Fiscal
U.S. monetary conditions will continue to support asset prices and worldwide economic activity for the coming 18 months or so. The Fed will ease policy further and is a long way from tightening. We are still on track for three 25-basis-point rate cuts this…
The Indian government resorted to an unexpected large corporate income tax cut last week. The government reduced the effective corporate tax rate from 35% to around 25%. If domestic bond yields rise materially in response to this fiscal stimulus, share prices…
The market is priced for roughly one more 25 bps rate cut before the end of the year. More specifically, the fed funds futures market is split 50/50 on whether that rate cut occurs at the October or December FOMC meeting. The market currently sees only a 4%…
Fed Chairman Jerome Powell had his work cut out for him at last week’s FOMC press conference. First, he had to craft a coherent message about the Fed’s reaction function following a meeting where three voting members dissented from the committee’s decision to…
Destacados
Estamos aprovechando la reclasificación de las acciones indias de infraponderadas a neutrales dentro de una cartera de renta variable de mercados emergentes (EM).
No obstante, las perspectivas para el rendimiento absoluto de los precios de las acciones indias siguen siendo negativas.
Es probable que los rendimientos de los bonos locales aumenten debido al ensanchamiento del déficit presupuestario.
Rendimientos de los bonos más altos y un crecimiento todavía deprimido anularán el efecto positivo puntual de las reducciones del impuesto corporativo en los precios de las acciones.
Análisis
La medida extraordinaria e inesperada se adoptó porque el crecimiento de la economía india se ha desacelerado drásticamente.
El gobierno indio recurrió la semana pasada a una inesperada y amplia reducción del impuesto sobre la renta corporativa. El gobierno redujo la tasa efectiva del impuesto corporativo del 35% a alrededor del 25%. ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones de inversión de este drástico cambio de política?
¿Por qué la medida extraordinaria?
La medida extraordinaria e inesperada se adoptó porque el crecimiento de la economía india se ha desacelerado drásticamente:
El gasto discrecional de los hogares se está reduciendo (Gráfico I-1).
Las medidas del gasto de capital por parte de las empresas son extremadamente débiles y, en muchos casos, también se están contraendo (Gráfico I-2).
Gráfico I-1
India: El gasto discrecional de los hogares se está contrayendo
India: el gasto discrecional de los hogares se está contrayendo
India: el gasto discrecional de los hogares se está contrayendo
Gráfico I-2
India: El gasto de capital está estancado
India: El gasto de capital está estancado
India: El gasto de capital está estancado
Las ganancias por acción de las 500 principales empresas indias cotizadas han caído un 8% respecto al año pasado en términos de moneda local (Gráfico I-3).
Las medidas subyacentes de la inflación son bajas (Gráfico I-4).
Gráfico I-3
Las ganancias corporativas indias se están contrayendo
Las ganancias corporativas indias se están contrayendo.
Las ganancias corporativas indias se están contrayendo.
Gráfico I-4
La inflación está extremadamente contenida
La inflación está extremadamente contenida
La inflación está extremadamente contenida
El banco central ha estado recortando las tasas de interés, pero los costos de endeudamiento en términos reales siguen siendo elevados. La razón es que la inflación ha disminuido, lo que eleva las tasas de préstamo en términos reales (ajustadas por inflación) (Gráfico I-5).
Además, los costos de endeudamiento corporativo (rendimientos de bonos corporativos BBB en moneda local) están por encima del crecimiento del PIB nominal (Gráfico I-6). Esto implica que los costos de endeudamiento no se encuentran en niveles propicios para los desembolsos de inversión de capital por parte de las empresas.
La decisión del gobierno de reducir drásticamente los impuestos sobre la renta corporativa es la decisión de política adecuada en el entorno actual. Los responsables de la política esperan que las empresas, a su vez, inviertan y se desencadene un ciclo económico virtuoso.
Gráfico I-5
Las tasas reales son altas y están aumentando
Las tasas reales son altas y están subiendo
Las tasas reales son altas y están subiendo
Gráfico I-6
Los tipos de endeudamiento son altos en relación con el crecimiento nominal
Las tasas de endeudamiento son altas en relación con el crecimiento nominal
Las tasas de endeudamiento son altas en relación con el crecimiento nominal
Gráfico I-7
Préstamos de bancos comerciales: públicos vs. privados
Préstamos de Bancos Comerciales: Público Vs. Privado
Préstamos de Bancos Comerciales: Público Vs. Privado
Por último, los prestamistas aún están lamiéndose las heridas por los préstamos incobrables. Los bancos públicos han sufrido recortes, las empresas financieras no bancarias están reduciendo actualmente sus balances y los bancos privados podrían ser los siguientes en reducir su ritmo de originación de crédito (Gráfico I-7).
Al comprender que la reducción gradual de las tasas de política del banco central probablemente no impulsará el crecimiento en el corto plazo, las autoridades han recurrido a la política fiscal para estimular. India es un país con inversión insuficiente y el gasto de capital es clave para su potencial de crecimiento a largo plazo. Por lo tanto, la decisión del gobierno de reducir drásticamente los impuestos sobre la renta corporativa es la decisión de política adecuada en el entorno actual. Los responsables de la política esperan que las empresas, a su vez, inviertan y se desencadene un ciclo económico virtuoso.
Una cuestión pertinente para los inversores, sin embargo, es si estas medidas políticas establecerán ahora un suelo para los precios de las acciones o si se presentará una mejor oportunidad de compra más adelante.
Los rendimientos de los bonos locales son la clave de los precios de las acciones
Si los rendimientos de los bonos gubernamentales y corporativos en moneda local aumentan considerablemente en respuesta a este estímulo fiscal, los precios de las acciones tendrán dificultades.
Gráfico I-8
Los altos costos de endeudamiento son negativos para los precios de las acciones
Los altos costos de endeudamiento son negativos para los precios de las acciones.
Los altos costos de endeudamiento son negativos para los precios de las acciones.
Si los rendimientos de los bonos domésticos aumentan considerablemente en respuesta a este estímulo fiscal, los precios de las acciones tendrán dificultades. En cambio, si los rendimientos de los bonos locales se mantienen cerca de los niveles actuales, los precios de las acciones se comportarán bien, especialmente en relación con el índice de referencia de mercados emergentes (EM) (Gráfico I-8).
Críticamente, los precios de las acciones son mucho más sensibles a las tasas de interés y a las expectativas de crecimiento a largo plazo que a los beneficios o dividendos del próximo año.1 La reducción de los impuestos corporativos es un evento puntual que incrementará las ganancias y posiblemente los dividendos el próximo año, pero solo el próximo año.
Si las tasas de interés aumentan o las expectativas de crecimiento nominal a largo plazo se moderan, un aumento puntual de las ganancias corporativas no será suficiente para justificar valoraciones accionarias más altas. Por el contrario, tasas de interés más altas o expectativas de crecimiento nominal más bajas abrumarán el efecto positivo del aumento puntual de las ganancias corporativas el próximo año. Como resultado, el valor justo de las acciones disminuirá, no aumentará.
Conclusión: Los rendimientos de los bonos en moneda local y las expectativas de crecimiento a largo plazo son mucho más importantes para las valoraciones de las acciones que el aumento puntual de las ganancias corporativas.
Perspectivas de los bonos domésticos
¿Por qué aumentarían de manera abrupta los rendimientos de los bonos locales en medio de un crecimiento débil persistente y una inflación muy baja?
La razón principal es un fuerte ensanchamiento del déficit fiscal, lo que obliga a incrementar la emisión de bonos gubernamentales.
El déficit fiscal global del gobierno central era del 3,7% del PIB antes de la última reducción del impuesto corporativo. Sumado a los gobiernos estatales, el déficit fiscal agregado ronda el 6% del PIB.
De cara al futuro, el déficit presupuestario central excederá considerablemente la previsión gubernamental del 3,3% del PIB para este ejercicio fiscal. Además de las reducciones del impuesto corporativo, el crecimiento de los ingresos del gobierno se ha desplomado y seguirá cayendo al menos hasta el final del ejercicio fiscal actual – marzo de 2020 – debido al crecimiento nominal muy débil.
Gráfico I-9
India: Creación de dinero frente al déficit fiscal
India: Creación de dinero frente al déficit fiscal
India: Creación de dinero frente al déficit fiscal
Si la creación de dinero amplio por parte de los bancos comerciales no cubre el déficit fiscal agregado (que equivale a la emisión neta de bonos del gobierno), los rendimientos de los bonos estarán sujetos a presión al alza. Gráfico I-9 muestra que, a medida que el déficit fiscal agregado se dispara, el aumento incremental de la oferta monetaria amplia podría no ser suficiente para absorber el déficit creciente.
Salvo grandes compras de bonos por parte de los bancos, esto implicaría que habrá menos financiación disponible tanto para el sector público como para el privado. Esto empujaría los rendimientos de los bonos al alza.
Aumentan las probabilidades de que la nueva emisión de bonos no sea fácilmente absorbida por el mercado. Con el 28% de los depósitos, las tenencias de bonos gubernamentales por parte de los bancos ya están muy por encima del mínimo legal del 18,75%.
Las tenencias de bonos gubernamentales por parte de extranjeros también se han disparado desde 2014. La apetencia de los inversores extranjeros por los bonos gubernamentales indios probablemente será débil en los próximos meses por las siguientes razones:
Un aumento pronunciado de la relación deuda pública/PIB desde su actual nivel elevado del 67%.
La depreciación de las monedas de mercados emergentes (EM) probablemente desencadenará salidas de capital extranjero de los mercados de renta fija de EM, lo que reducirá la demanda internacional de bonos indios denominados en moneda local.
Los bancos representan el 42% de las tenencias de bonos gubernamentales, las compañías de seguros el 23% y los fondos mutuos y los extranjeros el 3% cada uno. En conjunto, actualmente representan el 71% de los bonos gubernamentales en circulación. Por lo tanto, los bancos son clave para financiar tanto al sector público como al privado.
Gráfico I-10
Participación del RBI en los bonos gubernamentales
Tenencia del RBI de bonos gubernamentales
Tenencia del RBI de bonos gubernamentales
Un riesgo para el escenario de rendimientos de bonos más altos es que el banco central de India acelere aún más sus compras en curso de bonos gubernamentales (Gráfico I-10). En tal caso, los rendimientos de los bonos se verían limitados. Sin embargo, esto implicaría una expansión cuantitativa o la monetización de la deuda pública. Esto último conduciría a la depreciación de la moneda y provocaría la fuga de capitales.
Conclusión: Las probabilidades son de que los rendimientos de los bonos del gobierno indio aumenten. Esto elevará los rendimientos de los bonos corporativos en moneda local y, a su vez, pesará sobre las valoraciones de las acciones.
Conclusiones de inversión
Las perspectivas para el rendimiento absoluto de los precios de las acciones indias siguen siendo negativas (Gráfico I-11, panel superior).
Sin embargo, estamos aprovechando la subrentabilidad de los últimos meses para mejorar la calificación de esta bolsa de infraponderada a neutral dentro de una cartera de renta variable de mercados emergentes (EM) (Gráfico I-11, panel inferior). Las probabilidades de que las acciones superen al índice de referencia de EM han aumentado debido a las reducciones del impuesto corporativo, pero no son lo suficientemente altas como para justificar una asignación en sobreponderación.
Gráfico I-11
Precios de las acciones indias: perfiles de rendimiento absoluto y relativo
Precios de las Acciones de la India: Perfiles de Rendimiento Absoluto y Relativo
Precios de las Acciones de la India: Perfiles de Rendimiento Absoluto y Relativo
Gráfico I-12
Nuestra posición larga en software indio / corta en acciones de EM
Nuestra posición larga en software indio / corta en acciones de mercados emergentes
Nuestra posición larga en software indio / corta en acciones de mercados emergentes
Como ocurre con otras monedas de mercados emergentes (EM), la rupia es vulnerable a un retroceso en los próximos meses. Históricamente, los inversores extranjeros en India han inyectado de forma acumulada 148.000 millones de dólares en fondos de renta variable y de inversión. Por lo tanto, las decepciones acumuladas por parte de los inversores extranjeros respecto a la trayectoria de crecimiento de India y a los déficits fiscales podrían desencadenar un periodo de salidas de capital.
Una moneda más débil y nuestro tema de favorecer apuestas de crecimiento de mercados desarrollados (DM) frente a mercados emergentes (EM) siguen justificando una posición larga en acciones de software indias / corta en el índice de renta variable general de EM. Iniciamos esta posición el 21 de diciembre de 2016 y ha producido ganancias considerables (Gráfico I-12).
Los inversores en renta fija deberían seguir apostando por un pronunciado diferencial en la curva de rendimientos, recibiendo swaps a 1 año y pagando a 10 años.
Arthur Budaghyan Jefe de Estrategia de Mercados Emergentes arthurb@bcaresearch.com
Ayman Kawtharani, Editor/Estratega ayman@bcaresearch.com
Notas
1 La razón es que tanto las tasas de interés como la tasa de crecimiento a largo plazo de las ganancias están presentes en el denominador de cualquier modelo de descuento de flujos de caja (Precio de la acción = Dividendos esperados / (Tasa de interés – Tasa de crecimiento a largo plazo de las ganancias)). Por lo tanto, tienen el potencial de afectar los precios de las acciones de forma exponencial, mientras que los dividendos/beneficios están presentes en el numerador, por lo que su impacto en los precios de las acciones es lineal.
Recomendaciones de acciones
Recomendaciones sobre divisas, crédito y renta fija
Dear Client, Owing to BCA’s 40th Annual Investment Conference at the Grand Hyatt in New York City next week, there will be no report on Wednesday, September 25. We will return to our regular publication schedule on Wednesday, October 2. I look forward to meeting China Investment Strategy clients in person at our conference. Please do not hesitate to say hello. Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist Highlights China’s economy should bottom as a result of the pickup in credit that occurred earlier this year, but the circumstances surrounding the ongoing slowdown are unprecedented in nature. This raises the risk that policymakers will have to do more in order to stabilize growth. Optimism surrounding recent Chinese policy announcements is misguided. For now, Chinese policymakers are not upping the pace of stimulus, which underscores the risk to our forecast that growth will soon stabilize. A more meaningful shot of reflation will occur in the coming few months if the economy slows further, but policymakers will be reactive rather than proactive. Barring a successful (even if temporary) trade deal, we expect more weakness in the RMB as a passive source of reflation to aid the economy. But currency devaluation is a double-edged sword, and cannot be counted on to single-handedly stabilize China’s economy. Over a 6-12 month time horizon, investors should continue to overweight Chinese stocks versus the global benchmark in currency hedged terms, but the risk of further underperformance over the near-term is high. Feature Chinese economic growth continues to weaken. The Caixin manufacturing PMI for August, along with the New Export Orders component of the manufacturing PMI released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, registered small gains in August from July. However, any hopes pinned on this being an emerging sign of turnaround in the Chinese economy soon faded. A slew of August data showed continued sluggishness in exports, an even worse domestic-demand picture, and further deflation in ex-factory producer prices. Most importantly, we continue to witness “half-measured” stimulus. In explaining past and existing economic weakness, many investors point to the trade war with the U.S. However, Charts 1 and 2 serve as an important reminder that domestic weakness predates U.S. protectionism. The trade war tensions and tariffs are magnifying this weakness, but China’s slowdown is, at its core, policy driven. Chart 1Weakness In Chinese Economy Predates The Trade War... Chart 2…And Has Been A Byproduct Of Financial De-Risking Campaign Given this, investors should be more focused on identifying signs of a major reversal in policy. So far Chinese policymakers have been firmly holding their line in keeping credit growth somewhat in check. Policy-Induced Economic Stabilization: A Tough Forecast To Make Our baseline view is that the current scale of stimulus should be sufficient to stop economic growth from decelerating further. Two factors support our baseline view: The direct impact from tariffs on the Chinese economy is limited. Growth in China’s exports to the U.S. in 2019 is likely to be somewhere close to a 9% contraction, down from the 10.8% increase registered in 2018. Based on a simple calculation with all else being equal, this is likely to shave 1.6 percentage points off China’s total export growth and 0.3 percentage points off nominal GDP growth in 2019. This is not trivial, but arguably not devastating to China’s aggregate economy either. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting some Chinese exports have been re-routed to peripheral countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan in order to avoid the U.S. import tariffs on Chinese goods (Chart 3). This suggests that real growth in Chinese exports to the U.S. could be stronger than the current data suggests. Chart 3Exports Finding Alternative Routes? Chart 4Bottoming in the economy In Sight? Credit growth has picked up since the beginning of this year. Based on the historical relationship between China’s credit impulse (measured by the 12-month change in BCA’s adjusted total social financing as a percentage of nominal GDP) and domestic demand, the economy should bottom out at some point before the end of the year (Chart 4). Although, import growth, a key measure of China’s domestic demand, remains in deep contraction, some of its components that usually lead industrial activities are showing signs of improvement (Chart 5). Chart 5Early Signs of Improved Domestic Demand Chart 6Manufacturing Investment Growth In Contraction However, our level of confidence that the existing stimulus will be sufficient to stabilize economic growth is lower than it otherwise would be. This is due to the fact that the challenges facing the Chinese economy are unprecedented in nature. For one, the indirect impact of the trade war on China’s economy through business sentiment and manufacturing investment has yet to be fully revealed in the data. As Chart 6 shows, manufacturing investment is already deteriorating, particularly in export-intensive sectors. The ultimate impact on investment from the trade war is still uncertain, and can pose significant downside risks to the Chinese economy in the coming year. More importantly, as Chart 7 suggests, a weak credit impulse will at best lead to a very subdued economic recovery even if growth does indeed bottom. In terms of the link between policy and the economy, Chart 8 points out a key difference between the current slowdown and previous down cycles: Monetary conditions have been ultra-loose for more than a year, but current economic conditions remain on a downward trend – much more so than in the previous cycles. This huge gap and lag in economic response to monetary stance can only be explained by an impaired policy transmission mechanism. An expansionary monetary stance has not proportionally translated into credit expansion or economic recovery. This challenges the effectiveness and timeliness of future monetary loosening in terms of its ability to revive the Chinese economy. Chart 7Current Pace Of Credit Growth Will Lead To A Fragile Recovery, At Best Chart 8An Impaired Monetary Policy Transmission The scale and timing of the current stimulus measures have been “behind the curve.” Therefore, the historical relationship between China’s credit impulse and the turning points in the economy may not apply to the current cycle. Bottom Line: China’s economy should bottom as a result of the pickup in credit that occurred earlier this year, but the circumstances surrounding the ongoing slowdown are unprecedented in nature. This raises the risk that policymakers will have to do more in order to stabilize growth. An Unusually Prudent Policy Bias For some, the recent slew of announcements on upcoming stimulus qualified as a major shift in policy bias. Our analysis suggests otherwise. The bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts announced late in August have been among the most cited policy announcements, with the PBoC stating that the new cuts will release RMB 900 billion of fresh liquidity.1 In our view, this measure is more about maintaining liquidity in China’s large commercial banks than adding to it (on a net basis). Chart 9RRR Cuts May Not Be That Stimulative Chart 9 shows that, in previous episodes of meaningful RMB depreciation against the U.S. dollar, in order to prevent the RMB from falling at an undesirable pace, PBoC has had to intervene in the spot market by selling U.S. dollars. The selling of U.S. dollars in this round of RMB depreciation has been much more muted than in 2015-2016, but we suspect some intervention has taken place following each bout of escalation in the trade war. This has had a liquidity tightening effect on banks, as selling central bank foreign-exchange reserves reduces liquidity in the banking system. It is very likely that following the PBoC’s defense of the RMB in the last two months, the RRR cuts were a measure aimed at preventing a liquidity crunch ahead of the September tax season. If true, this hardly qualifies as net new stimulus for the economy. There were also two important announcements that came out of the September 5th State Council meeting: The entire 2019 quota for local government special project bonds must be issued by the end of September, and all money raised from the bonds must be disbursed to projects by the end of October. This too is not exactly “stimulative,” as over 90% of the 2019 local government special-project bond quota has already been issued. This leaves less than 10% of the quota outstanding, an 80% decline from what was issued last September. On a quarterly basis, special-bond issuance in the third quarter of 2019 will end up being 30% lower than the same period last year. It was also announced that, in order to meet the local needs for construction of key projects, part of 2020’s special bonds quota will be allocated in advance to ensure that the funds are available for use at the beginning of next year.2 While the announcement did not indicate how much in the way of special-purpose bonds local governments are allowed to frontload through the remainder of this year, we maintain our view that this is not a policy shift towards materially larger stimulus than we have seen so far this year: Without an additional quota, local government special-purpose bond issuance would essentially fall to zero in the fourth quarter as the 2019 target would be hit by the end of September. Thus, the frontloading of next year’s bond issuance will only “fill the gap” between now and year-end. As special-purpose bond issuance only accounts for 15% of total funding for local governments’ infrastructure spending, the new measure alone is unlikely to meaningfully accelerate investment growth.3 We have noted in previous reports that in order for local governments to accelerate spending within the current fiscal budget framework, one of three things must occur: more direct funding from the central government, an acceptance by policymakers of more shadow bank lending, or a larger quota for bond issuance. So far we have not seen any of the above-mentioned shifts in policy. Chart 10Local Governments Tightening Belt This Year The only positive sign for local government spending has been a pickup in land sales in Q2, which makes up more than 70% of local government revenues. But, it is far from making up the shortfalls in local governments’ budgets (Chart 10). Local governments are facing considerable fiscal pressure as annual tax revenue growth has fallen to near zero. Critically, the government’s regulatory stance on local government budgets has continued to tighten: Local governments have been ordered by the Ministry of Finance to liquidate state-owned assets to fund their budget deficits this year.4 This austerity measure is also being met with explicit reiteration from the Ministry of Finance on the central government not bailing out local governments, and that local government officials are held responsible for their own borrowing and spending.5 Bottom Line: Optimism surrounding recent Chinese policy announcements is misguided. For now, Chinese policymakers are not upping the pace of stimulus, which underscores the risk to our forecast that growth will soon stabilize. A more meaningful shot of reflation will occur in early 2020 if the economy slows further in Q4, but policymakers will most likely continue their reactive approach rather than proactive. RMB Depreciation: A Plus Or Peril? The RMB’s renewed depreciation since August initially raised fears among global investors that an uncontrolled decline might occur, but these fears have subsided over the past several weeks. Even though the USD-CNY exchange rate has broken the psychological 7 threshold, it is not forming a linear downward trend. Unlike after the August 2015 devaluation, it appears that the PBoC can successfully enact countercyclical measures to guide the RMB’s value higher following each large depreciation (Chart 11). Chart 11PBoC Not Panicking Over RMB Depreciation Fears of uncontrolled capital outflows following the depreciation are also abating. We presented a dashboard for monitoring short-term capital outflows from China in our March 20 Special Report,6 and an update of these indicators suggests that China’s heightened capital controls are holding – i.e., outflows have not escalated as they did in 2015 (Chart 12). Chart 12No Major Capital Outflow Chart 13RMB Depreciation Partially Offsets Tariffs Thus, the conclusion is that Chinese policymakers appear to be in control of the currency. The reduced risk of an uncontrolled decline has allowed policymakers to (passively) provide meaningful stimulus to the domestic economy via depreciation. Indeed, the RMB has not only depreciated against the USD, but also against many Asian currencies including direct trade competitors such as Vietnam and Taiwan (Chart 13). This is helping offset the negative impact of U.S. tariffs on Chinese exporters. But currency devaluation can come with a price tag – in particular for corporations that have borrowed heavily in U.S. dollar-denominated debt. We estimate that $440 billion of U.S. dollar debt will be maturing over the coming two years, for Chinese companies and banks in the aggregate.7 A 12% depreciation in the RMB since April 2018 means that debt servicing costs will be 12% higher for unhedged debtors. This is particularly painful for real estate and financial services companies, two of the largest holders of U.S. dollar-denominated loans, and the weakest sectors in the current economic downturn. Most importantly, while currency devaluation ease the slowdown, it cannot be counted on to stabilize Chinese economic activity on its own. For example, while our earnings recession model suggests that the decline in the RMB since May has reduced the odds of a major decline in economic activity by roughly 20%, the model also shows that such an event is still highly probable (current odds are roughly at 70%). Bottom Line: Barring a successful (even if temporary) trade deal, we expect more weakness in the RMB as a passive source of reflation to aid the economy. But currency devaluation is a double-edged sword, and cannot be counted on to single-handedly stabilize China’s economy if a further slowdown occurs. An Update On Corporate Earnings Against a backdrop of what may turn out to be insufficient policy support, the earnings picture is providing one modest positive for equity investors. While the growth rate in investable earnings per share has slowed significantly over the past year (Chart 14), it has merely fallen to zero and not deeply into negative territory, as what seemingly occurred in 2015-2016. In our view, the risk of a similar collapse in earnings per share (EPS) has been an important factor weighing on Chinese investable equities’ relative performance since June 2018. In reality, a closer examination of MSCI China Index earnings reveals that a huge decline in EPS this year was never really a threat, because the apparent collapse in 2015-2016 did not actually transpire. Changes to the composition in the MSCI China Index that took effect in November 2015 and June 2016 had the effect of depressing index EPS, due to the sizeable inclusion of a set of richly valued stocks. Chart 15 presents BCA’s calculation of “break-adjusted” EPS for Chinese investable stocks, which shows that EPS growth bottomed out at -10% in late-2016, as opposed to the -28% implied by the unadjusted series. Chart 14Investable EPS Has Yet To Contract Meaningfully Chart 15The Potential Downside For Earnings Is Less Than Many Fear Chart 16A Cyclical Recovery In Earnings Has Not Yet Begun The existence of less downside potential for earnings is certainly positive for investable stocks at the margin, but it does not alter the outlook for equity fundamentals over the coming year. We have shown in several previous reports that there is a strong and reliable link between investable EPS growth and China’s coincident economic activity,8 and the continued slowing in the latter does not suggest that a bottom in earnings is imminent. In addition, Chart 16 highlights that while net earnings revisions have recovered from their early-year lows, they remain in negative territory and have stopped rising over the past few weeks. Twelve-month forward EPS momentum, also presented on a break-adjusted basis, is modestly negative, and has recently weakened (panel 2). Bottom Line: The downside risk to earnings for Chinese investable equities is less than many investors fear. But absent stronger credit growth, it remains too early to confidently project a cyclical earnings recovery. Investment Conclusions The historical relationship between credit growth and economic activity suggests that the latter should soon stabilize, which is our base case view for the coming few months. Still, the risk of a further, meaningful deceleration in growth is elevated, given the unprecedented circumstances surrounding the ongoing slowdown. For equity investors, less potential downside risks to earnings than previously feared is a positive at the margin, but the fundamental outlook still hinges on a durable pickup in economic activity. Over a 6-12 month time horizon, this implies that one of two scenarios will unfold: The economy will stabilize in response to the easing that has already occurred (i.e. our base case view). The economy slows further in the near-term, prompting a more significant policy response that leads to an even sharper pickup in activity. Chart 17Investable Stocks: An Overshoot To The Downside? In the first scenario, investable stocks have probably overshot to the downside versus the global benchmark and thus will very likely outperform from current levels. Near-term performance is likely to be flat-to-down, as investors await hard evidence of a sequential improvement in growth (Chart 17). In the second scenario, investable stocks are at potentially acute near-term risk, but will likely eventually outperform global stocks once activity begins to pick up sharply. In this scenario, the outperformance of Chinese equities will commence later, but would likely still occur by the tail end of our cyclical investment horizon (6-12 months). As a final point, we are not ruling out the possibility of a temporary trade deal between the U.S. and China, as both sides have the incentive to avoid a further escalation and are now showing goodwill towards constructive negotiations. This may change our tactical view on Chinese stocks, but our cyclical view remains focused on China’s domestic policy and economic fundamentals. Jing Sima China Strategist JingS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 PBC Official: The RRR Cut Aims at Bolstering Real Economy, September 6, 2019 2 China to accelerate the issuance and use of special local government bonds to catalyze effective investment, China State Council, September 4, 2019 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “Chinese Infrastructure Investment: A Ramp-Up Ahead?”, dated August 1, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4 China’s Local Governments Sell Assets to Make Up for Revenue Loss, Caixin, September 3, 2019 5 http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/201909/t20190906_3382239.htm?mc_cid=eb2b199651&mc_eid=9da16a4859 6 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows”, dated March 20, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “China’s Foreign Debt, And A Secret Weapon”, dated September 12, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 2):Will Proactive Fiscal Policy Lose Steam?”, dated July 24, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Juxtaposed with news that China is once again buying U.S. soybeans, rumors that the U.S. could be willing to mollify its position are causing overbought and expensive bonds to rebound. However, we have been here before. Good news on trade come and go and the…
Highlights Our cyclical view is unchanged, … : Despite the evident risks from escalating trade tensions, soft global economic data, and widespread recession concerns, we expect the expansion and the bull markets in spread product and equities will remain intact. … as fiscal largesse has provided the U.S. economy with ample cushion: Per the IMF’s estimates, the fiscal stimulus package centered on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 amounted to about 70 basis points (“bps”) of fiscal thrust in 2018 and another 40 bps in 2019. But how is Congress’ unprecedented experiment shaping up beyond 2019?: The first-order impact of the tax cuts on government revenues is straightforward. The ultimate net effect turns on how lower taxes alter the course of corporate investment and work force participation. The CBO’s latest projections have the federal deficit widening by an additional $1 trillion over the next decade: Supply-side benefits from the 2017 Act have underwhelmed so far, and the fate of the federal budget depends on lawmakers’ restraint. We are long-run bearish on Treasuries and the dollar. Feature The fundamental backdrop remains mixed in the United States and the rest of the world. Global trade has slowed, and the world is experiencing a sharp manufacturing slowdown. The consensus of BCA researchers expects that manufacturing will soon find a footing, and the global economy will revive, helped along by easier monetary policy. A fiscal pick-me-up is long overdue, and would be especially welcome, but we are not holding our breath, especially when Japan finally seems prepared to impose its repeatedly-postponed VAT increase. Opinion within BCA is notably split, and the glass-half-full and glass-half-empty camps remain far apart. The mixed tone of the macro data offers something for bulls and bears, and contributed to the sharp single-day moves that characterized August’s equity action. Although the S&P 500 moved at least 1% in half of its sessions, however, it was down less than 2% for the month through Thursday. After slipping from its 3,000 perch amidst a 5% decline across August’s first three sessions on renewed trade hostilities, it traded in a narrow range between 2,825 and 2,945 the rest of the way (Chart 1). Chart 1Big Daily Swings, But A Tight Monthly Range The Fed is caught in a loop of responding to inorganic shocks. It tightened policy in 2018 while nervously looking over its shoulder at a sizable injection of procyclical fiscal stimulus that wound up exerting less overheating pressure than it had feared. Now it finds itself uncomfortably drawn into the vortex of the trade war, cutting rates to keep the expansion from being snuffed out prematurely by self-inflicted wounds. Various Fed officials seem to be chafing under the burden of serving as a bulwark against the drag from the tariff fights. As Chair Powell admonished in his Jackson Hole address, “[M]onetary policy … cannot provide a settled rulebook for international trade.” Like it or not, the Fed is stuck cleaning up other policymakers’ messes. Jackson Hole would normally have brought down the curtain on any meaningful market news until after Labor Day. But Bill Dudley, the head of the New York Fed from 2009 to 2018, had other ideas. He argued in a Bloomberg opinion column that the Fed should refuse to abet foolhardy trade policy with rate cuts that offset its ill effects. He went on to posit that it is within the Fed’s remit to set policy with an eye toward influencing the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. Dudley’s grenade enlivened a slow news day and had the effect of unifying the economics community in condemnation of his polemic. The Fed swiftly distanced itself from the comments, reiterating that its “decisions are guided solely by its congressional mandate,” and that “political considerations play absolutely no role.” It is hard to know what Dr. Dudley intended to accomplish, but he ensured that we will be at BCA’s 40th Annual Investment Conference bright and early on Friday, September 27th when he kicks off its second day. Initial Estimates Soon after the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) assessed how its provisions would affect the U.S. economy. Although calculating the components involves myriad complex estimates, the budget equation is quite simple: Budget Surplus/(Deficit) = Revenues – Outlays. Cutting taxes clearly reduces revenues, and the reductions in individual tax rates, partially offset by limits on deductions, were estimated to cost the federal government roughly $300 billion over the next decade. The 10-year tab for lower corporate rates, and immediate expensing of business investments through 2022, was estimated to run about $1 trillion. Relief from some spending constraints brought the total estimated cost to $1.7 trillion. A trillion here, and a trillion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money. Though the Act was sure to worsen the deficit, it contained provisions meant to encourage investment and labor supply. Corporate tax cuts and the full immediate expensing of investments in software and eligible equipment were expected to permanently increase the nation’s capital stock, thereby boosting the trend pace of productivity growth. A reduced individual income tax burden was expected to encourage more people to enter the workforce and incumbents to work longer hours. Ultimately, the CBO projected that the Act would boost the level of real potential GDP by 0.7%, on average, through 2029. Six Quarters On It follows that people might work more if they are able to keep more of what they earn, but the data since individual income tax rates were reduced at the beginning of 2018 are inconclusive. The labor force participation rate has been treading water for several years (Chart 2, solid line), as it battles against the drag from baby boomer aging (Chart 2, dashed line). Prime-age labor force participation has risen very slowly off of its 2015 bottom, and has spent 2019 unwinding its gains from late last year (Chart 3). Average weekly hours worked remain locked in the narrow range that has prevailed since 2012 (Chart 4). Though it is difficult to isolate the drivers of participation gains, the part rate’s erratic 2018-9 course suggests that the Act has not yet had a discernible work force impact. Chart 2The Baby Boomers Have Become A Demographic Headwind Chart 3Labor Supply ##br##Gains ... Chart 4... Have Yet To Materialize Residential investment, which lost some tax subsidies via the Act’s limits on mortgage interest and state and local tax deductions, has declined in every quarter since it was passed, and we back it out of fixed investment to assess the Act’s impact on corporate investment. As with labor supply, the record so far is mixed. Fixed investment (ex-residential investment) built on its 4Q17 acceleration over the first three quarters of 2018 only to slide in the three subsequent quarters (Chart 5). Publicly traded corporations have proven more eager to share their cash windfall with shareholders than they have been to invest it. Chart 5Investment Stimulus? What Investment Stimulus? Looking Ahead – Activity Effects We accept that lower individual income tax rates make work more attractive. People respond to incentives, and more after-tax pay, all else equal, should encourage some discouraged workers to rejoin the labor market and push some of the currently employed to want to work more. The changes are modest, though, with take-home pay increasing $324, or 2%, for someone earning $20,000, and $1,299, or 3%, for someone earning $50,000 (Table 1). We see the Act as having no more than a modest marginal effect on labor supply, though it should help boost consumption until households begin to factor in seemingly inevitable future tax hikes. Table 1Take-Home Pay Is Up, But Not By Much If the 2017 Act really is going to boost the potential trend rate of growth, it will have to do so by pushing the rate of productivity growth higher.1 Workers are able to produce more in a given block of time when they’re endowed with more and better tools, and new tools require investment. If fixed investment doesn’t accelerate, there’s no reason to expect that productivity will (Chart 6). The capex outlook from the NFIB survey and the various Fed regional manufacturing surveys is iffy, and BCA has previously noted how an aging population and a shift to more capital-light businesses may restrain investment. Chart 6Investment Drives Productivity It will not be an easy matter to boost productivity by boosting capex, though some of businesses’ after-tax cash will likely find its way to investment. To help the process along, Congress incorporated a familiar provision: accelerated depreciation. Accelerated depreciation’s empirical record as an investment catalyst is hardly clear (Box), and we don’t find its theoretical basis terribly compelling. We think the Act’s trend growth impacts are more likely to disappoint the CBO’s expectations than exceed them. Investment confronts demographic headwinds, too. Pushing trend growth higher will not be easy. Box - An Anodyne Prescription A celebrated provision of the Act allows for the immediate expensing of qualified investments until 2022. Accelerated depreciation programs, which allow for more rapid expensing of investments in property, equipment and other depreciable assets in an attempt to stimulate investment, are a stock measure in lawmakers’ stimulus toolkit, but their effectiveness is hardly assured. For one thing, they’re not new, and businesses may have built up an immunity to them, as they have been a continuous feature of the tax code since 1981. The immediate expensing allowed under the 2017 Act is a form of bonus depreciation, which was initially introduced in the wake of the September 11th attacks. It has remained in place for all but one subsequent year, and though investment peaked during the other stretch that provided for immediate write-offs (September 2010 - December 2011), we are skeptical that it will materially increase the size of the capital stock going forward. Accelerated depreciation schemes encourage investment via the time value of money. They do not increase the depreciation benefit provided by a particular investment, they simply speed up its recognition. Savvy businesses may adjust the timing of their investments to take advantage of temporary bonus periods, but they will not necessarily invest more.2 With rock-bottom interest rates squeezing the time value of money, it’s possible that bonus depreciation’s impact may be especially muted this time. Looking Ahead – The Budget Deficit The CBO’s updated projections through 2029, released two weeks ago, call for the budget shortfall to widen by $800 billion more than previously estimated in January. Despite a downward revision of over $1 trillion in projected interest expense, additional spending has weakened the deficit outlook. It appears that elected officials simply can’t help themselves. In a climate in which neither Congress nor voters evince any desire to rein in the deficit, it seems foolishly naïve to assume that future sessions of Congress will abide by built-in expenditure limits like sunset provisions and spending caps. Although the CBO projects that federal revenues will rise across its 10-year forecasting horizon, they will not do so fast enough to keep up with outlays swollen by interest payments on the growing pile of Treasuries (Chart 7). The CBO sees debt as a share of GDP rising to 95% by 2029, within reach of the all-time high recorded after World War II (Chart 8). Financial markets don’t care now, and we don’t think they will any time in the near future, but the CBO’s baseline projections, which assume future Congresses abide by their stated commitments, probably represent an optimistic scenario. We are more inclined to expect the alternative scenarios, in which sunset provisions are ignored, and pre-set spending caps are set aside, to come to pass. Chart 7A Widening Budget Gap ... Chart 8... Leads To An Increased Debt Burden Investment Implications Chart 9The Dollar's Long-Run Direction Is Down Treasury yields are currently within sight of their July 2016 Brexit-inspired lows, and may well revisit them. Negative yields are a common feature well out the maturity curve in core Europe and Japan. A sustained move higher is not in the cards in the near term, and though we do expect yields to rise as the global economy gains some traction later this year, we do not foresee a disruptive move higher even over the next couple of years. The very long-term outlook for Treasuries is lousy, however, and the dollar also faces secular pressures (Chart 9). The U.S. is not likely to turn into Japan, but the next decade’s returns will likely pale beside those earned since 1982. We are congenitally optimistic about humanity, and Americans seem to have a particular knack for pulling rabbits out of hats. We do not see the U.S. turning into Argentina, Greece or even Japan. The debt burden will weigh on potential growth down the road, however, as debt service will limit Congress’ ability to deploy countercyclical adjustments and longer-term investments, and debt issuance will eventually crimp private entities’ access to capital. All of these factors will limit potential economic growth and contribute to softening returns on equity and credit. We continue to foresee tepid returns over the next ten years relative to the returns investors have grown accustomed to over the last four decades, and we would much rather borrow at current rates for the next 20 or 30 years than lend at them. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Economic growth is the sum of growth in productivity and growth in the size of the labor force. Since the Act does not bear on immigration or birthrates, productivity represents its best shot at moving the growth needle. 2 Congressional Research Service Report RL31852, The Section 179 and Section 168(k) Expensing Allowances: Current Law and Economic Effects, by Gary Guenther, May 1, 2018.