Developed Countries

Overweight Last summer, following our recession thought experiment report1 we upgraded the S&P hypermarkets index to overweight preparing our portfolio for the inevitable recession.2 Since then, hypermarket stocks have bested the SPX by nearly 30%. The 10-year Treasury yield recently melted to 0.31%, fully discounting ZIRP, QE5 and recession. This week’s US PMI release also made for grim reading, and it will likely be a harbinger of acute economic pain in the weeks to come. Tack on the 40% jump in weekly unemployment insurance claims, and things are falling into place for additional gains in relative share prices (see chart). Following explosive gains thanks to COVID-19 driven panic, we have also instituted a rolling 10% profit taking stop from the peak gains of 36% in the most recent Weekly Report. Bottom Line: We reiterate our overweight stance in the S&P hypermarkets index, but remain disciplined as we will obey our 10% rolling stop. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HYPC – WMT, COST. Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2    Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Divorced From Reality” dated July 15, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

  Feature We are downgrading US President Donald Trump’s odds of winning election. We now consider him an underdog. Since November 2018 we had given Trump a 55% chance of victory – and when former Vice President Joe Biden clinched the nomination in the midst of the virus crisis we argued that the election was “too close to call.” Now, subjectively, we would say Trump has a 35% chance of winning. This is generous relative to history, but seems appropriate to us due to the unpredictable nature of the coronavirus pandemic (which could claim either presidential candidate), the massive US and global stimulus, and the weakness of his opponent. Trump’s approval rating has fallen, albeit slightly, amid the coronavirus pandemic (Chart 1). It is now deviating from the rising approval rating of President Barack Obama at this stage in the 2012 election cycle. Since Trump has been generally less popular than the average president (Chart 2), including Obama, this is a very worrying sign for Trump. Chart 1Virus Knocked Trump Off Track Chart 2Trump Has Zero Buffer For Loss Of Popularity It is also a worrying sign for global risk assets despite their recent collapse. Chart 3To Boost Economy, Trump Must Allow Outbreaks The risk that Trump becomes a “lame duck” president was one of our top two geopolitical risks for the year. The pandemic and recession have laid the groundwork for this risk to materialize (Chart 3).  Trump becomes a liability for the stock market if he concludes that he cannot win reelection. If he seems destined to lose, he has an incentive to use the powers of the presidency in his final months to “turn the tables” and change the narrative, or to cement his legacy by achieving long-term US national interests that have negative economic consequences. For now Trump apparently believes he can still salvage the economy in time to win reelection. He is softening his tone on the need for stringent social distancing policies that are designed to “flatten the curve” of the coronavirus burden on the health system. His administration will review the tough policies on Monday, March 30 before determining whether they should be extended. Individual states have leeway to maintain lockdowns, but a loosening of federal scrutiny would allow more workers to go back to work. While Trump’s desire to restart the economy is self-interested, it is true that too long of a shutdown could create negative feedback loops in the economy. A deeper slump might have worse consequences than the virus outbreak with targeted measures to mitigate the most vulnerable populations (e.g. those over 60, those with heart disease or type-2 diabetes). The problem for Trump is that if he runs on an economic ticket, he is already doomed. Unemployment is bound to rise and laid off workers tend to show up at polls to vote against the party in power. Otherwise Trump’s only option is to run as a “war president” and try to capitalize on the population’s general unwillingness to change leaders in the thick of a crisis. This strategy could work, but then Trump must tighten rather than loosen quarantines, at least over the next month. President George W. Bush benefited from the “war president” effect: his popularity surged after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the invasion of Iraq. It fell beneath 50% over the following three years, but it recovered as the election approached and the country decided not to “change horses in mid-stream.” Franklin Delano Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor is another analogy, albeit less applicable. Richard Nixon in 1972 is only roughly analogous because the recession began the year after his reelection. For President Trump to benefit from a similar dynamic we would need to see two things. First, his approval rating would need to hold steady through the worst of the crisis – from today throughout the spring – and then improve over the summer on the back of perceived progress in handling the outbreak. Second, we would need to see the economy improve from the deep contraction expected to occur in H1, so that by October voters feel the situation is improving and the future is brightening. Loosening vigilance against the virus and causing new outbreaks jeopardizes the first imperative, while maintaining or increasing vigilance jeopardizes the second part.   Few presidents have survived a recession – Trump is asking to do what no president has done since Teddy Roosevelt in 1904. Our quantitative US election model will shift decisively against Trump in April when new data becomes available for state economic indicators (Chart 4). Chart 4Quantitative Election Model Will Show Trump Defeat When Q1 Data Arrive This implies that Trump should double down on the painful isolation measures today to try to secure a victory in the battle against the virus. But then the recession is deeper – and the buck still stops with him for the initial mismanagement of the outbreak. Of course, the virus is not Trump’s fault, but it is a nationwide health crisis, and neither he nor his party can defend their record on health care. True, Biden is a weak opponent. Nevertheless a pandemic and recession would favor any opposition candidate. The burden is on Trump to surprise the world a second time. If the public becomes accustomed to the virus and the 8% of GDP US stimulus package kicks in, Trump might just pull it off, which is why we still give him a 35% chance. The silver lining for financial markets is that the 29% selloff in US equities from their peak earlier this year has already largely discounted any negative implications of a Democratic ascendancy, such as tougher regulation and higher corporate and individual tax rates. The fact that the Democratic candidate is Biden, not democratic socialist Bernie Sanders, is important because the Democrats are highly likely to take the Senate if they take the White House.  Biden would reduce some aspects of Trumpian populism and rehabilitate US alliances (e.g. with Europe). However, as with Trump, trade protectionism and great power competition with China and Russia will intensify.   A major underrated risk to markets this year is that Trump, running as a “war president” and facing a recessionary defeat, could adopt an aggressive foreign policy or trade policy, especially once the coronavirus outbreak subsides and a scapegoat is sought. A clash with China – including proxy battles over North Korea or Taiwan – is not out of the question. Bottom Line: We are downgrading Trump’s chances of winning reelection. However, a Biden presidency is no longer market-negative because the worst is discounted.    Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com    

Below are the 20 reasons to start buying equities. We are already in recession. Markets trough in recessions and historically offer enticing risk/reward return profiles. China’s manufacturing PMI and other hard data fell below the GFC lows. As a general rule of thumb investors should buy stocks when the global PMI is well below 50 (Chart 1). Cupboards are bare. A drawdown in inventories is usually followed by a jump in production. Consumers will benefit from the oil market carnage and the super low mortgage refinancing rates. The Fed cut rates to zero, did QE5, and brought back the alphabet soup of programs like CPFF, PDCF and MMLF from the GFC, more will likely follow (Chart 2).  The DXY has gone from 95 on March 9 to 103 on Friday. King dollar will soon have to reverse course and provide some much-needed relief globally as the Fed’s US dollar swap lines aim to alleviate the shortage of US dollars (Chart 3). Keep in mind what Dr. Bernanke told Scott Pelley in a 60 Minutes interview with regard to money creation: “PELLEY: Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?   Chart 1 Chart 2 BERNANKE: It's not tax money. The banks have accounts with the Fed, much the same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account that they have with the Fed (emphasis ours). So it's much more akin to printing money than it is to borrowing.”1     Chart 3 Other global Central Banks are cutting
rates and doing QE. Beyond Christine Lagarde’s recent €750bn bazooka, the ECB has the OMT ready from previous crises. Already last week the ECB intervened in Italian BTPs via Banca d’Italia. Germany has hinted that it would not be opposed to a “Covid-bond.” A mega US fiscal package looms near the $1tn mark.2 The recession-related automatic stabilizers and government spending will soar. China’s fiscal response will likely be as large as in late 2008 (as a reminder in Q4/2008 the Chinese fiscal spending announcement equated “to 12.5% of China’s GDP in 2008, to be spent over 27 months”3). Germany and a slew of other countries have already pledged fiscal spending. Spain has announced a 20% of GDP package. Countries will bid-up the size of the bailout. IMF announced a $1tn bailout package. Nibbling at stocks when the VIX is at 85 makes sense versus when the VIX is at 12 (Chart 4). The yield curve slope is steepening  (Chart 5). The 10-year real Treasury yield hit a low of -50bps that indicator has also priced in recession (Chart 4). Equity market internals have fully priced recession, small caps and weak balance sheet stocks in particular (Chart 6). Sentiment is washed out as per our Capitulation, Sentiment and Complacency-Anxiety Indicators (Chart 6). Bernie Sanders has lost his bid to become the nominee of the Democratic Party. Buffett will either bailout a company or two or buyout a company he likes. Jamie Dimon and/or other prominent CEOs (insiders) will start buying their own company stock. Social-distancing measures in the West will ultimately break the Epidemic Curve first derivative and arrest the panic. Even if COVID-19 comes back
in force, the fact is that most of the patients who succumb to it are elderly. In Italy, the average age of death is 80 years old. As such, the final circuit-breaker ahead of a GFC would be desensitization by the population, as selective quarantines – targeting the elderly cohorts – get implemented in order to allow other people to return to work. Furthermore, two “silver bullet” solutions remain as tail risks to the bearish narrative. First, a biotech or pharmaceutical company may make a break-through in the fight against COVID-19. Not necessarily a vaccine, but a treatment. Finally, upcoming warm weather in the northern hemisphere may also help the fight against the virus. Bottom Line: Investors with higher risk tolerance should continue to layer in slowly and put cash to work with a cyclical 9-12 month time horizon. Please refer to yesterday’s Weekly Report for more details. Chart 4   Chart 5 Chart 6 Footnotes 1 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ben-bernankes-greatest-challenge/2/ 2 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Daily Report, "Don’t Be A Hero" dated March 11, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/Public%20Governance%20Issues%20in%20China.pdf

Highlights Duration: Last week’s bond market sell-off was a headfake and does not portend a sustained move higher in Treasury yields. We will need to see a stabilization in confirmed COVID-19 cases and signs of improving global growth before calling the bottom in yields. Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark. Yield Curve: A fed funds rate pinned at zero means that the yield curve will trade directionally with yields for the foreseeable future. The yield curve’s recent re-shaping also means that a barbelled Treasury portfolio now only offers a small yield advantage. We recommend shifting out of a barbell and into a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Corporate Spreads: High-yield spreads are now fairly priced for a default cycle of similar magnitude to the 2001/02 recession, and the Fed’s entrance into the corporate bond market is a potential game changer for investment grade spreads. Investors should increase exposure to investment grade corporates from neutral to overweight. High-yield investors with horizons of 12 months or more should also start adding exposure. Fed Policy: The Fed is frantically trying to mitigate the impact of three different (though related) shocks: An economic shock, a liquidity shock and a credit shock. We assess its progress to date and discuss what could be done next. Feature Headfake Chart 1Not A Reflationary Environment Bond yields jumped early last week, shortly after the Fed cut rates back to the zero bound. At one point the 10-year Treasury yield reached as high as 1.18%. But make no mistake, this was not the start of a protracted bond sell off. By Monday morning, the 10-year was back down to 0.75%. Evidently, the conditions for a sustained move higher in Treasury yields are not yet in place. To see why this is so, we need to look a little bit beyond the headline grabbing change in nominal yields and notice that, even when the nominal 10-year yield moved up early last week, the 10-year real yield increased much more quickly, causing the implied cost of inflation protection to fall (Chart 1). This is unusual behavior. Typically, real yields, nominal yields and breakeven inflation rates are all positively correlated. This is because an improving economic outlook usually leads investors to expect both higher inflation and a higher fed funds rate in the future, and vice-versa. When the correlation breaks down it is usually related to some policy action or constraint. For example, investors could come to believe that the Fed will keep interest rates too low for far too long, causing real yields to fall even as inflation expectations jump. Or, as is the case right now, the market could recognize the zero-lower-bound constraint on Fed policy and start to price-in a scenario where the Fed can’t cut rates far enough to jumpstart economic growth. Real yields move higher in this scenario, but inflation expectations crash. We are seeing the same dynamic of rising real yields and falling inflation expectations that was witnessed in 2008. This same dynamic of rising real yields and falling inflation expectations was witnessed in 2008, when the Fed was rapidly cutting rates but investors did not view that action as sufficient (Chart 2). Falling equity prices and a rising dollar further underscored that the environment was becoming more deflationary, not reflationary. A sustained rise in bond yields can only be caused by a reflationary environment. Chart 2Shades Of 2008 How Close To The Bottom? The relevant question then becomes: How close are we to returning to a reflationary environment? To answer this question we will rely on the checklist to call the bottom in bond yields that we unveiled two weeks ago.1 That checklist contains four factors: A stabilization in confirmed COVID-19 cases Improving global economic growth (particularly in China) Weaker US economic data A trigger from one or more technical trading rules Last week we started to see the first signs of weaker US economic data. Initial jobless claims spiked to 281k and both the New York and Philadelphia Fed regional manufacturing surveys plunged (Chart 3). We expect the bottom in bond yields will occur when the US economic data are very weak and when economies that experienced the outbreak earlier – such as China – are showing signs of rebounding. Investors will superimpose the Chinese experience onto the US. But it is still too early for that. Global growth bellwethers such as the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index remain in freefall (Chart 3, bottom panel). We also noted that we want to see stabilization in the global number of confirmed COVID-19 cases. Essentially, this would mean the number of daily new cases falling close to zero. We are far from that point, as the daily number of new cases continues to rise exponentially (Chart 4). Chart 3Weaker US Data, But No Global Recovery Chart 4New Cases Still Rising We should also mention that we expect risk assets – equities and corporate credit – to bottom before Treasury yields, as the Fed will take care not to signal a premature removal of crisis stimulus measures. Finally, two weeks ago we described several technical trading rules that have demonstrated some success at calling troughs in Treasury yields in the past. Since last week, one of our three proposed trading rules was briefly triggered, but that signal was quickly reversed. Bottom Line: Last week’s bond market sell-off was a headfake and does not portend a sustained move higher in Treasury yields. We will need to see a stabilization in confirmed COVID-19 cases and signs of improving global growth before calling the bottom in yields. Keep portfolio duration close to benchmark. A Quick Note On TIPS In last week’s report we made the case for long-term investors to buy TIPS relative to equivalent-maturity nominal Treasuries.2  The reasoning is that TIPS breakeven inflation rates offer exceptional value relative to likely future inflation outcomes. For example, the 5-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 0.31% and the 10-year rate is 0.75%. This means that a buy-and-hold investor will make money owning TIPS versus nominals if inflation averages more than 0.31% per year for the next five years, or 0.75% per year for the next decade. Chart 51-Year TIPS Return Scenarios We also observed last week that TIPS breakeven inflation rates have turned negative at the front-end of the curve. We described this pricing as irrational because of the embedded deflation floors in TIPS. This was incorrect. While TIPS will always pay at least par at maturity, seasoned TIPS with only a year or two left to maturity already have inflation-adjusted principal values that are well above par. In other words, there is room for deflation to influence the returns from these securities before any floor is triggered. Specifically, we can take a look at the TIPS maturing in just over one year, on April 15 2021 (Chart 5). This note has an accumulated principal of just under $109 and is currently trading at an ask price of $97.63.3 According to our calculations, this security will earn 2.55% if headline CPI inflation is 0% over the next 12 months. It will only lose money if headline CPI inflation comes in at -2.49% or below. What’s more, it will return more than a 12-month nominal T-bill as long as inflation is above -2.4%. Note that the lowest year-over-year headline CPI inflation print during the Great Financial Crisis was -2.1%. TIPS offer exceptional value relative to nominal Treasuries for investors who are able to hold the trade for at least one year. Bottom Line: TIPS offer exceptional value relative to nominal Treasuries for investors who are able to hold the trade for at least one year.  Treasury Curve: Re-Visiting The Zero-Lower-Bound Playbook Chart 6Curve Will Trade Directionally With Yields The Fed’s aggressive policy easing has caused the yield curve to re-shape dramatically during the past few weeks. The 2/10 Treasury slope is up to 55 bps from a 2019 low of -4 bps. The 2/30 Treasury slope is up to 118 bps from a 2019 low of 42 bps, and the 2/5 Treasury slope is up to 15 bps from a 2019 low of -13 bps. Looking through the recent volatility, the fact that the fed funds rate is back to a range between 0% and 0.25% means that we can dust off our yield curve playbook from the last zero-lower-bound period. Fortunately, that playbook is quite straightforward. With the front-end of the curve pinned near zero, the slope of the yield curve will essentially trade directionally with the level of Treasury yields for the foreseeable future. Chart 6 shows that during the last zero-lower-bound period, the 2/30, 2/10 and 2/5 slopes were all positively correlated with the 5-year Treasury yield. This correlation suggests one obvious strategy. If you think yields will rise, put on steepeners. If you think they will fall, put on flatteners. Or if, like us, you suspect that bond yields will be higher in 12 months but are not quite ready to call the bottom, you could hedge benchmark or above-benchmark portfolio duration by entering a duration-neutral steepener. What About Value Across The Curve? Chart 7Bullets Looking Less Expensive Until recently, investors could earn large positive carry by owning a barbell consisting of the long and short ends of the Treasury curve (e.g. 2/30) and shorting the belly (e.g. 5yr), in duration-matched terms. But this has changed. The 2/10 barbell now only offers 6 bps of positive carry versus the 5-year bullet, while the 2/30 barbell and 5-year bullet offer approximately the same yield. Both the 2/5/10 and 2/5/30 butterfly spreads are also much closer to the fair values suggested by our models (Chart 7).4 Though we are not ready to call the bottom in Treasury yields, we think the 5-year yield is sufficiently attractive to initiate a duration-neutral curve steepener trade: go long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This trade should perform well if the 2/10 slope steepens going forward. Since a steeper curve is now positively correlated with the level of yields, this trade will profit if yields move higher. Viewed this way, the trade acts as a hedge when implemented alongside our conservative ‘At Benchmark’ portfolio duration recommendation. Bottom Line: A fed funds rate pinned at zero means that the yield curve will trade directionally with yields for the foreseeable future. The yield curve’s recent re-shaping also means that a barbelled Treasury portfolio now only offers a small yield advantage. We recommend shifting out of a barbell and into a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Corporate Spread Update Corporate spreads continue to widen very quickly. As such, our conclusions from last week about the amount of value in corporate bonds are already out of date. Our value assessment is based on our High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread, which is the excess spread left over in the high-yield index after removing actual 12-month default losses. Table 1 shows how often the Default-Adjusted Spread has been in different 50 basis point intervals, and what sort of 12-month junk excess returns occurred during those periods. One conclusion from the table: To be confident that high-yield will outperform duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month horizon, we would need to expect a Default-Adjusted Spread of at least 150 bps. Preferably, the spread would be greater than or equal to 250 bps, the historical average. The red numbers down the right-hand side of Table 1 indicate what the Default-Adjusted Spread will be for the next 12 months if the speculative grade default rate hits a specific value. For example, a default rate of 6%, which would correspond to a default cycle of a similar magnitude as 2015/16, implies a very attractive Default-Adjusted Spread of +633 bps. In contrast, a default rate of 14% or greater would lead to a negative Default-Adjusted Spread. For context, the default rate peaked at 15% and 11% in the 2008 and 2001/2 recessions, respectively. Table 1What's Priced In Credit Spreads? As of now, our base case scenario is that the current default cycle will be more severe than the 2015/16 episode but probably not as bad as the 2008 financial crisis. Something on the order of 9% - 11% seems plausible. If that’s the case, then the Default-Adjusted Spread will be somewhere between 216 bps and 394 bps. This looks quite attractive. Additionally, yesterday’s announcement that the Fed will effectively be entering the investment grade corporate bond market could be a game changer. As a result, we recommend increasing exposure to investment grade corporate bonds from neutral to overweight. For high-yield, it is possible that spreads will widen more in the near-term, but value is now sufficiently attractive for investors with investment horizons of 12 months or more to start adding exposure. We retain our neutral 6-12 month recommended allocation for now, but will re-visit the question in more detail in next week’s report.  To be confident that high-yield will outper­form duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month horizon, we would need to expect a Default-Adjusted Spread of at least 150 bps.  Bottom Line: High-yield spreads are now fairly priced for a default cycle of similar magnitude to the 2001/02 recession, and the Fed’s entrance into the corporate bond market is a potential game changer for investment grade spreads. Investors should increase exposure to investment grade corporates from neutral to overweight. High-yield investors with horizons of 12 months or more should also start adding exposure. The Fed’s War On Three Fronts   Events continue to unfold rapidly in financial markets and in terms of the Fed’s response to the market turmoil. We conclude this week’s report with a brief discussion of the three main shocks that the Fed is frantically trying to contain. We also assess how successful the Fed’s responses might be. #1: The Economic Shock The first shock that the Fed is trying to contain is the pure shock to aggregate demand that is occurring as a result of widespread quarantine measures. In cutting rates to zero and signaling that rates will not rise any time soon, the Fed has effectively done all it can to help fight the economic shock. It should help a little. Lower interest rates will ease the debt burden of homeowners who can refinance their mortgages. They may also lower costs for firms that are able to issue debt to weather the current storm. But these effects are minor compared to the fiscal measures currently making their way through Congress.5 Next steps for the Fed: None. The Fed is effectively out of bullets to contain the economic shock. It’s all about fiscal policy now. #2: Market Liquidity Shock Chart 8Bond Market Liquidity Shock In addition to the economic shock, the Fed is also responding to a severe market liquidity shock. What we mean by a “market liquidity shock” is that investors are finding it more expensive (or difficult) to transact in certain markets because of the scarce amount of capital being deployed to those areas. This is different than credit risk (see Shock #3). We are not talking about investors having trouble transacting because there are few willing buyers of credit risk. We are talking about high transaction costs in otherwise risk-free parts of the bond market. The issue is critical because these risk-free parts of the bond market (overnight repo, for example) are often used to fund riskier investments. Disruption in funding markets can have ripple-on effects into other, less opaque, areas. We currently see several examples of disruptions to bond market liquidity (Chart 8): Repo rates have spiked relative to the overnight index swap curve (Chart 8, top panel). The iShares 20+ year Treasury Bond ETF (TLT) is suddenly trading at a huge discount to its net asset value (Chart 8, panel 2). Cross-currency basis swap spreads have turned deeply negative, meaning that it is more expensive for non-US actors to obtain US dollar funding (Chart 8, bottom panel). Wider-than-normal bid/ask spreads are being reported in the Treasury market (not shown). These disruptions are occurring because the financial system is not deploying enough capital to market-making activities in these areas. Essentially, nonfinancial firms have drawn on their revolving credit lines during the past few weeks and this has left the financial system short of cash to deploy toward market-making activities. To fix the problem, the Fed has started to transact directly (in large amounts) in both the repo and Treasury markets. This essentially replaces the function that banks were performing until a few weeks ago. But perhaps more importantly, the Fed is also encouraging banks to deploy the capital that already sits on their balance sheets. Unlike during the 2008 financial crisis, banks now carry a lot of capital – the result of Dodd-Frank and Basel III regulations. What the banks need now is tacit permission from regulators to deploy that capital into financial markets, without concern that they will face consequences during a future stress test. Table 2Banks Have Excess Capital Even without any specific changes to regulation, Table 2 shows that the big 5 US financial institutions all carry significant buffers above the regulatory minimum 100% Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 6% Supplementary Leverage Ratio. At a minimum, these excess buffers must be deployed to aid market liquidity. Next steps: The Fed is already transacting directly in both the repo and Treasury markets, and behind closed doors it is most certainly encouraging banks to deploy more capital toward market-making activities. If these actions prove insufficient, the next step would be for the Fed – along with other regulators and possibly Congress – to offer temporary regulatory relief for banks, lowering the required Liquidity Coverage and Supplementary Leverage ratios. We view this market liquidity problem as one that regulators will be able to solve. And given the Fed’s aggressive policy response to date, we expect that regulators will get a handle on the issue and restore bond market liquidity fairly soon. #3 Credit Shock Chart 9Can The Credit Shock Be Contained? We draw a distinction between spreads widening because of a lack of market liquidity and spreads widening because investors are unwilling to take credit risk. Though admittedly, it is not always easy to distinguish between these two factors in real time. But there is no doubt that the economy is also grappling with a credit shock, in addition to the economic and liquidity shocks we already mentioned. Some evidence that market players are less willing to take credit risk (Chart 9): The average option-adjusted spread on the Bloomberg Barclays Investment Grade Corporate Bond index has spiked (Chart 9, top panel). The spread between the 3-month commercial paper rate and the overnight index swap rate has surged (Chart 9, panel 2). The Municipal / Treasury yield ratio is higher than it was during the financial crisis (Chart 9, panel 3). The 30-year mortgage rate has so far not followed Treasury yields lower (Chart 9, bottom panel). The Fed can take some measures to mitigate the negative impacts of a credit shock, and it has already taken quite a few. The Fed has set up facilities to back-stop commercial paper and short-maturity municipal debt. It also announced yesterday morning that it will, in conjunction with the Treasury department, enter the investment grade corporate bond market out to the 5-year maturity point, effectively back-stopping a large portion of corporate issuance. The Fed has not yet set up a facility to purchase longer-maturity municipal bonds, but this could be forthcoming. The Fed is also directly purchasing large amounts of Agency MBS in an effort to tighten the spread between the mortgage rate and Treasury yields. The Fed’s measures to guarantee some risky debt can help solve some problems related to a credit shock. For example, if Fed purchases increase asset values for corporate and municipal bonds, then it lessens the risk of bankruptcy both for the issuing firms and for any systemically-important investment fund that may be levered to those markets. However, Fed purchases do not guarantee that stressed firms will be able to take out new debt, nor do they prevent firms from cutting payrolls in the face of lower demand. Only direct cash bailouts from the government can fix those problems. Next steps: The Fed could add another facility to purchase long-maturity municipal bonds. It could also implement a “funding for lending” scheme similar to what the Bank of England has done. These measures, along with what has already been announced, will help ease the credit shock at the margin. But ultimately, cash bailouts from Congress to firms and state & local governments will be required.    Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “When And Where Will Bond Yields Trough?”, dated March 10, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buying Opportunities & Worst-Case Scenarios”, dated March 17, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Numbers quoted assuming a par value of $100. 4 For details on our yield curve models please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 The global fiscal response to the COVID crisis is discussed in more detail in Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “De-Globalization Confirmed”, dated March 20, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification