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Highlights Portfolio Strategy Intensifying recession fears, rising risks of ineffectual monetary policy, and escalating trade policy uncertainty that is shattering corporate America’s capex plans, warn that sizable drawdown risks persist in the broad U.S. equity market in the upcoming 3-12 months. The transition from a virtuous to a vicious EPS-to capex cycle, souring global growth, the firming U.S. dollar that is weighing on cyclical/defensive pricing power and exports, and deteriorating relative balance sheet (b/s) and relative operating metrics compel us to put the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent on downgrade alert. Recent Changes The cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent is now on our downgrade watch list. Table 1 Feature The SPX moved laterally last week, and remains below the critical 50-day moving average. Recession worries intensified on the back of the first sustained 10/2 yield curve slope inversion. Coupled with the trade war re-escalation, they remain the dominant macro themes. Worrisomely, BCA’s Equity Selloff Indicator captures these dynamics and continues to emit a distress signal (Chart 1). Equities have been relatively resilient in the face of these headwinds. Investors are hoping not only for a U.S./China trade deal, but also that the Fed’s cutting cycle will save the day. Chart 1Mind The Gap What caught our attention from all the speeches at the recent Jackson Hole Symposium was RBA Governor Philip Lowe’s speech, especially the section titled “Elevated Expectations That Monetary Policy Can Deliver Economic Prosperity”.1 Lowe highlighted that “When easing monetary policy, all central banks know that part of the transmission mechanism is a depreciation of the exchange rate. But if all central banks ease similarly at around the same time, there is no exchange rate channel: we trade with one another, not with Mars. There are, of course other transmission mechanisms, but once we cancel out the exchange rate channel, the overall effect for any one economy is reduced. If firms don't want to invest because of elevated uncertainty, we can't be confident that changes in monetary conditions will have the normal effect (stress ours).” The perception that the Fed is going to be the savior of the economy is a big risk, and when reality hits that President Trump’s tariffs are a shock to global final demand and presage profit contraction, volatility will skyrocket (please refer to Chart 3 from the August 19 Weekly Report). Importantly, the virtuous capex upcycle that has been in motion since the Trump inauguration when CEOs voted with their feet and started investing, has ground to a halt according to national accounts (Chart 2). U.S. non-residential fixed investment subtracted from GDP growth last quarter, and we doubt the Fed’s fresh interest rate cutting cycle will arrest the fall. Leading indicators of capital outlays point to additional pain in coming quarters (Chart 2). As a reminder, generationally low interest rates and a real fed funds rate near zero hardly restrict expansion plans. Chart 2Free Falling The shift from a virtuous to a vicious capex cycle is a theme that will start gaining traction as the year draws to a close. While pundits are dismissing the recent steep fall in capex as a one off, our indicators suggest otherwise. The middle panel of Chart 3 clearly depicts this emerging dynamic. Profit growth peaked in 2018 on the back of the massive fiscal easing package and capex is following suit, albeit with a slight lag. There are high odds that a looming profit contraction will further shatter frail animal spirits, sabotage the capex upcycle and tilt into a down cycle. Tack on the ongoing trade uncertainty, and CEOs are certain to, at least, postpone deploying longer-term oriented capital. Worryingly, this transition from a virtuous to a vicious capex cycle is not limited to a few cyclical sectors as we would have expected on the back of the re-escalating Sino-American trade tussle. In fact, basic resources’ and non-capital goods producers’ capital outlays are decelerating, warning that corporate America is in the early stages of retrenchment (bottom panel, Chart 3). Chart 3EPS-To-Capex Down Cycle Chart 4Capex… Charts 4, 5 & 6 break down sectorial capex growth using financial statement reported data from Refinitiv. Seven out of eleven sectors are steeply decelerating from near 20%/annum growth to half that; given that these sectors comprise more than 72% of the total capex pie, they will continue to weigh on overall stock market reported investment. Chart 5…Per… Chart 6…Sector Similarly, the news on the cyclicals versus defensives capex profile is grim. Trade uncertainty and the global growth soft patch has dealt a blow to deep cyclical expansion plans and leading indicators signal that the cyclicals/defensives capex will flirt with the contraction zone in the coming quarters (Chart 7). In sum, intensifying recession fears, rising risks of ineffectual monetary policy, and escalating trade policy uncertainty that is shattering corporate America’s capex plans, warn that sizable drawdown risks persist in the broad U.S. equity market in the upcoming 3-12 months. As a reminder, this is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which contrasts BCA’s sanguine equity market house view. Chart 7Relative Capex Blues This week we update our cyclicals versus defensives bias (we are currently neutral) and are compelled to put this portfolio bent on our downgrade watch list. Put The Cyclical/Defensive Tilt On Downgrade Alert Roughly two years ago, when nobody was talking about the brewing capex upcycle, we penned a report titled “Underappreciated Capex” and posited that: “It would be unprecedented if the current business cycle ended without a visible capex upcycle. Since the 1980s recession, all four recessions were preceded by stock market reported capex soaring to roughly a 20% annual growth rate. At the current juncture, capex is merely on the cusp of entering expansion territory and, if history at least rhymes, a significant capex upcycle is looming.” Fast forward to today and as historical empirical evidence had suggested, capex growth peaked near the 20%/annum mark (Chart 3 above). If our assessment is accurate that capex has now likely hit a wall and the virtuous EPS-to-capex cycle reverses to a vicious down cycle as EPS are now contracting, then deep cyclical high-operating leverage sectors are in for a rough ride. This will especially be true if the global recession warnings also morph into an actual recession on the back of the re-escalating Sino-American trade war. More specifically, our capex indicators are firing warning shots. Capex intentions according to a plethora of regional Fed surveys are sinking steadily, which bodes ill for cyclicals versus defensives (Chart 8). One key driver of the capex cycle is China and the emerging markets (EM). News on both fronts is grim. Our real-time indicator that gauges China’s reflation efforts (monetary and fiscal) turning into actual economic activity is Chinese excavator sales that remain in the doldrums (top panel, Chart 9). Chart 8Drop In Capex Will Weigh On Relative Profits Chart 9Elusive Global Growth Granted, global growth remains elusive as we highlighted last week and while softening Chinese economic activity is weighing on global growth, European and Japanese GDP growth is also decelerating with a number of economies already in the contraction zone (bottom panel, Chart 9). Melting global bond yields reflect these growth fears and warn that the relative share price ratio has more downside (middle panel, Chart 9). Export growth is an important indicator that closely tracks the ebbs and flows of global trade. When the trade-weighted U.S. dollar appreciates it dampens trade, the opposite is also true. Currently the Fed’s trade-weighted greenback based on goods has vaulted to cyclical highs, warning that the path of least resistance is lower for trade, thus a net negative for relative export and profit prospects (Chart 10). Similarly, EM capital outflows exacerbate the ongoing global growth blues and put additional strain on EM economies as depreciating currencies sap consumer purchasing power (top panel, Chart 10). The implication is that EM final demand is in retreat. The rising U.S. dollar not only deals a blow to basic resource exports via making them less competitive and leading to market share losses, but it also undermines cyclical sectors' pricing power. The top panel of Chart 11 shows that deflating commodity prices are exerting downward pull on relative share prices. The ISM manufacturing survey’s prices paid subcomponent corroborates this deflationary backdrop. Keep in mind that operating leverage cuts both ways, and now that the pendulum is swinging the opposite way revenue contraction in these high fixed costs industries will fall straight off the bottom line (Chart 11). Chart 10Rising Dollar Dollar Dampens Trade And… Chart 11…Saps Pricing Power Our macro-based cyclicals/defensives EPS growth models do an excellent job in capturing all these moving parts and signal that defensives have the upper hand in the coming quarters (bottom panel, Chart 8). Turning to operating metrics, the inventory buildup in the past few quarters coupled with a softness in overall business sales underscore that relative share prices will continue to trend lower (top panel, Chart 12). On the balance sheet front, relative net debt-to-EBITDA has troughed and widening junk spreads and the inverted yield curve warn that a further relative b/s degrading looms (second & third panels, Chart 12). If our thesis pans out in the coming months, then cash flow growth will come under pressure as the vicious capex cycle flexes its muscles foreshadowing a rise in bankruptcy filings. Already, the news on the profit margin front is disconcerting. Historically, the ISM manufacturing index and relative operating profit margins have been joined at the hip and the recent flirting of the former with the boom/bust line points toward an ominous relative margin squeeze (bottom panel, Chart 12). Chart 12Poor Financial & Operating Backdrop… Chart 13…But Excellent Valuations And Technicals Finally, soft versus hard data surprise oscillations have an excellent track record in forecasting relative share price movements. The current message is to expect additional weakness in relative share prices (second panel, Chart 13). While most of the indicators we track signal that the time is ripe to downgrade this portfolio bent to an underweight stance, bombed out relative valuations, and oversold technicals keep us at bay, at least for the time being (third & bottom panels, Chart 13). However, we are compelled to put the cyclicals/defensives ratio on downgrade alert to reflect the transition from a virtuous to a vicious EPS-to-capex cycle, souring global growth, the firming U.S. dollar that is weighing on cyclical/defensive pricing power and exports, and deteriorating b/s and operating metrics. The way we will execute this downgrade will be via a downgrade of the S&P tech sector (for additional details on the S&P tech sector's downgrade mechanics please refer to last Friday’s U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report). Bottom Line: Stay on the sidelines in the S&P cyclicals/S&P defensives ratio, but put it on downgrade alert.     Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1      https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2019/sp-gov-2019-08-25.html Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Highlights Our cyclical view is unchanged, … : Despite the evident risks from escalating trade tensions, soft global economic data, and widespread recession concerns, we expect the expansion and the bull markets in spread product and equities will remain intact. … as fiscal largesse has provided the U.S. economy with ample cushion: Per the IMF’s estimates, the fiscal stimulus package centered on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 amounted to about 70 basis points (“bps”) of fiscal thrust in 2018 and another 40 bps in 2019. But how is Congress’ unprecedented experiment shaping up beyond 2019?: The first-order impact of the tax cuts on government revenues is straightforward. The ultimate net effect turns on how lower taxes alter the course of corporate investment and work force participation. The CBO’s latest projections have the federal deficit widening by an additional $1 trillion over the next decade: Supply-side benefits from the 2017 Act have underwhelmed so far, and the fate of the federal budget depends on lawmakers’ restraint. We are long-run bearish on Treasuries and the dollar. Feature The fundamental backdrop remains mixed in the United States and the rest of the world. Global trade has slowed, and the world is experiencing a sharp manufacturing slowdown. The consensus of BCA researchers expects that manufacturing will soon find a footing, and the global economy will revive, helped along by easier monetary policy. A fiscal pick-me-up is long overdue, and would be especially welcome, but we are not holding our breath, especially when Japan finally seems prepared to impose its repeatedly-postponed VAT increase. Opinion within BCA is notably split, and the glass-half-full and glass-half-empty camps remain far apart. The mixed tone of the macro data offers something for bulls and bears, and contributed to the sharp single-day moves that characterized August’s equity action. Although the S&P 500 moved at least 1% in half of its sessions, however, it was down less than 2% for the month through Thursday. After slipping from its 3,000 perch amidst a 5% decline across August’s first three sessions on renewed trade hostilities, it traded in a narrow range between 2,825 and 2,945 the rest of the way (Chart 1). Chart 1Big Daily Swings, But A Tight Monthly Range The Fed is caught in a loop of responding to inorganic shocks. It tightened policy in 2018 while nervously looking over its shoulder at a sizable injection of procyclical fiscal stimulus that wound up exerting less overheating pressure than it had feared. Now it finds itself uncomfortably drawn into the vortex of the trade war, cutting rates to keep the expansion from being snuffed out prematurely by self-inflicted wounds. Various Fed officials seem to be chafing under the burden of serving as a bulwark against the drag from the tariff fights. As Chair Powell admonished in his Jackson Hole address, “[M]onetary policy … cannot provide a settled rulebook for international trade.” Like it or not, the Fed is stuck cleaning up other policymakers’ messes. Jackson Hole would normally have brought down the curtain on any meaningful market news until after Labor Day. But Bill Dudley, the head of the New York Fed from 2009 to 2018, had other ideas. He argued in a Bloomberg opinion column that the Fed should refuse to abet foolhardy trade policy with rate cuts that offset its ill effects. He went on to posit that it is within the Fed’s remit to set policy with an eye toward influencing the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. Dudley’s grenade enlivened a slow news day and had the effect of unifying the economics community in condemnation of his polemic. The Fed swiftly distanced itself from the comments, reiterating that its “decisions are guided solely by its congressional mandate,” and that “political considerations play absolutely no role.” It is hard to know what Dr. Dudley intended to accomplish, but he ensured that we will be at BCA’s 40th Annual Investment Conference bright and early on Friday, September 27th when he kicks off its second day. Initial Estimates Soon after the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) assessed how its provisions would affect the U.S. economy. Although calculating the components involves myriad complex estimates, the budget equation is quite simple: Budget Surplus/(Deficit) = Revenues – Outlays. Cutting taxes clearly reduces revenues, and the reductions in individual tax rates, partially offset by limits on deductions, were estimated to cost the federal government roughly $300 billion over the next decade. The 10-year tab for lower corporate rates, and immediate expensing of business investments through 2022, was estimated to run about $1 trillion. Relief from some spending constraints brought the total estimated cost to $1.7 trillion. A trillion here, and a trillion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money. Though the Act was sure to worsen the deficit, it contained provisions meant to encourage investment and labor supply. Corporate tax cuts and the full immediate expensing of investments in software and eligible equipment were expected to permanently increase the nation’s capital stock, thereby boosting the trend pace of productivity growth. A reduced individual income tax burden was expected to encourage more people to enter the workforce and incumbents to work longer hours. Ultimately, the CBO projected that the Act would boost the level of real potential GDP by 0.7%, on average, through 2029.  Six Quarters On It follows that people might work more if they are able to keep more of what they earn, but the data since individual income tax rates were reduced at the beginning of 2018 are inconclusive. The labor force participation rate has been treading water for several years (Chart 2, solid line), as it battles against the drag from baby boomer aging (Chart 2, dashed line). Prime-age labor force participation has risen very slowly off of its 2015 bottom, and has spent 2019 unwinding its gains from late last year (Chart 3). Average weekly hours worked remain locked in the narrow range that has prevailed since 2012 (Chart 4). Though it is difficult to isolate the drivers of participation gains, the part rate’s erratic 2018-9 course suggests that the Act has not yet had a discernible work force impact. Chart 2The Baby Boomers Have Become A Demographic Headwind Chart 3Labor Supply ##br##Gains ... Chart 4... Have Yet To Materialize Residential investment, which lost some tax subsidies via the Act’s limits on mortgage interest and state and local tax deductions, has declined in every quarter since it was passed, and we back it out of fixed investment to assess the Act’s impact on corporate investment. As with labor supply, the record so far is mixed. Fixed investment (ex-residential investment) built on its 4Q17 acceleration over the first three quarters of 2018 only to slide in the three subsequent quarters (Chart 5). Publicly traded corporations have proven more eager to share their cash windfall with shareholders than they have been to invest it. Chart 5Investment Stimulus? What Investment Stimulus? Looking Ahead – Activity Effects We accept that lower individual income tax rates make work more attractive. People respond to incentives, and more after-tax pay, all else equal, should encourage some discouraged workers to rejoin the labor market and push some of the currently employed to want to work more. The changes are modest, though, with take-home pay increasing $324, or 2%, for someone earning $20,000, and $1,299, or 3%, for someone earning $50,000 (Table 1). We see the Act as having no more than a modest marginal effect on labor supply, though it should help boost consumption until households begin to factor in seemingly inevitable future tax hikes. Table 1Take-Home Pay Is Up, But Not By Much If the 2017 Act really is going to boost the potential trend rate of growth, it will have to do so by pushing the rate of productivity growth higher.1 Workers are able to produce more in a given block of time when they’re endowed with more and better tools, and new tools require investment. If fixed investment doesn’t accelerate, there’s no reason to expect that productivity will (Chart 6). The capex outlook from the NFIB survey and the various Fed regional manufacturing surveys is iffy, and BCA has previously noted how an aging population and a shift to more capital-light businesses may restrain investment. Chart 6Investment Drives Productivity It will not be an easy matter to boost productivity by boosting capex, though some of businesses’ after-tax cash will likely find its way to investment. To help the process along, Congress incorporated a familiar provision: accelerated depreciation. Accelerated depreciation’s empirical record as an investment catalyst is hardly clear (Box), and we don’t find its theoretical basis terribly compelling. We think the Act’s trend growth impacts are more likely to disappoint the CBO’s expectations than exceed them. Investment confronts demographic headwinds, too. Pushing trend growth higher will not be easy. Box - An Anodyne Prescription A celebrated provision of the Act allows for the immediate expensing of qualified investments until 2022. Accelerated depreciation programs, which allow for more rapid expensing of investments in property, equipment and other depreciable assets in an attempt to stimulate investment, are a stock measure in lawmakers’ stimulus toolkit, but their effectiveness is hardly assured. For one thing, they’re not new, and businesses may have built up an immunity to them, as they have been a continuous feature of the tax code since 1981. The immediate expensing allowed under the 2017 Act is a form of bonus depreciation, which was initially introduced in the wake of the September 11th attacks. It has remained in place for all but one subsequent year, and though investment peaked during the other stretch that provided for immediate write-offs (September 2010 - December 2011), we are skeptical that it will materially increase the size of the capital stock going forward. Accelerated depreciation schemes encourage investment via the time value of money. They do not increase the depreciation benefit provided by a particular investment, they simply speed up its recognition. Savvy businesses may adjust the timing of their investments to take advantage of temporary bonus periods, but they will not necessarily invest more.2 With rock-bottom interest rates squeezing the time value of money, it’s possible that bonus depreciation’s impact may be especially muted this time. Looking Ahead – The Budget Deficit The CBO’s updated projections through 2029, released two weeks ago, call for the budget shortfall to widen by $800 billion more than previously estimated in January. Despite a downward revision of over $1 trillion in projected interest expense, additional spending has weakened the deficit outlook. It appears that elected officials simply can’t help themselves. In a climate in which neither Congress nor voters evince any desire to rein in the deficit, it seems foolishly naïve to assume that future sessions of Congress will abide by built-in expenditure limits like sunset provisions and spending caps. Although the CBO projects that federal revenues will rise across its 10-year forecasting horizon, they will not do so fast enough to keep up with outlays swollen by interest payments on the growing pile of Treasuries (Chart 7). The CBO sees debt as a share of GDP rising to 95% by 2029, within reach of the all-time high recorded after World War II (Chart 8). Financial markets don’t care now, and we don’t think they will any time in the near future, but the CBO’s baseline projections, which assume future Congresses abide by their stated commitments, probably represent an optimistic scenario. We are more inclined to expect the alternative scenarios, in which sunset provisions are ignored, and pre-set spending caps are set aside, to come to pass. Chart 7A Widening Budget Gap ... Chart 8... Leads To An Increased Debt Burden Investment Implications Chart 9The Dollar's Long-Run Direction Is Down Treasury yields are currently within sight of their July 2016 Brexit-inspired lows, and may well revisit them. Negative yields are a common feature well out the maturity curve in core Europe and Japan. A sustained move higher is not in the cards in the near term, and though we do expect yields to rise as the global economy gains some traction later this year, we do not foresee a disruptive move higher even over the next couple of years. The very long-term outlook for Treasuries is lousy, however, and the dollar also faces secular pressures (Chart 9). The U.S. is not likely to turn into Japan, but the next decade’s returns will likely pale beside those earned since 1982. We are congenitally optimistic about humanity, and Americans seem to have a particular knack for pulling rabbits out of hats. We do not see the U.S. turning into Argentina, Greece or even Japan. The debt burden will weigh on potential growth down the road, however, as debt service will limit Congress’ ability to deploy countercyclical adjustments and longer-term investments, and debt issuance will eventually crimp private entities’ access to capital. All of these factors will limit potential economic growth and contribute to softening returns on equity and credit. We continue to foresee tepid returns over the next ten years relative to the returns investors have grown accustomed to over the last four decades, and we would much rather borrow at current rates for the next 20 or 30 years than lend at them.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Economic growth is the sum of growth in productivity and growth in the size of the labor force. Since the Act does not bear on immigration or birthrates, productivity represents its best shot at moving the growth needle. 2 Congressional Research Service Report RL31852, The Section 179 and Section 168(k) Expensing Allowances: Current Law and Economic Effects, by Gary Guenther, May 1, 2018.  

Informe especial

Dear Client, We will not be publishing a report next week as we take an end-of-summer break. Our next report will be published on Tuesday, September 10th. Best regards, Robert Robis  Highlights Canadian Corporates: The small but growing Canadian corporate bond market has delivered performance comparable to other developed market credit over the past decade, with less duration risk and higher average credit quality compared to the larger U.S. corporate debt market. Returns: Our new regression model for Canadian corporate bond excess returns is calling for modest positive gains for Canadian corporate debt over the next year.  Corporate Health: Canadian companies’ financial health remains a positive for corporate bond returns on a cyclical basis, but high leverage and mediocre profitability are longer-term concerns. Allocation: We recommend overweight allocations into Canadian investment grade corporates, versus both Canadian government bonds and U.S. investment grade corporates. Amid elevated global policy uncertainty, favor the moderate spread volatility and attractive valuation in Canadian corporates. Feature Canadian corporate bonds do not get much attention from global fixed income investors due to the relatively small size of the market. Yet Canadian corporates have delivered returns in line with their global peers over the past decade, delivering an average excess return over Canadian government bonds (hedged into U.S. dollars) of 2.8% (Chart  of the Week). Looking ahead, Canadian corporates may present an opportunity for diversification in what is becoming an increasingly challenging environment for corporate bond investors, offering relatively higher yields and better credit quality with an economy that has held up well relative to the current weakening trend in global growth. In this Special Report, we outline the contours of the Canadian corporate bond market, assess the macroeconomic factors driving Canadian corporate bond returns, and survey the current overall financial health of Canadian companies. We also take a high-level look at the state of Canadian corporate debt at the sector level, while offering our recommendations on which ones to favor over the next 6-12 months. A Brief Overview The bulk of outstanding Canadian corporate debt is rated investment grade (IG), but this represents only 5% of the global IG market (Chart 2), using the Bloomberg Barclays Global Corporates Index as a proxy.1 However, the total market capitalization of Canadian corporate bonds is 30% of Canadian GDP – a ratio as large as seen in other major developed countries like the U.S., U.K. and Switzerland (Chart 3).  Like those other markets, Canadian companies have taken advantage of historically low borrowing rates and increased demand for income-generating assets to add leverage to their balance sheets.   On the demand side, Canadian corporates have traditionally been more of an institutional investment product, although domestic retail investor interest has picked up in recent years (mostly through mutual funds and exchange traded funds). The buy-and-hold nature of those local institutional investors reduces liquidity, particularly in comparison to the more widely-traded debt of Canadian federal and provincial governments. Yet according to a September 2018 Bank of Canada (BoC) report, domestic investor concerns over a perceived deterioration of Canadian corporate bond market liquidity appeared overstated.2 The report concluded that corporate bond market liquidity had generally been improving since 2010, with only short-lived bouts of illiquidity around events such as the 2011 European Debt Crisis and the 2014/15 collapse in oil prices. That medium-term improvement in liquidity was especially concentrated in high-grade corporate debt and bonds issued by banks, although the BoC concluded that liquidity and trading activity in low-grade and non-bank bonds have generally been stable. Issuance is dominated by financials, utilities, and energy companies. Unsurprisingly, the defensive utilities sector, which has high borrowing requirements, has been the top-performing industry group in 2019 (total return of +14% year-to-date) against a backdrop of falling bond yields and increased investor nervousness about future global growth (Chart 4). Yet all Canadian corporate bonds have generally performed well, with the overall Bloomberg Barclays Canadian Corporate Index delivering a total return of +8.2% so far in 2019, compared to 11.4% for Canadian equities and 5.6% for Canadian government bonds. Canadian corporate credit spreads have been remarkably stable since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  The overall index option-adjusted spread (OAS) has stayed in a range between 100-200bps, while both total and excess (duration-matched versus government debt) returns exhibiting fairly low volatility since 2008 (Chart 5). Canadian corporate credit spreads have been remarkably stable since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  The overall index option-adjusted spread (OAS) has stayed in a range between 100-200bps, while both total and excess (duration-matched versus government debt) returns exhibiting fairly low volatility since 2008 The duration of the benchmark Canadian IG corporate index is now 6.4 years, well below the equivalent level for U.S IG (7.9 years) even though it has steadily increased over the past decade.  Over that same period, the average credit quality has deteriorated, with 40% of the Canadian corporate index now rated BBB (Chart 6). This is below the BBB share seen in the U.S. (50%) and euro area (52%), though, making Canadian IG relatively less exposed to potential downgrades to junk bond status. Chart 5Low Volatility Of Spreads & Returns Since 2008 Chart 6Lower Share Of BBBs Compared To The U.S. & Europe Bottom Line: The small but growing Canadian corporate bond market has delivered performance comparable to other developed market credit over the past decade, with less duration risk and higher average credit quality compared to the large U.S. corporate debt market. A Fundamental Model To Forecast Canadian Corporate Bond Returns In order to help forecast Canadian corporate bond performance, we have developed a factor-based regression model of Canadian IG excess returns (in local currency terms). We first determined the independent variables in the regression by compiling a list of potential drivers of bond returns which map to four factor groups: growth, inflation, financial variables, and other miscellaneous factors. After statistically testing those factors, the insignificant and unrelated ones were dropped. The final result of this analysis is shown in Table 1. Table 1Regression Details Of The Fundamental Canadian Corporate Bond Return Model We concluded that five variables explain the bulk of Canadian corporate bond returns:  the annual percentage change in oil prices (using the Canadian benchmark, Western Canadian Select), non-residential fixed investment growth, the M3 measure of money supply growth, the Canadian dollar trade-weighted index (CAD TWI), and the level of Canadian industrial capacity utilization. We concluded that five variables explain the bulk of Canadian corporate bond returns:  the annual percentage change in oil prices (using the Canadian benchmark, Western Canadian Select), non-residential fixed investment growth, the M3 measure of money supply growth, the Canadian dollar trade-weighted index (CAD TWI), and the level of Canadian industrial capacity utilization. Chart 7A Fundamental Model Of Canadian Corporate Bond Returns Looking at recent excess return history (Chart 7), it is not surprising that oil prices significantly affect returns given the importance of Canada’s energy sector to the overall Canadian economy.  Moreover, growth in non-residential fixed asset investment also positively influences excess returns as faster capital spending can potentially increase the profitability of Canadian firms. In contrast, the inflation factors - money supply and capacity utilization – are detrimental to returns. Increases in both of those factors can result in higher inflation and rising bond yields as the BoC is forced to tighten monetary policy, which often results in rising risk premiums and wider corporate credit spreads (falling excess returns). Finally, the CAD TWI is (weakly) positively correlated to corporate bond excess returns. A stronger currency is a reflection of a strong domestic economy, but it also helps lower imported input costs for Canadian companies – both of which boost corporate profits and corporate bond returns. We now turn to the outlook for these factors over the next 6-12 months, which remain generally supportive for moderate positive excess returns for Canadian corporates: Oil prices: BCA’s commodity strategists expect global oil prices to increase moderately over the next year as global inventory drawdowns outpace expectations (Iran sanctions, Venezuela production collapsing and OPEC 2.0 production discipline are likely sources of supply restraint). In addition, if global growth starts to rebound from the end of this year, as we expect, oil demand will also rise. Non-residential fixed investment: According to the BoC’s most recent Business Outlook Survey of Canadian companies, investment spending plans of firms remain healthy – although that survey was taken at the end of June before the latest increase in uncertainty over global trade and economic growth.3  Moreover, relatively easy credit conditions have made it easier for firms to finance capex. Therefore, our baseline scenario is still to expect moderate growth in non-residential fixed capital investment, although risks are to the downside given the global macro uncertainties. Money supply: The most recent reading of the annual growth of Canadian M3 from June was a solid +7.5%. The BoC is expected to maintain an accommodative monetary policy stance, keeping the current policy rate on hold until the end of 2020. Therefore, money supply growth is likely to remain firm – a negative for Canadian corporate bond returns in our model, although perhaps less so than in the past since rapid money growth will not generate the same type of monetary tightening response from the BoC. Capacity utilization: The Canadian capacity utilization rate is currently at 81%, a meaningful pullback from the 84% level seen in early 2018. According to the latest BoC Monetary Policy Report, the Canadian economy is operating below potential (the output gap in Q1 was estimated to be between -1.25% to -0.25% of potential GDP) and that gap is only expected to close over the next two years.  Thus, capacity utilization is not expected to have a major impact on corporate excess returns over the next 6-12 months. Canadian Dollar: The CAD TWI has shown no change over the past year, and will likely remain near current levels in the short term. Although we do not expect the BoC to cut interest rates as much as currently discounted by markets (-40bps over the next twelve months), Canadian monetary policy will still remain accommodative and will likely keep the CAD relatively soft until global manufacturing growth and trade activity stabilize and begin to revive. The CAD is likely to be a neutral factor for Canadian corporate returns over the next year. Bottom Line: Our new regression model for Canadian corporate bond excess returns is calling for modest positive gains for Canadian corporate debt over the next year.  Canadian Corporate Balance Sheet Health: OK For Now, But At Risk If The Economy Weakens Chart 8The BCA Canadian Corporate Health Monitors Regular readers of our work will be familiar with our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) framework. In this approach, we combine financial ratios that are most important for corporate creditworthiness of the entire non-financial corporate sector of a given country into a summary indicator that is designed to track corporate credit spreads. We introduced a Canadian CHM in April 2018, both using top-down national accounts data and aggregated bottom-up ratios from actual company financial statements.4  The latest reading from our top-down and bottom-up Canadian CHMs suggest that the overall health of Canadian corporates is decent, with the CHMs both below the zero line (Chart 8).5  Digging into the individual ratios, however, does reveal some potential signs of future weakness.  Leverage is relatively high, while profitability metrics and interest coverage ratios are at the low end of the historical range.  However, in our CHM framework, how the latest data compares to the medium-term trend – rather than the absolute level of the ratios - is most relevant for corporate bond performance. On that front, the latest data points for the CHM ratios do represent modest improvements versus the levels seen in 2014 and 2015, which is why our CHMs remain in the “improving health” zone. The more cyclically-driven ratios (profit margins, return on capital, interest coverage) declined amid the sharp plunge in Canadian economic growth at the end of 2018. However, given the recent reacceleration visible in some Canadian economic data, those cyclically-driven ratios may end up showing signs of stabilization, if not improvement, once the underlying CHM data for Q2/2019 and Q3/2019 are available. Looking ahead, Canadian corporate debt would be vulnerable to spread widening (rising risk premiums) in the event of a sustained slowing of the Canadian economy, given the poor absolute levels of the CHM component ratios. With the BoC maintaining an accommodative monetary policy stance, however, and the Canadian economy likely to continue growing at a trend-like pace supported by consumer spending, we think the backdrop will remain conducive to credit spread stability in Canada over the next 6-12 months. With the BoC maintaining an accommodative monetary policy stance, however, and the Canadian economy likely to continue growing at a trend-like pace supported by consumer spending, we think the backdrop will remain conducive to credit spread stability in Canada over the next 6-12 months. Bottom Line: The financial health of Canadian companies remains a positive for corporate bond returns on a cyclical basis, but there are longer-term concerns given high leverage and mediocre profitability. Canadian Corporate Bond Sector Valuation For IG corporate sectors in the U.S., euro area and the U.K., we utilize a relative value framework to rank credit spreads within the benchmark corporate universe.  We can apply that same approach to assess valuations of Canadian corporate bond sectors. In our sector relative value model, the “fair value” option-adjusted spread (OAS) for each sector within the Bloomberg Barclays Canadian IG Corporate index is estimated based on a panel regression. The explanatory variables in the regression are the modified duration, convexity and credit rating of each industry sub-sector within the index. The regression produces a set of common coefficients for all sectors that can be used to estimate a fair value OAS for each industry group as a function of its own interest rate duration, convexity and credit quality – all important drivers of corporate bond returns. The Risk-Adjusted Valuation is the difference between each sector’s current OAS and the model estimate of the sector’s fair value OAS.  A positive Risk-Adjusted Valuation implies undervaluation for the sector in question, and a negative reading implies overvaluation. Table 2 shows the recommended positioning of the Canadian IG industry sectors based on our relative value model. Sectors with positive Risk-Adjusted Valuations have overweight allocations versus the benchmark, with the opposite holds true for sectors with negative valuations. Sectors with spreads that are very close to fair value (within a range of +5bps to -5bps) have only a neutral recommended weighting versus the benchmark. Table 2Canada Investment Grade Corporate Bond Aggregate: Sector Relative Valuation* Chart 9 depicts the risk/reward tradeoff between the valuation metric and the riskiness of each sector as measured by its duration-times-spread (DTS).  Valuation is measured along the vertical axis of the chart, while DTS is measured along the horizontal axis. Sectors with higher DTS exhibit greater excess return volatility and are thus riskier. In the current environment of heightened uncertainty and slowing global growth, but with the BoC and other global central banks responding with a more dovish monetary policy stance, targeting cheap sectors that are less risky (i.e. DTS scores close to or below the average DTS of all sectors) is a prudent strategy.  Those would be sectors that appear in the upper left quadrant of Chart 9, like Metals & Mining, Finance Companies and Office REITs. Chart 10Positive Support For Canadian Consumer Cyclicals We also see a case for overweighting the cheap Consumer Cyclical Services sector, even with a DTS that is modestly higher than the overall index, given the continued strength in the Canadian labor market which supports consumer confidence through rising earning power (Chart 10). Recommended underweights are in the bottom right quadrant of Chart 9, with expensive valuations and high DTS scores, like Utilities: Natural Gas, Utilities: Electric, Supermarkets and Food & Beverage. Bottom Line: Favor Canadian corporate bond sectors with cheap valuations and spread volatility close to that of the overall benchmark index. Investment Conclusions Chart 11Canadian Corporates Outperformance Vs U.S. Will Continue Canadian IG corporates now offer a potential opportunity to diversify corporate bond exposure away from the larger markets in the U.S. and Europe.  The Canadian economy remains resilient despite slowing global growth, while the fundamental drivers of Canadian corporate bond returns are stabilizing or even improving. At the same time, the economic weakness abroad and heightened trade/political uncertainty will ensure that the BoC maintains an accommodative monetary stance over the next 6-12 months. That is not to say that Canadian corporates are not without risk. Canada is not a low-beta market - spreads do widen during “risk-off” periods in global financial markets. Also, underlying Canadian corporate credit fundamentals look poor on a long-term basis; Canadian private sector debt levels are high (especially for households); and the export-intensive Canadian economy is vulnerable to any incremental deceleration of global growth in particular, and the US more specifically.  Yet as a relative value trade versus the much larger corporate bond market to the south, Canadian corporates are well positioned to continue their recent bout of outperformance versus U.S. equivalents over the next 6-12 months, for the following reasons (Chart 11): While markets are priced for rate cuts from both the Fed and the BoC, the starting point for monetary conditions is easier in Canada than in the U.S. given the much weaker level of the Canadian dollar compared to the U.S. dollar. There is a wide gap between the corporate credit fundamentals in Canada and the U.S. according to our top-down Corporate Health Monitors for both countries, such that Canadian balance sheets are more robust. There is a wide gap between the corporate credit fundamentals in Canada and the U.S. according to our top-down Corporate Health Monitors for both countries, such that Canadian balance sheets are more robust. Bottom Line: We recommend that domestic Canadian investors continue to stay overweight Canadian corporates versus Canadian government bonds, while keeping an overall level of spread risk close to benchmark. Global credit investors that have access to the Canadian corporate bond market should consider allocations out of U.S. investment grade corporates into Canadian equivalents. Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA,  Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com  Footnotes 1 Throughout this report, we solely use data on Canadian corporate debt from the Bloomberg Barclays bond indices, which is the main index data we use in all our global bond research. Comprehensive data is also available from other providers such as FTSE Russell and S&P Global. 2 Bank of Canada September 2018 Staff Analytical Note 2018-31, “Have Liquidity and Trading Activity in the Canadian Corporate Bond Market Deteriorated?” 3 https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/06/business-outlook-survey-summer-2019/ 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “BCA Corporate Health Monitor Chartbook Update: Growth Is Papering Over The Cracks”, dated April 24, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 5 A CHM below zero implies improving financial health, while a CHM above zero indicates deteriorating financial health. Thus, the direction of the CHM is designed to be positively correlated with corporate credit spreads.

Informe especial

Feature According to the official reported growth rate, Chinese industrial profit growth ticked slightly back into positive territory in July, after having fallen into modestly negative territory earlier this year. However, market participants have increasingly noted the gaping difference between the reported year-over-year (YoY) growth rate and the YoY growth rate of the reported level, with the latter having shown a much weaker profile over the past two years (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Will The Real Profit Trend Please Stand Up? The profile in the growth of overall earnings per share of listed companies does not match that of the reported level of industrial profit growth (either in the domestic or investable markets), and it remains unclear whether this is due to changes in shares outstanding or other factors. But the divergence between the two series shown in Chart I-1 has certainly focused investor attention on China’s profit outlook, which has deteriorated over the past year regardless of the data series used. This deterioration in earnings has raised the risk of a bullish cyclical position towards Chinese stocks for two reasons: 1) it makes an eventual uptrend in stock prices conditional on a rebound in EPS and, 2) it had led to a deterioration in corporate health in what has become a highly-leveraged economy. The latter is particularly notable, given the backdrop of serious investor concern over rising (although still low) onshore corporate defaults. To investigate the impact of declining/decelerating profit growth on Chinese corporate health, this week we are updating our China Industry Watch thematic chartpack. The charts shown on pages 6 - 27 present our corporate health monitor (CHM) and its components across multiple industries (see below for our CHM methodology).1 Several observations are noteworthy: Although our aggregate CHM for all industrials hasn’t yet fallen back to levels seen in 2008 or during the early-2000s, the deceleration in profit growth has clearly caused a meaningful deterioration in corporate health (Chart I-2). To underscore the point, our aggregate CHM suggests that Chinese industrial sector health is presently the worst that it has been since the global financial crisis (Chart I-3). While we acknowledge that Chinese authorities remain reluctant to prompt a large rise in the macro leverage ratio, this core finding of our report raises the stakes for policymakers in terms of their ability to tolerate significant further weakness in economic activity. Chart I-2In China, Profit Growth Drives Corporate Health Chart I-3Chinese Corporate Health Now The Worst Since the Global Financial Crisis Our sub-industry CHMs shed some light on what has driven the deterioration in our overall CHM. The monitors show a particularly marked decline in corporate health for the steel, non-ferrous metals, construction materials, autos, and information technology sectors. Three of these sectors (steel, non-ferrous metals, and IT) are particularly sensitive to exports, suggesting that the trade war with the U.S. is at least partially responsible for the worsening corporate health of industrial enterprises. However, the auto and construction materials sectors tend to be domestically-oriented, underscoring that some of the weakness in these sectors is purely homegrown. Corporate health for energy-related sub-industries (oil & gas and coal) continues to improve from a poor starting point, and the incredible two-decade improvement in health for the food & beverage sector has continued, which shows that Chinese demand for consumer staples remains robust. Measured either by debt-to-assets or interest coverage, China’s industrial enterprises have experienced a broad-based worsening of leverage. To the extent that “deleveraging” has happened, it has occurred in some of China’s “old industries” such as coal, steel, and non-ferrous metals. On the efficiency front, coal and steel have been the only sectors experiencing an improvement in inventory turnover due to China’s capacity reduction campaign; besides this, inventory, asset, and receivable turnover has deteriorated in nearly every other sub-industry. Similarly, profit growth has decelerated and/or fallen into negative territory broadly across sub-industries along with a meaningful deceleration in revenue growth. Utilities and food & beverage are the notable outliers, where profit growth has moderately recovered due to a combination of positive revenue growth and wider margins. Chart I-4Non-SOE Profits: A Leading Indicator For Overall Profit Growth? Finally, Chart I-4 provides an interesting perspective about overall profit growth. A breakdown of profit growth by ownership (state-owned vs. non-state-owned enterprises), shows that non-SOE industrial profits led the decline in overall profit growth in 2017-2018. While it has not yet occurred, a significant pickup in non-SOE profit growth may herald a durable bottom for industrial sector profits, which could act as a meaningful outperformance catalyst for Chinese stocks over the coming 6-12 months. To us, the significant decline in corporate health noted in this report reinforces both our tactically bearish and cyclically bullish recommendations towards Chinese stocks. In the near-term, the risks facing Chinese stocks are high, as the combination of the reluctance of policymakers to stimulate aggressively, weaker corporate health, and the likelihood of negative near-term economic and profit momentum is a perfect storm for stock prices. We recommend an underweight position relative to global stocks for the remainder of the year. However, over the cyclical time horizon (i.e. 6-12 month), these circumstances also suggest high odds in favor of Chinese policymakers soon accepting the need to ease meaningfully further. Barring a major episode of earnings dilution among publicly-listed stocks, significant further easing along with controlled currency depreciation makes a strong case for an overweight stance towards Chinese stocks versus the global benchmark in local currency terms.2 We recommend that investors who are not yet invested in Chinese assets to remain on the sidelines until clearer signs of materially stronger stimulus emerge. However, intermediate-term investors who are already positioned in favor of Chinese equities should stay long, as the relative performance trend of Chinese stocks will likely be higher a year from now than it is today.   Qingyun Xu, CFA, Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   BCA's China Industry Watch The BCA China Industry Watch includes four categories of financial ratios to monitor a sector’s leverage, profitability, growth and efficiency, respectively. Some of these ratios, as shown in Table 1, are slightly tweaked from conventional definitions due to data availability. The financial data in our exercise are from the official statistics on overall industrial firms, of which the listed companies are a subset, but most financial ratios based on the two sets of data are very similar, especially for the heavy industries that dominate the Chinese stock markets - both onshore and offshore. The financial ratios on leverage, growth and profitability are almost identical for some sectors, while some other sectors that are not well represented in the stock market, such as technology, healthcare and consumer sectors, show notable divergences. As the Chinese equity universe continues to expand, we expect that the two sets of data will increasingly converge. Appendix: China Industry Watch All Firms Chart II-1Non-Financial Firms: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-2Non-Financial Firms: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-3Non-Financial Firms: Leverage Indicators Chart II-4Non-Financial Firms: Growth Indicators Chart II-5Non-Financial Firms: Profitability Indicators Chart II-6Non-Financial Firms: Efficiency Indicators Oil & Gas Sector Chart II-7Oil&Gas Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-8Oil&Gas Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-9Oil&Gas Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-10Oil&Gas Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-11Oil&Gas Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-12Oil&Gas Sector: Efficiency Indicators   Coal Sector Chart II-13Coal Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-14Coal Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-15Coal Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-16Coal Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-17Coal Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-18Coal Sector: Efficiency Indicators Steel Sector Chart II-19Steel Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-20Steel Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-21Steel Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-22Steel Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-23Steel Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-24Steel Sector: Efficiency Indicators Non Ferrous Metals Sector Chart II-25Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-26Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-27Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-28Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-29Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-30Non Ferrous Metals Sector: Efficiency Indicators Construction Material Sector Chart II-31Construction Material Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart II-32Construction Material Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart II-33Construction Material Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart II-34Construction Material Sector: Growth Indicators Chart II-35Construction Material Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart II-36Efficiency Indicators Machinery Sector Chart III-37Machinery Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-38Machinery Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-39Machinery Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-40Machinery Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-41Machinery Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-42Machinery Sector: Efficiency Indicators Automobile Sector Chart III-43Automobile Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-44Automobile Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-45Automobile Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-46Automobile Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-47Automobile Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-48Automobile Sector: Efficiency Indicators Food & Beverage Sector Chart III-49Food&Beverage Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-50Food&Beverage Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-51Food&Beverage Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-52Food&Beverage Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-53Food&Beverage Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-54Food & Beverage Sector: Efficiency Indicators Information Technology Sector Chart III-55Information Technology Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-56Information Technology Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-57Information Technology Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-58Information Technology Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-59Information Technology Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-60Information Technology Sector: Efficiency Indicators Utilities Sector Chart III-61Utilities Sector: Stock Price & Valuation Indicators Chart III-62Utilities Sector: Relative Performance Of Valuation Indicators Chart III-63Utilities Sector: Leverage Indicators Chart III-64Utilities Sector: Growth Indicators Chart III-65Utilities Sector: Profitability Indicators Chart III-66Utilities Sector: Efficiency Indicators   Footnotes 1      Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Introducing The BCA China Industry Watch”, dated February 10, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2      We continue to recommend that investors hedge the currency exposure of a long Chinese equity position by being long USD-CNH. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Informe especial

Feature Introduction Chart 1Japanese Equities: ##br##Buying Opportunity Or Value Trap? Clients have recently been asking us a lot about Japan. The reason seems clear. With the consistent outperformance of U.S. equities over the past decade, and their rather high valuations now, asset allocators are looking for an alternative. Emerging Markets and the euro zone have major structural concerns which suggest they are unlikely to outperform over any prolonged period (even if they might have a short-lived cyclical pop). Maybe Japan – whose own structural problems are well known and so surely priced in by now – could be a candidate for outperformance and a structural rerating over the next three to five years. Indeed, since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Japanese equities have not performed as badly as you might have imagined: they have performed in line with all their global peers – except for the U.S. (Chart 1). In this Special Report, we answer the most common questions that clients have asked us about the long-term (three to five year) outlook for Japan, and try to address the key issue: Are Japanese equities now a buying opportunity, or still a value trap? Our conclusions are as follows: The Japanese economy is still weighed down by structural problems – stubborn disinflation, and a shrinking and aging population – which means consumption growth will remain weak over the coming years. Japan’s structural problems will not easily be solved, and will continue to dampen the economy’s growth. We think it is unlikely, therefore, that Japanese equities will outperform in the long run. In that sense, Japan probably is a value trap, not a buying opportunity. In the past, Japanese equities benefited from bouts of Chinese reflationary stimulus – which we expect will be ramped up in the coming months – but the effect was usually short-lived and muted. The clash between accommodative monetary policy and contractionary fiscal policy, particularly October’s tax hike, is likely to dampen any revival in the Japanese economy. Global Asset Allocation downgraded Japanese equities to underweight over a six-to-12 month investment horizon in our most recent Quarterly Outlook.1 We find it hard to make a strong “rerating” case for Japan, and so, do not expect Japanese equities to outperform other major developed markets in the long run. Why Isn’t Inflation Rising? Chart 2Domestic Drivers Muted Japanese Inflation The market clearly does not believe that Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor Haruhiko Kuroda can raise inflation to the BoJ’s target of 2%, despite negative interest rates and massive quantitative easing. The 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap rate, a proxy for inflation expectations, is currently at 0.1% (Chart 2, panel 1). Japan’s ultra-accommodative monetary policy has failed to push recorded inflation higher, with the core and core core measures2 both at 0.6% as of June (Chart 2, panel 2). In its recent outlook, the BoJ revised down its inflation forecasts in fiscal years 2019, 2020, and 2021 to 1.0%, 1.3%, and 1.6% respectively, implying that it does not expect to get even close to 2% over the forecast horizon.3  Prior to the bursting of Japan’s bubble in 1990, a big percentage of Japanese inflation came from domestic factors: housing, culture and recreation, and health care. By contrast, prices of items manufactured overseas, mainly in China, and imported goods – especially furniture and clothing – did not rise much. The same was true for other developed economies such as the U.S. and the euro area. However, since the 1990s, domestically-produced items in Japan have failed to rise in price, unlike the situation in the U.S. This kept a lid on Japanese inflation. Housing in particular, which represents about 20% of the inflation basket, now contributes only 0.02% to Japanese core core inflation (Chart 2, panels 3 & 4). Chart 3Deregulation = Low Inflation There are three main reasons for this difference: Stagnant wages Unfavorable demographics Deregulation The first two causes are discussed in detail below. Gradual deregulation of various industries has also been disinflationary. In the 1980s, Japan remained a highly regulated economy, with the government fixing many prices and limiting entry into many sectors. Although change has been slow, deregulation and the introduction of competition have caused structural downward pressure on prices in a number of industries, notably telecommunications and utilities. For example, deregulation of electric power companies in 2016 allowed increased competition and new entrants into the market.4 As a result, electricity prices in Japan dropped from an average of 11.4 JPY/Kwh prior to full deregulation to 9.3 JPY/Kwh (Chart 3). But there are still many industries which are more tightly regulated in Japan than in other advanced economies (the near-ban on car-sharing services such as Uber, and tight restrictions on AirBnB are just the most newsworthy examples). This suggests that structural disinflationary pressures are likely to persist on any further deregulation. Why Is Wage Growth Stagnant, Despite A Tight Labor Market? Chart 4Wages Have Been Beaten Down... Japan’s labor market appears very tight. The unemployment rate is 2.3%, the lowest since the early 1990s, and the jobs-to-applications ratio is 1.61, the highest since the 1970s. And yet wage growth has remained stagnant, averaging only 0.5% over the past five years. (Chart 4).5  There are a number of structural reasons why wages have failed to respond to the tight labor market situation. One major contributory factor is the social norm of “lifetime employment,” whereby many employees, especially at large companies, tend to stay with their initial employer through their careers, being rotated from one department to another, without becoming specialists in any particular field. This means they have little pricing power – and few transferable skills – when it comes to seeking a mid-career change. This social norm is also reflected in Japan’s typical salary schemes, which are based on employment length (Chart 5, panel 1). Wages tend to rise with age, while in other developed economies they peak around the age of 50. Another factor is the big increase in recent years in part-time and temporary positions, which typically pay lower wages than full-time positions. Because employment law makes it hard (if not impossible) to fire workers, companies have tended to prefer hiring non-permanent staff, who are easier to replace. Part-time workers have increased by 11 million over the past three decades, compared to an increase of two million in full-time workers (Chart 5, panel 2). A substantial part of this increase in part-time employment came from both the elderly and women joining the labor market – groups that have little wage bargaining power (Chart 5, panel 3). Part-time wage growth has also turned negative this year (Chart 5, panel 4). Bonuses are a significant portion of wages, and tend to be rather volatile, moving in line with corporate profits, which have weakened this year (Chart 5, panel 5). Japan’s structural problems will not easily be solved, and will continue to dampen the economy’s growth. Nonetheless, there are some tentative signs of a change in this social norm. The number of employees changing jobs has been rising over the past few years. This is mostly evident among employees aged over 45, signaling the need for experienced personnel (Chart 6, panel 1). The percentage of unemployed who had voluntarily quit their jobs, rather than being let go, has also reached an all-time high (Chart 6, panel 2). This evidence suggests that employees are increasingly willing to leave their jobs in search of a more interesting or a better-paid one. Given such a tight labor market, it seems only a matter of time before there is some pressure on employers to increase salaries in order to attract talent. Chart 5...Mainy Due To Part-Time Employment Chart 6Changing The Norm   Is There An Answer To Japan’s Demographic Problem? Chart 7Japanese Population: Shrinking And Aging Deteriorating demographics is a key reason why inflation has remained subdued. The Japanese population peaked in 2009 and, over the past eight years, has shrunk on average by 0.2%, or 220,000 people, a year. Furthermore, the working-age population (25-64) has shrunk by 6 million, or 10%, since its peak in 2005. With marital rates continuing to fall, and fertility rates doing no more than stabilizing, there is no sign of a quick turnaround in this situation (Chart 7, panels 1 & 2). Prime Minister Abe has eased immigration laws to try to put a stop to the population decline. Late last year, the Diet passed a law that will allow more foreign workers into the country. The law will provide long-term work visas for immigrants in various blue-collar sectors, whereas the previous regulation allowed in only highly skilled workers. It will also enable foreign workers to upgrade to a higher-tier visa category, giving them a path to permanent residency, and allowing them to bring their families along.6  However, Japan’s closed culture raises the question of how successful Prime Minister Abe’s immigration reforms will be. The number of foreign residents has risen over the past few years, reaching a cumulative 2.73 million people, but this has been insufficient to reverse the decline in the population. In addition, without implementing effective measures to integrate new immigrants and support their efforts to become long-term residents, these reforms are likely to be minor in their impact (Chart 7, panel 3). Chart 8Aging Population = Slowing Productivity Japan’s population is not just shrinking but also aging. People aged 65 and older comprise 28% of the total population (Chart 7, panel 4). That figure is projected to reach 40% within the next 40 years. The dependency ratio – those younger than 15 years and older than 64, as a ratio of the working-age population – continues to rise rapidly (Chart 7, panel 5). Moreover, older people tend to be less productive. Because of this, Japan’s productivity may continue to decline from its current level, which is already low compared to other developed countries (Chart 8). The combination of a shrinking working-age population and poor productivity growth means that Japan’s trend real GDP growth over the next decade – absent an increase in capital expenditure or improvement in technology – is unlikely to be above zero.7   Some argue that Japan’s aging population could be the trigger to overcoming its disinflation problem. They argue that, as the share of the elderly-to-total-population increases, public expenditure on health care will balloon. The United Nations projects the median age in Japan to be 53 years, 10 and 5 years older than in the U.S. and China, respectively, by 2060 (Chart 9). This implies that the Japanese government, which currently pays about 80% of total health care expenditure, will face an increasing burden from medical spending, elderly care, and public pension payments. These expenditures are projected to increase from 19% to 25% of GDP (Chart 9, panel 2). The government, therefore, may have no alternative but to resort to monetizing its debt to pay these bills, which would ultimately prove to be inflationary. Chart 9Aging Population = Higher Fiscal Burden In some countries, BCA has argued, an aging population is inflationary because retirees’ incomes fall almost to zero after retirement, but expenditure rises, particularly towards at the end of life as they spend more on health care.8 The resulting dissaving, and disparity between the demand and supply of goods, should have inflationary effects. But this rationale does not hold for Japanese households. Older people in Japan tend to maintain their level of savings (Chart 10). This phenomenon might change as a new generation, keener on leisure activities and less culturally attuned to maximizing savings, retires. But to date, at least, Japan’s aging process has been disinflationary. It is likely, then, that a combination of subdued wage growth, decreased spending by the elderly, low demand for housing, and the ineffectiveness of an ultra-accommodative monetary policy is likely to keep inflation low. Moreover, to reduce the burden on its budget, the government will continue its efforts to keep down health care costs, which have a 5% weight in the core core inflation measure. We find it unlikely, therefore, that the BoJ will achieve its 2% inflation target over the next few years. So, What Else Could The BoJ Do? Chart 11The BoJ's Ammunition Is Running Out Over the past six years, since Kuroda became governor in 2013, the Bank of Japan has rolled out aggressive monetary easing. It has cut rates to -0.1% and introduced a policy of “yield curve control,” which aims to keep the yield on 10-year JGBs at 0%, plus or minus 20 basis points. As a result, it now holds JPY479 trillion of JGBs, or 46% of the total outstanding amount (and equivalent to 89% of Japan’s GDP). It has also bought an average of JPY6 trillion of equity ETFs a year over the past three years (Chart 11, panels 1 & 2), to bring its total equity ETF holdings to JPY28 trillion, almost 5% of Japan's equity market cap. However, as noted above, these policies have had little impact on inflation, or on inflation expectations. BCA’s Central Bank Monitor indicates that Japan needs to ease monetary conditions further (Chart 11, panel 3). What alternative tools could the BoJ use to spur inflation? The BoJ could cut rates further, and indeed the futures market is discounting a 10 basis points cut over the next 12 months (Chart 11, panel 4). In its July Monetary Policy Committee meeting, the bank committed to keeping policy easy “at least through around spring 2020.” But it seems reluctant to cut rates, given that this would further damage the profitability of Japan’s banks, particularly the rather fragile regional banks. Indeed, one can argue that a small rate cut would be unlikely to have much effect, given the impotence of previous such moves. The BoJ might be inclined to emulate the ECB and extend its asset purchase program. It owns only JPY3 trillion of corporate bonds, and has bought almost no new ones since 2013 (Chart 11, panel 5), although the small size of the Japanese corporate bond market would give it limited scope to increase these purchases. It could also increase its purchases of REITs, of which it currently owns JPY26 trillion. It could even consider buying foreign assets (as does the Swiss National Bank), though this would annoy the U.S. authorities, who would consider it currency manipulation. Some economists argue in favor of a Japanese equivalent of the ECB’s Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO). In other words, the BoJ should provide funds to banks at rates significantly below zero, provided they use the proceeds to give out loans to households and corporations.9 This would not only increase credit in the economy, but also bolster banks’ declining profitability. Some academics consider Japan, which appears stuck in a liquidity trap, as the perfect setting to try out Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).10,11 However, the Ministry of Finance remains fixated on reducing Japan’s excessive pile of outstanding government debt, which is currently 238% of GDP. When MMT was debated in the Japanese Diet this June, Finance Minister Taro Aso dismissed it, saying “I’m not sure I should even call it a theory, it’s a line of argument,” and insisted that tax hikes are necessary to secure Japan’s welfare system. The Ministry’s current plan is to close the primary budget deficit by 2027.  Moreover, the Bank of Japan Law bans the central bank from underwriting government debt, due to the abuses of this in the 1930s, when it funded Japan’s militarist expansion12 – though there are no limits on how much the BoJ can buy in the secondary market.  Our conclusion is that negative rates and quantitative easing have reached the limit of their effectiveness. Even if the BoJ ramps up the measures it has taken up until now, this will have little impact on inflation. It will be only when the government finally understands that a combination of easy fiscal and monetary policy is single effective tool left that the situation can change. There is little sign of this happening soon. It will probably take a crisis before this mindset shifts. Are There Any Signs Of Improvement In Japan’s Banking Sector? Japan’s financial sector is also one of its longstanding problems. After Japan’s 1980s bubble burst, the BoJ aggressively cut rates from 6% to 0.5% over the span of eight years. Long-term rates also fell. Falling interest rates reduced Japanese banks’ net interest margins. The banks spent the 1990s cleaning up their balance sheets and recapitalizing themselves. In the end, the banks’ cumulative losses (including write-offs and increased provisioning) during the 1992-2004 period reached the equivalent of 20% of Japanese GDP.13 Japanese bank stocks have consistently underperformed the aggregate index since the late 1980s (with the exception of a short period in the mid-2000s) – and by 75% since 1995 (Chart 12, panel 1). It now seems like banks' relative performance is bound by the policy rate. It is likely, then, that a combination of subdued wage growth, decreased spending by the elderly, low demand for housing, and the ineffectiveness of an ultra-accommodative monetary policy is likely to keep inflation low. Bank loan growth throughout the period of 1995-2006 was weak or negative, as banks became more risk averse and borrowers focused on repairing their balance sheets (Chart 12, panel 2). It has picked up a little over the past decade, but remains low at around 2%-4%. This has been a drag on economic activity since both Japan’s corporate and household sectors rely much more heavily on banks for funding compared to the U.S. or the euro area (Chart 12, panels 3 & 4). As a result of stagnant loan growth at home, Japanese banks have in recent years expanded their activities overseas, particularly in south-east Asia. Foreign lending for Japan’s three largest banks comprises 29.7% of total loans, 33% of which is to Asia.14 This represents a risk for future stability since these assets could easily become non-performing in the event of an Emerging Markets crisis in the next recession. Chart 12Bank Stocks Have Consistently Underperformed... Chart 13...Because Of Weak Loan Growth ##br##And Poor Profits By the mid-2000s, Japanese banks had finished cleaning up from the 1980s bubble and the non-performing loan ratio is now low. But measures of profitability such as return on assets and net interest margin remain poor by international standards (Chart 13). Japanese financial institutions’ capital adequacy ratios have also deteriorated moderately over the past five years, according to the BoJ’s Financial System Report, as risk-weighted assets have increased more quickly than profits. The core capital adequacy ratio of just above 10% is significantly lower than in other major developed economies.15 How Should Investors Be Positioned In The Short-Term? There are two factors that will determine how Japanese equities perform over the next 12 months: Chinese stimulus, and the impact of the consumption tax hike in October. Can Chinese Reflation Help Boost Japanese Economic Activity? Chart 14Chinese Stimulus Boosts Japan's Activity... Chart 15...Yet Its Impact Is Short-Lived And Muted While Japan is not a particularly open economy – exports represent only 15% of GDP – its manufacturing sector is very exposed to global trade, and the swings in this sector (which is a lofty 20% of GDP) have a disproportionately large marginal impact on the overall economy. China accounts for 20% of Japan’s exports, roughly 3% of Japan’s GDP (Chart 14). China’s economic slowdown since 2017 has clearly weighed heavily on Japanese exports and the manufacturing sector. Japanese machine tool orders have contracted for nine months, in June reaching the lowest growth since the GFC, -38% year-on-year. Vehicle production growth has also been weak, rising only 1.8% year-to-date compared to 2018, and overall industrial production growth has turned negative, falling by 4.1% YoY in June. It seems that global growth data has not yet bottomed. The German manufacturing PMI remains well below the boom/bust line at 43.2. Korean export growth is also contracting at a double-digit rate. Nevertheless, we expect the global manufacturing downturn – which typically lasts about 18 months from peak-to-trough – to bottom towards the end of this year.16 This will be supported by the Chinese authorities accelerating their monetary and fiscal stimulus, although the magnitude of this might not be as big as it was in 2012 and 2015.17 Japanese economic activity has historically been closely correlated with Chinese credit growth, with a lag of six-to-nine months (Chart 15). What Will Be The Impact Of The Consumption Tax Hike? Japanese consumer demand has been sluggish for some time, mainly as a result of low wage growth. The planned rise in the consumption tax from 8% to 10% in October is likely to dampen consumption further. With the economy currently so weak, there seems little justification for a tax rise. But, having postponed it twice, it seems highly unlikely that Prime Minister Abe will do so again, particularly after his victory in last month’s Upper House election, which was a de facto referendum on the tax hike. Chart 16Previous Tax Hikes Hurt Sales Badly The OECD, based on Japanese government data, estimates the impact on households of the tax hike will be 5.7 trillion yen (about 1% of GDP).18 Consumers did not take previous tax rate hikes well. Spending was brought forward to the two to three months immediately before the hike. However, following the hike, not only did sales fall back, they also trended down for some time (Chart 16). The risk to the economy is that the same happens again.  The government, however, is planning several measures to mitigate the tax burden (Table 1). It will not apply the tax increase to food and beverages, which will stay at 8%. The government will implement a fiscal package including free early childhood education, support for low-income earners, and tax breaks on certain consumer durable goods, such as automobiles and housing. It will also introduce a rebate program, to encourage consumer spending at small retailers using non-cash payments (partly to reduce tax avoidance by these businesses).19 Based on the government’s estimates, these measures will be enough to fully offset the impact of the tax hike. However, the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor sees fiscal policy tightening due to the tax rate hike, although by less than in 2014. Its estimate is a drag of 0.6% of potential GDP in 2020 (Chart 17). Table 1Easing The Tax Hike Burden Chart 17Clash Of Policies: Fiscal Vs. Monetary   Previous sales tax hikes caused a short-lived jump in inflation, which trended lower afterwards. Assuming a full pass-through rate of price increases to consumers, the BoJ expects the hike to raise core inflation by +0.2% and +0.1% in fiscal years 2019 and 2020 respectively.20 Consumers did not take previous tax rate hikes well. As such, over the next 12 months, Global Asset Allocation recommends an underweight on Japanese equities. While a bottoming of the global manufacturing cycle and the impact of Chinese stimulus are positive factors, there are better markets in which to play this, given the risks surrounding Japanese consumption caused by the consumption tax rise. Are Improvements In Corporate Governance Enough To Make Japanese Equities A Long-Term Buy? Chart 18Corporate Governance Not Improving Enough Many investors believe that improved corporate governance could be the catalyst the stock market needs to outperform. It is true that there have been some improvements in recent years. Japanese companies have increased the share of independent directors on their boards, although this remains low by international standards (Chart 18, panel 1). Share buybacks have increased, and are on track to hit all-time high this year (Chart 18, panel 2). However, the improvements are still somewhat superficial. Cash holdings of Japanese companies are about 50% of GDP and 100% of market capitalization. The dividend payout ratio, at 30%, is significantly lower than in other developed markets, for example 40% in the U.S. and 50% in the euro area (Chart 18, panels 3 & 4). Why haven’t Japanese corporations returned their excess cash to shareholders? The answer is that many companies simply do not believe that they hold excess cash (Chart 19). The lack of a vibrant market for corporate control, and the general failure of activist foreign investment funds in Japan, means there is also less pressure on companies to use cash efficiently, and to raise leverage to improve their return on equity. The growing presence of the BoJ in the stock market is also a concern. The BoJ now holds over 70% of outstanding ETF equity assets, and is on track to become the single largest owner of Japanese stocks within a couple of years. With the BoJ not taking an active role as a shareholder, this risks undermining corporate governance reforms.21 It also suggests that, without the BoJ’s equity purchases over the past few years, Japanese equities might have performed even worse. Foreign investors have been the main buyers of Japanese equities over the past two decades, offsetting net selling by domestic households and most types of financial institutions. But foreign purchases have recently started to roll over, a trend that could be another catalyst for downward pressures on the stock market, if it were to continue (Chart 20). Chart 20Who Will Buy If Foreigners Don't?   We conclude, therefore, that signs of improvement in corporate governance are still sporadic and not sufficient to justify a major rerating of the Japanese corporate sector.   Bottom Line GAA recommends an underweight on Japan over a 12-month time horizon, since the drag on consumption from the tax hike will override any positive impact from a rebound in global growth caused by Chinese stimulus. In the longer term, a stubborn refusal to use fiscal policy as well as monetary easing, the limited improvement in corporate governance, and Japan’s intractable structural problems such as demographics, mean it is hard to make a strong rerating case for Japanese equities.   Amr Hanafy, Research Associate amrh@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, “Precautionary Dovishness – Or Looming Recession?” dated July 1, 2019, available on gaa.bcaresearch.com. 2      The BoJ calculates core inflation as headline inflation less fresh food, and core core inflation as headline inflation less fresh food and energy. 3      Please see “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (July 2019),” Bank Of Japan, July 2019. 4      Please see “Energy transition Japan: 'We have to disrupt ourselves,' says TEPCO,” Engerati, April 24, 2017.   5      Wage growth is total cash earnings, which includes regular/scheduled earnings plus overtime pay plus special earnings/bonuses. 6      Menju Toshihiro, “Japan’s Historic Immigration Reform: A Work in Progress,” nippon.com, February 6,2019. 7      Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8      Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Investor’s Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated May 22, 2019 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 9      Takuji Okubo, “Japan’s dormant central bank may have to rouse itself once more,” Financial Times, May 27, 2019. 10     The core idea of MMT is that, since governments can print as much of their own currency as they require, they do not need to raise money in order to spend money. Japan could increase its fiscal spending and, as long as the BoJ bought the increased bond issuance, this would not raise interest rates. 11     Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “MMT And Me,” dated May 31 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12     Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “The Emperor’s Act Of Grace,” dated 8 June 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 13     Mariko Fujii and Masahiro Kawai, “Lessons from Japan’s Banking Crisis 1991-2005,” ADB Institute Working Paper, No. 222, June 2010. 14     Mizuho, Mitsubishi UFJ and Sumitomo Mitsui. Data from March 2019 annual reports. 15     Please see “Financial System Report,” Bank of Japan, April 2019. 16       Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Cycles,” dated July 26, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 17       Please see GAA’s latest Monthly Portfolio Update, “Manufacturing Recession, Consumer Resilience, Dovish Central Banks,” dated 1 August 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 18     Please see “OECD Economic Surveys: Japan,” OECDiLibrary, April 15, 2019. 19     Please see “Government plans 5% rebates for some cashless payments after 2019 tax hike,”The Japan Times, November 22, 2018. 20     Please see “Outlook For Economic Activity And Price (July 2019),” Bank Of Japan, July 30, 2019. 21     Andrew Whiffin, “BoJ’s dominance over ETFs raises concern on distorting influence,” Financial Times, March 31, 2019.

Informe especial

BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1   The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Chart II-1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart II-1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart II-2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart II-2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart II-3). Chart II-3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart II-4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart II-4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart II-5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4   Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart II-6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart II-6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart II-7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S.  Chart II-7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. Chart II-8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart II-8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart II-8, bottom panel).   The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart II-9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart II-9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are Leveraged Than U.S. Ones On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production.  These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart II-10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Chart II-10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: 1. From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. 2. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart II-11). Chart II-11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over 3. The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. 4. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth.  Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart II-12). Chart II-12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart II-13). Chart II-13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Chart II-13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I)   Chart II-14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart II-14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates. Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart II-15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart II-15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart II-16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart II-17). Chart II-16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart II-17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart II-18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart II-18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Chart II-19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart II-19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6  Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart II-20). We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart II-21). Chart II-20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps Chart II-21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets   Chart II-22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart II-22). Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart II-23). On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Chart II-23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart II-24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart II-24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table II-1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart II-25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart II-26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart II-26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart II-26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II)   The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart II-27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade.  Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart II-28). Chart II-27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves Chart II-28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds   Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp. Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst   Summary Of Views And Recommendations The Bulls… …And The Bears Footnotes 1       To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2       Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3       Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4       Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5     France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6     Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Informe especial

BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1 The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart 1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart 2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart 2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart 4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart 4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart 5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4 Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart 6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart 6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart 7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S. Chart 7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart 8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart 8, bottom panel). The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart 9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart 8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart 9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones   On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production. Chart 10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart 10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart 11). The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth. Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Chart 12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I) Chart 13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. Chart 14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates.   Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart 15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart 16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart 17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart 18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart 18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart 19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6 Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart 21). This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care   Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart 24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart 24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table 1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart 25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. Table 1 (DOUG)The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession … We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart 26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart 26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart 26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II) The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. Chart 27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart 27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade. Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart 28). Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. Chart 28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp.   Summary Of Views And Recommendations   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5 France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends* MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Informe especial

BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1   The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart 1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart 2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart 2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart 4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart 4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart 5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4   Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart 6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart 6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart 7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S.  Chart 7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart 8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart 8, bottom panel).   The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart 9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart 8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart 9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones   On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production.  Chart 10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart 10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart 11). The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth.  Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Chart 12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I) Chart 13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. Chart 14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates.   Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart 15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart 16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart 17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart 18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart 18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart 19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6  Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart 21). This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care   Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart 24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart 24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table 1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart 25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. Table 1 (DOUG)The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession … We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart 26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart 26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart 26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II) The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. Chart 27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart 27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade.  Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart 28). Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. Chart 28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp.   Summary Of Views And Recommendations   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5      France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Informe especial

BCA takes pride in its independence. Strategists publish what they really believe, informed by their framework and analysis. Occasionally, this independence results in strongly diverging views and we currently are in one of those times. Within BCA, two views on the cyclical (six to 12-months) outlook for assets have emerged. One camp expects global growth to rebound in the second half of the year. Along with accelerating growth, they anticipate stock prices and risk assets to remain firm, cyclical equities to outperform defensive ones, safe-haven yields to move up, and the dollar to weaken. Meanwhile, another group foresees a further deterioration in activity or a delayed recovery, additional downside in stocks and risk assets, outperformance of defensives relative to cyclicals, low safe-haven yields, and a generally stronger dollar. For the sake of transparency, we have asked representatives of each camp to make their case in a round-table discussion, allowing our clients to decide for themselves which view is more appealing to them. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, and Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis take the mantle for the bullish camp. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, and European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi represent the bearish group.1 The round-table discussion below focuses on the cyclical outlook. For longer investment horizons, most strategists agree that a recession is highly likely by 2022. Moreover, on a long-term basis, valuations in both risk assets and safe-haven bonds are very demanding. In this context, a significant back up in yields could hammer risk assets. The BCA Round Table Mathieu Savary: Yield curve inversions have often been harbingers of recessions. Anastasios, you are amongst those investors troubled by this inversion. Do you not worry that this episode might prove similar to 1998, when the curve only inverted temporarily and did not foreshadow a recession? Moreover, how do you account for the highly variable time lags between the inversion of the yield curve and the occurrence of a recession? Anastasios Avgeriou: The yield curve inverts at or near the peak of the business cycle and it eventually forewarns of upcoming recessions. This past December, parts of the yield curve inverted and now, BCA’s U.S. Equity Strategy service is heeding the signal from this simple indicator, especially given that the SPX has subsequently made all-time highs as our research predicted.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS)The 1998 Episode Revisited The yield curve inversion forecasts a Fed rate cut, and it has never been wrong on that front. It served well investors that heeded the message in June of 1998 as the market soon thereafter fell 20% in a heartbeat. If investors got out at the 1998 peak near 1200 and forwent about 350 points of gains until the March 2000 SPX cycle peak, they still benefited if they held tight as the market ultimately troughed near 777 in October 2002 (Chart 1). With regard to timing the previous seven recessions using the yield curve, if we accept that mid-1998 is the starting point of the inversion, it took 33 months before the recession commenced. Last cycle, the recession began 24 months after the inversion. Consequently, December 2020 is the earliest possible onset of recession and September 2021, the latest. Our forecast calls for SPX EPS to fall 20% in 2021 to $140 with the multiple dropping between 13.5x and 16.5x for an SPX end-2020 target range of 1,890-2,310.3 In other words we are not willing to play a 100-200 point advance for a potential 1,000 point drawdown. The risk/reward tradeoff is to the downside, and we choose to sit this one out. Mathieu: Rob, you take a much more sanguine view of the current curve inversion. Why? Rob Robis: While the four most dangerous words in investing are “this time is different,” this time really does appear to be different. Never before have negative term premia on longer-term Treasury yields and a curve inversion coexisted (Chart 2). Longer-term Treasury yields have therefore been pushed down to extremely low levels by factors beyond just expectations of a lower fed funds rate. The negative Treasury term premium is distorting the economic message of the U.S. yield curve inversion. Chart 2 (ROB)Negative Term Premium Distorting The Economic Message Of An Inverted Yield Curve Term premia are depressed everywhere, as seen in German, Japanese and other yields, reflecting the intense demand for safe assets like government bonds during a period of heightened uncertainty. Global bond markets may also be discounting a higher probability of the ECB restarting its Asset Purchase Program, as term premia typically fall sharply when central banks embark on quantitative easing. This has global spillovers. Prior to previous recessions, U.S. Treasury curve inversions occurred when the Fed was running an unequivocally tight monetary policy. That is not the case today. The real fed funds rate still is not above the Fed’s estimate of the neutral real rate, a.k.a. “r-star,” which was the necessary ingredient for all previous Treasury curve inversions since 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB)Fed Policy Is Not Tight Enough For Sustained Curve Inversion Mathieu: The level of policy accommodation will most likely determine whether Anastasios or Rob is proven right. Peter, you have been steadfastly arguing that policy, in the U.S. at least, remains easy. Can you elaborate why? Peter Berezin: Remember that the neutral rate of interest is the rate that equalizes the level of aggregate demand with the economy’s supply-side potential. Loose fiscal policy and fading deleveraging headwinds are boosting demand in the United States. So is rising wage growth, especially at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major imbalances, I believe that the economy can tolerate higher rates without significant ill-effects. In other words, monetary policy is currently quite easy. Of course, we cannot observe the neutral rate directly. Like a black hole, one can only detect it based on the effect that it has on its surroundings. Housing is by far the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. If history is any guide, the recent decline in mortgage rates will boost housing activity in the remainder of the year (Chart 4). If that relationship breaks down, as it did during the Great Recession, it would suggest that the neutral rate is quite low. Chart 4 (PETER)Declining Mortgage Rates Bode Well For Housing Given that mortgage underwriting standards have been quite strong and the homeowner vacancy is presently very low, our guess is that housing will hold up well. We should know better in the next few months. Mathieu: Dhaval, you do not agree. Why do you think global rates are not accommodative? Dhaval Joshi: Actually, I think that global rates are accommodative, but that the global bond yield can rise by just 70 bps before conditions become perilously un-accommodative. Here’s where I disagree with Peter: for me, the danger doesn’t come from economics, it comes from the mathematics of ultra-low bond yields. The unprecedented and experimental panacea of our era has been ‘universal QE’ – which has led to ultra-low bond yields everywhere. But what is not understood is that when bond yields reach and remain close to their lower bound, weird things happen to the financial markets. I refer you to other reports for the details, but in a nutshell, the proximity of the lower bound to yields increases the risk of owning supposedly ‘safe’ bonds to the risk of owning so-called ‘risk-assets’. The result is that the valuation of risk-assets rises exponentially (Chart 5). Because when the riskiness of the asset-classes converges, investors price risk-assets to deliver the same ultra-low nominal return as bonds.4 Comparisons with previous economic cycles miss the current danger. The post-2000 policy easing distorted the global economy by engineering a credit boom – so the subsequent danger emanated from the most credit-sensitive sectors in the economy such as mortgage lending. In contrast, the post-2008 ‘universal QE’ has severely distorted the valuation relationship between bonds and global risk-assets – so this is where the current danger lies. Higher bond yields can suddenly undermine the valuation support of global risk-assets whose $400 trillion worth dwarfs the global economy by five to one. Where is this tipping point? It is when the global 10-year yield – defined as the average of the U.S., euro area,5 and China – approaches 2.5%. Through the past five years, the inability of this yield to remain above 2.5% confirms the hyper-sensitivity of financial conditions to this tipping point (Chart 6). Right now, I agree that bond yields are accommodative. But the scope for yields to move higher is quite limited. Chart 6 (DHAVAL)Since 2015, the Global Long Bond Yield Has Struggled To Surpass 2.5 Percent Mathieu: Monetary policy is important to the outlook, but so is the global manufacturing cycle. The global growth slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, tradeable goods in particular. Across advanced economies, the service and consumer sectors have been surprisingly resilient, but this will not last if the industrial sector decelerates further. Arthur, you still do not anticipate any major improvement in global trade and industrial production. Can you elaborate why? Chart 7 (ARTHUR)Global Trade Is Down Due To China Not U.S. Arthur Budaghyan: To properly assess the economic outlook, one needs to understand what has caused the ongoing global trade/manufacturing downturn. One thing we know for certain: It originated in China, not the U.S. Chart 7 illustrates that Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese and Singaporean exports to China have been shrinking at an annual rate of 10%, while their shipments to the U.S. have been growing. China’s aggregate imports have also been contracting. This entails that from the perspective of the rest of the world, China has been and remains in recession. U.S. manufacturing is the least exposed to China, which is the main reason why it has been the last shoe to drop. Hence, the U.S. has lagged in this downturn, and one should not be looking to the U.S. for clues about a potential global recovery. We need to gauge what will turn Chinese demand around. In this regard, the rising credit and fiscal spending impulse is positive, but it has so far failed to kick start a recovery (Chart 8). The key reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies. Notably, the marginal propensity to spend of mainland companies leads industrial metals prices by a few months, and it currently continues to point south (Chart 8, bottom panel). The lack of willingness among Chinese consumers and enterprises to spend is due to several factors: (1) the U.S.-China confrontation; (2) high levels of indebtedness among both enterprises and households (Chart 9); (3) ongoing regulatory scrutiny over banks and shadow banking as well as local government debt; and (4) a lack of outright government subsidies for purchases of autos and housing. Chart 8 (ARTHUR)Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart 9 (ARTHUR)Chinese Households Are More Leveraged Than U.S. Ones   On the whole, the falling marginal propensity to spend will all but ensure that any recovery in mainland household and corporate spending is delayed. Mathieu: Meanwhile, Peter, you have a much more optimistic stance. Why do you differ so profoundly with Arthur’s view? Peter: China’s deleveraging campaign began more than a year before global manufacturing peaked. I have no doubt that slower Chinese credit growth weighed on global capex, but we should not lose sight of the fact there are natural ebbs and flows at work. Most manufactured goods retain some value for a while after they are purchased. If spending on, say, consumer durable goods or business equipment rises to a high level for an extended period, a glut will form, requiring a period of lower production. Chart 10 (PETER)The Global Manufacturing Cycle Has Likely Reached A Bottom These demand cycles typically last about three years; roughly 18 months on the way up, 18 months on the way down (Chart 10). The last downleg in the global manufacturing cycle began in early 2018, so if history is any guide, we are nearing a trough. The fact that U.S. manufacturing output rose in both May and June, followed by this week’s sharp rebound in the July Philly Fed Manufacturing survey, supports this view. Of course, extraneous forces could complicate matters. If trade tensions ratchet higher, this would weaken my bullish thesis. Nevertheless, with China stimulating its economy again, it would probably take a severe trade war to push the global economy into recession. Mathieu: Dhaval, you are not as negative as Arthur, but nonetheless expect a slowdown in the second half of the year. What is your rationale? Dhaval: To be clear, I am not forecasting a recession or major downturn – unless, as per my previous answer, the global 10-year bond yield approaches 2.5% and triggers a severe dislocation in global risk-assets. In fact, many people get the relationship between recession and financial market dislocation back-to-front: they think that the recession causes the financial market dislocation when, in most cases, the financial market dislocation causes the recession! Nevertheless, I do believe that European and global growth is entering a regular down-oscillation based on the following compelling evidence: From a low last summer, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in the developed economies have already rebounded to the upper end of multi-year ranges. Short-term credit impulses in Europe, the U.S., and China are entering down-oscillations (Chart 11). The best current activity indicators, specifically the ZEW economic sentiment indicators, have rolled over. The outperformance of industrials – the equity sector most exposed to global growth – has also rolled over. Why expect a down-oscillation? Because it is the rate of decline in the bond yield that drove the rebound in growth after its low last summer. Furthermore, it is impossible for the rate of decline in the bond yield to keep increasing, or even stay where it is. Counterintuitively, if bond yields decline, but at a reduced pace, the effect is to slow economic growth. Mathieu: A positive and a negative view of the world logically result in bifurcated outlooks for interest rates and the dollar. Rob, how do you see U.S., German, and Japanese yields evolving over the coming 12 months? Rob: If global growth rebounds, U.S. Treasury yields will have far more upside than Bund or JGB yields. Inflation expectations should recover faster in the U.S., with the Fed taking inflationary risks by cutting rates with a 3.7% unemployment rate and core CPI inflation at 2.1%. The Fed is also likely to disappoint by delivering fewer rate cuts than are currently discounted by markets (90bps over the next 12 months). Treasury yields can therefore increase more than German and Japanese yields, with the ECB and BoJ more likely to deliver the modest rate cuts currently discounted in their yield curves (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL)Short-Term Impulses Rebounded... But Are Now Rolling Over Chart 12 (ROB)U.S. Treasuries Will Underperform Bunds & JGBs Japanese yields will remain mired at or below zero over the next 6-12 months, as wage growth and core inflation remain too anemic for the BoJ to alter its 0% target on 10-year JGB yields. German yields have a bit more potential to rise if European growth begins to recover, but will lag any move higher in Treasury yields. That means that the Treasury-Bund and Treasury-JGB spreads will move higher over the next year. Negative German and Japanese yields may look completely unappetizing compared to +2% U.S. Treasury yields, but this handicap vanishes when all three yields are expressed in U.S. dollar terms. Hedging a 10-year German Bund or JGB into higher-yielding U.S. dollars creates yields that are 50-60bps higher than a 10-year U.S. Treasury. It is abundantly clear that German and Japanese bonds will outperform Treasuries over the next year if global growth recovers. Mathieu: Peter, your positive view on global growth means that the Fed will cut rates less than what is currently priced into the OIS curve. So why do you expect the dollar to weaken in the second half of 2019? Peter: What the Fed does affects interest rate differentials, but just as important is what other central banks do. The ECB is not going to raise rates over the next 12 months. However, if euro area growth surprises on the upside later this year, investors will begin to question the need for the ECB to keep policy rates in negative territory until mid-2024. The market’s expectation of where policy rates will be five years out tends to correlate well with today’s exchange rate. By that measure, there is scope for interest rate differentials to narrow against the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (I) Chart 13B (PETER)Interest Rate Expectations Against The U.S. Should Narrow (II) Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 14). This countercyclicality stems from the fact that the U.S. economy is more geared towards services than manufacturing compared with the rest of the world. Chart 14 (PETER)The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency As such, when global growth accelerates, capital tends to flow from the U.S. to the rest of the world, translating into more demand for foreign currency and less demand for dollars. If global growth picks up in the remainder of the year, as I expect, the dollar will weaken. Mathieu: Arthur, as you are significantly more negative on growth than either Rob or Peter, how do you see the dollar and global yields evolving over the coming six to 12 months? Arthur: I am positive on the trade-weighted U.S. dollar for the following reasons: The U.S. dollar is a countercyclical currency – it exhibits a negative correlation with the global business cycle. Persistent weakness in the global economy emanating from China/EM is positive for the dollar because the U.S. economy is the major economic block least exposed to a China/EM slowdown. Meanwhile, the greenback is only loosely correlated with U.S. interest rates. Thereby, the argument that lower U.S. rates will drive the value of the U.S. currency much lower is overemphasized. The Federal Reserve will cut rates by more than what is currently priced into the market only in a scenario of a complete collapse in global growth. Yet this scenario would be dollar bullish. In this case, the dollar’s strong inverse relationship with global growth will outweigh its weak positive relationship with interest rates.   Contrary to consensus views, the U.S. dollar is not very expensive. According to unit labor costs based on the real effective exchange rate – the best currency valuation measure – the greenback is only one standard deviation above its fair value. Often, financial markets tend to overshoot to 1.5 or 2 standard deviations below or above their historical mean before reversing their trend. One of the oft-cited headwinds facing the dollar is positioning, yet there is a major discrepancy between positioning in DM and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. In aggregate, investors – asset managers and leveraged funds – have neutral exposure to DM currencies, but they are very long liquid EM exchange rates such as the BRL, MXN, ZAR and RUB versus the greenback. The dollar strength will occur mostly versus EM and commodities currencies. In other words, the euro, other European currencies and the yen will outperform EM exchange rates. I have less conviction on global bond yields. While global growth will disappoint, yields have already fallen a lot and the U.S. economy is currently not weak enough to justify around 90 basis points of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Mathieu: Before we move on to investment recommendations, Anastasios, you have done a lot of interesting work on the outlook for U.S. profits. What is the message of your analysis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS)Gravitational Pull Anastasios: While markets cheered the trade truce following the recent G-20 meeting, no tariff rollback was agreed. Since the tariff rate on $200bn of Chinese imports went up from 10% to 25% on May 10, odds are high that manufacturing will remain in the doldrums. This will likely continue to weigh on profits for the remainder of the year. Profit growth should weaken further in the coming six months. Periods of falling manufacturing PMIs result in larger negative earnings growth surprises as market forecasters rarely anticipate the full breadth and depth of slowdowns. Absent profit growth, equity markets lack the necessary ‘oxygen’ for a durable high-quality rally. Until global growth momentum turns, investors should fade rallies. Our four-factor SPX EPS growth model is flirting with the contraction zone. In addition, our corporate pricing power proxy and Goldman Sachs’ Current Activity Indicator both send a distress signal for SPX profits (Chart 15). Already, more than half of the S&P 500 GICS1 sectors’ profits are estimated to have contracted in Q2, and three sectors could see declining revenues on a year-over-year basis, according to I/B/E/S data. Q3 depicts an equally grim profit picture that will also spill over to Q4. Adding it all up, profits will underwhelm into year-end. Mathieu: Doug, you do not share Anastasios’s anxiety. What offsets do you foresee? Moreover, you are not concerned by the U.S. corporate balance sheets. Can you share why? Doug Peta: As it relates to earnings, we foresee offsets from a revival in the rest of the world. Increasingly accommodative global monetary policy and reviving Chinese growth will give global ex-U.S. economies a boost. That inflection may go largely unnoticed in U.S. GDP, but it will help the S&P 500, as U.S.-based multinationals’ earnings benefit from increased overseas demand and a weaker dollar. When it comes to corporate balance sheets, shifting some of the funding burden to debt from equity when interest rates are at generational lows is a no-brainer. Even so, non-financial corporates have not added all that much leverage (Chart 16). Low interest rates, wide profit margins and conservative capex have left them with ample free cash flow to service their obligations (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG)Corporations Have Not Added Much Leverage ... Chart 17 (DOUG)...Though They Have Ample Cash Flow To Service It Every single viable corporate entity with an effective federal tax rate above 21% became a better credit when the top marginal rate was cut from 35% to 21%. Every such corporation now has more net income with which to service debt, and will have that income unless the tax code is revised. You can’t see it in EBITDA multiples, but it will show up in reduced defaults. Mathieu: The last, and most important question. What are each of your main investment recommendations to capitalize on the economic trends you anticipate over the coming 6-12 months? Let’s start with the pessimists: Arthur: First, the rally in global cyclicals and China plays since December has been premature and is at risk of unwinding as global growth and cyclical profits disappoint. Historical evidence suggests that global share prices have not led but have actually been coincident with the global manufacturing PMI (Chart 18). The recent divergence is unprecedented. Chart 18 (ARTHUR)Global Stocks Historically Did Not Lead PMIs Second, EM risk assets and currencies remain vulnerable. EM and Chinese earnings per share are shrinking. The leading indicators signal that the rate of contraction will deepen, at least the end of this year (Chart 19). Asset allocators should continue underweighting EM versus DM equities. Finally, my strongest-conviction, market-neutral trade is to short EM or Chinese banks and go long U.S. banks. The latter are much healthier than EM/Chinese ones, as we discussed in our recent report.6 Anastasios: The U.S. Equity Strategy team is shifting away from a cyclical and toward a more defensive portfolio bent. Our highest conviction view is to overweight mega caps versus small caps. Small caps are saddled with debt and are suffering a margin squeeze. Moreover, approximately 600 constituents of the Russell 2000 have no forward profits. Only one S&P 500 company has negative forward EPS. Given that both the S&P and the Russell omit these figures from the forward P/E calculation, this is masking the small cap expensiveness. When adjusted for this discrepancy, small caps are trading at a hefty premium versus large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR)China And EM Profits Are Contracting Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS)Continue To Avoid Small Caps We have also upgraded the S&P managed health care and the S&P hypermarkets groups. If the economic slowdown persists into early 2020, both of these defensive subgroups will fare well. In mid-April, we lifted the S&P managed health care group to an above benchmark allocation and posited that the selloff in this group was overdone as the odds of “Medicare For All” becoming law were slim. Moreover, a tight labor market along with melting medical cost inflation would boost the industry’s margins and profits (Chart 21). This week, we upgraded the defensive S&P hypermarkets index to overweight arguing that the souring macro landscape coupled with a firming industry demand outlook will support relative share prices (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS)Buy Hypermarkets Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS)Stick With Managed Health Care   Dhaval: To be fair, I am not a pessimist. Provided the global bond yield stays well below 2.5 percent, the support to risk-asset valuations will prevent a major dislocation. But in a growth down-oscillation, the big game in town will be sector rotation into pro-defensive investment plays, especially into those defensives that have underperformed (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL)Switch Out Of Growth-Sensitives Into Healthcare On this basis: Overweight Healthcare versus Industrials. Overweight the Eurostoxx 50 versus the Shanghai Composite and the Nikkei 225. Overweight U.S. T-bonds versus German bunds. Overweight the JPY in a portfolio of G10 currencies. Mathieu: And now, the optimists: Doug: So What? is the overriding question that guides all of BCA’s research: What is the practical investment application of this macro observation? But Why Now? is a critical corollary for anyone allocating investment capital: Why is the imbalance you’ve observed about to become a problem? As Herbert Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Imbalances matter, but Dornbusch’s Law counsels patience in repositioning portfolios on their account: “Crises take longer to arrive than you can possibly imagine, but when they do come, they happen faster than you can possibly imagine.” Look at Chart 24, which shows a vast white sky (bull markets) with intermittent clusters of gray (recessions) and light red (bear markets) clouds. Market inflections are severe, but uncommon. When the default condition of an economy is to grow, and equity prices to rise, it is not enough for an investor to identify an imbalance, s/he also has to identify why it’s on the cusp of reversing. Right now, as it relates to the U.S., there aren’t meaningful imbalances in either markets or the real economy. Chart 24 (DOUG)Recessions And Bear Markets Travel Together Even if we had perfect knowledge that a recession would arrive in 18 months, now would be way too early to sell. The S&P 500 has historically peaked an average of six months before the onset of a recession, and it has delivered juicy returns in the year preceding that peak (Table 1). Bull markets tend to sprint to the finish line (Chart 25). If this one is like its predecessors, an investor risks significant relative underperformance if s/he fails to participate in its go-go latter stages. Table 1 (DOUG)The S&P 500 Doesn’t Peak Until Six Months Before A Recession … We are bullish on the outlook for the next six to twelve months, and recommend overweighting equities and spread product in balanced U.S. portfolios while significantly underweighting Treasuries. Peter: I agree with Doug. Equity bear markets seldom occur outside of recessions and recessions rarely occur when monetary policy is accommodative. Policy is currently easy, and will get even more stimulative if the Fed and several other central banks cut rates. Global equities are not super cheap, but they are not particularly expensive either. They currently trade at about 15-times forward earnings. Given the ultra-low level of global bond yields, this generates an equity risk premium (ERP) that is well above its historical average (Chart 26). One should favor stocks over bonds when the ERP is high. Chart 26A (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (I) Chart 26B (PETER)Equity Risk Premia Remain Elevated (II) The ERP is especially elevated outside the United States. This is partly because non-U.S. stocks trade at a meager 13-times forward earnings, but it also reflects the fact that bond yields are lower overseas. Chart 27 (PETER)EM And Euro Area Equities Outperform When Global Growth Improves As global growth accelerates, the dollar will weaken. Equity sectors and regions with a more cyclical bent will benefit (Chart 27). We expect to upgrade EM and European stocks later this summer. A softer dollar will also benefit gold. Bullion will get a further boost early next decade when inflation begins to accelerate. We went long gold on April 17, 2019 and continue to believe in this trade. Rob: For fixed income investors, the most obvious way to play a combination of monetary easing and recovering global growth is to overweight corporate debt versus government bonds (Chart 28). Within the U.S., corporate bond valuations look more attractive in high-yield over investment grade. Assuming a benign outlook for default risk in a reaccelerating U.S. economy, with the Fed easing, going for the carry in high-yield looks interesting. Emerging market credit should also do well if we see a bit of U.S. dollar weakness and additional stimulus measures in China. Chart 28 (ROB)Best Bond Bets: Overweight Global Corporates & Inflation-Linked Bonds European corporates, however, may end up being the big winner if the ECB chooses to restart its Asset Purchase Program and ramps up its buying of European company debt. There are fewer restrictions for the ECB to buy corporates compared to the self-imposed limits on government bond purchases. The ECB would be entering a political minefield if it chose to buy more Italian debt and less German debt, but nobody would mind if the ECB helped finance European companies by buying their bonds. If one expects reflation to be successful, a below-benchmark stance on portfolio duration also makes sense given the current depressed level of government bond yields worldwide. Yields are more likely to grind upward than spike higher, and will be led first by increasing inflation expectations. Inflation-linked bonds should feature prominently in fixed income portfolios, especially in the U.S. where TIPS will outperform nominal yielding Treasuries. Mathieu: Thank you very much to all of you. Below is a comparative summary of the main arguments and investment recommendations of each camp.   Summary Of Views And Recommendations   Anastasios Avgeriou U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 To be fair to each individual involved, this is simplifying their views. Even within each camp, the negativity or positivity ranges on a spectrum, as you will be able to tell from the debate itself. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” dated June 10, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 5 France is a good proxy for the euro area. 6 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Informe especial

BCA se enorgullece de su independencia. Los estrategas publican lo que realmente creen, informados por su marco y su análisis. Ocasionalmente, esta independencia resulta en opiniones fuertemente divergentes y actualmente estamos en uno de esos momentos. Dentro de BCA han surgido dos posturas sobre las perspectivas cíclicas (seis a 12 meses) para los activos. Un grupo espera que el crecimiento global se recupere en la segunda mitad del año. Junto con un crecimiento acelerado, anticipan que los precios de las acciones y los activos de riesgo se mantendrán firmes, que las acciones cíclicas superarán a las defensivas, que los rendimientos de los activos refugio subirán y que el dólar se debilitará. Mientras tanto, otro grupo prevé una mayor deterioro de la actividad o una recuperación retrasada, nuevas caídas en las acciones y los activos de riesgo, el mejor desempeño de las defensivas frente a las cíclicas, rendimientos refugio bajos y, en general, un dólar más fuerte. En aras de la transparencia, hemos pedido a representantes de cada grupo que expongan su postura en una mesa redonda, permitiendo a nuestros clientes decidir por sí mismos qué visión les resulta más atractiva. Global Investment Strategy’s Peter Berezin, U.S. Investment Strategy’s Doug Peta, y Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Rob Robis toman la voz por el bando alcista. U.S. Equity Strategy’s Anastasios Avgeriou, Emerging Market Strategy’s Arthur Budaghyan, y European Investment Strategy’s Dhaval Joshi representan al grupo bajista.1 La discusión de la mesa redonda a continuación se centra en las perspectivas cíclicas. Para horizontes de inversión más largos, la mayoría de los estrategas coinciden en que una recesión es muy probable para 2022. Además, a largo plazo, las valoraciones tanto de los activos de riesgo como de los bonos refugio son muy exigentes. En este contexto, una subida significativa de los rendimientos podría castigar a los activos de riesgo. La Mesa Redonda de BCA Mathieu Savary: Las inversiones de la curva de rendimientos a menudo han sido presagios de recesiones. Anastasios, estás entre esos inversores preocupados por esta inversión. ¿No te inquieta que este episodio pueda ser similar a 1998, cuando la curva solo se invirtió temporalmente y no anticipó una recesión? Además, ¿cómo explicas los plazos tan variables entre la inversión de la curva y la ocurrencia de una recesión? Anastasios Avgeriou: La curva de rendimiento se invierte en o cerca del pico del ciclo económico y eventualmente advierte sobre recesiones próximas. El pasado diciembre, partes de la curva se invirtieron y ahora, el servicio de U.S. Equity Strategy de BCA está atendiendo la señal de este indicador simple, especialmente dado que el SPX posteriormente ha marcado máximos históricos como predijo nuestra investigación.2 Chart 1 (ANASTASIOS) El episodio de 1998 revisitado El episodio de 1998 revisitado El episodio de 1998 revisitado La inversión de la curva anticipa un recorte de tasas de la Fed, y nunca se ha equivocado en ese aspecto. Fue útil para los inversores que hicieron caso al mensaje en junio de 1998, ya que el mercado cayó un 20% en un abrir y cerrar de ojos poco después. Si los inversores salieron en el pico de 1998 cerca de 1200 y renunciaron a unos 350 puntos de ganancias hasta el pico del ciclo del SPX de marzo de 2000, aún se beneficiaron si aguantaron, ya que el mercado finalmente marcó un mínimo cerca de 777 en octubre de 2002 (Chart 1). En cuanto a la sincronización de las siete recesiones anteriores usando la curva de rendimiento, si aceptamos que la mitad de 1998 es el punto de inicio de la inversión, se tardaron 33 meses antes de que comenzara la recesión. El ciclo anterior, la recesión comenzó 24 meses después de la inversión. Consecuentemente, diciembre de 2020 es el inicio más temprano posible de la recesión y septiembre de 2021, el más tardío. Nuestra previsión pronostica que el BPA del SPX caiga un 20% en 2021 hasta $140 con el múltiplo cayendo entre 13.5x y 16.5x para un rango objetivo del SPX a fines de 2020 de 1,890-2,310.3 En otras palabras, no estamos dispuestos a jugar una subida de 100-200 puntos por una posible caída de 1,000 puntos. La relación riesgo/recompensa está sesgada a la baja, y optamos por no participar en esta ocasión. Mathieu: Rob, tú tienes una visión mucho más optimista sobre la inversión actual de la curva. ¿Por qué? Rob Robis: Aunque las cuatro palabras más peligrosas en inversión son “esta vez es diferente”, esta vez realmente parece diferente. Nunca antes han coexistido primas de plazo negativas en los rendimientos de los bonos del Tesoro a más largo plazo y una inversión de la curva (Chart 2). Por lo tanto, los rendimientos del Tesoro a más largo plazo han sido empujados a niveles extremadamente bajos por factores que van más allá de las expectativas de una tasa de fondos federales más baja. La prima de plazo negativa del Tesoro está distorsionando el mensaje económico de la inversión de la curva de EE. UU. Chart 2 (ROB) La prima de plazo negativa distorsiona el mensaje económico de una curva invertida Prima por plazo negativa que distorsiona el mensaje económico de una curva de rendimientos invertida Prima por plazo negativa que distorsiona el mensaje económico de una curva de rendimientos invertida Las primas de plazo están deprimidas en todas partes, como se ve en los rendimientos alemanes, japoneses y otros, reflejando la intensa demanda de activos seguros como los bonos gubernamentales durante un periodo de incertidumbre elevada. Los mercados de bonos globales también pueden estar descontando una mayor probabilidad de que el BCE reinicie su Programa de Compras de Activos, ya que las primas de plazo típicamente caen bruscamente cuando los bancos centrales inician el alivio cuantitativo. Esto tiene efectos de contagio globales. Antes de recesiones previas, las inversiones de la curva del Tesoro de EE. UU. ocurrieron cuando la Fed aplicaba una política monetaria inequívocamente restrictiva. Ese no es el caso hoy. La tasa de fondos federales real aún no está por encima de la estimación de la Fed de la tasa real neutral, también conocida como “r-star”, que fue el ingrediente necesario para todas las inversiones de la curva del Tesoro desde 1960 (Chart 3). Chart 3 (ROB) La política de la Fed no es lo bastante restrictiva para una inversión sostenida de la curva La política de la Fed no es lo suficientemente restrictiva para una inversión sostenida de la curva La política de la Fed no es lo suficientemente restrictiva para una inversión sostenida de la curva Mathieu: El nivel de acomodación de la política probablemente determinará si Anastasios o Rob tienen razón. Peter, has sostenido firmemente que la política, al menos en EE. UU., sigue siendo acomodaticia. ¿Puedes explicar por qué? Peter Berezin: Recuerden que la tasa neutral de interés es la tasa que iguala el nivel de demanda agregada con el potencial de oferta de la economía. La política fiscal laxa y la desaparición de los vientos en contra de desapalancamiento están impulsando la demanda en los Estados Unidos. También lo está el aumento de los salarios, especialmente en la base de la distribución de ingresos. Dado que EE. UU. actualmente no sufre desequilibrios importantes, creo que la economía puede tolerar tasas más altas sin efectos adversos significativos. En otras palabras, la política monetaria es actualmente bastante acomodaticia. Por supuesto, no podemos observar la tasa neutral directamente. Como un agujero negro, solo se puede detectar por el efecto que tiene en su entorno. La vivienda es, con diferencia, el sector más sensible a las tasas de interés de la economía. Si la historia sirve de guía, la reciente caída en las tasas hipotecarias impulsará la actividad del sector inmobiliario en lo que resta del año (Chart 4). Si esa relación se rompiera, como ocurrió durante la Gran Recesión, sugeriría que la tasa neutral es bastante baja. Chart 4 (PETER) La caída de las tasas hipotecarias augura bien para la vivienda La disminución de las tasas hipotecarias augura un buen panorama para la vivienda La disminución de las tasas hipotecarias augura un buen panorama para la vivienda Dado que los estándares de suscripción hipotecaria han sido bastante estrictos y la tasa de viviendas desocupadas es actualmente muy baja, suponemos que la vivienda se mantendrá bien. Deberíamos saberlo mejor en los próximos meses. Mathieu: Dhaval, no estás de acuerdo. ¿Por qué crees que las tasas globales no son acomodaticias? Dhaval Joshi: En realidad, creo que las tasas globales sí son acomodaticias, pero que el rendimiento global de los bonos puede subir solo 70 pb antes de que las condiciones se vuelvan peligrosamente no acomodaticias. Aquí es donde discrepo con Peter: para mí, el peligro no proviene de la economía, proviene de las matemáticas de los rendimientos de bonos ultra bajos. La panacea sin precedentes y experimental de nuestra era ha sido la ‘QE universal’, que ha llevado a rendimientos de bonos ultra bajos en todas partes. Pero lo que no se entiende es que cuando los rendimientos de los bonos alcanzan y permanecen cerca de su límite inferior, ocurren cosas extrañas en los mercados financieros. Gráfico 5 Remito a otros informes para los detalles, pero en pocas palabras, la proximidad del límite inferior a los rendimientos aumenta el riesgo de poseer bonos supuestamente “seguros” hasta el riesgo de poseer los llamados “activos de riesgo”. El resultado es que la valoración de los activos de riesgo aumenta exponencialmente (Chart 5). Porque cuando la asunción de riesgo de las clases de activos converge, los inversores valoran los activos de riesgo para que ofrezcan el mismo rendimiento nominal ultra bajo que los bonos.4 Las comparaciones con ciclos económicos previos pasan por alto el peligro actual. El alivio de política posterior a 2000 distorsionó la economía global al generar un auge crediticio, por lo que el peligro subsiguiente emanó de los sectores más sensibles al crédito en la economía, como el préstamo hipotecario. En contraste, la ‘QE universal’ posterior a 2008 ha distorsionado severamente la relación de valoración entre los bonos y los activos de riesgo globales; por tanto, aquí es donde reside el peligro actual. Rendimientos de bonos más altos pueden de repente socavar el soporte de valoración de los activos de riesgo globales, cuyo valor de $400 billones eclipsa a la economía global en una proporción de cinco a uno. ¿Dónde está este punto de inflexión? Es cuando el rendimiento global a 10 años —definido como el promedio de EE. UU., la zona euro,5 y China— se aproxima al 2.5%. Durante los últimos cinco años, la incapacidad de este rendimiento para mantenerse por encima del 2.5% confirma la hipersensibilidad de las condiciones financieras a este punto de inflexión (Chart 6). Ahora mismo, estoy de acuerdo en que los rendimientos de los bonos son acomodaticios. Pero el margen para que los rendimientos suban es bastante limitado. Chart 6 (DHAVAL) Desde 2015, el rendimiento global del bono a largo plazo ha tenido dificultades para superar 2.5 por ciento Desde 2015, el rendimiento de los bonos globales a largo plazo ha tenido dificultades para superar el 2,5 por ciento Desde 2015, el rendimiento de los bonos globales a largo plazo ha tenido dificultades para superar el 2,5 por ciento Mathieu: La política monetaria es importante para las perspectivas, pero también lo es el ciclo manufacturero global. La desaceleración del crecimiento global se ha concentrado en el sector manufacturero, especialmente en bienes transables. En las economías avanzadas, los sectores de servicios y consumo han sido sorprendentemente resistentes, pero esto no durará si el sector industrial se desacelera más. Arthur, sigues sin anticipar una mejora importante en el comercio global y la producción industrial. ¿Puedes explicar por qué? Chart 7 (ARTHUR) El comercio global ha caído debido a China, no a EE. UU. El comercio mundial cae por China, no por EE. UU. El comercio mundial cae por China, no por EE. UU. Arthur Budaghyan: Para evaluar correctamente las perspectivas económicas, es necesario entender qué ha causado la actual recesión del comercio/sector manufacturero global. Una cosa que sabemos con certeza: se originó en China, no en EE. UU. Chart 7 ilustra que las exportaciones de Corea, Japón, Taiwán y Singapur a China han estado disminuyendo a una tasa anual del 10%, mientras que sus envíos a EE. UU. han estado creciendo. Las importaciones agregadas de China también se han contraído. Esto implica que, desde la perspectiva del resto del mundo, China ha estado y permanece en recesión. La manufactura estadounidense es la menos expuesta a China, lo cual es la principal razón por la que ha sido la última en caer. Por tanto, EE. UU. se ha rezagado en esta desaceleración, y no se debe mirar a EE. UU. en busca de pistas sobre una posible recuperación global. Necesitamos evaluar qué hará que la demanda china se recupere. En este sentido, el impulso creciente del crédito y del gasto fiscal es positivo, pero hasta ahora no ha logrado poner en marcha una recuperación (Chart 8). La razón clave ha sido una propensión marginal decreciente a gastar entre hogares y empresas. Notablemente, la propensión marginal a gastar de las empresas del continente precede a los precios de los metales industriales por unos meses, y actualmente continúa apuntando hacia abajo (Chart 8, panel inferior). La falta de voluntad de consumidores y empresas chinas para gastar se debe a varios factores: (1) la confrontación EE. UU.-China; (2) altos niveles de endeudamiento tanto en empresas como en hogares (Chart 9); (3) la continua supervisión regulatoria sobre bancos y la banca en la sombra, así como la deuda de los gobiernos locales; y (4) la falta de subsidios gubernamentales directos para compras de autos y vivienda. Chart 8 (ARTHUR) Estímulo versus propensión marginal a gastar Estímulo frente a la propensión marginal al gasto Estímulo frente a la propensión marginal al gasto Chart 9 (ARTHUR) Los hogares chinos están más apalancados que los de EE. UU. Los hogares chinos están más apalancados que los estadounidenses Los hogares chinos están más apalancados que los estadounidenses   En conjunto, la caída de la propensión marginal a gastar casi garantizará que cualquier recuperación del gasto de hogares y empresas del continente se demore. Mathieu: Mientras tanto, Peter, tienes una postura mucho más optimista. ¿Por qué discrepas tan profundamente con la visión de Arthur? Peter: La campaña de desapalancamiento de China comenzó más de un año antes de que el sector manufacturero global alcanzara su pico. No tengo duda de que el menor crecimiento del crédito chino pesó sobre la inversión global en capital fijo, pero no debemos perder de vista que existen flujos y reflujos naturales en juego. La mayoría de los bienes manufacturados mantienen algo de valor durante un tiempo después de ser comprados. Si el gasto en, por ejemplo, bienes duraderos de consumo o equipo empresarial sube a un nivel alto durante un periodo prolongado, se formará una sobreoferta que requerirá un periodo de producción más baja. Chart 10 (PETER) El ciclo manufacturero global probablemente ha tocado fondo Es probable que el ciclo manufacturero global haya tocado fondo Es probable que el ciclo manufacturero global haya tocado fondo Estos ciclos de demanda típicamente duran alrededor de tres años; aproximadamente 18 meses en la subida y 18 meses en la bajada (Chart 10). La última fase bajista del ciclo manufacturero global comenzó a principios de 2018, así que si la historia sirve de guía, nos acercamos a un mínimo. El hecho de que la producción manufacturera de EE. UU. subiera en mayo y junio, seguido por el fuerte repunte esta semana en la encuesta manufacturera Philly Fed de julio, apoya esta visión. Por supuesto, fuerzas externas podrían complicar las cosas. Si las tensiones comerciales se intensifican, esto debilitaría mi tesis alcista. No obstante, con China estimulando su economía de nuevo, probablemente haría falta una guerra comercial severa para empujar a la economía global a la recesión. Mathieu: Dhaval, no eres tan negativo como Arthur, pero aun así esperas una desaceleración en la segunda mitad del año. ¿Cuál es tu argumento? Dhaval: Para ser claro, no pronostico una recesión o una caída importante —a menos que, como indiqué antes, el rendimiento global a 10 años se aproxime al 2.5% y desencadene una dislocación severa en los activos de riesgo globales. De hecho, mucha gente invierte la relación entre la recesión y la dislocación del mercado financiero: piensa que la recesión causa la dislocación financiera cuando, en la mayoría de los casos, ¡la dislocación financiera causa la recesión! No obstante, creo que el crecimiento europeo y global está entrando en una oscilación bajista regular basándome en la siguiente evidencia convincente: Desde un mínimo el verano pasado, las tasas de crecimiento del PIB trimestral en las economías desarrolladas ya han rebotado hasta el extremo superior de rangos plurianuales. Los impulsos de crédito a corto plazo en Europa, EE. UU. y China están entrando en oscilaciones bajistas (Chart 11). Los mejores indicadores de actividad actuales, específicamente los indicadores de sentimiento económico ZEW, han girado a la baja. El mejor desempeño de los industriales —el sector de renta variable más expuesto al crecimiento global— también ha girado a la baja. ¿Por qué esperar una oscilación a la baja? Porque es la velocidad de la caída en el rendimiento del bono la que impulsó la recuperación del crecimiento después de su mínimo el verano pasado. Además, es imposible que la velocidad de la caída del rendimiento del bono siga aumentando, o incluso mantenerse donde está. Contrario a lo que podría pensarse, si los rendimientos de los bonos disminuyen, pero a un ritmo reducido, el efecto es frenar el crecimiento económico. Mathieu: Una visión positiva y otra negativa del mundo resultan lógicamente en perspectivas bifurcadas para las tasas de interés y el dólar. Rob, ¿cómo ves la evolución de los rendimientos de EE. UU., Alemania y Japón en los próximos 12 meses? Rob: Si el crecimiento global se recupera, los rendimientos del Tesoro de EE. UU. tendrán mucho más recorrido al alza que los rendimientos de los Bunds o los JGBs. Las expectativas de inflación deberían recuperarse más rápido en EE. UU., con la Fed asumiendo riesgos inflacionarios recortando tasas con una tasa de desempleo del 3.7% y una inflación subyacente del IPC del 2.1%. Es probable que la Fed también decepcione al entregar menos recortes de tasas de los que actualmente descuentan los mercados (90 pb en los próximos 12 meses). Por tanto, los rendimientos del Tesoro pueden aumentar más que los rendimientos alemanes y japoneses, con el BCE y el BoJ más propensos a ofrecer los modestos recortes de tasas que ya están descontados en sus curvas (Chart 12). Chart 11 (DHAVAL) Los impulsos a corto plazo rebotaron... pero ahora están girando a la baja Los impulsos a corto plazo rebotaron... pero ahora están empezando a girar a la baja Los impulsos a corto plazo rebotaron... pero ahora están empezando a girar a la baja Chart 12 (ROB) Los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. rindarán peor que Bunds y JGBs Los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. se desempeñarán peor que los Bunds y los JGBs Los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. se desempeñarán peor que los Bunds y los JGBs Los rendimientos japoneses permanecerán estancados en o por debajo de cero durante los próximos 6-12 meses, ya que el crecimiento salarial y la inflación subyacente siguen siendo demasiado anémicos para que el BoJ altere su objetivo del 0% en los rendimientos a 10 años. Los rendimientos alemanes tienen un poco más de potencial de subida si el crecimiento europeo comienza a recuperarse, pero quedarán rezagados respecto a cualquier movimiento al alza en los rendimientos del Tesoro. Eso significa que los diferenciales Tesoro-Bund y Tesoro-JGB se moverán al alza durante el próximo año. Los rendimientos negativos alemanes y japoneses pueden parecer completamente poco atractivos comparados con +2% en los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU., pero esta desventaja desaparece cuando los tres rendimientos se expresan en términos de dólares estadounidenses. Cubrir un Bund alemán o un JGB a 10 años hacia dólares estadounidenses de mayor rendimiento crea rendimientos que son 50-60 pb más altos que un Tesoro de EE. UU. a 10 años. Es claramente evidente que los bonos alemanes y japoneses rendirán mejor que los Treasuries durante el próximo año si el crecimiento global se recupera. Mathieu: Peter, tu visión positiva sobre el crecimiento global implica que la Fed recortará menos de lo que actualmente está descontado en la curva OIS. ¿Por qué esperas entonces que el dólar se debilite en la segunda mitad de 2019? Peter: Lo que hace la Fed afecta a los diferenciales de tasas de interés, pero igual de importante es lo que hacen otros bancos centrales. El BCE no va a subir las tasas en los próximos 12 meses. Sin embargo, si el crecimiento de la zona euro sorprende al alza más adelante este año, los inversores empezarán a cuestionar la necesidad de que el BCE mantenga las tasas de política en territorio negativo hasta mediados de 2024. La expectativa del mercado sobre dónde estarán las tasas de política dentro de cinco años tiende a correlacionar bien con el tipo de cambio actual. Por esa medida, hay margen para que los diferenciales de tasas se estrechen frente al dólar estadounidense (Chart 13). Chart 13A (PETER) Las expectativas de tasas frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (I) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (I) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (I) Chart 13B (PETER) Las expectativas de tasas frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (II) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (II) Las expectativas sobre las tasas de interés frente a EE. UU. deberían estrecharse (II) Tengan en cuenta que el dólar estadounidense es una moneda contracíclica, lo que significa que se mueve en la dirección opuesta al crecimiento global (Chart 14). Esta contraciclicidad proviene del hecho de que la economía estadounidense está más orientada hacia los servicios que hacia la manufactura en comparación con el resto del mundo. Chart 14 (PETER) El dólar es una moneda contracíclica El Dólar Es Una Moneda Contracíclica El Dólar Es Una Moneda Contracíclica Como tal, cuando el crecimiento global se acelera, el capital tiende a fluir desde EE. UU. hacia el resto del mundo, traduciéndose en mayor demanda de moneda extranjera y menor demanda de dólares. Si el crecimiento global se recupera en lo que queda del año, como espero, el dólar se debilitará. Mathieu: Arthur, como eres significativamente más negativo sobre el crecimiento que Rob o Peter, ¿cómo ves la evolución del dólar y de los rendimientos globales en los próximos seis a 12 meses? Arthur: Soy positivo sobre el dólar ponderado por el comercio por las siguientes razones: El dólar estadounidense es una moneda contracíclica: muestra una correlación negativa con el ciclo económico global. La debilidad persistente en la economía global que emana de China/EM es positiva para el dólar porque la economía estadounidense es el principal bloque económico menos expuesto a una desaceleración China/EM. Mientras tanto, el billete verde solo está débilmente correlacionado con las tasas de interés de EE. UU. Por tanto, el argumento de que unas tasas estadounidenses más bajas harán que la divisa caiga mucho está sobreenfatizado. La Reserva Federal recortará las tasas por más de lo que actualmente está descontado en el mercado solo en un escenario de colapso completo del crecimiento global. Sin embargo, ese escenario sería alcista para el dólar. En ese caso, la fuerte relación inversa del dólar con el crecimiento global compensaría su débil relación positiva con las tasas de interés.   Contrario a la opinión dominante, el dólar no está muy caro. Según los costos laborales unitarios basados en el tipo de cambio real efectivo —la mejor medida de valoración de divisas— el billete verde está solo una desviación estándar por encima de su valor justo. A menudo, los mercados financieros tienden a sobrepasar 1.5 o 2 desviaciones estándar por debajo o por encima de su media histórica antes de revertir su tendencia. Uno de los vientos en contra a menudo citados para el dólar es la posicionamiento, pero existe una gran discrepancia entre el posicionamiento en monedas de mercados desarrollados y emergentes frente al dólar estadounidense. En agregado, los inversores —gestores de activos y fondos apalancados— tienen exposición neutral a las monedas DM, pero están muy largos en tipos de cambio líquidos de mercados emergentes como BRL, MXN, ZAR y RUB frente al billete verde. La fortaleza del dólar ocurrirá principalmente frente a las monedas de EM y las monedas vinculadas a materias primas. En otras palabras, el euro, otras monedas europeas y el yen superarán a las divisas de EM. Tengo menos convicción sobre los rendimientos de los bonos globales. Aunque el crecimiento global decepcionará, los rendimientos ya han caído mucho y la economía estadounidense actualmente no está lo bastante débil como para justificar alrededor de 90 puntos básicos de recortes de tasas en los próximos 12 meses. Mathieu: Antes de pasar a las recomendaciones de inversión, Anastasios, has realizado mucho trabajo interesante sobre las perspectivas de las ganancias estadounidenses. ¿Cuál es el mensaje de tu análisis? Chart 15 (ANASTASIOS) Atracción gravitatoria Atracción gravitatoria Atracción gravitatoria Anastasios: Aunque los mercados celebraron la tregua comercial tras la reciente reunión del G-20, no se acordó una retirada de aranceles. Desde que la tasa arancelaria sobre $200bn de importaciones chinas subió del 10% al 25% el 10 de mayo, las probabilidades son altas de que la manufactura permanezca en la penumbra. Esto probablemente seguirá pesando sobre las ganancias durante el resto del año. El crecimiento de las ganancias debería debilitarse aún más en los próximos seis meses. Los periodos de descenso de los PMI manufactureros resultan en sorpresas negativas de crecimiento de beneficios mayores, ya que los pronosticadores del mercado rara vez anticipan toda la amplitud y profundidad de las desaceleraciones. En ausencia de crecimiento de beneficios, los mercados de acciones carecen del ‘oxígeno’ necesario para un rally duradero y de alta calidad. Hasta que el momentum del crecimiento global cambie, los inversores deberían desaprovechar los repuntes. Nuestro modelo de crecimiento de BPA del SPX de cuatro factores coquetea con la zona de contracción. Además, nuestro proxy de poder de fijación de precios corporativos y el Indicador de Actividad Actual de Goldman Sachs envían una señal de alarma para las ganancias del SPX (Chart 15). Ya se estima que más de la mitad de los beneficios de los sectores GICS1 del S&P 500 se contrajeron en el Q2, y tres sectores podrían ver ingresos decrecientes en términos interanuales, según datos de I/B/E/S. El Q3 presenta un panorama igualmente sombrío para las ganancias que también se filtrará al Q4. Sumándolo todo, las ganancias decepcionarán hasta fin de año. Mathieu: Doug, no compartes la ansiedad de Anastasios. ¿Qué compensaciones prevés? Además, no te preocupan los balances corporativos estadounidenses. ¿Puedes explicar por qué? Doug Peta: En lo que respecta a las ganancias, prevemos compensaciones procedentes de una recuperación en el resto del mundo. Una política monetaria global cada vez más acomodaticia y la reactivación del crecimiento chino darán un impulso a las economías globales fuera de EE. UU. Ese punto de inflexión puede pasar en gran parte desapercibido en el PIB estadounidense, pero ayudará al S&P 500, ya que las ganancias de las multinacionales con sede en EE. UU. se benefician de una mayor demanda en el extranjero y de un dólar más débil. En lo que respecta a los balances corporativos, trasladar parte de la carga de financiación a deuda desde patrimonio cuando las tasas de interés están en mínimos generacionales es una elección obvia. Aun así, las corporaciones no financieras no han añadido tanto apalancamiento (Chart 16). Las bajas tasas de interés, los amplios márgenes de beneficio y el gasto de capital conservador les han dejado un flujo de caja libre amplio para atender sus obligaciones (Chart 17). Chart 16 (DOUG) Las empresas no han añadido mucho apalancamiento ... Las corporaciones no han aumentado mucho su apalancamiento... Las corporaciones no han aumentado mucho su apalancamiento... Chart 17 (DOUG) ...aunque tienen flujo de caja suficiente para atenderlo ...Aunque Tienen Amplio Flujo de Caja Para Atenderlo ...Aunque Tienen Amplio Flujo de Caja Para Atenderlo Toda entidad corporativa viable con una tasa impositiva federal efectiva por encima del 21% se volvió un mejor crédito cuando la tasa marginal superior se redujo del 35% al 21%. Cada una de esas corporaciones ahora tiene más ingreso neto con el que atender la deuda, y mantendrán ese ingreso a menos que se revise el código tributario. No se ve en los múltiplos EV/EBITDA, pero se manifestará en menores defaults. Mathieu: La última y más importante pregunta. ¿Cuáles son sus principales recomendaciones de inversión para capitalizar las tendencias económicas que anticipan en los próximos 6-12 meses? Empecemos con los pesimistas: Arthur: Primero, el repunte en los cíclicos globales y las apuestas por China desde diciembre ha sido prematuro y está en riesgo de revertirse conforme el crecimiento global y los beneficios cíclicos decepcionen. La evidencia histórica sugiere que los precios globales de las acciones no han liderado sino que han sido coincidentes con el PMI manufacturero global (Chart 18). La divergencia reciente es sin precedentes. Chart 18 (ARTHUR) Históricamente, las acciones globales no adelantaron a los PMIs Las acciones globales históricamente no precedieron a los PMIs Las acciones globales históricamente no precedieron a los PMIs Segundo, los activos y monedas de riesgo de EM siguen siendo vulnerables. Las ganancias por acción de EM y China están contrayéndose. Los indicadores adelantados señalan que la tasa de contracción se intensificará, al menos hasta fin de año (Chart 19). Los asignadores de activos deberían seguir con una infraponderación en EM frente a DM en renta variable. Finalmente, mi operación de mayor convicción y neutral al mercado es vender en corto bancos de EM o chinos y comprar bancos estadounidenses. Estos últimos están mucho más saludables que los bancos de EM/China, como discutimos en nuestro informe reciente.6 Anastasios: El equipo de U.S. Equity Strategy se está moviendo de una cartera cíclica hacia una orientación más defensiva. Nuestra visión de mayor convicción es sobreponderar las mega caps frente a las small caps. Las small caps están cargadas de deuda y sufren un estrechamiento de márgenes. Además, aproximadamente 600 componentes del Russell 2000 no tienen ganancias futuras. Solo una compañía del S&P 500 tiene BPA futuro negativo. Dado que tanto el S&P como el Russell omiten estas cifras en el cálculo del P/E futuro, esto está enmascarando la sobrevaloración de las small caps. Cuando se ajusta por esta discrepancia, las small caps cotizan a una prima considerable frente a las large caps (Chart 20). Chart 19 (ARTHUR) China y las ganancias de EM se están contrayendo Los beneficios en China y en los mercados emergentes se contraen Los beneficios en China y en los mercados emergentes se contraen Chart 20 (ANASTASIOS) Sigan evitando las small caps Continúe evitando las versalitas Continúe evitando las versalitas También hemos mejorado la calificación del grupo S&P managed health care y del grupo S&P hypermarkets. Si la desaceleración económica persiste hasta inicios de 2020, ambos subgrupos defensivos se desempeñarán bien. A mediados de abril, elevamos el grupo S&P managed health care a una asignación por encima del índice de referencia y propusimos que la venta masiva en este grupo fue exagerada dado que las probabilidades de que “Medicare For All” se convierta en ley eran escasas. Además, un mercado laboral ajustado junto con la caída de la inflación de costos médicos aumentaría los márgenes y las ganancias de la industria (Chart 21). Esta semana, mejoramos el índice defensivo S&P hypermarkets a sobreponderar argumentando que el empeoramiento del panorama macro junto con una perspectiva de demanda de la industria más firme apoyarán los precios relativos de las acciones (Chart 22). Chart 21 (ANASTASIOS) Comprar hypermarkets Comprar Hipermercados Comprar Hipermercados Chart 22 (ANASTASIOS) Mantener el sobreponderado en managed health care Sigue con la atención médica administrada Sigue con la atención médica administrada   Dhaval: Para ser justo, no soy un pesimista. Siempre que el rendimiento global de los bonos se mantenga muy por debajo del 2.5 por ciento, el soporte a las valoraciones de los activos de riesgo evitará una dislocación mayor. Pero en una oscilación bajista del crecimiento, el gran tema será la rotación sectorial hacia apuestas pro-defensivas, especialmente hacia aquellas defensivas que han tenido peor desempeño (Chart 23). Chart 23 (DHAVAL) Cambiar fuera de sensibles al crecimiento hacia salud Cambie de valores sensibles al crecimiento al sector sanitario. Cambie de valores sensibles al crecimiento al sector sanitario. Sobre esa base: Sobreponderar Salud frente a Industriales. Sobreponderar el Eurostoxx 50 frente al Shanghai Composite y al Nikkei 225. Sobreponderar los bonos del Tesoro de EE. UU. frente a los bunds alemanes. Sobreponderar el JPY en una cartera de monedas del G10. Mathieu: Y ahora, los optimistas: Doug: So What? es la pregunta fundamental que guía toda la investigación de BCA: ¿Cuál es la aplicación de inversión práctica de esta observación macro? Pero Why Now? es una corolaria crítica para quien asigna capital: ¿Por qué el desequilibrio que has observado está a punto de convertirse en un problema? Como dijo Herbert Stein, “Si algo no puede continuar para siempre, se detendrá.” Los desequilibrios importan, pero la Ley de Dornbusch aconseja paciencia al reposicionar carteras por ese motivo: “Las crisis tardan más en llegar de lo que puedes imaginar, pero cuando llegan, ocurren más rápido de lo que puedes imaginar.” Miren el Chart 24, que muestra un vasto cielo azul (mercados alcistas) con racimos intermitentes de gris (recesiones) y rojo claro (mercados bajistas). Las inflexiones del mercado son severas, pero poco comunes. Cuando la condición por defecto de una economía es crecer, y los precios de las acciones subir, no basta con que un inversor identifique un desequilibrio; también debe identificar por qué está a punto de revertirse. Ahora mismo, en lo que respecta a EE. UU., no hay desequilibrios significativos ni en los mercados ni en la economía real. Chart 24 (DOUG) Recesiones y mercados bajistas viajan juntos Las recesiones y los mercados bajistas van de la mano Las recesiones y los mercados bajistas van de la mano Incluso si tuviéramos conocimiento perfecto de que una recesión llegará en 18 meses, ahora sería demasiado pronto para vender. Históricamente, el S&P 500 ha alcanzado su pico un promedio de seis meses antes del inicio de una recesión, y ha ofrecido rendimientos jugosos en el año previo a ese pico (Table 1). Los mercados alcistas tienden a acelerar hacia la meta (Chart 25). Si este es como sus predecesores, un inversor corre el riesgo de una subperformance relativa significativa si no participa en sus etapas finales en auge. Table 1 (DOUG) El S&P 500 no alcanza su pico hasta seis meses antes de una recesión ... ¿Qué ocurre entre esos muros? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto ¿Qué ocurre entre esos muros? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto Gráfico 25 Somos alcistas sobre las perspectivas para los próximos seis a doce meses, y recomendamos sobreponderar acciones y productos de spread en carteras equilibradas de EE. UU. mientras se infraponderan significativamente los Treasuries. Peter: Estoy de acuerdo con Doug. Los mercados bajistas de acciones rara vez ocurren fuera de recesiones y las recesiones raramente ocurren cuando la política monetaria es acomodaticia. La política es actualmente acomodaticia, y se volverá aún más estimulativa si la Fed y varios otros bancos centrales recortan tasas. Las acciones globales no están súper baratas, pero tampoco particularmente caras. Actualmente cotizan en torno a 15 veces las ganancias futuras. Dado el nivel ultra bajo de los rendimientos de los bonos globales, esto genera una prima por riesgo de acciones (ERP) que está por encima de su promedio histórico (Chart 26). Se debe favorecer las acciones frente a los bonos cuando la ERP es alta. Chart 26A (PETER) Las primas por riesgo de acciones permanecen elevadas (I) Las primas de riesgo de renta variable permanecen elevadas (I) Las primas de riesgo de renta variable permanecen elevadas (I) Chart 26B (PETER) Las primas por riesgo de acciones permanecen elevadas (II) Las primas de riesgo de la renta variable siguen siendo elevadas (II) Las primas de riesgo de la renta variable siguen siendo elevadas (II) La ERP está especialmente elevada fuera de Estados Unidos. Esto se debe en parte a que las acciones no estadounidenses cotizan a unas módicas 13 veces las ganancias futuras, pero también refleja que los rendimientos de los bonos son más bajos en el extranjero. Chart 27 (PETER) Las acciones de EM y de la zona euro superan cuando el crecimiento global mejora Las acciones de los mercados emergentes y de la zona del euro rinden mejor cuando el crecimiento global mejora Las acciones de los mercados emergentes y de la zona del euro rinden mejor cuando el crecimiento global mejora A medida que el crecimiento global se acelere, el dólar se debilitará. Los sectores y regiones de renta variable con una inclinación más cíclica se beneficiarán (Chart 27). Esperamos mejorar la recomendación sobre acciones de EM y europeas más adelante este verano. Un dólar más suave también beneficiará al oro. El metal recibiría un impulso adicional a principios de la próxima década cuando la inflación comience a acelerarse. Entramos largos en oro el 17 de abril de 2019 y seguimos creyendo en esta apuesta. Rob: Para los inversores en renta fija, la forma más obvia de jugar una combinación de relajación monetaria y recuperación del crecimiento global es sobreponderar deuda corporativa frente a bonos gubernamentales (Chart 28). Dentro de EE. UU., las valoraciones de la deuda corporativa parecen más atractivas en high-yield que en investment grade. Suponiendo un panorama benigno para el riesgo de impago en una economía estadounidense que se acelera de nuevo, con la Fed aflojando, buscar el carry en high-yield resulta interesante. El crédito de mercados emergentes también debería comportarse bien si vemos cierta debilidad del dólar y medidas de estímulo adicionales en China. Chart 28 (ROB) Mejores apuestas en bonos: sobreponderar corporativos globales y bonos ligados a la inflación Mejores apuestas en bonos: sobreponderar bonos corporativos globales y bonos ligados a la inflación Mejores apuestas en bonos: sobreponderar bonos corporativos globales y bonos ligados a la inflación Sin embargo, las corporativas europeas podrían terminar siendo las grandes ganadoras si el BCE decide reiniciar su Programa de Compras de Activos y aumenta sus compras de deuda de empresas europeas. Hay menos restricciones para que el BCE compre deuda corporativa en comparación con los límites autoimpuestos sobre compras de deuda soberana. El BCE entraría en un campo de minas político si decidiera comprar más deuda italiana y menos deuda alemana, pero a nadie le importaría si el BCE ayudara a financiar a las empresas europeas comprando sus bonos. Si se espera que la reflación tenga éxito, una posición de duración por debajo del índice también tiene sentido dado el nivel deprimido actual de los rendimientos de los bonos gubernamentales en todo el mundo. Es más probable que los rendimientos suban de forma gradual que que se disparen, y estarán liderados primero por un incremento de las expectativas de inflación. Los bonos ligados a la inflación deberían figurar prominentemente en las carteras de renta fija, especialmente en EE. UU., donde los TIPS superarán a los Treasuries de rendimiento nominal. Mathieu: Muchas gracias a todos. A continuación hay un resumen comparativo de los principales argumentos y recomendaciones de inversión de cada bando.   Resumen de perspectivas y recomendaciones ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA al descubierto ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA a la luz pública ¿Qué ocurre entre esas paredes? Las posturas divergentes de BCA a la luz pública   Anastasios Avgeriou Estratega de Renta Variable de EE. UU. anastasios@bcaresearch.com Peter Berezin Estratega Global Jefe peterb@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Jefe de Estrategia de Mercados Emergentes arthurb@bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi Jefe de Estrategia de Inversión en Europa dhaval@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta Jefe de Estrategia de Inversión en EE. UU. dougp@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis Jefe de Estrategia de Renta Fija rrobis@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Notas al pie 1      Para ser justos con cada persona involucrada, esto simplifica sus puntos de vista. Incluso dentro de cada bando, la negatividad o positividad varía en un espectro, como podrán apreciar en el propio debate. 2      Véase BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Signal Vs. Noise,” fechado el 17 de diciembre de 2018, disponible en uses.bcaresearch.com. 3      Véase BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “A Recession Thought Experiment,” fechado el 10 de junio de 2019, disponible en uses.bcaresearch.com. 4      Véase el European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance,” 25 de octubre de 2018, disponible en eis.bcaresearch.com. 5      Francia es un buen proxy para la zona euro. 6      Véase Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” disponible en ems.bcaresearch.com.