacco category alone making up 7.4% (Table). Given food price differentials have been stable versus the U.S. in over a decade, Aussie citizens have not been particularly worse off. Chart 5The Aussie Is Slightly Cheap Australia CPI Weights Shelter accounts for almost a quarter percent of the basket. Relative shelter prices in Australia have been rising since the late 1990s, but started to soften in the past few years, on the back of macro prudential measures. Meanwhile, holiday travel and accommodation have a total weight of 6%, of which domestic travel makes up 2.9%, and international travel 3.1%. The overall cost of tourism in Australia has been falling relative to the U.S., boosting the fair value of the Aussie. In the 1980s, inflation in Australia averaged around 8.3% year-on-year. This made the Aussie incrementally expensive, creating grounds for a subsequent 50% devaluation from 1980 to 1986. Inflation targeting was finally introduced and has realigned Aussie prices with the rest of the world. Our bias is that the Aussie will be less driven by price differentials going forward, but more by RBA policy and terms of trade. New Zealand Dollar The New Zealand dollar is at fair value according to both models (Chart 6).  Like the aussie, the kiwi is less driven by price differentials and more by terms of trade. Food and shelter account for the largest share of the consumption basket, and relative prices have not been moving in favor of the kiwi (Table). So, while the kiwi was overvalued earlier this decade, the overvaluation gap has been mostly closed via a higher dollar. Chart 6The Kiwi Is At Fair Value New Zealand CPI Weights Relative shelter prices in New Zealand have been soaring in recent decades compared to the U.S. Higher immigration, foreign purchases and a commodity boom helped. However, in August 2018, the ban on foreign property purchases came into effect, which helped cool down the housing market. Like in Australia, the inflation rate in New Zealand reached 18% year-on-year in the early 1980s, and was subsequently addressed via inflation targeting. This has realigned New Zealand prices somewhat with the rest of the world. Our bias is that going forward, the kiwi will underperform the aussie, mainly because of a negative terms of trade shock. Canadian Dollar The loonie is currently trading below its fair value, according to both of our models (Chart 7).  Shelter remains the largest budget item for Canadian households (Table). The average Canadian household spent C$18,637 on shelter per year, around 29.2% of the total consumption in 2017.3 Interestingly, the shelter consumer price index does not fully capture skyrocketing house prices in Canada over the last decade. Since 2005, Canadian house prices relative to U.S. have doubled, according to OECD. On the contrary, the relative shelter CPI has trended downwards. These crosscurrents have dampened the explanatory power of the exchange rate. Chart 7The Loonie Is Slightly Cheap Canada CPI Weights Canadians are avid users of private transportation. The average spending on transportation accounted for 20% of total consumption, the second-largest expenditure item. Relative prices in this category have been rising, which has lowered the fair value of the exchange rate. Canada stands as the sixth largest energy producer in the world, but due to heavy taxation, Canadian consumers are paying more for gas prices than their U.S. neighbors. That said, terms of trade have been more important than PPP concerns for the loonie. In the near term, we believe energy prices (and the Western Canadian Select price spread) will continue to be important for the loonie. Swiss Franc USD/CHF is trading slightly below fair value, despite structural appreciation in the franc in recent years (Chart 8). The largest consumption item in Switzerland is the food, restaurants and hotels category (Table). The second item is shelter. Social services have a higher weight in the CPI basket, compared to other developed nations. This has been a huge driver of relative prices between Switzerland and the rest of the world, with falling relative prices boosting the fair value of the franc. Chart 8The Swiss Franc Is At Fair Value Switzerland CPI Weights Healthcare notably accounts for 15.5% in the total CPI basket, of which patient services makes up 11.5%. The Swiss healthcare system is a combination of public, subsidized private, and entirely private systems. It is mandatory for a Swiss resident to purchase basic health insurance, which covers a range of treatments. The insured person then pays the insurance premium plus part of the treatment costs. Finally, as a small open economy, tradable goods prices are important for Switzerland. Given high levels of specialization, terms-of-trade in Switzerland are soaring to record highs. This makes the franc a core holding in a currency portfolio. Norwegian Krone The Norwegian krone is undervalued according to both models (Chart 9). Food and shelter account for the largest share of the Norwegian CPI basket (Table). While the share of shelter is lower than in the U.S., other categories share similar weights, allowing traditional PPP models to be adequate for USD/NOK. One difference is that in terms of social services, only 0.2% of the expenditures are allocated to education, since all schools are free in Norway, including universities. Chart 9The Norwegian Krone Is Cheap Norway CPI Weights As a large energy producer, Norwegians pay less for electricity, gas, and other fuels. Norway is also a heavy producer of renewable energy, notably hydropower. This makes the domestic energy basket less susceptible to the ebbs and flows of energy prices. Going forward, the path of energy prices will continue to dictate ebbs and flows in the krone. Meanwhile, long NOK positions also benefit from an attractive valuation starting point.  Swedish Krona The krona is the cheapest currency in our universe by a wide margin (Chart 10). This stems less from fluctuations in relative prices and more from negative rates that have hammered the exchange rate. Like many countries, food and shelter is the largest component of the consumption basket (Table). Transportation is also important. However, an important driver for undervaluation in the currency has been a drop in the relative price of social services. Chart 10The Swedish Krona Is Very Cheap Sweden CPI Weights Sweden experienced very high inflation rates in the 1980s, and since then, has been in a disinflationary regime. More recently, the inflation rate has edged down below the Riksbank’s target, mostly dragged down by recreation, culture, and healthcare. This makes Swedish real rates relatively attractive. We remain positive on the Swedish krona and believe that it will be one of the first to benefit, should global growth pick up.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com   Kelly Zhong, Research Analyst kellyz@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We removed the shelter component in regression 1, since it was distorting results. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Short USD/JPY: Heads I Win, Tails I Don’t Lose Too Much”, dated May 31, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see “Survey of Household Spending, 2017,” Statistic Canada, December 12, 2018. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades