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Informe especial Highlights Egypt’s balance of payments have deteriorated materially due to both the crash in oil prices and the global pandemic. The country’s foreign funding requirements in 2020 are high and the currency is under depreciation pressures. Unless domestic interest rates are brought considerably lower, the nation’s public debt is on an unsustainable trajectory. Hence, Egypt needs to reduce local interest rates substantially and rapidly. And in so doing, the central bank cannot control or defend the exchange rate. The latter is set to depreciate. Investors should buy Egyptian local currency bonds while hedging their currency exposure. Feature The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is depleting its foreign exchange (FX) reserves to defend the currency (Chart I-1). As the CBE’s foreign exchange reserves diminish, so will its ability to support the currency. As such, the Egyptian pound will likely depreciate in the next 6-9 months. Interestingly, despite being a net importer of energy, many of Egypt’s critical macro parameters are positively correlated with oil prices (Chart I-2). Egypt is in fact deeply integrated in the Gulf oil-economy network via trade and capital flows. In other words, Egypt is a veiled play on oil. Chart I-1The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency Chart I-2Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil   Although oil prices have rallied sharply recently, the Emerging Markets Strategy team believes upside is limited and that oil prices will average about $40 over the next three years.1  In addition, local interest rates that are persistently above 10% are disastrous for both Egypt’s domestic demand and public debt sustainability. Egypt’s current account balance strongly correlates with oil prices because of the strong interlinkages that exist between Egypt and the oil-exporting Gulf countries. To preclude a vicious cycle in both the economy and public debt, the CBE should reduce interest rates materially and rapidly. Therefore, higher interest rates cannot be used to defend the exchange rate. Balance Of Payments Strains Egypt’s balance of payments (BoP) dynamics have deteriorated and the probability of a currency devaluation has risen: Current Account: The current account deficit – which stood at $9 billion and 3% of the GDP as of December 2019 – is widening significantly due to the plunge in oil prices this year (Chart I-2, top panel). Egypt’s current account balance strongly correlates with oil prices because of the strong interlinkages that exist between Egypt and the oil-exporting Gulf countries. The latter have been hard hit by the twin shocks of the coronavirus pandemic and the oil crash. First, Egypt’s $27 billion in annual remittances are drying up (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The majority of these transmittals come from Egyptian workers working in Gulf countries. Second, Egypt’s tourism industry – which brings in $13 billion in annual revenues or 4% of GDP – has collapsed due to the pandemic. Tourist arrivals from Middle Eastern countries – which makeup 20% of total tourist arrivals into Egypt – will diminish substantially due to both the pandemic and the negative income shock that the Gulf economies have experienced (Chart I-3). Third, Egyptian exports are in freefall (Chart I-4, top panel). Not only is this due to the freeze in global trade, but also because the country’s exports to the oil-leveraged Arab economies have taken a massive hit. The latter make up 25% of Egypt’s total goods shipments. Chart I-3Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Chart I-4Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices   Furthermore, since 2019 Egypt has been increasingly exporting natural gas. The collapse in gas prices has probably already wiped out a large of chunk its natural gas export revenues (Chart I-5). Chart 6 exhibits the structure of Egypt’s exports of goods and services. Energy, tourism and transportation constituted 67% of total exports in 2019. Chart I-5Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Chart I-6Egypt: Structure Of Goods & Services Exports Chart I-7Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Finally, while export revenues have plunged, imports remain resilient (Chart I-7). Critically, 26% of Egypt’s imports are composed of essential and basic items such as consumer non-durable goods, wheat and maize. Consumption of these staples and goods are less sensitive to business cycle oscillations. Therefore, the nation’s current account deficit has ballooned. A wider current account deficit needs to be funded by foreign inflows. With foreign investors reluctant to provide funds, the CBE has lately been financing BoP by depleting its foreign exchange reserves (Chart I-1, on page 1). Foreign Funding Requirements: Not only is Egypt facing a massively deteriorating current account deficit, but the country also carries large foreign funding debt obligations (FDO). FDOs are the sum of debt expiring in the next 12 months, and interest as well as amortization payments over the next 12 months. FDOs due in 2020 were $24 billion.2 In turn, Egypt’s total foreign funding requirements (FFR) – which is the sum of FDOs and the country’s current account deficit – has risen to $33 billion.3 Importantly, this FFR amount is based on the current account for 2019 and, thereby, does not take Egypt’s deteriorating current account deficit into consideration – as discussed above. Meanwhile, the central bank has net FX reserves of only $8 billion.4 If the monetary authorities continue to fund FFR of $33 billion in 2020 to prevent the pound from depreciating, the CBE will soon run out of its net FX reserves. Overall, Chart I-8 compares Egypt to the rest of the EM universe: with respect to (1) exports-to-FDO on the x-axis and (2) foreign exchange reserves-to-FFR on the y-axis. Based on these two measurements, Egypt is among the most vulnerable EM countries in terms of the balance of payments as it has the lowest FX reserves-to-FFR ratio and a low export-to-FDO ratio as well. Chart I-8Egypt Is One Of The Most Exposed EM Countries To Currency Depreciation Chart I-9FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish Foreign Funding of Private Sector: Egypt will struggle to attract private-sector foreign inflows to meet its large FFR amid this adverse regional economic environment and the likely renewed relapse in oil prices in the months ahead. FDI inflows are set to drop (Chart I-9). The oil & gas sector has been the largest recipient of FDI inflows recently (around 55% in 2019 according to the central bank). The crash in both crude oil and natural gas prices will therefore ensure that FDIs into this sector will dry up. Besides, overall FDI inflows emanating from Gulf countries are poised to shrink substantially.5 Chart I-10The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive Foreign Funding of Government: With FDI inflows diminishing, the Egyptian government has once again been forced to approach the IMF for assistance. The country managed to secure $8 billion in assistance from the IMF ($2.8 billion in May and $5.2 in June). This has ameliorated international investor confidence in Egypt. Indeed, the country raised $5 billion by issuing US dollar-denominated sovereign bonds in May. Egypt is now seeking another $4 billion from other international lenders. Crucially, assuming Egypt manages to get the $4 billion loan, which would allow it to raise a total of $17 billion, Egypt would still be short on foreign funding to finance its $33 billion in FFR. Therefore, the currency will come under pressure of devaluation. As we argue below, the nation’s public debt sustainability is in jeopardy unless local currency interest rates are brought down substantially. This can only happen if the currency is allowed to depreciate. Consistently, foreign investors might be unwilling to lend to Egypt until interest rates are pushed lower and the country’s public debt trajectory is placed back on a sustainable path. Finally, the Egyptian pound has once again become expensive according to the real effective exchange rate (REER) which is based on both consumer and producer prices (Chart I-10). Bottom Line: Egypt is facing sharply slowing foreign inflows due to both the crash in oil prices and the global pandemic. This is occurring amid increased FFRs. Meanwhile, the CBE’s net FX reserves are insufficient to defend the exchange rate. Public Debt Sustainability The BoP strains discussed above are forcing the CBE to keep interest rates high to prevent the currency from depreciating. Yet the country’s public debt is on a dangerous path due to elevated interest rates. In turn, without currency devaluation that ultimately allows local interest rates to drop dramatically, the sustainability of Egypt’s public debt will worsen considerably. The BoP strains discussed above are forcing the CBE to keep interest rates high to prevent the currency from depreciating. Yet the country’s public debt is on a dangerous path due to elevated interest rates. To start, Egypt’s public debt stands at 97% of GDP – local currency and foreign currency debt account for 79% and 18% of GDP respectively (Chart I-11, top panel). Chart I-12 illustrates that interest payments on public debt is already using up 60% of government revenue and stands at 10% of GDP. Chart I-11Egypt: Public Debt Profile Chart I-12The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable   Therefore, if the CBE keeps interest rates at the current level, then the government will continue to pay high interest on its debt. Generally, two conditions need to be met to ensure public debt sustainability in any country (i.e., to ensure that the public debt-to-GDP ratio does not to surge). Nominal GDP growth needs to be higher than government borrowing costs. The government needs to run persistently large primary fiscal surpluses. Chart I-13Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Regarding the first condition, nominal GDP growth was already dangerously close to the level of Egypt’s government borrowing costs even before the pandemic hit Egypt (Chart I-13). With the pandemic, both domestic demand and exports have plunged. Consequently, nominal GDP is likely close to zero while local currency borrowing costs are above 10%. So long as nominal GDP growth remains below borrowing costs, the public debt sustainability will continue to deteriorate. As to the second condition, Egypt only started running primary fiscal surpluses in 2018 as it implemented extremely tight fiscal policy by cutting non-interest expenditures (Chart I-14). However, that was only possible because economic growth was then strong. As growth has slumped, government revenue is most likely shrinking. Chart I-14Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Tightening fiscal policy amid the economic downturn will be ruinous. Cutting non-interest expenditures further will depress the already weak economy, drying up both nominal GDP and government revenues even more. This will bring about a vicious economic cycle. Needless to say, the latter option is politically unviable. The most feasible option to ensure sustainability of public debt dynamics is to bring down domestic interest rates considerably. Lower local interest rates will reduce interest expenditures on its domestic debt and will either narrow overall fiscal deficit or free up space for the government to spend elsewhere, boosting much needed economic growth. Meanwhile lower interest rates will boost demand for credit and revive private-sector domestic demand. Provided Egypt’s public debt has a short maturity profile, lower interest rates will reasonably quickly feed into lower interest payments for the government. This means that lower interest rates could reasonably quickly feed to lower interest payments for the government. Importantly, there is a trade-off between the exchange rates and interest rates. Lowering interest rates entail currency depreciation. According to the impossible trinity theory, a central bank facing an open capital needs to choose between controlling interest rates or the exchange rate, it cannot control both simultaneously. As such, if the Central Bank of Egypt opts to bring down local interest rates, while keeping the capital account reasonably open, it needs to tolerate a weaker currency amid its ongoing BoP strains. Bottom Line: Public debt dynamics are treading on a dangerous path. Egypt needs to bring down local interest rates down substantially and rapidly. And in so doing, the CBE cannot control and defend the exchange rate. Devaluation Is Needed All in all, the Egyptian authorities are facing a tight tradeoff: (1) either they continue to defend the currency at the expense of depressing the economy and worsening public debt dynamic, or (2) they tolerate a one-off currency devaluation which would allow the monetary authorities reduce interest rates aggressively. The latter will help stimulate economic growth and make public debt sustainable. Specifically, if the Central Bank of Egypt opts for defending the currency from depreciation, it will need to tolerate much higher interest rates for a long period of time. The CBE would essentially need to deplete whatever little net FX reserves it currently has to fund BoP deficits. This would simultaneously shrink local banking system liquidity, pushing domestic interbank rates higher.  All in all, the Egyptian authorities are facing a tight tradeoff: (1) either they continue to defend the currency at the expense of depressing the economy and worsening public debt dynamic, or (2) they tolerate a one-off currency devaluation which would allow the monetary authorities reduce interest rates aggressively. Worryingly, not only would high interest rates devastate the already shaky Egyptian economy, but higher domestic interest rates carry major ramifications for Egypt’s public debt sustainability as discussed earlier. A one-off currency devaluation is painful and carries some political risks yet, it is still the least worst choice for Egypt from a longer-term perspective. Although inflation will spike due to pass-through from currency devaluation, it will be a transitory one-off increase (Chart I-15). Besides, the pertinent risk to the Egyptian economy currently is low inflation and high real interest rates (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Chart I-16Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High     In turn, currency depreciation will ultimately provide the CBE with scope to reduce its policy rate which will help stimulate the ailing economy as well as make public debt trajectory more sustainable. Finally, odds are high that Egyptian authorities might choose to devalue the currency sooner rather than later. The basis for this is that the government’s foreign public debt is still relatively small at 18% of the GDP and 19% of the total government debt (Chart I-11, on page 8). Further, the majority (70%) of Egypt’s foreign public debt remains linked to international and bilateral government loans making it easier to renegotiate their terms than in the case of publicly traded sovereign US dollar bonds (Chart I-11, bottom panel). This means that currency depreciation will not materially deteriorate the government’s debt servicing ability. Furthermore, Egypt has experience managing and tolerating currency depreciation. The currency depreciated against the US dollar by 50% in 2016 and before that by 12% in 2013. Bottom Line: The Central Bank of Egypt will not hike interest rates or sell its foreign currency reserves for too long to defend the pound. Odds are high that it will allow the currency to depreciate and will cut interest rates materially. Investment Recommendations Chart I-17Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Investors should buy Egyptian 3-year local currency bonds while hedging their currency exposure. The basis is that low inflation and a depressed economy in Egypt will lead the CBE to cut rates by several hundred basis points over the next 12 months while allowing currency to depreciate. Forward markets are pricing 5% depreciation in the EGP in the next 6 months and 10% in the next 12 months (Chart I-17). We would assign a higher probability of depreciation.   For now, EM credit portfolios should have a neutral allocation on Egyptian sovereign credit. While another potential drop in oil prices and the currency devaluation could push sovereign spreads wider (Chart I-18), eventually large rate cuts by the CBE will make public debt dynamics more sustainable. Absolute return investors should wait for devaluation to go long on Egypt’s US dollar sovereign bonds. Chart I-18Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Chart I-19Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities   Equity investors should keep a neutral allocation on Egyptian stocks with an EM equity portfolio (Chart I-19). Lower interest rates ahead will eventually boost this stock market. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com      1 This is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service and it differs from the view of BCA’s Commodities and Energy Strategy service. 2 We exclude the Central Bank’s foreign liabilities due in 2020 as they are mostly deposits at the Central Bank of Egypt owed to Gulf countries. It is highly likely that Gulf lenders will agree to extend these deposits given the difficulties Egypt is experiencing. 3 Excluding the Central Bank’s foreign liabilities due in the next 12 months. Please refer to above footnote. 4 The amount of net foreign exchange reserves currently at the Central Bank – i.e. excluding the Bank’s foreign liabilities– are now low at $8 billion. 5 Gulf Co-operation Countries (GCC) are in no position to provide much financial assistance due to the pandemic and oil crash as they are under severe financial strain themselves. Also, GCC countries run strict currency pegs and need to preserve their dwindling foreign exchange reserves to defend their currency pegs to the US dollar.
Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, we will be sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan will be examining the global effectiveness of recent pandemic containment measures to judge both the odds of a second infection wave and what policy responses are likely to be effective in countering one were it to occur. I hope you find the report insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Fiscal deficits have soared in the wake of the pandemic, putting government debt-to-GDP ratios on a trajectory to reach post-WWII highs in many countries. Contrary to popular belief, there is little reason to think that fiscal relief will make it more difficult for governments to repay their obligations down the road. Larger budget deficits tend to increase overall national savings when the economy is depressed because private savings rise more than enough to compensate for the decline in government savings. The end result is a higher level of national wealth that governments can tax in the future. That said, there is more than one way to tax national wealth. For political reasons, higher inflation coupled with financial repression may prove to be more feasible than other forms of taxation. While inflation is not an imminent risk, it could become a formidable problem in two-to-three years. Investors should maintain below-benchmark levels of duration in fixed-income portfolios and favor inflation-linked securities over nominal bonds. Gold prices will rise over the long haul. The yellow metal should perform well even in the near term if the dollar weakens during the remainder of this year, as we anticipate. Real estate investors should reallocate capital away from densely populated urban areas towards suburbs and farmland. Stay Cyclically Overweight Equities Global equities continued to climb higher this week, as more countries reopened their economies. As we discussed three weeks ago in our report entitled “Risks To The U,” the main downside risk facing stocks is a second wave of the disease.1 While the number of new COVID-19 cases has declined in many countries, it continues to rise in others. As a result, the global tally of new cases remains broadly flat. The daily number of deaths seems to be trending lower, but that could easily reverse if social distancing measures are abandoned too quickly (Chart 1). Chart 1COVID-19: Global New Cases Remain Broadly Flat, While Deaths Seem To Be Trending Slightly Lower Chart 2Joined At The Hip Given this risk, we do not have a strong near-term (3-month) view on the direction of equities. Google searches for the “coronavirus” have closely correlated with equity prices and credit spreads (Chart 2). If fears of a new outbreak were to escalate, risk assets would suffer. Looking at a cyclical (12-month) horizon, we still recommend a modest overweight to stocks. Even if a vaccine does not become available later this year, increased testing should allow for a more economically palatable approach to containment strategies. Ample fiscal support will also help. As we provocatively asked in a report entitled “Could The Pandemic Lead To Higher Stock Prices?”,2 one can easily imagine a scenario where central banks keep rates near zero for the foreseeable future, while ongoing fiscal stimulus enables the labor market to reach full employment. Such an outcome could allow corporate profits to return to pre-pandemic levels, but leave the discount rate lower than before. The end result would be a higher fair value for the stock market. Although we would not counsel investors to bank on such a fortuitous outcome, the probability of it occurring is reasonably high – probably in the range of 30%-to-40%. This makes us inclined to favor stocks over a cyclical horizon. Will Indebted Governments Spoil The Party? One potential flaw in this bullish thesis is that massive government deficits could push up interest rates, crowding out private-sector investment in the process. As we argue below, such worries are misplaced for now. For the time being, bigger budget deficits will likely lead to an increase in overall savings, thus raising investment relative to what would have happened in the absence of any stimulus. That said, as we conclude towards the end of this report, there will come a time – probably in two-to-three years – when most economies are back to full employment. If budget deficits are still high at that point, inflation and long-term bond yields could end up rising substantially. Keynes To The Rescue The IMF expects budget deficits in advanced economies to exceed 10% of GDP in 2020, significantly higher than during the financial crisis. The sea of red ink is projected to push government debt-to-GDP ratios to fresh highs in many economies (Chart 3). Chart 3AGovernment Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Chart 3BGovernment Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Chart 4The Paradox Of Thrift: Not Just A Theory Should bond investors be worried? Not for now. One of John Maynard Keynes’ great insights was that an individual’s attempt to increase savings could lead to a collective decline in savings, a phenomenon he called the paradox of thrift. Keynes argued that if everyone tried to save more, the resulting contraction in spending would cause total employment to fall by so much that overall income would decline by more than spending. As a result, aggregate savings would fall. This is precisely what happened during the Great Depression and in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 4). The paradox of thrift implies that bigger budget deficits in a depressed economy will lead to an increase in overall savings, as private savings rise more than one dollar for every dollar decline in government savings. S-I=CA One can see this point using the familiar macroeconomic accounting identity which says that the difference between what a country saves and invests should equal its current account balance.3 In the absence of a change in the current account balance, any increase in investment will translate into an increase in savings. If the government stimulates aggregate demand by increasing spending, cutting taxes, or boosting transfer payments, companies are likely to respond by investing more (or at least not cutting capital expenditures as much as they would otherwise). Thus, if fiscal stimulus raises investment, it will also raise aggregate savings. Chart 5Huge Spike In The US Personal Savings Rate This conclusion has important implications for bond yields. If bigger budget deficits lead to an increase in overall savings, there is no reason to expect real bond yields to rise very much, at least in the short term. The failure of bond yields to rise since March, when governments began to trot out one fiscal stimulus package after another, is a testament to this fact. So too is the stimulus-induced surge in the US personal saving rate, which reached a record high of 33% in April (Chart 5). All That Money Printing If bigger government budget deficits are, in some sense, self-financing, why are so many people convinced that the Fed and other central banks are effectively “monetizing” deficits by buying up bonds? Part of the answer has to do with how one defines monetization. Governments create money whenever they purchase goods or services or make transfers to the public by running down their deposits at the central bank. In theory, the public could use that money to buy government bonds, which would allow the government to replenish its account at the central bank. In practice, it is usually a bit more circuitous than that. Chart 6Commercial Banks Deposits, Bank Reserve Held At The Fed, And Fed Holdings Of Treasuries Have All Expanded This Year What normally happens is that the public places the money in a commercial bank deposit and the commercial bank then transfers the money to its account at the central bank. Next, the central bank buys the bonds from the government, crediting the government’s deposit account at the central bank in the process. Chart 6 shows that this is precisely what has happened this year: Commercial bank deposits, bank reserves held at the Fed, and the Fed’s holdings of Treasuries have all risen by roughly the same amount. Granted, there is a bit more to the story. If the central bank buys bonds, it will push down bond yields at the margin, allowing the government to finance itself more cheaply than it could otherwise. However, this is a far cry from the sort of “money printing” that many people have in mind. True debt monetization occurs when governments lose all access to outside financing, forcing the central bank to pick up the tab. Such situations invariably involve accelerating inflation and a collapsing currency, which often culminates in hyperinflation. This is clearly not the case today. Back To Full Employment The idea that bigger budget deficits can generate enough private savings to more than fully compensate for any loss in government savings is applicable only for economies with spare capacity. Once the economy reaches full employment, fiscal stimulus will not lead to more income or production since everyone who wants a job already has one. At that point, bigger budget deficits will cause the economy to overheat and inflation to rise, potentially forcing the central bank to raise rates. Higher interest rates will reduce investment. Higher rates will also put upward pressure on the currency, leading to a reduction in net exports and a corresponding deterioration in the current account balance. If investment and the current account balance both decline, then savings, which is just the sum of the two, must also fall. Strategies For Alleviating A Debt Burden Once the free lunch from fiscal stimulus disappears, the question of how to address the government debt accumulated during the downturn becomes paramount. There are four ways to reduce the ratio of government debt-to-GDP: 1) outgrow the debt burden; 2) tighten fiscal policy; 3) default; and 4) inflate away the debt. Outgrowing It At the end of the Second World War, many governments found themselves saddled with high levels of debt. In the US, the government debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 121% in 1945. In the UK, it hit 270%. In Canada, it reached 155%. For the most part, these governments did not repay the debt they incurred during the war. As Chart 7 shows, the nominal value of debt outstanding either rose or remained broadly constant following the war. What happened was that rapid GDP growth led to a shrinkage in debt-to-GDP ratios. Compared with the post-war period, the two drivers of an economy’s growth potential, labor force and productivity growth, are both weaker now. Thus, outgrowing the debt by raising the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio will be more difficult than in the past. It’s About g-r That said, the trajectory of the debt-to-GDP ratio does not depend solely on GDP growth; it also depends on the interest rate that the government pays to service its debt. Conceptually, it is the difference between the two that determines whether the level of any given budget deficit is sustainable or not. While trend GDP growth in advanced economies has declined since the 1950s, equilibrium interest rates have also fallen. As a consequence, the spread between growth rates and interest rates is only somewhat smaller in advanced economies today than it was in the 1950s and 60s and notably higher than it was in the 1980s and 90s (Chart 8). Indeed, as Chart 9 shows, g-r has been trending higher for hundreds of years! Chart 7The Case Of Outgrowing The Debt Burden Post-WWII Chart 8The Rate Of Economic Growth Has Been Higher Than Interest Rates   Chart 9A Multi-Century Trend In The Spread Between Growth And Interest Rates Today, government borrowing rates in most economies are well below trend growth rates. No matter the size of the budget deficit, the ratio of debt-to-GDP will converge to a stable level as long as the interest rate the government pays on the debt is below the growth rate of the economy.4  A Gordian Fiscal Knot Of course, there is no guarantee that real rates will remain below the rate of trend growth. As we have discussed before, the exodus of baby boomers from the labor force, a peak in globalization, and rising political populism could all curtail aggregate supply, leading to a depletion of national savings.5 What would happen if governments allowed debt levels to reach very high levels only to find that the neutral rate of interest — the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation — has risen above the growth rate of the economy? Raising the policy rate would be very painful in a high-debt environment because even a small increase in interest rates would lead to a large rise in interest payments. Faced with this reality, some governments might elect to tighten fiscal policy. An increase in taxes or a decline in government spending would not only create some resources to pay back debt, but it would also reduce aggregate demand, pushing down the neutral rate of interest in the process. Don’t Blame The Stimulus Ironically, all the fiscal relief efforts that governments have carried out over the past few months have probably left them better placed to pay back debt than if no stimulus had been undertaken in the first place. Box 1 illustrates this point with a numerical example, but the intuition for this claim can be seen easily enough. As noted earlier, fiscal stimulus in a depressed economy will raise overall savings. This means that after the pandemic is over, governments will have a larger tax base available to them than they would have had in the absence of any stimulus (although, obviously, the tax base would be even larger if the pandemic had never occurred). The Inflation Solution Chart 10Long-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Very Depressed Still, any decision to tighten fiscal policy down the road is going to be an inherently political one. What if governments do not have the political will to tighten fiscal policy even if the economy begins to overheat? Defaulting on the debt is always an option in that case, but not one that any sensible government would choose given the devastating impact this would have on the financial system and broader economy. Rather, it is conceivable that governments will lean on central banks to keep rates low and let inflation accelerate. While higher inflation will not boost real GDP, it will raise nominal GDP, allowing the ratio of government debt-to-GDP to decline. Investors currently assign very low odds to such an outcome. Long-term market-based inflation expectations remain very depressed (Chart 10). Yet, we think such an eventuality is more plausible than widely believed. As long as inflation does not spiral out of control, central banks are likely to welcome rising prices. A higher inflation rate would make monetary policy more effective by allowing central banks to bring real rates deeper into negative territory whenever the economy falls into recession. Higher inflation would also result in steeper yield curves, reoxygenating commercial banks’ profitability. Profiting From Higher Inflation The path to higher interest rates is paved with lower rates. In order to generate inflation, central banks will need to keep rates at very low levels even once the economy has returned to full employment. Given that unemployment is quite high today, inflation is not an imminent risk. However, it could become a formidable problem in two-to-three years. Investors should maintain below-benchmark levels of duration in fixed-income portfolios and favor inflation-linked securities over nominal bonds. While gold is no longer super cheap, it remains a good hedge against inflation. The yellow metal should also do well if the dollar weakens during the remainder of this year, as we anticipate. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar tends to fall whenever global growth picks up (Chart 11). Chart 11Gold Will Do Well When The Dollar Weakens As Global Growth Picks Up Chart 12Farmland Would Benefit From High Inflation Lastly, land will gain from low interest rates in the near term and higher inflation in the long term. Farmland and suburban land are particularly appealing. The pandemic has made remote working more commonplace. It has also highlighted the potential dangers of living in densely populated cities. Since most suburbs are built on top of land that was previously zoned for agriculture, farmland should benefit from the retreat from urban living, much like it did during the inflationary period of the 1970s (Chart 12). Box 1Saving More By Spending More   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Risks To The U,” dated May 7, 2020. 2  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Could The Pandemic Lead To Higher Stock Prices?” dated April 23, 2020. 3  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be computed as the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), government spending (G), and net exports (X-M). Gross National Product (GNP) is equal to GDP except that the former includes net income from abroad (which is included in the current account balance). Thus, GNP=C+I+G+CA, or GNP-C-G=I+CA. Savings (S) is equal to GNP-C-G. Taken together, the two expressions imply S-I=CA, or S=I+CA. 4  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, ”Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019. 5  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Structural Bear Market In Bonds,” dated February 16, 2018. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Informe especial Highlights In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession. The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. Even when narrowly-defined, the announced (or likely) fiscal response of the US, China, and Germany is quite large and appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. This is not the case, however, in other euro area economies (France, Italy, and Spain), or in emerging markets. Our analysis also suggests that the global fiscal response will need to increase if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year. This underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. Feature The global economic expansion that began in 2009 has come to an abrupt end due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aggressive containment measures necessary to control the spread of the disease and prevent the collapse in health care systems around the world have caused a large and sudden stop in global economic activity, which has prompted unprecedented responses from governments around the world. In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession (characterized by a very prolonged return to trend growth). The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. But for now, we (tentatively) conclude that the fiscal response appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. However, there are two important caveats. First, while Germany has provided among the strongest fiscal responses globally, measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Second, the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year – more will have to be done. For policymakers, this underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. In this regard, the gradual re-opening of several US states by early-May, while positive for economic activity in the short-run, is a non-trivial risk to the US and global economic outlooks over the coming 6-12 months. This risk must be closely watched by investors. The Global Fiscal Response: Comparing Across Countries And Across Measures The flurry of policy announcements from national governments over the past six weeks has led to a great degree of confusion about the size and disposition of the global COVID-19 fiscal response. Our analysis is based heavily on the IMF’s tracking of these measures, albeit with a few adjustments. We also rely on analysis from Bruegel, a prominent European macroeconomic think-tank, as well as our own Geopolitical Strategy team and a variety of news reports. Chart II-1 presents the IMF’s estimate of the total fiscal response to the crisis across major countries, as of April 23rd, broken down into “above-the-line” and “below-the-line” measures. Above-the-line measures are those that directly impact government budget balances (direct fiscal spending and revenue measures, usually tax deferrals), whereas below-the-line measures typically involve balance sheet measures to backstop businesses through capital injections and loan guarantees. Chart II-1The Global Fiscal Response Is Huge When Including All Measures Chart II-1 makes it clear that the fiscal response of advanced economies is enormous when including both above- and below-the-line measures. By this metric, the response of most developed economies is on the order of 10% of GDP, and well above 30% in the case of Italy and Germany. However, using the sum of above- and below-the-line measures to gauge the fiscal response of any country may not be the ideal approach, given that below-the-line measures are contingent either on the triggering of certain conditions or on the provision of credit to households and firms from the financial system. Below-the-line measures also likely increase the liability position of the private sector, thus raising the odds of negative second-round effects. Instead, Chart II-2 compares the countries shown in Chart 1 based only on the IMF’s estimate of above-the-line measures, and with a 4% downward adjustment to Japan’s reported spending to account for previously announced measures.8 The chart shows that countries fall into roughly three categories in terms of the magnitude of their above-the-line response: in excess of 4% of GDP (Australia, the US, Japan, Canada, and Germany), 2-3% (the UK, Brazil, and China), and sub-2% (all other countries shown in the chart, including Spain, Italy, and France). Chart II-2The Picture Changes When Excluding Below-The-Line Measures Analysis by Bruegel provides somewhat different estimates of the global COVID-19 fiscal response for select European countries as well as the US (Table II-1). Bruegel breaks down discretionary fiscal measures that have been announced into three categories: those involving an immediate fiscal impulse (new spending and foregone revenues), those related to deferred payments, and other liquidity provisions and guarantees. Bruegel distinguishes between the first and second categories because of their differing impact on government budget balances. Deferrals improve the liquidity positions of individuals and companies but do not cancel their obligations, meaning that they result only in a temporary deterioration in budget balances. Table II-1The Type Of Fiscal Response Varies Significantly Across Countries Table II-1 highlights that Bruegel’s estimates of the sum of above- and below-the-line measures are similar to the IMF’s estimates for the US, the UK, and Spain, but are smaller for Italy and larger for France and Germany (particularly the latter). These differences underscore the extreme uncertainty facing investors, who have to contend not only with varying estimates of the magnitude of government policies but also a torrent of news concerning the evolution of the pandemic itself. Chart II-3 presents our best current estimate of the above-the-line fiscal response of several countries (the measure we deem to be most likely to result in an immediate fiscal impulse), by excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals to the best of our ability.2 Chart II-3 is based on a combination of data from the IMF, Bruegel analysis, and BCA estimates and news analysis. Chart II-3When Narrowly Defined, Several Countries Are Responding Forcefully, But Many Countries Are Not Overall, investors can draw the following conclusions from Charts II-1 – II-3 and Table II-1: When measured as the total of above- and below-the-line measures, nearly all large developed market countries have responded with sizeable measures. Emerging market economies are the clear laggards. Excluding below-the-line measures and using our approach, Australia, the US, China, Germany, Japan, and Canada appear to be spending the most relative to the size of their economies. While Japan’s “headline” fiscal number was inflated by including previously-announced spending, it is still decently-sized after adjustment. Outside of Germany, the rest of Europe appears to be providing a middling or poor above-the-line fiscal response. The UK appears to be providing between 4-5% of GDP as a fiscal impulse, whereas the fiscal response in Italy, Spain, and France looks more like that of emerging markets than of advanced economies. Measuring The Stimulus Against The Shock Despite the substantial amount of new information over the past six weeks concerning the evolution of the pandemic and the attendant policy response, it remains extremely difficult to judge what the balance between shock and stimulus will be and what that means for the profile of growth. Nonetheless, below we present a framework that investors can use to approach the question, and that can be updated as new information emerges concerning the impact of the shutdowns and the extent of the response. Our approach involves analyzing four specific questions: What is the size of the initial shock? What are the likely second-round effects on growth? What is the likely multiplier on fiscal spending? Will the composition of fiscal spending alter its effectiveness? The Size Of The Initial Shock Chart II-4 presents the OECD’s estimates of the initial impact of partial or complete shutdowns on economic activity in several countries. The OECD first used a sectoral approach to estimating the impact on activity while lockdowns are in effect, assuming a 100% shutdown for manufacturing of transportation equipment and other personal services, a 50% decline in activity for construction and professional services, and a 75% decline for retail trade, wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and air travel. Chart II-4 illustrates the total impact of this approach for key developed and emerging economies. Chart II-4Annual GDP Will Be 1.5%-2.5% Lower For Each Month Lockdowns Are In Effect The OECD’s approach provides a credible estimate of the impact of aggressive containment policies, and implies that annual real GDP is likely to be 1.5-2.5% lower for major countries for each month that lockdown policies are in effect. This implies that output in major economies is likely to fall 3.5% - 6% for the year from the initial shock alone, assuming an aggressive 10-week lockdown followed by a complete return to normal. Estimating Potential Second Round Effects Chart II-5 presents projections from the Bank for International Settlements on the spillover and spillback potential of a 5% initial shock to the level of global GDP from the COVID-19 pandemic (equivalent to a 20% impact on an annualized basis). Chart II-5Additional Lockdown Events Are A Greater Risk Than First Wave After-Effects The chart shows that the cumulative impact of the initial shock rises to 7-8% by the end of this year for the US, euro area, and emerging markets, and 6% for other advanced economies. These estimates account for both domestic second round effects of the initial shock, as well as the reverberating impact of the shock on global trade. Chart II-5 also shows the devastating effect that a second wave of COVID-19 emerging in the second half of the year would have after including spillover and spillback effects, assuming that only partial lockdowns would be required. In this scenario, the level of GDP would be 10-12% lower at the end of the year depending on the region, suggesting that investors should be more concerned about the possibility of additional lockdown events than they should be about the after-effects of the first wave of infections (more on this below). Will Fiscal Multipliers Be High Or Low? When examining the academic literature on fiscal multipliers, the first impression is that multipliers are likely to be extremely large in the current environment. Tables II-2 and II-3 present a range of academic multiplier estimates aggregated by the IMF, categorized by the stage of the business cycle and whether the zero lower bound is in effect. Table II-2Fiscal Multipliers Are Much Larger During Recessions Than Expansions Table II-3Models Suggest The Multiplier Is Quite High At The Zero Lower Bound The tables tell a clear story: multipliers are typically meaningfully larger during recessions than during expansions, and extremely large when the zero lower bound (ZLB) is in effect. However, there are at least two reasons to expect that the fiscal multiplier during this crisis will not be as large as Tables II-2 and II-3 suggest. First, it is obviously the case that the multiplier will be low while full or even partial lockdowns are in effect, as consumers will not have the ability to fully act in response to stimulative measures. This will be partially offset by a burst of spending once lockdowns are removed, but the empirical multiplier estimates during recessions shown in Table II-2 have not been measured during a period when constraints to spending have been in effect, and we suspect that this will have at least somewhat of a dampening effect on the efficacy of fiscal spending relative to previous recessions (even once regulations concerning store closures are removed). Second, Table II-3 likely overestimates the multiplier at the ZLB. These estimates have been based on models rather than empirical analysis, and appear to be in reference to the prevention of large subsequent declines in output following an initial shock. The modeled finding of a large multiplier at the ZLB occurs because increased deficit spending will not lead to higher policy rates in a scenario where the neutral rate has fallen below zero. But it seems difficult to believe that the fiscal multiplier during ZLB episodes, defined as the impact of fiscal spending on the path of output relative to the initial shock (not relative to a counterfactual additional shock), is larger than the highest empirical estimates of the multiplier during recessions. The only circumstance in which we can envision this being the case is an environment where long-term bond yields are capped and remain at zero, alongside short-term interest rates, as the economy improves. The IMF has provided a simple rule of thumb approach to estimating the fiscal multiplier for a given country. The IMF’s approach involves first estimating the multiplier under normal circumstances based on a series of key structural characteristics that have been shown to influence the economy’s response to fiscal shocks. Then, the “normal” multiplier is adjusted higher or lower depending on the stage of the business cycle, and whether monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. For the US, the IMF’s approach suggests that a multiplier range of 1.1 – 1.6 is reasonable, assuming the highest cyclical adjustment but no ZLB adjustment (see Box II-1 for a description of the calculation). Given the unprecedented nature of this crisis, we are inclined to use the low end of this range (1.1) as a conservative assumption when judging whether fiscal responses to the crisis are sufficient. For investors, this means that governments should be aiming, at a minimum, for fiscal packages that are roughly 90% of the size of the expected shock of their economies, using our US fiscal multiplier assumption as a guide. Box II-1 The “Bucket” Approach To Estimating Fiscal Multipliers The IMF “bucket” approach to estimating fiscal multiplier involves determining the multiplier that is likely to apply to a given country during “normal” circumstances, based on a set of structural characteristics associated with larger multipliers. This “normal” multiplier is then adjusted based on the following formula: M = MNT * (1+Cycle) * (1+Mon) Where M is the final multiplier estimate, MNT is the “normal times” multiplier derived from structural characteristics, Cycle is the cyclical factor ranging from −0.4 to +0.6, and Mon is the monetary policy stance factor ranging from 0 to 0.3. The Cycle factor is higher the more a country’s output gap is negative, and the Mon factor is higher the closer the economy is to the zero lower bound. Table II-B1 applies the IMF’s approach to the US, using the same structural score as the IMF presented in the note that described the approach. The table highlights that the approach suggests a US fiscal multiplier range of 1.1 – 1.6 given the maximum cycle adjustment proscribed by the rule, which we feel is reasonable given the unprecedented rise in US unemployment. We make no adjustment to the range for the zero lower bound. Table II-B1A Multiplier Estimate Of 1.1 – 1.6 Seems Reasonable For The US The Composition Of The Response: Helping Or Hurting? The last of our four questions deals with the issue of composition and whether the form of a country’s fiscal response is likely to alter its effectiveness. We implicitly addressed the first element of composition, whether measures are above-the-line or below-the-line, by comparing Charts II-1 - II-3 on pages 28-31. Our view is that above-the-line measures are far more important than below-the-line measures, as the former provides direct income and liquidity support. Below-the-line measures are also important, as they are likely to help reduce business failure and household bankruptcies. The fiscal multiplier on these measures has to be above zero, but it is likely to be much lower than that of an above-the-line response. The second element of composition concerns the appropriate distribution of aid among households, businesses, and local governments. On this particular question, it remains extremely challenging to analyze the issue on a global basis, owing to a frequent lack of an explicit breakdown of fiscal measures by recipient. Chart II-6Much Of The US Fiscal Response Is Going To Households And Small Businesses For now, we limit our distributional analysis to the US, and hope to expand our approach to other countries in future research. Chart II-6 presents a breakdown of the US fiscal response by recipient, which informs the following observations. Households: Chart II-6 highlights that US households will receive approximately $600 billion as part of the CARES Act, roughly half of which will occur through direct payments (i.e. “stimulus checks”) and another 40% from expanded unemployment benefits. In cases where the federal household response has been criticized by members of the public as inadequate, it has often been compared to income support programs of other countries. The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (“CERB”) is a good example of a program that seems, at first blush, to be superior: it provides $2,000 CAD in direct payments to individuals for a 4 week period, for up to 16 weeks (i.e. a maximum of $8,000 CAD), which seems better than a $1,200 USD stimulus check. However, Table II-4 highlights that this comparison is mostly spurious. First, the CERB is not universal, in that it is only available to those who have stopped or will stop working due to COVID-19. At a projected cost of $35 billion CAD, the CERB program represents 1.5% of Canadian GDP. By comparison, $600 billion USD in overall household support represents 2.75% of US GDP; this number drops to 1.75% when only considering support to those who have lost their jobs, but this is still higher as a share of the economy than in Canada. Moreover, there is little question that Congress is prepared to pass more stimulus for additional weeks of required assistance. The discrepancy between the perception and reality of US household sector support appears to be rooted in the speed of payments. Speed is the one area where Canada’s household sector response appears to have legitimately outperformed the US; CERB payments are received by applicants within three business days for those registered for electronic payment, and in some cases they are received the following day. By contrast, it has taken some time for US States to start paying out the additional $600 USD per week in expanded unemployment benefits, but as of the middle of last week nearly all states had started making these payments. Table II-4US Household Relief Is Just As Generous As Seemingly Better Programs Firms: On April 16th the Small Business Administration announced that the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) had expended its initial budget of $350 billion. While additional funds of $320 billion have subsequently been approved (plus $60 billion in small business emergency loans and grants), the run on PPP funds was, to some investors, an implicit sign that the CARES Act was inadequately structured. However, the fact that the initial funds ran out in mid-April simply reflects the reality that social distancing measures had been in place for 3-4 weeks by the time that the program began taking applications. Table II-5 highlights that $350 billion was large enough to replace nearly 90% of lost small business income for one month, assuming that overall small business revenue has fallen by 50% and that small businesses account for 44% of total GDP. The Table also shows that a combined total of $730 billion is enough to replace almost 80% of lost small business income for 10 weeks, given these assumptions. With loan forgiveness at least partially tied to small businesses retaining employees on payroll for an 8-week period, the PPP is also essentially an indirect form of household income support. Table II-5Help For Small Businesses Will Replace A Significant Amount Of Lost Income Chart II-7Persistent State & Local Austerity Must Be Avoided This Time State & Local Governments: The magnitude of support for state & local (S&L) governments appears to be the least-well designed element of the US fiscal response. The CARES Act provides for $170 billion in support to S&L, which at first blush seems large as it is approximately 25% of S&L current receipts in Q4 2019 (i.e. it stands to cover a 25% loss in revenue for one quarter). However, this does not account for the significant reported increase in S&L costs to combat the pandemic, nor does it provide S&L governments with any revenue certainty beyond June 30th when most of the assistance from CARES must be spent. Unlike households or firms, who also face significant uncertainty, nearly all US states are subject to balanced budget requirements, which prevent them from spending more than they collect in revenue. When faced even with projected revenue losses in the second half of this year and into 2021, states are likely to aggressively and immediately cut costs in order to avoid budgetary shortfalls. Chart II-7 highlights that S&L austerity was a significant element of the persistent drag on real GDP growth from overall government expenditure and investment in the first 3-4 years of the post-GFC economic expansion. A repeat of this episode would significantly raise the odds of an “L-type” recession (and thus should certainly be avoided). This is why Congress is moving to pass larger state and local aid. Our Geopolitical Strategy team argues that neither President Trump nor Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell will prevent the additional financial assistance that US states will require, despite their rhetoric about states going bankrupt.3 A near-term, temporary standoff may occur, but Washington will almost certainly act to provide at least additional short-term funding if state employment starts to fall due to budget pressure. So while we recognize that the state & local component of the US fiscal response is currently lacking, it does not seem likely to represent a serious threat to an eventual economic recovery in the US. Putting It All Together: Will It Be Enough? Chart II-8 reproduces Chart II-3 with an assumed fiscal multiplier of 1.1, and with shaded regions denoting the likely initial and total impact on GDP from aggressive containment measures (based on the OECD and BIS’ estimates). Based on our analysis of the US fiscal response, we make no adjustments for the composition of the measures beyond defining the fiscal response on a narrow basis (i.e. excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals). The chart highlights that the narrowly-defined fiscal response of three key economies driving global demand, the US, China, and Germany, is either at the upper end or above the total impact range. Thus, for now, we tentatively conclude that the fiscal response that has or will happen appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event, especially since Chart II-8 explicitly excludes below-the-line measures. However, there are two important caveats to this conclusion. First, Chart II-8 makes it clear that measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Italy and France have provided a substantial below-the-line response, but it is far from clear that a debt-based response or one that only temporarily improves access to cash for households and businesses will be enough to prevent a prolonged fallout from the sudden stop in economic activity and income. Chart II-8Several Important Countries Seem To Be Doing Enough, But More Is Needed In Europe Ex-Germany Second, our analysis suggests that the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year or if these measures remain in place at half-strength for many months. This underscores how sensitive the adequacy of announced fiscal measures are to the amount of time economies remain under full or partial lockdown. As such, it is crucial for investors to have some sense of when advanced economies may be able to sustainably end aggressive containment measures. When Can The Lockdowns Sustainably End? Several countries and US states have already announced some reductions in their restrictions, but the question of how comprehensive these measures can be without risking a second period of prolonged stay-at-home orders looms large. Table II-6 presents two different methods of estimating sustainable lockdown end dates for several advanced economies. First, we use the “70-day rule” that appears to have succeeded in ending the outbreak in Wuhan, calculated from the first day that either school or work closures took effect in each country.4 Second, using a linear trend from the peak 5-day moving average of confirmed cases and fatalities, we calculate when confirmed cases and fatalities may reach zero. Table II-6By Re-Opening Soon, The US May Be Risking A Damaging Second Wave The table highlights that these methods generally prescribe a reopening date of May 31st or earlier, with a few exceptions. The UK’s confirmed case count and fatality trends are still too shallow to suggest an end of May re-opening, as is the case in Canada. In the case of Sweden, no projections can truly be made based on the 70-day rule because closures never formally occurred. But the most problematic point highlighted in Table II-6 is that US newly confirmed cases are only currently projected to fall to zero as of February 2021. Chart II-9 highlights that while new cases per capita in New York state are much higher than in the rest of the country, they are declining whereas they have yet to clearly peak elsewhere. Cross-country case comparisons can be problematic due to differences in testing, but with several US states having already begun the gradual re-opening process, this underscores that US policymakers may be allowing a dangerous rise in the odds of a secondary infection wave. Chart II-9No Clear Downtrend Yet Outside Of New York State Investment Conclusions Our core conclusion that an “L-shaped” global recession is likely to be avoided is generally bullish for equities on a 12-month horizon. However, uncertainty remains extremely elevated, and the recent rise in stock prices in the US (and globally) has been at least partially based on the expectation that lockdowns will sustainably end soon, which at least in the case of the US appears to be a premature conclusion given the current lack of large-scale virus testing capacity. As such, we are less optimistic towards risky assets tactically, and would recommend a neutral stance over a 0-3 month horizon. As noted above, our cross-country comparison of narrowly-defined fiscal measures suggested that euro area countries (excluding Germany) will likely have to do more in order to prevent a long period of below-trend growth. In the case of highly-indebted countries like Italy, this raises the additional question of whether a significantly increased debt-to-GDP ratio stemming from an aggressive fiscal impulse will cause another euro area sovereign debt crisis similar to what occurred from 2010-2014. Chart II-10Italy's Debt Sustainability Hurdle Is Lower Than It Used To Be Government debts are sustainable as long as interest rates remain below economic growth, and from this vantage point Italy should spend as much as needed in order to ensure that nominal growth remains above current long-term government bond yields. Chart II-10 highlights that, despite a widening spread versus German bunds, Italian 10-year yields are much lower today than they were during the worst of the euro area crisis, meaning that the debt sustainability hurdle is technically lower. However, we have also noted in previous reports that high-debt countries often face multiple government debt equilibria; if global investors become fearful that that high-debt countries may not be able to repay their obligations without defaulting or devaluing, then a self-fulfilling prophecy will occur via sharply higher interest rates (Chart II-11). Chart II-11Multiple Equilibria In Debt Markets Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort Chart II-12Italy's Structural Budget Balance Has Improved For now, we view the risk of a renewed Italian debt crisis from significantly increased spending related to COVID-19 as minimal, and it is certainly lower than the status quo as the latter risks causing a sharp gap between nominal growth and bond yields like what occurred from 2010 – 2014. First, Chart II-12 highlights that Italy has succeeded in somewhat reducing its structural balance, which averaged -4% for many years prior to the euro area crisis. Assuming an adequate global response to the crisis and that economic recovery ensues, it is not clear why global bond investors would be concerned that Italian structural deficits would persistently widen. Second, the ECB is purchasing Italian government bonds as part of its new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, which will help cap the level of Italian yields. Chart II-13Italy's Debt Service Ratio Won't Go Up Much, If Yields Are Unchanged Third, Chart II-13 shows what will occur to Italy’s government debt service ratio (general government net interest payments as a percent of GDP) in a scenario where Italy’s gross debt to GDP rises a full 20 percentage points and the ratio of net interest payments to debt remains unchanged. The chart shows that while debt service will rise, it will still be lower than at any point prior to 2015. So not only should Italy spend significantly more to combat the severely damaging nature of the pandemic, we would expect that Italian spreads would fall, not rise, in such an outcome. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President Special Reports Footnotes 1  Skeptical economists call Japan’s largest-ever stimulus package ‘puffed-up’, Keita Nakamura, The Japan Times, April 8, 2020. 2  Please note that Chart II-3 differs somewhat from a chart that has been frequently shown by our Geopolitical Strategy service. Both charts are accurate; they simply employ different definitions of the fiscal response to the pandemic. 3 Indeed, McConnell has already walked back his comments that states should consider bankruptcy. President Trump is constrained by the election, as are Senate Republicans, and the House Democrats control the purse strings. Hence more state and local funding is forthcoming. At best for the Republicans, there may be provisions to ensure it goes to the COVID-19 crisis rather than states’ unfunded pension obligations. See Geopolitical Strategy, “Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update),” April 24, 2020, www.bcaresearch.com. 4 School and work closure dates have been sources from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.
Informe especial Dear Client, This week, in lieu of our regular report, we are sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan discusses the global fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and provides some perspective on whether the response will be enough to prevent an "L-shaped" economic outcome. I hope you find the report insightful. Last Friday, I participated in a webcast with my fellow BCA Strategists Caroline Miller and Arthur Budaghyan where we discussed the outlook for developed and emerging market equities over the immediate (0-3 month) and cyclical (12 month) horizon. You can access a replay of the webcast here. Please note we will be sending out our regular weekly report next week. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession. The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. Even when narrowly-defined, the announced (or likely) fiscal response of the US, China, and Germany is quite large and appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. This is not the case, however, in other euro area economies (France, Italy, and Spain), or in emerging markets. Our analysis also suggests that the global fiscal response will need to increase if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year. This underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. Feature The global economic expansion that began in 2009 has come to an abrupt end due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aggressive containment measures necessary to control the spread of the disease and prevent the collapse in health care systems around the world have caused a large and sudden stop in global economic activity, which has prompted unprecedented responses from governments around the world. In this Special Report we explore in detail the fiscal response amongst advanced economies, with the goal of judging whether the response is large enough to prevent an “L-shaped” recession (characterized by a very prolonged return to trend growth). The crisis remains in its early days and new information about the size and character of the response, as well as the magnitude of the economic shock, continues to emerge on a near-daily basis. As such, our conclusions may change over the coming weeks in line with incoming data. But for now, we (tentatively) conclude that the fiscal response appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event. However, there are two important caveats. First, while Germany has provided among the strongest fiscal responses globally, measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Second, the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year – more will have to be done. For policymakers, this underscores the importance of ensuring that the “Great Lockdown” succeeds at reducing the spread of the disease to a point that does not necessitate widespread renewed restrictions on economic activity. In this regard, the gradual re-opening of several US states by early-May, while positive for economic activity in the short-run, is a non-trivial risk to the US and global economic outlooks over the coming 6-12 months. This risk must be closely watched by investors. The Global Fiscal Response: Comparing Across Countries And Across Measures The flurry of policy announcements from national governments over the past six weeks has led to a great degree of confusion about the size and disposition of the global COVID-19 fiscal response. Our analysis is based heavily on the IMF’s tracking of these measures, albeit with a few adjustments. We also rely on analysis from Bruegel, a prominent European macroeconomic think-tank, as well as our own Geopolitical Strategy team and a variety of news reports. Chart 1 presents the IMF’s estimate of the total fiscal response to the crisis across major countries, as of April 23, broken down into “above-the-line” and “below-the-line” measures. Above-the-line measures are those that directly impact government budget balances (direct fiscal spending and revenue measures, usually tax deferrals), whereas below-the-line measures typically involve balance sheet measures to backstop businesses through capital injections and loan guarantees. Chart 1 makes it clear that the fiscal response of advanced economies is enormous when including both above- and below-the-line measures. By this metric, the response of most developed economies is on the order of 10% of GDP, and well above 30% in the case of Italy and Germany. However, using the sum of above- and below-the-line measures to gauge the fiscal response of any country may not be the ideal approach, given that below-the-line measures are contingent either on the triggering of certain conditions or on the provision of credit to households and firms from the financial system. Below-the-line measures also likely increase the liability position of the private sector, thus raising the odds of negative second-round effects. Chart 1The Global Fiscal Response Is Huge When Including All Measures Instead, Chart 2 compares the countries shown in Chart 1 based only on the IMF’s estimate of above-the-line measures, and with a 4% downward adjustment to Japan’s reported spending to account for previously announced measures.1 The chart shows that countries fall into roughly three categories in terms of the magnitude of their above-the-line response: in excess of 4% of GDP (Australia, the US, Japan, Canada, and Germany), 2-3% (the UK, Brazil, and China), and sub-2% (all other countries shown in the chart, including Spain, Italy, and France). Chart 2The Picture Changes When Excluding Below-The-Line Measures Analysis by Bruegel, provides somewhat different estimates of the global COVID-19 fiscal response for select European countries as well as the US (Table 1). Bruegel breaks down discretionary fiscal measures that have been announced into three categories: those involving an immediate fiscal impulse (new spending and foregone revenues), those related to deferred payments, and other liquidity provisions and guarantees. Bruegel distinguishes between the first and second categories because of their differing impact on government budget balances. Deferrals improve the liquidity positions of individuals and companies but do not cancel their obligations, meaning that they result only in a temporary deterioration in budget balances. Table 1 highlights that Bruegel’s estimates of the sum of above- and below-the-line measures are similar to the IMF’s estimates for the US, the UK, and Spain, but are smaller for Italy and larger for France and Germany (particularly the latter). These differences underscore the extreme uncertainty facing investors, who have to contend not only with varying estimates of the magnitude of government policies but also a torrent of news concerning the evolution of the pandemic itself. Table 1The Type Of Fiscal Response Varies Significantly Across Countries Chart 3 presents our best current estimate of the above-the-line fiscal response of several countries (the measure we deem to be most likely to result in an immediate fiscal impulse), by excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals to the best of our ability.2Chart 3 is based on a combination of data from the IMF, Bruegel analysis, and BCA estimates and news analysis. Chart 3When Narrowly Defined, Several Countries Are Responding Forcefully, But Many Countries Are Not Overall, investors can draw the following conclusions from Charts 1 – 3 and Table 1: When measured as the total of above- and below-the-line measures, nearly all large developed market countries have responded with sizeable measures. Emerging market economies are the clear laggards. Excluding below-the-line measures and using our approach, Australia, the US, China, Germany, Japan, and Canada appear to be spending the most relative to the size of their economies. While Japan’s “headline” fiscal number was inflated by including previously-announced spending, it is still decently-sized after adjustment. Outside of Germany, the rest of Europe appears to be providing a middling or poor above-the-line fiscal response. The UK appears to be providing between 4-5% of GDP as a fiscal impulse, whereas the fiscal response in Italy, Spain, and France looks more like that of emerging markets than of advanced economies. Measuring The Stimulus Against The Shock Despite the substantial amount of new information over the past six weeks concerning the evolution of the pandemic and the attendant policy response, it remains extremely difficult to judge what the balance between shock and stimulus will be and what that means for the profile of growth. Nonetheless, below we present a framework that investors can use to approach the question, and that can be updated as new information emerges concerning the impact of the shutdowns and the extent of the response. Our approach involves analyzing four specific questions: What is the size of the initial shock? What are the likely second-round effects on growth? What is the likely multiplier on fiscal spending? Will the composition of fiscal spending alter its effectiveness? The Size Of The Initial Shock Chart 4 presents the OECD’s estimates of the initial impact of partial or complete shutdowns on economic activity in several countries. The OECD first used a sectoral approach to estimating the impact on activity while lockdowns are in effect, assuming a 100% shutdown for manufacturing of transportation equipment and other personal services, a 50% decline in activity for construction and professional services, and a 75% decline for retail trade, wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and air travel. Chart 4 illustrates the total impact of this approach for key developed and emerging economies. Chart 4Annual GDP Will Be 1.5%-2.5% Lower For Each Month Lockdowns Are In Effect The OECD’s approach provides a credible estimate of the impact of aggressive containment policies, and implies that annual real GDP is likely to be 1.5-2.5% lower for major countries for each month that lockdown policies are in effect. This implies that output in major economies is likely to fall 3.5% - 6% for the year from the initial shock alone, assuming an aggressive 10-week lockdown followed by a complete return to normal. Estimating Potential Second Round Effects Chart 5 presents projections from the Bank for International Settlements on the spillover and spillback potential of a 5% initial shock to the level of global GDP from the COVID-19 pandemic (equivalent to a 20% impact on an annualized basis). The chart shows that the cumulative impact of the initial shock rises to 7-8% by the end of this year for the US, euro area, and emerging markets, and 6% for other advanced economies. These estimates account for both domestic second round effects of the initial shock, as well as the reverberating impact of the shock on global trade. Chart 5 also shows the devastating effect that a second wave of COVID-19 emerging in the second half of the year would have after including spillover and spillback effects, assuming that only partial lockdowns would be required. In this scenario, the level of GDP would be 10-12% lower at the end of the year depending on the region, suggesting that investors should be more concerned about the possibility of additional lockdown events than they should be about the after-effects of the first wave of infections (more on this below). Chart 5Additional Lockdown Events Are A Greater Risk Than First Wave After-Effects Will Fiscal Multipliers Be High Or Low? When examining the academic literature on fiscal multipliers, the first impression is that multipliers are likely to be extremely large in the current environment. Tables 2 and 3 present a range of academic multiplier estimates aggregated by the IMF, categorized by the stage of the business cycle and whether the zero lower bound is in effect. The tables tell a clear story: multipliers are typically meaningfully larger during recessions than during expansions, and extremely large when the zero lower bound (ZLB) is in effect. However, there are at least two reasons to expect that the fiscal multiplier during this crisis will not be as large as Tables 2 and 3 suggest. First, it is obviously the case that the multiplier will be low while full or even partial lockdowns are in effect, as consumers will not have the ability to fully act in response to stimulative measures. This will be partially offset by a burst of spending once lockdowns are removed, but the empirical multiplier estimates during recessions shown in Table 2 have not been measured during a period when constraints to spending have been in effect, and we suspect that this will have at least somewhat of a dampening effect on the efficacy of fiscal spending relative to previous recessions (even once regulations concerning store closures are removed). Table 2Fiscal Multipliers Are Much Larger During Recessions Than Expansions Table 3Models Suggest The Multiplier Is Quite High At The Zero Lower Bound Second, Table 3 likely overestimates the multiplier at the ZLB. These estimates have been based on models rather than empirical analysis, and appear to be in reference to the prevention of large subsequent declines in output following an initial shock. The modeled finding of a large multiplier at the ZLB occurs because increased deficit spending will not lead to higher policy rates in a scenario where the neutral rate has fallen below zero. But it seems difficult to believe that the fiscal multiplier during ZLB episodes, defined as the impact of fiscal spending on the path of output relative to the initial shock (not relative to a counterfactual additional shock), is larger than the highest empirical estimates of the multiplier during recessions. The only circumstance in which we can envision this being the case is an environment where long-term bond yields are capped and remain at zero, alongside short-term interest rates, as the economy improves. The IMF has provided a simple rule of thumb approach to estimating the fiscal multiplier for a given country. The IMF’s approach involves first estimating the multiplier under normal circumstances based on a series of key structural characteristics that have been shown to influence the economy’s response to fiscal shocks. Then, the “normal” multiplier is adjusted higher or lower depending on the stage of the business cycle, and whether monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. For the US, the IMF’s approach suggests that a multiplier range of 1.1 – 1.6 is reasonable, assuming the highest cyclical adjustment but no ZLB adjustment (see Box 1 for a description of the calculation). Given the unprecedented nature of this crisis, we are inclined to use the low end of this range (1.1) as a conservative assumption when judging whether fiscal responses to the crisis are sufficient. For investors, this means that governments should be aiming, at a minimum, for fiscal packages that are roughly 90% of the size of the expected shock of their economies, using our US fiscal multiplier assumption as a guide. Box 1The 'Bucket' Approach To Estimating Fiscal Multipliers The Composition Of The Response: Helping Or Hurting? The last of our four questions deals with the issue of composition and whether the form of a country’s fiscal response is likely to alter its effectiveness. We implicitly addressed the first element of composition, whether measures are above-the-line or below-the-line, by comparing Charts 1 - 3 on pages 3-5. Our view is that above-the-line measures are far more important than below-the-line measures, as the former provides direct income and liquidity support. Below-the-line measures are also important, as they are likely to help reduce business failure and household bankruptcies. The fiscal multiplier on these measures has to be above zero, but it is likely to be much lower than that of an above-the-line response. Chart 6Much Of The US Fiscal Response Is Going To Households And Small Businesses The second element of composition concerns the appropriate distribution of aid among households, businesses, and local governments. On this particular question, it remains extremely challenging to analyze the issue on a global basis, owing to a frequent lack of an explicit breakdown of fiscal measures by recipient. For now, we limit our distributional analysis to the US, and hope to expand our approach to other countries in future research. Chart 6 presents a breakdown of the US fiscal response by recipient, which informs the following observations. Households: Chart 6 highlights that US households will receive approximately $600 billion as part of the CARES Act, roughly half of which will occur through direct payments (i.e. “stimulus checks”) and another 40% from expanded unemployment benefits. In cases where the federal household response has been criticized by members of the public as inadequate, it has often been compared to income support programs of other countries. The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (“CERB”) is a good example of a program that seems, at first blush, to be superior: it provides $2,000 CAD in direct payments to individuals for a 4 week period, for up to 16 weeks (i.e. a maximum of $8,000 CAD), which seems better than a $1,200 USD stimulus check. However, Table 4 highlights that this comparison is mostly spurious. First, the CERB is not universal, in that it is only available to those who have stopped or will stop working due to COVID-19. At a projected cost of $35 billion CAD, the CERB program represents 1.5% of Canadian GDP. By comparison, $600 billion USD in overall household support represents 2.75% of US GDP; this number drops to 1.75% when only considering support to those who have lost their jobs, but this is still higher as a share of the economy than in Canada. Moreover, there is little question that Congress is prepared to pass more stimulus for additional weeks of required assistance.   Table 4US Household Relief Is Just As Generous As Seemingly Better Programs The discrepancy between the perception and reality of US household sector support appears to be rooted in the speed of payments. Speed is the one area where Canada’s household sector response appears to have legitimately outperformed the US; CERB payments are received by applicants within three business days for those registered for electronic payment, and in some cases they are received the following day. By contrast, it has taken some time for US States to start paying out the additional $600 USD per week in expanded unemployment benefits, but as of the middle of last week nearly all states had started making these payments.   Firms: On April 16 the Small Business Administration announced that the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) had expended its initial budget of $350 billion. While additional funds of $320 billion have subsequently been approved (plus $60 billion in small business emergency loans and grants), the run on PPP funds was, to some investors, an implicit sign that the CARES Act was inadequately structured.   Table 5Help For Small Businesses Will Replace A Significant Amount Of Lost Income However, the fact that the initial funds ran out in mid-April simply reflects the reality that social distancing measures had been in place for 3-4 weeks by the time that the program began taking applications. Table 5 highlights that $350 billion was large enough to replace nearly 90% of lost small business income for one month, assuming that overall small business revenue has fallen by 50% and that small businesses account for 44% of total GDP. The table also shows that a combined total of $730 billion is enough to replace almost 80% of lost small business income for 10 weeks, given these assumptions. With loan forgiveness at least partially tied to small businesses retaining employees on payroll for an 8-week period, the PPP is also essentially an indirect form of household income support. State & Local Governments: The magnitude of support for state & local (S&L) governments appears to be the least-well designed element of the US fiscal response.  The CARES Act provides for $170 billion in support to S&L, which at first blush seems large as it is approximately 25% of S&L current receipts in Q4 2019 (i.e. it stands to cover a 25% loss in revenue for one quarter). However, this does not account for the significant reported increase in S&L costs to combat the pandemic, nor does it provide S&L governments with any revenue certainty beyond June 30 when most of the assistance from CARES must be spent.   Chart 7Persistent State & Local Austerity Must Be Avoided This Time Unlike households or firms, who also face significant uncertainty, nearly all US states are subject to balanced budget requirements, which prevent them from spending more than they collect in revenue. When faced even with projected revenue losses in the second half of this year and into 2021, states are likely to aggressively and immediately cut costs in order to avoid budgetary shortfalls. Chart 7 highlights that S&L austerity was a significant element of the persistent drag on real GDP growth from overall government expenditure and investment in the first 3-4 years of the post-GFC economic expansion. A repeat of this episode would significantly raise the odds of an “L-type” recession (and thus should certainly be avoided). This is why Congress is moving to pass larger state and local aid. Our Geopolitical Strategy team argues that neither President Trump nor Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell will prevent the additional financial assistance that US states will require, despite their rhetoric about states going bankrupt.3 A near-term, temporary standoff may occur, but Washington will almost certainly act to provide at least additional short-term funding if state employment starts to fall due to budget pressure. So while we recognize that the state & local component of the US fiscal response is currently lacking, it does not seem likely to represent a serious threat to an eventual economic recovery in the US. Putting It All Together: Will It Be Enough? Chart 8 reproduces Chart 3 with an assumed fiscal multiplier of 1.1, and with shaded regions denoting the likely initial and total impact on GDP from aggressive containment measures (based on the OECD and BIS’ estimates). Based on our analysis of the US fiscal response, we make no adjustments for the composition of the measures beyond defining the fiscal response on a narrow basis (i.e. excluding loans, guarantees, and non-specified revenue deferrals). The chart highlights that the narrowly-defined fiscal response of three key economies driving global demand, the US, China, and Germany, is either at the upper end or above the total impact range. Thus, for now, we tentatively conclude that the fiscal response that has or will happen appears to be adequate to prevent the direct and indirect effects of the lockdowns from causing an “L-shaped” event, especially since Chart 8 explicitly excludes below-the-line measures. Chart 8Several Important Countries Seem To Be Doing Enough, But More Is Needed In Europe Ex-Germany However, there are two important caveats to this conclusion. First, Chart 8 makes it clear that measures in France, Italy, and Spain are still lacking and must be stepped up. Italy and France have provided a substantial below-the-line response, but it is far from clear that a debt-based response or one that only temporarily improves access to cash for households and businesses will be enough to prevent a prolonged fallout from the sudden stop in economic activity and income. Second, our analysis suggests that the announced fiscal measures will not be sufficient if the global economy faces a W-shaped shock caused by another round of aggressive containment measures later this year or if these measures remain in place at half-strength for many months. This underscores how sensitive the adequacy of announced fiscal measures are to the amount of time economies remain under full or partial lockdown. As such, it is crucial for investors to have some sense of when advanced economies may be able to sustainably end aggressive containment measures. When Can The Lockdowns Sustainably End? Several countries and US states have already announced some reductions in their restrictions, but the question of how comprehensive these measures can be without risking a second period of prolonged stay-at-home orders looms large. Table 6 presents two different methods of estimating sustainable lockdown end dates for several advanced economies. First, we use the “70-day rule” that appears to have succeeded in ending the outbreak in Wuhan, calculated from the first day that either school or work closures took effect in each country.4 Second, using a linear trend from the peak 5-day moving average of confirmed cases and fatalities, we calculate when confirmed cases and fatalities may reach zero. Table 6By Re-Opening Soon, The US May Be Risking A Damaging Second Wave The table highlights that these methods generally prescribe a reopening date of May 31 or earlier, with a few exceptions. The UK’s confirmed case count and fatality trends are still too shallow to suggest an end of May re-opening, as is the case in Canada. In the case of Sweden, no projections can truly be made based on the 70-day rule because closures never formally occurred. But the most problematic point highlighted in Table 6 is that US newly confirmed cases are only currently projected to fall to zero as of February 2021. Chart 9 highlights that while new cases per capita in New York state are much higher than in the rest of the country, they are declining whereas they have yet to clearly peak elsewhere. Cross-country case comparisons can be problematic due to differences in testing, but with several US states having already begun the gradual re-opening process, this underscores that US policymakers may be allowing a dangerous rise in the odds of a secondary infection wave. Chart 9No Clear Downtrend Yet Outside Of New York State Investment Conclusions Our core conclusion that an “L-shaped” global recession is likely to be avoided is generally bullish for equities on a 12-month horizon. However, uncertainty remains extremely elevated, and the recent rise in stock prices in the US (and globally) has been at least partially based on the expectation that lockdowns will sustainably end soon, which at least in the case of the US appears to be a premature conclusion given the current lack of large-scale virus testing capacity. As such, we are less optimistic towards risky assets tactically, and would recommend a neutral stance over a 0-3 month horizon. As noted above, our cross-country comparison of narrowly-defined fiscal measures suggested that euro area countries (excluding Germany) will likely have to do more in order to prevent a long period of below-trend growth. In the case of highly-indebted countries like Italy, this raises the additional question of whether a significantly increased debt-to-GDP ratio stemming from an aggressive fiscal impulse will cause another euro area sovereign debt crisis similar to what occurred from 2010-2014. Chart 10Italy's Debt Sustainability Hurdle Is Lower Than It Used To Be Government debts are sustainable as long as interest rates remain below economic growth, and from this vantage point Italy should spend as much as needed in order to ensure that nominal growth remains above current long-term government bond yields. Chart 10 highlights that, despite a widening spread versus German bunds, Italian 10-year yields are much lower today than they were during the worst of the euro area crisis, meaning that the debt sustainability hurdle is technically lower. However, we have also noted in previous reports that high-debt countries often face multiple government debt equilibria; if global investors become fearful that that high-debt countries may not be able to repay their obligations without defaulting or devaluing, then a self-fulfilling prophecy will occur via sharply higher interest rates (Chart 11). Chart 11Multiple Equilibria In Debt Markets Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort For now, we view the risk of a renewed Italian debt crisis from significantly increased spending related to COVID-19 as minimal, and it is certainly lower than the status quo as the latter risks causing a sharp gap between nominal growth and bond yields like what occurred from 2010 – 2014. First, Chart 12 highlights that Italy has succeeded in somewhat reducing its structural balance, which averaged -4% for many years prior to the euro area crisis. Assuming an adequate global response to the crisis and that economic recovery ensues, it is not clear why global bond investors would be concerned that Italian structural deficits would persistently widen. Second, the ECB is purchasing Italian government bonds as part of its new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, which will help cap the level of Italian yields. Third, Chart 13 shows what will occur to Italy’s government debt service ratio (general government net interest payments as a percent of GDP) in a scenario where Italy’s gross debt to GDP rises a full 20 percentage points and the ratio of net interest payments to debt remains unchanged. The chart shows that while debt service will rise, it will still be lower than at any point prior to 2015. Chart 12Italy's Structural Budget Balance Has Improved Chart 13Italy's Debt Service Ratio Won't Go Up Much, If Yields Are Unchanged   So not only should Italy spend significantly more to combat the severely damaging nature of the pandemic, we would expect that Italian spreads would fall, not rise, in such an outcome.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 “Skeptical economists call Japan’s largest-ever stimulus package ‘puffed-up’, Keita Nakamura, The Japan Times, April 8, 2020. 2 Please note that Chart 3 differs somewhat from a chart that has been frequently shown by our Geopolitical Strategy service. Both charts are accurate; they simply employ different definitions of the fiscal response to the pandemic. 3 Indeed, McConnell has already walked back his comments that states should consider bankruptcy. President Trump is constrained by the election, as are Senate Republicans, and the House Democrats control the purse strings. Hence more state and local funding is forthcoming. At best for the Republicans, there may be provisions to ensure it goes to the COVID-19 crisis rather than states’ unfunded pension obligations. See Geopolitical Strategy, “Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update),” April 24, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 School and work closure dates have been sources from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores  
Informe especial Highlights In mainstream EM, foreign currency debt restructuring is more likely to occur among corporates than governments. Thus, dedicated EM credit investors should overweight mainstream EM sovereign credit and underweight EM corporate debt. Urgency among EM companies and banks to hedge their large foreign currency liabilities will continue exerting downward pressure on EM exchange rates. Ongoing currency depreciation and the lack of buyers of last resort for EM credit underpin the following strategy: short EM sovereign and corporate credit / long US investment-grade corporate credit. Feature Scope And Focus Of Analysis This report re-visits the issue of EM foreign currency debt, assessing EM debt vulnerability. This report focuses on mainstream EM (countries included in Table 1), excluding Gulf countries and frontier markets. Frontier markets like Argentina, Ecuador, Egypt, Ukraine, Lebanon and sub-Saharan African countries occupy somewhat idiosyncratic positions and are therefore not part of this report. Gulf countries on the other hand, are extremely leveraged to oil prices and, unlike mainstream EMs they have currency pegs warranting a separate analysis.1 Chart 1Favor EM Sovereign Against EM Corporate Credit Among mainstream EM countries, public debt restructuring is not imminent and in the majority of cases is unlikely. However, there is a growing risk of foreign currency debt restructuring among EM companies and banks. Hence, we make a new investment recommendation: overweight mainstream EM sovereign credit / underweight EM corporate debt (Chart 1). We also reiterate the short EM sovereign and corporate credit / long US investment-grade corporate credit strategy. In this report, foreign currency debt is defined as the sum of foreign debt securities (i.e., foreign currency bonds) and foreign currency loans. In short, foreign currency debt measures foreign currency borrowing of companies, banks and governments. These statistics do not include foreign holdings of local currency bonds and equities or any other local currency liability of residents to foreigners. Overall, the level of foreign currency debt is pertinent in assessing EM debt vulnerability originating from exchange rate depreciation. Table 12 offers comprehensive foreign currency debt statistics for each individual country and EM as a whole. It details foreign currency debt by type of borrower - the government, corporates and banks – and also reveals the breakdown between foreign debt securities and foreign currency loans for each segment. Table 1EM FX Debt: Who Owes How Much Chart 2EM FX Debt Has Doubled Since 2008 The foreign currency debt of Chinese companies and banks is quite substantial relative to other EM countries. Hence, including China in the EM aggregates would materially affect these EM aggregates. We thus focus our analysis on EM ex-China and present China’s numbers separately. Since early 2009, EM ex-China aggregate foreign currency debt has doubled to about $3 trillion (Chart 2). Furthermore, this $3 trillion EM ex-China foreign currency debt is split as follows in terms of borrower type: non-financial corporates ($1.25 billion), banks ($846 billion) and governments ($878 billion). Government Foreign Currency Debt Among mainstream EM countries, foreign currency government debt is not vulnerable to restructuring or default. The reason is that the foreign currency debt burden of governments is low, having declined dramatically in the last decade. Table 2 illustrates that the share of local currency government debt is by far greater than the foreign currency debt in each EM country. Table 2EM Public Debt: Local Currency Exceeds FX Debt In the past 10 years, EM governments have deliberately replaced their foreign currency debt with local currency debt. Search for yield by international fixed-income investors has facilitated this debt swap: enormous foreign demand for EM domestic bonds has allowed EM governments to issue a considerable amount of local currency bonds. Chart 3EM Foreign Exchange Reserves Are Large In addition, mainstream EM countries, with exception of Turkey and South Africa, hold large foreign currency reserves (Chart 3). Lately, several mainstream EM countries have gained a new defense tool from the Federal Reserves – US dollar swap lines. EM central banks’ swap lines with the Fed are primarily intended to instill confidence among investors in financial markets. They could be used to fend off short-term speculative attacks on EM currencies. Nevertheless, they cannot alleviate insolvency problems. We will elaborate more about these swap lines with the Fed in another report this week. As to local currency public debt, the odds of debt restructuring are also low. First, the majority of EM countries have low aggregate public debt burdens as a share of the GDP (Table 2). Second, the majority of these nations have flexible currency regimes. This means that their central banks control the printing press. In the worst-case scenario - when investors become reluctant to own EM local currency government bonds, EM central banks can buy those bonds in both the secondary or primary markets if needed. In short, EM central banks can resort to a form of quantitative easing, i.e., purchasing local currency government bonds that would amount to public debt monetization. The wild card in this case will be the exchange rate – the currencies could depreciate substantially amid public debt monetization by central banks. Given that government liabilities in foreign currencies have declined substantially, exchange rate depreciation will not be a constraint for policymakers’ ability to monetize local currency debt. Remarkably, in the past two months amid the global indiscriminate selloff, central banks in several EM countries have begun purchasing government bonds or have stated that they will do so if required. This has created a precedent that will be used in future. One country that has large local currency government debt is Brazil. We have previously argued that Brazil requires robust nominal GDP growth to climb out of a public debt trap. With the COVID-19 crisis, the outbreak for its public debt has worsened considerably. Without the central bank monetizing public debt, it will be difficult for Brazil to escape rising government debt strains and, ultimately, local currency debt restructuring. In short, the cost of avoiding local currency public debt restructuring in Brazil could be large currency depreciation. Bottom Line: In mainstream EM, neither foreign currency nor local currency government debt face an imminent risk of restructuring. Public debt restructuring and defaults are occurring in Argentina and among frontier markets like Ecuador, Lebanon and a few sub-Saharan nations that are beyond the scope of this report. If local currency government bond markets become anxious about public debt sustainability, EM central banks could purchase government paper. If done on large scale, this will cause further currency depreciation. Corporate Foreign Currency Debt From a macro perspective, there are presently some pre-conditions that herald rising odds of foreign currency debt restructuring among EM corporates and banks: (1) rapid and massive foreign currency debt built up in the past 10-15 years; (2) substantial plunge in corporate revenues; and (3) massive currency depreciation. Taken together, these create fertile ground for debt restructuring by some corporate debtors. Foreign currency debt of companies and banks in mainstream EM ex-China countries has swelled in the past 10 years reaching $2.1. Bonds account for about $1.4 trillion while foreign currency loans account for the remaining $0.7 trillion. The global recession brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic is producing a collapse in EM companies’ local currency revenues and exports. Notably, EM ex-China exports were contracting even before the COVID-19 outbreak and they are currently crashing (Chart 4). Chart 4EM Exports & Corporate Credit Spreads Chart 5Commodities Prices And Currencies Drive EM Credit Spreads The top panel of Chart 5 illustrates EM corporate credit spreads (inverted) correlate with commodities prices. Hence, plunging commodities prices entail growing foreign currency debt stress for EM companies and banks. Finally, EM ex-China currencies have depreciated substantially making foreign currency debt more expensive to service (Chart 5, bottom panel). Please refer to Box 1 attesting that for EM debtors with US dollar liabilities, EM exchange rate depreciation is worse than that of higher US bond yields.     Box 1 What Is More Imperative For EM FX Debt: Exchange Rates Or Interest Rates? EM debtors with dollar debt are much more vulnerable to an appreciating dollar than rising US interest rates. Table 3 illustrates this point using the following hypothetical simulation: We consider a conjectural Brazilian debtor with $1,000 in debt with five years remaining to maturity, and a starting point exchange rate of 4 BRL per USD. In our example, a 5% depreciation in local currency against the dollar boosts the overall debt burden by 200 BRL (please refer to row 2 of Table 3). This does not include the rise in local currency costs of interest payments. It reflects only the increased burden of principal. Table 3A Hypothetical Simulation: FX Debt Burden Is More Sensitive To Exchange Rate Than Borrowing Costs An equivalent rise in debt servicing costs in local currency will require a 100-basis-point increase in US dollar borrowing costs. In brief, US dollar rates should rise by 100 basis points for interest payments to increase by BRL 200 over a five-year period, the time remaining to maturity. This simulation reveals that a 5% dollar appreciation versus local currency is as painful as a 100 basis points rise in US dollar rates and is more burdensome if the cost of coupon payments is accounted for. Provided there are higher odds of 5% currency depreciation in many EMs than a 100-basis-point rise in US dollar borrowing costs, we infer that EM FX debtors’ creditworthiness is more sensitive to exchange rates than to US Treasury yields. As the bottom panel of Chart 5 above clearly demonstrates, EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads correlate strongly with EM exchange rates. Consequently, the trend in EM exchange rates versus the US dollar is much more important for EM credit spreads than fluctuations in US bond yields. As to the currency composition of EM FX debt, about 82% of EM external debt is in US-dollar terms. Bottom Line: So long as EM currencies depreciate against the greenback, EM FX debt stress will mount, and EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads will widen. This will occur irrespective of whether US Treasury yields rise or drop.   If the bear market in commodities persists and/or EM currencies depreciate further – which is our baseline scenario, defaults on and restructuring of foreign currency debt among EM companies and banks are probable. One avenue to avoid corporate defaults is for the government to guarantee or assume the banks’ and companies’ foreign currency liabilities. It is probable because many of these borrowers are large entities with close links to their governments. However, governments will step in only after a debtor is on the brink default and its credit spreads are very wide. Briefly put, investors should be careful not to bet too early on government backstops of EM corporates’ and banks’ foreign currency debt. Identifying which corporate issuers could default or restructure debt involves bottom-up analysis that is beyond the scope of the macro research that BCA specializes in. An important question is what portion of corporate foreign currency liabilities have these debtors already hedged? Unfortunately, there are no macro data to answer this question either. Judging by the magnitude and speed of EM currency depreciation we have seen in the past two months, odds are that they have already partially hedged their exchange rate risk. Yet, given the sheer size of foreign currency liabilities, it is hard to imagine that corporates and banks have hedged all of them. Below we analyze each countries’ ability to service its foreign currency debt from a macro perspective. Vulnerability Assessment From a macro standpoint, foreign debt servicing vulnerability can be measured by foreign debt obligations (FDOs) and foreign funding requirements (FFRs). Chart 6EM FDOs And FFRs (Annualized) FDOs are the sum of debt expiring in the next 12 months, and interest as well as amortization payments over the next 12 months. FDO data are available until Q3 of 2019 (Chart 6, top panel). Hence, using this latest datapoint is pertinent to gauging the ability of individual countries to service their foreign debt over the coming six months. FFRs are the sum of FDOs in the next 12 months and current account balance (Chart 6, bottom panel). It measures the amount of foreign capital inflows required in the next 12 months for a country to cover any shortfalls in its balance of payment dynamics. Exports Coverage Of FDO: This measure compares annualized US dollar export revenues available to each country to its foreign debt service obligations in the next 12 months (Chart 7). The most vulnerable countries according to this measure are Brazil, Colombia, Turkey and Peru. On the other hand, Russia, Mexico, India & Korea have higher exports-to-FDO ratios. Chart 7Exports-To-Foreign Debt Obligations Ratio Foreign Exchange Reserves-to-FFRs Ratio: These metrics compare the size of foreign exchange reserves held by each nation’s central bank to its FFRs in the next 12 months (Chart 8). By this measure, Chile, Colombia, Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico have large FFRs relative to their central bank foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile, Russia, Korea and Thailand fare well on this metric. Chart 8FX Reserves-To-Foreign Funding Requirements On the whole, Chart 9 is a scatter plot combining both FDO and FFR measures to determine the most and least vulnerable EMs. The most vulnerable EMs are Brazil, Turkey, Colombia and Chile. Meanwhile, Russia, Korea, India and the Philippines are the least vulnerable. Chart 9EM FX Debt And Currency Vulnerability Investment Recommendations So long as EM currencies depreciate against the greenback, EM foreign currency debt stress will mount, and EM corporate and sovereign credit spreads will widen. We remain bearish on EM currencies. They usually trade with the global business cycle and the latter remains in free fall. We continue recommending shorting a basket of the following currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, ZAR, IDR, PHP and KRW. There will likely be no imminent restructuring or default on public debt in mainstream EM countries, outside frontier markets like Argentina, Ecuador, Lebanon and sub-Saharan African countries. However, there could be meaningful credit stress among EM corporate issuers. Consequently, dedicated EM credit investors should overweight mainstream EM sovereign credit and underweight EM corporate debt. We continue to recommend underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit versus US investment-grade corporate credit (Chart 10). Not only is the Fed buying US investment-grade and some high-yield bonds but US companies will also benefit from the substantial fiscal stimulus. In EM, corporates and banks lack such support. Crucially, in contrast to US corporates, EM issuers also suffer from currency depreciation. Within the EM sovereign credit universe, our overweights are Russia, Mexico, Peru, Thailand and Malaysia. Underweights include South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines and Turkey. The rest warrant a neutral allocation within an EM sovereign credit portfolio. Finally, within corporate credit, we reiterate our long-standing recommendation of long Asian investment-grade corporates / Asian short high-yield corporate (Chart 11). We continue recommending shorting a basket of the following currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, ZAR, IDR, PHP and KRW. Chart 10Remain Underweight EM Credit Versus US IG Credit Chart 11Long Asian IG Corporate / Short Asian HY Corporate     Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1We will publish a report on Saudi Arabia in the coming weeks. 2We have compiled data on foreign currency securities issued by non-financial companies and banks from Bloomberg. Bloomberg data accounts for the nationality of debt issuers. For instance, a US dollar bond issued by a Brazilian corporate subsidiary or a shell company located in the Cayman Islands is counted as Brazilian foreign corporate debt, rather than a Cayman Island debt security. For foreign loans, we use the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) datasets on Banking Statistics.
Highlights Europe’s dirty little secret: Euro area debt is already mutualised. Investment implication: Overweight Italian BTPs, underweight German bunds, and overweight the euro on a structural (2-year plus) horizon. ESM plus ECB plus OMT equals a compromise solution to fund stimulus at a mutualised euro area interest rate. Investment implication: Overweight Italian BTPs, underweight German bunds on a cyclical (6-12 month) horizon. Spain’s high early peak in morbidity means that it has taken its pain upfront, at least compared to other countries.  Investment implication: upgrade Spain’s IBEX to a tactical overweight – and remove it from the cyclical underweight basket. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Underperformances Of China, Italy And Spain Were A Mirror-Image Of Their Covid-19 Morbidity Curves More About Morbidity Curves Most analyses of the pandemic tend to focus on the grim daily mortality statistics. Yet the key to the pandemic’s evolution is not its mortality rate, but rather its morbidity (severe illness) rate. This is because, without a vaccine, the total area underneath the morbidity curve is fixed. The cumulative number of people who will fall severely ill is pre-determined at the outset (Figures 1-3). Figure I-1The Area Under The Morbidity Curve Is Fixed, A High First Peak Means A Low Second Peak Figure I-2A Low First Peak Means An Extended First Peak…   Figure I-3…Or A High Second Peak Very optimistically assuming a Covid-19 morbidity rate of 1 percent, and that 65 percent of the population must get infected to exhaust the pandemic, we know that Covid-19 will ultimately make 0.65 percent of the population severely ill. Absent a vaccine, this number is set in stone. But the number of deaths is not set in stone. It depends on the availability of emergency medical treatment for those that are severely ill. For Covid-19 this means access to ventilation in an intensive care unit (ICU). Yet even the best equipped countries only have ICUs for 0.03 percent of the population. Therefore, the emergency treatment must be rationed either by supply or by demand. Without a Covid-19 vaccine, we cannot change the cumulative number of people who will become severely ill. Rationing by supply means that we must deny emergency treatment to the severely ill – not just Covid-19 patients but victims of, say, heart attacks or car crashes. Accept more deaths. Rationing by demand means that we must flatten the demand (morbidity) curve so that demand is always satisfied by the limited ICU supply. During the pandemics of 1918-19 and 1957, countries could ration emergency medical treatment by supply. Not in 2020. In an era of universal healthcare, everybody is entitled to, and expects to get, emergency medical care. Which means we must ration emergency medical treatment by demand. As such, we must analyse the 2020 response differently to the responses in 1918-19 and 1957. To repeat, without a vaccine, we cannot change the area under the morbidity curve. There is no way of escaping this truth. A low first peak requires a very elongated peak or a high second peak (Chart I-2). Conversely, countries that have suffered a high first peak will need a shorter peak and small (or no) second peak. Chart I-2Japan's Early Stabilisation Was A False Dawn Turning to an equity market implication, the underperformances of highly cyclical and domestically exposed Spain and Italy have closely tracked their morbidity curves (Chart I-1). Given that both countries have suffered very high first peaks in morbidity, the strong implication is that they have taken their pain upfront – at least compared to other countries. In the case of Spain, the market is also technically oversold (see Fractal Trading System). Investment implication: upgrade Spain’s IBEX to a tactical overweight – and remove it from the cyclical underweight basket. How Europe Could Unite Europe is dithering on its fiscal response to the pandemic. Specifically, Germany and the Netherlands are pushing back against the concept of mutualised euro area debt in the form of ‘corona-bonds’. But a pandemic is an act of nature, an indiscriminate exogenous shock. What is the point of the economic and monetary union if Italy must fund its response to an act of nature at the Italian 10-year yield of 1.5 percent rather than the euro area 10-year yield of 0 percent? (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4) Chart I-3To Fight An Act Of Nature Why Should Italy Borrow At A Higher Rate... Chart I-4...When It Could Borrow At A Lower Mutualised Rate? The good news is there is a compromise solution to fund stimulus at a mutualised interest rate. It uses the euro area’s €500 billion bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). But the compromise solution carries two problems which need mitigation. First, ESM credit lines come with conditionality. Italy would rightly balk if it were shackled like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland were after the euro debt crisis. Luckily, the ESM is likely to regard the current ‘act of nature’ crisis very differently to the debt crisis and impose only minimum and appropriate conditionality – for example, that credit lines should be used for healthcare and social welfare spending. Second, ESM credit lines come with a stigma. Taking fright that Italy is tapping the ESM, the bond market might drive up the yields on Italian BTPs. If this pushed up Italy’s overall funding rate, it would defeat the purpose of using the ESM in the first place. ESM plus ECB plus OMT equals a compromise solution to borrow at a mutualised interest rate. The hope is that the bond market, realising that Italy is using the bailout facility to counter an act of nature, would not drive up BTP yields. But if it did, the ECB could counter this by buying BTPs. One option would be to use its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) facility. Set up during the euro debt crisis, the OMT’s specific function is to counter bond market attacks when they are not justified by the economic fundamentals. In other words, to prevent a liquidity crisis escalating into a solvency crisis. Thereby, ESM plus ECB plus OMT equals a compromise solution to fund stimulus at a mutualised euro area interest rate. Investment implication: Overweight Italian BTPs, underweight German bunds on a cyclical (6-12 month) horizon. Europe’s Dirty Little Secret Outwardly, Germany and the Netherlands are reluctant to go down the slippery slope to mutualised euro area debt. But here’s the dirty little secret they don’t want you to know. Euro area debt is already mutualised. The stealth mutualisation has happened via the Target2 banking imbalance which now stands at €1.5 trillion. This imbalance is an accounting identity showing that Italy is owed ‘German euros’ via its large quantity of bank deposits in German banks while Germany is symmetrically owed ‘Italian euros’ via its large effective holding of Italian government bonds. The imbalance is irrelevant if a German euro equals an Italian euro. But if Italy defaulted on its bonds – by repaying them in a reinstated and devalued lira – then Target2 means that Germany must pick up the bill (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Target2 Means That If Italy Defaults, Germany Picks Up The Bill The Target2 imbalance is the result of the ECB’s QE program, in which the central bank has bought hundreds of billions of Italian bonds. If Italy repaid those bonds in a devalued lira, then the ECB would become insolvent, and the central bank’s remaining shareholders would have to plug the hole. The biggest shareholder would be Germany. Could Germany force Italy to repay its bonds in euros? No. According to a legal principle called ‘lex monetae’ Italy can repay its debt in its sovereign currency, whatever that is. Meanwhile, because of the fragility of the Italian banking system, the Italians who sold the bonds to the ECB deposited the cash in German banks. Legally, these depositors must be paid back in whatever is the German currency. Euro area debt is already mutualised. If euro area debt is already mutualised, why do policymakers continue to pretend that it isn’t? There are three reasons. First no policymaker would want to publicise that Germany is now on the hook if Italy left the euro. Second, no policymaker would want to publicise that the ECB has put Germany in this position (Chart I-6). Chart I-6ECB QE Has Created The Target2 Imbalance Third, and most important, policymakers would point out that the mutualisation of debt only happens if the euro breaks up. They would argue that because the euro is irreversible, the debt is not mutualised. In fact, their argument is completely back to front. The truth is: Because euro area debt is now mutualised, the euro has become irreversible. Investment implication: Overweight Italian BTPs, underweight German bunds, and overweight the euro on a structural (2-year plus) horizon. Fractal Trading System* As already discussed, this week’s recommended trade is long Spain’s IBEX 35 versus the Euro Stoxx 600. The profit target is 3 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. Meanwhile our other trade, long Australia versus New Zealand has moved into a 2 percent profit. The rolling 12-month win ratio now stands at 66 percent. Chart I-7IBEX 35 Vs. EUROSTOXX 600 When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated  December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com   Fractal Trading System   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  
Informe especial Making predictions about the economic and market outlook seems a futile exercise in the midst of such massive uncertainty. The deluge of articles about COVID-19 merely serves to highlight that nobody really knows how things will play out in the year ahead. Much depends on whether an effective vaccine or treatment becomes available within a reasonable timescale and that remains an open question. Social and economic disruption will continue to intensify until the spread of the virus starts to abate. One thing is certain. Economic activity around the world faces its biggest contraction in modern times. Declines in second quarter GDP will be mind-numbingly bad in a wide range of countries, especially those that have instituted lockdowns and the closure of non-essential businesses. According to the OECD, the median economy faces an initial output decline of around 25% as a result of shutdowns and restrictions.1 Chart 1A Meltdown In Economic Activity Estimates for the drop in US real GDP in the second quarter range as high as 50% at an annual rate. To put this into perspective, the peak-to-trough decline in US real GDP in the 2007-09 recession was a mere 4% over six quarters, and that felt catastrophic at the time. The New York Fed’s weekly economic index2 has already fallen to the lows of 2008 and worse is still to come (Chart 1). Could things be as bad as the 1930s Great Depression when US real GDP contracted by 25% over a three-year period? That would require an extreme apocalyptic view about the progression of the virus and does not bear thinking about. I am not that gloomy. Policymakers are acting aggressively to limit the economic damage. Central banks are flooding the system with liquidity and the cost of money is negligible. Meanwhile, fiscal caution has been thrown to the wind with massive government stimulus in many countries. While this will not prevent a deep recession, it will minimize the downside risks and support the eventual rebound. Markets are understandably in a deep funk because it is hard to price unknown risks. If this is no more than a two-quarter economic downturn followed by a sharp recovery, then a good buying opportunity in risk assets is in place given that monetary policy will stay hyper accommodative for a considerable time. If the downturn lingers much longer than that, then equities remain at risk. While loath to make a prediction, I am uncharacteristically tending to the more optimistic side. Let’s make the heroic assumption that we are not in an end of days scenario and that this crisis will pass at some point in the next year- hopefully sooner than later. What are some of the longer-run implications? A few come to mind. The backlash against globalization will gather impetus. Public sector debt will rise to unimaginable peacetime levels. Meanwhile, the crisis puts the final nail in the coffin of the private sector Debt Supercycle. Monetary policy will err on the side of ease for a very long time. The way that companies and other institutions have been forced to adapt to the crisis could trigger lasting changes in how they operate. Globalization In Full Retreat Chart 2A Retreat From Globalization The peak of globalization has been a central part of the BCA view for several years.3 Long before the current crisis, it was clear that anti-globalization forces were gathering strength, illustrated by increased trade barriers, a backlash against inward migration in many countries, and reduced flows of foreign direct investment (Chart 2). The Trump Administration’s imposition of tariffs and the Brexit vote were two of the more obvious examples of the change in attitudes. The supply-chain interruptions caused by factory shutdowns in China will reinforce the view that shifting production to cheaper-cost countries overseas went too far. At a minimum, it seems inevitable that many companies will seek to reduce their reliance on a single producer for critical components. On the medical front, one striking fact to emerge was that China supplies around 80% of US antibiotics. There will be massive pressure to develop greater homegrown supplies of medical supplies and other products deemed critical for economic and national security. The crisis also has led to a breakdown of the Schengen Area of open borders within the European Union (EU). Many member countries have reinstituted border controls and it is unclear when these might be removed. The free movement of people is a core principle of the EU. Meanwhile, the Maastricht Treaty rules on fiscal discipline, a key element of economic union, have been thrown out of the window. Even Germany has bowed to the pressure of relaxing fiscal constraints. Finally, a worsening situation for the already troubled Italian banking system will threaten EU financial stability. Overall, the crisis will leave a huge question mark over the long-term viability of the EU. Globalization was a major force behind disinflation as production shifted to low-cost producers. A reversal of this trend will thus be inflationary, at the margin. For many, this will be a price worth paying if it means increased job security and reduced vulnerability of supply chains. But the shift away from globalization will not be the only trend that threatens an eventual resurgence of inflation. The Explosion In Government Debt: Last Gasp Of  The Debt Supercycle BCA introduced the concept of the Debt Supercycle more than 40 years ago to describe the actions of policymakers to pump up demand rather than allow financial imbalances to be fully unwound during economic downturns. This inevitably meant that each new cycle began with a higher level of financial imbalances. As indebtedness rose, the economic costs of a financial cleansing increased, requiring ever-more desperate policy measures to shore things up. Unfortunately, such actions merely created the conditions for greater excesses and imbalances down the road. For example, the Federal Reserve’s aggressive response to the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000 helped set the scene for the even bigger housing bubble later in the decade. In that sense, the Debt Supercycle was a self-reinforcing trap that was bound to end badly, and that occurred in 2007. Chart 3The US Household Love Affair With Debt Died A Decade Ago Our discussion of the US Debt Supercycle was focused largely on the private sector because that is where rising imbalances posed the greatest threat to economic and financial stability. Rising public sector imbalances were less of a concern because governments do not finance themselves through the banking sector. Moreover, unlike the private sector, taxes can always be raised to boost revenues or, in extremis, the authorities can resort to the printing press. At the end of 2014, we wrote that the Debt Supercycle was dead. By that, we meant that easing policy would no longer be able to encourage a new cycle of leverage-financed private-sector spending. The downturn of 2007-09 was a turning point in attitudes toward debt, much in the way that those who lived through the Great Depression were financially conservative for the rest of their lives. Our view has been vindicated by the fact the ratio of household debt to income has decisively broken its pre-housing bubble uptrend and has failed to revive in the face of record-low interest rates (Chart 3). Corporate borrowing has been strong, but largely to finance stock buybacks and M&A activity. Capital spending has been disappointing this cycle, despite strong profits and margins. The current deep downturn will add a further nail in the coffin of the private sector Debt Supercycle. The shock of the recession and destruction of wealth will leave a legacy of increased financial caution with households wanting to build precautionary savings and companies striving to repair damaged balance sheets. It would not be a surprise to see the US personal saving rate head back to the double-digit levels of the early 1980s. While the private sector embraces greater financial conservatism, we are witnessing the start of an extraordinary surge in public sector deficits and debt from already high levels. Chart 4A Bad Starting Point For A Surge In The Federal Deficit Budget deficits automatically rise during recessions because tax receipts drop and spending on unemployment and welfare programs goes up (Chart 4). In the past, the starting point for deficits generally was low before a recession took hold. This time, the federal deficit has breached 5% of GDP when the economy was doing fine. With the current recession set to be deeper than in 2007-09 and fiscal stimulus likely to end up much more than the initial $2 trillion package, the deficit will far exceed the previous post-WWII peak of almost 10% of GDP, reached in fiscal 2009. The ratio of federal debt to GDP will soar past 100% within the next few years, exceeding the peak reached in WWII. A speedy decline in WWII debt burdens was helped by a sharp rebound in economic activity, supported by a powerful combination of demographics (the post-WWII baby boom) and pent-up demand. Real GDP grew at an average annualized pace of 4.3% in both the 1950s and 1960s. Unfortunately, slower population growth means that growth in the next one and two decades will be less than half that pace. At the same time, the federal deficit will be under upward pressure because of the impact of an aging population on healthcare and social security. In other words, restoring order to fiscal finances through normal measures (growth and/or austerity) will be an impossible task. High levels of government debt are perfectly manageable when private sector savings are plentiful, interest rates are negligible, and investors seek the safety of low-risk bonds. Thus, $1 trillion US federal deficits have not prevented Treasury yields from falling to all-time lows. However, such conditions will not last indefinitely. The timing of when bloated budget deficits start to impact markets and thus the economy will partly depend on the actions of the Fed. Monetary Policy: Is There  A Limit To What It Can Do? Gone are the days when monetary policy was a rather technical exercise: tweaking the level of interest rates to ensure that money and credit trends delivered the economic growth consistent with low and stable inflation. In the past decade, the old rule book has been discarded with policymakers forced to take ever-more extreme measures to prevent total collapse of the economic and financial system. The 2007-9 downturn was easier to deal with than the current crisis. The primary problem a decade ago was a financial rather than economic seizure. While policymakers had to be creative, the main task was to shore up systemically important financial institutions and inject enough liquidity into the system to restore normal market functioning. And it worked. This time, the issue is an economic not financial seizure and associated liquidity strains are a symptom, not the primary problem. The immediate role of central banks is again to ensure that the financial system continues to function by injecting whatever amounts of liquidity are necessary. But monetary policy cannot directly bail out all the businesses that face bankruptcy or help those that have lost their jobs. That is the role of fiscal policy. What central banks can do is print money to finance the rise in budget deficits. During WWII, the Fed had an agreement with the Treasury Department to peg the level of long-term yields below 2.5% and this arrangement persisted until 1951, long after the war ended. This ensured that a post-war rebound in private credit demand would not cause a spike in interest rates that might short-circuit the recovery. We could well see a similar arrangement in the coming years, though it might be an informal rather than publicized agreement. The key point is that the Fed will be massively biased toward easy policy for many years. The current generation of central bankers have experienced periodic threats of deflation rather than inflation during the past 20 years and that will shape how they perceive the balance of risks going forward. After the Great Depression of the 1930s, fears of deflation lingered well into the 1950s and policymakers’ resulting complacency toward inflation led to the inflation spike of the 1970s. We are at a similar point again. The Fed will remain a massive buyer of Treasury bonds, even as the economy recovers because it will not want to risk higher yields undermining growth. Even if inflation starts to rise, the Fed will justify a continued easy stance on the grounds that inflation has fallen far short of its 2% target for many years. Given the combination of a global blowout in central bank balance sheets and the retreat from globalization, the scene will be set for inflation to surprise on the upside. But this may not occur for several years because the recession will create a lot of spare capacity and deflation is a greater near-term threat than inflation. We have long argued that a sustained upturn in inflation would be preceded by a final bout of deflation. The revival of inflation may be gradual but its insidious nature ultimately will make it more dangerous. It seems inevitable that there will have to be monetization of public sector debt, not only in the US but in other major economies. Once investor confidence returns, the demand for government bonds will recede and yields will be under upward pressure. Financial repression may help contain the rise, but that cannot be a long-term solution. In the end, central banks will be the bond buyers of last resort and ultimately it will have to be written off via making the debt effectively non-maturing. If the economic picture continues to deteriorate could central banks use quantitative easing to start buying assets such as equities and real estate? Current legislation prevents such purchases in the case of the Fed and European Central Bank. Of course, legislation can always be changed but the Fed would be reluctant for Congress to change the Federal Reserve Act. That could open a can of worms including amendments such as requiring regular audits of policy decisions and altering how regional presidents are chosen. But it will not be the Fed’s decision and if things get bad enough then nothing should be ruled out. An Accelerated Move To Virtual Activity? The restrictions on travel and public meetings and the closure of many businesses have forced companies to embrace online ways of conducting operations. And the same applies to schools and universities. In many cases, companies may find that virtual meetings between far-flung offices work rather well. This could cause a major rethink about future spending on business travel. Replacing travel with virtual meetings not only saves on airfares but also frees up employee time and reduces stress. And the improvements in communication technology make virtual meetings almost as good as the real thing. Of course, this is not a great story for airlines. The same arguments can be made for education but are slightly less compelling because of the social dimension. Mixing with friends and peers is one of the big attractions for students and most would be loath to give this up. And for working parents, it is not feasible to have children stuck at home. Nonetheless, at the post-secondary level, there could be a move to more online teaching. Another consequence of the current crisis has been a forced shift to more online shopping. This trend was already well established but is now likely to accelerate. Those retailers who fail to adapt will fall by the wayside. Market Implications As noted at the outset, it is hard to make predictions without knowing how the virus will progress. But we know a few things. First, there is not much scope for bond yields to fall from current levels. Second, equity valuations have improved as a result of the collapse in prices. Third, monetary policy will remain supportive of markets for a long time. On this basis, it is easy to conclude that stocks should beat bonds handsomely over the medium and long term. The short-term picture is cloudier. If the recession is short-lived and economic activity rebounds strongly, then we currently have a good buying opportunity for stocks. But there is no way to make a prediction about this with any conviction. The case for a strong recovery is that policy is massively stimulative and there will be a lot of pent-up demand. The case for a slow and drawn-out recovery is that consumers and businesses will be left with greatly weakened balance sheets and the loss of small businesses and associated jobs could be a lasting problem. A final issue is that fears of another virus wave could weigh on consumer and business confidence. Initially, there will be some extremely strong quarters of growth but beyond that, the odds favor a drawn-out recovery rather than a vigorous one. Faced with such uncertainty, one strategy is to rely on technical indicators rather than economic forecasts as a judge of whether it is safe to rebuild positions in risk assets. This gives some reason for encouragement as measures of sentiment are at depressed extremes, typically seen only at major bottoms. And this is supported by momentum indicators at oversold extremes. However, a word of caution: these indicators make the case for a near-term bounce but say nothing about the durability of any rally. For some time, non-US markets have looked more appealing than Wall Street from a valuation perspective. That remains the case, but there is an important caveat. Thus far, the virus has been more of a problem for the developed countries than emerging ones (China and Iran excepted). It remains to be seen whether Africa, and Latin America and other countries in Asia and the Middle East can avoid a catastrophic spread of the virus. It could potentially be disastrous given the poor infrastructure and lack of government resources in those regions. Moreover, a shift away from globalization is not bullish for the emerging world. Some positions in gold are a good hedge given current uncertainties and the fact that inflation fears will rise long before actual inflation picks up. In normal circumstances, the extraordinary rise in the US budget deficit would be bearish for the US dollar. But other countries are following the same path so in relative terms, the US is no worse off. And there is still no serious competition to the dollar as the global reserve currency. Thus, while the dollar might weaken somewhat, it should not be a major source of risk to US assets. In closing, it is impossible to provide the certainty and high-conviction predictions that investors crave. That makes it rash to make aggressive bets on how things will play out in the economy and markets. At BCA, we favor equities over bonds but advise continued near-term caution. The bottoming process in equities could be volatile and drawn-out. Building positions gradually seems the most sensible strategy.   Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Chief Economist mbarnes@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 For an estimate of the virus impact on a range of economies, please see the recent OECD report “Evaluating the initial impact of COVID-19 containment measures on economic activity”. Available at: www.oecd.org 2 The report and underlying data are available at www.newyorkfed.org. 3 For example, the retreat from globalization was discussed in our 2015 Outlook report published at the end of 2014.
Informe especial Dear Client, This week’s report is written by BCA’s chief economist, Martin Barnes. Martin explores the myriad ways the pandemic could influence long-term economic and financial trends. I trust you will find his report very insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Making predictions about the economic and market outlook seems a futile exercise in the midst of such massive uncertainty. The deluge of articles about COVID-19 merely serves to highlight that nobody really knows how things will play out in the year ahead. Much depends on whether an effective vaccine or treatment becomes available within a reasonable timescale and that remains an open question. Social and economic disruption will continue to intensify until the spread of the virus starts to abate. One thing is certain. Economic activity around the world faces its biggest contraction in modern times. Declines in second quarter GDP will be mind-numbingly bad in a wide range of countries, especially those that have instituted lockdowns and the closure of non-essential businesses. According to the OECD, the median economy faces an initial output decline of around 25% as a result of shutdowns and restrictions.1 Chart 1A Meltdown In Economic Activity Estimates for the drop in US real GDP in the second quarter range as high as 50% at an annual rate. To put this into perspective, the peak-to-trough decline in US real GDP in the 2007-09 recession was a mere 4% over six quarters, and that felt catastrophic at the time. The New York Fed’s weekly economic index2 has already fallen to the lows of 2008 and worse is still to come (Chart 1). Could things be as bad as the 1930s Great Depression when US real GDP contracted by 25% over a three-year period? That would require an extreme apocalyptic view about the progression of the virus and does not bear thinking about. I am not that gloomy. Policymakers are acting aggressively to limit the economic damage. Central banks are flooding the system with liquidity and the cost of money is negligible. Meanwhile, fiscal caution has been thrown to the wind with massive government stimulus in many countries. While this will not prevent a deep recession, it will minimize the downside risks and support the eventual rebound. Markets are understandably in a deep funk because it is hard to price unknown risks. If this is no more than a two-quarter economic downturn followed by a sharp recovery, then a good buying opportunity in risk assets is in place given that monetary policy will stay hyper accommodative for a considerable time. If the downturn lingers much longer than that, then equities remain at risk. While loath to make a prediction, I am uncharacteristically tending to the more optimistic side. Let’s make the heroic assumption that we are not in an end of days scenario and that this crisis will pass at some point in the next year- hopefully sooner than later. What are some of the longer-run implications? A few come to mind. The backlash against globalization will gather impetus. Public sector debt will rise to unimaginable peacetime levels. Meanwhile, the crisis puts the final nail in the coffin of the private sector Debt Supercycle. Monetary policy will err on the side of ease for a very long time. The way that companies and other institutions have been forced to adapt to the crisis could trigger lasting changes in how they operate. Globalization In Full Retreat Chart 2A Retreat From Globalization The peak of globalization has been a central part of the BCA view for several years.3 Long before the current crisis, it was clear that anti-globalization forces were gathering strength, illustrated by increased trade barriers, a backlash against inward migration in many countries, and reduced flows of foreign direct investment (Chart 2). The Trump Administration’s imposition of tariffs and the Brexit vote were two of the more obvious examples of the change in attitudes. The supply-chain interruptions caused by factory shutdowns in China will reinforce the view that shifting production to cheaper-cost countries overseas went too far. At a minimum, it seems inevitable that many companies will seek to reduce their reliance on a single producer for critical components. On the medical front, one striking fact to emerge was that China supplies around 80% of US antibiotics. There will be massive pressure to develop greater homegrown supplies of medical supplies and other products deemed critical for economic and national security. The crisis also has led to a breakdown of the Schengen Area of open borders within the European Union (EU). Many member countries have reinstituted border controls and it is unclear when these might be removed. The free movement of people is a core principle of the EU. Meanwhile, the Maastricht Treaty rules on fiscal discipline, a key element of economic union, have been thrown out of the window. Even Germany has bowed to the pressure of relaxing fiscal constraints. Finally, a worsening situation for the already troubled Italian banking system will threaten EU financial stability. Overall, the crisis will leave a huge question mark over the long-term viability of the EU. Globalization was a major force behind disinflation as production shifted to low-cost producers. A reversal of this trend will thus be inflationary, at the margin. For many, this will be a price worth paying if it means increased job security and reduced vulnerability of supply chains. But the shift away from globalization will not be the only trend that threatens an eventual resurgence of inflation. The Explosion In Government Debt: Last Gasp Of  The Debt Supercycle BCA introduced the concept of the Debt Supercycle more than 40 years ago to describe the actions of policymakers to pump up demand rather than allow financial imbalances to be fully unwound during economic downturns. This inevitably meant that each new cycle began with a higher level of financial imbalances. As indebtedness rose, the economic costs of a financial cleansing increased, requiring ever-more desperate policy measures to shore things up. Unfortunately, such actions merely created the conditions for greater excesses and imbalances down the road. For example, the Federal Reserve’s aggressive response to the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000 helped set the scene for the even bigger housing bubble later in the decade. In that sense, the Debt Supercycle was a self-reinforcing trap that was bound to end badly, and that occurred in 2007. Chart 3The US Household Love Affair With Debt Died A Decade Ago Our discussion of the US Debt Supercycle was focused largely on the private sector because that is where rising imbalances posed the greatest threat to economic and financial stability. Rising public sector imbalances were less of a concern because governments do not finance themselves through the banking sector. Moreover, unlike the private sector, taxes can always be raised to boost revenues or, in extremis, the authorities can resort to the printing press. At the end of 2014, we wrote that the Debt Supercycle was dead. By that, we meant that easing policy would no longer be able to encourage a new cycle of leverage-financed private-sector spending. The downturn of 2007-09 was a turning point in attitudes toward debt, much in the way that those who lived through the Great Depression were financially conservative for the rest of their lives. Our view has been vindicated by the fact the ratio of household debt to income has decisively broken its pre-housing bubble uptrend and has failed to revive in the face of record-low interest rates (Chart 3). Corporate borrowing has been strong, but largely to finance stock buybacks and M&A activity. Capital spending has been disappointing this cycle, despite strong profits and margins. The current deep downturn will add a further nail in the coffin of the private sector Debt Supercycle. The shock of the recession and destruction of wealth will leave a legacy of increased financial caution with households wanting to build precautionary savings and companies striving to repair damaged balance sheets. It would not be a surprise to see the US personal saving rate head back to the double-digit levels of the early 1980s. While the private sector embraces greater financial conservatism, we are witnessing the start of an extraordinary surge in public sector deficits and debt from already high levels. Chart 4A Bad Starting Point For A Surge In The Federal Deficit Budget deficits automatically rise during recessions because tax receipts drop and spending on unemployment and welfare programs goes up (Chart 4). In the past, the starting point for deficits generally was low before a recession took hold. This time, the federal deficit has breached 5% of GDP when the economy was doing fine. With the current recession set to be deeper than in 2007-09 and fiscal stimulus likely to end up much more than the initial $2 trillion package, the deficit will far exceed the previous post-WWII peak of almost 10% of GDP, reached in fiscal 2009. The ratio of federal debt to GDP will soar past 100% within the next few years, exceeding the peak reached in WWII. A speedy decline in WWII debt burdens was helped by a sharp rebound in economic activity, supported by a powerful combination of demographics (the post-WWII baby boom) and pent-up demand. Real GDP grew at an average annualized pace of 4.3% in both the 1950s and 1960s. Unfortunately, slower population growth means that growth in the next one and two decades will be less than half that pace. At the same time, the federal deficit will be under upward pressure because of the impact of an aging population on healthcare and social security. In other words, restoring order to fiscal finances through normal measures (growth and/or austerity) will be an impossible task. High levels of government debt are perfectly manageable when private sector savings are plentiful, interest rates are negligible, and investors seek the safety of low-risk bonds. Thus, $1 trillion US federal deficits have not prevented Treasury yields from falling to all-time lows. However, such conditions will not last indefinitely. The timing of when bloated budget deficits start to impact markets and thus the economy will partly depend on the actions of the Fed. Monetary Policy: Is There  A Limit To What It Can Do? Gone are the days when monetary policy was a rather technical exercise: tweaking the level of interest rates to ensure that money and credit trends delivered the economic growth consistent with low and stable inflation. In the past decade, the old rule book has been discarded with policymakers forced to take ever-more extreme measures to prevent total collapse of the economic and financial system. The 2007-9 downturn was easier to deal with than the current crisis. The primary problem a decade ago was a financial rather than economic seizure. While policymakers had to be creative, the main task was to shore up systemically important financial institutions and inject enough liquidity into the system to restore normal market functioning. And it worked. This time, the issue is an economic not financial seizure and associated liquidity strains are a symptom, not the primary problem. The immediate role of central banks is again to ensure that the financial system continues to function by injecting whatever amounts of liquidity are necessary. But monetary policy cannot directly bail out all the businesses that face bankruptcy or help those that have lost their jobs. That is the role of fiscal policy. What central banks can do is print money to finance the rise in budget deficits. During WWII, the Fed had an agreement with the Treasury Department to peg the level of long-term yields below 2.5% and this arrangement persisted until 1951, long after the war ended. This ensured that a post-war rebound in private credit demand would not cause a spike in interest rates that might short-circuit the recovery. We could well see a similar arrangement in the coming years, though it might be an informal rather than publicized agreement. The key point is that the Fed will be massively biased toward easy policy for many years. The current generation of central bankers have experienced periodic threats of deflation rather than inflation during the past 20 years and that will shape how they perceive the balance of risks going forward. After the Great Depression of the 1930s, fears of deflation lingered well into the 1950s and policymakers’ resulting complacency toward inflation led to the inflation spike of the 1970s. We are at a similar point again. The Fed will remain a massive buyer of Treasury bonds, even as the economy recovers because it will not want to risk higher yields undermining growth. Even if inflation starts to rise, the Fed will justify a continued easy stance on the grounds that inflation has fallen far short of its 2% target for many years. Given the combination of a global blowout in central bank balance sheets and the retreat from globalization, the scene will be set for inflation to surprise on the upside. But this may not occur for several years because the recession will create a lot of spare capacity and deflation is a greater near-term threat than inflation. We have long argued that a sustained upturn in inflation would be preceded by a final bout of deflation. The revival of inflation may be gradual but its insidious nature ultimately will make it more dangerous. It seems inevitable that there will have to be monetization of public sector debt, not only in the US but in other major economies. Once investor confidence returns, the demand for government bonds will recede and yields will be under upward pressure. Financial repression may help contain the rise, but that cannot be a long-term solution. In the end, central banks will be the bond buyers of last resort and ultimately it will have to be written off via making the debt effectively non-maturing. If the economic picture continues to deteriorate could central banks use quantitative easing to start buying assets such as equities and real estate? Current legislation prevents such purchases in the case of the Fed and European Central Bank. Of course, legislation can always be changed but the Fed would be reluctant for Congress to change the Federal Reserve Act. That could open a can of worms including amendments such as requiring regular audits of policy decisions and altering how regional presidents are chosen. But it will not be the Fed’s decision and if things get bad enough then nothing should be ruled out. An Accelerated Move To Virtual Activity? The restrictions on travel and public meetings and the closure of many businesses have forced companies to embrace online ways of conducting operations. And the same applies to schools and universities. In many cases, companies may find that virtual meetings between far-flung offices work rather well. This could cause a major rethink about future spending on business travel. Replacing travel with virtual meetings not only saves on airfares but also frees up employee time and reduces stress. And the improvements in communication technology make virtual meetings almost as good as the real thing. Of course, this is not a great story for airlines. The same arguments can be made for education but are slightly less compelling because of the social dimension. Mixing with friends and peers is one of the big attractions for students and most would be loath to give this up. And for working parents, it is not feasible to have children stuck at home. Nonetheless, at the post-secondary level, there could be a move to more online teaching. Another consequence of the current crisis has been a forced shift to more online shopping. This trend was already well established but is now likely to accelerate. Those retailers who fail to adapt will fall by the wayside. Market Implications As noted at the outset, it is hard to make predictions without knowing how the virus will progress. But we know a few things. First, there is not much scope for bond yields to fall from current levels. Second, equity valuations have improved as a result of the collapse in prices. Third, monetary policy will remain supportive of markets for a long time. On this basis, it is easy to conclude that stocks should beat bonds handsomely over the medium and long term. The short-term picture is cloudier. If the recession is short-lived and economic activity rebounds strongly, then we currently have a good buying opportunity for stocks. But there is no way to make a prediction about this with any conviction. The case for a strong recovery is that policy is massively stimulative and there will be a lot of pent-up demand. The case for a slow and drawn-out recovery is that consumers and businesses will be left with greatly weakened balance sheets and the loss of small businesses and associated jobs could be a lasting problem. A final issue is that fears of another virus wave could weigh on consumer and business confidence. Initially, there will be some extremely strong quarters of growth but beyond that, the odds favor a drawn-out recovery rather than a vigorous one. Faced with such uncertainty, one strategy is to rely on technical indicators rather than economic forecasts as a judge of whether it is safe to rebuild positions in risk assets. This gives some reason for encouragement as measures of sentiment are at depressed extremes, typically seen only at major bottoms. And this is supported by momentum indicators at oversold extremes. However, a word of caution: these indicators make the case for a near-term bounce but say nothing about the durability of any rally. For some time, non-US markets have looked more appealing than Wall Street from a valuation perspective. That remains the case, but there is an important caveat. Thus far, the virus has been more of a problem for the developed countries than emerging ones (China and Iran excepted). It remains to be seen whether Africa, and Latin America and other countries in Asia and the Middle East can avoid a catastrophic spread of the virus. It could potentially be disastrous given the poor infrastructure and lack of government resources in those regions. Moreover, a shift away from globalization is not bullish for the emerging world. Some positions in gold are a good hedge given current uncertainties and the fact that inflation fears will rise long before actual inflation picks up. In normal circumstances, the extraordinary rise in the US budget deficit would be bearish for the US dollar. But other countries are following the same path so in relative terms, the US is no worse off. And there is still no serious competition to the dollar as the global reserve currency. Thus, while the dollar might weaken somewhat, it should not be a major source of risk to US assets. In closing, it is impossible to provide the certainty and high-conviction predictions that investors crave. That makes it rash to make aggressive bets on how things will play out in the economy and markets. At BCA, we favor equities over bonds but advise continued near-term caution. The bottoming process in equities could be volatile and drawn-out. Building positions gradually seems the most sensible strategy.   Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Chief Economist mbarnes@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    For an estimate of the virus impact on a range of economies, please see the recent OECD report “Evaluating the initial impact of COVID-19 containment measures on economic activity”. Available at: www.oecd.org 2   The report and underlying data are available at www.newyorkfed.org. 3   For example, the retreat from globalization was discussed in our 2015 Outlook report published at the end of 2014.
Highlights Analyses on Asian semis, Argentina and Russia are available on pages 7, 12 and 14, respectively. The most likely trajectory for Chinese growth will be as follows: the initial plunge in business activity will be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, that quick rebound will probably be followed by weaker growth. Financial markets will soon focus on growth beyond the temporary rebound. In our opinion, it will be weaker than markets are currently pricing. Thus, risks for EM risk assets and currencies are skewed to the downside. A major and lasting selloff in EM stocks will only occur if EM corporate bond yields rise. In this week’s report we discuss what it will take for EM corporate credit spreads to widen. Feature The downside risks to EM risk assets and currencies are growing. We continue to recommend underweighting EM equities, credit and currencies versus their DM counterparts. Today we are initiating a short position in EM stocks in absolute terms. Chart I-1 illustrates that the total return index (including carry) of EM ex-China currencies versus the US dollar has failed to break above its 2019 highs, and has rolled over decisively.  In contrast, the trade-weighted US dollar has exhibited a bullish technical configuration by rebounding from its 200-day moving average (Chart I-2). Odds are the dollar will make new highs. An upleg in the greenback will foreshadow a relapse in EM financial markets. Chart I-1EM Ex-China Currencies Have Been Struggling Despite Low US Rates Chart I-2The US Dollar Remains In A Bull Market   Growth Trajectory After The Dust Settles The evolution of the coronavirus remains highly uncertain and unpredictable. As with any pandemic or virus outbreak, its evolution will be complex with non-trivial odds of a second wave. Even under the assumption that the epidemic will be fully contained by the end of March, its economic impact on the Chinese and Asian economies will likely be greater than global financial markets are currently pricing. As investors come to the realization that this initial pick-up in economic activity after the virus outbreak will be followed by weaker growth, the odds of a selloff in equities and credit markets will rise. In our January 30 report titled Coronavirus Versus SARS: Mind The Economic Differences, we argued that using the framework from the SARS outbreak to analyze the current epidemic is inappropriate. First, only a small portion of the Chinese economy was shut down in 2003, and for a brief period of time. The current closures and limited operations are much more widespread and likely more prolonged. Table I-1China’s Importance Now And In 2003 Second, China accounts for a substantially larger share of the global economy today than it did in 2003 (Table I-1). Hence, the global business cycle is presently much more sensitive to demand and production in the mainland than it was during the SARS outbreak. Global financial markets have rebounded following the initial selloff in late January on expectations that the Chinese and global economies will experience a V-shaped recovery. In last week’s report, we discussed why the odds favor a tepid recovery for the Chinese business cycle and global trade. The main point of last week’s report was as follows: with the median company and household in China being overleveraged, any reduction in cash flow or income will undermine their ability to service their debt and will dent their confidence for some time. Hence, consumption, investment and hiring over the next several months will be negatively affected, even after the outbreak is contained. This in turn will diminish the multiplier effect of policy stimulus in China. Chart I-3Our Expectations Of China’s Business Cycle The most likely pattern for Chinese growth will likely resemble the trajectory demonstrated in Chart I-3. It assumes the plunge in business activity will be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, that snap-back will likely be followed by weaker growth, for reasons discussed in last week’s report. Equity and credit markets in Asia and worldwide have been sanguine because they have so far focused exclusively on expectations of a sharp rebound. As investors come to the realization that this initial pick-up in economic activity will be followed by weaker growth, the odds of a selloff in equities and credit markets will rise. Bottom Line: The most likely trajectory for Chinese and Asian growth will be as follows: the initial plunge in business activity will be succeeded by a rather sharp snap-back due to pent-up demand. However, that quick rebound will probably be followed by weaker growth. Financial markets are not pricing in this scenario. Thus, risks are skewed to the downside for EM risk assets and currencies. The Missing Ingredient For An Equity Selloff The missing ingredient for a selloff in EM equities is rising EM corporate bond yields. Chart I-4 illustrates that bear markets in EM stocks typically occur when EM US dollar corporate bond yields are rising. Hence, what matters for the direction of EM share prices is not risk-free rates/yields but EM corporate borrowing costs. Chart I-4The Destiny Of EM Equities Is DependEnt On EM Corporate Bond Yields EM (and US) corporate bond yields can rise under the following circumstances: (1) when US Treasury yields are ascending more than corporate credit spreads are tightening; (2) when credit spreads are widening more than Treasury yields are falling; or (3) when both government bond yields and corporate credit spreads are increasing simultaneously. Provided the backdrop of weaker growth is bullish for government bonds, presently corporate bond yields can only rise if credit spreads widen by more than the drop in Treasury yields. In short, the destiny of EM equities currently relies on corporate spreads. A major and lasting selloff in EM stocks will only occur if their respective corporate bond yields rise. From a historical perspective, EM and US corporate credit spreads are currently extremely tight (Chart I-5). A China-related growth scare could trigger a widening in EM corporate credit spreads. As this occurs, corporate bond yields will climb, causing share prices to plummet. EM corporate spreads have historically been correlated with EM exchange rates, the global/Chinese business cycle, and commodities prices (Chart I-6). The Chinese property market plays an especially pivotal role for the outlook of EM corporate spreads. Chart I-5EM And US Corporate Spread Remain Tame Chart I-6EM Corporate Spreads Inversely Correlate With EM Currencies And Commodities Prices   First, offshore bonds issued by mainland property developers account for a large share of the EM corporate bond index. Chart I-7China Property Market Will Continue Disappointing Second, swings in China’s property markets often drive the mainland’s business cycle and its demand for resources, chemicals and industrial machinery. In turn, Chinese imports of commodities affect both economic growth and exchange rates of EM ex-China. Finally, the latter two determine the direction of EM ex-China corporate spreads. China’s construction activity and property developers were struggling before the coronavirus outbreak (Chart I-7). Given their high debt burden, the ongoing plunge in new property sales and their cash flow will not only weigh on their debt sustainability but also force them to curtail construction activity. The latter will continue suppressing commodities prices. The sensitivity of EM corporate spreads to these variables have in recent years diminished because of the unrelenting search for yield by global investors. As QE policies by DM central banks have removed some $9 trillion of high-quality securities from circulation, the volume of securities available in the markets has shrunk. This has distorted historical correlations of EM corporate spreads with their fundamental drivers – namely, China’s construction activity, commodities prices, EM exchange rates and the global trade cycle. Nonetheless, EM corporate credit spreads’ sensitivity to these variables has diminished, but has not vanished outright. If EM currencies depreciate meaningfully, commodities prices plunge and China’s growth and the global trade cycle disappoint, odds are that EM corporate spreads will widen. Given that credit markets are already in overbought territory, any selloff could trigger a cascading effect, resulting in meaningful credit-spread widening. Bottom Line: A major and lasting selloff in EM stocks will only occur if their respective corporate bond yields rise. The timing is uncertain, but the odds of EM corporate credit spreads widening are mounting as Chinese growth underwhelms, commodities prices drop and EM currencies depreciate. If these trends persist, they will push EM shares prices over the cliff. As to today’s recommendation to short the EM stock index, we anticipate at least a 10% selloff in EM stocks in US-dollar terms. For currency investors, we are maintaining our shorts in a basket of EM currencies versus the dollar. This basket includes the BRL, CLP, COP, ZAR, KRW, IDR and PHP. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Are Semiconductor Stocks Facing An Air Pocket? Global semiconductor share prices have continued to hit new highs, even though there has not been any recovery (positive growth) in global semiconductor sales or in their corporate earnings (EPS). The coronavirus outbreak and the resulting delay in 5G phone sales in China in the first half of 2020 will trigger a pullback in semiconductor equities. Global semiconductor sales bottomed on a rate-of-change basis in June, but their annual growth rate was still negative in December. In the meantime, global semi share prices have been rallying since January 2019. This divergence between stock prices and revenue of global semiconductor stocks is unprecedented (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Over-Hyped Global Semi Share Prices Odds are that global semi stocks in general, and Asian ones in particular, will experience a pullback in the coming weeks. The coronavirus outbreak will likely dampen expectations related to the speed of 5G adoption and penetration in China. Critically, China accounted for 35% of global semiconductor sales in 2019, versus 19% for the US and 10% for the whole of Europe. In brief, semiconductor demand from China is now greater than the US and European demand combined. Furthermore, the latest news that the US administration is considering changing its regulations to prevent shipments of semiconductor chips to China’s Huawei Technologies from global companies - including Taiwan's TSMC - could hurt chip stocks further. Since Huawei Technologies is the global leader in 5G networks and smartphones, the ban, if implemented, will instigate a sizable setback to 5G adoption in China and elsewhere. Table II-1Industry Forecasts Of The 2020 Global 5G- Smartphone Shipments Our updated estimate of global 5G smartphone shipments is between 160 million and 180 million units in 2020, which is below the median of industry expectations of 210 million units (Table II-1). The key reasons why the industry’s expectations are unreasonably high, in our opinion, are as follows: Chinese demand for new smartphones will likely stay weak (Chart II-2). The mainland smartphone market has become extremely saturated, with 1.3 billion units having been sold in just the past three years – nearly equaling the entire Chinese population. Chinese official data show that each Chinese household owned 2.5 phones on average in 2018, and that the average household size was about three persons (Chart II-3). This suggests that going forward nearly all potential phone demand in China is for replacement phones, and that there is no urgent need for households to buy new phones. Chart II-2Chinese Smartphone Demand: Further Decline In 2020 Chart II-3Chinese Households: No Urgent Need For A New Phone   The Chinese government’s boost to 5G infrastructure investment will likely increase annual installed 5G base stations from 130,000 units last year to about 600,000 to 800,000 this year. However, the total number of 5G base stations will still only account for about 7-9% of total base stations in China in 2020. Hence, geographical coverage will not be sufficiently wide enough to warrant a very high rate of 5G smartphone adoption and penetration. From Chinese consumers’ perspectives, a 5G phone in 2020 will be a ‘nice-to-have,’ but not a ‘must-have.’ Given increasing economic uncertainty and many concerns related to the use of 5G phones, mainland consumers may delay their purchases into 2021 when 5G phone networks will have more geographic coverage.  The number of 5G phone models on the market is expanding, but not that quickly. Consumers may take their time to wait for more models to hit the market before making a 5G phone purchase. For example, Apple will release four 5G phone models, but only in September 2020. Moreover, the price competition between 5G and 4G phones is getting increasingly intense. Smartphone producers have already started to cut prices of their 4G phones aggressively. For example, the price of Apple’s iPhone XS, released in September 2018, has already dropped by about 50% in China. Outside of China, 5G infrastructure development will be much slower. The majority of developed countries will likely give in to pressure from the US and limit their use of Huawei 5G equipment. This will delay infrastructure installation and adoption of 5G throughout the rest of the world because Huawei has the leading and cheapest 5G technology. In 2019, China accounted for about 70% of worldwide 5G smartphone shipments. We reckon that in 2020 Chinese 5G smartphone shipments will be between 120 million and 130 million units. Assuming this accounts for about 70-75% of the world shipment of 5G phones this year, we arrive at our estimate of global 5G smartphone shipments of between 160 million and 180 million units. We agree that 5G technology is revolutionary. Nevertheless, we still believe global semi share prices are presently overhyped by unreasonably optimistic 2020 projections. Overall, investors are pricing global semi stocks using the pace and trajectory of 4G smartphones adoption. However, in 2020 the number and speed of 5G phone penetration will continue lagging that of 4G ones when the latter were introduced in December 2013 (Chart II-4). We agree that 5G technology is revolutionary, and its adoption and penetration will surge in the coming years. Nevertheless, we still believe global semi share prices are presently overhyped by unreasonably optimistic 2020 projections (Chart II-5).  Chart II-4China 5G-Adoption Pace: Slower Than The Case With 4G Chart II-5Net Earnings Of Global Semi Sector: Too Optimistic?   Investment Implications Global semi stocks’ valuations are very elevated, as shown in Chart II-6 and Chart II-7. Besides, semi stocks are overbought, suggesting they could correct meaningfully if lofty growth expectations currently baked into their prices do not materialize in the first half of this year. Chart II-6Global Semi Stocks Valuations: Very Elevated Chart II-7Global Semi Stocks’ Valuations: Very Elevated   The coronavirus outbreak and the resulting delay in 5G phone sales in China in the first half of 2020, along with US pressure on global semi producers not to sell to Huawei, will likely trigger a pullback in semiconductor equities. We recommend patiently waiting for a better entry point for absolute return investors. Within the EM equity universe, we have not been underweight Asian semi stocks because of our negative outlook for the overall EM equity benchmark. The Argentine government will drag out foreign debt negotiations with the IMF and foreign private creditors to secure a more favorable settlement. We remain neutral on Taiwan and overweight Korea. The reason is that DRAM makers such as Samsung and Hynix have rallied much less than TSMC. Besides, geopolitical risks in relation to Taiwan in general and TSMC in particular are rising, warranting a more defensive stance on Taiwanese stocks relative to Korean equities. Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Argentina’s Eternal Tango With Foreign Creditors Chart III-1Downside Risks To Bond Prices Our view remains that debt negotiations will be drawn-out because the Argentine government is both unwilling and lacks the financial capacity to service public foreign debt. The administration’s recent attitude toward foreign creditors and the IMF have startled markets: sovereign Eurobond bond prices have tanked (Chart III-1). The reasons why the Fernandez administration will play tough ball with creditors and the IMF are as follows: The country’s foreign funding and the public sector debt situations are precarious. Hence, the lower the recovery rate they negotiate with creditors, the more funds will be available to expand social programs and secure domestic political support. Given Fernandez’s and Peronist’s voter base, the government is inclined to please the population at expense of foreign creditors. Moreover, Alberto Fernandez is facing increasing scrutiny from radical Peronists, who want to dissolve the debt altogether. Vice-president Fernandez de Kirchner stated that Argentina should not pay international agents until the economy escapes a recession. To further add to creditors’ frustration, the government has yet to announce a comprehensive economic plan to revive the economy and service outstanding debt. The public foreign currency debt burden is unsustainable – its level stands at $250 billion, about 4 times larger than exports. The country is still in a recession, and economic indicators do not show much improvement. Committing to fiscal austerity to service foreign debt would entail further economic suffering for Argentine businesses and households, something Fernandez rejected throughout his campaign. The authorities are singularly focused on reviving the economy: government expenditures have grown by over 50% annually under the current administration (Chart III-2). Crucially, Argentina has already achieved a large trade surplus and its current account balance is approaching zero (Chart III-3). Assuming exports stay flat, the economy can afford to maintain its current level of imports. This makes the authorities less willing to compromise and more inclined to adopt a tough stance in debt negotiations. Chart III-2Peronist Government Has Again Boosted Fiscal Spending Chart III-3Argentina: Current Account Is Almost Balanced   The risk of this negotiation strategy is that the nation will not be able to raise foreign funding for a while. Nevertheless, the country is currently de facto not receiving any external financing. Hence, this risk is less pressing. Moreover, the administration has already delayed all US$ bond payments until August. This allows them to extend negotiations with creditors over the next six months, thereby increasing uncertainty and further pushing down bond prices. A lower market price on Argentine bonds is beneficial for the government’s negotiation strategy as it implies lower expectations for foreign creditors. Thus, the Fernandez administration’s strategy will be to play hardball and draw-out negotiations as long as possible. We expect Argentina to reach a settlement with creditors no earlier than in the third quarter of this year and at recovery rates below current prices of the nation’s Eurobonds. Russian financial assets will be supported due to improving public sector governance, accelerating domestic demand growth and healthy macro fundamentals. Bottom Line: The government will drag out foreign debt negotiations with the IMF and foreign private creditors to secure a more favorable settlement. Continue to underweight Argentine financial assets over the next several months. Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Russia: Harvesting The Benefits Of Macro Orthodoxy Russian financial markets have shown resilience in face of falling oil prices. This has been the upshot of the nation’s prudent macro policies in recent years. We have been positive on Russia and overweight Russian markets over the past two years and this stance remains intact. Going forward, Russian financial assets will be supported due to improving public sector governance, accelerating domestic demand growth and healthy macro fundamentals: Fiscal policy will be relaxed substantially – both infrastructure and social spending will rise. Specifically, the Kremlin is eager to ramp up the national projects program. This is bullish for domestic demand. Russia’s public finances are currently in a very healthy state. Public debt (14% of GDP) is minimal and foreign public debt (4% of GDP) is tiny. The overall fiscal balance is in large surplus (2.7% of GDP). The current account is also in surplus. Hence, a major boost in fiscal spending will not undermine Russia’s macro stability for some time. As a major sign of policy change, President Putin has sidelined or reduced the authority of policymakers who have been advocating tight fiscal policy. This policy change has been overdue as fiscal policy has been unreasonably tight for longer than required (Chart IV-1). Chart IV-1Russia: Government Spending Has Been Extremely Weak Importantly, the recent changes at the highest levels of government are also positive for governance and productivity. The new Prime Minister Mishustin has earned this appointment for his achievements as the head of the federal tax authority. He has restructured and reorganized the tax department in a way that has boosted its efficiency/productivity substantially and increased tax collection. By promoting him to the head of government, Putin has boosted Mishustin’s authority to reform the entire federal governance system. Given his record of accomplishment, odds are that the new prime minister will succeed in implementing some reforms and restructuring. Thereby, productivity growth that has been stagnant in Russia for a decade could revive modestly. Also, Putin was reluctant to boost infrastructure spending as he was afraid of money being misappropriated without a proper monitoring system. Putin now hopes Mishustin can introduce an efficient governance system of fiscal spending to assure infrastructure projects can be realized with reasonably minimal losses. As to monetary policy, real interest rates are still very high. The prime lending rate is 10%, the policy rate is 6% and nominal GDP growth is 3.3% (Chart IV-2). Weak growth (Chart IV-3) and low inflation will encourage the central bank to continue cutting interest rates. Chart IV-2Russia: Interest Rates Remain Excessively High Chart IV-3Russia's Growth Is Very Sluggish   Finally, the economy does not have any structural excesses and imbalances. The central bank has done a good job in cleansing the banking system and the latter is in healthy shape. Bottom Line: The ruble will be supported by improving productivity, cyclical growth acceleration and a healthy fiscal position. We continue recommending overweighting Russian stocks, local currency bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Last week, we also recommended a new trade: Short Turkish bank stocks / long Russian bank stocks. The main risk to the absolute performance of Russian markets is another plunge in oil prices and a broad selloff in EM. On November 14, 2019 we recommended absolute return investors to go long Russian local currency bonds and short oil. This strategy remains intact. Finally, we have been recommending the long ruble / short Colombian peso trade since May 31, 2018. This position has generated large gains and we are reiterating it. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Dear Client, In addition to this short weekly report, you will also receive our 2020 outlook, published by the Bank Credit Analyst. Next week, I will be on the road visiting clients in South Africa. I hope to report my discussions and findings the following week. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor Highlights According to a simple attractiveness framework, the most desirable currencies are the Norwegian krone, the Swedish krona, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the New Zealand dollar and the British pound. Take profits soon on our long GBP/JPY position. Feature In this report, we use a simple framework for ranking G10 currencies. First, we consider the macroeconomic environment using as proxies a country’s basic balance and external vulnerability. Next, we look at valuation metrics,  surveying a variety of both short-term and longer-term models. Finally, we consider positioning, to gauge if our view is mainstream or out of consensus. Below are our results. Basic Balance Chart I-1Basic Balance We consider the basic balance to be one of the most important concepts in determining the attractiveness of a currency. In a nutshell, it captures the ebb and flow of demand for a country’s domestic assets. Persistent basic balance surpluses are usually associated with an appreciating currency and vice versa. The euro area sports the best basic balance surplus in the G10 universe, followed by Norway and then Australia (Chart I-1). In simple terms, this means there is constant strong underlying demand for these currencies - either for domestic goods and services, or for investment into portfolio assets. The UK and the US rank the worst in terms of basic balances, driven by Brexit uncertainty and the ebbing of tax reform benefits in the US. We will explore balance of payments dynamics within all of the G10 countries in detail next week. External Debt A currency is sometimes only as vulnerable as its external liabilities. In an absolute sense, external debt as a share of GDP is highest in the UK, euro area, and Switzerland (Chart I-2). However, what matters most times for vulnerability are net external assets rather than gross liabilities. On this measure, Japan, Switzerland, and Norway are the most attractive countries, while the US and Australia rank the worst (Chart I-3). Chart I-2External Vulnerability Chart I-3US Is Least Attractive Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Chart I-4PPP Model Various models have shown PPP to be a very poor tool for managing currencies, but an excellent one at extremes. However, there is a roadblock that comes from measurement issues, since consumer price baskets tend to differ in composition from one country to the next. In order to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison across countries, two adjustments are necessary. First, categorizing the consumer price index (CPI) into five major groups. In most cases, this breakdown captures 90% of the national CPI basket. This includes food, restaurants and hotels (1), shelter (2), health care (3), culture and recreation (4), and energy and transportation (5). The second adjustment is to run two regressions with the exchange rate as the dependent variable. The first regression (call it REG1) uses the relative price ratios of the five groups as independent variables. This allows us to observe the most influential price ratios that help explain variations in the exchange rate. The second regression (call it REG2) uses a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If, for example, shelter is 33% in the US CPI basket, but 19% in the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, as opposed to using the national CPI weights. The US dollar is overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and Norwegian krone.  The results show the US dollar as overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, and Norwegian krone. Commodity currencies are closer to fair value, and within the safe-haven complex, the Japanese yen is more attractive than the Swiss franc. The euro is less undervalued than implied by the overvaluation in the DXY index (Chart I-4). Intermediate-Term Timing Model (ITTM) Back in 2016, we developed a set of currency indicators to help global portfolio managers increase their Sharpe ratio in managing currency exposure. The idea was quite simple: For every developed world country, there were three key variables that influenced the near-term path of its exchange rate versus the US dollar. Our intermediate-term timing models are not sending any strong signals at the moment.  Interest Rate Differentials: Under the lens of interest rate parity, if one country is expected to have lower interest rates versus another, the incumbent’s currency will fall today so as to gradually appreciate in the future and nullify the interest rate advantage. Chart I-5Intermediate-Term Model Inflation Differentials: Assuming no transactional costs, the price of sandals cannot be relatively high and rising in Mumbai versus Auckland. Either the Indian rupee needs to fall, the kiwi rise, or a combination of the two has to occur to equalize prices across borders. Risk Factor: Exchange rates are not government bonds in that few treasury departments and central banks can guarantee a par value on them. Ergo, the ebb and flow of risk aversion will have an impact on the Norwegian krone as well as the yen. For the most part, our models have worked like a charm. On a risk-adjusted return basis, a dynamic hedging strategy based on our ITTMs has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001. These results give us confidence to continue running these models as a sanity check for our ever-shifting currency biases. That said, our intermediate-term timing models are not sending any strong signals at the moment. The Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and New Zealand dollar are the most attractive currencies, while the British pound and Swiss franc are the least attractive (Chart I-5). Long-Term Fair Value Model Chart I-6Long-Term Model Our long-term FX models are also part of a set of technical tools we use to help us navigate FX markets. Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials, and proxies for global risk aversion. These models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and emerging market FX markets. The models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their main purpose is to provide information on the longevity of a currency cycle, depending on where we are in the economic cycle. Our long-term FX models are not sending any strong signals right now, with the US dollar at fair value. The cheapest currencies are the yen, the Norwegian krone, and Swedish krona (Chart I-6). The priciest currencies are the South African rand and the Saudi riyal. Real Interest Rates One defining feature of the currency landscape is that pretty much across the G10 countries, we have negative real rates (Chart I-7). Within  the G10 universe, the US and New Zealand dollars are the highest-yielding currencies, while the British pound and Swedish krona are the least attractive. Chart I-7Real Rates Speculative Positioning Being long Treasurys and the dollar has been a consensus trade for many years now (Chart I-8). According to CFTC data, this has been expressed mostly through the aussie and kiwi, although our bias is that the Swedish krona and Norwegian krone have been the real victims. Chart I-8Positioning That said, flow data highlights just how precarious being long US dollars is right now. Net foreign purchases by private investors are still positive, but the momentum of these flows is clearly rolling over. This is being more than offset by official net outflows. As interest rate differentials have started moving against the US, so has foreign investor appetite for Treasury bonds. Concluding Thoughts Should the nascent pickup in global growth morph into a synchronized recovery, it will go a long way in further eroding the US’ yield advantage. More specifically, the currencies that have borne the brunt of the manufacturing slowdown should also experience the quickest reversals. For example, yields in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan have risen by much more than those in the US since the bottom. The most attractive currencies are the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the British pound and New Zealand dollar. This is the message being sent by an aggregate of our ranking model. The most attractive currencies are the Swedish krona, the Norwegian krone, and the Japanese yen. The least attractive are the British pound and New Zealand dollar (Chart I-9). Take profits soon on our long GBP/JPY position. Chart I-9Favor Norway, Japan and Sweden   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: Retail sales grew by 0.3% year-on-year in October. Industrial production contracted by 0.8% month-on-month in October. On the housing market front, building permits and housing starts both increased by 5% and 3.8% month-on-month in October. However, MBA mortgage applications contracted by 2.2% for the week ended November 15th. The NY Empire State Manufacturing index fell to 2.9 from 4 in November. The Philly Fed manufacturing index, on the other hand, soared to 10.4 from 5.6 in November. The DXY index depreciated by 0.3% this week. The FOMC minutes released this Wednesday showed that the Fed now sees little need to further reduce rates. Last week, we did a reassessment of global growth and the USD, and entered a limit sell for the DXY index at 100. Report Links: Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4UR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The seasonally-adjusted trade balance fell to €18.3 billion in September. The current account surplus slightly narrowed by €0.3 billion to €28.2 billion. Headline and core inflation were both unchanged at 1.1% and 0.7% year-on-year respectively in October. Consumer confidence improved from -7.6 in October to -7.2 in November. EUR/USD increased by 0.5% this week. The improvement in soft data confirms that the economy is in a bottoming process in the euro area. The fact that the largest economy, Germany, skirted a recession last week also boosted investor confidence. We continue to remain overweight the euro. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been positive: Exports decreased by 9.2% year-on-year in October. Imports slumped by 14.8% year-on-year. The total trade balance shifted to a surplus of ¥17.3 billion.  The industry activity index increased by 1.5% month-on-month in September. USD/JPY fell by 0.2% this week. While global growth is set to improve given a possible trade détente and easy monetary policy worldwide, uncertainties continue to loom. The US Senate unanimously passed legislation on the "Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act," adding more difficulties to finalize the Phase I trade deal. Global trade uncertainty is positive for safe-haven demand. Report Links: Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The Rightmove house price index increased by 0.3% year-on-year in November. Public sector net borrowing increased by £3 billion to £10.5 billion in October. The British pound continues to appreciate by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. With Brexit being less of a threat, the pound is poised to rise through next year. We are long GBP/JPY in our portfolio and it is in the money at 6.1%. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been soft: The Westpac leading index fell by 0.1% month-on-month in October, following a slight decline the previous month. AUD/USD has been more or less flat this week. In the monetary policy minutes released this week, the RBA expressed their expectations for stronger growth at 2.75% in 2020 and around 3% in 2021, supported by accommodative monetary policy, infrastructure spending, stabilizing house prices, and strong steel-intensive activities in China. The minutes also presented an argument against lower interest rates: while lower interest rates can support the economy through the usual transmission channels, they could be negative for savers and confidence. That said, the RBA is "prepared to ease monetary policy further if needed." Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: Both output and input components of the producer price index have increased in Q3: the output component grew by 1% quarter-on-quarter and input component by 0.9% quarter-on-quarter. NZD/USD increased by 0.7% this week. Both growth and inflation in New Zealand are showing signs that the economy is in a bottoming process. We are positive on the kiwi against the US dollar while we remain short against the Australian dollar and Swedish Krona. Report Links: Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Manufacturing shipments fell by 0.2% month-on-month in September. Both headline and core inflation were unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in October. ADP employment showed a loss of 22.6K jobs in October. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. While a possible trade détente between US and China and rising oil prices could put a floor under the loonie, the pipeline constraints in Canada have dampened the correlation between the oil prices and the loonie.  This will limit the upside potential for the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: The trade surplus narrowed to CHF 3.5 billion in October from CHF 4.1 billion the previous month, due primarily to growth in imports, which grew by 1.9 billion month-on-month. Exports also increased by 1.3 billion month-on-month. Import demand remains firm for chemical products. Industrial production grew by 8% year-on-year in Q3. USD/CHF increased by 0.2% this week. The trade balance still remains at a high level in Switzerland, which is bullish for the franc. Moreover, global uncertainties could underpin the safe-haven franc. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been positive: The trade balance shifted to a surplus of NOK 5.9 billion in October, after a deficit of NOK 1.4 billion in September. However, this is compared to a surplus of NOK 32.6 billion in the same month last year. On a year-on-year basis, exports slumped by 27%, caused by a decrease in exports of mineral fuels and chemical products. The Norwegian krone appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week, supported by the oil price recovery. On Wednesday, the EIA posted an increase of crude oil inventories by 1.4 million barrels from the previous week, lower than expectations. WTI crude oil prices thus surged by 4% on the news. Going forward, we remain overweight energy prices and the Norwegian krone. Report Links: Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Capacity utilization increased to 0.5% in Q3, up from 0.1% in the previous quarter. The Swedish krona increased by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The Swedish krona has depreciated by 23% against the USD since its 2018 peak. A global growth revival is likely to give a boost to the krona from a valuation perspective. Report Links: Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades