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Geopolitical Regions

Highlights US-China relations in 2020 consist of a gentleman’s agreement to keep the Phase One trade deal in place and aggressive maneuvering in every other policy area. Stimulus is unlikely to be curtailed in the US or China yet, which means brinkmanship will eventually lead to a negative surprise for markets. But it is just as unlikely to come after the election as before. Joe Biden would only initially benefit Chinese equities – trade and tech conflict is a secular trend. North Korea is not a red herring, but South Korea is still a geopolitical investment opportunity more than a risk, especially relative to Taiwan. Feature Chart 1US Power Struggle Raises Risk To Rally The “everything is awesome” rally continues, with US tech stocks unfazed by rising domestic and international risks. However, according to The Lego Movie 2, everything is not that awesome. The Treasury market smells trouble and long-dated yields remain subdued, despite a substantial new dose of monetary policy dovishness (Chart 1, top panel). In the near term we agree with the bears and remain tactically long 10-year Treasuries. Global policy uncertainty remains extremely elevated despite dropping off a bit from the heights of the pandemic lockdowns. US uncertainty, which is now rising relative to global, will climb through November and possibly all the way through Inauguration Day on January 20 (Chart 1, bottom panels). A contested election is not a low-probability event now that President Trump is making a comeback in the election race. President Trump’s comeback could generate a counter-trend bounce in the US dollar (Chart 2A). His comeback is not based in online betting odds but in battleground opinion polls (Chart 2B). Former Vice President Joe Biden is currently polling the same against Trump as Hillary Clinton did in 2016. Chart 2ATrump Staging A Comeback, But US Consumers Flagging Chart 2BTrump Staging A Comeback, But US Consumers Flagging Why should Trump be less negative for the greenback than Biden? First, Trump is a protectionist who would turn to aggressive foreign and trade policy when it became clear that most of his other legislative priorities would not make it past the Democratic House of Representatives. Unilateral, sweeping tariffs against China, and possibly the EU and various other nations, would weigh on global trade and economic recovery and hence support the dollar. Second, Trump’s populism means he would pursue growth at all costs, which means that US growth would increase relative to that of the rest of the world. Democrats, by contrast, would raise taxes and regulations that would have to be offset by new spending, weighing on growth at least at first. Thus Trump would inject animal spirits into the US economy while dampening those spirits abroad; Biden would do the opposite. The dollar may not rally sustainably, but it would be flat or fall less rapidly than if Biden and the Democrats reduced trade risks abroad while deterring domestic private investment. It is not yet clear that Trump’s comeback will have legs. The nation is still in thrall to the pandemic, recession, and social unrest, which undermine a sitting president. US consumer confidence has fallen, as anticipated (Chart 2, bottom panel). Trump should still be seen as an underdog despite his incumbent status. A Trump comeback could precipitate a counter-trend bounce in the US dollar. Nevertheless, our quantitative election model gives Trump a 45% chance of victory, up from 42% last month. Florida has shifted back into the Republican column – albeit as a “toss up” state with a roughly even chance of going either way (Chart 3). The shift reflects improvement in state leading economic indexes as a result of the V-shaped recovery in the economy thus far. Chart 3Trump Nearly Regains Florida In Our Quantitative Election Model, Odds Of Victory 45% Assuming Trump signs a new relief bill in September, which is working its way through Congress as we speak, we will upgrade our subjective odds from 35% to something closer to our quantitative model (and the market consensus). While Trump is less negative for the dollar than Biden, the dollar may fall anyway, at least beyond any near-term bounce. First, monetary policy is ultra-dovish. As we go to press, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has given a sneak preview of the Fed’s strategic review of monetary policy at the Kansas City Fed’s annual Jackson Hole summit (this time hosted in cyberspace instead of Wyoming). Powell met expectations that the Fed will adopt average inflation targeting. Inflation will be allowed to overshoot the 2% inflation target to compensate for periods of undershooting. Maximum employment will be the goal rather than an attempt to prevent excessive deviation from the Fed’s estimates of neutral unemployment. This means US growth and inflation will push real rates lower and weaken the dollar. Moreover, as mentioned, Trump’s big spending would eventually drive investors away from the dollar, especially in the context of global economic recovery. Trump, like Biden, would refuse to impose fiscal austerity amid high unemployment. The one area where he would be able to compromise with House Democrats would be spending bills, as in his first term. The US budget deficit and trade deficit would remain very large, showering the world with dollar liquidity. Risk-on currencies will attract buyers in a new global business cycle. Republicans and Democrats have released their policy platforms following their national conventions. We will revisit these platforms in detail in a future report. The Democratic platform is the one that matters most because the Democrats are more likely to win full control of Congress and thus be capable of enacting their preferred policies. Their platform is reflationary, but in seeking to rebalance the economy to reduce financial and social disparities through more progressive tax policy it would offset some of the fiscal spending. Biden would also moderate foreign policy and trade policy, launching a new dialogue with China to manage tensions. The dollar would fall faster in this environment. Bottom Line: President Trump is staging a comeback in the election campaign. If the comeback receives a boost from fiscal stimulus, Trump could pull off a Harry Truman-style surprise victory. This would precipitate a bounce in the US dollar in the near term. Over the medium term, the dollar should continue falling due to US debt monetization and global recovery. The Trump-Xi Gentleman’s Agreement Has Two Months Left Financial markets have largely ignored US-China strategic tensions this year because the two countries are puffing themselves up with monetary and fiscal stimulus. Going forward, either the stimulus will falter, or the US-China conflict will escalate to the point of triggering a negative surprise for markets. Chart 4US-China: Embracing While Struggling China is unlikely to pull back on stimulus measures. It cannot do so when unemployment has spiked and the economy is experiencing the weakest growth in over 40 years. Authorities said as much during the annual July Politburo meeting on the economy (a meeting that has often marked turning points in policy), when they pledged to maintain accommodative policy and to speed up local government issuance of special bonds. Money supply is growing briskly. The market is validating the signal from China’s easy monetary policies and robust credit expansion. Our China Play Index – which consists of the Australian dollar, iron ore prices, Brazilian equities, and Swedish equities – continues to rally smartly, breaking above its 2019 peaks (Chart 4, top panel). The risk to this view is that the People’s Bank of China may not provide additional monetary easing in the near term, as the Politburo signaled that monetary policy would be more flexible and targeted in the second half of the year. The three-month Shanghai interbank rate has been rising since April. Politically, Chinese authorities would benefit from releasing negative news or statements that would undermine President Trump’s reelection campaign. However, Beijing would not make consequential moves merely to spite Trump. Its primary interest lies in its own stability. Credit growth will continue growing at its current clip through most of the rest of the year and fiscal spending will expand, particularly to support infrastructure projects. The US Congress is also likely to add more stimulus before the election, as noted above. Thus with both countries stimulating, the risk is that they escalate their strategic confrontation to the point that it causes a negative surprise in financial markets. Will this occur? The US-China relationship in 2020 has been characterized by (1) a gentleman’s agreement to adhere to the Phase One trade deal, which was reaffirmed by top negotiators this week; (2) an aggressive pursuit of national interest in every other policy area. Beijing accelerated its power grab in Hong Kong; the US accelerated up its ban on Chinese tech. Chinese imports of US commodities are naturally much weaker than projected due to economic reality but neither side has an interest in exiting the deal. The renminbi continues to appreciate against the dollar on the back of Chinese and global recovery (Chart 4, second and third panels). Nevertheless a new burst of stimulus will lower the hurdle to President Trump taking additional punitive measures against China. The administration could have paused after its major decision to finalize its ban on business with Huawei and other tech firms, which ostensibly even extends to foreign firms that use US-designed parts in sales to China. It did not. Trump is maintaining the pressure with new sanctions over China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Washington is also likely to kick Chinese companies off US stock exchanges if they fail to meet transparency and accounting standards. Trump is not only burnishing his “tough on China” credentials against Democratic candidate Joe Biden – the US’s recent measures are unlikely to be repealed under either president in the coming years. Chart 5China Faces Internal And External Political Pressures Therefore stimulus will enable US actions and Chinese reactions that will eventually trigger a pullback in financial markets. Chinese tech equities are reflecting this headwind. Equities ex-tech are likely to outperform (Chart 5, top panel). A Biden victory does not prevent Trump from taking punitive measures against China on his way out of office, to solidify his legacy as the Man Who Confronted China, so Chinese tech will remain at risk. Biden would be more favorable for emerging market equities because his administration would speed the dollar’s decline. A change of government in the US would temporarily disrupt the US’s overall policy assault against China. Biden’s foreign and trade policies would be more predictable and orthodox than Trump’s. Over a twelve month period, after a shot across the bow to warn that he is not a lightweight, Biden would probably attempt a diplomatic reset with China – a new round of engagement and dialogue that would support the Chinese equity rally. Eventually this reset would fail, however, and Biden would all the while be working up a coalition of democracies to pressure China to change its behavior – not only on trade but also on unions, carbon emissions, and human rights. Externally focused Chinese companies will remain exposed to the harmful secular trend of US-China power struggle regardless of the US election outcome. Coming out of the secretive leaders’ conclave at the Beidaihe resort in August, it is clear once again that Chinese domestic politics is not conducive to smooth US-China relations. Chinese political risk remains underrated. Our GeoRisk indicator is gradually picking up on this trend, and so are other quantitative political risk indicators such as that provided by GeoQuant (Chart 5, second panel). President Xi Jinping has been dubbed the “Chairman of Everything” due to his tendency to promote a neo-Maoist personality cult and thus shift Chinese governance from consensus-rule to personal rule. He is once again reportedly considering taking on the title of “Chairman” of the Communist Party, a position that only Mao Zedong has held.1 More importantly he is re-energizing his domestic anti-corruption campaign, i.e. political purge, this time against law enforcement. Xi had already seized control of China’s domestic security forces but controlling the police is even more critical in a period of high unemployment, slow growth, and social unrest (Chart 5, third panel). Xi’s attempt to re-consolidate power ahead of the Communist Party centennial in 2021 and especially the twentieth national party congress in 2022 is already under way. China’s domestic and international political environment is a risk for the renminbi, which we noted is rallying forcefully on the global rebound. We will not join this rally until the US election is decided at minimum. With the US posing a long-term threat, Beijing is speeding up its attempts to diversify away from the US dollar, both in trade settlements and foreign exchange reserves. Reliance on the dollar leaves Chinese banks and companies vulnerable to US financial sanctions, which have harmed US rivals like Russia and Iran. Over the long run there is a lot of upside for the yuan given its very low level of global penetration (about 2% of both SWIFT transactions and global foreign exchange reserves) and yet China’s very high share of global trade (about 15%). Cross-border settlements in RMB are recovering gradually after the steep drop-off following 2016. Beijing is also allowing foreign investors greater access to onshore financial markets where they will hold more and more RMB-denominated assets. However, the yuan will not become a reserve currency anytime soon given China’s state-controlled economy and closed capital account. We favor the euro, yen, and other G7 currencies as alternatives to the dollar. Hong Kong equities have suffered from the combination of Xi Jinping’s centralization of power and the US-China strategic conflict. The above analysis suggests that while they may get a temporary reprieve, the secular outlook is uninspiring. However, the Hong Kong monetary authorities are capable of managing the dollar peg. They have been able to manage dollar strength over the past decade, including the COVID-19 dollar run-up, and foreign exchange reserves are more than ample. By contrast, a sharp drop in the dollar can be handled even more easily by printing additional HKD. Eventually shifting to a trade basket, or a renminbi peg, is to be expected. The US election may support the Chinese equity rally if Biden wins, but tech equities should continue to underperform the rest of the bourse due to US grand strategy. Bottom Line: We prefer to play China’s growth recovery via outside countries that export into China, such as Sweden, Australia, and Brazil. The US election may support the Chinese equity rally if Biden wins, but tech equities should continue to underperform the rest of the bourse due to US grand strategy which will remain focused on constraining China’s tech ambitions. North Korea Is Not A Red Herring – But Taiwan Is Entirely Underrated The Taiwan Strait remains the chief geopolitical risk. Xi Jinping’s reassertion of Beijing’s supremacy within China’s sphere of influence has led to a backlash in Taiwanese politics and a confrontational posture across the Strait that is being expressed in saber-rattling and low-level economic sanctions that could easily escalate. Chart 6Taiwan Remains #1 Geopolitical Risk Military exercises and jingoistic rhetoric are also heating up, not only directly relating to Taiwan but also in the neighboring South China Sea, which is critical to national security for all geopolitical actors in Northeast Asia. On August 26 Beijing testing two anti-ship ballistic missiles known as “aircraft carrier killers” in the South China Sea (the DF-21D and the DF-26B). We have long argued that the lack of clarity over whether the US would uphold its defense obligations to Taiwan makes the situation ripe for misunderstandings. The US Naval Institute has recently confirmed the validity of fears about a full-scale conflict in the near term.2 Neither Beijing nor Taipei nor Washington has crossed a red line. But China’s imposition of legislative dependency on Hong Kong highlights the incompatibility of the Communist Party’s governing model with western liberalism. The “one country, two systems” formulation has become unacceptable to the Taiwanese people, who want to preserve their autonomy indefinitely. The US ban on doing business with Huawei extends to foreign companies that use US parts or designs, squeezing Taiwanese companies (Chart 6, top panel). War is possible, but our base case still holds that the mainland will first use economic means. In particular it will impose economic sanctions, either precipitating or in response to a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. The market continues to underrate the enormous risk to the Taiwanese dollar, as captured by the low level of our risk indicators (Chart 6, second panel). We continue to recommend shorting Taiwan relative to emerging markets. Taiwan is a short relative to South Korea, in particular, which stands to benefit from any negative turn of events in cross-strait relations. Korean equities are finally perking up, though the US tech war with China is weighing on the South Korean tech sector (Chart 7, top panel). We see this as a geopolitical opportunity given that both China and the US will need South Korean companies as they divorce each other. Korean political risk, however, may also be shifting from adequately priced to underrated. The risk premium has trended upward since President Trump’s diplomatic overture to leader Kim Jong Un stopped making progress (Chart 7, second and third panels). We have largely dismissed concerns about North Korea since the reduction of tensions in late 2017 due to our assessment that diplomacy would remain on track throughout Trump’s first term. This has proved to be the case, but it is still possible that North Korea could prove globally relevant before the US election. Chart 7North Korea A Non-Negligible Risk The reason stems from rumors of Kim Jong Un’s health problems earlier this year. We noted at the time that it was suspicious that preparations for Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, to take on greater responsibilities within the Politburo of the Worker’s Party seemed to predate reports of Kim Jong Un’s illness. For the North Korean state to continue to promote her implies that something may indeed be amiss. In fact, she has missed two Politburo meetings after her aggressive public relations campaign against South Korea was called off this summer. It is possible she got too much attention as the Number Two person in the regime. The South Korean National Intelligence Service is debating her status with the Defense Ministry and Unification Ministry. What is clear is that Kim Jong Un is preparing a new five-year economic plan, to be launched in January 2021, and that he is eager to share any blame for disastrous internal conditions in the country amid the global pandemic and recession. The market is typically correct not to hyperventilate over North Korean risks, but after 2016 North Korea is no longer a “red herring.” First, any domestic power struggle would occur at an immensely inconvenient time given the breakdown in US-China trust. Second, as the North manages any internal problems through its opaque and untested political process, it could be pressed into making a show of force that would either embarrass and antagonize President Trump, or provoke a forceful response from a future President Biden, given that North Korea in theory has the raw capability to deliver a crude nuclear weapon to the continental United States. If any US president makes a show of force, it will antagonize China and could lead to a major standoff. This would upset the markets at least temporarily. We are long Korean equities and would also look favorably on Korean tech. A geopolitical risk premium could temporarily undercut these stocks if North Korean diplomacy fails around the US election. But the risk is globally relevant only if Pyongyang somehow sparks a standoff between the US and China. Otherwise a major Korean peninsula crisis is far less of a concern than that of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1Financial Times. 2 See Admiral James A. Winnefeld and Michael J. Morell, "The War That Never Was?" US Naval Institute Proceedings 146: 8 (August 2020), usni.org. Section II: GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights The stock market can apparently ignore the intensifying US-China conflict as long as massive monetary and fiscal stimulus continues. Hence the ongoing “stimulus hiccup” is a big problem. Ultimately a stimulus bill will pass, but risks are rising that it will come too late or fall short in size. The longer the negotiations drag on, the more likely that the absence of fiscal support, the spiraling US-China conflict, US political instability, and other risks will take center stage and upset the equity rally. Assuming a new stimulus package will ultimately pass, it will fuel Trump’s tentative comeback in opinion polls, increasing the risk that the revolution in the global trading system gets a new lease on life. Thus volatility is likely to rise from here until the US succession is settled. Stay long JPY-USD and health stocks in the near term and bullion in the long term. Feature Two of the key views we have hammered since May are coming to fruition: Stimulus Hiccup: The White House and Congress are struggling to get a new relief bill passed. We have argued that the next round of fiscal stimulus would face execution risks that would cause equity volatility to rise again, which is now occurring (Chart 1). Ultimately we expect the Republican Senate to capitulate to a major new stimulus bill. But the very near term is murky and the negotiations pose a clear and present danger to an equity market that has now surpassed its pre-COVID-19 highs (Chart 2). Chart 1Volatility Is Bottoming, Will Rise Ahead Of US Election Chart 2Markets Recovered, Near-Term Risk To Downside US-China Conflict: The White House has revoked Chinese tech giant Huawei’s general license, leaving the company in thrall to periodic Commerce Department allowances that will impede business. It has also expanded punitive measures to a slew of subsidiaries and Chinese software companies like TikTok (ByteDance) and WeChat (Tencent). We have argued that President Trump’s electoral vulnerability and economic stimulus in both countries lowered the bar to conflict and decoupling. Both countries have an interest in reducing their interdependency and the COVID-19 crisis has given them an opportunity to make structural changes that were previously more difficult. Neither the US tech sector, nor China-exposed US stocks, nor Taiwanese equities are pricing this monumental geopolitical risk at present (Chart 3). Combining these two views results in a dangerous outlook for global risk assets in the near term. The reason we argued that US-China tensions would escalate to the point of disrupting markets this year was that we viewed domestic stimulus as lowering the economic and financial bar that prevented conflict. Hence US and Chinese confrontational steps could go farther than the market expected and eventually something would snap (Chart 4). Chart 3Market Ignores US-China Escalation Chart 4US And Global Stimulus Enable US-China Fight Yet today tensions are escalating despite the failure to arrange a new jolt of domestic stimulus. This is true on both sides, as China is also seeing a deceleration in stimulus provision, mainly on the monetary side, that we also expect to be temporary but nevertheless has negative implications in the near term. The longer fresh stimulus is delayed, the more likely that markets will respond to the historic breakdown in US-China relations, US political instability, and other risks to corporate earnings and the economic recovery. Constraints On Politicians Support Cyclical Recovery To be sure, there is evidence that politicians are aware of their limits and already heading back to the negotiating table. Even with talks ongoing, the risks of delayed stimulus or Chinese retaliation are substantial. First, the White House, House Democrats, and Senate Republicans are continuing to negotiate despite being on recess while hosting national party conventions this week and next. House members are rushing back to Washington to vote on measures to boost the US postal service amid a controversy over how to handle mail-in voting for the election amid the pandemic. This has opened a pathway for stimulus talks to get back on track. It could result in a “skinny” stimulus bill quickly, or otherwise new developments could lead to the roughly $2.5 trillion blowout that we expect based on the two sides splitting the difference on most issues (Table 1). Table 1Stimulus Bill Will Hit $2.5 Trillion If Democrats And Republicans Split The Difference Chart 5Trump’s Reelection Bid Stands On The Economy Second, the US and China are arranging to keep talking. Ostensibly they are checking up on the status of the Phase One trade deal. The Trump administration cannot easily walk away from this deal– unless Trump irredeemably becomes a lame duck making a desperate bid to turn the tables on the Democrats. To do so would hurt Trump’s credibility on renegotiating US trade deals and likely trigger a selloff in the stock market that could set back the economic recovery and remove the last leg that his reelection bid stands on (Chart 5). The Chinese, for their part, have stuck with the deal despite US punitive measures because they do not want to provoke Trump, lest he attempt to inflict maximum damage on their economy in his final months or in a second presidential term. The renminbi is not depreciating relative to the dollar, suggesting that the tenuous truce is intact for now (Chart 6). Chart 6Renminbi Signals Phase One Trade Deal Intact ... For Now Yet The Market May Sell Before Politicians Soften Their Line Nevertheless in the very near term investors have very low visibility on what happens next. Congress could still fumble and cause greater doubts. It could easily fail to reach a new stimulus deal until after September 8 when the Senate returns or September 14 when the House returns. President Trump’s executive orders, and negotiating gestures from Republicans, are a tenuous bridge for markets as they fall far short of even the Republicans’ $1 trillion asking price. The stock market will plunge if the talks collapse, but it will also drop if the stimulus falls short. The market may have to sell off to force politicians to provide stimulus and temper strategic competition. Trump’s complicated attempt to extend relief via executive orders, and/or a skinny deal that does not include direct rebates to households and funding for state and local governments, would be inadequate for the needs of the economy (Chart 7). It is imperative for Senate Republicans to capitulate and come closer to the Democrats $2.4 trillion standing offer (down from $3.4 trillion) – but it is possible they could miscalculate and fail to compromise. Democrats will not cave because they ultimately benefit at the ballot box if stimulus flops and financial turmoil returns. Chart 7US Economy Needs Extended Period Of Fiscal Support On the China front, it is not guaranteed that China will refrain from retaliation against tech companies like Apple that depend on China for their operations. The market is betting that a rally entirely based on the tech sector can be sustained even in the face of an expanding tech war between the world’s biggest economies (Chart 8). Yet China suffers an economic and strategic blow from the US imposition of a technological cordon and Xi Jinping could decide to retaliate immediately. He could come to believe that the risk of not retaliating – which would entail continuing economic recovery and possibly Trump’s reelection on an anti-China platform – is greater than the risk of retaliation and financial turmoil. He has the ability to stimulate the domestic economy and benefits if he sets a precedent that American presidents lose if they attack China. China may not turn to Taiwan immediately, but since 2016 we have highlighted that Taiwan, not Hong Kong, is the major geopolitical risk stemming from the US-China crisis. Saber-rattling, cyber-rattling, and punitive economic measures are picking up in the Taiwan Strait and could lead to a global geopolitical crisis at any time. Here, too, the base case is that China will remain in a holding pattern until after the US election. It also should use economic sanctions long before it resorts to the final military option (Chart 9). But there is a large risk of miscalculation as the US seeks to cut off Taiwan semiconductor trade with China while Taiwan reduces its economic dependency on the mainland and tightens its defense relations with the United States. The Trump administration presents a window of opportunity so the risks are elevated in the lead up to and aftermath of the US election. Chart 8Tech Bubble Amid Tech War An Obvious Danger Chart 9China's Economic Card May Be Only Thing Preventing War We do not view Chinese economic sanctions on Taiwan as a tail risk but rather as our base case. Of course, we eschew conspiracy theories and usually seek to curb enthusiasm over war risks, as with Sino-Indian saber-rattling. But Taiwan is the epicenter of the political, military, and technological struggle between Washington and Beijing. War is a tail-risk, but even minor clashes would have a major impact on global financial markets. Other Risks Come To Forefront Amid Stimulus Hiccup Chart 10Trump’s Comeback Substantial If Stimulus Passes, Pandemic Subsides The longer stimulus is delayed, the more likely that other risks will rise to the forefront and trouble the equity market. The US election does not offer much upside for markets at this point. Other risks stem from Iran and Russia. In the US election, President Trump is beginning to make a comeback in the opinion polling (Chart 10). Trump’s approval rating benefits from signing off on deals, so a final stimulus bill from Congress is essential. But a stimulus bill, a continued rollover in new cases of COVID-19, and a revival of support among his base would improve his odds of winning. Former Vice President Joe Biden is not polling much better against Trump than former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did back in 2016 (Chart 11). Biden’s momentum in national opinion polling has been arrested, especially in battleground states, and the lower end of the “band of uncertainty” around the polling also suggests that Trump is within striking distance (Chart 12). Chart 11Biden Polling About Same As Hillary Versus Trump   Chart 12Trump Still Within Striking Distance Of Biden Our election model suggests that Trump has a 42% chance of winning, which is higher than our subjective 35% (Chart 13). We will upgrade if a stimulus bill is agreed. A Trump comeback may be received well by US equity markets – as it prevents tax hikes, re-regulation, higher minimum wages, and a federal push to revive labor unions, all promoted by Biden and the Democrats. But then again, Biden’s agenda is more reflationary, whereas Trump faces obstacles in a still-Democratic House, leaving global trade as the path of least resistance – which is market-negative. The dollar may bounce on the prospect of a Trump second term (Chart 14). Tech stocks, Chinese currency, and other cyclicals, such as the euro and European stocks, will suffer a setback if Trump is reelected. Chart 13We Give Trump 35% Odds, Quant Model Shows Upside At 42% Lesser risks, still notable, include Iran and Russia. Chart 14Trump Could Trigger Near-Term Dollar Bounce We have maintained that the US and Iran are in a bull market of geopolitical tensions and that this could result in crisis around the election. The US’s decision on August 20 unilaterally to maintain the expiring international conventional arms embargo on Iran is a clear trigger for a military incident. The macro and market implications are different and less dire than with a US-China crisis. But oil price volatility would rise due to regional instability, President Trump’s reelection bid could benefit, and that would carry the implication of expanding trade war with China. Meanwhile our expectation of sharply rising Russian geopolitical risk is materializing both within Russia and in relations with Europe, which is preparing sanctions over the suppression of dissent within both Russia and its satellite state Belarus. Russia is capable of interfering in the US election while a Democratic victory would likely lead to a US policy offensive against Russia. Investors must look beyond the short term. If stimulus is passed, the stock market will go up, but the US and China will be further enabled and ultimately their strategic showdown will cap the gains by harming the tech sector. Meanwhile, if the stimulus fails, then the market will plunge. Investment Takeaways At present the stock market seems prepared for Trump to remain in the White House – or for Republicans to retain the Senate. The market’s YTD profile matches that of past elections that result in gridlock, as opposed to the Democratic “clean sweep” scenario that we have flagged as the likeliest outcome (Chart 15). However, this profile will change, the market will correct, if Trump does not sign a new relief act. Assuming stimulus ultimately passes, markets will cheer and Trump’s comeback in the polls will get a boost. He could still lose the election, given fundamental political and economic weaknesses captured in our state-by-state quantitative model above. But the election itself would be more closely fought – with a contested outcome more likely to occur and roil markets. Finally a Trump victory would give a new mandate to the US-China breakdown and the revolution in the global trading system, which is ultimately negative for risk assets and the cyclical recovery. Hence our confidence that the next few months will be marked by volatility. Ultimately geopolitical and macro fundamentals are negative for the dollar even if Trump provides the occasion for a last gasp in the past decade’s dollar bull market. The US is monetizing its debt and flooding the world with dollar liquidity. Meanwhile China and other powers are diversifying away from the dollar and into gold, the euro, the yen, and other reserve currencies over the long run (Chart 16). Chart 15Dollar Outlook Bearish In Medium Term Chart 16Stock Market Preparing For Trump Win And More Gridlock? The great US fiscal debate is over, regardless of Trump or Biden, as populism has made austerity impracticable and massive twin deficits will ensue. Thus we remain long gold and the Japanese yen. We have refrained from re-initiating our long EUR-USD trade given our expectation of stimulus hiccups and US-China tensions, but will reconsider if and when these hurdles are cleared. Our strategic portfolio continues to expect a global recovery over the next twelve months and beyond but tactically we are positioned against downside risks.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com
Informe especial Highlights The Beirut blast calls attention to instability in the Shia Crescent. A turbulent push for political change will now ensue in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s political capital in Lebanon will suffer significantly. Lebanon is a red herring, but Iraq is a Black Swan. It is at risk of social unrest contagion. Iran’s financial troubles are weighing on its ability to maintain its sphere of influence. It is adopting a strategy of measured sabotage and deterrence against US interests in Iraq. The double whammy of low oil prices and pandemic is weighing on Saudi Arabia’s finances. Nevertheless it is prioritizing a cooperative relationship with Iraq. Iran could stage a major attack or President Trump’s poor election prospects could force him to “wag the dog.” Massive excess oil capacity will mute the oil market impact of a supply shortfall in Iraq. However, the risk becomes more relevant as demand recovers and markets rebalance in the second half of the year. Stay long Brent crude oil and gold. Feature The August 4 explosion at the Port of Beirut was devastating. It killed more than 220, wounded over 6000, left 300,000 homeless, and damaged buildings as far away as 9km from the site of the explosion. The blast added insult to injury to the country’s already troubled finances. Estimates for the cost of repair range anywhere between $5 billion and $15 billion. Global investors can largely write off the incident as an idiosyncratic shock. Even though emigration is likely to pick up, Lebanon’s population is only a third of Syria’s prior to its civil war. Assuming that a third of Lebanese become displaced abroad – a generous assumption more suitable to Syrian-style civil war than Lebanon’s situation – about 2 million Lebanese will be displaced, half of which will make their way to Europe or elsewhere outside the Middle East. As long as an antagonistic Turkey upholds its agreement with the EU, a mass exodus from Lebanon does not risk an unmanageable migrant crisis for Europe (Chart 1). Political tensions will rise and potentially lead to a populist backlash, given Europe’s battered economy. But Lebanon alone is not enough. The risk is broader Middle Eastern instability, which is a credible risk. Chart 1Middle Eastern Instability Could Fuel European Populism Thus Lebanon in itself is a red herring, but it is a bellwether for further unrest in the Middle East in countries that are not red herrings (Map 1). Map 1Lebanon Is A Red Herring; Iraq And Saudi Arabia Are Relevant A major conflict in Iraq is an underrated risk to global oil supply. The catastrophe calls attention to instability the Shia Crescent – a region in a tug of war between rival sectarian and geopolitical interests. Whereas the 2008 crisis led to the largely Sunni Arab states in the so-called Arab Spring, the 2020 crisis is piling pressure onto already unstable Shia states and regions: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly eastern Saudi Arabia. Of particular significance is the fate of Iraq. Popular grievances are eerily similar to Lebanon’s. Baghdad is on shaky ground, yet the ramp up in US-Iran tensions going into the November US elections makes the threat of instability in Iraq more acute. As OPEC’s second ranked oil producer, a major conflict in Iraq poses an underrated risk to global oil supply. Supply losses are a tailwind to oil prices when market conditions are tight. However OPEC 2.0’s 8.3mm b/d of voluntary cuts means massive spare capacity is available globally to offset potential losses in Iraq, reducing the potential upside to oil prices. Nevertheless, this risk becomes more relevant as markets tighten on the back of a demand-side recovery, i.e. as balance is restored to the oil market and as excess spare capacity is eliminated. With oil markets likely rebalancing in 3Q20, unrest in Iraq poses an upside risk to our Commodity & Energy Strategy service’s expectation that 2H20 Brent prices will average $44/bbl and 2021 prices will average $65/bbl (Chart 2). Even though gold has already rallied 30% since mid-March, geopolitical risks including US-Iran tensions suggest any near-term selloff is a buying opportunity (Chart 3). The bullish gold narrative – geopolitical risks, falling dollar, and low real interest rates for the foreseeable future – remain intact even as the downturn gives way to a cyclical recovery. We continue to recommend gold on a strategic time horizon. Chart 2Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Chart 3Gold Is Due For A Breather Lebanon’s economic collapse highlights risks to other regional economies tied to the oil dependent Arab economies of the Persian Gulf. As the latter grapple with record low oil prices, production cuts, and the pandemic-induced recession, second-order effects will reverberate throughout the region, hitting economies such as Egypt and Jordan whose economic as well as political structures are intimately intertwined with Gulf Cooperation Council finances and policies. Lebanon’s Collapse Was Inevitable Lebanon was already going through an economic and financial meltdown before the explosion (Chart 4). Aside from the humanitarian loss, the economic impact is also profound. The country – highly dependent on imports of basic goods and suffering from food insecurity – must now contend with the loss of its main port and most of its grain reserves, destroyed in the explosion. As the dust settles, grief is morphing into anger on the streets. Regardless of whether the blast was due to happenstance or malice, the immediate cause was 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate in storage for six years. The government was warned about the risks of the explosive chemicals at least four times this year – with the latest being on the day of the blast. Chart 4Beirut Port Explosion Accelerated Lebanon’s Collapse Mass protests are already taking place, calling on the government to be held accountable for criminal negligence. A controversial petition to return Lebanon to French mandate has gained more than 60,000 signatures. Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s seven-month-old cabinet has resigned. (It was put in place last year amid an earlier bout of unrest.) Official incompetence and neglect are in fact the best-case explanations for the explosion. Many questions remain unanswered. For instance, what triggered the fire? Israel swiftly denied any connection and offered humanitarian aid, while Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed to know more about the Port of Haifa than about Beirut Port. Early parliamentary elections and the cabinet’s resignation will not appease the protesters. Photos of Nasrallah, President Aoun, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri were among those hung by protesters in gallows in Martyrs’ Square over the weekend. Berri and Gebran Bassil are known to be the source of the cabinet’s decision-making power.1 They have veto over all decisions, large and small. During the mass protests in October 2019, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah has two red lines:     Aoun must finish his term, which expires in 2022;     No early elections will be held, i.e. the speaker of the house will not be changed. While early elections have now been promised, these red lines highlight that corruption runs deep in Lebanon and opposition groups face an uphill battle against the establishment. A turbulent push for political change will now ensue. Hezbollah’s and Iran’s political capital in Lebanon will suffer significantly. Another Israeli confrontation with Hezbollah is not the base case but it could occur. Bottom Line: Lebanon is a failed state. As with the Arab Spring, the question is whether popular anger will prove contagious and spread to more market-relevant neighboring countries. The rally in the Israeli shekel in trade weighted terms since mid-March has already started to fizzle and may be tested further as turmoil in Lebanon raises the risk of confrontation. Contagion? In order for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to warrant investors’ attention, it must affect at least two of the following factors : (1) global oil supply, (2) geography of existential significance to a regional power, or (3) sectarian conflict which could lead to contagion. In this context, Lebanon is a red herring, but Iraq is not – therefore investors should watch to see if anything causes destabilization in Iraq. A decline in Iranian funds will weaken Tehran’s sphere of influence. Like Lebanon, Iraq is dominated by a highly corrupt sectarian system that has been plundering the wealth; people are suffering from rising rates of unemployment; and the regime is in the crosshairs of competing foreign agendas (Chart 5). Chart 5Iraqis And Lebanese Suffer Similar Grievances Iraq is in Iran’s sights because it aspires to establish a land bridge to the Mediterranean through a friendly “Shia Crescent” (Map 2). Iran’s modus operandi is to establish a presence in its neighbors’ domestic politics through Iran-backed factions. Map 2Iraq Essential To Iran’s Aspirational ‘Land Bridge’ To The Mediterranean Given the current state of Iran’s economy, it is not far-fetched to envision a significant drop in the funding of its foreign proxies (Chart 6). Historically these funds have followed the ebbs and flows of oil prices. For instance, in 2009, when faced with declining oil prices and US sanctions Iran’s funds to Hezbollah were estimated to have fallen by 40%. This happened again in 2014-16 and is not too different from today. Thus Iraq is at risk of contagion. Iran’s financial troubles are weighing on its ability to maintain its sphere of influence. Syrian fighters have reported paychecks being slashed, Iranian projects in Syria have stalled, and Hezbollah employees report to have missed paychecks and lost other benefits. Tehran’s finances are essential for Hezbollah’s survival.2 Iran’s proxies in Iraq are facing a similar fate.3 Chart 6Iran Suffering Under "Maximum Pressure" Bottom Line: Iraq faces an uptick in social unrest due to the poor living conditions and possible contagion from Lebanon. Meanwhile, Iran-backed groups there face a decline in funds from Tehran, which will send them searching for replacement funds. If Lebanon falters the world can usually ignore it but if Iraq falters the world will have to take notice. Saudi Arabia Prioritizes Revenue Over Growth Beirut’s foreign policy stances in recent years have been seen as appeasing Iran at the expense of Gulf Arab states.4 This trend coincides with a decline in Gulf Cooperation Council financing to Lebanon. Now the collapse in oil prices and pandemic have weighed on Saudi Arabia’s budget, which still depends on the energy sector for most of its revenues despite efforts to diversify. State revenues were down 49% year-on-year in Q2 pulling the budget deficit down to $29 billion (Chart 7). Riyadh is reassessing its priorities. Opting for revenue at the expense of growth, Riyadh has tightened the screws on its citizens. The government has had to pare back some of the benefits Saudis have long been accustomed to. The value-added-tax rate tripled from 5% to 15%, and a bonus cost-of-living allowance of $266 for public sector employees ended. The kingdom also announced plans to reduce spending on major projects by $26 billion – including some of those associated with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reform agenda, Vision 2030. Chart 7Saudi Arabia Under Pressure From Double Whammy Severe economic turmoil poses a risk to the Saudi social contract in which citizens pledge allegiance to the ruling class in exchange for financial and social guarantees. The risk now is that the fiscal challenges dent Saudi citizens’ pocketbooks and thus impact social and political stability. However, oil prices are recovering to levels consistent with the kingdom’s fiscal breakeven oil price next year. The global economic recovery will begin to support the kingdom’s economy in the second half of this year (Chart 8). This will ease pressure on the budget and hence households. Moreover the slowdown is likely to hit foreign workers hardest and thus hasten the Saudization process. Foreign workers are the lowest hanging fruit and will be the first to find themselves jobless. In that sense the crisis is expediting some of Riyadh’s long-term reform targets. That said, there is still some risk of internal instability or even a palace coup. Tehran could incite sectarian tensions in the kingdom’s Eastern Province where an estimated 30-50% of the population is believed to be Shia. This is relevant given that nearly all Saudi oil production is located there. Chart 8KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... Regarding the possibility of a palace coup, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has spent this year cracking down on potential dissidents. Former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and King Salman’s only surviving full-brother Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz – both influential and well-liked – were among those detained in March. The kingdom’s contradictory policies – reform through repression – may eventually culminate in an overt political crisis. Though such a crisis may not occur until the time of royal succession. These economic and political challenges may force Saudi Arabia to adopt an inward stance. Its foreign interventions to date have been costly and come with little benefit – judging by the war in Yemen. It is also possible that Saudi Arabia, which is already the third largest defense spender globally, will try to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already stated that the kingdom will pursue a nuclear program if Iran develops a nuclear bomb. This is relevant in today’s context with Iran no longer complying with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 1). Saudi Arabia, like Iran, claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes – in order to generate nuclear power as part of efforts to diversify its economy.5 Table 1Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Still, low oil prices tend to discourage petro states from engaging in conflict (Chart 9). Arab petro states may show restraint, at least until oil markets recover. Chart 9Low Oil Prices Discourage Petro States From Engaging In Conflict Overall weakness in oil-producing economies will hurt various countries that rely on remittances (Chart 10). The downturn will also hurt countries dependent on remittances from petro states in the region such as Egypt and Jordan. Bottom Line: The collapse in oil prices is forcing Saudi Arabia to reconsider its priorities and is expediting some long-term reforms. For now, it is adopting a pro-revenue rather than a pro-growth stance. This is likely to result in a focus inward for the kingdom. The implication is that countries that are leveraged to the petro-economies of the Gulf for remittances, bilateral aid, and capital flows will take a hit. These include Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Chart 10Egypt And Jordan Also Vulnerable To Petro State Weakness Iraq Is The Prize Not unlike Lebanon, Iraq’s political class has been suffering a legitimacy crisis since protests erupted there last October resulting in the resignation of then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. However unlike Lebanon, Iraq is a significant geography for global investors. It is a major OPEC producer – second only to Saudi Arabia – accounting for 16% of the cartel’s production last year. The Iraqi oil minister’s first foreign trip was to the Saudi capital. This is not surprising. Iraq not only seeks Saudi leniency in OPEC 2.0 cuts, but also needs financial assistance to develop a natural gas field that will allow it to reduce dependence on Iran. Saudi Arabia also hopes to reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian natural gas and coax it into its sphere of influence. When it comes to crude oil, the additional 1mm b/d of voluntary cuts in June announced unilaterally by Saudi Arabia beyond its agreed OPEC 2.0 commitments are also a sign of Saudi willingness to accommodate Iraq and its non-compliance  (Chart 11).6 Saudi Arabia does not want to see Iraq’s newly elected government failing on the back of budgetary strain. In fact, al-Kadhimi is an opportunity for the Saudis. Formerly the director the National Intelligence Service with warm ties to the US, he is a champion of Iraqi sovereignty. Even though Iraq is being forced to compensate for past overproduction of oil in August and September, it was cajoled by the promise of a $500 million “bridging” loan from Saudi Arabia, to be repaid when oil markets recover. While financial assistance shows the kingdom’s commitment to Iraq, more significantly it reflects Riyadh’s desperation to revive oil markets and bring prices closer to its fiscal breakeven oil price amid the still uncertain demand outlook. Chart 11Saudi Arabia Willing To Accommodate Iraq Neither Saudi Arabia’s nor al-Kadhimi’s efforts are guaranteed to succeed in pulling Iraq out of Iran’s sphere. The prime minister received a rude awakening upon his arrest of 14 Kata’ib Hezbollah fighters in June on grounds of a plan to launch a rocket attack on US interest in Baghdad. They were swiftly released, and the case against them dropped. It is hard to curb Iranian influence. For its part, Iran stood behind al-Kadhimi’s nomination despite him being perceived as pro-Western. Tehran needed to avoid an anti-Iranian backlash on the streets of Baghdad if it had stood against him. Instead, Iran’s calculus was that it is in its best interest to swallow the pill and work with the new government at a time when Iraqi anger was targeted against US involvement rather than at Iranian interference. Prior to the US assassination of Qassem al-Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Iraqi soil, Iraqis were rebelling against Iran’s influence. That being said, Iran will maintain pressure on Iraq through continued attacks on US interests there (Table A1 in Appendix). This is also reflected in the July assassination of top Iraqi security expert Hisham al-Hashimi, who had previously advised the government on how to curb Iranian control. Iran was looking to make it to the US election in November without an escalation in tensions, hoping the US elections will result in a more dovish Democratic Party leadership averse to conflict with Iran. However, recent cyber-attacks on key Iranian infrastructure raise the likelihood that tensions will escalate ahead of the elections. The US is also threatening to maintain maximum sanctions even if the United Nations Security Council disagrees. As always, Iraq will find itself in the crossfire of any deterioration in relations. Bottom Line: Maintaining a cooperative relationship with Iraq aligns with both of Saudi Arabia’s interests there: limiting Iranian interference and supporting global oil markets through supply-side discipline. Iran will maintain pressure on Iraq’s new government through continued attacks on US interests. However, these attacks are supposed to fall short of killing US citizens and giving President Trump a reason to launch air strikes that could give him a patriotic boost in opinion polls. Nevertheless, tensions in the Gulf could escalate if Iran stages a major attack or if President Trump’s poor election prospects force him to “wag the dog.” In that case Iraqi oil supply would be disrupted. Investment Implications The Shia Crescent remains at heightened risk of instability on the back of Iran’s economic deterioration. Massive excess oil capacity will mute the oil market impact of a supply shortfall in Iraq. However, the risk becomes more relevant as demand recovers and markets rebalance in the second half of the year. Given that the Saudi loan will ensure Iraq’s commitment to compensatory production cuts in August and September, supply-side risks are a tailwind to oil prices in H2. The elevated risk of an escalation in US-Iran tensions also favors holding gold. President Trump’s polling has bottomed, yet he remains the underdog in the election – we maintain his odds of winning reelection are 35%. This raises the risk that he adopts a “war president” posture. Iran could become a target as the financial price of confronting Iran is negligible for Trump, whereas a major China confrontation could sink the stock market. The collapse in oil prices and pandemic have weighed on Saudi Arabia’s budget. It has adopted a revenue over growth posture. While this could be a risk to domestic stability, our base case is that it accelerates the kingdom’s long-term reforms. The oil market rout and economic downturn will hurt other countries in the region that are leveraged to Arab petro states – chiefly Egypt and Jordan. Investors should monitor risks to state stability in the coming years. Lebanon’s crisis will incentivize emigration, but given the relatively small size of its population, the major risk to Europe comes from any broader state failures and Middle Eastern instability rather than from Lebanon’s failure alone. If the Democratic Party wins the US election, as expected, then the US-Iran strategic détente will resume and Iran will get a lifeline. But the immediate transition will still be rocky given the Israeli and Saudi desire to exploit Iran’s extreme vulnerability and build leverage with Washington. The COVID-19 crisis heralds another round of Middle Eastern crisis, much as the 2008 crisis led to the Arab Spring. Stay strategically long Brent crude oil and gold. Also, in the wake of yesterday’s 15% pullback in silver, go strategically long silver (XAGUSD), which will continue benefiting from the same structural trends favoring gold but also outperform gold as the global economy recovers, given its greater industrial utility.     Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com       Appendix Table A1Iran Adopting Deterrence Strategy In Iraq   Footnotes 1     Berri is of the Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement and has been parliamentary speaker since 1992, while Bassil is President Aoun’s son-in-law and president of the Free Patriotic Movement, which has the most seats in parliament. 2     Hezbollah gains legitimacy at home through its charity work that plugs the gap in services normally provided for by the government. 3    According to a commander of an Iran-backed paramilitary group in Iraq, Iran slashed its monthly funding to the top four militias by nearly half this year. Please see “Coronavirus and sanctions hit Iran’s support of proxies in Iraq,” Reuters, July 2, 2020. 4    Hezbollah has gained control over the foreign policy and Lebanon has recently taken stances that are seen as bowing to Iranian pressure. Lebanon did not attend a March 22, 2018 extraordinary Arab League meeting discussing violations committed by Iran. Prior to that, Beirut did not condemn Iranian attacks on a Saudi diplomatic mission in Tehran. 5    However an undisclosed facility for processing uranium ore in the northeast of the kingdom has recently appeared. 6    This is not unlike the US’s decision to extend sanction waivers by four months, allowing Baghdad to import Iranian energy in order to ensure that the new government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi can stand on its own and is not overly dependent on Iran.
Informe especial Highlights We remain bullish on France over the long run. Its industrial economy should revive on global stimulus over the coming years and its government will likely remain reformist in orientation. Macron has enough of a popular consensus and enough time on the political clock to oversee recovery in 2021 and get reelected in 2022. It would take a massive new economic crisis, on top of COVID-19, to generate a successful anti-establishment challenge. Macron is not likely to enjoy the strong legislative majorities of his first term. Much depends on how he handles the economic recovery and the international challenges facing Europe. The likely leadership change in the US will assist on the latter point, although US policy uncertainty will weigh on France’s prospects in the near term. Investors with a long-term horizon should go long French defense and energy stocks relative to American peers, which face policy headwinds. Underweight French government bonds in a diversified portfolio over the long run. Feature France celebrated Bastille Day this year with a toned down military parade on the Champs Elysee. The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the country hard – it has the eighth highest death toll in the world with 452 deaths per million people. By comparison, the US is ranked seventh, with 472 deaths per million (Chart 1). Chart 1France Has Been Badly Hit By COVID-19 Ironically, the crisis provided President Emmanuel Macron an opportunity to postpone his controversial pension reform and put a stop to massive labor strikes. These strikes were surprisingly large and effective – much more significant than the Yellow Vest protests that erupted in 2018. Aggregate demand will benefit but France’s economic structure will not, until reforms get back on track. With less than two years before the presidential election, we take a moment to reassess our view on Macron’s re-election prospects and our bullish view of the country’s equity market. We view Macron as a favorite for re-election and hence remain optimistic about the prospects for structural reforms that improve France’s economic competitiveness over the long run. French Markets Have Underperformed Amid COVID-19 But Will Outperform Later Chart 2French Equities Amid Covid-19 French equities have underperformed developed market equities by 12% this year. The post-February equity rally, fueled as elsewhere by massive monetary and fiscal stimulus, has been disappointing compared to US and German equities but still better than that of southern European bourses Italy, Spain and Greece (Chart 2). France has also outperformed the UK, which is heavily reliant on energy and financials and faces a high degree of economic policy uncertainty due to Brexit. Our European Strategist, Dhaval Joshi, has described equity performance this year as a case of the “good stock market” versus the “bad stock market.” The key lies in the relationship between equity sectors and bond yields. For the good sectors, lower bond yields entail a valuation boom and higher prices – as with information technology and health care. For the bad market, lower bond yields entail a profits recession and lower prices – case in point being the banking sector. To better illustrate his point, Table 1 provides the sector composition for core European equities and other developed market bourses (US and UK) as well as the year-to-date performance of each sector. Banks have underperformed massively while information technology and health care have delivered positive returns across different bourses thus far. Table 1The "Good" And The "Bad" Stock Markets French equities are the most exposed to global growth, with 17% allotted to industrials and 4% to energy. Year to date, these sectors have underperformed by -24% and -34% respectively. The upside is that global economic recovery will benefit France more than other bourses and enable it to retrace its massive underperformance during the virus lockdowns. Global economic recovery will benefit France more than other bourses and enable it to retrace its massive underperformance. Extremely accommodative monetary policy around the world will keep bond yields low as long as unemployment stays high and inflation stays low. Central bankers will remain ultra-dovish. This will drive a search for yield from investors and bid up risk assets’ prices in the process. Core European government bond yields may fall further in the short run, in the face of a resurgent virus and acute geopolitical risk surrounding the US election, but not the long run (Chart 3). Reliable cyclical indicators such as the German ZEW and IFO surveys are already showing signs that Euro Area growth is starting to recover from the lockdowns. Chart 3The Threat Of Second Waves Will Keep A Lid On Bond Yields Chart 4French Bonds Will Underperform As Growth Recovers In relative terms, economies with high “yield betas” tend to have the greatest sensitivity to global growth indicators (Chart 4). We anticipate a revival in global growth sometime in 2021, as policymakers will be forced to apply more stimulus when needed. Bond yields will eventually rise, though there is a long journey before the output gap will be closed. French bonds will underperform their peripheral peers, which have more to gain from the global search for yield combined with the implementation of the Macron-Merkel agreement to mutualize Euro Area debt. Bottom Line: Fundamentals suggest that investors should go long French equities, and favor French over other developed market equities over a long-term investment horizon. Investors should remain underweight French government bonds in a diversified portfolio over the long run as the global recovery advances. The Bloated State Saves The Supply-Side Reformer Most lockdown restrictions ended at the beginning of June in France and most measures of economic activity have rebounded sharply. The French manufacturing PMI came in at 52.4 in July, a 22-month high, from 40.6 in May. The services PMI jumped well above the 50 boom/bust line to 57.8 from 31.1 in May (Chart 5). Firms are finally resuming business as usual alongside a marked improvement in sentiment regarding the next 12 months. The underlying data from the Markit PMI survey revealed that domestic demand drove the expansion. Chart 5Sharp Rebound In Soft Data Chart 6Don’t Judge The Recovery Based On The Fiscal Stimulus Package France’s rebound was sharp even relative to other developed markets that had deployed much larger fiscal stimulus packages (Chart 6, with details in Appendix). First, the French economy was surprisingly resilient during the 2019 manufacturing downturn and the slowdown in global activity – note that the French manufacturing PMI only flirted with the 50 boom/bust line in 2019 while German, Italian and Spanish manufacturing PMIs remained well below 50. Importantly, France is after Germany the European country that stands to benefit the most from the recovery in Chinese economic activity. Second, while France’s new fiscal spending was restrained overall, the composition of its stimulus and its existing automatic stabilizers proved to be effective. France rolled out one of the most generous state-subsidized furlough schemes in Europe, with the state shouldering more than two-thirds of wages and leaving the rest to the employers. By end of June, more than 13 million workers were on state-subsidized furloughs, almost half the French workforce (Chart 7). That compares with around one-third of workers in Italy, and around one-fifth in the UK and Germany. Going forward, the sectors most badly hurt by the COVID-19 crisis, such as aerospace and tourism, will be able to keep benefitting from state-subsidized furlough schemes for the next 24 months if necessary. For other companies, the coverage will be slightly reduced and extended into the first quarter of 2021. Reducing unemployment is essential for any world leader, but Macron faces an election around the corner, and he had promised specifically to bring unemployment to 7% by the end of his mandate. Before the crisis the unemployment rate was 7.6% but is now expected to reach 10% by the end of 2020 (Chart 8). Normally it takes eight years after a recession for French unemployment to return to pre-recession levels. Chart 7The French Furlough Scheme Is Impressive Chart 8French Unemployment Rate Expected To Jump Back To Post-GFC Peak In other words, Macron will do more stimulus if necessary. So far France’s coronavirus response measures amount to nearly 4% of GDP, excluding loan guarantees. An unprecedented public sector budget deficit of 11.4% is now expected by the government this year, compared to 3% in 2019. The government is supporting car manufacturer Renault and airline company Air France – two jewels of the French economy – as well as other industries. Given the V-shaped recovery, we would not expect banks to shut the credit tap (Chart 9). Indeed, the French economy will be able to rely on stronger bank lending activity than its European peers (Chart 9, panels 2 and 3). Importantly, Chart 10 shows that French companies rated by Moody’s are less extremely exposed to the pandemic-induced recession than the firms of neighboring Germany, Italy, and Spain. Further, once economic conditions improve enough to restore consumer confidence, then consumer spending will pick up, bolstered by accumulated savings (Chart 11). Chart 9Supportive Bank Lending Chart 10A Lower Exposure To The Pandemic-Induced Recession Tourism is a weak spot, but France’s reliance on tourism is overstated (Table 2). The sector accounts for 9.5% of GDP and 7.3% of non-financial business employment. France made supporting this industry a national priority.   Chart 11A V-Shaped Recovery In Consumer Spending Incoming? Table 2The French Reliance On Tourism Is Overstated Ironically, President Macron’s greatest asset right now is the large French state that he campaigned on cutting down to size. The French state helped sustain the economy better than others during this year’s historic shock. Bottom Line: France’s economic rebound has surpassed that of other countries that deployed larger stimulus packages. Gener­ous furloughing, large automatic stabilizers, ample bank credit, and Macron’s looming election ensure that government support will persist. This is a solid backdrop for an economic recovery led by domestic demand. Macron Still Favored In 2022 Chart 12France Gets A “C-“ For Handling The Pandemic & A “B+” For Handling The Economy The French people naturally question the ability of government authorities to handle the pandemic efficiently (Chart 12). By mid-May, about 60% of the public doubted the government’s effectiveness. Public opinion has not been so bad when it comes to the handling of the economy by the government (Chart 12, bottom panel). Moreover Macron has received a notable boost to his popular support during the crisis. The number of people who intend to vote for him has gone up, the first time that has happened for an incumbent president since 2002 (Chart 13). Compared to other world leaders, Macron fares pretty well. His personal support and his party’s support have increased more than their peers in Spain, the US, the UK, and Japan, albeit less than in Germany and the Netherlands (Chart 14). But while those two governments only have to sustain this support until next year’s elections, Macron needs to sustain support for two years to get re-elected. Chart 13The Crisis Ended Up Boosting Macron’s Popular Support... Chart 14…Which Is Not The Case For All Political Leaders The good news for Macron is that the public does not believe that any other parties or candidates would have handled the pandemic any better (Chart 15). There is a lack of credible opposition from traditional political parties. Macron and the anti-establishment Marine Le Pen, who leads the National Rally, are expected to face each other once again in the second round of the 2022 election. If the election were held today, polls suggest Macron would win this rematch with 55% of votes instead of the 66% he won in 2017. Chart 15French Public Does Not Blame Macron For Coronavirus Handling As long as voters are forced to choose between Macron and Le Pen, Macron has the advantage. As in 2017, he will be able to appeal to voters from other parties in the second round of the election, notably the green party EELV (see Box 1). Left-wing voters will join with center-right voters to elect him. The risk to Macron is if a viable challenger manages to edge out Le Pen. Or, an economic collapse could discredit his centrist and reformist movement and drive more voters into the anti-establishment camp. But that risk merely underscores the necessity that will drive his administration to play an accommodative and reflationary economic role. As long as voters are forced to choose between Macron and Le Pen in 2022, Macron has the advantage.  Box 1: Macron Suffers A Setback In Local Elections French local elections have historically been a way for voters to sanction the incumbent power, as was the case for Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 and his successor Francois Hollande in 2014. True to the historical pattern, Macron and his party La Republique En Marche (LREM) performed poorly in the polls this year. Amid the virus, voter turnout was historically low: 41% compared to 62.1% in 2014. Macron has seen some splintering in his party and has been forced to reshuffle his cabinet. This stumble should not come as a surprise for a party that is akin to an infant in the French political landscape and therefore preferred to play it safe by endorsing candidates in only half of France’s cities of 10,000 people, often choosing to support right-wing candidates (Les Republicains) everywhere else. Fortunately for Macron, Marine Le Pen’s party did not fare any better. The main surprise from the 2020 local elections came from the green party Europe Ecologie-Les Verts (EELV) which even managed to win a number of major victories in large cities. A surge for the Greens is actually quite positive for Macron as he will have no trouble rallying the Greens in 2022 if he is opposed by Le Pen (Chart 16, bottom panel). This outcome also calls for an environmental spending push as part of stimulus efforts in the second half of his term. Chart 16Polls See Macron Win In 2022 Macron is still popular among Millennials, white collar workers, and the elderly (Chart 16). He also has a strong base in Paris (and the suburbs) as opposed to Le Pen, yet he still outperforms Le Pen among rural voters in today’s polls. Bottom Line: Macron is still favored to win the 2022 election. The two-round voting system makes it very difficult for a populist or anti-establishment politician to win the election, given that other factions will align against extreme players. While another massive economic shock could change things, the Macron administration will pursue economic reflation all the more aggressively to prevent this outcome. Macron Keeps France On Reformist Path Crises often accelerate the changes that were taking shape beforehand. This is positive for Macron’s centrist vision of France rather than the anti-establishment alternative that he faced down in 2017. What will be Macron’s roadmap for the remaining two years of his presidency? Public opinion wants him to focus on the labor market and the economic recovery in the months to come and he will be happy to oblige (Chart 17). Macron reshuffled his government before announcing a recovery plan of 100 billion euros, of which 40% will be funded by the European recovery fund. For now, we know the private sector will receive a large share of the pie in order to boost productivity and help French companies stay afloat. Twenty billion euros will go toward the environmental push. A detailed blueprint will be unveiled at the end of August. Chart 17Roadmap To 2022: Focusing On The Labor Market & Economic Recovery Structural reforms may not resume until after 2022. Yes, Macron intends to finish his pension reform prior to the election. And yes, he is capable of passing it through the legislature on paper. Technically he lost his single-party absolute majority in the National Assembly in May. Defections have cost him 26 party members since the 2017 election. But LREM can still count on the unconditional support of two other coalitions in the Assembly giving him 355 seats out of 577 (61.5%). However, Macron would take a huge gamble in reviving the pension reform when the country’s output gap is large. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to pass a less ambitious pension reform in the midst of the Euro debt crisis, 12 months before facing re-election in 2012 – and he lost the election. We doubt Macron will share the fate of his predecessor, but that most likely means punting on reforms for now and returning to them after securing re-election. If Macron proves us wrong, then that will be a positive surprise for French equity markets confirming our thesis that Macron is favored and France is on a reformist trajectory. The pace and breadth of the reforms have been substantial so far, but obviously Macron has halted plans to pare back the size of the state. Cutting back inefficiencies will still be a theme of Macron’s re-election campaign, but with modifications for the new political environment (such as green spending, mentioned above). Meantime, the COVID-19 crisis revealed that more state decentralization is desperately needed. We should also expect measures to push French companies to relocate production activities back into France, which will be more feasible thanks to labor reforms passed into law earlier in Macron’s presidency. The crisis revealed France might find ways to strengthen supply chains, starting with medical masks, of which France is a net importer. Excessive foreign dependency is an economic reality that the French president cannot envision for France and the EU. As Macron said, “The only answer is to build a new, stronger economic model, to work and produce more, so as not to rely on others.” The objective is to build a European Union that is less dependent on China and the US. The EU is first and foremost a geopolitical project, and the impetus for integration has increased, not decreased, since the 2008 financial crisis. A divided Europe is no match for Russia, the US, or China, especially if the US takes a step back from its post-World War II role of guaranteeing free trade and global security. While a Democratic Party government in Washington would ease trans-Atlantic tensions, there will still be an American need to limit foreign commitments and a European need to look after itself. The outstanding question, then, is the makeup of the National Assembly in 2022. This is too far away to predict. What is clear is that Macron is unlikely to regain the golden single-party majority with which he entered office in 2017, or to gain control of the Senate. So he will necessarily be more constrained in a second term in the legislature. Nevertheless he will still benefit from the underlying trend in France: the demand for a better economy and jobs market. This requires pro-productivity reforms, which is known by the public, and Macron has made reform his banner. Bottom Line: Overseeing the economic recovery and bringing down unemployment will be the two key factors to monitor. At present, Macron’s chances of re-election are good. He does not face a major challenger other than the anti-establishment Marine Le Pen, who will provoke a coalition of parties against her. He even stands to benefit from the rise of the Greens, although the future makeup of the legislature will then become the key challenge. Although the focus of the remaining two years of his mandate will be on economic recovery, there is a chance that Macron could pass a watered-down pension reform. This political setup is positive for French growth but not entirely at the expense of long-term productivity. After 2022, Macron will face a higher legislative constraint, but he will have a new mandate to pursue structural reforms. Investment Takeaways Governments and their populations do not have much appetite for additional social lockdowns as COVID-19 cases reaccelerate, but lockdowns are clearly a near-term risk to the recovery. As such, risky assets face volatility in the near term. Europe’s political cooperation and stability combined with global reflation provide a stable launching pad for EUR-USD. The EUR-USD is reaching a critical testing ground (Chart 18). European integration has taken another leap forward during this crisis, thanks in part to Macron’s diplomatic success in smoothing the way for Germany’s Merkel to take prompt steps toward joint debt issuance and more proactive fiscal support for the periphery. Europe’s political cooperation and stability combined with global reflation provide a stable launching pad for EUR-USD. Chart 18The Case For A Higher EUR/USD However, the dollar could bounce in the near term. A chaotic US election is looming in three months and European earnings revisions underperforming the US will weigh on the euro. While global growth is recovering, and a massive new round of US fiscal stimulus is likely to further enlarge US twin deficits, the 35% chance of a surprise Trump victory would raise the prospect of trade war against Europe as well as China in 2021 and beyond. The dollar could revive if the market seeks safe havens on the anticipation of new crises in a second term in which President Trump is “unleashed.” This would also hurt industrial-oriented economies like France. The risk scenario of Trump’s re-election would also increase the tail-risk of a major conflict with Iran over the subsequent four years – and Middle Eastern instability is negative for European risk assets and political stability. Therefore the long EUR-USD call could be jeopardized by a surprise as November approaches. Otherwise, assuming that the Democratic Party wins the US election, the risk of a trade war against Europe will collapse. So too will the risk of a real war with Iran. Meanwhile the US’s strategic pivot to Asia will be handled in a less disruptive way. Therefore EUR-USD would stand to benefit. To the extent that European equities tend to outperform other regions only when global growth is accelerating, bond yields are heading higher, and the growth defensives like tech are underperforming, we are inclined to underweight European bourses relative to US equities in the short run, but not the long run. On a cyclical or 12-month-plus time frame, governments are likely to succeed in rebooting economic growth through massive stimulus. This is positive for French equities, particularly relative to US equities. We recommend going long French aerospace and defense equities in particular. This sector has been beaten down, like its global and American peers. Yet geopolitical power struggle will fuel defense expenditures and global stimulus will revive the aerospace sector once the coronavirus becomes more manageable (Chart 19). Tactically, the shift to a Democratic administration in the US presents near-term risk for US defense stocks, making them the fitting short end of a pair trade favoring French defense stocks. Two French sectors equities are particularly attractive: Aerospace & defense and Energy. Tactically we would play these against American counterparts due to US election policy headwinds for defense and energy. We also recommend going long French energy equities, relative to US peers. The French energy sector has been outperforming its US and developed market counterparts in recent years and will benefit from a global growth revival (Chart 20). The sector will also benefit on the margin if Trump loses the vote and cannot pursue “maximum pressure” on Iran, but instead gives way for former Vice President Joe Biden to tighten regulation on US energy companies and restore the 2015 nuclear deal and strategic détente with Iran. Chart 19Go Long French Aerospace & Defense... Chart 20…And Long French Energy Relative To US We remain bullish French equities on a secular basis as long as Macron’s reelection remains the base case, European integration is supported and France has the prospect to return to incremental structural reforms over time. Meanwhile it is an economy that is structurally protected from the world’s retreat from globalization. De-globalization abroad requires Europe to break down internal barriers and France is well-positioned to succeed in such an environment.   Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Appendix
Highlights The tech sector faces mounting domestic political and geopolitical risks. We fully expected stimulus hiccups but believe they will give way to large new fiscal support, given that COVID-19 is weighing on consumer confidence. Europe’s relative political stability is a good basis for the euro rally but any comeback in opinion polling by President Trump could give dollar bulls new life. DXY is approaching a critical threshold below which it would break down further. The US could take aggressive actions on Russia and Iran, but China and the Taiwan Strait remain the biggest geopolitical risk. Feature Near-term risks continue to mount against the equity rally, even as governments’ combined monetary and fiscal policies continue to support a cyclical economic rebound. Chart 1Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Testimony by the chief executives of Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet to the US House of Representatives highlighted the major political risks facing the market leaders. There are three reasons not to dismiss these risks despite the theatrical nature of the hearings. First, the tech companies’ concentration of wealth would be conspicuous during any economic bust, but this bust has left pandemic-stricken consumers more reliant on their services. Second, acrimony is bipartisan – conservatives are enraged by the tendency of the tech companies to side with the Democratic Party in policing the range of acceptable political discourse, and they increasingly agree with liberals that the companies have excessive corporate power warranting anti-trust probes. Executive action is the immediate risk, but in the coming one-to-two years congressional majorities will also be mustered to tighten regulation. Third, technology is the root of the great power struggle between the US and China – a struggle that will not go away if Biden wins the election. Indeed Biden was part of the administration that launched the US’s “Pivot to Asia” and will have better success in galvanizing US diplomatic allies behind western alternatives to Chinese state-backed and military-linked tech companies. US tech companies struggle to outperform Chinese tech companies except during episodes of US tariffs, given the latter firms’ state-backed turn toward innovation and privileged capture of the Chinese domestic market (Chart 1). The US government cannot afford to break up these companies without weighing the strategic consequences for America’s international competitiveness. The attempt to coordinate a western pressure campaign against Huawei and other leading Chinese firms will continue over the long run as they are accused of stealing technology, circumventing UN sanctions, violating human rights, and compromising the national security of the democracies. China, for its part, will be forced to take counter-measures. US tech companies will be caught in the middle. Like the threat of executive regulation in the domestic sphere, the threat of state action in the international sphere is difficult to time. It could happen immediately, especially given that the US is having some success in galvanizing an alliance even under President Trump (see the UK decision to bar Huawei) and that President Trump’s falling election prospects remove the chief constraint on tough action against China (the administration will likely revoke Huawei’s general license on August 13 or closer to the election). Massive domestic economic stimulus empowers the US to impose a technological cordon and China to retaliate. Combining this headline risk to the tech sector with other indications that the equity rally is extended – the surge in gold prices, the fall in the 30-year/5-year Treasury slope – tells us that investors should be cautious about deploying fresh capital in the near term. Republicans Will Capitulate To New Stimulus Just as President Trump has ignored bad news on the coronavirus, financial markets have ignored bad news on the economy. Dismal Q2 GDP releases were fully expected – Germany shrank by 10.1% while the US shrank by 9.5% on a quarterly basis, 32.9% annualized. But the resurgence of the virus is threatening new government restrictions on economic activity. US initial unemployment claims have edged up over the past three weeks. US consumer confidence regarding future expectations plummeted from 106.1 in June to 91.5 in July, according to the Conference Board’s index. Chart 2Global Instability Will Follow Recession Setbacks in combating the virus will hurt consumers even assuming that governments lack the political will to enforce new lockdowns. The share of countries in recession has surged to levels not seen in 60 years (Chart 2). Financial markets can look past recessions, but the pandemic-driven recession will result in negative surprises and second-order effects that are unforeseen. Yes, fresh fiscal stimulus is coming, but this is more positive for the cyclical outlook than the tactical outlook. Stimulus “hiccups” could precipitate a near-term pullback – such a pullback may be necessary to force politicians to resolve disputes over the size and composition of new stimulus. This risk is immediate in the United States, where House Democrats, Senate Republicans, and the White House have hit an all-too-predictable impasse over the fifth round of stimulus. The bill under negotiation is likely to be President Trump’s last chance to score a legislative victory before the election and the last significant legislative economic relief until early 2021. The Senate Republicans have proposed a $1.1 trillion HEALS Act in response to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, passed in mid-May. As we go to press, the federal unemployment insurance top-up of $600 per week is expiring, with a potential cost of 3% of GDP in fiscal tightening, as well as the moratorium on home evictions. Congress will have to rush through a stop-gap measure to extend these benefits if it cannot resolve the debate on the larger stimulus package. If Democrats and Republicans split the difference then we will get $2.5 trillion in stimulus, likely by August 10. Compromise on the larger package is easy in principle, as Table 1 shows. If the two sides split the difference between their proposals in a commonsense way, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1, then the result will be a $2.5 trillion stimulus. This estimate fits with what we have published in the past and likely meets market expectations for the time being. Table 1Outline Of Fifth US COVID Stimulus Package (Estimate) Whether it is enough for the economy depends on how the virus develops and how governments respond once flu season picks up and combines with the coronavirus to pressure the health system this fall. A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the amount of spending necessary to keep the budget deficit from shrinking in the second half of the year comes much closer to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion bill (Table 2), which suggests that what appears to be a massive stimulus today could appear insufficient tomorrow. Nevertheless, $2.5 trillion is not exactly small. It would bring the US total to $5 trillion year-to-date, or 24% of GDP! Table 2Reducing The Budget Deficit On A Quarterly Basis Will Slow Economy While a compromise bill should come quickly, the Republican Party is more divided over this round of stimulus than earlier this year. Chart 3US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 First, there is some complacency due to the fact that the economy is recovering, not collapsing as was the case back in March. Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that US personal income is much better off, thus far, than it was in the months following the 2008 financial crisis, even though the initial pre-transfer hit to incomes is larger (Chart 3). Second, the Republican Party is reacting to growing unease within its ranks over the yawning budget deficit, now the largest since World War II (Chart 4). Chart 4If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose Chart 5Consumer Confidence Sends Warning Signal To Republicans If Republicans are guided by complacency and fiscal hawks, they will cook their own goose. A failure to provide government support will cause a financial market selloff, will hurt consumer confidence, and will put the final nail in the coffin of their own chance of re-election as well as President Trump’s. Consumer confidence tracks fairly well with presidential approval rating and election outcomes. A further dip could disqualify Trump, whereas a last-minute boost due to stimulus and an economic surge could line him up for a comeback in the last lap (Chart 5). These constraints are obvious so we maintain our high conviction call that a bill will be passed, likely by August 10. But at these levels on the equity market, we simply have no confidence in the market gyrations leading up to or following the passage of the bill. Our conviction level is on the cyclical, 12-month horizon, in which case we expect US and global stimulus to operate and equities to rise. Bottom Line: Political and economic constraints will force Republicans to join Democrats and pass a new stimulus bill of about $2.5 trillion by around August 10. This is cyclically positive, but hiccups in getting it passed, negative surprises, and other risks tied to US politics discourage us from taking an overtly bullish stance over the next three months. Yes, US-China Tensions Are Still Relevant Chart 6Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Financial markets have shrugged off US-China tensions this year for understandable reasons. The pandemic, recession, and stimulus have overweighed the ongoing US-China conflict. As we have argued, China is undertaking a sweeping fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimulus – despite lingering hawkish rhetoric – and the size is sufficient to assist in global economic recovery as well as domestic Chinese recovery. What the financial market overlooks is that China’s households and firms are still reluctant to spend (Chart 6). China’s Politburo's late July meetings on the economy are frequently important. Initial reports of this year’s meet-up reinforce the stimulus narrative. Hints of hawkishness here and there serve a political purpose in curbing market exuberance, both at home and in the US election context, but China will ultimately remain accommodative because it has already bumped up against its chief constraint of domestic stability. Note that this assessment also leaves space for market jitters in the near-term. The phase one trade deal remains intact as President Trump is counting on it to make the case for re-election while China is looking to avoid antagonizing a loose cannon president who still has a chance of re-election. As long as broad-based tariff rates do not rise, in keeping with Trump’s deal, financial markets can ignore the small fry. We maintain a 40% risk that Trump levels sweeping punitive measures; our base case is that he goes to the election arguing that he gets results through his deal-making while carrying a big stick. At the same time, our view that domestic stimulus removes the economic constraints on conflict, enabling the two countries to escalate tensions, has been vindicated in recent weeks. Chinese political risk continues on a general uptrend, based on market indicators. The market is also starting to price in the immense geopolitical risks embedded in Taiwan’s situation, which we have highlighted consistently since 2016. While North Korea remains on a diplomatic track, refraining from major military provocations, South Korean political risk is still elevated both for domestic and regional reasons (Chart 7). Chart 7China Political Risk Still Trending Upward The market is gradually pricing in a higher risk premium in the renminbi, Taiwanese dollar, and Korean won, and this pricing accords with our longstanding political assessment. The closure of the US and Chinese consulates in Houston and Chengdu is only the latest example of this escalating dynamic. While the US’s initial sanctions on China over Hong Kong were limited in economic impact, the longer term negative consequences continue to build. Hong Kong was the symbol of the Chinese Communist Party’s compatibility with western liberalism; the removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy strikes a permanent blow against this compatibility. China’s decision to go forward with the imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong – and now to bar pro-democratic candidates from the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which will probably be postponed anyway – has accelerated coalition-building among the western democracies. The UK is now clashing with China more openly, especially after blocking Huawei from its 5G system and welcoming Hong Kong political refugees. Australia and China have fought a miniature trade war of their own over China’s lack of transparency regarding COVID-19, and Canada is implicated in the Huawei affair. Even the EU has taken a more “realist” approach to China. Across the Taiwan Strait, political leaders are assisting fleeing Hong Kongers, crying out against Beijing’s expansion of control in its periphery, rallying support from informal allies in the US and West, and doubling down on their “Silicon Shield” (prowess in semiconductor production) as a source of protection. Intel Corporation’s decision to increase its dependency on TSMC for advanced microchips only heightens the centrality of this island and this company in the power struggle between the US and China. China cannot fulfill its global ambitions if the US succeeds in creating a technological cordon. Taiwan is the key to China’s breaking through that cordon. Therefore Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or even military conflict. The base case is that Beijing will impose economic sanctions first, to undermine Taiwanese leadership. The uncertainty over the US’s willingness to defend Taiwan is still elevated, even if the US is gradually signaling a higher level of commitment. This uncertainty makes strategic miscalculations more likely than otherwise. But Taiwan’s extreme economic dependence on the mainland gives Beijing a lever to pursue its interests and at present that is the most important factor in keeping war risk contained. By the same token, Taiwanese economic and political diversification increases that risk. A “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” that involves trade war and sanctions is our base case, but war cannot be ruled out, and any war would be a major war. Thus investors can safely ignore Tik-Tok, Hong Kong LegCo elections, and accusations of human rights violations in Xinjiang. But they cannot ignore concrete deterioration in the Taiwan Strait. Or, for that matter, the South and East China Seas, which are not about fishing and offshore drilling but about China’s strategic depth and positioning around Taiwan. Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or military conflict. The latest developments have seen the CNY-USD exchange rate roll over after a period of appreciation associated with bilateral deal-keeping (Chart 8). Depreciation makes it more likely that President Trump will take punitive actions, but these will still be consistent with maintaining the phase one deal unless his re-election bid completely collapses, rendering him a lame duck and removing his constraints on more economically significant confrontation. We are perilously close to such an outcome, which is why Trump’s approval rating and head-to-head polling against Joe Biden must be monitored closely. If his budding rebound is dashed, then all bets are off with regard to China and Asian power politics. Chart 8A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation Bottom Line: China’s stimulus, like the US stimulus, is a reason for cyclical optimism regarding risk assets. The phase one trade deal with President Trump is less certain – there is a 40% chance it collapses as stimulus and/or Trump’s political woes remove constraints on conflict. Hong Kong is a red herring except with regard to coalition-building between the US and Europe; the Taiwan Strait is the real geopolitical risk. Maritime conflicts relate to Taiwan and are also market-relevant. Europe, Russia, And Oil Risks Europe has proved a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk, as we have contended. The passage of joint debt issuance in keeping with the seven-year budget reinforces the point. The Dutch, facing an election early next year, held up the negotiations, but ultimately relented as expected. Emmanuel Macron, who convinced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to embrace this major compromise for European solidarity, is seeing his support bounce in opinion polls at home. He is being rewarded for taking a leadership position in favor of European integration as well as for overseeing a domestic economic rebound. His setback in local elections is overstated as a political risk given that the parties that benefited do not pose a risk to European integration, and will ally with him in 2022 against any populist or anti-establishment challenger. We still refrain from reinitiating our long EUR-USD trade, however, given the immediate risks from the US election cycle (Chart 9). We will reevaluate if Trump’s odds of victory fall further. A Biden victory is very favorable for the euro in our view. Chart 9EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity We are bullish on pound sterling because even a delay or otherwise sub-optimal outcome to trade talks is mostly priced in at current levels (Charts 10A and 10B). Prime Minister Boris Johnson has the raw ability to walk away without a deal, in the context of strong domestic stimulus, but the long-term economic consequences could condemn him to a single term in office. Compromise is better and in both parties’ interests. Chart 10APound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Chart 10BPound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Two other risks are worth a mention in this month’s GeoRisk Update: Chart 11Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: In recent reports we have maintained that Russian geopolitical risk is understated by markets. Domestic unrest is rising, the Trump administration could impose penalties over Nordstream 2 or other issues to head off criticism on the campaign trail, and a Biden administration would be outright confrontational toward Putin’s regime. Moscow may intervene in the US elections or conduct larger cyber attacks. US sanctions could ultimately target trading of local currency Russian government bonds, which so far have been spared (Chart 11). Iran: The jury is still out on whether the recent series of mysterious explosions affecting critical infrastructure in Iran are evidence of a clandestine campaign of sabotage (Table 3). The nature of the incidents leaves some room for accident and coincidence.1 But the inclusion of military and nuclear sites in the list leads us to believe that some degree of “wag the dog” is going on. The prime suspect would be Israel and/or the United States during the window of opportunity afforded by the Trump administration, which looks to be closing over the next six months. Trump likely has a high tolerance for conflict with Iran ahead of the election. Even though Americans are war-weary, they will rally to the president’s defense if Iran is seen as the instigator, as opinion polls showed they did in September 2019 and January of this year. Iran is avoiding goading Trump so far but if it suffers too great of damage from sabotage then it may be forced to react. The dynamic is unstable and hence an oil price spike cannot be ruled out. Table 3Wag The Dog Scenario Playing Out In Iran Chart 12Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil markets have the capacity and the large inventories necessary to absorb supply disruptions caused by a single Iranian incident (Chart 12). Only a chain reaction or major conflict would add to upward pressure. This would also require global demand to stay firm. The threat from COVID-19 suggests that volatility is the only thing one can count on in the near-term. Over the long run we remain bullish crude oil due to the unfettered commitment by world governments to reflation. Bottom Line: The euro rally is fundamentally supported but faces exogenous risks in the short run. We would steer clear of Russian currency and local currency bonds over the US election campaign and aftermath, particularly if Trump’s polling upturn becomes a dead cat bounce. Iran is a “gray swan” geopolitical risk, hiding in plain sight, but its impact on oil markets will be limited unless a major war occurs. Investment Implications The US dollar is at a critical juncture. Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor argues that if the DXY index breaks beneath the 93-94 then the greenback has entered a structural bear market. The most recent close was 93.45 and it has hovered below 94 since Monday. Failure to pass US stimulus quickly could result in a dollar bounce along with other safe havens. Over the short run, investors should be prepared for this and other negative surprises relating to the US election and significant geopolitical risks, especially involving China, the tech war, and the Taiwan Strait. Over the long run, investors should position for more fiscal support to combine with ultra-easy monetary policy for as far as the eye can see. The Federal Reserve is not even “thinking about thinking about raising rates.” This combination ultimately entails rising commodity prices, a weakening dollar, and international equity outperformance relative to both US equities and government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Raz Zimmt, "When it comes to Iran, not everything that goes boom in the night is sabotage," Atlantic Council, July 30, 2020. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China Russia UK Germany France Italy Canada Spain Taiwan Korea Turkey Brazil Section III: Geopolitical Calendar
Informe especial Highlights The epicenter of the new Middle East crisis is the Shia Crescent, which threatens global oil supply. However, the escalation of conflict in the Mediterranean is also relevant to global investors. The crises in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean are escalating as President Erdogan makes a last attempt to benefit from his relationship with Trump before US elections in November. A breakup between Turkey and NATO is not our base case, but European sanctions against Turkey are likely. Turkish risk will rise. A revival in Libyan oil production would not be a meaningful risk to the recovery in oil markets. Stay strategically long Brent crude oil. Libya could become a “Black Swan” for market participants exposed to southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. We remain short our EM Strongman Currency Basket versus other emerging market currencies. Feature Dear Clients, This week we present to you a special report on Turkey by my colleague Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor, Geopolitical Strategy. Roukaya argues that President Erdogan is at a crossroads in which he will confront major military and economic constraints to his foreign policy adventurism. On Monday, July 27 you will receive a special report that I co-wrote with Anastasios Avgeriou, chief strategist of our US Equity Strategy. In this report we continue our analysis of the equity sector implications of the upcoming US election. Anastasios also provides analysis of two cyclical sectors that you may find of interest. On Friday, July 31 we will send you our regular monthly GeoRisk Update, which surveys our proprietary, market-based geopolitical risk indicators and what they imply for your portfolio. We trust you will enjoy these reports and look forward to your feedback. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Shia Crescent' Flailing Under Maximum Pressure And COVID-19 The Middle East is suffering a wave of instability after the COVID-19 crisis just as it did in the years after the 2008 financial crisis. The crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen were never resolved and now new crises are emerging from Egypt and Turkey to Iran and Iraq. By contrast with the “Arab Spring” of 2011, the epicenter of the political earthquake this time around is likely to be the “Shia Crescent,” i.e. Iran, Iraq, eastern Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon. The US policy of maximum pressure on Iran, which is intensifying in the lead-up to the US election, has weakened Iran and its sphere of influence (Chart 1). Chart 2Dominant Arab States Also Face Struggles Meanwhile the pandemic and collapse in oil prices have destabilized the predominantly Arab states (Chart 2). Authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that consolidated power after the Arab Spring are more stable than they were but still vulnerable to external and internal forces. These cyclical developments are occurring against the backdrop of structural changes like the US’s energy independence and strategic pivot to Asia, which have created a power vacuum in the Middle East. The pivot to Asia is rooted in US grand strategy and has proceeded across partisan administrations, so it will continue. Indeed US-China tensions are escalating rapidly in 2020 despite the financial market’s lack of interest. Turkey and Russia are scrambling to take advantage of the US’s withdrawal and gain greater influence through regional proxy wars. This year has seen a marked escalation of their involvement in Libya, where the war is re-escalating and drawing in Egypt, Europe, and Gulf Arabs. At minimum a Mediterranean conflict could affect oil prices as well as Turkish, Russian, and other regional financial assets. At maximum it could affect European assets, which are exposed to geopolitical risk in Turkey and North Africa. The Shia Crescent is the crisis’s epicenter, but Libya is also investment relevant. Bottom Line: The epicenter of the new Middle East crisis is the Shia Crescent, which threatens global oil supply. However, the escalation of conflict in the Mediterranean is also relevant to global investors, primarily through its potential to impact European assets. Re-Escalation In Libya The Libyan crisis has been escalating since the beginning of the year and is on the verge of turning into a major multilateral conflict. The risk now is that Egypt, another regional power, will intervene in Libya against Turkey in a battle for North African hegemony (Map 1). Map 1Libya Could Become A "Black Swan" Event Several incidents since we outlined Egypt’s red lines on the Libyan conflict suggest that Cairo and Ankara will clash in Libya (Table 1). Table 1Egypt And Turkey Up The Ante In Libya While Egypt has declared Sirte and al-Jufra as red lines, threatening military intervention if crossed, Turkey is calling for the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) withdrawal from these regions as a precondition for a ceasefire (Map 2). Egypt is allied with General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, which is based in Benghazi and holds parliament in Tobruk. Map 2Libya’s Battlefront Is Closing In On The Oil Crescent The next move is now in Turkey’s hands. The escalation depends on whether it insists on moving forward toward Egypt’s red line. Turkey’s recent movements do not suggest it is backing down. True on July 21, and again on July 22, top officials from Turkey’s foreign ministry referred to a political solution as being the only solution in Libya. However, these statements were made while Turkey held diplomatic meetings with Niger and Malta that could be aimed at establishing airbases there.1 At its core, the conflict in Libya is a clash between the two dominant geopolitical forces in the Middle East. On the one hand, Turkey and Qatar are independent economic forces to Saudi Arabia and supporters of political Islam. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt form an economic bloc and support Saudi religious authority and political authoritarianism. Bottom Line: The crisis in Libya is heading toward an Egypt-Turkey confrontation. Be ready for an escalation. Egypt Has More To Lose Than Turkey In Libya Both Egypt and Turkey are nearing a point of no return in Libya. A last-minute change of heart from either side would be increasingly more humiliating, both domestically and regionally. Chart 3Defeat In Libya Would Accelerate Erdogan’s Decline While Egypt’s geographic proximity to Libya makes it more interested in what goes on there and will give it a home advantage in any military confrontation, Egypt’s military may be overstretched as it is also at risk of conflict with Ethiopia over water resources.2 For Egypt, a victory would resuscitate its position as a regional power, bringing about a new era of greater Egyptian regional leadership. It would silence domestic skeptics who argue Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule is based on the illegitimate ousting of Egypt’s only democratically elected leader. It would squash any prospect of a revival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and validate authoritarian rulers in the region. It could also annul the recent Libya-Turkey maritime demarcation agreement – a positive for Egypt’s natural gas ambitions. A loss would be a wake-up call for Egypt’s military, which has been spending scarce funds on costly equipment. It may also result in a change in leadership in Egypt or at the very least weaken al-Sisi’s domestic power and Egypt’s regional clout. The regime would persist over the short and medium term, but it would suffer a loss of legitimacy and the underground domestic opposition would intensify, creating a long-term threat. A complete defeat of LNA forces would pose a major security risk. Haftar’s LNA acts as a buffer between Egypt and unfriendly militias in Western Libya. Turkey does not have a vital national strategic interest in Libya and therefore the constraint pushing against on a protracted conflict is stronger than it is for Egypt. Given that Turkey is a democracy, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has more to lose in the case of a military defeat. It would accelerate the decline in his popular support and that of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Chart 3). A conflict with Egypt is therefore a gratuitous gamble. However, victory would vindicate Erdogan’s efforts to create a strongman regime and revive memories of the great Ottoman empire.3 Such an accomplishment could mark a major turning point for Erdogan. His domestic blunders would be forgiven and he would be able to claim that he is one of the great leaders of Turkey. Given that Turkey lacks strategic necessity in Libya, and a defeat could dislodge Erdogan in 2023, one should expect Turkey not to cross Egypt’s red lines. However, Erdogan’s rule has been characterized by hubris, nationalism, and foreign assertiveness to distract from domestic economic mismanagement. Therefore we cannot have a high conviction that Turkey will bow to its political and military constraints. The risk of a large conflict is underrated. Bottom Line: Egypt has greater national interests at stake in Libya than Turkey. The implication is that Turkey should recognize Egyptian red lines. However, Turkey’s decision to intervene in Libya suggests that Erdogan could overreach. Libya could become a “Black Swan” for market participants exposed to southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. Will Turkey Break With NATO? Since signing the maritime and military cooperation agreements with Libya on November 27, Turkey has raised its stakes in Libya. Ankara has sent more armed drones, surface-to-air missile defense systems, naval frigates, a hundred officers, and up to 3,800 Syrian fighters. It has rolled back all of the strategic gains that the Libyan National Army made in 2019. The timing of the recent escalation is significant. The US election cycle offers Erdogan a chance to increase Turkey’s foreign assertiveness with minimal US retaliation. US-Turkish relations have been icy for years. Turkey is an ascendant regional power that is pursuing an increasingly independent national policy, while the US is no longer as dominant of a global hegemonic power capable of enforcing discipline among minor allies. The US alliance with the Kurds in Syria and Iraq has alienated Turkey. The 2016 Turkish coup attempt also increased the level of distrust between the two states. However, President Trump’s personal and political affinity for President Erdogan has resulted in a permissive policy toward Turkey. Trump seeks to distance the US from conflicts in Syria and Libya inherited from his predecessor. He has little commitment to the Kurds. More broadly he has embraced geopolitical multipolarity and avoided telling Erdogan what to do. The Trump administration has not retaliated against Turkey for purchasing Russia’s S400 missile defense system or for pursuing expansive maritime-territorial claims near Cyprus. Even though the Turkish arms purchase makes it eligible for sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the Trump administration has yet to impose sanctions. Senator Lindsey Graham, who is close to the Trump administration, suggested in July 2019 that sanctions could be avoided if Turkey did not activate the system.4 Turkey, for its part, has yet to activate the system three months after the April target date for activation. Turkey blames the delay on COVID-19. With regard to Libya, the Trump administration has remained largely on the sidelines. It has promised to reduce American commitment to overseas conflicts and has criticized the Obama administration’s intervention in Libya in 2011 to bail out the European allies. Officially the US is aligned with Fayez al-Sarraj’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), but so far its role has been minimal, refraining from providing any military support. Moreover, Washington’s key allies in the region – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, even France – support the Libyan National Army. Libya could become a “Black Swan” event. It is Haftar’s other main backer – Russia – that would present an incentive for greater American involvement. The US African Command reports that two thousand Russian mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group have fought in Libya. The US also reported in June that at least 14 MiG29 and Su-24 Russian warplanes were sent to Libya via Syria, believed to be located in the al-Jufra airbase. Moreover, the US State Department has accused Russia of printing billions of fake Libyan dinars to fund Haftar’s forces.5 The Trump administration has been permissive toward Russia as well as Turkey, letting them work out deals with each other, but US electoral politics could prompt Trump to make shows of strength against Russia to fend off criticism. Thus the months in the lead up to the US elections offer the Turkish leader what may be a closing opportunity to increase the country’s foreign assertiveness with minimal US retribution. If Trump loses, Erdogan may face a less sympathetic Washington. By contrast France, also a NATO ally, has taken a stronger position against Ankara over its involvement in Libya. Relations with other eastern Mediterranean countries have also been rocky due to Turkey’s exclusion from gas deals in the region and drilling in disputed waters near Cyprus and Greece. France has a commercial interest in Libya’s oil industry and backs Haftar’s Libyan National Army to some extent.6 Citing aggressive behavior by Turkish warships after an encounter in the Mediterranean, France suspended its involvement in NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian on July 1.7 France has also demanded EU sanctions against Turkey – both for its drilling activities around Cyprus as well as for its role in Libya.8 Still, Europeans have little appetite for direct intervention in Libya. The leaders of France, Italy and Germany have threatened sanctions against foreign states that violate the arms embargo in Libya. This warning comes after EU foreign ministers agreed to discuss the possibility of another set of sanctions against Turkey in their August meeting if Turkey persists in converting the Hagia Sophia from a museum to a mosque. Despite the fracturing within NATO, the alliance will not break up. Turkey’s geographic proximity to Russia, large number of troops, and military strength make it an essential member of the defense treaty (Chart 4). Chart 4NATO Will Not Break With Turkey Instead, the Europeans will retaliate against Erdogan’s foreign adventurism through sanctions, while maintaining the NATO alliance. This acts as a cyclical rebuke without damaging the secular relationship. Europe will use sanctions to retaliate against Turkey’s provocations. The Europeans will be particularly rattled if Turkey succeeds in its North African endeavor and amasses significant regional power as a result. Victory in Libya would make Turkey the gatekeeper to two major migrant entry points to the European continent, providing Ankara with leverage in its negotiations with Europe (Chart 5). It would also increase the likelihood that Turkey increases its assertive behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy are seeking to develop a natural gas hub. Chart 5Turkish Victory In Libya Would Rattle Europe Although Erdogan shows no signs of backing down, constraints suggest that Erdogan may pull back from being perceived as overly provocative. The Turkish economy is highly dependent on Europe in trade and capital flows (Chart 6). Thus unlike American sanctions, which have little bearing on the Turkish economy short of radical financial measures, European sanctions suppress any chance of an economic recovery. Chart 6European Sanctions Would Reverse Turkey's Recovery Chart 7Erdogan Risks Popularity By Overstepping In Libya And East Med Turkey’s frail economy and crackdown on opposition parties could weigh on Erdogan’s approval, which is losing its COVID-induced bounce (Chart 7). Thus, as in the case of Egypt, Erdogan should recognize these constraints and reduce his foreign assertiveness. If he does not, then he will hit up against material constraints that will harm the Turkish economy. Bottom Line: The Libyan crisis is escalating as Erdogan makes a last attempt to benefit from his relationship with Trump before US elections in November. Washington’s detached stance in Libya highlights that its foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere – in Asia and Iran. Meanwhile, Europe is divided over Libya. A breakup between Turkey and NATO is not our base case, but new European sanctions against Turkey are not unlikely. A Turkish victory in Libya would lead to a significant escalation in tensions between Turkey and the West. Investment Implications Turkish geopolitical risk is set to rise in the lead up to the November US elections as Turkey becomes increasingly embroiled in foreign conflicts – in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and most recently in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict (Chart 8). Ankara’s more provocative stances raise the risk of sanctions from the US and more significantly from the EU. This would hurt Turkish risk assets at a time of already heightened vulnerability. If Turkey manages to secure a victory in Libya, it would benefit economically from construction and energy contracts there. However, it would also result in a significant uptick in geopolitical tensions in the Middle East as the West and the West’s regional allies will be disturbed by Ankara’s expanding influence. Stay short our EM Strongman Currency Basket composed of the Turkish lira, Philippine peso, and Brazilian real versus other emerging market currencies. Even though the lira is already cheap against the US dollar, it faces more downside due to the risks highlighted in this report and the massive growth in money supply in Turkey. Similarly, the prospect of a military confrontation will raise the equity risk premium priced in Egyptian stocks. Egypt will continue underperforming emerging markets as long as it remains invested in an unsettled conflict in Libya (Chart 9). Chart 8Turkish Risk Will Rise Libyan oil exports are unlikely to stage a major revival anytime soon (Chart 10). Although the Libyan National Oil Company lifted force majeure on July 10, Haftar’s Libyan National Army reintroduced the blockade a day later. Clashes are also occurring near oil facilities in the Brega region where Syrian, Sudanese, and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries currently have a presence. Chart 9Egyptian Risk Assets Will Underperform Chart 10Libyan Oil Handicapped By Haftar’s Blockade Chart 11Stay Bullish Euro Over The Long Run Even in the best-case scenario, in which force majeure is promptly lifted, the blockade damaged both the reservoirs and oil and gas infrastructure, preventing a resurgence of exports to pre-January levels. The Libyan National Oil Company warned that unless oil production restarts immediately, output will average 650,000 barrels per day in 2022. This is significantly less than the over 1 million barrels per day just prior to the blockade, and the 2.1 million barrels per day Libya had planned to produce by 2024. In any case these figures pale in comparison to the production curtailments currently in place by OPEC 2.0, which are set to decrease to 8.3 million barrels per day beginning in August from 9.6 million barrels per day now. Given OPEC 2.0’s demonstrated commitment to production discipline, a revival in Libyan oil production is not a meaningful risk to the recovery in oil markets. We remain strategically long Brent crude oil, which is up 78% since inception in March. This trade could experience near-term volatility due to any hiccups in global economic stimulus or risk-off events from geopolitical risks. But over a 12-month time frame we expect oil prices to rise higher. BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy strategists expect Brent prices to average $44/bbl in 2H2020, and $65/bbl in 2021. The recent rise in the euro is rooted in global macro and structural factors but a major Mediterranean crisis and/or other geopolitical risks we have highlighted surrounding the US election cycle could create headwinds in the short term. Over the long run we are bullish euro (Chart 11).   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 In Niger, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met with his Nigerien counterpart and stated the two states’ willingness to boost bilateral relations in agriculture, mining, energy, industry, and trade. A day earlier, Turkey and Qatar’s defense ministers met with Libya’s minister of interior in Ankara to discuss the situation in Libya. And on July 20, a trilateral meeting was held between Turkey’s defense minister, Libya’s interior minister, and Malta’s minister of home affairs and national security. The inclusion of Malta – located just north of Libya in the Mediterranean – is perplexing. The three discussed defense cooperation and efforts toward regional stability and peace. These recent meetings could suggest that Turkey is negotiating agreements to fortify its strategic approaches to Libya. This could involve greenlighting airbases in Niger and Malta in exchange for economic support and Qatari funding. 2 The latest developments suggest that the Egypt-Ethiopia conflict is de-escalating. On July 21, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed tweeted that Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan had reached a “common understanding on continuing technical discussions on filling.” But Ethiopia will have an opportunity if Egypt becomes embroiled in Libya. 3 The Turks ruled Tripolitania from the mid-1500s until Italy’s 1912 victory in the Italo-Turkish War. Surveys conducted by Metropoll reveal that the share of Turks with a positive perception of Turkey’s active role in Libya shot up to 58% in June from 35% in January. 4 Senate Majority Whip John Thune has even proposed using the US Army’s missile procurement account to buy the Russian missiles from Turkey, thus reducing tensions between the two NATO allies. This is unlikely to occur because it would look politically weak in the US, while Turkey would face Russian pressure. The US suspended Turkey from the F35 Joint Strike Fighter program, banning it from purchasing F35s, and removing it from the aircraft’s production program. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated that the US would only consider allowing Turkey back into the F35 Joint Strike Program if the Russian defense system were moved out of the country. The Turkish purchase of the Russian defense system was partly driven by the need to work with Russia and partly driven by Erdogan’s desire to reduce the risk of another coup attempt. Ankara was indefensible against the Turkish Air Force’s F-16s during the 2016 coup attempt since its military relies heavily on US built missile defense. 5 Moscow has denied all allegations of involvement in Libya. 6 US-made javelin missiles purchased by France were found at the pro-Haftar base in Gharyan in June last year, raising suspicion that France was backing Haftar’s offensives. 7 On June 10, French frigate Courbet approached a Tanzanian-flagged ship heading to Libya in suspicion that it was violating the UN arms embargo. France accused three Turkish vessels that were escorting the Tanzanian vessel of harassment by targeting the Courbet’s fire control radars. Turkey denied harassing the Courbet and maintains that the Tanzanian vessel was transporting humanitarian aid to Libya. A NATO investigation into the incident was inconclusive. 8 The EU agreed to impose sanctions on two Turkish oil company officials in February in protest against Turkish drilling activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. However these sanctions are mostly just political symbolism.
Informe especial Dear Clients, This week we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center. He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Highlights As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Feature   As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart 1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. Chart 1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart 2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart 2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart 3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart 3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table 1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table 1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart 4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Chart 4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Chart 5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart 5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart 6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. Chart 6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart 7). Chart 7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart 8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart 9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart 8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart 9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map 1). Map 1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart 10). Chart 10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. Chart 11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Chart 12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart 12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix TableMajor Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade   Footnotes Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan. “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul. “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser. “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019. Putin, Vladimir. “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948).
Highlights The bull market in US-Iran tensions was never resolved, and now a series of suspicious explosions in Iran raises the possibility that tensions will re-escalate. Iran’s interest lies in waiting out Trump so that a Democratic victory in the US election can restore the US-Iran strategic détente agreed in 2015. However, both the Trump administration and US ally Israel are applying “maximum pressure” on Iran and could go on the offensive at a time when Trump’s odds of re-election are collapsing. Israel cannot engage in a full-fledged war with Iran alone but it would have American backing for pressure tactics through the duration of Trump’s term. A “wag the dog” scenario is not inconceivable because the US and Israel have long-term national security interests at stake while Iran is on the verge of economic collapse. Investors should prepare for near-term global equity volatility and safe-haven demand for a number of reasons but a major escalation in Iran would add to the list. Stay long Brent crude oil. Feature Since May 2018 we have argued that US-Iran tensions will remain market-relevant. We downgraded the odds of US air strikes from 40% in June 2019 to 20% in January of this year after Iran’s lackluster retaliation to the US assassination of its top military commander. Now things are heating up again due to a series of extremely suspicious explosions in Iran that may or may not be linked to Israel and the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic, oil price rout, and global recession have reinforced this bull market in US-Iran tensions by weakening and destabilizing the entire Shia Crescent, from Lebanon to Iran. They have also pushed President Trump dangerously close to “lame duck” status, which reduces the constraints on conflict with Iran for the remainder of his term. In this report we update our Iran view by looking at whether the Trump administration or Israel could attempt to “wag the dog,” i.e. provoke a conflict with Iran to boost Trump’s re-election odds or achieve some long-term strategic objectives while Trump is still in power. We have long held the view that Iran poses a market-relevant geopolitical risk and now the mysterious attacks in Iran suggest it could be materializing. Nothing is confirmed, but it is wise for investors to monitor these developments in case they escalate. Geopolitical incidents often cause buying opportunities but they can create substantial equity drawdowns first. Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East A string of mysterious explosions and fires at military and economic facilities have rocked Iran in recent days (Table 1). Table 1Iran Hit By A String Of Mysterious Attacks The most significant of these incidents is the July 2 explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility – Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, which houses a new centrifuge assembly center.1 The fire resulted in a significant setback to the development and production of advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges used to enrich uranium – by up to two years. Iranian officials initially downplayed the incidents as unsuspicious accidents. However the Natanz explosion was too significant to cast off. Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA declared that the Natanz incident may be the work of foreign countries, “especially the Zionist regime [Israel] and the US,” and vowed Iranian retaliation if sabotage is proven to be the case. Similarly, the New York Times reported that an anonymous Middle Eastern intelligence official – rumored to be Mossad chief Yossi Cohen – called the incident the work of Israel.2 Israel’s response to these allegations has been oblique, but the accusation is not far-fetched. Israel has a successful history of halting the advancement of nuclear programs in the region. Mossad’s Operation Opera destroyed Iraq’s only known nuclear facility in 1981, and Operation Outside the Box bombed a suspected nuclear reactor at the Kibar site in Syria in 2007. Israeli intelligence has also previously been accused of targeting Iran’s missile program – with the assassination of four Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2012. Israel is also believed to be involved, with the US, in Operation Olympic Games, the Stuxnet cyber attacks that stunted Iran’s uranium enrichment program circa 2010. Iran’s ballistic missile program and alleged nuclear weapons ambitions remain Israel’s greatest long-term strategic threat in the region. More recently, Iran and Israel have been locked in a series of cyber-attacks. Israel claims to have foiled an Iranian attack on its water facilities in April which attempted a cyber break on water control systems. A May 9 cyberattack on Iranian shipping hub Shahid Rajaae – through which half of Iran’s maritime trade traverses – is seen as Israeli retaliation. Most recently, Israel’s Mossad revealed that it thwarted Iranian attempts to attack Israeli diplomatic missions in Europe. These attacks come as the US increases pressure on UN Security Council members to support the indefinite extension of the UN arms embargo against Iran, which is scheduled to expire on October 18.3 But other signatories to the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement – China, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France – argue that since the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), its threat to invoke a “snapback” provision of the deal to reimpose former UN sanctions on Iran is not legally valid. The other JCPA signatories remain committed to the deal, arguing for its necessity in order to continue IAEA inspections that prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. They are biding their time to see if Trump is re-elected before deciding anything. Iran has moved further from the JCPA’s requirements since announcing, on January 5, 2020, that it will no longer comply with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 2). The risk is that unless controlled, this will eventually significantly reduce Iran’s “breakout time” – the time required to acquire enough fissile material for one bomb. The nuclear deal aimed to maintain at least a one-year breakout time, and this is generally understood to be the US’s “red line.” Table 2Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Despite some non-compliance, Iran is still permitting IAEA inspectors to monitor and verify its nuclear activities. Yet the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution, requesting Iran’s cooperation in the investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and sites.4 Chart 1Iran's Sphere Of Influence In Collapse As tensions with US and Israel escalate, Tehran has been keen to highlight its military capabilities. Revolutionary Guard Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza revealed the existence of onshore and offshore underground missile sites along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, holding advanced long-range missiles and new weapons, more capable of launching attacks against enemies. Escalating tensions raise the likelihood of retaliation as Iran reconsiders its “strategic patience” policy.5 Tehran had been playing the waiting game, especially since Trump’s decision to assassinate Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani in January. Iran has an interest in avoiding confrontation in the months ahead of the US election on November 3. Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia in September 2019 led to a boost in Trump’s approval rating. A major conflict today would cause a patriotic rally around the president at a time when he is beset with negative opinion over the coronavirus response and poor race relations. Iran has an interest in Joe Biden winning the presidency in November. Biden would likely restore the US-Iran deal, which would remove sanctions and allow Iran to open its economy. However, neither the Trump administration nor the Israeli government share that interest. The latest attacks raise the possibility that the US and/or Israel are going on the offensive. This could force Iran to retaliate. Iranian moderates are already suffering domestically. Iran’s hardline parliamentarians were never on board with the nuclear deal and criticized President Hassan Rouhani when President Trump pulled out of it in May 2018. This past weekend Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, an ally of Rouhani whose reputation also rests on the deal, was heckled as he addressed the parliament. As of February, parliament is mostly comprised of hardliners.6 Iran is also on shaky ground in the Shia Crescent. Lebanon and Iraq – the two countries most entrenched in Iran’s sphere of influence – have been experiencing civil unrest. Protesters in both countries initially took to the streets last fall in demonstration of anger over government corruption, the sectarian based political system, and poor economic conditions. The pandemic and recession have breathed new life into these movements. The Lebanese pound collapsed on the parallel market since October, and some groups have called for the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah (Chart 1). Meanwhile a June cabinet decision in Iraq to cap the amount and number of state salaries and pension payments collected – in attempt to buttress the country’s ailing finances – fueled outrage. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is also in a tussle with Iran-backed paramilitary forces as he attempts to curb their influence and bring them under state control.7 Chart 2Iran Has Little To Lose Thus a timid stance by Iran in face of foreign attacks will not go down well. Instead, with oil production having collapsed, the economy in shambles, and its sphere of influence in turmoil, Tehran has little to lose in protecting what is left of its nuclear program and deterring American or Israeli aggression (Chart 2). With few options left, Iran is likely to move further away from its “strategic patience” in response to the uptick in “maximum pressure.” Bottom Line: Tensions are escalating between Tehran and Washington/Tel Aviv. Cyber attacks are likely to increase in the lead up to the expiration of the arms embargo on October 18 and US elections this fall. Iran may be forced to abandon its policy of “strategic patience” if its foes sabotage its nuclear capabilities. Expect the conflict to spillover to Iran’s proxies in the region – Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. So What? Massive monetary and fiscal stimulus and continued commitment from OPEC 2.0 on the supply side will keep oil prices moving higher this year. Barring a second COVID-19 wave, our Commodity & Energy Strategists expect oil markets to rebalance beginning in 3Q2020, with Brent prices averaging $40/bbl this year and $65/bbl in 2021 (Chart 3). We remain long Brent which is up 70.55% since initiation in March.   The escalation in tensions in the Persian Gulf is an upside risk to this assessment. That said, with major oil producers now operating significantly below capacity in compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production agreement, the net impact on oil prices will likely be muted and short-lived. Production can be increased to fill gaps. As demonstrated by the recent acts of sabotage in Iran and Israel, the increase in geopolitical tensions globally will manifest in cyberattacks, supporting cyber stocks. Our strategically long ISE Cyber Security Index relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector trade is up 2% since initiation in April (Chart 4). Chart 3Oil Markets On The Way To Recovery Chart 4Buy Cybersecurity Stocks Finally, we should note that Iran is not the only geopolitical risk that could explode amid the US election cycle. China is the greater risk. But President Trump faces fewer financial and economic constraints in a conflict with Iran than he does in a conflict with China. A conflict with Iran could change the game ahead of the election at a time when Trump is beset with the coronavirus and social unrest. His opinion polling would benefit from a rally around the flag, as it did in September 2019. The risk for Trump is that this bump may not last long. Americans are less concerned about Iran than China and Russia and Trump himself has benefited from American weariness of Middle Eastern wars. All we can say for certain is that the US election is of critical strategic importance to several major and minor powers. Trump’s allies and enemies know that the next six months offer their best chance to take actions that either affect the election or exploit the current alignment of US foreign policy relative to a Democratic Party alignment. While China probably prefers Biden, it can deal with either ruling party. Whereas Israel has a unique opportunity to advance its objectives under Trump and Iran has a clear imperative to remove Trump from office.   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The damaged building was constructed in 2013 to be a site for the development of advanced centrifuges. Work there was stopped in 2015 as per requirements of the JCPA, but was restarted when the US withdrew from the deal in 2018. 2 Meanwhile a group of dissidents from within Iran’s military and security forces, calling themselves Homeland Cheetahs, claimed responsibility for the Natanz attack. However, it is possible that the claim was made with the intention to mislead. Please see Jiyar Gol, "Iran blasts: What is behind mysterious fires at key sites?" BBC News, July 6, 2020. 3 The draft US resolution bans Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring weapons after the October 18 expiration of the embargo. It bans UN member states from purchasing Iranian arms or permitting citizens to train or provide financial resources or assistance to Iran without Security Council approval. 4 This resolution, introduced by France, Germany, and the UK, refers to an undeclared uranium metal disc, potential fuel-cycle-related activities such as uranium processing and conversion, and suspected storage of nuclear material. Iran’s parliament responded by issuing a statement signed by 240 out of the 290 members which called the resolution excessive and requested that Iran halt voluntary implementation of additional protocol and change inspections 5 Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA published the following commentary in response to the Natanz explosion: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far tried to prevent intensifying crises and the formation of unpredictable conditions and situation … the crossing of red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran by hostile countries, especially the Zionist regime and the US, means that strategy … should be revised." 6 In addition, 120 out of the 290 parliamentarians signed and delivered a motion to the presiding board of the assembly, requesting that Rouhani be summoned for questioning. The presiding board may not issue the summons and is unlikely to result in Rouhani’s impeachment as Khamenei has requested unity amid high foreign tensions. It nonetheless reflects Rouhani’s weakened position ahead of next year’s elections. 7 Hisham al-Hashemi, an advisor to Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi who had advised the government on reducing the influence of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, was killed on July 6, days after receiving threatening telephone calls from militias.
Informe especial Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.
Informe especial Highlights Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Feature Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart 1). Chart 1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.1  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart 2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart 3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. Chart 2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism Chart 3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart 4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart 5). Chart 4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession Chart 5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.2 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart 6).3 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart 6Globalization Hits A Major Top The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP  ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart 7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyber space has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Chart 7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart 8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.4  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart 9). Chart 8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism Chart 9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart 10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart 10).5 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a "coalition of the willing" to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart 11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart 12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart 11English Versus Scottish Nationalism Chart 12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart 13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart 13Chinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart 14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart 14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart 15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart 15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 2  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020. 3 Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95. 4 Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 5 In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.