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Overweight While housing-related data releases have been slightly weaker than anticipated lately, we deem that this softness is transitory as housing market fundamentals rest on solid foundations. True, affordability has taken a hit both as a result of rising home price inflation and mortgage rates but as long as job certainty remains intact and wage growth picks up steam as we expect, we doubt that the U.S. housing market will suffer a relapse. In that light, we recommend augmenting exposure to overweight in the S&P homebuilding index. While galloping lumber prices were previously a key reason for putting the S&P homebuilding index on our high-conviction underweight list, the recent liquidation, down $300/thousand board feet since the mid-May peak, in lumber prices represents a massive input cost relief for homebuilders (second panel). In addition, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey showed that demand for residential real estate loans ticked higher, while simultaneously bankers remain willing extenders of mortgage credit. The implication is that new home sales will likely reaccelerate in the coming months (third & bottom panels). Bottom Line: A playable opportunity has surfaced to ride the S&P homebuilding index higher. Lift exposure to overweight and see Monday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM.
Highlights Duration: The housing market is the key channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. As such, it is unlikely that Treasury yields will peak until housing shows meaningful weakness. While residential investment has decelerated in recent quarters, we expect this weakness will prove temporary and that Treasury yields have further cyclical upside. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Yield Curve: The Fed will maintain its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace for the time being, but could be forced to pause next year if weak foreign growth migrates to the U.S. via a stronger dollar. We recommend hedging this risk via a long position in the 7-year bullet versus a short position in the 1/20 barbell. Corporate Health: Strong profit growth - both organic and as a result of corporate tax cuts - has led to a significant improvement in corporate balance sheet health during the past few quarters. This improvement will not persist for much longer. We recommend only a neutral allocation to corporate bonds, both investment grade and junk. Feature This time last week the 10-year Treasury yield was bumping up against 3% and money markets were on the cusp of discounting an extra rate hike between now and the end of 2019. Both resistance levels broke during the past seven days. The 10-year yield is now 3.07% and the January 2020 fed funds futures contract is fully priced for four rate hikes (Chart 1). Chart 1Past Resistance Levels With the 10-year yield back above 3%, many investors are once again speculating about where it will ultimately peak for the cycle. Any answer to this question relies on an assumption about the neutral fed funds rate, the level of interest rates above which monetary policy turns restrictive and acts to slow economic growth and inflation. In past reports we have suggested several measures investors can track to help decide whether interest rates are close to breaking above neutral.1 In this week's report we focus on one particularly important indicator - the housing market. In his essential 2007 paper "Housing Is The Business Cycle", Edward Leamer notes that of the ten post-WWII U.S. recessions, eight were preceded by a significant slowdown in residential investment.2 Given that recessions are also typically preceded by tightening monetary policy, it is not a stretch to connect the two. In fact, there is good reason to believe that housing is the main channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. Since leverage is employed in the acquisition of new homes, interest rates impact the cost of homeownership more directly than other assets. A similar claim could be made about leveraged investment from the corporate sector, but business investment is also beholden to swings in expected future demand. Households can easily postpone the acquisition of a new home if the interest rate environment makes it uneconomical, businesses need to act when the market demands it. But most importantly, Leamer's paper demonstrates that, unlike residential investment, weaker business investment does not consistently provide advance warning of recession. The State Of U.S. Housing Turning to the data, we see that Leamer's claim is validated by the top panel of Chart 2. Residential investment tends to decline in the year preceding a U.S. recession. Housing starts and new home sales display a similar pattern (Chart 2, panels 2 & 3). Chart 2The Housing Market Predicts Recessions What's worrying is that residential investment has barely grown at all during the past year (Chart 2, bottom panel). If this weakness continues it would signal that interest rates are too high for the housing market, and that we are likely very close to the cyclical peak in bond yields. However, we doubt the current weakness will persist. For one, the recent decline in construction activity has been concentrated in the multi-family sector while single-family construction continues to expand at a steady rate (Chart 3). This could simply reflect a shift in demand away from multi-family toward single-family, reversing the trend witnessed between 2010 and 2012. It's possible that some households who were forced into the rental market in the aftermath of the Great Recession now find themselves able to switch back. But even if we focus on the multi-family sector exclusively, there is little reason to believe that construction will see significantly more downside. The rental vacancy rate remains very low, and the National Multi Housing Council's Survey of Apartment Market Conditions suggests that there is no strong upward or downward pressure on the vacancy rate at the moment (Chart 3, bottom 2 panels). The fact that single-family housing starts have not declined casts some doubt on the notion that higher mortgage rates are to blame for the deceleration in residential investment. This is further borne out by the fact that, while higher mortgage rates have certainly increased the cost of homeownership, mortgage payments as a percent of median income are not stretched compared to history (Chart 4). The demand back-drop for housing also remains robust, with household formation in a clear uptrend (Chart 4, panel 2) and homebuilders as optimistic as ever about future sales activity (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3A Temporary Weakness In Residential Investment Chart 4Higher Mortgage Rates Are Not The Culprit We conclude that interest rates are still too low to meaningfully impact the housing market. Residential investment will re-accelerate in the coming quarters and Treasury yields have plenty of room to rise before reaching their cyclical peak. Bottom Line: The housing market is the key channel through which monetary policy impacts the economy. As such, it is unlikely that Treasury yields will peak until housing shows meaningful weakness. While residential investment has decelerated in recent quarters, we expect this weakness will prove temporary and that Treasury yields have further cyclical upside. Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Hedging Weak Foreign Growth With Steepeners The resilience of the U.S. housing market makes it likely that interest rates will continue to rise for quite some time. However, this does not preclude weak foreign growth - and the resultant dollar strength - from forcing the Fed to slow its 25 basis point per quarter rate hike pace at some point during the next 6-12 months. In fact, we have flagged in recent reports that, since 1993, every time the Global (ex. U.S.) Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has fallen below zero, the U.S. LEI has eventually followed (Chart 5).3 Unless foreign growth suddenly recovers, it is quite likely that dollar strength will drag the U.S. LEI lower in the first half of next year. At that point, the Fed may be forced to pause its rate hike cycle in order to take some shine off the dollar, allowing the recovery to continue. Chart 5Weak Global Growth Could Bring Down The U.S. Drops in the U.S. LEI to below zero almost always coincide with a recommendation for easier monetary policy from our Fed Monitor (Chart 5, bottom panel). Although one notable exception did occur in 2005. An examination of the three components of our Fed Monitor reveals that a falling LEI caused the economic growth component of our monitor to decline in 2005 (Chart 6). However, this was offset by an elevated inflation component and extremely easy financial conditions (Chart 6, bottom 2 panels). Chart 6The Three Components Of Our Fed Monitor As in 2005, inflation pressures are once again elevated and financial conditions remain accommodative. It follows that it could take a significant deterioration in economic growth before the Fed is forced to pause its 25 bps per quarter rate hike cycle, one that is not yet evident in the data. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the risk that weak foreign growth will infiltrate the U.S. via a stronger dollar, forcing the Fed to pause. With only two 25 basis point rate hikes currently discounted for 2019, some pause is already in the price. This makes us reluctant to advocate shifting away from below-benchmark portfolio duration. We think a better way to hedge the risk of a Fed pause is through yield curve steepeners. Since short-dated yields are more heavily influenced by the expected near-term pace of rate hikes than long-dated yields, any Fed pause will cause the yield curve to steepen. Steepeners are also very attractively priced at the moment, meaning that they should even perform well in a mild curve flattening environment.4 Our preferred method for implementing a curve steepener is to go long a bullet maturity near the middle of the curve and short a duration-matched barbell consisting of the very short and very long ends of the curve.5 With that in mind, we can determine the best yield curve trade to implement by answering the following two questions: Which bullet over barbell combination offers the most attractive value? Which bullet over barbell combination is most likely to outperform in the "Fed pause" scenario we are trying to hedge? In response to the first question, we consider the 2-year, 3-year, 5-year and 7-year bullet maturities all relative to a duration-matched 1/20 barbell. All of those butterfly spreads offer approximately the same yield pick-up (Chart 7). They also all offer approximately the same yield pick-up relative to our fair value models, which are based on regressions of the butterfly spread versus the 1/20 slope of the curve (Chart 8).6 To answer the second question, we try to identify which of the 2-year, 3-year, 5-year or 7-year yields is likely to decline the most in response to the market pricing-in a pause in Fed rate hikes. To do this we look at the historical correlations between different yield curve slopes and our 12-month Fed Funds Discounter - the change in the fed funds rate that is priced into the market for the next 12 months. The correlations are displayed in Chart 9, and they show that monthly changes in the 7/10 slope are almost always negatively correlated with monthly changes in the 12-month discounter. In other words, when the discounter falls, the 7-year yield falls by more than the 10-year yield. Chart 7Different Bullets, Similar Yield Pick-Up I Chart 8Different Bullets, Similar Yield Pick-Up II Chart 9Hedging The "Fed Pause" Scenario Monthly changes in the 5/7 slope are also usually negatively correlated with changes in the discounter, though the correlation has been closer to zero in recent years. This makes it difficult to say with certainty whether the 5-year or 7-year yield would fall by more in response to a decline in the discounter. Chart 9 also shows that changes in both the 2/3 and 3/5 slopes are positively correlated with changes in the 12-month discounter. This means that when the discounter falls, the 3-year yield falls by more than the 2-year yield and the 5-year yield falls by more than the 3-year yield. In general, we can safely conclude that the 5-year and 7-year bullets are better hedges against a Fed pause than the 2-year or 3-year bullets. The 7-year in particular appears to be a safe bet. Given that the differences in valuation between the different options are miniscule, we are inclined to maintain our current yield curve position: long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell. This week we also close our recommendation to favor the 5/30 barbell over the 10-year bullet for a small loss of 2 bps. This trade was designed to hedge the risk of Fed overtightening leading to an inverted yield curve. This trade would underperform in the event of a Fed pause, which we now view as the greater risk. Bottom Line: The Fed will maintain its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace for the time being, but could be forced to pause next year if weak foreign growth migrates to the U.S. via a stronger dollar. We recommend hedging this risk via a long position in the 7-year bullet versus a short position in the 1/20 barbell. Corporate Balance Sheet Reprieve Last week's release of the second quarter U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) allows us to update our indicators of nonfinancial corporate balance sheet health. Overall, there has been a significant improvement in our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) since the end of 2016. It has fallen from deep in "deteriorating health" territory to close to the "improving health" zone (Chart 10). By far, the biggest driver of the CHM's improvement has been the sharp increase in after-tax cash flows (Chart 10, panel 2). This is partly due to the recent corporate tax cuts, but also reflects a significant rebound in pre-tax cash flows (Chart 10, bottom panel). Despite the rebound in profits, we remain cautious on the outlook for corporate balance sheets going forward. First, our bottom-up samples of firms included in the investment grade and high-yield Bloomberg Barclays bond indexes both show that the median firm's net debt-to-EBITDA has improved in recent quarters, but remains elevated compared to history (Chart 11). Chart 10After-Tax Cash Flows Drive CHM Improvement Chart 11Debt Levels Still High Second, we see increasing headwinds to profit growth going forward. The positive impact from tax cuts is set to wane, while the stronger dollar and faster wage growth will both weigh on pre-tax profits during the next year.7 It is important to note that it will not take much deceleration in pre-tax profits for corporate balance sheets to worsen. Our measure of gross leverage - total debt over pre-tax profits - has only managed to flatten-off during the past few quarters, even as profit growth has surged. This means that the rapid gains in profits have only managed to keep pace with the rate of debt growth. Even a small deceleration in profits will cause leverage to rise, and rising leverage tends to occur alongside an increasing default rate (Chart 12). Chart 12Gross Leverage And Corporate Defaults Bottom Line: Strong profit growth - both organic and as a result of corporate tax cuts - has led to a significant improvement in corporate balance sheet health during the past few quarters. This improvement will not persist for much longer. We recommend only a neutral allocation to corporate bonds, both investment grade and junk. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The Two-Stage Treasury Bear", dated August 14, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2http://www.nber.org/papers/w13428 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Playing Catch-Up", dated September 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresesarch.com 5 For further details on why we prefer this trade construction, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 We calculate the butterfly spread as: the bullet yield minus the yield of the duration-matched barbell. 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Go To Neutral On Spread Product", dated June 26, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The firming long-term housing demand backdrop, lumber price cost relief, steady new home prices and favorable new home sales expectations, all signal that it is time to buy homebuilders. On the flip side, we do not want to overstay our welcome in the S&P home improvement retail index as a number of leading industry profit indicators have started to wave a yellow flag. Recent Changes Boost the S&P Homebuilding index to overweight today. Trim the S&P Home Improvement Retail index to neutral and lock in gains of 13.3% today. Table 1 Feature Another week, another SPX all-time high. Investors have refocused their attention on the important macro drivers: solid profits, easing fiscal policy, and still-benign monetary policy with the real fed funds rate barely probing 0%. Trade-related rhetoric has taken the back seat as it has now become obvious that the rest of the world will bear the brunt of President Trump's trade escalation. Our EPS growth models are sniffing this out, with the SPX ticking higher, while our global profit model sinking close to nil (Chart 1). Chart 1Ex-U.S. EPS Will Bear The Brunt Of Trade Wars Importantly, we are impressed by how thick-skinned the market has become to negative trade-related news. Putting the looming Chinese tariffs into proper perspective is instructive. Assuming a 25% tariff rate on $250bn worth of Chinese manufactured goods and no relief from the renminbi's steep depreciation since April, results in a "tax" of $63bn. The net new "tax" is actually $53bn as an average 3.8%1 import tariff rate already exists on manufactured goods. The consumer and corporations will bear the brunt of this "tax", so it is worth examining the data on household net worth, consumer incomes, and corporate sales. Federal Reserve data show that household net worth increased by $8.1tn in the past year. BEA data reveal that total wage & salary disbursements increased by $400bn, and BCA's projections call for $600bn increase in SPX sales for 2019 (using IBES data for calendar 2019, Chart 2). In other words, it becomes clear that $53bn in a new tariff "tax" will barely eat into net worth, consumer incomes or corporate revenue flows. In addition, according to the IMF, fiscal easing in 2019 will surpass even this year's fiscal expansion in the U.S. The upshot is that over 1% of GDP in fiscal thrust in 2019 thwarts the specter of tariffs, before the fiscal impulse turns negative starting in 2020 (bottom panel, Chart 2). Meanwhile, following up from last week's report when we posited that the current macro backdrop resembles more the mid-2000s than the late-1990s, we are challenging ourselves and asking what if we are wrong in our assessment. Could we actually be replaying a late-1990s episode instead? Revisiting the late-1990s in more detail is in order, refreshing our memory on the sequence of events that led to the climactic LTCM bailout, and highlighting potential signposts that can be helpful in navigating today's macro and equity market maps. In March 1997 the Fed raised rates and pushed the fed funds rate to 5.5%. In hindsight that was a mistake as the Fed then paused the tightening cycle and watched as the Thai baht began to tumble in late-June 1997, eventually gripping all of the emerging world. True, the U.S. stock market modestly pulled back in October 1997 and the VIX spiked to 38. Then, as equities recovered in Q1/1998 and jumped to fresh all-time highs, suddenly the yield curve inverted in May 1998. Undeterred, the S&P 500 hit another peak in July of 1998 before falling roughly 20% in the subsequent month. Finally, once Russia defaulted and the Fed had to bail out the banks due to the LTCM fiasco, the FOMC, late in the game in September 1998, started to ease monetary policy, and engineered a steepening of the yield curve (Chart 3). Chart 2Trade "Tax" A Drop In The Bucket Chart 3Sequence Of Macro Events Matters The most important signpost from this trip down memory lane is the yield curve. In other words, heed the signal from the bond market: the yield curve inversion correctly predicted a reversal of Fed policy and naturally led the temporary peak in the stock market. Importantly, despite the peak-to-trough near-20% decline in the SPX between July and late-August 1998, if someone had bought the index on Jan 2, 1998 and held through the cathartic LTCM bailout, they remained in the black (bottom panel, Chart 3), and a buy the dip strategy was a winning one. As a last reminder, the SPX jumped another 65% from the August 1998 trough until the March 2000 peak that was preceded, once again, by another yield curve inversion. At the current juncture, were the yield curve to invert we would become overly cautious on the broad equity market as we highlighted in late-June2, and would begin to transition the portfolio away from cyclicals and toward defensives. But, we are not there yet. Thus, we sustain our sanguine broad equity market outlook on a 9-12 month horizon and our SPX target remains 10% higher with EPS doing all the heavy lifting as the multiple moves sideways (for more details, please refer to our April 30th, 2018 Weekly Report titled "Lifting SPX Target"). This week we are taking a deeper dive in housing and housing-related equities and making a subsurface portfolio shift. Look Through The Housing Soft Patch, And... While housing-related data releases have been slightly weaker than anticipated lately, we deem that this softness is transitory as housing market fundamentals rest on solid foundations. On the demand side, first-time home buyers still make only a third of total home sales and the homeownership rate is near generational lows, underscoring that pent up housing demand exists. In fact, the percentage of 18-34 year-olds that live with their parents remains close to 32% a multi-decade high and also represents another source of housing demand that has been dormant because of the Great Recession (Chart 4). Importantly, household formation is still running at a higher clip than housing starts and permits, signaling that the risk of a significant supply/demand imbalance is rising. Historically, this gets resolved via higher prices. Further on the supply side, inventories of existing and new homes for sale remain low and point toward a tight residential housing market (Chart 5). The 98.5% homeowner occupancy rate corroborates the apparent residential real estate market tightness. Chart 4Homeownership Still Well Within Reach Chart 5Positive Housing Demand/Supply Dynamics True, affordability has taken a hit both as a result of rising home price inflation and mortgage rates. But, putting affordability in historical context reveals that homeownership is still well within reach. Were we to exclude that aberration of the post 2007 surge in affordability owing to the collapse in house prices and all-time lows in mortgage rates, affordability is higher than the 1992-2007 range and only lower than the early 1970s. The reason is largely because of still generationally-low interest rates (Chart 5). While a rising interest rate backdrop and sustained house price inflation will continue to dent affordability, as long as job certainty remains intact and wage growth picks up steam as we expect (please see Chart 4 from last week's publication), we doubt that the U.S. housing market will suffer a relapse. ...Boost Homebuilders To Overweight, But... In that light, we recommend augmenting exposure to overweight in the S&P homebuilding index. With the labor market at full employment and unemployment insurance claims on the verge of breaking below the 200K mark, housing starts should regain their footing (Chart 6) and propel homebuilding profits. In addition, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey showed that demand for residential real estate loans ticked higher, while simultaneously bankers remain willing extenders of mortgage credit. The implication is that new home sales will likely reaccelerate in the coming months (third & bottom panels, Chart 7). Chart 6Homebuilders Rest On Solid Foundations Chart 7Lumber Input Cost Relief While galloping lumber prices were previously a key reason for putting the S&P homebuilding index on our high-conviction underweight list, the recent liquidation, down $300/thousand board feet since the mid-May peak, in lumber prices represents a massive input cost relief for homebuilders (second panel, Chart 7). With regard to the relative pricing power front, previous price concessions (new home prices compared with existing home prices) are paying off as new home sales are steadily gaining a larger slice of the overall home sales pie (second & third panels, Chart 8). As input cost relief is slated to kick in during the next few months, especially on the framing lumber front, at a time when new home prices have stabilized, homebuilding sales and profits will likely overwhelm (bottom panel, Chart 8). While the latest NAHB/Wells Fargo National Home Market survey showed some softness on the overall housing market index (HMI), keep in mind that both the HMI and the sales expectations subcomponents of the survey are squarely above the 50 boom/bust line and only slightly below the recent cyclical highs (top and second panels, Chart 9). This healthy housing backdrop is also evident in plentiful construction job openings and expanding national house prices (third & bottom panels, Chart 9). Nevertheless, there are two risks to our upbeat S&P homebuilding view. First, interest rates. At the margin, rising mortgage rates can be a source of deficient housing demand especially for first-time home buyers. However, as mentioned earlier, interest rates are generationally low (middle panel, Chart 10) and the job market remains vibrant which should continue to entice first-time home buyers to make one of the largest purchase decisions of their lifetime. Chart 8Price Hikes Should Stick Chart 9Big Gaps Set To Narrow Chart 10Two Risks: Interest Rates & Wages Second, industry wage inflation. Construction sector wages are climbing rapidly, as much as 150bps faster than overall average hourly earnings (bottom panel, Chart 10). This is another key input cost for homebuilders that could eat into profit margins, especially if new home price inflation does not stick. In sum, a firming long-term housing demand backdrop, lumber price cost relief, steady new home prices and favorable leading indicators of new home sales will more than offset rising interest rates and industry wage inflation. Bottom Line: A playable opportunity has surfaced to ride the S&P homebuilding index higher. Lift exposure to overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM. ...Don't Over Stay Your Welcome In Home Improvement Retailers Nevertheless, we do not want to overstay our welcome on the other residential real estate-levered consumer discretionary subgroup, the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index. We recommend a downgrade to a benchmark allocation for a relative gain of 13.3% since the July 5, 2016 inception. Such a move does not reflect a worsening overall housing view; as we made clear in our analysis above, we remain housing market bulls. Instead, we are concerned that too much euphoria is already priced in HIR equities. Chart 11 shows that fixed residential investment as a percentage of GDP is up 50% from trough to the recent peak (similar to the advance in existing home sales), whereas relative HIR performance is up 170% in the same time frame. Our worry is that optimistic sell side analysts' relative profit forecasts will be hard to attain, let alone surpass (bottom panel, Chart 11). Three main reasons are behind our softening EPS backdrop for home improvement retailers. First, our HIR model has plunged on the back of the wholesale liquidation in lumber prices and rising interest rates (Chart 12). Lumber deflation in particular will prove a profit headwind as building supply Big Box retailers make a set margin on wood products. Chart 11Too Much Euphoria Chart 12Timberrrr! Second, household appliance and furniture & durable selling prices have tentatively crested, and represent another source of profit headaches for HIR (bottom panel, Chart 13). Finally, select industry operating metrics suggest that the easy profits are behind HIR. Not only is our productivity growth proxy (sales per employee) on the verge of deflating, but also an inventory surge has sunk the HIR sales-to-inventories ratio into the contraction zone (second & third panels, Chart 13). But there are still some pockets of strength in the home improvement retailing industry that prevent us from turning outright bearish on the S&P HIR index. Despite the aforementioned easing in appliance and furniture wholesale prices, our HIR implicit price deflator has spiked on a short-term rate of change basis, likely owing to firm demand for remodeling activity. Indeed, the latest NAHB remodeling survey remains perched near record highs. The implication is that the recent lull in industry sales growth may reverse (middle and bottom panels, Chart 14). Importantly, a large driver of the previous cycle's remodeling activity was the availability of HELOCs and the stratospheric rise in Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (popularized by Fed economist Dr. James Kennedy). Now that home equity has nearly doubled to near 60% from the depths of the GFC, there are rising odds that homeowners may begin to tap their rebuilt equity and embark upon more renovations (top & middle panels, Chart 15). Tack on rising disposable incomes (bottom panel, Chart 15) and a buoyant labor market and the outlook for remodeling activity brightens further. Chart 13Operational Trouble Brewing... Chart 14...But Offsets... Chart 15...Exist Netting it out, is it prudent to lock in gains in the S&P HIR index as profit drivers have downshifted at the margin. Bottom Line: Crystalize gains of 13.3% in the S&P HIR index since inception, and downgrade exposure to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MANF.SM.FN.ZS?locations=US&name_desc=true 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Has The Reward/Risk Tradeoff Changed?" dated June 25, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights We review last year's "Three Tantalizing Trades" and offer four additional ones: Trade #1: Long June 2019 Fed funds futures contract/short Dec 2020 Fed funds futures contract Trade #2: Long USD/CNY Trade #3: Short AUD/CAD Trade #4: Long EM stocks with near-term downside put protection Feature A Review Of Last Year's "Three Tantalizing Trades" I had the pleasure of speaking at BCA's last Annual Investment Conference on September 25th, 2017, where I presented the following three trade ideas (Chart 1): 1. Short December 2018 Fed funds futures We closed this trade for a profit of 70 basis points. Had we held on, it would be up 92 basis points as of the time of this writing. 2. Long global industrial equities/short utilities We closed this trade on February 1st for a gain of 12%, as downside risks to global growth began to mount. This proved to be a timely decision, as the trade would be up only 6.1% had we kept it on. We would not re-enter this trade at present. 3. Short 20-year JGBs/long 5-year JGBs This trade struggled for much of 2018 but sprung back to life in August. It is up 0.6% since we initiated it. We still like the trade over the long haul. Investors are grossly underestimating the risk that Japanese inflation will move materially higher as an aging population creates a shortage of workers and a concomitant decline in the national savings rate. We also think the government will try to egg on any acceleration in consumer prices in order to inflate away its debt burden. In the near term, however, the trade could struggle if a combination of weaker EM growth and an increase in the value of the trade-weighted yen cause inflation expectations to decline. Four Additional Trades Trade #1: Long June 2019 Fed funds futures contract/short December 2020 Fed funds futures contract Investors expect U.S. short-term rates to rise to 2.38% by the end of 2018 and 2.85% by the end of 2019. The 47 basis points in tightening priced in for next year is less than the 75 basis points in hikes implied by the Fed dots. Investors appear to have bought into Larry Summers' secular stagnation thesis. They are convinced that short rates will not be able to rise above 3% without triggering a recession (Chart 2). Chart 1Revisiting Last Year's Three Tantalizing Trades Chart 2Markets Expect No Fed Hikes Beyond Next Year Regardless of what one thinks of Summers' thesis, it must be acknowledged that it is a theory about the long-term drivers of the neutral rate of interest. Over a shorter-term cyclical horizon, many factors can influence the neutral rate. Critically, most of these factors are pushing it higher: Fiscal policy is extremely stimulative. The IMF estimates that the U.S. cyclically-adjusted budget deficit will reach 6.8% of GDP in 2019 compared to 3.6% of GDP in 2015. In contrast, the euro area is projected to run a deficit of only 0.8% of GDP next year, little changed from a deficit of 0.9% it ran in 2015 (Chart 3). The relatively more expansionary nature of U.S. fiscal policy is one key reason why the Fed can raise rates while the ECB cannot. Credit growth has picked up. After a prolonged deleveraging cycle, private-sector nonfinancial debt is rising faster than GDP (Chart 4). The recent easing in The Conference Board's Leading Credit Index suggests that this trend will continue (Chart 5). Wage growth is accelerating. Average hourly earnings surprised on the upside in August, with the year-over-year change rising to a cycle high of 2.9%. This followed a stronger reading in the Employment Cost Index in the second quarter. A simple correlation with the quits rate suggests that there is plenty of upside for wage growth (Chart 6). Faster wage growth will put more money into workers pockets who will then spend it. The savings rate has scope to fall. The personal savings rate currently stands at 6.7%, more than two percentage points higher than what one would expect based on the current ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income (Chart 7). If the savings rate were to fall by two points over the next two years, it would add 1.5% of GDP to aggregate demand. Chart 3U.S. Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary Than The Euro Area Chart 4U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend Chart 5U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong Chart 6Quits Rate Is Signaling That There Is Upside For Wage Growth Chart 7The Personal Savings Rate Has Room To Fall A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that these cyclical factors will permit the Fed to raise rates to 5% by 2020, almost double what the market is discounting.1 A more hawkish-than-expected Fed will bid up the value of the greenback. A stronger dollar, in turn, will undermine emerging markets, which have seen foreign-currency debts balloon over the past six years (Chart 8). The deflationary effects of a stronger dollar and falling commodity prices could temporarily cause investors to price out some hikes over the next few quarters. With that in mind, we recommend shorting the December 2020 Fed funds futures contract, while going long the June 2019 contract. The first leg of the trade captures our expectation that the market will revise up its estimate the terminal rate, while the second leg captures near-term risks to global growth. The gap between the two contracts has widened over the past few days as we have prepared this report, but at 21 basis points, it has plenty of room to increase further (Chart 9). Chart 8EM Dollar Debt Is High Chart 9U.S. Rate Expectations Are Too Low Beyond Mid-2019 Trade #2: Long USD/CNY China's economy is slowing, which has prompted the government to inject liquidity into the financial system. The spread in 1-year swap rates between the U.S. and China has fallen from about 3% earlier this year to 0.6% at present, taking the yuan down with it (Chart 10). It is doubtful that China will be willing to match - let alone exceed - U.S. rate hikes. This suggests that USD/CNY will appreciate. China's real trade-weighted exchange rate has weakened during the past four months, but is up 25% over the past decade (Chart 11). U.S. tariffs on $250 billion (and counting) of Chinese imports threaten to erode export competitiveness, making a further devaluation necessary. Chart 10USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials Chart 11The RMB Is Still Quite Strong President Trump will oppose a weaker yuan. However, just as China's actions earlier this year to strengthen its currency did not prevent the U.S. from imposing tariffs, it is doubtful that efforts by the Chinese authorities to talk up the yuan would appease Trump. Besides, China needs a weaker currency. The Chinese economy produces too much and spends too little. The result is excess savings, epitomized most clearly in a national savings rate of 46%. As a matter of arithmetic, national savings need to be transformed either into domestic investment or exported abroad via a current account surplus. China has concentrated on the former strategy over the past decade. The problem is that this approach has run into diminishing returns. Chart 12 shows that the capital stock has risen dramatically as a share of GDP. As my colleague Jonathan LaBerge has documented, the rate of return on assets among Chinese state-owned companies, which have been the main driver of rising corporate leverage, has fallen below their borrowing costs (Chart 13).2 Chart 12China's Capital Stock Has Grown Alongside Rising Debt Levels Chart 13China: Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For State-Owned Companies Now that the economy is awash in excess capacity, the authorities will need to steer more excess production abroad. This will require a larger current account surplus which, in turn, will necessitate a relatively cheap currency. The dollar is currently working off overbought technical conditions, a risk we flagged in our August 31st report.3 That process should be complete over the next few weeks. Meanwhile, hopes of a massive Chinese stimulus focused on fiscal/credit easing will fade. The combination of these two forces will push up USD/CNY above the psychologically-critical 7 handle by the end of the year. Trade #3: Short AUD/CAD A weaker yuan will raise raw material costs to Chinese firms. This will hurt commodity prices. Industrial metals are much more vulnerable to slower Chinese growth than oil. Chart 14 shows that China consumes close to half of all the copper, nickel, aluminum, zinc, and iron ore produced in the world, compared to only 15% of oil output. Our expectation that developed economy growth will hold up better than EM growth over the next few quarters implies that oil will outperform industrial metals. Oil is also supported by a tighter supply backdrop, particularly given the downside risks to Iranian and Venezuelan crude exports. A bet on oil over metals is a bet on DM over EM growth in general, and the Canadian dollar over the Australian dollar specifically (Chart 15). Canada exports more oil than metals, while Australian exports are dominated by ores and metals. In terms of valuations, the Canadian dollar is still somewhat cheap relative to the Aussie dollar based on our FX team's long-term valuation model (Chart 16). Chart 14China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil Chart 15Oil Over Metals = CAD Over AUD Chart 16Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar The loonie has been weighed down by ongoing fears that Canada will be left out of a renegotiated NAFTA. However, our geopolitical strategists believe that the Trump administration is trying to focus more on China, against whom the case for unfair trade practices is far easier to make. The U.S. has already negotiated a trade deal with Mexico and an agreement with Canada is more likely than not. If a new deal is struck, the Canadian dollar will rally. We recommended going short AUD/CAD on June 28. The trade is up 3.4%, carry-adjusted, since then. Stick with it. Trade #4: Long EM stocks with near-term downside put protection It is too early to call a bottom in EM assets. Valuations have not yet reached washed-out levels (Chart 17). Bottom fishers still abound, as evidenced by the fact that the number of shares outstanding in the MSCI iShares Turkish ETF has almost tripled since early April (Chart 18). However, at some point - probably in the first half of next year - investors will liquidate their remaining bullish EM bets. During the 1990s, this capitulation point occurred shortly after the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998. EM equities fell by 26% between April 21, 1998 and June 15, 1998. After a half-hearted attempt at a rally, EM stocks tumbled again in July, falling by 35% between July 17 and September 10. The second leg of the EM selloff brought down the S&P 500 by 22%. Thanks to a series of well-telegraphed Fed rate cuts, global markets stabilized on October 8th (Chart 19). The S&P 500 surged by 68% over the next 18 months. The MSCI EM index more than doubled in dollar terms over this period. EM stocks outperformed U.S. equities by a whopping 71% between February 1999 and February 2000. Europe also outperformed the U.S. starting in mid-1999. Value stocks, which had lagged growth stocks over the prior six years, also finally gained the upper hand. Chart 17EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels Chart 18EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound Chart 19The ''Great Equity Rotation'' Is Coming: A Roadmap From The 1990s The "Great Equity Rotation" is coming. All the trades that have suffered lately - overweight EM, long Europe/short U.S., long cyclicals/short defensives, long value/short growth - will get their day in the sun. Investors can prepare for this inflection point by scaling into EM equities today, but guarding against near-term downside risk by buying puts. With that in mind, we are going long the iShares MSCI Emerging Market ETF (EEM), while purchasing March 15, 2019 out-of-the-money puts with a strike price of $41. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Depending on which specification of the Taylor rule one uses, a one percent of GDP increase in aggregate demand will increase the neutral rate of interest by half a point (John Taylor's original specification) or by a full point (Janet Yellen's preferred specification). Fiscal policy is currently about 3% of GDP too simulative compared to a baseline where government debt-to-GDP is stable over time. Assuming a fiscal multiplier of 0.5, fiscal policy is thus boosting aggregate demand by 1.5% of GDP. Nonfinancial private credit has increased by an average of 1.5 percentage points of GDP per year since 2016. Assuming that every additional one dollar of credit increases aggregate demand by 50 cents, the revival in credit growth is raising aggregate demand by 0.75% of GDP, compared to a baseline where credit-to-GDP is flat. The labor share of income has increased by 1.25% of GDP from its lows in 2015. Assuming that every one dollar shift in income from capital to labor boosts overall spending on net by 20 cents, this would have raised aggregate demand by 0.25% of GDP. Lastly, if the savings rate falls by two points over the next two years, this would raise aggregate demand by 1.5% of GDP. Taken together, these factors are boosting the neutral rate by anywhere from 2% (Taylor's specification) to 4% (Yellen's specification). This is obviously a lot, and easily overwhelms other factors such as a stronger dollar that may be weighing on the neutral rate. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging," dated August 29, 2018. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Dollar And Global Growth: Are The Tables About To Turn?" dated August 31, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
The opposing sides of our market- and industry-neutral trade going long the S&P homebuilding index/short the S&P REITs index1 have both been on the receiving end of negative data in the last month. With respect to homebuilders, housing permits, a leading indicator of future starts, fell well short of expectations this week and took the S&P homebuilding index down with it. Meanwhile rising UST yields have been weighing heavily on REIT stocks. The end result is that our trade has given up its early gains. The macro environment tells us that it is too early to throw in the towel on this trade. We continue to believe prices in the residential real estate sector have the upper hand over their commercial real estate (CRE) peers. Existing home inventories have tightened and remain at historically low levels, which should support pricing. On the flip side, our CRE occupancy rate composite is still contracting, warning that already-slowing pricing has further to fall. The divergence in pricing should support homebuilders' returns at the expense of REITs. Bottom Line: We reiterate our long S&P homebuilding/short S&P REITs pair trade. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P homebuilding and S&P REITs indexes are: BLBG: S5HOME - LEN, PHM, DHI and BLBG: S5REITS - IRM, MAA, AMT, BXP, PLD, ESS, CCI, PSA, O, VTR, VNO, WY, EQIX, DLR, EXR, DRE, FRT, WELL, SBAC, HCP, GGP, KIM, EQR, UDR, REG, MAC, HST, SPG, AVB, AIV, SLG, ARE, respectively. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "UnReal Estate Opportunity," dated July 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The U.S. dollar is likely to correct further over the coming weeks. The CAD should benefit as it is cheap and oversold, and the inflationary back-drop warrants tighter monetary conditions. This will be a bear market rally, not the ultimate trough for the loonie. EUR/SEK should correct as the Riksbank will start tightening policy in December; a pause in the global growth slowdown should also give the cheap SEK a welcome boost. Cheap long-term valuations will not help the yen in the coming weeks; instead, falling Japanese inflation expectations and growing investor expectations of Chinese stimulus will weigh on the JPY. A better opportunity to buy the yen on its crosses will emerge later this year. EUR/CHF has upside over the coming months; the swissie needs additional global growth weakness to rally further. This is unlikely to happen for a few months. Feature Chart I-1DXY Correction Has Further To Run By the middle of the summer, the dollar had hit massively overbought levels, which left it vulnerable to any signs of stabilization in global growth, especially if some key U.S. activity gauges began to soften (Chart I-1). This is exactly what is transpiring. As we highlighted last week, BCA's Global LEI Diffusion Index is rebounding, EM and Japanese exports are stabilizing and U.S. core inflation and building permits have disappointed. This bifurcation in the data suggests the dollar has more room to correct, as neither our Capitulation Index nor our Intermediate-Term Technical Indicator have hit technically oversold levels. Last week we also argued that this correction in the dollar is likely to prove a temporary reprieve, but that in the interim the euro and the Australian dollar were well placed to experience significant rebounds.1 This week, we explore if the same case can be built for the Canadian dollar, the Swedish krona, the yen and the Swiss Franc. CAD: The Bank of Canada Will Proceed Cautiously The first half of 2018 has not been kind to the Canadian dollar. A rout in EM assets, signs of softening global growth and tough rhetoric from the White House on trade generally and NAFTA and Canada in particular have conspired to create fertile grounds for loonie-selling. Since the end of June, the CAD has managed to regain some composure, rallying by 3.3% against the USD. Essentially, much bad news has been embedded in this currency, which now trades at a significant discount to BCA's estimate of its short-term fair value (Chart I-2). Moreover, speculators, who had been aggressively buying the CAD at the end of 2017, now hold large short positions in the currency (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This combination is now resulting in a situation where any pause in the USD's strength is being mirrored in CAD strength. Can this rebound continue? Canadian economic data sends a murky message. Canadian real GDP growth had overtaken that of the U.S., peaking at 3.6% in February last year. However, it is now below U.S. growth (Chart I-3). Canadian consumers have been the main source of the slowdown as Canadian capex growth is in line with the U.S. and the Trudeau government has been spending generously. Can this rebound continue? Canadian economic data sends a murky message. Canadian real GDP growth had overtaken that of the U.S., peaking at 3.6% in February last year. However, it is now below U.S. growth (Chart I-3). Canadian consumers have been the main source of the slowdown as Canadian capex growth is in line with the U.S. and the Trudeau government has been spending generously. Chart I-2No One Is Going Crazy For The Loonie Chart I-3Canada: Growth Picture Is Mixed The weakness in Canadian consumption partly reflects the underperformance of Canadian employment relative to the U.S. However, the slowdown in house prices has played a bigger role (Chart I-4). Canadian households are burdened by a debt load of 170% of disposable income. Now that mortgage rates are rising, Canadians are spending more than 14% of their disposable income servicing their debt, a burden last experienced in 2008 when mortgage rates were 220 basis points higher. Without the benefit of rapidly rising real estate assets, it is much more difficult for Canadian retail sales to grow at an 8.7% annual rate as they did three quarters ago. Despite these weaknesses, it is hard to justify that Canadian monetary conditions - as approximated by the slope of the yield curve, the level of real rates, and the trade-weighted CAD - should be as easy as they are today (Chart I-5). This is even truer when we take into account Canadian inflationary conditions. Chart I-4Canadian Consumers Have A Problem Chart I-5Canadian Monetary Conditons Are Very Easy The three inflation gauges targeted by the Bank of Canada stand between 1% and 3%, or at its objective. This means that the BoC's 1.5% policy rate is negative in real terms. Moreover, this inflationary pressure is unlikely to abate. The BoC estimates that the output gap has closed, and companies are running into growing capacity constraints (Chart I-6, top panel). Despite a correction last month, wages are in an uptrend, powered by growing and severe labor shortages (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Thanks to these conditions, we anticipate that the BoC will track the pace of rate increases by the Federal Reserve over the next 12 months. This is not very different from what is currently priced into Canadian money markets. Chart I-6Canadian Capacity Pressures Point To A Hawkish ##br##BoC Inflation Will Force The BoC's Hand If the BoC does not disappoint, the combination of a cheap and oversold CAD should help the loonie rally against the USD, so long as the current stabilization in global growth continues. A move toward USD/CAD 1.26 is likely. The biggest risk to this view is that trade negotiations between the U.S. and Canada deteriorate further. While we do not anticipate an imminent breakthrough in these negotiations, we do not see much scope for significant deterioration in the relationship either. The energy market could prove to be another positive for the loonie. Bob Ryan, who leads BCA's Commodity and Energy Strategy service, argues that the oil market is currently very tight and vulnerable to supply disruptions.2 Under these circumstances, the removal of Iranian exports, tensions in Iraq, declining Nigerian production and Venezuela's cascading implosion all risk causing a melt-up in oil prices by the first half of 2019. This could help the CAD as well, even if the Canadian oil benchmark remains at a large discount to Brent. Longer-term, the upside in the CAD is likely to be capped. There is only one rate hike priced into the U.S. OIS curve from June 2019 to December 2020. We expect the Fed to hike rates by more than that. Meanwhile, the emerging softness in the Canadian household sector suggests it will be much more difficult for the BoC to keep following the Fed higher over that period. The CAD is not cheap enough to compensate for these long-term headwinds (Chart I-7). Bottom Line: On a short-term basis, the Canadian dollar is cheap and oversold. While the Canadian consumer has begun to disappoint, the inflationary pressures present in Canada should keep the BoC on track to follow the Fed and push rates higher over the coming 12 months. The CAD should therefore benefit from any USD weakness, with USD/CAD moving toward 1.26. Once the short-term undervaluation and oversold conditions are corrected, USD/CAD should rebound toward 1.40. Chart I-7We Like The CAD For Now, But The Rally Has A Limited Shelf Life EUR/SEK Will Trade Heavy Any which way we cut it, the SEK is cheap. The trade-weighted krona is trading at its cheapest levels relative to BCA's long-term fair value since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart I-8). The SEK is not only trading at a 32% discount to its purchasing-power parity against the greenback, it is also trading at a 10% discount against its PPP relative to the euro. Chart I-8The SEK Is An Attractive Long-Term Buy... The SEK is not only cheap on a long-term basis, it is also cheap on a short-term basis. This is most evident against the euro. Currently the SEK trades at a 7% discount to the euro according to our short term fair value model based on real rate differentials, commodity prices and global risk aversion. Historically, this kind of discount in the SEK has been followed by a prompt rebound (Chart I-9). Are there any catalysts to convert this good value into good returns? We see many. First, as was the case in Canada, Sweden's Monetary Gauge has not been at such easy levels since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart I-10). Meanwhile, the economy is also experiencing rising capacity pressures. The OECD's estimate of the output gap stands at 0.7% of GDP, and inflationary pressures are building, as evidenced by the Riksbank's Capacity Utilization measure (Chart I-11). Chart I-9...And A Short-Term One As Well Chart I-10The Riksbank Is Too Easy Chart I-11Swedish Inflation Has Upside This set of circumstances suggests the Riksbank could start hiking rates as early as this coming December, well ahead of the European Central Bank. As a result, we project that Swedish real interest rates could rise further relative to the euro area. Historically, falling euro area / Swedish real interest rate spreads precede depreciations in EUR/SEK (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Real Rate Differentials Point To A Lower EUR/SEK Chart I-13Chinese Liquidity Injections Point To A Lower EUR/SEK The global context also points toward an imminent correction in EUR/SEK. The krona is much more pro-cyclical than the euro. This reflects the more volatile nature of the Swedish economy and the extraordinarily large role of trade in its GDP. EUR/SEK greatly benefited from the tightening in Chinese liquidity conditions, as evidenced by the widening between the 1-month and 1-week Chinese interbank rate (Chart I-13). EUR/SEK essentially sniffed out a slowdown in Chinese capex, a key source of ultimate demand for Swedish goods. However, now that the PBoC is injecting liquidity in the Chinese interbank system, EUR/SEK is likely to suffer. Moreover, the outperformance of Chinese infrastructure and real estate stocks in recent weeks also suggests the SEK could appreciate further against the EUR. The rally of risk assets on the day that U.S. President Donald Trump announced an additional 10% tariff on US$200 billion worth of Chinese exports further confirms that investors may be in the process of discounting additional stimulus out of China, which would further hurt EUR/SEK. To be clear, we have already noted that we do not anticipate the Chinese authorities to attempt to boost growth - we only expect them to limit the damage created by an intensifying trade war with the U.S. As a result, the positive impact of China on the krona should prove transitory. But for the time being, it could be enough to help correct the SEK's 7% discount to the euro. Since we anticipate the USD to continue to correct in the coming weeks, this also implies that USD/SEK possesses ample tactical downside. This negative EUR/SEK view is not without risks. The first comes from the fact that the Swedish current account surplus is now smaller than the euro area's, something not seen since the early 1990s. This is mitigated by the fact that Sweden's net international investment position is now 10% of GDP, while it used to be negative as recently as 2015. The euro area NIIP is still in negative territory. The second risk is that Swedish house prices have begun to contract in response to macroprudential measures. However, we believe that Sweden's inflationary backdrop is likely to dominate the Riksbank's reaction function. Bottom Line: The SEK is cheap against the dollar and the euro on both long-term and short-term metrics. As the Riksbank is set to lift rates in December, we expect EUR/SEK to decline significantly. Recent injections of liquidity by the PBoC and growing expectations among investors of Chinese stimulus could create additional downward impetus under both EUR/SEK and USD/SEK. This is a tactical view. We anticipate the reprieve in the global growth slowdown to be temporary. Once it resumes, the SEK will find it difficult to rally further. JPY: Down Now, Up Later Investors are well aware that the yen is one of the cheapest G10 currencies on a long-term basis. BCA's long-term fair value model shows that the real trade-weighted yen is trading at a 17% discount, close to its cheapest levels in 36 years. However, despite its prodigious long-term cheapness, the yen is not nearly as attractive when compared to its short-term determinants, which show a small premium in the price of the yen versus the dollar (Chart I-14). This means the direction of Japanese monetary policy and global growth will remain more important for the yen's price action over the coming months than its long-term cheapness. When it comes to growth, Japan is doing okay. We witnessed a decline in industrial production driven by foreign demand this summer, but domestic machinery orders are improving and export growth is finding a floor. Actually, BCA's real GDP model for Japan is suggesting that growth could re-accelerate significantly next quarter (Chart I-15). In our view, this improvement reflects the fact that business credit is once again growing after decades of hibernation. Chart I-14Is The JPY A Bargain? Long Term, Yes; Short Term, No! Chart I-15Japanese Growth Doing Just Fine However, we doubt this is enough to prompt any tightening in the Bank of Japan's policy. The most immediate problem facing the BoJ is that Japanese inflation expectations are in free fall (Chart I-16). Since the BoJ assigns the blame of low realized inflation on depressed inflation expectations, this aforementioned weakness, despite the yen's softness, guarantees that the BoJ will stay on the sidelines for much longer. After all, if any little shock can spur such a sharp impact on Japanese inflation expectations, despite an unemployment rate at 2.5% and an output gap at 0.8% of GDP, the BoJ has not anchored inflation expectations higher. Further reinforcing our bias that the BoJ is not set to tighten policy for many more quarters, the VAT is set to be increased to 10% in October 2019. The LDP leadership race is currently underway, and no one is mentioning postponing that hike. This suggests that significant fiscal tightening could emerge next year. The fact that the BoJ will continue to lag behind other global central banks forces us to be negative on the yen. However, could an external event push the yen higher, despite this absence of domestic support? A big downgrade in EM asset prices and global growth would do the trick. While we do think this is likely to happen over the next six to nine months, now does not appear to be the moment to implement such a bet. As we highlighted above, the deceleration in global growth seems to be pausing, and Chinese liquidity conditions have eased. Seven weeks ago, we introduced our China Play Index to track whether or not investors were discounting additional easing on the part of China.3 This indicator looks as if it is forming a base right now (Chart I-17), indicating that pro-growth plays could perform well over the coming weeks while countercyclical plays, like the yen, could perform poorly. Until this indicator begins a new down leg - something we anticipate for the backend of the year - the yen will remain under downward pressure against the dollar, the euro or the aussie. Chart I-16The BoJ's Problem Chart I-17Chinese Plays Are Stabilizing As a result, while we continue to expect more upside in the yen in the latter part of the year, for the time being we will remain on the sidelines as neither short-term valuations, monetary policy dynamics or the global growth environment point to an imminent rally in the yen. Bottom Line: The yen is an attractive long-term play as it displays prodigiously cheap long-term valuations. However, the short-term outlook is less favorable. The yen is not cheap enough based on our augmented interest rate differentials models, the BoJ will remain dovish for the foreseeable future, and an uptick in our China Play Index bodes poorly for countercyclical currencies like the yen. However, since we do expect that global growth will stabilize only on a temporary basis, we will look to open some long yen bets later this fall. Close Short EUR/CHF Trade Last March, we argued that EUR/CHF had more cyclical upside, but that bouts of volatility in global markets would cause periods of weaknesses in the cross.4 Based on this insight, we proceeded to sell EUR/CHF on April 6 as we worried that markets were set to price in a period of weakness in global growth.5 We closed this trade in August, but EUR/CHF kept falling. Now, is EUR/CHF more likely to rally or selloff in the coming quarter? We think a rebound is in the cards. First, the franc is once again highly valued, based on the Swiss National Bank's assessment. It is true that the SNB has not intervened to limit the franc's upside recently, but the CHF's strength is likely to short-circuit the increase in inflation that could have justified betting on the Swissie moving higher (Chart I-18). Ultimately, there is limited domestic inflationary pressures in Switzerland. Moreover, since the import penetration of goods and services in Switzerland is the highest of all the G10, imported deflation will soon be felt. Further, as Swiss labor costs remain very high internationally, the large improvement in full-time jobs witnessed this year is likely to peter off as Swiss businesses work to maintain their competitiveness. Second, the franc received an additional fillip this year as the breakup risk premium in Europe surged (Chart I-19). Every time investors perceive that the probability of a disintegration of the euro rises, they end up pouring money into stable Switzerland. Marko Papic, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy expert, believes that the euro break-up risk will continue to be a red herring in the coming few years. Investors will therefore price out this risk, pulling money out of Switzerland where interest rates remain 30 basis points below the euro area, and boosting EUR/CHF in the process. Chart I-18The Swissie's Strength Will Be Deflationary Chart I-19If A Euro Break-Up Is A Red Herring... Finally, if a temporary stabilization in global growth will hurt the yen, it will also hurt the Swiss franc. As a result, the stabilization in the China Play Index should support EUR/CHF. While we expect EUR/CHF to rally over the coming months, we worry that any such rebound will prove temporary. The current expansion in Chinese stimulus is only a passing phenomenon, and not one powerful enough to put a durable bottom under global growth and EM assets. Hence, while EUR/CHF could easily rally to 1.15, any such rebound should be faded. This move, if followed by a deterioration in our China Play Index, should be used to re-open EUR/CHF shorts. Bottom Line: The Swiss franc remains in a cyclical bear market, punctuated by occasional rallies against the euro when global growth sentiment sours. We just experienced such a rally in the Swissie, but it is ending as the deflationary impact of the CHF's rally will soon be felt. Moreover, the breakup risk premium in the euro is currently too large, and the pricing-in of slowing global growth is likely to take a breather. As a result, EUR/CHF is likely rally over the coming months. We will look to bet again on a CHF rally once the reprieve in global growth ends. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Policy Divergence Are Still The Name Of The Game", dated September 14, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl", dated September 20, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus", dated August 3, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Retail sales and retail sales ex autos yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.1% and 0.3% respectively. Capacity utilization and building permits also surprised to the downside, coming in at 78.1% and 1.229 million respectively. However, Housing starts and the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index surprised positively, coming in at 9.2% and 100.8 respectively. DXY has fallen by nearly 1% this week. Overall, we continue to be bullish on the dollar on a cyclical basis, as inflationary pressures inside the U.S. will force the Fed to hike more than the market expects. That being said, the slowdown in the dollar's momentum, the growing Chinese stimulus, and accumulating signs of stabilizing global economic activity are likely to further weigh on the dollar on a more immediate basis. We will monitor these factors closely in order to gauge whether or not this pullback will remain a garden-variety correction or something more serious. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus - August 3, 2018 Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area has been positive: Labor costs growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.2%. Moreover, construction output yearly growth also surprised positively, coming in at 2.6%. Finally, both core and headline inflation came in line with expectations, at 1% and 2% respectively. EUR/USD has rallied by 1.1% this week We are bearish on the cyclical outlook for the euro, given that core inflation measures are continue to be too weak for the ECB to meaningfully change their dovish monetary policy stance. However, the current tactical rebound is likely to continue, as the weakness in the euro this year has eased financial conditions, which could lead to a temporary boon for the economy. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 Time To Pause And Breathe - July 6, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Industrial production yearly growth surprised negatively, coming in at 2.2%. Moreover, capacity utilization also underperformed expectations, coming in at -0.6%. Finally, both export and import yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 6.6% and 15.4% respectively. USD/JPY has been relatively flat this week. We are bearish on the yen on a structural basis, given that the economy continues to suffer from strong deflationary forces, which will force the Bank of Japan to keep their ultra-easy monetary policy. Report Links: Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been positive: The retail price index yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 3.5%. Moreover, both core and headline inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1% and 2.7% respectively. Finally, the DCLG House Price Index also surprised positively, coming in at 3.1%. GBP/USD has rallied by roughly 1.5% this week. The GBP's vol is likely to increase further going foirward, as very little political risks is priced into it. A practical strategy will be to lean against large weekly moves, both on the upside and downside. This strategy should be particularly profitable versus the euro. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been positive: The participation rate surprised to the upside, coming in at 65.7%. Moreover, the total change in employment also outperformed expectations, coming in at 44 thousand. Finally, the house price index yearly growth also surprised positively, coming in at -0.6%. AUD/USD has risen by roughly 1.8% this week. We continue to be cyclically bearish on the Australian dollar, as the deleveraging campaign in China will weigh on demand for industrial metals, Australia's main export. Moreover, the AUD will also have downside against the CAD, as oil should continue to hold up relative to other commodities thanks to supply cuts from OPEC. That being said, the AUD's recent rebound is likely to continue on a short-term basis. Hence, investors already shorting the Aussie should consider buying hedges. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD/USD has rallied nearly 1.9% this week. We are negative on the New Zealand dollar on a structural basis due to the measures taken by the Ardern government, which include reducing immigration, and adopting_a dual mandate for the RBNZ. Both of these measures will weigh on the real neutral rate, which means that the RBNZ will have to hold rates lower than otherwise. However, on a more tactical basis, this cross could rally, thanks to the temporary stimulus by the Chinese authorities which will help risk assets. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mixed: Manufacturing shipments monthly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.9%. However, capacity utilization surprised to the downside, coming in at 85.5%. Finally, the new house price index yearly growth was in line with expectations, coming in at 0.5% USD/CAD has depreciated by 1% this week. We remain bullish on the CAD among the dollar bloc currencies, given that inflationary pressures continue to be strong in Canada. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has rallied by 0.5% this week. We continue to be bullish on this cross on a cyclical basis, as the Swiss economy is still too fragile for the SNB to remove its ultra-dovish monetary stance. Moreover, the recent appreciation in the franc that has taken place over the last four months should be very negative for inflation, as Switzerland is the country with the most imports as a percentage of demand in the G10, and thus the country with the most sensitive inflation to currency movements. Finally, on a tactical basis we are also bullish on this cross, as the recent easing of monetary policy by Chinese authorities should be weigh on safe heaven assets like the franc. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Yesterday, Norges Bank increased rates for the first time since 2011, yet the NOK was flat against a weak USD, and fell against the euro and the Swedish krona, suggesting that the hike was well anticipated by market participants. Despite this price action, USD/NOK has depreciated by 1.2% this week. We are positive on the NOK against other non-oil commodity currencies, as oil should outperform base metals in the current environment. After all, OPEC supply cuts and geopolitical risk in the Middle East should provide a boon for oil prices. On the other hand, while temporary easing is likely, the Chinese deleveraging campaign will continue once the Chinese economy has stabilized. Finally, the positive NIIP, and positive current account of the NOK should give it an additional advantage against the rest of the commodity currencies. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been negative: Headline inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 2%. Moreover, the unemployment rate increased from 6% in July to 6.1% on the August reading. USD/SEK has depreciated by almost 2.8% this week. We expect the Riksbank to begin tightening policy in December, as Swedish inflationary pressures remain strong. Moreover, the recent stimulus from the PBoC should put additional downward pressure on EUR/SEK, given the krona's more pro-cyclical profile than the euro. Finally, valuations also support the SEK, as the krona is cheap according to multiple measures. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Overweight Rail stocks in general, and Union Pacific (UNP) in particular, got a major lift yesterday when UNP announced a plan to implement the principles of Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR) in its push to improve customer deliveries and profitability. Recall that PSR was developed by Hunter Harrison first at CN Rail, then CP Rail and finally at CSX where its implementation took industry profit laggards to profit leadership. Though his recent passing was untimely, the 9% year-over-year improvement in CSX’s Q2/18 operating ratio is a testament to the success of Mr. Harrison’s strategy. The timing for a renewed approach at UNP could scarcely be better. Both demand and pricing are soaring (second and third panels) and the resulting congestion is threatening profitability. We expect the ongoing supportive macro backdrop, combined with operating improvements such as these, to sustain the operating margin improvement trend of the past two years (bottom panel). Stay overweight, despite the 20% in relative return since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU.
Highlights The latest round of tariffs on U.S. imports from China confirms that the Trump administration's confrontation with China goes beyond the mid-term elections. Desynchronization between the U.S. and China/EM growth foreshadows dollar appreciation. The latter is the right medicine for the global economy for now. A stronger dollar is required to redistribute growth and inflation away from the U.S. and towards the rest of the world. China needs a weaker currency to offset deflationary pressures stemming from domestic deleveraging and trade tariffs. For EM ex-China, the dollar rally is painful, but it is the right medicine in the long run. It will bring about the unraveling of excesses within their economies. Feature The global economy presently finds itself between two strong and opposing crosscurrents: robust growth and mounting inflationary pressures in the U.S. on the one hand, and weakening Chinese growth on the other. Desynchronization between China/EM and the U.S. has been our theme since April 2017.1 Although this theme has become evident and to a certain degree priced into the markets, we believe it is not yet time to abandon it. Before exploring this analysis in greater depth, we will address the issue of whether strong U.S. demand will reverse the slowdown in the global trade cycle, and update our thoughts on the trade wars. Global Trade And Trade Wars Our leading indicators for global trade do not herald a reversal in the global exports slowdown. Chart I-1 demonstrates that the ratio of risk-on versus safe-haven currencies2 leads global export volumes by several months, and it does not yet flag any improvement. Chart I-1Risk-On / Safe-Haven Currency Ratio As An Indicator Of Global Trade In addition, Taiwanese exports of electronic products lead the global trade cycles by a couple of months, and they are currently pointing to further deceleration in world exports (Chart I-2). It seems extremely robust U.S. domestic demand growth has not prevented a slowdown in global trade in general and EM exports in particular. The reason for this is that many developing countries' shipments to China are larger than their exports to the U.S., as illustrated in Table I-1. Chart I-2Taiwanese Electronics Exports##br## Slightly Lead Global Exports Table I-1Many Emerging Economies##br## Sell More To China Than To The U.S. The latest decision by the U.S. administration to impose a 10% tariff on $200 billion of imports from China and increase this rate to 25% starting January 1, 2019 confirms that the Trump administration's confrontation with China goes beyond the mid-term elections. The true intention of the U.S. is to contain China's geopolitical rise to preserve its global hegemony. These episodes of import tariffs will likely mark the beginning of a much longer and drawn-out geopolitical confrontation. Our colleagues at BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service have been noting for several years that a U.S.-China confrontation is unavoidable.3 In this vein, it is not clear to us why global growth-sensitive and China-leveraged plays in financial markets have rallied in recent days on the new tariff announcement. We can think of two reasons: (1) markets expect China to stimulate domestic demand aggressively to counter tariffs; and (2) gradually rising U.S. import tariffs will boost global trade in the near term, as companies front load their production and shipments before the 25% tariff rate takes hold. On the first point, there has so far been no major new fiscal stimulus announced in China. We detailed fiscal numbers in our August 23 report,4 and there have been no changes since. As to liquidity easing - which has been material - our assessment is that it is likely to be overwhelmed by ongoing regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking. In short, lingering credit excesses and regulatory tightening will hamper the monetary transmission mechanism from lower interest rates to faster credit growth. So far, money growth in China remains very weak (Chart I-3). Chart I-3China's Narrow Money And EM Stocks On the second point, we cannot rule out a moderate and temporary improvement in global trade due to various technical factors. Yet, any rally rooted in this will prove to be short-lived and fleeting. Bottom Line: Escalating tariffs on U.S. imports from China will reinforce the tectonic macro shifts that have been in place since early this year: it will lift U.S. inflation slightly and weigh on Chinese growth. Rising U.S. Inflation U.S. core inflation is accelerating and moving above the Federal Reserve's soft target of 2%. This will substantially narrow the Fed's maneuvering room to respond to the turmoil in EM and weakening growth outside the U.S. Chart I-4 demonstrates that an equally weighted average of various core consumer inflation measures for the U.S. has been markedly accelerating. The components of this core inflation aggregate are presented in Chart I-5 and include: trimmed mean CPI, trimmed mean PCE, market-based core PCE and median CPI. Besides, the U.S. labor market is super tight, and employee compensation growth will continue to rise. This will put downward pressure on corporate profit margins and will push businesses to consider passing on their rising costs to consumers. Provided wage growth will continue accelerating and the job market and confidence both remain strong, odds are that companies will be able to raise their selling prices. Chart I-4U.S. Inflation Is Rising... Chart I-5...Based On Various Core Measures Weakening Chinese Growth Growth continues to weaken in China. In particular: The aggregate freight index (transport by railway, highway, waterway, and aviation) is sluggish and the measure of Air China's freight continues to downshift (Chart I-6). The strength in China's residential property market since 2015 has partially been due to the central bank providing very cheap financing directly to housing via its Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) scheme. We have argued in the past that this represents nothing less than monetization of excess housing inventories directly by the People's Bank of China.5 This has boosted property prices and sales, supporting the economy over the past two years. Having met the objective of reducing housing inventories, the PBoC has lately reduced the amount of PSL. Provided changes in PSL flows have led both housing prices and sales volumes, it is reasonable to expect a relapse in new sales in the next six months or so (Chart I-7). Chart I-6China: A Slowdown In Freight Indicators Chart I-7China: Housing Sales To Roll Over Soon Our main theme in China has been and remains shrinking construction activity - both infrastructure and property building. This is the primary rationale for our negative view on commodities prices as well as weakness in mainland aggregate imports. Chart I-8 illustrates property construction activity is already contracting. Headline fixed asset investment in real estate has been held up by booming land purchases, yet equipment purchases as well as construction and installation have been shrinking (Chart I-8). Capital expenditures for all industries, including construction and installation, purchase of equipment and instruments - but excluding land values - are also very weak (Chart I-9). Chart I-8China: Property Investment##br## Excluding Land Is Contracting Chart I-9China: Overall Capex##br## Is Very Weak Interestingly, our proxy for marginal propensity to spend6 by Chinese companies leads global industrial metals prices, and continues pointing to more downside (Chart I-10). With respect to oil, Chinese oil import growth has downshifted considerably (Chart I-11) implying that global oil prices have been mostly propped up by supply concerns. Chart I-10Chinese Companies' Propensity##br## To Spend And Metal Prices Chart I-11China: A Slowdown##br## In Oil Imports Currency Markets As A Rebalancing Mechanism Pressures from growth desynchronization between the U.S. and China and trade wars continue to build. Left unchecked, these imbalances will enlarge and culminate into a bust. A release valve is needed to diffuse these accumulating pressures. Currency and bond markets often act as such - they move to rebalance the global economy and amend economic excesses. Odds are that exchange rates will continue to act as a rebalancing conduit. A stronger dollar is the right medicine for the global economy at the moment. A stronger dollar is required to redistribute growth away from the U.S. and towards the rest of the world. In particular, dollar appreciation is needed to cap budding U.S. inflationary pressures. China needs a weaker currency to offset deflationary pressures stemming from domestic deleveraging and trade tariffs. In turn, a stronger greenback will cause capital outflows from EM and compel the unraveling of excesses within the developing economies. While the result will be painful growth retrenchment for EM in the medium term, cheapened currencies and deleveraging (an unwinding of credit excesses) will ultimately create a foundation for stronger and healthier growth in the years ahead. As to the question of why the dollar would rally in the face of widening twin deficits, we have the following remarks. In a world where growth and inflation are scarce (i.e., in a deflationary milieu), a wider current account deficit and higher inflation - signs of robust domestic demand - will attract capital, ultimately lifting a country's currency. By contrast, in a world of strong growth and intensifying inflationary pressures, twin deficits and higher inflation will cause a country's currency to depreciate. Our assessment is that the global economic backdrop is still more deflationary than inflationary, despite intensifying inflationary pressures in the U.S. Therefore, twin deficits and inflation in the U.S. will be at a premium. That and the fact that the Federal Reserve is willing to continue tightening are conducive for dollar appreciation. As we have argued in previous reports, the U.S. dollar is not cheap,7 but it is not particularly expensive either. In fact, odds are it will get much more expensive before topping out. Bottom Line: Beyond any possible short-term countertrend moves, the path of least resistance for the U.S. dollar is up, and for the RMB and EM currencies, down. As these adjustments within the currency markets endure, EM risk assets will stay under selling pressure and underperform their developed market counterparts. Indonesia: At The Whims Of Foreign Portfolio Flows 20 September 2018 The Indonesian currency has reached a two- decade low, and equities and bonds have sold off considerably. Is it time to turn positive on the nation's financial markets? Our bias remains that this selloff is not over and stocks, bonds as well as the currency have more downside. The basis is that Indonesia's balance of payments (BoP) will continue to deteriorate. Indonesia has been very reliant on volatile foreign portfolio flows to fund its current account deficit (Chart II-1). Not surprisingly, a reversal in foreign portfolio inflows to emerging markets (EM) has hurt this country's financial markets. We expect international capital flows to EM to be lackluster, which will continue to weigh on Indonesia's capital account. In the meantime, Indonesia's current account deficit is likely to widen in the months ahead. First, export revenues will begin rolling over on the back of lower copper and palm oil prices. Together, these commodities account for 13% of Indonesian exports. Second, the ongoing slowdown in China may eventually weigh on thermal coal prices. This commodity makes up another 12% of exports. Third, Indonesian imports remain very robust. Overall, a widening current account/trade deficit is typically negative for both share prices and the rupiah (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Indonesia: Foreign ##br##Portfolio Flows Are Key Chart II-2Deteriorating Trade Balance ##br##Is Bearish For Equities To prevent further currency depreciation, the government announced it will curb certain imports by raising tariffs.While this policy may succeed in limiting imports, it will also raise inflation by pushing prices of imported goods higher. This will allow inefficient domestic producers to stay in business. Higher inflation is fundamentally negative for the currency and local bonds. The above dynamics are making Indonesia's macro outlook increasingly toxic because Bank Indonesia (BI) will probably need to tighten monetary policy further in order to stabilize the rupiah and restrain inflation. Crucially, the BI's objective is to maintain rupiah stability in order to keep inflation tame. Further, Perry Warjiyo, the current governor of BI, has highlighted his preference for setting decisive and preemptive policies. Indonesia's central bank has already raised interest rates, and more hikes are likely if the currency continues depreciating - as we expect. On top of rate hikes, the BI will continue to deplete its foreign exchange reserves to defend the rupiah. Chart II-3 shows that foreign exchange reserve selling by the BI is shrinking local banking system liquidity (commercial bank reserves at the central bank) and lifting domestic interbank rates. In turn, higher local rates will cause bank loan growth to slow, hurting domestic demand. The latter will be very negative for profit growth and share prices because the Indonesian stock market is heavily dominated by banks and other domestic plays. The outlook for Indonesian banks is crucial for the performance of the Indonesian bourse, given they account for 42% of total MSCI market cap. Unfortunately, banks still rest on shaky foundations: Chart II-3Selling FX Reserves = Higher Interbank Rates Chart II-4Net Interest Margins Will Keep Compressing Not only will demand for loans slump as borrowing costs rise, but banks' net interest margins will also continue to compress (Chart II-4). Weaker growth and higher interest rates will also lead to a considerable rise in non-performing loans (NPLs), and cause banks' provisioning levels to spike. Higher provisions will hurt their earnings (Chart II-5). Notably, banks have boosted their profits substantially in the past two years by reducing their provisions. This process is set to reverse very soon. Finally, a word on overall equity valuations is warranted. Despite the correction that has taken place, this bourse is not yet trading at compelling valuation levels neither in absolute nor in relative terms (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Downside Ahead For Banks' Shares Chart II-6Indonesian Bourse Isn't Cheap Bottom Line: The rupiah will remain under selling pressure. This in turn will create a toxic macro mix of higher inflation, rising borrowing costs and weaker domestic demand. We recommend investors keep an underweight position in Indonesian stocks as well as local and sovereign bonds within their respective EM dedicated portfolios. We are also maintaining our short positions in the rupiah versus the U.S. dollar and on 5-year local currency bonds. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Toward A Desynchonized World?" dated April 26, 2017, the link is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Relative total return (carry included) of four equally weighted EM (ZAR, RUB, BRL and CLP) and three DM (AUD, NZD and CAD) commodities currencies versus an equally weighted average of two safe-haven currencies - the Japanese yen and Swiss franc. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated March 28, 2018, the link is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: Do Not Catch A Falling Knife," dated August 23, 2018, the link is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?" dated April 6, 2018, the link is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 6 Calculated as a ratio of corporate demand deposits to time deposits. Rising demand deposits relative to time (savings) deposits entail that companies are gearing up to spend /invest money and vice versa. 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "The Dollar: Will The U.S. Invoke A "Nuclear" Option?" dated August 30, 2018, the link is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Recent estimates by ship trackers put the loss of Iranian exports at close to 1mm b/d as of mid-September vs April levels. This loss is higher (and sooner) than our previous baseline expectation, and prompts us to raise our estimate of lost Iranian oil exports to 1.25mm b/d by November, when U.S. sanctions kick in. Venezuela still is close to collapse, but may avoid a complete meltdown with Chinese companies stepping in to safeguard the $50 billion loaned to the country's oil industry.1 We expect production to fall below 1mm b/d next year - to less than half its end-2016 level. With Fed policy likely to continue tightening into 2019 as oil prices surge, the odds of an equity bear market and recession arriving in 2H19 - vs our 2H20 House view - also increase. Our dominant scenario now includes a supply shock and higher prices in 1Q19, which is followed by a U.S. SPR release and price-induced demand destruction (Chart of the Week). As a result, we are raising the odds of Brent prices reaching or exceeding $100/bbl by as early as 1Q19, and lifting our 2019 forecast to $95/bbl. Energy: Overweight. U.S. refining capacity utilization remains close to 19-year highs. At 97.1% of operable capacity, it is within a whisker of the four-week-moving-average highs of 97.3% recorded in August, driven by strong product demand ex U.S. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Treasury granted permission to Rusal's existing customers to continue signing new contracts with the aluminum producer. The announcement stopped short of a full removal of sanctions, which are set to come into effect on October 23. Precious Metals: Neutral. The strong trade-weighted USD continues to hold gold prices on either side of $1,200/oz. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's Crop Production report forecasts record yields for corn and soybeans - 181.3 and 52.8 bushels/acre, respectively - which continues to weigh on prices. The bean harvest is expected to be a record. Feature Chart of the WeekBCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens With the loss of Iranian exports occurring faster and sooner than expected, and Venezuela remaining on the brink of collapse, senior energy officials from the U.S., Russia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) are going to great lengths to reassure their domestic consumers everything - particularly on the supply side - is under control. We are inclined to believe their comfort level re global oil supply is inversely proportional to the amount of reassurance they provide their domestic audiences. The more they meet and talk - particularly to the media - the more concerned they are. And right now, they're pretty concerned. Rick Perry, the U.S. Energy Secretary, held a presser in Moscow following his meeting with Alexander Novak, Russia's Energy Minister, saying the U.S., KSA and Russia can lift output over the next 18 months to compensate for the loss of exports from Iran, Venezuela, and other unplanned outages.2 That might be true, but the market's already tightening far faster and far sooner than many analysts expected. Covering a supply shortfall in 18 months does nothing for the market over the next few months, particularly with demand remaining robust (Chart 2) and OECD inventories falling (Chart 3). Since 2017, our factor model shows Brent prices have been supported by two factors acting simultaneously together: Chart 2Fundamentals Support Strong Prices Chart 3Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Strong compliance of OPEC 2.0 members to the coalition's production-cutting agreement, which reduced the OPEC Supply-and-Inventory factor's role, and The pickup in global oil demand, particularly in EM economies, which pushed our Global Demand factor up. These effects were partly counterbalanced by the rise in our non-OPEC Supply factor - driven by strong growth in U.S. shale-oil output - which became the largest negative contributor to price movements. Global demand's been strengthening since the end of 1H17 on the back of stellar EM income growth. This remains the fundamental backdrop to global oil for now. While our base case remains relatively supportive for oil prices, we are raising the odds of a price spike resulting from a supply shock as early as 1Q19 on the back of larger- and faster-than-expected Iranian export losses, and continued declines in Venezuelan production. Should this occur, we believe it would trigger a U.S. SPR release, and produce demand destruction at a rate that could be faster than historical experience would suggest (Table 1). This further tightens balances, and leads us to raise our 2019 forecast for Brent crude oil to $95/bbl on average, up from $80/bbl last month, with WTI trading $6/bbl below that (Chart 4). This forecast is highly conditional, given our assumptions re supply-side variables, a U.S. SPR release, and demand destruction estimates. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) Chart 4BCA's Oil Balances Tighter Oil Balances Tighten As Supply Contracts In our monthly balances update, we are incorporating a sharply accelerated loss of Iranian export barrels to the market, which already is evident. Bloomberg this week reported its tanker-tracking service registered a decline in Iranian exports of close to 1mm b/d between April, when sanctions were announced, and mid-September.3 At this rate, the assessment by Platts Analytics last week that as much as 1.4mm b/d of Iranian exports could be lost by the time U.S. sanctions kick in November 4 appears more likely.4 However, to be conservative, we are building in a loss of 1.25mm b/d in our balances, and have it developing over the July - November period in increments of 250k b/d, instead of the November - February interval we assumed in last month's balances. We will monitor this situation and revise our estimates as new information arrives. Also on the supply side, we are assuming the U.S. SPR releases 500k b/d starting a month after Brent prices go over $90/bbl in March 2019. This is in line with the SPR's enabling legislation, which limits drawdowns to 30mm b/d over a 60-day period, after the President authorizes such action to meet a severe energy supply interruption. Lastly, we continue to carry supply constraints arising from the lack of sufficient take-away capacity to get all of the crude produced in the Permian Basin to refining markets in our models. To wit: We continue to expect 1.2mm b/d of supply growth from the U.S. shales, driven largely by Permian production, vs an earlier expectation of 1.4mm b/d of growth. We expect the Permian to be de-bottlenecked by 4Q19. We expect the Big 3 producers Secretary Perry expects to fill supply gaps in 18 months - the U.S., Russia, and KSA - to produce 10.83mm, 11.4mm and 10.4mm b/d in 2H18, and 11.79mm, 11.43mm and 10.4mm b/d next year, respectively. They will get some help from OPEC's Gulf Arab producers - i.e., the core OPEC producers (Chart 5) - but, supply will continue to fall/stagnate in most of the rest of the world, particularly in offshore producers (Chart 6). Chart 5While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... Chart 6... 'The Other Guys' Output Stagnates We also note the EIA and IEA have lowered their supply-growth estimates this month. The EIA this month reduced expected U.S. crude production growth by 210k b/d in 2019, and the IEA lowered its estimate of offshore production growth in Brazil from 260k b/d to just 30k b/d this year. These are non-trivial adjustments in a market that was tight prior to the downgrade in supply growth. Still, there are significant marginal disagreements on the supply side among the major data supporters (the EIA, IEA and OPEC), which can be seen in Table 2. Table 2Comparison Of Major Balances Estimates Demand Destruction Likely As Prices Spike In 1Q19 We expect the rate of growth in EM incomes and trade - a proxy for income - to slow slightly this year vs 2017, on the back of a strengthening USD. This will reduce the rate of growth in EM imports and the rate of growth in EM commodity demand, at the margin. However, y/y growth in EM incomes is expected to remain positive over the next 12 months in our baseline scenario, which will keep the level of commodity demand - particularly for oil and industrial metals - robust. This will drive global demand growth of ~ 1.6mm b/d this year, roughly unchanged from last month. Higher prices risk slowing next year's growth. This is where it gets tricky. An oil-supply shock occurring when global demand is strong most likely will produce a price spike, as we've been arguing for the past several weeks.5 This price spike, coupled with continued monetary-policy tightening by the Fed, raises the likelihood of demand destruction globally. Higher oil prices and a stronger USD act as a double-whammy on EM oil demand. The problem we have now is gauging the elasticity of oil demand, particularly in EM. Oil markets are fundamentally different now than at any point in the modern era - roughly beginning in the early 1960s with the ascendance of OPEC - because many big oil-importing EM economies removed or relaxed subsidies following the prices collapse of 2014 - 2016. Prominent among these states are China and India. OPEC states also took advantage of the price collapse to relax or remove subsidies, e.g., KSA.6 The price shock we anticipate, therefore, will be the first in the modern era in which EM consumers - the principal driver of oil demand in the world, accounting for roughly 70% of the demand growth we expect - are exposed directly to higher prices. How quickly they will respond to higher prices is unknown. For this reason, we're introducing what we consider a reasonable first approximation of how EM demand might respond to higher prices and a stronger USD into the scenarios we include in our ensemble forecast (Chart 7). As a first approximation - subject to at least monthly adjustment, as more data become available - we are modeling a 100k b/d loss of demand for every $10/bbl increase in crude oil prices.7 We will continue to iterate on this as new information becomes available. Chart 7Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Bottom Line: We've raised the odds of a supply shock in the oil markets that takes Brent prices to or through $100/bbl by 1Q19. Should this occur, we expect it will be met by a U.S. SPR release of 500k b/d a month after prices breach $90/bbl. This price spike will set off a round of demand destruction, which we expect will be quicker than history would suggest, given many large EM oil-consuming states have relaxed or eliminated fuel subsidies, leaving their consumers exposed to the price shock. This will be exacerbated by a stronger USD going forward, as the Fed likely looks through the price spike and continues with its policy-rate normalization. In this scenario, a U.S. recession could arrive in 2H19 vs our House view of 2H20 or later. In addition, we would expect an equity bear market to ensue sooner than presently anticipated. We recommend using Brent call spreads to express the view consistent with our research. At tonight's close, we will go long April, May and June 2019 calls struck at $85/bbl and short $90/bbl calls. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Venezuela hands China more oil presence, but no mention of new funds," published by reuters.com September 14, 2018. 2 U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry made this claim at a press conference after meeting with Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak last Friday. Please see "Big Three oil states can offset fall in Iran supplies: Perry," published by reuters.com September 14, 2018. 3 Please see "Saudi Arabia Is Comfortable With Brent Oil Above $80," published by bloomberg.com September 18, 2018. 4 Please see "OPEC crude oil production rises to 32.89 mil b/d in Aug as cuts unwind: Platts survey" published by SP Platts Global September 6, 2018. 5 Please see "Oil-Supply Shock, Rising U.S. Rates Favor Gold As A Portfolio Hedge," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report on September 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. For a discussion of the effect of a stronger USD on global oil demand, please see "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk," published by the Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018. 6 Please see the Special Focus in the World Bank's January 2018 Global Economic Prospects entitled "With The Benefit of Hindsight: The Impact of the 2014 - 16 Oil Price Collapse," beginning on p. 49. 7 In this simulation, we employ an iterative one-step-ahead forecasting methodology that reduces demand by 100k b/d for every $10/bbl increase in prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018