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Highlights When it comes to a beauty contest among currencies, the US dollar is a winner right now. Significant dollar moves tend to occur in very long cycles. When – and only when – the crisis ends will the dollar begin to surrender to significant headwinds. The transition from a stronger to weaker dollar is likely to occur in fits and starts. Watch the gold-to-bond ratio and USD/CNY exchange rate as key arbiters in timing this shift. Feature The world economy has clearly been nudged into a very deep recession. But as with other pandemics, the global economy is likely to survive this one too. As currency markets continue to fight a tug-of-war between deteriorating global growth and very easy financial conditions, it is instructive to start placing bets on the likely winners (and losers) that will emerge from this battle. Throughout the past few decades, the most powerful driver of currencies has been the relative rate of return between any two economies. After all, an exchange rate is simply a measure of relative prices between any two concerns. And as equilibrating mechanisms by definition, currencies will fluctuate to equalize rates of returns across borders. Therefore, placing bets with higher odds of success critically requires answering two questions. Which markets and/or asset classes have the highest potential rate of return? What are the key mechanisms/signals through which this value will be unlocked? The Source Of US Dollar Beauty When it comes to a beauty contest among currencies, the US dollar is clearly the fairest. In fact, the most recent Treasury International Capital (TIC) data show that inflows into US assets have been reaccelerating (Chart I-1). Remarkably, the momentum of these purchases has been driven by equities (bottom panel), as US stocks have outperformed their international peers. Even the 2017 change in the US tax code to allow for favorable capital repatriation still continues to benefit the dollar. On a rolling 12-month basis, the US has repatriated about $192 billion in net assets, or close to 1% of GDP. Chart I-11. Inflows Into US Assets Are Picking Up Supercharging this trend has been a global shortage of dollars, which has increased the international appeal of US paper. This was triggered by the Federal Reserve’s tapering of asset purchases. The Fed’s balance sheet peaked a nudge above US$4.5 trillion in early 2015 and, until recently, had been falling. This triggered a severe contraction in the U.S. monetary base (Chart I-2), and curtailing commercial banks’ excess reserves. Chart I-2A Liquidity Flush Despite the Fed’s massive liquidity injections and significant uptake of its swap program (Chart I-3), the greenback could remain well bid in the near term. We will not revisit the analysis here, but encourage clients to read our issue from last week in case they missed it.1 What we can add is that the dollar tends to thrive in uncertainty, and even with ample dollar liquidity, non-banks are still facing dollar shortages. For example, there remains a gap between the rate on the Fed’s US dollar swap lines and various measures of offshore dollar funding. Meanwhile, cross-currency basis swaps are still wide for some developed and emerging market currencies (Chart I-4).2 Chart I-3Foreign Central Banks Tap Into USD Swaps Chart I-4The Funding Crisis Has Eased Bottom Line: As a countercyclical currency, the greenback remains well bid in the near term. Historically, the dollar has tended to move in long cycles, usually 10 years, suggesting the current bull market might be nearing an end (please see Chart I-8 in the next section). This also suggests there is no need to rush into building USD shorts, should the next cycle in the dollar last a decade.  Regime Shift? When, and only when the crisis ends will the dollar begin to surrender to significant headwinds. The good news is that these headwinds continue to mount, and will eventually exert a powerful deflationary force on the greenback.  When, and only when the crisis ends will the dollar begin to surrender to significant headwinds. Starting with equity markets, expected relative returns are extremely unfavorable for US stocks. Chart I-5A – Chart I-5R shows that the equity valuation starting point is important for local-currency returns over the long term. The chart shows 10-year annualized equity relative returns, superimposed on our composite valuation indicator.3 So, in the case of the US versus Japan, the left-hand side scale shows that US equities are trading 1.5 standard deviations above their mean valuation relative to Japanese equities. The right-hand side scale shows what to expect in terms of relative returns over the next 10 years by overweighting Japanese equities relative to the US. Chart I-5A Chart I-5B Chart I-5C Chart I-5D Chart I-5E Chart I-5F Chart I-5G Chart I-5H Chart I-5I Chart I-5J Chart I-5K Chart I-5L Chart I-5M Chart I-5N Chart I-5O Chart I-5P Chart I-5Q Chart I-5R The forward P/E on MSCI US and Japan is 19.7x and 13.4x, respectively. The skew towards the US is because market participants expect US profits to keep outperforming, the greenback to keep appreciating, or a combination of the two. While this might be plausible in the short term as the fascination with FAANG stocks continues to capture investors’ imaginations, the empirical evidence is that current US valuations have more than fully capitalized future earning streams. Based on historical correlations, expected 10-year annualized returns for the MSCI US relative to Japan is -10%. Importantly, our composite valuation indicator adjusts for sector weights, so that there is no over representation of any sector in any country. So even if technology and healthcare are winners over the next decade, capital can still gravitate from the US towards other markets where these sectors are cheaper. Capital outflows will lead to a selloff in an overvalued US dollar. In fact, across our sample of 18 developed and emerging market currencies, the message remains that long-term equity capital will dry up for US assets due to expensive valuations. Therefore, the latest inflows into US equities are at risk of a Minsky moment. Such capitulation could well be the beginning of a 10-year cycle of dollar weakness. Cross-currency basis swaps are still wide for some developed and emerging market currencies. Second, the US has lost its interest rate advantage. Against an aggregate of G10 currencies, the dollar currently yields almost nil in real terms (Chart I-6). This has historically led to a softer dollar. Remarkably, even for a Japanese or German investor, negative domestic rates might no longer be a catalyst to invest in US paper, should domestic inflation continue blasting downward. The catalyst for outflows could be if the US 10-year Treasury yield hits zero, amidst the Fed adopting negative rates. Chart I-6The US Interest Rate Gap Has Vanished Chart I-710-Year Cycle Outlook For The Dollar Once that happens, new bond investors face the prospect of real losses from either higher yields and/or currency depreciation as the Fed continues to dilute existing Treasury shareholders (Chart I-7). If the Fed is set to anchor the price of money near zero for the foreseeable future, currency depreciation is the only mechanism to entice foreign investors to keep funding the US twin deficits. The US dollar does have an exorbitant privilege in that as a reserve currency, the trade deficit is settled in dollars. However, that privilege does require that the rise in foreign exchange reserves from other central banks are reinvested back into Treasurys. This allows the current account deficit (or capital account surplus) to finance the budget deficit. The bad news is that official flows into US paper have plateaued, with the likes of Beijing and other central banks continuing to destock their holdings of Treasurys (Chart I-8). Global allocation of foreign exchange reserves paints a similar picture – allocations toward the US dollar recently peaked at about 65% and have been in a downtrend since, with the void being filled by other currencies, notably gold, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the yen. Chart I-8Diversification Away From Dollars Accelerates The key point is that for one reason or another, foreign central banks are diversifying out of dollars. Our bias is that China has been doing so to make room for the internationalization of the RMB, as well as for geopolitical reasons, similar to other countries such as Russia. This trend will be supercharged as private investors start to focus on the real prospect of very dire returns over the coming cycle. Bottom Line: Expensive valuations and low interest rates make prospective returns for US equities and fixed income unattractive. This will force private capital to require a much lower exchange rate to fund US liabilities. The RMB And Gold As Umpires Chart I-9Will TLT Outperform GLD Next Decade? The transition from a stronger to weaker dollar is likely to occur in fits and starts. For one, the dollar is a countercyclical currency and will remain strong as uncertainty continues to dominate the macro landscape. We are watching two key indicators (among many others) as signposts for when the shift is occurring: Gold-To-Bond Ratio: One of our favorite indicators for gauging ultimate downside in the dollar is the gold-to-bond ratio. Ever since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, gold has stood as a viable threat to dollar liabilities, capturing the ebb and flows of investor confidence in the greenback tick-for-tick. Any sign that the balance of forces are moving away from the US dollar will favor a breakout in the gold-to-bond ratio. The TLT ETF relative to the GLD ETF broke above parity earlier this year, and has since been consolidating those gains (Chart I-9). This has brought it back within the trading range in place since early 2017. A decisive move below 0.95 will be a bearish development for the greenback. RMB Exchange Rate: As the RMB continues to gain international recognition, Chinese government bonds should outperform Treasurys. It is remarkable that from 2011 up until the Fed turned dovish in 2018, Chinese government bond performance was much better than Treasurys, even as the dollar was soaring (Chart I-10). Going forward, the USD/CNY rate should continue to act a key anchor for the direction of cyclical/emerging market currencies, as we highlighted last week. A break above last year’s highs will be bearish, while it will be encouraging if the 7.0 level is breached on the downside. Chart I-10Will Treasurys Outperform RMB Bonds Next Decade? Bottom Line: Watch the bond-to-gold ratio and Chinese RMB exchange rate as key signals for the direction of the US dollar. A breakdown in the US dollar will be a key mechanism to unlock value in foreign assets.  Housekeeping Chart I-11Target 1.10 On AUD/NZD The Reserve Bank of New Zealand decided to keep rates on hold, but reinforced forward guidance by almost doubling the size of its asset purchases to NZ$60 billion, while keeping open the possibility of negative rates. This has driven the divergence between Aussie and Kiwi 10-year yields to the highest level since 2008 (Chart I-11). In a world where rates continue to fall to very low levels, the policy of yield curve control implemented by the Reserve Bank of Australia does not pack the same punch as negative interest rates. Fundamentally, three factors will support the AUD/NZD cross: First, terms-of-trade dynamics are more favorable for Australia, which is lifting the nation’s basic balance to a substantial surplus. While infrastructure investment growth in China is likely to slow from historical levels, liquefied natural gas imports should remain in a structural uptrend. China’s switch from coal to natural gas electricity generation will continue to buffet Australian export volumes. On the kiwi side of things, as food security becomes more and more important in a post COVID-19 world, agricultural exports will not enjoy the same volume boost. Stay long AUD/NZD. Second, a substantial lift to New Zealand’s labor dividend has come from immigration (Chart I-12). The recent surge in net migrant numbers is due to exit restrictions for recent entrants. Yet even as things return to normal, that labor dividend will remain low as many people rethink international travel for work. This will restrain some supply-side parts of the economy, prompting the RBNZ to keep rates lower for longer. Chart I-12Loss Of A Meaningful Tailwind For Employment Finally, the cross offers a lot of relative value – not just from an interest rate standpoint, but also on a real effective exchange rate basis.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Line In The Sand,” dated May 08, 2020, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 2 Egemen Eren, Andreas Schrimpf, and Vladyslav Sushko, “US Dollar Funding Markets During The Covid-19 Crisis – The International Dimension,” BIS Bulletin (May 12, 2020). 3 Composite indicator comprised of price-to-earnings, forward price-to-earnings, price-to-cash flow, dividend yield, price-to-book, price-to-sales, Tobin's Q, and market capitalization-to-GDP. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been negative: Nonfarm payrolls fell by 20.5 million in April. The unemployment rate soared to 14.7% from 4.4%. The labor force participation rate declined to 60.2%. However, average hourly earnings increased by 7.9% year-on-year, since most job losses were in lower-income quartiles. Headline inflation fell from 1.5% to 0.3% year-on-year in April. Core inflation declined from 2.1% to 1.4% year-on-year in April. The NFIB business optimism index fell from 96.4 to 90.9 in April. Initial jobless claims kept increasing by 22.9 million last week. The DXY index appreciated by 1.2% this week. On Tuesday, House Democrats unveiled a $3 trillion stimulus package to further aid the economy, including nearly $1 trillion for state and local governments, $200 billion fund for essential worker hazard pay, and an additional $75 billion for COVID-19 testing. Report Links: Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Dollar Funding Crisis - March 19, 2020 Are Competitive Devaluations Next? - March 6, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been negative: Industrial production plunged by 13% year-on-year in March. The unemployment rate in France declined from 8.1% to 7.8% in Q1. The euro depreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The ECB Economic Bulletin released this Thursday highlighted that euro area GDP could fall by between 5% and 12% this year, highlighting uncertainty around the ultimate extent of the economic fallout. More importantly, the ECB Governing Council is fully prepared to increase the size of the PEPP by as much as necessary. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: The coincident index fell from 95.4 to 90.5 in March. The leading economic index fell from 91.9 to 83.8 in March. The trade surplus narrowed from ¥1.4 trillion to ¥1.03 trillion in March. The current account surplus shrank by nearly 40% to ¥1.97 trillion. Bank lending increased by 3% year-on-year in April, up from 2% the previous month. Machine tool orders kept contracting by 48.3% year-on-year in April.  The Japanese yen fell by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The Economy Watchers’ Survey released this week showed that the current situation index plunged from 14.2 to 7.9 in April. The outlook index also declined from 18.8 to 16.6. It also implied that the situation is likely to deteriorate further, due to the severe challenges posed by COVID-19. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been negative: GDP contracted by 1.6% year-on-year in Q1, compared with a 1.1% increase the previous quarter. Retail sales increased by 5.7% year-on-year in April, up from a 3.5% decline in March. The total trade deficit widened notably from £1.5 billion to £6.7 billion in March. Industrial production fell further by 8.2% year-on-year in March. Manufacturing production fell by 9.7% year-on-year in March. The British pound fell by 1.6% against the US dollar this week, alongside the weak Q1 GDP data. Moreover, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) estimates that GDP will plunge by about 25-to-30%quarterly in Q2. They also pointed out that while some activities will resume with the reopening, there is a significant risk of a second wave which could trigger a further setback in the economy. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed:  The NAB business confidence improved from -65 to -46 in April, while the business conditions index fell from -22 to -34 in April. Westpac consumer confidence ticked up from -17.7 to 16.4 in May. Employment decreased by 594K in April, down from a 5.9K increase the previous month. The unemployment rate increased from 5.2% to 6.2%, however this is well below the expected rise to 8.3%. The wage price index increased by 2.1% year-on-year in Q1. The Australian dollar fell by 1.9% against the US dollar this week. The labour force survey showed that the number of people looking for work declined significantly during the shutdown, which has been one of the main reasons why the unemployment rate did not fall as much as expected. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mixed: ANZ business confidence improved from -66.6 to -45.6 in May. Net migration increased by 4,941 in March, compared with a 4,339 increase the previous month. The New Zealand dollar fell by 2% against the US dollar this week. On Tuesday, the RBNZ kept the interest rate unchanged at 0.25%, while increasing its asset purchase programme by up to NZ$60 billion. Moreover, it implied that negative interest rates could be possible as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to disrupt the economy. We recommend holding on to long AUD/NZD positions. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Housing starts declined from 195.4K to 171.3K in April. Building permits plunged by 13.2% month-on-month in March. The unemployment rate soared to 13% from 7.8% in April. The participation rate declined to 59.8% from 63.5%. Employment decreased by 1993.8K in April, better than the expected 4000K drop, while average hourly wages increased by 10.5% year-on-year. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. The employment loss is led by Quebec, which saw the increase of unemployment to 18.7%. Moreover, while the number of self-employed workers was little changed, there has been a large drop in total hours worked. In addition, the loss of employment was concentrated in accommodation, food services and construction. Report Links: More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been negative: Producer and import prices kept declining by 4% year-on-year in April, following a 2.7% decrease in March. Sight deposit increased from CHF 663.8 billion to CHF 669.1 billion for the week ended May 8. The Swiss franc fell by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. Switzerland has entered its second phase of reopening. Schools, businesses, museums and restaurants can reopen as long as they take precautionary measures. However, as a small open economy, Switzerland is heavily dependent on exports and imports, which are curtailed in a global economic recession. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: Manufacturing output fell by 3% month-on-month in March. PPI plunged by 16.1% year-on-year in April. Headline inflation increased from 0 to 0.4% in April, while core inflation soared from 2.1% to 2.8% year-on-year, led by higher food prices especially imported fruits and vegetables. The Norwegian krone initially rebounded by 2.8% against the US dollar, then gradually fell amid broad dollar strength, returning flat this week. The Norges Bank Executive Board has decided to exclude a list of Canadian oil companies from its government pension fund due to pollution concerns. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been negative: Headline consumer prices contracted by 0.4% year-on-year in April. The Swedish krona has been flat against the US dollar this week. The Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting released this week showed that the Riksbank is ready to scale up its bond purchases if conditions warrant. Last week, all bank members continued to support asset purchases of up to SEK 300 billion until this September. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, we will be sending you a Special Report on China from Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Matt will discuss whether China’s President Xi Jinping is losing his political mandate. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights The pandemic is likely to have a more severe impact on Main Street than Wall Street, which helps explain why stocks have rallied off their lows even as bond yields have remained depressed. Equity investors are hoping that central banks will keep rates lower for longer, while fiscal easing will revive demand. The end result could be lower bond yields within the context of a full employment economy – a win-win for stocks.  In the near term, these hopes could be dashed, given bleak economic data, falling earnings estimates, and rising worries about a second wave of the pandemic. Longer term, an elevated equity risk premium and the likelihood that the pandemic will not have a significantly negative effect on the supply side of the economy argue for overweighting stocks over bonds. Negative real rates will continue to support gold prices. A weaker dollar later this year will also help. Divergent Signals Chart 1Conflicting Signals Global equities have rallied 24% off their March lows. The S&P 500 is down only 12% year-to-date and is trading close to where it was last August. In contrast, bond yields have barely risen since March. The US 10-year note currently yields 0.63%, down from 1.92% at the start of the year. The yield on the 30-year bond stands at a mere 1.3%. While crude oil and industrial metal prices have generally tracked bond yields, gold prices have rallied alongside equities (Chart 1). It would be easy to throw up one’s hands and exclaim that markets are behaving schizophrenically. Yet, we think it is possible to reconcile these seemingly divergent price patterns in a way that sheds light on where the major asset classes are likely to go in the months ahead. Two important points should be kept in mind: Bonds and industrial commodities tend to reflect the outlook for the real economy (i.e., Main Street) whereas stocks reflect the outlook for corporate earnings (i.e., Wall Street). The two often move together but can occasionally diverge in important ways. Stock prices and bond yields will tend to move in tandem when deflationary pressures are intensifying; however, the two often move in opposite directions when monetary policy is becoming more accommodative. The former prevailed in early March whereas the latter has been the dominant force since central banks have opened up the monetary spigots. The Real Economy Is Suffering The current economic downturn will go down as the deepest since the Great Depression. The IMF expects global GDP to contract by 3% this year, compared with a flat reading in 2009. GDP in advanced economies is projected to fall by 6%, twice as bad as in 2009 (Chart 2). Chart 2Severe Damage To The Global Economy This Year Unemployment rates are also likely to reach the highest levels since the 1930s. The US unemployment rate spiked to 14.7% in April. Even that understates the true increase in joblessness. The labor force has shrunk by 8 million workers since February. If everyone who had left the labor force had been considered unemployed, the unemployment rate would have jumped to nearly 19% (Chart 3). Unemployment among less-skilled workers rose more than among the skilled. Joblessness also increased more among women than men (Chart 4). Chart 3Increase In Joblessness Is Understated Chart 4Unemployment Has Risen More For Less Skilled Workers And Women The one silver lining is that unlike in past recessions, temporary layoffs have accounted for the vast majority of job losses (Chart 5). This suggests that the links between firms and workers have yet to be severed. As businesses reopen, the hope is that most of these workers will be able to return to their jobs, fueling a rebound in spending. Chart 5Temporary Layoffs Account For Most Of The Recent Increase In Unemployment Risks Of A Second Wave Will that hope be realized? As we discussed last week, the virus that causes COVID-19 is highly contagious – probably twice as contagious as the one that caused the Spanish flu.1 While some social distancing measures will persist even if governments relax lockdown orders, the risk is high that we will see a second wave of infections. Even if a second wave ensues, we do not expect stocks to take out their March lows. In many places, the second wave could come on top of a first wave that has barely abated. This is precisely what happened during the Spanish flu pandemic (Chart 6). Stock prices and credit spreads have closely tracked the number of Google queries about the coronavirus (Chart 7). If the number of new infections begins to trend higher, concern about the pandemic will deepen. This makes us somewhat wary about the near-term direction of risk assets. Chart 6The Lesson From The Spanish Flu: The Second Wave Could Be Worse Than The First Chart 7Joined At The Hip   March Was The Bottom In Equities Nevertheless, even if a second wave ensues, we do not expect stocks to take out their March lows. This is partly because the cone of uncertainty around the virus has narrowed. We now know that the fatality rate from the virus is around 1%-to-1.5%, which makes COVID-19 ten times more deadly than the common flu, but still less lethal than SARS or MERS, let alone some avian flu strains which have mortality rates upwards of 50%. A few treatments for the virus are on the horizon. Gilead’s remdesivir appears to be effective in treating COVID-19. Blood plasma injections also look promising. A vaccine developed by researchers at the University of Oxford has been shown to be safe on humans and effective against COVID-19 on rhesus monkeys. Production of the vaccine has already begun, and if it works well on humans, the Oxford scientists expect it to be widely available by September.2 The Stock Market Is Not The Economy Then there is the issue of Main Street versus Wall Street. US equities account for over half of global stock market capitalization. Tech and health care are the two largest sectors in the S&P 500. The former has benefited from the shift towards digital commerce in the wake of the pandemic, while the latter is a highly defensive sector that has gained from the flurry of interest in new treatments for the disease (Chart 8). Chart 8AUS Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic (I) Chart 8BUS Equity Sectors: Winners And Losers From The Pandemic (II) Even within individual sectors, the impact on Wall Street has been more muted than on Main Street. For example, spending on consumer discretionary goods and services has plummeted across the real economy over the past few months. Yet, this has not hurt equity investors as much as one might have expected. Amazon accounts for 55% of the retail sector’s market capitalization. Home Depot is in second place by market cap. Home Depot’s stock is trading near an all-time high, buoyed by increased spending on home improvement projects by people stuck at home. McDonald's, which is benefiting from the shift to take-out ordering, is the largest stock in the consumer services sector (followed by Starbucks). Contrary to the claim that the stock market is blissfully ignorant of the mounting economic damage, those sectors that one would expect to suffer from a pandemic-induced downturn have, in fact, suffered. Airline stocks, which account for less than 2% of the industrials sector, have plunged. The same is true for cruise ship stocks. Bank stocks have also been beaten down, reflecting fears of heightened loan losses. Likewise, lower oil prices have undercut the stocks of energy exploration and production companies (Chart 9). At the regional level, non-US stocks, with their heavy weighting in deep cyclicals and financials, have underperformed their US peers. Small caps have also lagged their large cap brethren, while value stocks have trailed growth stocks (Chart 10). Chart 9Sectors Expected To Suffer From A Pandemic-Induced Downturn Have, In Fact, Suffered Chart 10Non-US Stocks, Small Caps, And Value Stocks Have Underperformed Tech stocks are overrepresented in growth indices, which helps explain why growth has outperformed value. Tech companies also tend to carry little debt while sporting large cash holdings. Companies with strong balance sheets have greatly outperformed companies with weak ones since the start of the year (Chart 11). Chart 11Firms With Strong Balance Sheets Have Excelled Relative To Weak Ones Chart 12Real Rates Have Come Down This Year In addition, growth companies have disproportionately benefited from the dramatic decline in real interest rates (Chart 12). A drop in the discount rate raises the present value of a stream of cash flows more the further out in time those cash flows are expected to be realized.   What Low Bond Yields Are Telling Us Doesn’t the decline in real long-term interest rates signal that future economic growth will be considerably weaker? If so, doesn’t this nullify the benefit to growth companies in particular, and the stock market in general, from a lower discount rate? Not necessarily! While lockdowns have led to a temporary drop in aggregate supply, they have not severely undermined the long-term productive capacity of the economy. Unlike during a war, no factories have been destroyed. And while heightened unemployment could lead to some atrophying of skills, the human capital base has remained largely intact. Chart 13 shows that output-per-worker eventually returned to its long-term trend following the Great Depression. Chart 13No Clear Evidence That The Great Depression Lowered Long-Term Trend Growth What the pandemic has done is made some forms of capital obsolete. We probably will not need as many cruise ships or airplanes as we once thought. But these items are not a huge part of the capital stock. And while some brick and mortar stores will disappear, this was part of a long-term shift toward a digital economy – a shift that has been raising productivity levels, rather than lowering them. Demand Is The Bigger Issue So why have long-term real interest rates fallen so much? The answer has more to do with demand than supply. Investors are betting that the pandemic will force central banks to keep interest rates at ultra-low levels for a very long period of time. All things equal, such an extended period of low rates might be necessary if the pandemic causes households to increase precautionary savings and prompts businesses to cut back on investment spending for an extended period of time. All things are not equal, however. As discussed in greater detail in Box 1, if real interest rates fall by enough, aggregate demand could still return to levels consistent with full employment since lower interest rates would discourage savings while encouraging capital expenditures. What if interest rates cannot fall by enough because of the zero-lower bound? In that case, fiscal policy would have to pick up the slack. Either taxes would need to be cut so that the private sector becomes more eager to spend, or the government would need to undertake more spending directly on goods and services. When interest rates are close to zero, worries about debt sustainability diminish since debt can be rolled over at little cost. In the end, the economy could end up in a new post-pandemic equilibrium where real interest rates are lower and fiscal deficits are larger. Applying Theory To Practice Framed in this light, we can make sense of what has happened over the past few months. The drop in long-term bond yields in February and early March was driven by falling inflationary expectations and rising financial stress. Yields then briefly jumped in mid-March as panicky investors dumped bonds in a mad scramble to raise cash. Not surprisingly, stocks suffered during this period. The Federal Reserve reacted to this turmoil by cutting rates to zero. It also initiated large-scale asset purchases, which injected much needed cash into the markets. In addition, the Fed dusted off the alphabet soup of programs created during the financial crisis, while launching a few new ones in an effort to increase the availability of credit and reduce funding costs. Other central banks also eased aggressively. As Chart 14 illustrates with a set of simple examples, even a modest decline in long-term interest rates has the power to significantly raise the present value of future cash flows. To compliment the easing in monetary policy, governments loosened fiscal policy (Chart 15). The point of the stimulus was not to raise GDP. After all, governments wanted most non-essential workers to remain at home. What fiscal easing did do was allow many struggling households and businesses to meet their financial obligations, while hopefully having enough income left over to generate some pent-up demand for when businesses did reopen their doors. Chart 14What Happens To Earnings During A Recessionary Shock? Chart 15Will It Be Enough? Ultimately, equity investors are hoping for an outcome where fiscal policy is eased by enough to eventually restore full employment while interest rates stay low well beyond that point in order to induce the private sector to keep spending: A win-win combination for stocks. Chart 16Gold Prices Move In The Opposite Direction To Real Rates The discussion above can also explain the divergent moves in commodity prices. Most industrial metals are consumed not long after they are produced. This makes industrial metal prices highly sensitive to the state of the global business cycle. In contrast, almost all of the gold that has ever been unearthed is still around. This makes gold an anticipatory asset whose price reflects expectations about future demand. Since owning gold does not generate any income, the opportunity cost of holding gold is simply the interest rate (Chart 16). When real interest rates rise, as they did briefly in early March when deflationary fears intensified, gold prices tend to fall. When real interest rates decline, as they did after central banks slashed rates and restarted large-scale QE programs, gold prices tend to rise. Investment Conclusions The current environment bears a passing resemblance to the one that prevailed in late 2008. Following the stock market crash in the wake of Lehman’s bankruptcy, the S&P 500 rallied by 24% between November 20, 2008 and January 6, 2009 to reach a level of 935. Had you bought stocks on that day in January, you still would have made good money over a 12-month horizon. However, you would have lost money over a 3-month horizon since the S&P 500 ultimately dropped to as low as 667 on March 6. During that painful first quarter of 2009, the economic surprise index remained firmly below zero, while earnings estimates continued to drift lower, just like today (Chart 17). As noted above, we do not expect stocks to take out their March 2020 lows, but a temporary sell-off would not surprise us, especially against a backdrop where a second wave of the pandemic looks increasingly likely. Chart 17Is Today A Replay Of Late 2008/Early 2009? Chart 18Favor Equities Over Bonds Over A 12-Month Horizon Despite our near-term concerns, we continue to think that stocks will outperform bonds over a 12-month horizon. The equity risk premium remains elevated, particularly outside the US (Chart 18). While non-US stocks do not have as much exposure to tech and health care, they do benefit from very cheap valuations. European banks are trading at washed out levels (Chart 19). The cyclically-adjusted PE ratio for EM stocks is near record lows (Chart 20). Investors should consider increasing exposure to non-US equities if global growth begins to reaccelerate this summer. Chart 19European Banks Are Trading At Washed Out Levels Chart 20EM Stocks Are Very Cheap Given our view that central banks want real rates to stay low and will refrain from tightening monetary policy even if inflation eventually begins to rise, investors should maintain above-average exposure to gold. A weaker US dollar later this year will also help bullion. Box 1The Role Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy Following Savings Shocks Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Risks To The U,” dated May 7, 2020. 2  Charlie D’Agata, “Oxford scientists say a vaccine may be widely available by September,” cbsnews (April 30, 2020). Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Neutral As reopening of the economy will, at the margin, bring back diners (take out mostly) to restaurants, the two heavyweights that comprise 80% of the market cap of the S&P restaurants group are anything but discretionary. In our view, MCD is defensive and SBUX has become a staple. Thus, as the economy slowly reopens and store traffic picks up, these bellwether stocks will lead this index higher. With regard to macro data, most of the restaurant-relevant releases are looking in the rear view mirror. In other words, the trouncing in restaurant retail sales and employment, food-away-from-home PCE and even the collapse in the Restaurant Performance Index were “known knowns”. Therefore, all of this grim news is already reflected in the 30% drubbing in relative performance from peak-to-trough (see chart). Bottom Line: Lift the S&P restaurants index to neutral from previously underweight, and please see this Monday’s report for additional details.  

Informe especial

Highlights Even though EM equities appear cheap, the key near-term threats to them are their poor fundamentals and a renewed sell off in the S&P 500. Given the immense uncertainty, the current equity risk premium (ERP) should be at the upper end of its historical range. Hence, the discount rate – the sum of the risk-free rate and the ERP – should be reasonably high. This makes US equity valuations rather expensive. The key risk to our defensive strategy is that the rally in global growth stocks evolves into a full-fledged mania. Feature Every investor is aware that global corporate profits have collapsed due to nationwide lockdowns and profits will eventually recover as the lockdowns are gradually eased. This thesis, though, is not helpful for equity investors. To price equities properly, investors need to know how low corporate profits will fall and how fast and strong the eventual recovery will be.  Currently, visibility on the magnitude and speed of the decline in profits and the subsequent recovery is factually nil. In fact, very few companies are providing any guidance. There is enormous uncertainty surrounding the pace at which economies will be reopened, the possibility of secondary infection outbreaks and the discovery of a remedy or a vaccine for this virus. Besides, it is hard to forecast how fast animal spirits will revive among consumers and businesses worldwide. Thus, it is impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude and pace of both the decline in corporate profits and the subsequent recovery. What framework should investors use to value stocks when facing extremely low visibility? The CAPE Ratio Presently, the best method for valuing stocks is the Cyclically-Adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. This is a structural valuation measure that looks beyond the profit cycle, i.e., removes the cyclicality of earnings per share (EPS) from P/E ratio calculations. When the profit outlook is as muddy as it is today and the possible range of outcomes is very wide, it is safe to assume that in the next 12-18 months corporate profits will revert to their historical trend, i.e., drop below and then recover to their structural trend. This is a better conjecture than any attempt to forecast the magnitude and speed of both the profit plunge and subsequent recovery. Hence, the appropriate question for investors at this time is: what is the forward P/E multiple on equities assuming that EPS will plummet and then recover to their historical trend over the next 12 to 18 months? The CAPE model provides the answer to this question. Presently, the best method for valuing stocks is the Cyclically-Adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. Chart I-1 illustrates our EM CAPE model, showing EM equities as cheap as they were at previous major bear market bottoms. The EM CAPE is presently 12.5 assuming EM EPS plunge further in the coming months but recover to their long-run trend in 12-18 months from now (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Our measure for US CAPE presently stands in high 20s, well above its historical average of 18 (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM Equity Valuations Are Low Chart I-2US Equity Valuations Are Expensive   Box I-1 on page 3 elaborates how our CAPE model is built and how it differs from Shiller’s CAPE ratio. Even though EM equities are very cheap, the key near-term threats to them are two-fold: (1) EM fundamentals remain downbeat, which is creating a near-term risk to share prices; and (2) a renewed sell off in the S&P 500 would drag EM stocks lower, despite cheap EM equity valuations. In the next section, we explore US equity valuations in a bit more detail. BOX I-1 Our CAPE Versus The Shiller CAPE: Differences In Methodologies Due to the lack of historical data for EM, we were unable to use Robert Shiller's methodology for constructing the CAPE ratio for developing markets. The Shiller method uses a 10-year moving average of EPS to calculate the cyclically adjusted EPS. However, in the case of EM aggregate EPS, data only goes back to 1986. If we were to calculate a 10-year moving average for EM EPS, we would lose 10 years of data, and the valuation indicator would only start in 1996. This is too short a time-frame for a structural valuation indicator. Chart I-3Comparing Two CAPE Methodologies Instead, we used the following methodology to construct the CAPE ratio for EM: We deflated EM EPS and EM equity prices (both in US dollar terms) by US consumer price inflation to get EM EPS and EM share prices in real (inflation-adjusted) US dollar terms. Then we ran a regression of EM EPS in real US dollar terms against a time trend. The resulting trend line represents the cyclically adjusted or structural EPS in real US dollar terms (Chart I-1, bottom panel on page 1). Finally, we divided EM stock prices in real US dollar terms by the cyclically-adjusted real US dollar EM EPS trend line. The outcome is the EM CAPE ratio (Chart I-1, top panel on page 1). To be sure that our methodology produced a reasonable outcome, we computed a CAPE ratio using our methodology for the US stock market and compared it with the Shiller CAPE ratio. Chart I-3 illustrates that our methodology generated a CAPE ratio that is similar to Shiller’s CAPE ratio. We are therefore confident that the results generated by our CAPE methodology are robust and sensible. Low Visibility = High Equity Risk Premium Chart I-4CAPE Ratio Negatively Correlates With Corporate Bond Yields It is a well-known fact that US equity multiples are very high. However, a common narrative in the investment community often justifies currently high US equity multiples by very low interest rates. One consideration that is missing in this argument is the equity risk premium. The P/E ratio is negatively correlated to the discount rate.1 The discount rate is the sum of the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium (ERP). Chart I-4 demonstrates that US CAPE ratio has been inversely correlated with corporate bond (BAA) yields. The latter includes both risk-free government bond yields and corporate credit spreads. Presently, one should use an ERP that is materially higher than its historical mean. Investors are currently facing record high uncertainty related to the business cycle as well as the structural trends in economic, political and geopolitical spheres. In short, enormous lingering uncertainty warrants using an ERP that is at the upper range of its historical trend. Critically, ERP is not a static variable. Yet, many equity valuation models assume that the ERP is constant and, therefore, compare equity multiples with risk-free rates. Such models are wrong-headed because a change in the ERP can in itself cause large fluctuations in share prices. Chart I-5Estimated US Equity Risk Premium Going forward, visibility on both the evolution of the virus containment measures and the global business cycle will eventually improve and, thereby, decrease ERPs that investors require. This will produce a lower discount rate heralding higher equity multiples. As of today, however, the tremendous uncertainty about the outlook still warrants a higher ERP. Chart I-5 illustrates that the US ERP based on our CAPE model is presently 270 basis points. It is elevated but still below historic peaks recorded in 2008 and 2011. Provided we face extremely limited visibility about the global outlook, we contend that the US ERP will likely rise in the short run. The latter will depress US equity valuations and prices. Bottom Line: Given the immense ambiguities investors are facing in regard to the business cycle and to economic, political and geopolitical trends, the ERP should be at the upper end of its historical range. Hence, the discount factor – the sum of the risk-free rate and the ERP – should be reasonably high. We conclude that US equity valuations are rather expensive despite the very low risk-free rate. Falling US stocks will drag EM share prices lower.  EM Versus The S&P 500: Three Conditions For A Reversal Chart I-6Relative CAPE Ratio: EM Versus US The relative EM versus US CAPE ratio is shown on Chart I-6. According to it, EM equities relative to their US counterparts are as cheap as they were at their previous major bottom in 2001. Nevertheless, valuation is not a good timing tool. For EM to start outperforming the S&P 500, three conditions are required: 1. China’s economy should embark on a cyclical recovery that is greater than the natural snapback in activity that it has been experiencing in the wake of the end of its lockdown. So far, the mainland economy is still in a snapback phase rather than in an expansion mode. 2. Global equity sector leadership should rotate from growth to value stocks, such as resource-related and banks. This has not occurred yet. The EM equity index is more sensitive to the performance of financials than the S&P 500 is. Table I-1 and I-2 represents individual EM and US sector weights in terms of both market cap and total corporate earnings in their respective equity benchmark. Financials account for 36.6% of EM total earnings and 20.9% of EM market cap. The same ratios for US financials in America’s broad equity index are 22.2% for earnings and 10.5% for the market cap. Table I-1EM Equity Sector Earnings And Market Cap Weights Table I-2US Equity Sector Earnings And Market Cap Weights   Further, EM equity prices remain highly correlated to global materials stocks (Chart I-7). As we discussed in our October 10, 2019 report, the rationale is as follows: both industrial metal prices and EM equities are driven primarily by China. Enormous lingering uncertainty warrants using an ERP that is at the upper range of its historical trend. 3. The US dollar should enter an extended bear market. The greenback has been resilient despite the Federal Reserve’s outright debt monetization and the general risk-on mood in global equity and credit markets. Further, the EM ex-China currency index has failed to rebound despite the noteworthy rally in the S&P 500 since late March (Chart I-8). Chart I-7EM Stocks Correlate With Global Materials Chart I-8EM Currencies Have Failed To Rally   For the greenback to depreciate, US dollars should be recycled overseas via augmented US imports or capital outflows from the US. It seems that none of this is currently taking place. The dollar is probably experiencing the last leg of its structural bull market that commenced in 2011. In financial markets, the final phase of a structural trend can last longer and run further than many investors expect. Odds are that the greenback will overshoot before topping out. Chart I-9 presents the real effective exchange rate for the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen, based on unit labor costs. This is our favored currency valuation measure. It reveals that the greenback is already expensive, but that its valuation can become even more expensive and reach two standard deviations above fair value before the US dollar peaks. In turn, according to the same measure, valuations of commodity currencies like NZD, AUD and CAD have downshifted considerably (Chart I-10). Nevertheless, they are not yet very cheap. Therefore, further undershoots cannot be ruled out. Chart I-9G3 Currency Valuations Chart I-10Commodity Currencies Valuations   Bottom Line: The conditions for EM stocks to begin outperforming the S&P 500 have not yet been satisfied. EM outperformance is not imminent. The Key Risk The key risk to our strategy of not chasing the recent equity rebound is as follows: The rally in expensive global growth stocks could evolve into a full-fledged mania. The latter would then lift the broader equity index, including value stocks. The average retail investor in any corner of the world can now make the case for an exponential rise in growth stocks: major central banks are printing money, risk-free interest rates are at zero, businesses in “new economy” are relatively immune to COVID shutdowns and, moreover, they represent the future. All conditions for a bubble formation are present: a concept that captures the average person’s imagination, good fundamentals and solid past performance, as well as liquidity overflow.  Growth companies that are leading this rally are very expensive and over-owned while the laggards – the value stocks – have a ruinous profit outlook. The only problem with this thesis is that these stocks have already rallied massively over the past decade and are consequently expensive and over-owned (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Each Decade Had A Mania Can they still go higher, dragging up overall equity indexes? They can, as the human imagination has no limits. If retail investors continue piling up on stocks – and there is some evidence they have been doing so – share prices will rise despite the expensive valuation of growth companies and the disastrous profit outlook for value stocks. Like any bubble, this mania, if it occurs, will eventually culminate with a crash. Investment Conclusions Chart I-12Growth And Value Stocks EM equities have become cheap and oversold, which is why we closed our short position in EM stocks on March 19. Nevertheless, we have not yet recommended buying or overweighting EM stocks. The near-term outlook remains risky and EM valuations could remain depressed for a while given that investors currently face zero visibility. Consistently, the risk-reward of global and EM equities is yet not attractive. The basis is as follows: Growth companies that are leading this rally are very expensive and over-owned while the laggards – the value stocks – have a ruinous profit outlook (Chart I-12).  For now, we continue recommending underweighting EM versus DM equities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnote 1   The P/E ratio inversely correlates to the discount rate: P/E ratio = (Payout rate x (1 + Growth rate)) / (Discount rate – Growth rate)

This week we upgraded the S&P railroads index to neutral locking in 6.4% in relative gains since inception. The defensive nature of rails is most evident in industry pricing power (third panel). Railroad selling prices are holding their own despite a sizable drop in volumes. Moreover, CEOs exercised caution and refrained from adding to headcount. Taken together, they are boosting our profit margin proxy, which can serve as a catalyst to lift relative share price momentum out of its recent funk (second panel). Similarly, our three factor S&P rail EPS growth model is heralding a pickup in profits in the back half of the year (bottom panel). Bottom Line:  Lift the S&P railroads index to neutral. Please refer to the most recent Weekly Report for the headwinds that prevent us from going overweight rail stocks.  

Informe especial

Dear Client, With this weekly update on the Chinese economy, we are sending you a Special Report published by BCA Geopolitical Strategy team and authored by my colleague Matt Gertken. Lately we have been getting numerous questions from our clients, on the risk of a significant re-escalation in the US-China conflict. Matt’s report provides timely insights on the topic, and we trust you will find the report very helpful. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Feature An Update On The Chinese Economy Since mid-April, the speed of resumption in China’s domestic business activity has accelerated. Industrial enterprises appear to be operating at 87% of normal activity levels as of May 11, up from 81.8% one month ago. Small to medium-sized enterprise (SMEs) are estimated to now operate at 87.3% of their normal activity, a vast improvement from 82.3% just two weeks ago. Chart 1Pickup In M1 Still Modest The material easing in monetary conditions and strong flows of local government special-purpose bond issuance in the past two months helped jump start a recovery in the construction sector. But at this early stage of a domestic economic rebound and in the middle of a deep global economy recession, China’s corporate marginal propensity to invest remains muted (Chart 1). Household consumption showed some resilience during last week’s “Golden Week” holiday. The strength in big-ticket item purchases, however, was highly concentrated among consumers in China’s wealthiest urban areas (Chart 2). The COVID-19 pandemic has created a situation resembling a combination of SARS and the global financial crisis. Now the physical constraints on consumption have largely been lifted, consumers’ willingness to spend, after a brief period of compensatory spending, will be suppressed if their expectations of the medium-term job and income security remain pessimistic (Chart 3). Chart 2A Compensatory Rebound In Big-Ticket Item Sales Chart 3The Average Chinese Consumer Remains Cautious Next week we will publish a report, focusing on China’s consumption in a post-pandemic environment. Looking forward, we maintain the view that China’s business activity will pick up momentum in H2, when the massive monetary and fiscal stimuli continue working its way into the economy.  Downside risks to employment and income loom large, which makes it highly unlikely that the authorities will tighten their policy stance any time soon. As such, while we maintain our defensive tactical positioning due to near-term economic and geopolitical uncertainties, our view remains constructive on both the economy and Chinese financial asset prices in the next 6 to 12 months.  (Chart 4). Chart 4Recovery To Gain Traction In H2   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com     #WWIII The phrase “World War III” or #WWIII went viral earlier this year in response to a skirmish between the US and Iran (Chart 1). Only four months later, the US and China are escalating a strategic rivalry that makes the Iran conflict look paltry by comparison (Chart 2). Chart 1US-Iran Tensions Were Just A Warm-Up Chart 2The Thucydides Trap Fortunately, the two great powers are constrained by the same mutually assured destruction that constrained the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They are also constrained by the desire to prevent their economies from collapsing further. Unfortunately, the intensity of their rivalry can escalate dramatically before reaching anything truly analogous to the Berlin Airlift or Cuban Missile Crisis – and these kinds of scenarios are not out of the question. Safe haven assets will catch a bid and the recovery in US and global risk assets since the COVID selloff will be halted. We maintain our defensive tactical positioning and will close two strategic trades to book profits and manage risk. In the wake of the pandemic and recession, geopolitics is the next shoe to drop. The War President Over the past 24 hours the White House has taken several steps indicating that President Trump is adopting the “war president” posture in the run-up to the US election: Export controls: Trump has gone forward with new export controls on “dual-purpose” technologies – those that have military as well as civilian applications, in a delayed reaction to China’s policy of civil-military technological fusion. The Commerce Department has wide leeway in whether to grant export licenses under the rule – but it is a consequential rule and would be disruptive if enforced strictly. Supply chain de-risking: Trump is also going forward with new restrictions on the import of foreign parts for US power plants and electricity grid. The purpose is to remove risks from critical US infrastructure. COVID investigation: Trump has hinted that the novel coronavirus that causes the COVID-19 disease may have originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The Director of National Intelligence issued a statement indicating that the Intelligence Community does not view the virus as man-made (not a bio-weapon), but is investigating the potential that the virus transferred to humans at the institute. The State Department had flagged the institute for risky practices long before COVID. Trump avoided the bio-weapon conspiracy theory and is focused on the hypothesis that the laboratory’s investigations into rare coronaviruses led to the outbreak. New tariffs instead of reparations: Director of the National Economic Council Larry Kudlow denied that the US would stop making interest and principal payments on some Chinese holdings of US treasuries. He said that the “full faith and credit of the United States’ debt obligation is sacrosanct. Absolutely sacrosanct.” Trump denied that this form of reparations, first floated by Republican Senator Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, was under consideration. Instead he suggested that new tariffs would be much more effective, raising the threat for the first time since the Phase One trade deal was agreed in principle in December. Strategic disputes: Tensions have flared up in specific, concrete ways across the range of US-Chinese relations – in the cyber-realm, psychological warfare, Korean peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. These could lead to sanctions. The war president posture is one in which President Trump recognizes that reelection is extremely unlikely in an environment of worse than -4.8% economic growth and likely 16% unemployment. Therefore he shifts the basis of his reelection to an ongoing crisis and appeals to Americans’ patriotism and desire for continuity amid crisis. Bottom Line: Protectionism is not guaranteed to work, and therefore it was not ultimately the path Trump took last year when he still believed a short-term trade deal could boost the economy. Now the bar to protectionism has been lowered. The Decline Of US-China Relations President Trump may still be bluffing, China may take a conciliatory posture, and a massive cold war-style escalation may be avoided. However, it is imprudent to buy risk assets on these reasons today, when the S&P 500’s forward price-to-earnings ratio stands at 20.15. It is more prudent to prepare for a historic escalation of tensions first, buy insurance, then reassess. Why? Because the trajectory of US-China relations is empirically worsening over time. US household deleveraging and the Chinese shift away from export-manufacturing (Chart 3) broke the basis of strong relations during the US’s distractions in Iraq and Afghanistan and China’s “peaceful rise” in the early 2000s. US consumers grew thriftier while Chinese wages rose. Not only has China sought economic self-sufficiency as a strategic objective since General Secretary Xi Jinping took power in 2012, but the Great Recession, Trump trade war, and global pandemic have accelerated the process of decoupling between the two economies. Decoupling is an empirical phenomenon, and it has momentum, however debatable its ultimate destination (Chart 4). Obviously policy at the moment is accelerating decoupling. Chart 3The Great Economic Divorce Chart 4Decoupling Is Empirical The US threat to cease payments on some of China’s Treasury holdings is an inversion of the fear that prevailed in the wake of 2008, that China would sell its treasuries to diversify away from dependence on the US and the greenback. China did end up selling its treasuries, but the US was not punished with higher interest rates because other buyers appeared. The US remains the world’s preponderant power and ultimate safe haven (Chart 5). By the same token, Trump and Kudlow naturally poured water on the threat of arbitrarily stopping payments because that would jeopardize America’s position. Instead Trump is threatening a new round of trade tariffs. Since the US runs a large trade deficit with China, and China is more exposed to trade generally, the US has the upper hand on this front. But it is important to notice that US tariff collections as a share of imports bottomed under President Obama (Chart 6). Chart 5Treasuries Can't Be Weaponized By Either Side... Chart 6... But Tariffs Can And Will Be   The US shift away from free trade toward protectionism occurred in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. President Trump then popularized and accelerated this policy option in an aggressive and unorthodox way. Trade tariffs are a tool of American statecraft, not the whim of a single person, who may exit the White House in January 2021 anyway. The retreat from globalization is not a passing fancy. Today’s recession also marks the official conclusion of China’s historic 44 year economic boom – and hence a concrete blow to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party (Chart 7). The more insular, autarkic shift in the Communist Party’s thinking is not irreversible, but there are no clear signs that Xi Jinping is pivoting toward liberalism after eight years in power. Chart 7Recession Destabilizes The 'G2' Powers China’s unemployment rate has been estimated as high as 20.5% by Zhongtai Securities, which then retracted the estimate (!). It is at least at 10%. Moreover 51 million migrant workers vanished from the job rolls in the first quarter of the year. Maximum employment is the imperative of East Asian governments, especially the Communist Party, which has not dealt with joblessness since the late 1990s. The threat to social and political stability is obvious. The party will take extraordinary measures to maintain stability – not only massive stimulus but also social repression and foreign policy distraction to ensure that people rally around the flag. Xi Jinping has tried to shift the legitimacy of the party from economic growth to nationalism and consumerism, the “China Dream.” But the transition to consumer growth was supposed to be smooth. Financial turmoil, the trade war, and now pandemic and recession have forced the Communist Party off the training wheels well before it intended. Xi’s communist ideology, economic mercantilism, and assertive foreign policy have created an international backlash. The US is obviously indulging in nationalism as well. A stark increase in inequality and political polarization exploded in President Trump’s surprise election on a nationalist and protectionist platform in 2016 (Chart 8). All candidates bashed China on the campaign trail, but Trump was an anti-establishment leader who disrupted corporate interests and followed through with his tariff threats. The result is that the share of Americans who see China’s power and influence as a “major threat” to the United States has grown from around 50% during the halcyon days of cooperation to over 60% today. Those who see it as a minor threat have shrunk to about a quarter of the population (Chart 9). Chart 8A Measure Of Inequality In The US Chart 9US Nationalism On The Rise Chart 10Broad-Based Anti-China Sentiment In US As with US tariff policy, the bipartisan nature of US anger toward China is significant. More than 60% of Democrats and more than 50% of young people have an unfavorable view of China. College graduates have a more negative opinion than the much-discussed non-college-educated populace (Chart 10). Already it is clear, in Joe Biden’s attack ads against Trump, that this election is about who can sound tougher on China. The debate is over who has the better policy to put “America first,” not whether to put America first. Biden will try to steal back the protectionist thunder that enabled Trump to break the blue wall in the electorally pivotal Rust Belt in 2016 (Map 1). Biden will have to win over these voters by convincing them that he understands and empathizes with their Trumpian outlook on jobs, outsourcing, and China’s threats to national security. He will emphasize other crimes – carbon emissions, cyber attacks, human rights violations – but they will still be China’s crimes. He will return to the “Pivot to Asia” foreign policy of his most popular supporter, former President Barack Obama. Map 1US Election: Civil War Lite Bottom Line: Economic slowdown and autocracy in China, unprecedented since the Cultural Revolution, is clashing with the United States. Broad social restlessness in the US that is resolving into bipartisan nationalism against a peer competitor, unprecedented since the struggle with the Soviets in the 1960s, is clashing with China. Now is not the time to assume global stability. Constraints Still Operate, But Buy Insurance The story outlined above is by this time pretty well known. But the “Phase One” trade deal allowed global investors to set aside this secular story at the beginning of the year. Now, as Trump threatens tariffs again, the question is whether he will resort to sweeping, concrete, punitive measures against China that will take on global significance – i.e. that will drive the financial markets this year. Trump is still attempting to restore his bull market and magnificent economy. As long as this is the case, a constraint on conflict operates this year. It is just not as firm or predictable. Therefore we are looking for three things. First, will President Trump’s approval rating benefit so much from his pressure tactics on China that he finds himself driven into greater pressure tactics? This raises the risk of policy mistakes. Second, will Trump’s approval rating fall into the doldrums, stuck beneath 43%, as the toll of the recession wears on him and popular support during the health crisis fades? “Lame duck” status would essentially condemn him to electoral loss and incentivize him to turn the tables by escalating the conflict with China. Chart 11Trump May Seek A Crisis ‘Bounce’ To Popularity Presidents are not very popular these days, but a comparison with Trump’s two predecessors shows that while he can hardly obtain the popularity boost that Obama received just before the 2012 election, he could hope for something at least comparable to what George W. Bush received amid the invasion of Iraq (Chart 11). (Trump has generally been capped at 46% approval, the same as his share of the popular vote in 2016.) The reason this is a real risk, not a Shakespearean play, is outlined above: however cynical Trump’s political calculus, he would be reasserting US grand strategy in the face of a great power that is attempting to set up a regional empire from which, eventually, to mount a global challenge. Thus if he is convinced he cannot win the election anyway, this risk becomes material. Investors should take seriously any credible reports suggesting that Trump is growing increasingly frustrated with his trailing Biden in head-to-head polls in the swing states. Third, will China, under historic internal stress, react in a hostile way that drives Trump down the path of confrontation? China has so far resorted to propaganda, aircraft carrier drills around the island of Taiwan, and maritime encroachments in the South China Sea – none of which is intolerably provocative to Trump. A depreciation of the renminbi, a substantial change to the status quo in the East or South China Seas, or an attempt to vitiate US security guarantees regarding US allies in the region, could trigger a major geopolitical incident. A fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is fully within the realm of possibility, especially given that Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” is fundamentally at stake. While we dismissed rumors of Kim Jong Un’s death in North Korea, any power vacuum or struggle for influence there is of great consequence in today’s geopolitical context. Aggressive use of tariffs always threatened to disrupt global trade and financial markets, but tariffs function differently in the context of a global economic expansion and bull market, as in 2018-19, than they do in the context of a deep and possibly protracted recession. Trump has a clear political incentive to be tough on China, but an equally clear financial and economic incentive to limit sweeping punitive measures and avoid devastating the stock market and economy. If events lower the economic hurdle, then the political incentive will prevail and financial markets will sell. Bottom Line: However small the risk of Trump enacting sweeping tariffs, the downside is larger than in the 2018-19 period. The stock market might fall by 40%-50% rather than 20% in an all-out trade war this year. Investment Takeaways Go tactically long US 10-year treasuries. Book a 9.7% profit on our long 30-year US TIPS trade. Close long global equities (relative to US) for a loss of 3.8%.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations