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Executive Summary The USD has appreciated by over 25% since the beginning of 2021. This is a negative for US corporate sales and profits and is a drag on US equity performance. According to BCA FX strategists, the USD is likely to roll over as it appears overbought and overvalued. However, even if the USD has peaked, the effects of its appreciation will be imprinted in the earnings of US corporates for months. Our earnings model signals an earnings recession, with earnings expected to contract to the tune of 20% into the year-end. Technology and Materials are most exposed to the dollar, while Utilities, Financials, and Real Estate are the most domestic sectors. Growth is a more international style than Value, while midcaps offer the best protection from a stronger greenback. USES Model Breakdown Bottom Line: While a strong dollar is certainly a headwind for US earnings growth and for the performance of US equities, its adverse effects are minor compared to the effects of tighter monetary policy, slowing growth at home and abroad, rising costs, falling productivity, and fading pricing power. An earnings recession is inevitable. Dollar depreciation will be a welcome development, yet the dollar should be the least of investors’ worries. Feature The USD has appreciated by over 25% since the beginning of 2021 (Chart 1), a concerning development for US equity investors. The S&P 500 companies derive roughly 40% of sales from abroad and the strong dollar is a headwind: Not only does an appreciating domestic currency diminish foreign earnings through a currency translation effect, but it also makes US goods and services more expensive and less competitive in a global marketplace. Related Report  US Equity StrategyUS Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell Over the past few months, a number of US multinationals have complained about the adverse effect of the strong greenback on their sales and earnings. The list is both long and diverse and includes technology giants like Microsoft, Dell, and Netflix as well as the likes of Philip Morris, Johnson and Johnson, TJX, and Costco. Investors paid attention: Since the beginning of 2021, US companies with a high share of international sales underperformed their more domestically oriented counterparts by about 20% (Chart 2). However, partially this divergence in performance may be explained by the international index heavily overrepresenting Tech, which has headwinds of its own. Chart 1The USD Has Appreciated By Over 25%​​​​​​ Chart 2US Multinationals Have Underperformed​​​​​​ In this week’s report, we will analyze the effects of the stronger dollar on US corporate earnings, zooming in on its implications for the S&P 500 sectors and styles. Sneak Preview: A strong dollar is a definite negative for US corporate sales and profits and is a drag on US equity performance. However, when compared in magnitude to the effects of tighter monetary policy, slowing growth, and rising costs – the dollar should take a backseat to the other investor worries. USD: The Best House On The Worst Street The reasons for the rapid rise of the USD are manifold. The following are just a few: The Dollar smile: The USD outperforms when global growth is strong and investors are optimistic, as well as when growth slows and investors are fearful, benefiting from its status as a reserve currency. Over the past two years, both scenarios have played out. In 2021, investor flows pushed the dollar higher as the US was ahead of the rest of the world in terms of post-pandemic recovery. This year, the USD became a safe haven for jittery investors and became one of the rare assets delivering positive returns in the “sea of misery.” Chart 3Rate Differentials Favored The US The US looks good compared to other regions: Despite its own economic maladies, such as high inflation and slowing growth, the US has been in an advantageous position compared to the rest of the world. The US appears well insulated from global shudders compared to Europe, which is in the midst of a recession and an energy crisis, China roiling from the zero-COVID policy and property market fallout, and EM countries on the verge of food and energy shortages. Interest rate differentials: The Fed is being viewed as the most credible central bank to curb inflation. As a result, US rates have risen more than in other markets (Chart 3). The USD has been strengthening as the US has been enjoying relative stability and better growth compared to the other regions. The Fed is also ahead of the curve. Will The USD Appreciation Continue? BCA FX Strategist Chester Ntonifor does not expect the dollar to continue to appreciate for the following reasons: While the Fed is ahead of the curve, other central banks are also becoming more hawkish. As such, interest rate differentials will not materially move further in favor of the dollar. Inflation is a global problem as opposed to US-centric. Thanks to the Fed’s aggressive policy stance compared to the other central banks, the inflation impulse is slowing in the US, relative to a basket of G10 countries (Chart 4). In addition, the dollar is expensive, overbought, and is a crowded consensus trade (Chart 5). Chart 4The US Inflation Impulse Has Turned​​​​​ Chart 5The Dollar Is Overvalued On A PPP Basis​​​​​​ We concur. While we will not outright bet against the dollar, to our mind, risks are skewed to the downside. The dollar must be close to its peak, and we are neutral on a tactical basis. Effects Of USD Moves On S&P 500 Sales And Earnings Growth It Takes Time While US dollar appreciation may have come to an end, its toll will be imprinted on US earnings growth for a while. There is a lag between currency appreciation and its effects on company sales and earnings: It takes companies three to six months to change contracts, adjust prices and record revenue (Table 1). Stronger Dollar: Lower Sales And Lower Costs It is foreign sales that are most affected by the variation in the purchasing power of foreign currencies relative to the dollar (Chart 6). And while US multinationals hate the strengthening dollar, they also get a hand from it on the cost side of the equation, especially if they outsource a sizeable part of production abroad. Thus, the net effect on profits depends on the cost structure and the type of business. That explains why changes in the dollar are never one-to-one to changes in earnings growth. Table 1Sensitivity Of EPS YoY% To USD YoY% Over Time Modeling Effects Of A Stronger Dollar In the “Is An Earnings Recession In The Cards?” report published this past June, we introduced our EPS Growth Forecast Model (Table 2). The model has five intuitive factors: Chart 6The USD Primarily Affects Sales​​​​​​ Table 2EPS Growth Forecast Model ISM PMI is a gauge of US economic growth and a proxy for top-line growth. PPI stands for the change in costs. Pricing Power is a BCA proprietary indicator and captures companies’ ability to pass costs onto their customers. HY Spreads indicate costs of borrowing and also the state of the economy (spreads tend to shoot up in a slowing economy). USD represents the ability of US multinationals to sell goods abroad. These five factors explain 65% of the variation in earnings growth,1 and all factors are statistically significant. Earnings Recession Is Still In The Cards Back in June, we predicted an earnings recession later this year. After all, economic growth is slowing at home and abroad, and demand is rolling over while costs are rising, especially wages. Making things worse, productivity is falling, and Unit Labor Costs (ULC) hit nearly 10% in August. At the same time, consumers are reeling from rising prices, while companies are coming to realize that their ability to pass on costs to customers is pushing the limit. We have updated the model with three more months of data and expect earnings to start contracting in the third quarter, falling as much as 20% in the fourth quarter (Chart 7). None of this is surprising. S&P 500 margins have fallen by 2% in the second quarter, and earnings growth ex Energy came in at -2% on a nominal basis. Analysts expect six out of 11 S&P 500 sectors to deliver negative EPS Growth in Q3-2022. And while a 20% earnings drawdown sounds terrible, it is fairly mild compared to recent recessions – at the worst point in 2008, nominal earnings went to 0, printing a -100% contraction (Table 3). Chart 7The BCA Earnings Model Predicts A Earnings Recession Later This Year​​​​​​ Table 3The S&P 500 Earnings Drawdowns Here, we would like to emphasize that financial econometrics is not an exact science, and earnings growth point estimates are rarely precise. However, it is abundantly clear that earnings growth will trend well past the zero mark. Costs And Pricing Power Are Key Drivers Of S&P 500 Earnings In 2022 Breaking down the negative earnings growth forecast into contributions from different factors (Chart 8), we observe that the outcome is mostly driven by the interplay between PPI and Pricing Power – costs are rising and companies’ ability to pass them on further defines their profitability. And while commodity prices have fallen, these changes will take a while to flow into earnings. In addition, tighter monetary policy and slowing growth are the new speed bumps (HY Spreads and ISM PMI). Chart 8Interplay Of PPI And Pricing Power Drives The Direction Of Earnings Chart 9The USD Contribution Is Negative… USD Is Less Important So what about the dollar? According to our model, 1% of dollar appreciation is shaving off roughly 50bps from earnings growth. However, we need to keep this number in context. While the dollar has appreciated more than 25% since the beginning of 2021, only the last three to six months matter on a rolling basis. And over the past three months, USD has appreciated by about 8%, which will detract 4% from earnings in Q4-2022 (Chart 9). The importance of the USD for earnings growth is fairly minor compared to the other factors, such as pricing power, PPI, HY spreads, and ISM PMI (Chart 10). Chart 10... But Is Minor Compared To The Other Factors Bottom Line: A strong dollar is a headwind for earnings growth. However, its effects are dwarfed by other factors. Sectors Most Affected By The Strong Currency And Weakening Global Growth Table 4The S&P 500: % Of Foreign Sales By Sector While the overall negative effect of a strong dollar on the S&P 500 earnings is relatively minor, some sectors in the index are more exposed than others (Table 4). While the S&P 500 derives about 40% of sales from abroad, the Technology and Materials sectors have about 60% of foreign sales, and for the companies in these sectors, a strong currency is a serious concern. Utilities, Financials, and Real Estate are the most domestic in the index. It is important to note, that, at present, US multinationals are dealing not only with the effects of a stronger currency but also with global growth slowdown. Effects Of Strong Dollar On US Equity Performance While over the long term, a link between earnings growth and equities performance is irrefutable, in the short run, there may be significant variations. In this section, we will look at the relationship between equity returns and the USD. We will also isolate sectors and styles that are best positioned to withstand the current environment. And when the dollar swoons, we will also know which parts of the equity market are most likely to bounce back. USD Dollar Regimes To better understand the relationship between equity returns and the USD, we demarcate two distinct USD regimes, defined rather simplistically as “USD Rising” and “USD Falling” (Chart 11). Then we compile median monthly returns in each regime and keep track of how many months the S&P 500 was positive in each. Chart 11The USD Regimes Chart 12The USD Is A Headwind For The Performance Of Equities We found that when the USD is appreciating, median monthly returns are only 0.5% and are positive only 37% of the time. However, when the dollar is depreciating, median monthly returns are 1.4% and are positive 63% of the time (Chart 12). This relationship is significant at a 10% confidence level. Sector Performance Under Different USD Regimes When the USD rises, more defensive sectors, such as Utilities, Healthcare, and Consumer Staples tend to outperform. Energy has made the list thanks to the recent rally – normally Energy does not benefit from dollar strength (Chart 13). Chart 13Materials And Comm Services Will Outperform If The USD Turns The weakening dollar supports Materials as it stimulates demand, as well as the Communications sector, as it is home to multinational media and entertainment companies like Netflix, Facebook, and Google. Style Performance Under Different USD Regimes Growth Vs Value: Growth is more exposed to the USD than Value thanks to the index composition (Chart 14). Growth is home to Tech as well as Media & Entertainment, and “growthy” Consumer Discretionary, all of which have a higher share of earnings from abroad than the index. Value is dominated by Financials, Industrials, and Utilities, which are fairly domestic. Thus, while over time, exposure to the dollar fluctuates, over the long term, Growth is clearly more sensitive than Value (Chart 15). Chart 14Growth Is Dominated By Multinationals​​​​​​ Chart 15Growth Is More Exposed To The USD Than Value​​​​​​ Chart 16Mid Is A More Domestic Asset Class Than Small Small Vs Mid: According to a popular belief, small caps are insulated from currency moves as they don’t have reach and scale and earn very little outside of the US. However, small caps are often part of the ecosystem and supply chain of multinationals, and when the profitability of those is under pressure, they also start to feel the heat. Small caps have little leverage with their large clients and their profitability changes with the ebbs and flows of their larger brethren. Hence, they are quite sensitive to currency moves. Arguably, it is midcaps that are the most domestic asset class, as their exposure to the USD is less and more stable compared to the S&P 500 and small caps (Chart 16). Midcaps are usually not big enough to have much international reach but are big enough to have bargaining power with their multinational customers to guard their profitability. Investment Implications The S&P 500 derives roughly 40% of sales from abroad, which makes its earnings quite sensitive to dollar moves and global growth. The recent dollar bull market and slowing growth abroad have challenged US corporates and have detracted from their profit growth. However, slower growth, rising costs, and diminished pricing power by far dwarf the effects of the dollar. Overall, challenges at home and abroad are likely to trigger an earnings recession, which in all likelihood, has already started this summer, and is about to get worse. The dollar may be close to its peak, and our colleagues from the FX team expect dollar devaluation over the long term. A turn in the dollar will offer some respite for the performance of US equities despite the domestic backdrop of slowing growth and rising rates. It will also trigger a change in leadership, with sectors such as Materials and Communications rebounding from their lows. In terms of styles, a strong dollar lends support to Value, thanks to its sector composition. Once the dollar starts to depreciate, Growth will get another tailwind towards recovery. And lastly, midcap is one area in the US equity market somewhat more insulated from currency moves. Bottom Line While a strong dollar is certainly a headwind for US earnings growth and for the performance of US equities, its adverse effects are minor compared to the effects of tighter monetary policy, slowing growth at home and abroad, rising costs, falling productivity, and companies, diminished ability to pass on costs to customers—who are already strapped by rising prices. In short, dollar depreciation will be a welcome development, yet the dollar is the least of investors’ worries.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The model’s adjusted R-squared is 0.65. Recommended Allocation

Informe especial

Listen to a short summary of this report     Executive Summary Sales & Profit Margins: The Two Propellers That Powered The Post-GFC US Rally US equity markets underperformed the global benchmark by 10% over 2000-08. Since then, the US has outperformed the global benchmark by about 170%. So, what has driven the US’ chartbusting performance in the post-GFC period? If we break down the US’ price performance into three parts – namely price-to-earnings ratio, net profit margins, and sales – then it becomes clear that growth in the latter two elements played a key role in driving US outperformance in the post-GFC era. Can the US’ outperformance relative to global markets persist going forward? It appears unlikely that the US’ high profit margins can sustain these levels of growth going forward. Distinct from the mean reversion argument, the US’ high profit margins are unusually concentrated amongst a fistful of firms.  US firms may also find it challenging to maintain high sales growth as US GDP growth slows and given that America’s antitrust philosophy may soon undergo a once-in-a-generation change. Finally, it is worth noting that ‘sector composition’ effects played a significant role in driving US outperformance over 2008-22. Given that we expect outperforming sectors like Tech to become underperformers, this effect could become weaker going forward, thereby subverting another source of the US’ outperformance.   Bottom Line: Forecasting is a tenuous science but given that the two prime propellers of the US’ performance engine are likely to confront headwinds going forward, investors should consider reducing allocations to US equities over a longer term, strategic horizon.   Dear Client,  I am meeting clients in Asia this week while also working on our Fourth Quarter Strategy Outlook, which will be published next week, followed by my webcast the week after. In lieu of our regular report this week, you are receiving a Special Report from my colleague, Ritika Mankar, discussing the sources of US equity outperformance over the past 14 years and the likely path ahead. Best Regards,  Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist US Stock Market Dominance – It Wasn’t Always This Way Let us assume that you could travel back in time, and today was December 31, 2008. On this day you know that US and Japanese equity markets have underperformed the global benchmark (Chart 1). You also know that Europe (i.e., EU-27) has done marginally better than the US, while Emerging Markets (EM) have been the star outperformer. Let us further assume that by close of play today you have to deploy US$10bn across these four equity markets (across the US, Europe, Japan, and EM).  As if the task of taking this decision on the last day of this historic year was not enough, let us assume that the funds you invest must be locked in until the fall of 2022. Finally, let us add one more condition to this task – let us suppose that you have no idea how markets would perform over the 2008-22 period, but you have perfect foresight about how the nominal GDP of these four regions would look like in 2022. Specifically, you know that EM GDP will have a terrific run between 2008 to 2022, US GDP will increase but by a far less impressive degree, European GDP will grow only slightly, and Japan’s GDP would be lesser in 2022 than it was in 2008 (Chart 2).  Chart 1US Equities Underperformed The Global Benchmark By 10% Over 2000-08 Chart 2EM GDP Has More Than Doubled Since The GFC Chart 3US Equities Outperformed The Global Benchmark By About 170% Over 2008-22YTD If you were to take an investment decision based only this information, what is certain is that the fund you manage would underperform by a painful degree. This is because we now know that even though US markets had poor momentum in 2008, and the US’ GDP expansion paled relative to EM, US equity markets outperformed global markets by a wide margin since 2008 (Chart 3). On the other hand, despite positive momentum and high GDP growth, EM emerged as a distant second-best performer. Japan miraculously made it to third place despite a contraction in nominal GDP, and finally Europe ended up being the worst performer. If market momentum and GDP growth cannot explain these market movements, then what drove the US' outstanding performance in the post-GFC period? In this Special Report, we delve into answering this question in detail. The purpose of peeling the onion of the US' performance is simple – we hope to extract the insights that investors need to construct alpha-generating portfolios, in a world where forward time travel is not a possibility (yet). The US’ Performance Has Been Powered More By Earnings, Less By Valuations The two basic building blocks of any equity index are its earnings and its price-to-earnings ratio. The former captures the fundamentals backing an index, while the latter quantifies the valuation element. Breaking down the US’ performance into these two parts shows that earnings have been the prime factor that have propelled the rise of US equity markets in the post-GFC era (Chart 4). That earnings have been an important driver of the US’ outperformance becomes even more apparent when US earnings are compared to that of other major markets. For instance, the steep expansion in US earnings contrasts with the situation across the Atlantic. In Europe, earnings have trended lower relative to the global benchmark since 2008 and an increase in relative valuations has helped lend a floor to the index (Chart 5). The earnings report card for Japan and EM, on the other hand, have been surprisingly similar as earnings failed to rise meaningfully in both these geographies in the post-GFC period (Chart 6 and 7). Chart 4Earnings Have Played A Key Role In Propelling The Post-GFC US Rally Chart 5European Equities Supported More By Valuation Multiples Chart 6Earnings Growth Has Been Unimpressive In Japan Too Chart 7Earnings Have Trended Lower In EM Since 2008 In summary, the US' price-to-earnings ratio has had a meaningful role in driving US outperformance in the post-GFC period (Chart 8), but earnings expansion has played an outsized role (Chart 9). Chart 8Relative Valuation Multiples Have Played A Key Role In Supporting European Markets Chart 9Earnings Expansion In The US Has Been Phenomenal In fact, the growth in earnings in the US in the post-GFC era has been so noteworthy that if US equity market prices were to be broken down into its two building blocks i.e., earnings and price-to-earnings ratio, then the lion’s share of US equity market prices today would be attributed to its earnings (Chart 10). Expectedly, this contrasts with the situation in Europe where equity market prices have managed to stay afloat owing to a re-rating in its price-to-earnings ratio (Chart 11). These attribution analysis numbers are not meant to be taken literally, but rather, reflect the relative role played by earnings and price-to-earnings ratios in supporting the prices of regional indices. Chart 10US Equities: Supported More By Earnings Chart 11EU Equities: More Reliant On Multiples The Unsung Hero Behind The US’ Outperformance - Record Sales Expansion The index of a region can also be envisaged as the product of three elements, namely: (1) its price-to-earnings ratio; (2) its net profit margins; and (3) its sales. In other words: Price = (Price / Earnings) x (Earnings / Sales) x (Sales) While the US' healthy earnings tend to attract disproportionate investor attention, this formulation shows how a surge in US sales was the bigger driver of US outperformance (Chart 12). US profit margins experienced a sharp surge relative to global profit margins over the 2008-12 period, but then this parameter flatlined. US sales, on the other hand, have managed to register a steady march upwards over the entirety of the post-GFC period. The growth in sales of listed American corporations has in fact been so remarkable that a grand total of ten American firms now have annual sales of over $200 billion – which marks an all-time high for the US (Chart 13). Chart 12Post-GFC US Rally Powered By Record Sales Expansion Chart 13The US Is Home To Ten Firms With Revenues Of +$200bn Furthermore, the US’ lead on sales today is meaningful not only by its own historical standards, but by cross-country standards too. The rise in US sales has meant that the US is now home to half of the twenty largest listed corporations globally (Table 1). Conversely, Europe and Japan, despite being the third and fourth largest economies of the world, respectively, together account for only three names on this list. Notably however, Emerging Markets have managed to punch above their weight and are home to six of the top twenty firms by sales globally. Table 1The US Today Dominates The Global List Of Top 20 Firms By Revenue The steep rise in America’s sales in the post-GFC world is also unique because no other major market has experienced such a clear upward move in sales as the US has. Europe and Japan in fact saw their sales-per-share trend downwards in the post-GFC period (Chart 14 and Chart 15). Emerging markets  were the only other major global market where sales-per-share managed to stay steady relative to the global benchmark (Chart 16). Chart 14Europe’s Sales Have Trended Lower Post-GFC Chart 15Japan’s Sales Also Trended Lower Post-GFC Finally, thanks to the high growth in US sales, the contribution of sales to US equity prices is far higher than the contribution of its net profit margins or its price-to-earnings ratio (Chart 17). This once again is in sharp contrast to a market like Europe, where only a smidgeon of the European equity prices pie can be attributed to its sales. Chart 16EM Sales Have Expanded Marginally Post-2008 Chart 17The Main Engine That Powers US Markets Is ‘Sales’ Chart 18US Profit Margins Have Also Been Expanding Steadily Post-GFC Distinct from the role played by growing sales, the US’ stellar post-GFC performance has also been powered by growing profit margins. It is notable that the US has experienced an unusually strong upward movement in its profit margins in the post-GFC period (Chart 18). Japan is the only other region which has seen its profit margins expand post-GFC, with both Europe and EM having experienced a fall in profit margins from the levels seen in 2008. A Quick Note On Dividends: The US Lags On Dividend Yields But Leads On Buybacks Thus far we have focused on the returns generated by the US market relative to the world and the factors that drove US outperformance since the GFC. If one were to focus on the dividend yield component, then it is notable that the US lags its peers on this front. Post-GFC, the first major cresting of dividend yields globally took place in 2009-10. Then the next major move down in yields took place in 2020 (Chart 19). While globally, yields have now recovered from this last dip, the US finds itself lagging on this metric which matters for pension funds that rely on annuities (Chart 20). Not only have dividend yields in the US almost halved since the GFC, but the gap between dividend yields offered by the US and other markets has widened over the last few years. Europe however has managed to stay the undisputed leader when it comes to dividend yields through most of the 21st century. Chart 19Global Dividend Yields Have Recovered From The Post-2020 Fall Chart 20US Lags Global Markets On Dividend Yields Chart 21Pace Of Buybacks In The US Has Been Meaningful Notably, however, while the US lags its peers on dividend yields, it leads when it comes to buybacks. The latter is evident from the fact that proxy measures of shares outstanding have trended lower in the US in the post-GFC period, as compared to the rest of the world (Chart 21). Finally, it is important to note that both the growth in dividends-per-share as well as the absolute level of dividends in the US has been high. This parameter has increased by 2.4 times since 2008 and US dividends in absolute terms are nearly 5 times that of Europe’s dividends today. The only reason why dividend yields have stayed low despite this is because US equity prices have had a stellar run in the post-GFC period.     Can This Extent Of US Outperformance Persist? Having delved into the drivers of the US’ performance, we now know that a record expansion in sales and net profit margins have driven its outstanding performance in the post-GFC era. This in turn means that the probability of the US continuing to outperform over the next few years will be closely linked to its ability to maintain a lead on these two parameters. So how is the US positioned with respect to both these factors?   The US’ High Profit Margins Appear Unsustainable, For A Wide Range Of Reasons We have established the fact that expanding profit margins have been a supporting driver of the US’ outperformance in the post-GFC period. Now, the consensus view is that US profit margins are extraordinarily high and that they will eventually come down to earth. The logic for this argument is often grounded in mean reversion. We have also previously highlighted that most of the increase in US profit margins has occurred due to rising margins within the tech sector and the accompanying increase in the market cap weight of tech within benchmark indices. Chart 22US High Profit Margins Are Concentrated Amongst Top Firms Aside from these reasons, two more factors could lead to the compression of US profit margins over the next few years. Firstly, it is worth noting that the US' high profit margins are unusually concentrated amongst a handful of firms. While the US as a market is characterized by high margins at the headline level, profit margins of companies below the top tier are notably lower than that of the top tier (Chart 22). If profit margins were uniformly high across the US listed space and the divergence was low, then the probability of sustaining elevated margins would have been higher. But given that the US uniquely suffers from a high profit margin concentration problem, the probability of the sustainability of US high profit margins appears lower. Secondly, history suggests that in the globalized world that we live in, any region’s profit margins fail to persist above the global average beyond a maximum of 15 years (Table 2). This makes sense and is in line with economic theory which suggests that when profitability in a particular market is excessive, then new firms will enter this space, increase competition, and thereby exert downward pressure on the incumbents’ profit margins. Table 2Regional Profit Margins Seldom Persist Above The Global Average Beyond 15 Years Given that US profit margins have now persisted above global levels for almost 13 years, if history were to repeat itself, then it appears highly likely that US profit margins would trend towards the global average over the next 2 years.   US Sales Growth: A Peak Appears Nigh We now know that the rapid sales expansion experienced by US firms has been the prime driver of the US stock market outperformance since the GFC. However, the prognosis for this variable also appears shaky for the US. Chart 23US GDP And Sales Tend To Move In Lockstep The key macro variable which has the tightest theoretical link to the sales generated by the companies in a country is the country’s nominal GDP. Even as companies headquartered in the US end up selling to the global economy, history suggests that the link between the US’ nominal GDP and the sales generated by listed American firms are closely linked (Chart 23). Given that the pace of US nominal GDP growth is set to slow over the next few years (relative to both its past and relative to other major economies), US companies’ sales growth could end up slowing too (Chart 24). Also, given that the US revenue-to-nominal GDP ratio is already elevated, it is likely that even as the US’ nominal GDP keeps growing, the pace of conversion of this GDP into revenues will stay the same or may even diminish over the coming decade.   Chart 24US GDP Growth Is Set To Slow Then from a bottom-up perspective, we are also of the view that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies (by sales) may become increasingly compromised over the next decade. This is because a peculiar stagnation is in the works in the middle tier of American firms, which tend to become the mega-sized corporations of tomorrow. Finally, the US' antitrust philosophy is likely to undergo a once-in-a-generation change under the Biden administration. This could mean that America’s mega-scaled firms (which have had a free run up until now) could end-up baiting regulatory attention, restricting their ability to grow sales.   US Price Performance: Strong Sector Effects Are Unlikely To Persist Chart 25Sector Composition Effect: Strongest For The US Lastly, it is worth noting that the price performance of the broad US equity index subverts the role played by “sector composition” in driving the US' outperformance. The fact that returns generated by the US benchmark are higher than the returns generated by a hypothetical US index which weights all sectors equally suggests that “sector composition” effects had a meaningful role in driving US outperformance. In fact, as compared to other major markets, the sector composition effect is the most prominent for the US (Chart 25). Another way of quantifying the role of sector effects is to compare the US’ market cap expansion relative to a global benchmark after removing the market cap of top-performing sectors. Expectedly, US outperformance relative to the global benchmark over the post-GFC period gets substantially reduced if the market cap of the three top-performing sectors (namely Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, and Health Care) is adjusted for (Chart 26). To complicate matters, the sector composition effect in the US has been unwinding but remains high (Chart 27). Given that we expect outperforming sectors like Tech to turn into underperformers, the sector constitution effect in the US could weaken going forward, thereby subverting another source of US outperformance.  Chart 26Extent Of US Outperformance Weakens Sans Tech, Consumer Discretionary, And Health Care Chart 27Sector Composition Effect In The US Remains High Investment Conclusions The prime drivers of US outperformance relative to the global benchmark in the post-GFC period have been ascendant sales and rising net profit margins. Forecasting is a tenuous science but given that both these propellers of the US equity market engine are set to face headwinds, investors should consider reducing allocations to US equities over a longer term, strategic horizon. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist Ritika.Mankar@bcaresearch.com  

Executive Summary Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias The Fed is pacing a globally synchronized monetary-policy tightening cycle as the war in Ukraine escalates, following Russia’s mobilization of 300k reserve forces. Despite central-bank tightening, the intensification of the war increases the odds of higher inflation.  This will keep the USD well bid. Russia’s threat to cut oil supplies to states observing the G7 price cap will test US and EU resolve as winter sets in.  Retaliatory output cuts by Russia could send Brent crude oil prices above $200/bbl. The Biden administration remains fearful its G7 price cap and EU sanctions on Russian oil exports will spike prices.  The US will make 10mm barrels of crude from its SPR available in November as a palliative.  Our base case Brent forecast is slightly lower, averaging $105/bbl this year from $110/bbl, due to weaker realized prices.  On the back of this, we expect 4Q22 Brent to average $106/bbl, and for 2023 to average $118/bbl, up slightly vs. last month.  WTI will trade $3-$5/bbl lower. Bottom Line: The economic war pitting the EU and its allies against Russia could escalate and widen as more Russian troops pour into Ukraine.  This raises the odds of expanded conflict outside Ukraine, and higher war-driven inflation.  Our baseline forecast for 2023 remains intact, with a strong bias to the upside.  We remain long the COMT and XOP ETFs to retain exposure to commodities. Feature The Fed is pacing a globally synchronized monetary-policy tightening cycle at a time when the war in Ukraine is escalating. Russia’s mobilization of a reported 300k reserve forces raises the spectre of an expansion of the Ukraine war – perhaps crossing into a NATO state’s border – if tactical nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are used. This is a low-probability outcome, but it would increase the odds of significantly higher inflation should it come to pass.1 The US central bank lifted its Fed funds rate 75 bps Wednesday to a range of 3% - 3.25% – and strongly indicated further rate hikes will follow. The Fed is one of numerous banks increasing policy rates. This synchronous monetary-policy tightening has not been observed for 50 years, and raises the odds of a global economic recession, according to the World Bank.2 The World Bank notes that since 1970, recessions have been “preceded by a significant weakening of global growth in the previous year, as has happened recently,” and, importantly, “all previous global recessions coincided with sharp slowdowns or outright recessions in several major economies.” The withdrawal of monetary and fiscal support “are necessary to contain inflationary pressures, but their mutually compounding effects could produce larger impacts than intended, both in tightening financial conditions and in steepening the growth slowdown.” Markets are acting in a manner consistent with this assessment, but, in our view, need to expand the risk set to include a higher likelihood of a war widening beyond Ukraine. While this is not our base case, it is worthwhile recalling the link between war and inflation. Prior to and during the 20th century’s two world wars, then the Korean and Vietnam wars, US CPI inflation rose sharply (Chart 1).3 Price controls and tighter monetary policy were needed to address these inflationary episodes. Chart 1A Wider Ukraine War Would Stoke Inflation Stronger USD Remains Oil-Demand Headwind Fed policy will continue to push US interest rates higher, which will push the USD higher on the back of continued global demand for dollar-denominated assets. This will keep the cost of most commodities ex-US higher in local currency terms, which, all else equal, will weaken commodity demand in general, and oil demand in particular. This will be compounded if tighter monetary policy at systemically important central banks (led by the Fed) results in a global recession in 2023. This is especially true for EM oil demand: The income elasticity of EM oil consumption is 0.61, which means a 1% decrease (increase) in real EM GDP translates into a 0.61% decrease (increase) in oil demand, all else equal. In our base case, we expect global oil demand to grow 2.2mm b/d this year and 1.91mm b/d next year, roughly in line with the US EIA’s and IEA’s estimates (Chart 2). We expect EM demand will increase 1.25mm b/d this year, and 1.90mm b/d next year, accounting for almost all of global growth. As before, we expect China’s oil demand growth to be de minimus this year, on the back of its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy. EM remains the key driver of our global oil demand assumptions, which, in our modeling, are a function of real income (GDP). Offsetting the stronger USD effects on demand is gas-to-oil switching demand, resulting from record-high LNG prices this year. This will add 800k b/d to demand globally this winter (November – March). Chart 2Global Oil Demand Holding Up Oil Supply Getting Tighter Oil supply will remain challenged this year and next, as core OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – approaches the limit of what it can supply to the market and still retain sufficient spare capacity to meet unexpected supply shocks (Chart 3). Among the anticipated shocks we believe core OPEC 2.0 is aware of is the loss of 2mm b/d of Russian crude oil output over the next year, due to the imposition of EU embargoes on seaborne crude oil and refined products, which will go into effect 5 December 2022 and 5 February 2023, respectively. The continued inability of non-core OPEC 2.0 states to maintain higher production – “The Other Guys” in our nomenclature – is another foreseeable shock (Chart 4). This is becoming acute for OPEC 2.0, given The Other Guys account for most of the 3.6mm b/d of below-quota output currently registered by the producer coalition.4 This is a record gap between expected production and actual production from OPEC 2.0, which was registered in August. Chart 3Core OPEC 2.0 Conserves Supplies Chart 4'Other Guys' Production Keeps Falling Net, demand will continue to outpace supply in our base case (Chart 5, Table 1). This will require continued inventory draws for the next year or so, as core OPEC 2.0 continues to conserve supplies (Chart 6). Chart 5Demand Continues To Outpace Supply Chart 6Inventory Will Continue Drawing Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Russian Wild Card Battlefield losses in Ukraine are forcing Russia’s military to activate some 300k reserve troops. These losses again are prompting veiled threats to deploy nuclear and perhaps chemical weapons, which drew a sharp warning from US President Biden.5 Further economic losses will begin mounting in a little more than two months, as the first of two major EU oil-import embargoes and a ban on insuring/re-insuring vessels carrying Russian crude and products takes hold. In addition, a US-led G7 price cap on Russian oil purchases will go into effect with the December embargo on seaborne crude imports into the EU.6 We continue to expect Russia will be forced to shut in ~ 2mm b/d of crude oil production by the end of next year – taking output from a little more than 10mm b/d to ~ 8mm b/d.7 Russian’s President Putin already has threatened to cut off oil supplies to anyone abiding by the G7 price cap.8 In our modeling, a unilateral 2mm b/d cut in Russian output – in addition to the lost sales from the EU embargoes and insurance/reinsurance bans – would take Brent prices above $200/bbl (Chart 7). On the downside, a severe global recession that removes 2mm b/d of demand next year could send prices below $60/bbl. Equally plausible cases for either outcome can be made, given current supply-demand fundamentals and the geopolitical backdrop discussed above. This can be seen in the lack of skew in the options markets, which is measured by the difference in out-of-the-money call and put implied volatilities (Chart 8). The skew sits close to zero at present – meaning options buyers are not giving higher odds to a sharp upside or downside move at present.9 Chart 7Higher Brent Prices, Stronger Upside Bias Chart 8Option Skew Shows Up Or Down Moves Equally Likely In our modeling and analysis, we continue to believe the balance of risk is to the upside. As can be seen in Chart 6, inventories are below the 2010-14 five-year average – OPEC 2.0’s original target when it was formed – which means KSA and the UAE will be able to respond to any demand shocks that cause unintended inventory accumulation (e.g., the sort that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic or the OPEC market-share war of 2015-16). Managing the upside risk is more difficult: KSA and the UAE are close to the limits of what they can supply and still carry sufficient spare capacity to meet unexpected production losses. KSA’s crude oil output is just over 11mm b/d, and the UAE’s is at 3.2mm b/d, according to OPEC’s Monthly Oil Market Report. This puts both within 1mm b/d of their max production capacity of 12mm and 4mm b/d. Both got close to producing at these max levels in early 2020, when Russia provoked a market share war; this was quickly reversed as a magnitude of the COVID-19 demand destruction became apparent. The only other large producer outside the OPEC 2.0 coalition capable of increasing and sustaining higher output is the US shales, which are producing at 7.8mm b/d and have pushed total US crude oil output to 12.2mm b/d (Chart 9). Leading producers in the shales have foreclosed any sharp increase in output this year, given tight labor markets and services and equipment markets in the US. Chart 9US Shales Close To Max Output Investment Implications Global crude oil markets remain tight, with demand continuing to exceed supply. The risk that the economic war pitting the EU and its allies against Russia could expand to a more kinetic confrontation involving additional states is higher, as more Russian troops are called up to serve in Ukraine. If the additional troops do not reverse Russia’s battlefield losses – or if Ukraine looks like it will win this war – Putin likely will feel cornered, and get more desperate.10 We believe Putin will first attempt to impose as much economic pain on the West as possible by cutting off all natural gas and oil flows to the EU and states and firms observing the G7 price cap. However, if that does not force the West to relent on its economic war with Russia, a war with NATO could evolve in which tactical nukes or other weapons of mass destruction are employed. At that point, Putin would have concluded there would be nothing he could do to restore Russia’s standing as a world power. Any plume – nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) – that crosses a NATO border likely would be treated as an act of war. NATO would have to act at that point. This is not our expectation, nor is it any part of our base case. But it is a higher non-trivial risk than it was last month or last week. This raises the odds of higher war-driven inflation, as well, which will further complicate central-bank monetary policy at a time of war. Our baseline forecast remains intact, with a strong bias to the upside. We remain long the COMT and XOP ETFs to retain exposure to commodities.   Robert P. Ryan  Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish In its September update, the US EIA reported natural gas consumption will hit record levels in 2022, increasing by 3.6 Bcf/d to just under 87 Bcf/d on average, led by increases in the electric power residential and commercial sectors (Chart 10). US natural gas consumption in the electric power sector will increase in 2022 due to limitations at coal-fired power plants and weather-driven demand. It is expected to decrease in 4Q22 and in 2023, due to more renewable electricity generation capacity. Natural gas consumption in the residential and commercial sectors for 2023 is expected to be similar as 2022 levels. Base Metals: Bullish According to Eurometaux, a consortium of European metal producers, approximately 50% of the EU’s zinc and aluminum production capacity is offline due to high power prices. More operations are expected to shut as European power prices remain elevated and metal prices drop on recessionary fears (Chart 11). The decision to reopen a smelter following a shutdown is expensive and can result in long wait times. This will make the bloc’s manufacturers heavily reliant on metal imports from other states, which likely will lead to higher pollution from these plants. Aluminum supply is particularly vulnerable to this power crisis since one ton needs an eye-watering 15 megawatt-hours of electricity – enough to power five homes in Germany for a year. Precious Metals: Neutral The Fed’s additional 75-bps rate hike will strengthen the USD and weaken gold prices. Geopolitical risk has been a tailwind for the greenback thus far, as investors rush to the USD instead of the yellow metal for safe-haven investments. If this trend continues, along with further Fed rate increases, the additional risk arising from Putin’s reserve force mobilization and possible expansion of the Ukraine war will boost the USD and leave gold in the doldrums.   Chart 10 Chart 11   Footnotes 1     Please see Vladimir Putin mobilises army reserves to support Ukraine invasion, published by ft.com on September 21, 2022. 2     Please see Is a Global Recession Imminent?, published by the World Bank on September 15, 2022.  The report notes, “Policymakers need to stand ready to manage the potential spillovers from globally synchronous withdrawal of policies supporting growth. On the supply-side, they need to put in place measures to ease the constraints that confront labor markets, energy markets, and trade networks.” 3    Please see One hundred years of price change: the Consumer Price Index and the American inflation experience, published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics in April 2014.  4    Please see OPEC+ supply shortfall now stands at 3.5% of global oil demand, published 20 September 2022 by reuters.com. 5    Please see Biden warns Putin over nuclear, chemical weapons, published by politico.eu on September 17, 2022. 6    Please see EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices, which we published on August 18, 2022, for discussion. 7    We include Russia among “The Other Guys” in our balances estimates.  8    Please see Explainer: The G7's price cap on Russian oil begins to take shape, published by reuters.com on September 19, 2022. 9    We use the standard measure of skew – i.e., the difference between 25-delta calls and puts – to determine whether option market participants are discounting a higher likelihood of an up or down move, respectively. 10   Please see CIA director warns Putin's 'desperation' over Russia's failures in Ukraine could lead him to use nukes, published by businessinsider.com on April 15, 2022. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary There’s Value In TIPS A survey of economic and financial market indicators suggests that we are not yet close to the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle. This argues for a continued flattening of the yield curve and one more push higher in bond yields before the end of the cyclical bond bear market. While headline inflation has rolled over, there is so far little indication of a slowdown in core price appreciation. We see core CPI reaching 3.6% during the next 12 months, driven by decelerating goods prices but sticky wage growth and services inflation. The TIPS market is discounting an overly sanguine view of headline inflation for the next 12 months, and there is value in owning TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Bottom Line: Investors should reduce portfolio duration to ‘below-benchmark’ and hold a position in 5-year/30-year Treasury curve flatteners. Investors should also overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and own 2-year/10-year TIPS breakeven inflation curve flatteners. Feature US bond yields continued their ascent last week, spurred on by August’s surprisingly high core CPI print and the perception that the Fed will have to tighten policy even more quickly to bring inflation back down. Currently, the market is discounting that the Fed will lift the funds rate to 4.61% by April of next year and then bring it back down to 4.26% by the end of 2023 (Chart 1). Chart 1Rate Expectations This market-implied interest rate path would involve 225 bps of tightening at the next 5 FOMC meetings, or an average rate increase of +45 bps per meeting. With a 75 basis point rate increase looking like a lock for this week, market pricing is consistent with additional 50 basis point increases at the final two meetings of this year (November and December) and then two more 25 basis point rate hikes in Q1 2023. After that, the market anticipates that the tightening cycle will be over. Our view continues to be that the peak in the fed funds rate will occur later than April 2023 and that, while a pause in the Fed’s tightening cycle is likely at some point next year, inflation will be strong enough to preclude outright rate cuts. In terms of investment strategy, last week’s report presented empirical evidence showing that, on average, Treasury yields peak 1-2 months before the last rate hike of the cycle.1 In fact, in the seven Fed tightening cycles that we analyzed, the 10-year Treasury yield always peaked within a window spanning four months before the last rate hike and four months after (Table 1). This analysis suggests that even if the fed funds rate peaks in April, as is implied by the market, bond yields likely have one more leg higher before the end of the cyclical bear market. Table 1Timing Fed Tightening Cycles While we have been consistently highlighting that the market is not pricing-in a sufficiently high average fed funds rate for 2023, we have been recommending an ‘at benchmark’ portfolio duration stance on the view that falling inflation could briefly send bond yields lower in the near term. The 10-year Treasury yield did fall back to 2.60% on August 1, but it then rebounded quickly and has continued to head higher since. With Treasury yields unlikely to re-test those depths anytime soon, we recommend shifting to a ‘below-benchmark’ portfolio duration stance to play the final leg higher in bond yields before a US recession ends the cyclical bond bear market. The next section of this report surveys nine cyclical economic indicators and argues that the balance of evidence suggests that the fed funds rate’s peak will occur later than April 2023. Then, the final section of this report discusses our recommended TIPS investment strategy in light of last week’s CPI report and our outlook for inflation. Tracking The Tightening Cycle One of the most useful tools in our arsenal for assessing the state of the interest rate cycle is our Fed Monitor. The Fed Monitor is a composite of 47 economic and financial market variables that has been designed to output a positive value when the data recommend interest rate hikes and a negative value when rate cuts are required. Historically, the Monitor does a good job of lining up with the actual path of the fed funds rate (Chart 2). Chart 2Fed Monitor Says More Tightening Required The Fed Monitor is currently down off its highs, but at 1.03 it is well above the zero line. Looking at past tightening cycles, we find that the Monitor has averaged 0.41 on the day of the last rate hike of a cycle, with a range of outcomes spanning -0.49 to +0.93. Notably, the +0.93 upper-end of that range occurred in 1995, a time when the Fed only delivered a modest amount of policy easing before pivoting back to tightening in 1999. The variables in our Fed Monitor can be grouped into three categories: (i) economic growth variables, (ii) inflation variables and (iii) financial market variables. Interestingly, we observe that the Economic Growth component of our Monitor has dipped into negative territory while the Inflation and Financial Conditions components continue to argue for tighter policy (Chart 2, bottom 3 panels). A negative Economic Growth component suggests that we are getting closer to the end of the tightening cycle, but the Fed will likely stay hawkish and tolerate an even deeper negative reading from Economic Growth as long as inflation remains high. In addition to our Fed Monitor, we have identified nine economic indicators (some included in the Fed Monitor and some not) that are particularly relevant for the Fed’s policy stance. In this week’s report, we look at the message these indicators were sending on the day of the last rate hike of seven past tightening cycles. The indicators are: The Sahm Rule: Economist Claudia Sahm has noted that a recession always occurs when the 3-month moving average of the unemployment rate rises by more than 0.5% off its trailing 12-month low.2 We include the unemployment rate’s deviation from its 12-month low as a measure of labor market utilization. Employment Momentum: We look at the 6-month growth rate in nonfarm payrolls as a measure of momentum in the labor market. Inflation: We use 12-month core PCE as a measure of inflation that is most closely related to the Fed’s target. Inflation Momentum: To measure momentum in inflation we look at the difference between 3-month core PCE and 12-month core PCE. Labor Market Tightness: Using responses from the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Survey, we look at the number of people who describe jobs as “plentiful” minus the number who describe jobs as “hard to get”. Economic Growth: We use the ISM Manufacturing PMI as a simple measure of the trend in aggregate demand in the US economy. Housing: To assess trends in the housing market we look at the 12-month moving average in housing starts minus the 24-month moving average. Financial Conditions: We use the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index to assess whether financial conditions are accommodative or restrictive. The Yield Curve: We look at the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope to ascertain whether the bond market perceives the monetary policy stance as accommodative or restrictive. Table 2A lists the nine indicators described above and shows their values on the day of the last rate hike of seven past tightening cycles. We also include the current reading from each indicator. Finally, we shade in red every cell that we deem consistent with the Fed stopping its tightening cycle. To make this determination we compare the value on the day of the last rate hike to the median value witnessed on the day of the last hike across all seven tightening cycles. We don’t use median values for the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index or the Treasury slope. Rather, we say that an inverted yield curve and a Financial Conditions reading above 100 are both consistent with the end of rate hikes. Table 2AEconomic Indicators At The End Of Fed Tightening Cycles The last column of Table 2A simply adds up the number of red cells in each row. As of today, we see that only 2 out of nine indicators are consistent with the end of the tightening cycle. The end of a tightening cycle has never occurred with less than four indicators flashing red. Table 2B takes a slightly more sophisticated approach to the same exercise. Rather than simply comparing above or below the median, we rank each indicator as a percentile relative to its value on the day of the last rate hike across seven different tightening cycles. We then combine those percentile ranks with an equal weighting to get an “End of Tightening Score”. Larger values are consistent with a greater likelihood that the tightening cycle will end and lower values are consistent with a lower likelihood. Currently, the End of Tightening Score stands at 28%, lower than on the day of the last rate hike in all of the cycles we analyzed. Table 2BEconomic Indicators At The End Of Fed Tightening Cycles: Percentile Ranks As is the case with our Fed Monitor, the closest End of Tightening Score to today’s occurred in 1995. One key difference between 1995 and today is that core inflation was running much closer to target in 1995. This gave the Fed scope to fine tune its policy stance without risking its inflation fighting credibility. That flexibility is not available to the Fed in today’s high inflation environment. Bottom Line: A survey of economic and financial market indicators suggests that we are not yet close to the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle. This argues for a continued flattening of the yield curve and one more push higher in bond yields before the end of the cyclical bond bear market. Investors should set portfolio duration to ‘below benchmark’ and maintain a position in 5-year/30-year Treasury curve flatteners.3 The TIPS Market Is Too Complacent August’s month-over-month core CPI print came in well above expectations at +0.57%, sending bond yields higher and risk assets lower last week. Zooming out, while falling gasoline prices appear to have shifted the trend in headline inflation, there is so far little evidence of a meaningful move down in core or trimmed mean measures of CPI (Chart 3). Chart 3No Slowdown In Core CPI Chart 4Core CPI Forecast In a recent Special Report, we went through the five major components of CPI (energy, food, shelter, goods and services) and came up with 12-month forecasts for both core and headline inflation.4  For core inflation, we forecast that it will fall to 3.6% during the next 12 months (Chart 4). The main driver of the drop will be a return of goods inflation to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4, panel 3). We anticipate only a minor pullback in shelter inflation (Chart 4, panel 2) and that services inflation will remain elevated, driven by strong wage growth (Chart 4, bottom panel). Recently, we have seen some evidence that home prices and rents on new leases are decelerating, no doubt a response to high and rising mortgage rates. That said, we don’t anticipate much pass through from those trends into shelter inflation during the next 12 months. First, home price appreciation leads shelter CPI by 18 months (Chart 5A). This means that we shouldn’t expect falling home prices to meaningfully impact shelter inflation until the end of 2023. Second, rental growth on new leases as measured by Zillow and Apartment List has clearly decelerated, but it is still running much hotter than shelter CPI (Chart 5B). Given the limited historical track record, it’s very difficult to say how much (if any) of the recent deceleration in rental growth will ultimately pass through to the CPI. Chart 5AHome Prices & Shelter CPI Chart 5BDecelerating Rents In our research, we have found that measures of labor market utilization are the most important variables to include in any model of shelter inflation. For ease of forecasting, the model shown in Chart 4 and in the top panel of Chart 6 uses the unemployment rate as its measure of labor market tightness. This model works well, but it arguably understates shelter inflation because it doesn’t include a variable capturing wage growth. If we replace the unemployment rate in our model with the more comprehensive aggregate weekly payrolls measure, then we get a much tighter fit and a model that does a better job explaining the recent surge in shelter CPI (Chart 6, bottom panel).5 All in all, we conclude that our expectation that shelter inflation will fall from 6.3% to 4.7% during the next 12 months may wind up being a tad optimistic. When we combine our forecast for 3.6% core inflation with two scenarios for the oil price – a benign one based on what is priced into the futures curve and another based on the forecasts of our commodity strategists – we get an expected range of 2.1% to 4.7% for headline CPI during the next 12 months (Chart 7). According to our Golden Rule of TIPS Investing, if 12-month headline CPI comes in above the current 1-year CPI swap rate then TIPS will outperform nominal Treasuries during the 12-month investment horizon.6 Chart 6Modeling Shelter Inflation Chart 7There's Value In TIPS At present, the 1-year CPI swap rate is 2.76%, near the bottom of our expected range of outcomes for 12-month headline CPI. It seems to us that a lot of things will have to go right for inflation to come in below market expectations during the next year. For this reason, we think it makes sense for investors to overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in US bond portfolios. Chart 8Own Inflation Curve Flatteners Additionally, we see a lot of value in owning TIPS breakeven curve flatteners (Chart 8). The 2-year and 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rates are both currently 2.38%, meaning that the 2-year/10-year TIPS breakeven slope is at zero. Higher-than-expected inflation during the next 12 months will put more pressure on the front-end of the breakeven curve than the long end, flattening the curve. Further, logic dictates that an inverted inflation curve is more consistent with an environment where the Fed is fighting above-target inflation than a positively sloped one. There will come a time when it makes sense for the inflation curve to move back into positive territory, but that won’t be until the Fed has brought inflation down much closer to its target. Bottom Line: The inflation outlook priced into markets for the next 12 months is too benign. Investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and own TIPS breakeven inflation curve flatteners.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Brief History Of Fed Tightening Cycles”, dated September 13, 2022. 2  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ES_THP_Sahm_web_20190506.pdf 3  For more details on this curve trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Great Soft Landing Debate”, dated August 9, 2022. 4  Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of TIPS Investing”, dated August 23, 2022. 5  Aggregate weekly payrolls = nonfarm employment x average weekly hours x average hourly earnings 6   Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of TIPS Investing”, dated August 23, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns