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The news flow so far has been positive, with both U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping publicly acknowledging they are closer to a deal. But with a still-ballooning U.S. trade deficit with China, Trump will want to take home a win.…
Highlights The first quarter is in the books, … : Risk may have been out in the fourth quarter, but it is squarely back in fashion so far this year, with equities and high yield posting gaudy first-quarter returns. … and events have compelled us to modify our high-conviction Fed call, … : There may yet be another four or more rate hikes, but they’re not going to occur this year. … but we’re still confident in our asset-allocation recommendations, … : The Fed may no longer be a menacing presence, but that doesn’t mean Treasuries and longer-maturity bonds are going to have it easy from here. … which should benefit from a more accommodative monetary policy outlook: Conditions remain favorable for equities and spread product, and unfavorable for Treasuries, even if the underlying drivers have shifted. Feature Table 1Whipsaw Newton’s Third Law holds that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Markets have been busy supporting the theorem, as the fourth quarter’s sharp selloff has been nearly erased by the potent first-quarter rally (Table 1). Risk assets have been on a rollercoaster ride, though our economic outlook has been more or less unchanged. We chalked up the fourth quarter’s selloff to fears that the Fed was threatening the expansion. Conversely, the first quarter’s snapback likely owed quite a bit to the Fed’s pivot. By shifting its emphasis from trying to prevent inflation from getting away on the upside to trying to keep inflation expectations from falling too far, the Fed has gone from removing the punch bowl to promising to keep it full. In financial markets, risk assets should be the biggest relative beneficiaries. The Fed’s turn thwarted our more-hikes-than-expected call, at least in the near term. That surprise has been compounded by the administration’s seeming intent to pack the board of governors with nominees chosen solely on the basis of their uber-dovishness, and has inspired us to reflect on our calls. We like to share our reflections, as well as the internal BCA discussions and the client questions that shed light on our views. This week’s report examines some of the most important issues on our minds, and the minds of our colleagues and clients. Q: What does the Fed do from here? The quarterly summary of economic projections compiles FOMC meeting participants’ expectations for the likely path of key economic indicators (real GDP growth, unemployment and inflation) and monetary policy. The latest release revealed that Fed governors and regional presidents sharply dialed back their rate hike expectations between the December meeting and the March meeting (Chart 1). The median participant lopped 50 basis points (“bps”) off of his/her year-end 2019 and terminal fed funds rate projections, calling for no hikes in 2019 and just one more for the current cycle, in 2020. The rationale is a bit of a mystery, as the median participant’s estimates of GDP and inflation only came down modestly, and his/her unemployment rate estimates only rose modestly. It made sense for the Fed to turn away from the gradual pace of hikes it pursued in 2017 and 2018 in response to the sharp tightening in financial conditions brought on by the fourth-quarter selloff. The ensuing rallies in equities and high-yield bonds have undone much of that tightening, however. From a data perspective, it seems the Fed is mostly holding off to see how the outlook for the rest of the world evolves. The minutes of the March meeting, released last week, suggested that there may be more nuance to the Fed’s embrace of patience than markets initially perceived. The money markets had been calling for a 25-bps cut in the fed funds rate, to 2.25%, by the end of 2020; following the March meeting, they swiftly moved to price in a high likelihood of a second cut, to 2% (Chart 2). That outlook does not exactly accord with the committee’s more measured take: “Several participants observed that the [‘patient’] characterization … would need to be reviewed regularly[.] … A couple of participants noted that the ‘patient’ characterization should not be seen as limiting the Committee’s options[.] … Several participants noted that their views of the appropriate target range for the federal funds rate could shift in either direction[.] … Some participants indicated that if the economy evolved as they currently expected, … they would likely judge it appropriate to raise the target range … modestly later this year[.]” Chart 2... To Keeping It Full We continue to believe that the Phillips Curve is alive and well inside the Fed’s policy framework. The inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment is embedded in its macroeconomic models, and will compel the Fed to tighten policy in response to an unemployment rate that is nosing around 50-year lows (Chart 3). With the committee seemingly willing to let inflation get a bit of a head start before it tightens policy, it may well have to hike faster, and establish a higher terminal rate, than it otherwise would have if it had continued to follow a steady course. We believe the tightening cycle has been postponed rather than truncated, contrary to the money market’s view. Chart 3Sixties Flashback Bottom Line: The Fed is not going to take the fed funds rate to 3.25 - 3.5% by year end, as we expected late last year. We still believe the terminal rate is in that neighborhood, however, and the longer the Fed cools its heels, the greater the potential that it could exceed our estimate. Q: What is the outlook for the rest of the world? The March minutes revealed that conditions in the rest of the world continue to influence the Fed’s policy decisions. The slowdown in China, the uncertain outcomes of ongoing trade talks and Britain’s separation from the EU shadow the outlook in emerging economies and the major non-U.S. developed economies. The outlook for China, other emerging markets, and Europe have been a spirited subject of discussion within BCA. With a majority of the managing editors perceiving the signs of some green shoots, we upgraded Chinese equities to overweight from equal weight, and European and EM equities to equal weight from underweight, at our monthly View Meeting last week. An end to China’s deleveraging campaign may be all the rest of the world needs to show a little more life. Chart 4As China Goes China is a critical influence on our global view. We expect that policymakers have already begun de-emphasizing their deleveraging campaign, as suggested by March’s credit data, released Friday, and will encourage lenders to lend. No one at BCA expects a stimulus campaign on the order of the massive 2008 and 2016 efforts, but the general view is that policymakers can take steps to end the deceleration in China’s growth, since it was rooted in their deleveraging drive. The deceleration weighed on trade and manufacturing activity around the world (Chart 4), and may have been the catalyst for the global mini-slowdown. The rest of the world should benefit from the easing in financial conditions driven by the global equity rally. The decline in bond yields has also helped ease financial conditions, and the nearly unanimous dovishness of major-economy central banks may provide investors and consumers with additional comfort. The key issue for the U.S. economy, and U.S.-oriented investors, is whether or not the other major economies will slow enough to cool off the U.S. at a time when its fiscal impulse is slowing. We have a sense that China and Europe are beginning to turn, and we do not expect spillovers to drag on U.S. growth, but continued rallies in U.S. risk assets probably require some sort of revival beyond its shores. Q: How do corporate profits look? Is the consensus overly optimistic? The corporate profit outlook is getting less ambitious by the day. Over the last three months, consensus expectations for first quarter S&P 500 share-weighted earnings have fallen by 6.5%, as analysts downwardly revised their year-over-year growth projections from +3.5% to -2.2%. Management teams seek to under-promise and over-deliver, and do their best to guide analyst expectations to a level their companies can exceed. Since 1994, according to Thomson Reuters, about two-thirds of companies have reported earnings that beat estimates. On average over that stretch, companies have beaten estimates by a margin of 3.2%. We are therefore inclined to take the projected earnings contraction with a grain of salt. Corporations seem to have lowered the bar to a level they should be able to clear without too much trouble. Chart 5Wages Aren't Yet Pressuring Margins ... We are further inclined to question the projected 2.2% contraction in earnings, given that revenues are projected to grow by 5% in the quarter. The disparity implies margin contraction of close to 7%. Compensation is the largest component of corporate expenses, with the remainder roughly split between interest expense and other input costs. The other meaningful input is the dollar, which should most often exhibit an inverse relationship with margins. Real unit labor costs is the compensation series that most directly impacts profit margins, and it has been contracting on a year-over-year basis, augmenting margins (Chart 5). It will continue to do so as long as nominal wage growth lags inflation and productivity gains. BBB-rated corporate yields were materially higher in the first quarter than they were a year ago, and may have taken a modest bite out of margins, but they’re now back to where they were then and cannot explain the projected 7-ppt margin haircut by themselves (Chart 6). Producer prices grew just 2.2% on a year-over-year basis, slightly ahead of consumer prices (Chart 7), suggesting that margins only slightly narrowed from the disparity between input costs and selling costs. Chart 6... And Interest Rates Aren't Anymore Chart 7Input Costs Are Manageable The broad trade-weighted dollar gained 6% from 1Q18 to 1Q19. Assuming corporations lower prices to defend market share against foreign competitors, profit margins should fall when the dollar rises. Dollar appreciation likely exerted some incremental pressure on margins, but the internal model we’ve previously referenced pegs the EPS impact of a 10% rise in the dollar at 2.5%, far too small for a 6% rise in the dollar to drive a 7-ppt fall in margins. If the revenue estimates are accurate, it seems to us that management must be sandbagging its earnings guidance to some degree. The 10-year Treasury yield will have a harder time falling further now that the Fed is already awfully dovish. Q: Are you having any second thoughts about your duration recommendation? Our below-benchmark duration call was largely founded on our expectation that the Fed was going to surprise complacent markets by hiking more than they expected. It instead surprised dovishly, and the OIS curve responded by pricing in an additional rate cut by the end of next year. The 10-year Treasury yield melted, in accordance with our U.S. Bond Strategy service’s golden rule1 (Chart 8). Chart 8The Golden Rule The surest way to mess up a Fed call is to allow what one thinks the Fed should do to intrude on one’s assessment of what the Fed will do. We did not fall into that trap: our view that the Phillips Curve exerts considerable influence over the Fed and other central banks is founded in the observation that virtually every mainstream macroeconomic model incorporates an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment. As noted above, we see the Fed’s hiking campaign as extended rather than ended. We believe pausing the hiking campaign will extend the expansion and allow the economy to build up more momentum. More momentum would merit higher real rates, and we also expect it would promote inflation pressures given that the output gap is already closed. We were admittedly on the wrong side as the 10-year Treasury yield fell from 3.25% to 2.4%, but still lower yields would be incompatible with our constructive view of the U.S. economy. With much of the drag on Treasury yields seeming to have come from overseas, it’s also important to note that lower major-economy yields would be incompatible with our house view that the global economy is on the cusp of rebounding (Chart 9). Chart 9Yields Rise When Green Shoots Appear Bottom Line: We missed the slide in the 10-year Treasury yield because we failed to foresee the Fed’s pivot, and because we may have focused too much on U.S., rather than global, conditions. We do not see yields falling much further, however, now that the Fed’s capacity for dovish surprises is spent, and green shoots are starting to appear in China and Europe. Q: How was the Final Four? Fantastic, and we recommend gathering some old college friends and making the trip to cheer on your alma mater should it qualify. Bring your kids if they’re old enough. If your school wins it all, you’ll share lifelong memories of the sort the Virginia alumni who attended the games will cherish. We’ll always have Minneapolis. Go ‘Hoos! Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Treasuries beat cash when the Fed hikes less than the money market expects, and lag cash when it hikes more than expected. Please see the U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing,” published July 24, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.
KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however.…
Underweight The relative resilience of consumer discretionary stocks has been puzzling over the past two years. Typically, rising interest rates prelude a period of underperformance in these highly rate sensitive stocks (fed funds rate shown inverted, bottom panel) but the divergence has grown exceptionally wide. Regardless, we believe our negative thesis is sound. Consumer confidence is near record highs (though it has started to decline), which appears to be driving the relative share price gains but consumer credit has not followed suit (second panel), implying consumers are not backing up their positivity with their wallets. The sell-side too appears to discount soaring consumer confidence as earnings estimates have not kept pace with share prices, driving sector valuations to a 25% premium to the broad market and well above sustainable average levels (third panel). However, this is partially explained by Amazon, which carries roughly 30% weight in the S&P consumer discretionary index but only 12.5% of operating profit, and its exceptional outperformance since the beginning of 2018. Nonetheless, we expect retail sales to follow the opposite path of interest rates, as it always has in past cycles, and a derating to occur. Bottom Line: We reiterate our below-benchmark allocation rating on the S&P consumer discretionary index as valuations have grown excessive and BCA’s view remains that interest rates are near their trough.
Highlights OPEC 2.0 will meet in June to decide whether to continue its production cuts into 2H19. Once again, the leaders are sending conflicting signals – KSA is subtly indicating OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts will need to be extended to year-end. Russia, not so much. Much will depend on whether the U.S. extends waivers on Iran oil-export sanctions when they expire May 2. Not surprisingly, Trump administration officials also are not providing much in the way of forward guidance to markets, other than to insist they want Iran’s exports at zero. Our modeling indicates OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – will need to raise production in 2H19, as markets tighten on the back of Venezuela’s collapse, continued unplanned outages (most recently in Libya) and still-strong demand. This aligns our view somewhat with that of Russia. That said, OPEC 2.0’s leaders – and member states – all benefit from higher prices, as we show below. Some, like Russia, more so than others – e.g., KSA, hard as that is to reconcile with their respective stances on production cuts. But none benefits if EM demand is crushed by high prices. It’s a delicate balancing act, given the aggregate GDP of EM commodity-importing countries exceeds that of commodity-exporting countries (Chart of the Week).1 Chart of the WeekEM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand We continue to expect Brent to trade at $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, given our expectation for global supply and demand. KSA and Russia remain the fulcrum of the oil market, as we argued recently, and anticipating their decision-making process remains the critical task for understanding the new political economy of oil.2 Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded opposing forces in Libya cease fighting this week. The country recently lifted oil production over 1mm b/d, but renewed fighting threatens this output. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC) earlier this week tee’d up markets to expect higher infrastructure and transportation spending, which lifted steel and iron ore markets. Markets continue to tighten on the back of the Vale high-grade iron-ore supply losses, which could lift prices above $100/MT in the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral. Central banks continued buying gold in February, the World Gold Council reported this week. Central-bank holdings rose a net 51 tonnes in February bringing total additions to 90 tonnes in the first two months of the year. Agriculture: Underweight. The USDA lifted its estimate of global ending stocks for corn by 5.5mm tons for the 2018/19 crop year. With total use estimates unchanged at 1.13 billion tons, this raises ending stocks-to-use estimates, which will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Feature KSA and Russia share a common feature in that both are petro states, and thus heavily dependent on crude and product exports to fund their governments and economies. Both suffered a near-death experience during the 2014-16 oil-market-share war launched by OPEC, and both have seen their GDPs slowly recover, following the successful production-cutting agreements they jointly engineered to drain excess inventories and restore balance to the market beginning in 2017 and renewed this year (Chart 2). Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. At first blush, it would be logical to assume KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs are driven by the same economic forces of oil supply and demand. In broad terms, they are. Both benefit from higher oil prices, given they are predominantly petro-economies, although Russia tends to benefit more as prices rise (Chart 3). In the post-GFC era, we find that a 1% increase in Brent prices lifts Russia’s GDP ~ 0.07%, while KSA’s goes up ~ 0.03%. Another way of saying this is Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. Chart 2KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Chart 3Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Looking a bit deeper into KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs’ sensitivities to Brent prices, we modeled income growth for both using our Brent forecast (Table 1), the futures markets’ forward curve and compare both to the World Bank’s expectation (Chart 4, bottom panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Given our expectation for EM GDP growth (Chart of the Week), we expect KSA’s GDP to show relatively strong growth with GDP up ~ 5.4% this year and ~ 3.5% next year, propelled partly by higher oil prices (Chart 4, top panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Russia’s GDP goes up ~ 0.25% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. We expect Russia’s GDP to dip then recover in 4Q19, then rise 3.5% by the end of 3Q20 before tapering off toward the end of 2020. This is not surprising given the trajectory for Brent prices in our forecasts and in the futures curves, and the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP to oil prices.We found a similar impact of EM oil demand on Russia and KSA GDPs when controlling for EM FX rates instead of Brent prices (Chart 5).3 Chart 4Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Chart 5While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand U.S. Waivers Dictate OPEC 2.0’s Decision On Production KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. Russia’s a bit of a cipher. President Vladimir Putin this week stated Russia will continue to cooperate with KSA vis-à-vis managing production, although his energy minister, Alexander Novak, has indicated he sees no reason for extending OPEC 2.0’s production deal. Both sides are waiting on fundamental data, and the decision of the U.S. on its waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions. There’s also the ever-likely collapse of Venezuela to consider, and renewed violence in Libya, both of which argue against letting the waivers expire. The Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. The countries granted waivers on U.S. sanctions against Iranian crude oil imports appear to be exercising their option to lift additional barrels, based on data showing loadings out of Iran increased for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 6 and Table 2).4 Loadings out of Iran rose to 1.30mm b/d in March, from 1.24mm b/d in February. Table 2Iran Exports By Country 2018-2019 (‘000 b/d) Bottom Line: We continue to expect U.S. waivers on Iranian oil sanctions will be extended to year end in some form. The collapse of Venezuela and renewed violence in Libya show how tenuously balanced oil markets are at present. Going into a general election in the U.S. next year, the Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. When they meet in June, ministers from OPEC 2.0 member states will be ideally set up to respond to the Trump administration’s decision on waivers for Iranian oil imports, which expire May 2. We are closing our June 2019 $70 vs. $75/bbl call spread, as the position is close to expiry. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In the post-GFC world, we find total EM oil demand rises ~ 0.4% for each 1% rise in EM commodity-importers’ GDP, while it only rises ~ 0.3% for each 1% rise in EM commodity exporters’ GDP, based on our modeling. According to World Banks’ constant 2010 USD series, EM commodity importers’ GDP represented 66% of total EM GDP in 2018, up from 56% in 2010. The EM income elasticity of oil demand has remained at roughly ~ 0.60 from 2000 to now, meaning a 1% increase in EM GDP – hence EM income – lifts oil demand by ~ 0.6%. This has been remarkably stable pre-GFC, post-GFC and from 2000 to now. 2 The new political economy of oil is a continuing theme in our research. For an extended discussion of this theme, please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” and “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy on February 21 and March 21, 2019. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 When using EM FX rates instead of Brent prices as an explanatory variable, we find KSA’s GDP still increases a little more than 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand, but Russia’s rises closer to 0.6%. NB: All GDP measures use historical World Bank data, and BCA Research estimates using the Bank’s projections in constant 2010 USD. We proxy EM oil demand using non-OECD oil consumption. KSA’s production is crude oil only, while Russia’s production is crude and liquids. 4 For a discussion of the waivers’ optionality, please see our BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published on March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades
Overweight With a pickup in oil prices in general and jet fuel prices in particular, a logical inference would be a decline in airlines’ earnings power (second panel). However, the revenue side of the equation has proven much more resilient than anticipated, a result of industry discipline reflected in constrained capacity growth combined with elevated consumer confidence. The upshot is that consumers have been willing to part with greater shares of their wallets in order to fly (third panel). Much of this is reflected in Delta’s results yesterday. The company lifted their full-year guidance on the back of outstanding customer demand driving unit revenues higher, combined with single-digit capacity growth. While it is worth cautioning that DAL does not face the same 737 MAX grounding issues as peers LUV, UAL and AAL, we believe the exceptional fare environment is a tide that lifts all boats. Accordingly, we expect earnings in the S&P airlines index to continue to significantly outpace the broad market (bottom panel), particularly once the transitory 737 MAX grounding issue is resolved. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, UAL, AAL and ALK.
While most FOMC participants do not expect growth weaknesses to last beyond the first quarter of 2019, a majority do not anticipate interest rates to rise in 2019. The key to this seeming paradox lies in the participants’ assessment of the inflation…
Last week’s release of traffic data showed further deterioration in freight volumes, the fundamental driver of pricing power, confirming our bearish thesis. Only four of the 20 commodity categories tracked by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) saw…
This should temper enthusiasm regarding the long-term durability of the trade truce, highlighting that China’s credit data is the more important factor for the 12-month horizon, though the trade issue is an impediment that needs to be removed for a…

